Tan v. People of the Philippines G.R. No.

115507, May 19, 1998, 290 SCRA 117

Syllabus:

One of the essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an
actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court
of Appeals correctly pointed out, petitioners were not charged with the [unlawful] possession of firewood, bark, honey,
beeswax, and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO
No. 277 is absolutely of no concern to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a
judicial determination at this time. Besides, they did not present any convincing evidence of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution that would justify the nullification of said provision. A statute is always presumed to be
constitutional, and one who attacks it on the ground of unconstitutionality must convincingly prove its invalidity.

The question of whether lumber is excluded from the coverage of Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, has been
settled in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.

Facts:

In two instances, forest guards in the town of Cajidiocan, Sibuyan Island intercepted a dump truck which carried narra
and white lauan lumber, in one instance, and tanguile lumber in another. The truck was driven by employees of A & E
Construction. In both cases, the drivers failed to show documents showing legal possession of the lumber. As a
consequence thereof, the forest guards confiscated the pieces of lumber.

The Provincial Prosecutor charged Alejandro Tan, the owner of A & E Corporation and the trucks, and Fred Moreno, one
of the drivers, with violation of Section 68 of PD No. 705. In defense hereof, the accused averred that: (1) Executive
Order No. 277 (EO No. 277) was unconstitutional for being violative of substantive due process “because it requires the
possession of certain legal documents to justify mere possession of forest products which, under Section 3(q) of PD No.
705, includes, among others, firewood, bark, honey, beeswax, and even grass, shrub, flowering plant, the associated
water or fish and penalizes failure to present such required documents”; and (2) they are not liable because what the
law punishes is the cutting, gathering, collection and/or possession, without license, of timber not lumber. The trial court
convicted Tan and Moreno and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

ANNEX A: SUMMARY OF SUPREME COURT CASES188

Issues:

(1) Whether Section 68 of EO No. 277 was constitutional. (2) Whether lumber and timber should be given a distinction.

Ruling:

(1) In the first issue, the Supreme Court did not touch upon the constitutionality of the law. “One of the essential
requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law is the existence of an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination. As Respondent Court of Appeals
correctly pointed out, petitioners were not charged with the [unlawful] possession of firewood, bark, honey, beeswax,
and even grass, shrub, the associated water or fish; thus, the inclusion of any of these enumerated items in EO No. 277 is
absolutely of no concern to petitioners. They are not asserting a legal right for which they are entitled to a judicial
determination at this time.xxx” (2) No distinction should be given between lumber and timber. This issue had already
been decided in the case of Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.