Anarna, Ma. Jelly Joyce Y.

Criminal Law II Atty David Yap

Class Student No. 3 PD 330; PD 705, Sec. 58 DAY 6

MUSTANG LUMBER, INC. VS. CA G.R. No. 104988, June 18, 1996 257 SCRA 430

DAVIDE, JR., J:

FACTS:
On 1 April 1990, an information of a pile of narra flitches, shorts and slabs were seen inside the
lumberyard of Mustan Liumber Inc. The Special Actions and Investigation Division (SAID) of Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) conducted a surveillance in the place and saw a truck
with pile of lauan and almaciga lumber of assorted sizes and dimensions. The driver could not produce
the documents for it, the DENR confiscated the truck and its content. SAID tried to enter the premises
but the owner refused, and eventually they were able to provide a search warrant. They confiscated
remaining stockpile of almaciga, supa, and lauan lumber with a total volume of 311,000 board feet
because the petitioner failed to produce upon demand the corresponding certificate of lumber origin,
auxiliary invoices, tally sheets, and delivery receipts from the source of the invoices covering the lumber
to prove the legitimacy of their source and origin.
The trial court held that the warrantless search and seizure on 1 April 1990 of the petitioner’s
truck, did not offend the constitutional mandate that search and seizure must be supported by a valid
warrant. The situation fell under one of the settled and accepted exceptions where warrantless search
and seizure is justified, viz., a search of a moving vehicle. As to the seizure of a large volume of almaciga,
supa, and lauan lumber and shorts effected on 4 April 1990, the trial court ruled that the said seizure
was a continuation of that made the previous day and was still pursuant to or by virtue of the search
warrant issued by Executive Judge Osorio whose validity the petitioner did not even question.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the case at bar can fall under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705?

HELD:
Yes, the case at bar can fall under Section 68 of P.D. No. 705. The Revised Forestry Code
contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the former is included in forest products as
defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the
definition of “Processing plant,” which reads: (aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or
combination of machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into lumber,
veneer, plywood, wallboard, blockboard, paper board, pulp, paper or other finished wood products. This
simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses the
term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993 copyright edition of Webster’s Third New
International Dictionary, lumber is defined, inter alia, as “timber or logs after being prepared for the
market.” Simply put, lumber is a processed log or timber.
Supreme Court’s judgment is hereby rendered:
1. (a) GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 106424; (b) SETTING ASIDE and ANNULLING, for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion, the challenged orders of 16 August 1991 and 18 October
1991 of respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, Branch 172, Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 324-V-91, entitled “People of the Philippines vs. Ri Chuy Po”; (c)
REINSTATING the information in the said criminal case; and (d) DIRECTING the respondent Judge or her
successor to hear and decide the case with purposeful dispatch; and
2. DENYING the petitions in G.R. No. 104988 and in G.R. No. 123784 for utter failure of the
petitioner to show that the respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the
challenged decisions of 29 November 1991 in CA-G.R. SP No. 25510 in the FIRST CIVIL CASE and of 31
July 1995 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33778 in the SECOND CIVIL CASE.
Costs against the petitioner in each of these three cases. SO ORDERED.

1
Anarna, Ma. Jelly Joyce Y. Criminal Law II Atty David Yap
Class Student No. 3 PD 330; PD 705, Sec. 58 DAY 6