G.R. No.
111080             April 5, 2000
Orosa vs CA
Facts:
The complaint alleged that on September 28, 1983, petitioner purchased
the subject motor vehicle on installment from Fiesta Motor Sales
Corporation. He executed and delivered to Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. a
promissory note in the sum of P133,824.00 payable in monthly
installments. 2 To secure payment, petitioner executed a chattel mortgage
over the subject motor vehicle in favor of Fiesta Motor Sales Corp. On
September 28, 1983, Fiesta Motor Sales assigned the promissory note
and chattel mortgage to private respondent FCP Credit Corporation. The
complaint further alleged that petitioner failed to pay part of the installment
which fell due on July 28, 1984 as well as three (3) consecutive installment
which fell due on August 28, September 28, and October 28, 1984.
Consequently, private respondent FCP Credit Corporation demanded from
petitioner payment of the entire outstanding balance of the obligation
amounting to P106,154.48 with accrued interest and to surrender the
vehicle which petitioner was allegedly detaining.
The trial court ruled that private respondent FCP had no reason to file the
present action since petitioner already paid the installments for the months
of July to November 1984, which are the sole bases of the complaint. The
lower court declared that private respondent was not entitled to the writ of
replevin, and was liable to petitioner for actual damages under the replevin
bond it filed. 3
Private respondent was also ordered to return to petitioner the 1983 Ford
Laser 1.5 Sedan, or its equivalent, in kind or value in cash, as of date of
judgment and to pay the costs of the suit. 5
On June 7, 1988, a "Supplemental Decision" was rendered by the trial
court ordering private respondent's surety, Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc.
to jointly and severally [with private respondent] return to petitioner the
1983 Ford Laser 1.5 Sedan or its, equivalent in kind or in cash and to pay
the damages specified in the main decision to the extent of the value of the
replevin bond in the amount of P210,000.00. 6
Issue:
WON the issuance of the replevin is improper?
Held:
Furthermore, we agree with the appellate court that when private
respondent brought the complaint, it did so only to exercise a legal right,
believing that it had a meritorious cause of action clearly borne out by a
mere perusal of the promissory note and chattel mortgage. Thus, there
was no malicious prosecution against the Orosa.
G.R. No. 148132   January 28, 2008
Regina Astorga vs Smart Communications Inc.
Facts:
The termination of her employment prompted Astorga to file a
Complaint8 for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salaries and other benefits
with prayer for moral and exemplary damages against SMART and Ann
Margaret V. Santiago (Santiago). She claimed that abolishing CSMG and,
consequently, terminating her employment was illegal for it violated her
right to security of tenure. She also posited that it was illegal for an
employer, like SMART, to contract out services which will displace the
employees, especially if the contractor is an in-house agency. 9
SMART responded that there was valid termination. It argued that Astorga
was dismissed by reason of redundancy, which is an authorized cause for
termination of employment, and the dismissal was effected in accordance
with the requirements of the Labor Code. The redundancy of Astorga’s
position was the result of the abolition of CSMG and the creation of a
specialized and more technically equipped SNMI, which is a valid and
legitimate exercise of management prerogative.10
In the meantime, on May 18, 1998, SMART sent a letter to Astorga
demanding that she pay the current market value of the Honda Civic
Sedan which was given to her under the company’s car plan program, or
to surrender the same to the company for proper disposition. 11 Astorga,
however, failed and refused to do either, thus prompting SMART to file a
suit for replevin with the Regional Trial Court of Makati (RTC) on August
10, 1998. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-1936 and was
raffled to Branch 57.12
Astorga moved to dismiss the complaint on grounds of (i) lack of
jurisdiction; (ii) failure to state a cause of action; (iii) litis pendentia; and (iv)
forum-shopping. Astorga posited that the regular courts have no
jurisdiction over the complaint because the subject thereof pertains to a
benefit arising from an employment contract; hence, jurisdiction over the
same is vested in the labor tribunal and not in regular courts. 13
The RTC denied Astorga’s motion filed a MR but RTC denied likewise.
Thus, Astorga appealed to the CA via certiorari and CA reversed the
decision of the RTC stating that the RTC does not have jurisdiction over
the case because such issue is intertwined with the labor case pending
with the NLRC.
Issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
COMPLAINT FOR RECOVERY OF A CAR WHICH ASTORGA
ACQUIRED AS PART OF HER EMPLOYEE (sic) BENEFIT.
Held:
Replevin is an action whereby the owner or person entitled to
repossession of goods or chattels may recover those goods or chattels
from one who has wrongfully distrained or taken, or who wrongfully detains
such goods or chattels. It is designed to permit one having right to
possession to recover property in specie from one who has wrongfully
taken or detained the property. 30 The term may refer either to the action
itself, for the recovery of personalty, or to the provisional remedy
traditionally associated with it, by which possession of the property may be
obtained by the plaintiff and retained during the pendency of the action. 31
That the action commenced by SMART against Astorga in the RTC of
Makati City was one for replevin hardly admits of doubt.
We do not agree. Contrary to the CA’s ratiocination, the RTC rightfully
assumed jurisdiction over the suit and acted well within its discretion in
denying Astorga’s motion to dismiss. SMART’s demand for payment of the
market value of the car or, in the alternative, the surrender of the car, is not
a labor, but a civil, dispute. It involves the relationship of debtor and
creditor rather than employee-employer relations. 33 As such, the dispute
falls within the jurisdiction of the regular courts.
In Basaya, Jr. v. Militante,34 this Court, in upholding the jurisdiction of the
RTC over the replevin suit, explained:
Replevin is a possessory action, the gist of which is the right of possession
in the plaintiff. The primary relief sought therein is the return of the property
in specie wrongfully detained by another person. It is an ordinary statutory
proceeding to adjudicate rights to the title or possession of personal
property. The question of whether or not a party has the right of
possession over the property involved and if so, whether or not the
adverse party has wrongfully taken and detained said property as to
require its return to plaintiff, is outside the pale of competence of a labor
tribunal and beyond the field of specialization of Labor Arbiters.
xxxx
The labor dispute involved is not intertwined with the issue in the Replevin
Case. The respective issues raised in each forum can be resolved
independently on the other. In fact in 18 November 1986, the NLRC in the
case before it had issued an Injunctive Writ enjoining the petitioners from
blocking the free ingress and egress to the Vessel and ordering the
petitioners to disembark and vacate. That aspect of the controversy is
properly settled under the Labor Code. So also with petitioners’ right to
picket. But the determination of the question of who has the better right to
take possession of the Vessel and whether petitioners can deprive the
Charterer, as the legal possessor of the Vessel, of that right to possess in
addressed to the competence of Civil Courts.
In thus ruling, this Court is not sanctioning split jurisdiction but defining
avenues of jurisdiction as laid down by pertinent laws.
A.M. NO. P-07-2384 : June 18, 2008
KENNETH HAO, Complainant, v. ABE C. ANDRES, Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City, Respondent.
Facts:
Complainant Hao is one of the defendants in a civil case for replevin
docketed as Civil Case No. 31, 127-20052 entitled "Zenaida Silver, doing
trade and business under the name and style ZHS Commercial v. Loreto
Hao, Atty. Amado Cantos, Kenneth Hao and John Does," pending before
the RTC of Davao City, Branch 16.
On the strength of the order by Judge Fuentes on the Seizure order,
Andres the sheriff was able to seize a total of nine motor vehicles.

In his Affidavit-Complaint6 against Andres before the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), Hao alleged that Andres gave undue advantage to
Zenaida Silver in the implementation of the order and that Andres seized
the nine motor vehicles in an oppressive manner. Hao also averred that
Andres was accompanied by unidentified armed personnel on board a
military vehicle which was excessive since there were no resistance from
them. Hao also discovered that the compound where the seized motor
vehicles were placed is actually owned by Silver.
However, on October 24, 2005, eight of the nine seized motor vehicles
were reported missing. Andres stated that he was shocked to find that the
motor vehicles were already missing when he inspected it on October 22,
2005. He narrated that on October 21, 2005, PO3 Rodrigo Despe, one of
the policemen guarding the subject motor vehicles, reported to him that a
certain "Nonoy" entered the compound and caused the duplication of the
vehicles' keys.11 But Andres claimed the motor vehicles were still intact
when he inspected it on October 21, 2005.
Andres denied implementing the Order of Seizure in an oppressive
manner. He said he took the vehicles because they were the specific
vehicles ordered to be seized after checking their engine and chassis
numbers. Andres also maintained that no form of harassment or
oppression was committed during the implementation of the order,
claiming that the presence of the policemen was only for the purpose of
preserving peace and order, considering there were 22 motor vehicles
specified in the Order of Seizure. Andres added that he exercised no
discretion in the selection of the policemen who assisted in the
implementation of the order, much less of those who will guard the seized
motor vehicles. Andres likewise contended that after the unauthorized
duplication of the vehicles' keys was reported to him, he immediately
advised the policemen on duty to watch the motor vehicles closely.14 He
negated the speculations that he was involved in the disappearance of the
seized motor vehicles as he claims to be the one who reported the incident
to the court and the police.
As to the allegation of undisclosed depository receipts, Andres maintained
that he never denied the existence of the depository receipts. He said the
existence of the depository receipts was immediately made known on the
same day that the subject motor vehicles were discovered missing. He
even used the same in the filing of the carnapping case against Silver and
her co-conspirators.
Finally, Andres insisted that the guarding of properties under custodia legis
by policemen is not prohibited, but is even adopted by the court. Hence, he
prays that he be held not liable for the loss of the vehicles and that he be
relieved of his duty to return the vehicles.15
Issue:
WON Andres is guilty of gross negligence of duty?
Held:
Being an officer of the court, Andres must be aware that there are well-
defined steps provided in the Rules of Court regarding the proper
implementation of a writ of replevin and/or an order of seizure.
First, the rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to
be delivered immediately to the plaintiff.22 In accordance with the said
rules, Andres should have waited no less than five days in order to give
the complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond or of
the surety or sureties thereon, or require the return of the seized motor
vehicles by filing a counter-bond. This, he failed to do.
Records show that Andres took possession of two of the subject motor
vehicles on October 17, 2005, four on October 18, 2005, and another three
on October 19, 2005. Simultaneously, as evidenced by the depository
receipts, on October 18, 2005, Silver received from Andres six of the
seized motor vehicles, and three more motor vehicles on October 19,
2005. Consequently, there is no question that Silver was already in
possession of the nine seized vehicles immediately after seizure, or no
more than three days after the taking of the vehicles. Thus, Andres
committed a clear violation of Section 6, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court with
regard to the proper disposal of the property.
It matters not that Silver was in possession of the seized vehicles merely
for safekeeping as stated in the depository receipts. The rule is clear that
the property seized should not be immediately delivered to the plaintiff,
and the sheriff must retain custody of the seized property for at least five
days.23 Hence, the act of Andres in delivering the seized vehicles
immediately after seizure to Silver for whatever purpose, without observing
the five-day requirement finds no legal justification.
Navarro vs Escobido
G.R. No. 153788
Facts:
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints,
docketed as Civil Case Nos. 98-599 (first complaint)6 and 98-598 (second
complaint),7 before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with
damages against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the
RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in
Navarro's possession.
As evidence by a lease agreement with option to purchase Roger Navarro
issued checks in payment of the rental fees but the fifth and sixth checks
were dishonored thus this case. The plaintiff Karen Go prays for the
immediate delivery of the two mounted cranes upon posting of the bond
double the value of the said vehicles.
Navarro’s defense is that the complaint did not state any cause of action
because since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with
Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements) - the actionable
documents on which the complaints were based and that demand should
be first be done by the party before they can avail of the provisional
remedy of replevin.
RTC dismissed the case and on MR RTC considered considering that
Glenn Go, in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court (Rules).12 Thus, the lower court ordered Karen Go to file a motion
for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. Thus with MR of Navarrao
RTC denied such then it went to CA. the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC and thus this action is brought to the SC for resolution.
Issue:
WON demand is necessary for a writ of replevin be issued?
Held:
In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of
replevin is filed, Navarro apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful
detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an
affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which
states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person
who personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging
the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment
or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it
is exempt from such seizure or custody; andcralawlibrary
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in
double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned,
for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be
adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he
may recover from the applicant in the action.
We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a
prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action
for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an
action for a writ of replevin The remedies provided for in Art. 1484 are alternative, not cumulative. The
exercise of one bars the exercise of the others. This limitation applies to
G.R. No. 182963               June 3, 2013 contracts purporting to be leases of personal property with option to buy by
SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs BPI Family Savings virtue of Art. 1485. The condition that the lessor has deprived the lessee of
Bank possession or enjoyment of the thing for the purpose of applying Art. 1485
was fulfilled in this case by the filing by petitioner of the complaint for
Facts: replevin to recover possession of movable property.
Deo Agner and Maricon Agner executed a Promissory Note with Chattel
Mortgage in favor of Citimotors, Inc. The contract provides, among others, Compared with Elisco, the vehicle subject matter of this case was never
that: for receiving the amount of Php834, 768.00, petitioners shall pay Php recovered and delivered to respondent despite the issuance of a writ of
17,391.00 every 15th day of each succeeding month until fully paid; the replevin. As there was no seizure that transpired, it cannot be said that
loan is secured by a 2001 Mitsubishi Adventure Super Sport; and an petitioners were deprived of the use and enjoyment of the mortgaged
interest of 6% per month shall be imposed for failure to pay each vehicle or that respondent pursued, commenced or concluded its actual
installment on or before the stated due date. foreclosure. The trial court, therefore, rightfully granted the alternative
prayer for sum of money, which is equivalent to the remedy of "exacting
For failure to pay four successive installments from May 15, 2002 to fulfillment of the obligation." Certainly, there is no double recovery or
August 15, 2002, respondent, through counsel, sent to petitioners a unjust enrichment30 to speak of.1âw
demand letter dated August 29, 2002, declaring the entire obligation as
due and demandable and requiring to pay Php576,664.04, or surrender
the mortgaged vehicle immediately upon receiving the letter. 6 As the
demand was left unheeded, respondent filed on October 4, 2002 an action
for Replevin and Damages before the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC).
A writ of replevin was issued. 7 Despite this, the subject vehicle was not
seized.8 Trial on the merits ensued. On August 11, 2005, the Manila RTC
Br. 33 ruled for the respondent and ordered petitioners to jointly and
severally pay the amount of Php576,664.04 plus interest at the rate of 72%
per annum from August 20, 2002 until fully paid, and the costs of suit.
Appealed to CA but CA affirmed the decision of the trial court and thus this
petition to the SC.

Issue:

Respondent’s remedy of resorting to both actions of replevin and collection

of sum of money is contrary to the provision of Article 1484 9 of the Civil
Code and the Elisco Tool Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of
Appeals10 ruling.

Held: