INTERPLEADER I Page 1 of 6

G.R. No. L-23851 March 26, 1976
WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC vs WON
Facts:
Wack Wack Golf and Country Club filed a complaint for interpleader against Won and Tan
who both claim ownership over membership fee certificate 201. Won claims its ownership
stemming from a decision rendered in Civil Case 26044 entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon
Lee vs. Wack Wack Golf & Country Club, Inc." Meanwhile, Tan claims ownership from the
assignment made by the alleged true owner of the same certificate. The trial court dismissed
the complaint on the ground of res judicata by reason of the previous civil case that issued
Won the right to the certificate. Hence, the appeal.
In fine, the instant interpleader suit cannot prosper because the Corporation had already
been made independently liable in civil case 26044 and, therefore, its present application for
interpleader would in effect be a collateral attack upon the final judgment in the said civil
case; the appellee Lee had already established his rights to membership fee certificate 201 in
the aforesaid civil case and, therefore, this interpleader suit would compel him to establish his
rights anew, and thereby increase instead of diminish litigations, which is one of the purposes
of an interpleader suit, with the possibility that the benefits of the final judgment in the said
civil case might eventually be taken away from him; and because the Corporation allowed
itself to be sued to final judgment in the said case, its action of interpleader was filed
inexcusably late, for which reason it is barred by laches or unreasonable delay.

Issue: Was the remedy of interpleader proper and timely?

Held: There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the
membership fee certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. However, the Corporation
may not properly invoke the remedy of interpleader.

It is the general rule that before a person will be deemed to be in a position to ask for an
order of intrepleader, he must be prepared to show, among other prerequisites, that he has
not become independently liable to any of the claimants. Indeed, if a stakeholder defends a
suit filed by one of the adverse claimants and allows said suit to proceed to final judgment
against him, he cannot later on have that part of the litigation repeated in an interpleader suit. 

In the case at hand, the Corporation allowed civil case 26044 to proceed to final judgment. It
was aware of the conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee
certificate 201 long before it filed the present interpleader suit. Yet it did not interplead Tan. It
preferred to proceed with the litigation and to defend itself therein. As a matter of fact, final
judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been executed. It is
therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader

To now permit the Corporation to bring Won to court after the latter's successful
establishment of his rights in civil case 26044 to the membership fee certificate 201, is to
increase instead of to diminish the number of suits, which is one of the purposes of an action
of interpleader, with the possibility that the latter would lose the benefits of the favorable
judgment. This cannot be done because having elected to take its chances of success in said
civil case 26044, with full knowledge of all the fact, the Corporation must submit to the
consequences of defeat. 

Besides, a successful litigant cannot later be impleaded by his defeated adversary in an

interpleader suit and compelled to prove his claim anew against other adverse claimants, as
that would in effect be a collateral attack upon the judgment.
INTERPLEADER I Page 2 of 6
G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION vs FIRST SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NORTH PHILIPPINE UNION
MISSION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS
Facts:
Eternal Gardens Memorial Parks Corporation and North Philippine Union Mission Corporation
of the Seventh Day Adventists executed a Land Development Agreement whereby the former
undertook to introduce and construct at its own expense and responsibility necessary
improvements on the property owned by private respondent into a memorial park to be
subdivided into and sold as memorial plot lots, at a stipulated area and price per lot. Out of
the proceeds from the sale, private respondent is entitled to receive 40% of the net gross
collection from the project to be remitted monthly by petitioner to private respondent through
a designated depositary trustee bank. On the same date private respondent executed in
petitioner's favor a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage (Rollo, pp. 183-186) on the lots with
titles involved in the land development project.
the property or funds in controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity:
"that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the
pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.
Petitioner would now compound the issue by its obvious turn-about, presently claiming in its
memorandum that there is a novation of contract so that the amounts due under the Land
Development Agreement were allegedly extinguished, and the requirement to make a deposit
of said amounts in a depositary bank should be held in abeyance until after the conflicting
claims of ownership now on trial before Branch CXXII RTC-Caloocan City, has finally been
resolved.
All these notwithstanding, the need for the deposit in question has been established, riot only
in the lower courts and in the Court of Appeals but also in the Supreme Court where such
deposit was required in "the resolution of July 8, 1987 to avoid wastage of funds.

All went well until Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the parcel of land in
question. Confronted with such conflicting claims, petitioner as plaintiff filed a complaint for
interpleader. Private respondent presented a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the
amounts due and unpaid from petitioner but the RTC denied such deposit. It was appealed to
the CA but it was affirmed thus this petition to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in reconsidering its resolution of February 27, 1985 and in requiring instead in the
resolution of September 5, 1985, that petitioner Eternal Gardens deposit whatever amounts
are due from it under the Land Development Agreement with a reputable bank to be
designated by the respondent court?

Held: In the case at bar, a careful analysis of the records will show that petitioner admitted
among others in its complaint in Interpleader that it is still obligated to pay certain amounts to
private respondent; that it claims no interest in such amounts due and is willing to pay
whoever is declared entitled to said amounts.

Under the circumstances, there appears to be no plausible reason for petitioner's objections
to the deposit of the amounts in litigation after having asked for the assistance of the lower
court by filing a complaint for interpleader where the deposit of aforesaid amounts is not only
required by the nature of the action but is a contractual obligation of the petitioner under the
Land Development Program (Rollo, p. 252).

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside from the
disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit of
INTERPLEADER I Page 3 of 6
[G.R. NO. 136409 : March 14, 2008]
SUBHASH C. PASRICHA and JOSEPHINE A. PASRICHA v. DON LUIS DISON REALTY,
INC.
Respondent Don Luis Dison Realty, Inc. and petitioners executed two Contracts of
Lease3 whereby the former, as lessor, agreed to lease to the latter Units 22, 24, 32, 33, 34,
35, 36, 37 and 38 of the San Luis Building, located at 1006 M.Y. Orosa cor. T.M. Kalaw
Streets, Ermita, Manila. Petitioners, in turn, agreed to pay monthly rentals, as follows: x x x
The lease of Rooms 36, 37 and 38 did not materialize leaving only Rooms 22, 24, 32, 33, 34
and 35 as subjects of the lease contracts. x x x  Petitioners religiously paid the monthly
rentals until May 1992.11 After that, however, despite repeated demands, petitioners
continuously refused to pay the stipulated rent. Consequently, respondent was constrained to
refer the matter to its lawyer who, in turn, made a final demand on petitioners for the payment
of the accrued rentals amounting to P916,585.58.12 Because petitioners still refused to
comply, a complaint for ejectment was filed x x x
Petitioners admitted their failure to pay the stipulated rent for the leased premises starting
July until November 1992, but claimed that such refusal was justified because of the internal
squabble in respondent company as to the person authorized to receive payment. 14 To further
justify their non-payment of rent, petitioners alleged that they were prevented from using the
units (rooms) subject matter of the lease contract, except Room 35.
X X X MeTC x x x considered petitioners' non-payment of rentals as unjustified. The court
held that mere willingness to pay the rent did not amount to payment of the obligation;
petitioners should have deposited their payment in the name of respondent company.
X X X the Regional Trial Court (RTC) x x x adopted the MeTC's finding on petitioners'
unjustified refusal to pay the rent, which is a valid ground for ejectment.
ISSUE: What should have been the best remedy for Petitioners when they had a difficulty
ascertaining to whom payment must be made?
RULING: They should have availed of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines on
the consignation of payment and of the Rules of Court on interpleader. X X X
In the instant case, consignation alone would have produced the effect of payment of the
rentals. The rationale for consignation is to avoid the performance of an obligation becoming
more onerous to the debtor by reason of causes not imputable to him. 58 Petitioners claim that
they made a written tender of payment and actually prepared vouchers for their monthly
rentals. But that was insufficient to constitute a valid tender of payment. Even assuming that it
was valid tender, still, it would not constitute payment for want of consignation of the amount.
Well-settled is the rule that tender of payment must be accompanied by consignation in order
that the effects of payment may be produced.59
Moreover, Section 1, Rule 62 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When interpleader proper. - Whenever conflicting claims upon the same subject
matter are or may be made against a person who claims no interest whatever in the subject
matter, or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the claimants, he may bring
an action against the conflicting claimants to compel them to interplead and litigate their
several claims among themselves.
Otherwise stated, an action for interpleader is proper when the lessee does not know to
whom payment of rentals should be made due to conflicting claims on the property (or on the
right to collect).60 The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against double liability but to
protect him against double vexation in respect of one liability. 61
Notably, instead of availing of the above remedies, petitioners opted to refrain from making
payments.
(for discussion purpose lang) The evidence of petitioners' non-payment of the stipulated rent
is overwhelming. Petitioners, however, claim that such non-payment is justified by the
following: 1) the refusal of respondent to allow petitioners to use the leased properties, except
room 35; 2) respondent's refusal to turn over Rooms 36, 37 and 38; and 3) respondent's
refusal to accept payment tendered by petitioners. X X X
If it were true that they were allowed to use only one of the nine (9) rooms subject of the
contract of lease, and considering that the rooms were intended for a business purpose, we
cannot understand why they did not specifically assert their right. If we believe petitioners'
contention that they had been prevented from using the rooms for more than a year before
the complaint for ejectment was filed, they should have demanded specific performance from
the lessor and commenced an action in court. With the execution of the contract, petitioners
were already in a position to exercise their right to the use and enjoyment of the property
according to the terms of the lease contract. 56 As borne out by the records, the fact is that
respondent turned over to petitioners the keys to the leased premises and petitioners, in fact,
renovated the rooms. Thus, they were placed in possession of the premises and they had the
right to the use and enjoyment of the same. They, likewise, had the right to resist any act of
intrusion into their peaceful possession of the property, even as against the lessor itself. Yet,
they did not lift a finger to protect their right if, indeed, there was a violation of the contract by
the lessor.
INTERPLEADER I Page 4 of 6
G.R. Nos. 154470-71               September 24, 2012
BANK OF COMMERCE vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and BANGKO SENTRAL
NG PILIPINAS
G.R. Nos. 154589-90
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
I. First set of CB bills
RCBC was the registered owner of seven Central Bank (CB) bills with a total face value of ₱
70 million, x x x the RCBC sold these CB bills to the BOC. 4 As evidenced by another
"Detached Assignment"5 of even date, the BOC, in turn, sold these CB bills to the PDB. 6 The
BOC delivered the Detached Assignments to the PDB.7
X x x PDB, in turn, sold to the BOC Treasury Bills worth ₱ 70 million x x x as evidenced by a
Trading Order8 and a Confirmation of Sale.9 However, instead of delivering the Treasury Bills,
the PDB delivered the seven CB bills to the BOC x x x Nevertheless, the PDB retained
possession of the Detached Assignments.
X x x according to the BOC, it "sold back"11 to the PDB three of the seven CB bills. In turn, the
PDB transferred these three CB bills to Bancapital Development Corporation (Bancap). x x x
BOC bought the three CB bills from Bancap – so, ultimately, the BOC reacquired these three
CB bills x x x
x x x BOC sold the remaining four (4) CB bills to Capital One Equities Corporation 13 which
transferred them to All-Asia Capital and Trust Corporation (All Asia). All Asia further
transferred the four CB bills back to the RCBC.14
x x x RCBC sold back to All Asia one of these 4 CB bills. When the BSP refused to release
the amount of this CB bill on maturity, the BOC purchased from All Asia this lone CB bill x x x
As the registered owner of the remaining three CB bills, the RCBC sold them to IVI Capital
and Insular Savings Bank. Again, when the BSP refused to release the amount of this CB bill
on maturity, the RCBC paid back its transferees, reacquired these three CB bills and sold
them to the BOC – ultimately, the BOC acquired these three CB bills.
All in all, the BOC acquired the first set of seven CB bills.
II. Second set of CB bills
RCBC, as registered owner, (i) sold two CB bills with a total face value of ₱ 20 million to the
PDB and (ii) delivered the corresponding Detached Assignment.
x x x On even date, the PDB delivered to Bancap the two CB bills 18 (April 19 transaction). In
turn, Bancap sold the CB bills to Al-Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines,
which in turn sold it to the BOC.19
x x x upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed 20 the Officer-in-
Charge of the BSP’s Government Securities Department, 21 Lagrimas Nuqui, of the PDB’s
claim over these CB bills, based on the Detached Assignments in its possession.
Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8 of CB Circular No. 28 (Regulations Governing
Open Market Operations, Stabilization of the Securities Market, Issue, Servicing and
Redemption of the Public Debt)24 which requires the presentation of the bond before a
registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP. 25
In a July 25, 1994 letter, the PDB clarified to Nuqui that it was not "asking for the transfer of
the CB Bills…. rather it intends to put the BSP on formal notice that whoever is in possession
of said bills is not a holder in due course," and, therefore the BSP should not make payment
upon the presentation of the CB bills on maturity. 26 Nuqui responded that the BSP was "not in
a position at that point in time to determine who is and who is not the holder in due course
since it is not privy to all acts and time involving the transfers or negotiation" of the CB bills.
X X X PDB filed 29 with the RTC two separate petitions for Mandamus, Prohibition and
Injunction with prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, docketed
as Civil Case No. 94-3233 (covering the first set of CB bills) and Civil Case 94-3254 (covering
the second set of CB bills) against Nuqui, the BSP and the RCBC. 30
The PDB essentially claims that in both the April 15 transaction (involving the first set of CB
bills) and the April 19 transaction (involving the second set of CB bills), there was no intent on
its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-issuance of a detached assignment
in favor of the BOC and Bancap, respectively.
RTC temporarily enjoined Nuqui and the BSP from paying the face value of the CB bills on
maturity.
Alternatively, the BSP asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among
the claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to
pay the subject CB bills’ face value, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to
the rightful owner. X X X
INTERPLEADER I Page 5 of 6
x x x RTC granted the BSP’s motion to interplead and, accordingly, required the BOC to
amend its Answer and for the conflicting claimants to comment thereon.
In the alternative, the BOC added that even assuming that there was no effective transfer of
the nine CB bills ultimately to the BOC, the PDB remains obligated to deliver to the BOC, as
buyer in the April 15 transaction and ultimate successor-in-interest of the buyer (Bancap) in
the April 19 transaction, either the original subjects of the sales or the value thereof, plus
whatever income that may have been earned during the pendency of the case. 59
RTC dismissed the PDB’s petition, the BOC’s counterclaim and the BSP’s counter-
complaint/cross-claim for interpleader, holding that under CB Circular No. 28, it has no
jurisdiction (i) over the BOC’s "counterclaims" and (ii) to resolve the issue of ownership of the
CB bills.64 With the denial of their separate motions for Reconsideration, 65 the BOC and the
BSP separately filed the present petitions for review on certiorari. 66
ISSUE: 1. What is the effect of the special civil action of Interpleader? 2. Was the action for
Interpleader procedurally tenable, considering that it was filed with the Answer?
RULING:
1. The remedy of an action of interpleader 131 is designed to protect a person against
double vexation in respect of a single liability. 7 It requires, as an indispensable
requisite, that conflicting claims upon the same subject matter are or may be made
against the stakeholder (the possessor of the subject matter) who claims no interest
whatever in the subject matter or an interest which in whole or in part is not disputed
by the claimants.132
Through this remedy, the stakeholder can join all competing claimants in a single
proceeding to determine conflicting claims without exposing the stakeholder to the
possibility of having to pay more than once on a single liability. 133
When the court orders that the claimants litigate among themselves, in reality a new
action arises,134 where the claims of the interpleaders themselves are brought to the
fore, the stakeholder as plaintiff is relegated merely to the role of initiating the suit. In
short, the remedy of interpleader, when proper, merely provides an avenue for the
conflicting claims on the same subject matter to be threshed out in an action. Section
2 of Rule 62 provides: X X X
SEC. 2. Order. – Upon the filing of the complaint, the court shall issue an order
requiring the conflicting claimants to interplead with one another. If the interests of
justice so require, the court may direct in such order that the subject matter be paid
or delivered to the court.
xxx
Without the motion to interplead and the order granting it, the RTC could only dismiss
the PDB’s petition since it is the RTC which has jurisdiction to resolve the parties’
conflicting claims – not the BSP. Given that the motion to interplead has been
actually filed, the RTC could not have really granted the relief originally sought in the
PDB’s petition since the RTC’s order granting the BSP’s motion to interplead - to
which the PDB in fact acquiesced into - effectively resulted in the dismissal of the
PDB’s petition. This is not altered by the fact that the PDB additionally prayed in its
petition for damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit "against the public
respondents" because the grant of the order to interplead effectively sustained the
propriety of the BSP’s resort to this procedural device.
2. What is quite unique in this case is that the BSP did not initiate the interpleader suit
through an original complaint but through its Answer. This circumstance becomes
understandable if it is considered that insofar as the BSP is concerned, the PDB does
not possess any right to have its claim recorded in the BSP’s books; consequently,
the PDB cannot properly be considered even as a potential claimant to the proceeds
of the CB bills upon maturity. Thus, the interpleader was only an alternative position,
made only in the BSP’s Answer.135
X X X Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-in-
interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer.
Similarly, Section 5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court137 does not include a complaint-in-interpleader as a claim, 138 a form of
defense,139 or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to put up in his
answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s
"counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.
Apart from a pleading,140 the rules141 allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the
court through the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with
counter complaint/cross-claim for interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the
nature of a motion,142 seeking relief which essentially consists in an order for the
conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that "payment is made to the
rightful or legitimate owner"143 of the subject CB bills.
The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."
Interpleader may be considered as a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that
is, from making payment to one not entitled to it, thereby rendering itself vulnerable to
lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.
Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to
govern the uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of
INTERPLEADER I Page 6 of 6
the Rules of Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a
complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-
in-intervention." In an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be
contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-
interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-
complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule 62.