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Mobilities
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To cite this article: Susanne Nordbakke & Tim Schwanen (2013): Well-being and Mobility:
A Theoretical Framework and Literature Review Focusing on Older People, Mobilities,
DOI:10.1080/17450101.2013.784542
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Mobilities, 2013
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2013.784542
ABSTRACT There is an increasing attention for how mobility is associated with well-being
amongst people in general and older adults in particular. Comparisons across research pro-
jects and articles are, however, hampered by the different understandings and conceptualisa-
tions of well-being that are employed. We, firstly, develop a heuristic framework for
understanding the concept of well-being, and secondly, use this to explore possible linkages
between well-being and mobility and to critically examine the various conceptualisations of
well-being in research on mobility in later life. It is argued that future work on well-being
and mobility should consider both the objective and the subjective and the hedonic and
eudaimonic dimensions of well-being, and should pay detailed attention to the multiple ways
in which well-being and its linkages to mobility are context-dependent and shaped by the
particularities of time and place.
KEY WORDS: Well-being, Quality of life, Mobility, Motility, Ageing, Literature review
1. Introduction
Increased attention is paid to the connections of mobility in everyday life with
well-being and quality of life, both in mobilities research (Kronlid 2008; Freuden-
dal-Pedersen 2009; Ziegler and Schwanen 2011; see also Urry 2007, 185–210)
and in transport studies (Duarte et al. 2010; Ettema et al. 2010; Abou-Zeid and
Ben-Akiva 2011; Delbosc and Currie 2011). Some of this work highlights issues of
social justice (Urry 2007; Kronlid 2008), and other studies focus on specific social
groups rather than the population in general, such as immigrant women (Shin 2011)
or older people (Banister and Bowling 2004; Schwanen and Ziegler 2011; Spinney,
Scott, and Newbold 2009). It is, however, difficult to compare and synthesise across
studies and research traditions. This is in part due to differences in research design
and geographical context, but in particular because well-being is a complex and
fuzzy concept. Not only is the term easily used without being defined robustly, dif-
ferent theoretical and disciplinary traditions are also mobilised, when well-being is
grounded theoretically. Economists, psychologists, sociologists, public health
researchers, geographers, gerontologists – all draw on (slightly) different and some-
times contradictory understandings of well-being. This can make it difficult to tell
what researchers are talking about and whether they are talking about the same object.
It is our contention that researchers seeking to understand the links between
mobility and well-being would benefit from adopting a radical interdisciplinary per-
spective and taking stock of the rich and diversified thinking on well-being, most of
which is outside what is usually considered the remit of geographies and sociolo-
gies of mobility or transport studies. The first aim of this paper, therefore, is to pro-
vide an interdisciplinary overview of the most important and relevant (for mobility
research) conceptualisations of well-being in the academic literature. As this litera-
ture is extensive, the bulk of the paper will focus on the concept of well-being per
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effective interventions to secure (safe) mobility and well-being in old age can be
proposed and implemented.
Three clarifications are in order at this point. Firstly, whilst authors sometimes
differentiate between well-being and quality of life, we use these terms interchange-
ably. After all, both concern the ‘good life’ and many facets of quality of life and
well-being are the same. Further, both have been studied and conceptualised differ-
ently across and within disciplines. Secondly, we limit ourselves to theoretical
approaches to well-being that consider people as individuals; conceptions of well-
being at the level of communities, regions and countries are not explored. This is
partly to keep the analysis tractable but also because the latter approaches fail to
engage in detail with differences between individuals and the role of mobility
therein. This means, for instance, that the field of social indicator research is not
considered. The limitation to individuals also implies that we do not consider well-
being at the level of the household of which an older adult is part or his/her social
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network, as this goes beyond our primary focus of interest in this paper – older
people. At the same time, we readily concede the importance of further analysing
how care-giving to older adults – and the (corporeal) mobility this triggers – can at
times compromise the well-being of next of kin, friends and neighbours.
Thirdly, we do not consider the concepts of poverty and social exclusion. This is
because definitions of poverty and social exclusion are usually based on – typically
implicit – preconceptions of what living well is. In that sense, definitions and
understandings of well-being are primordial to those of poverty and social exclu-
sion. Additionally, whilst social exclusion and poverty often mean lower levels of
well-being, this is not necessarily so: being poor in terms of income or accessibility
to opportunities does not necessarily mean that a person perceives s/he is not living
well. The relationships of well-being with social exclusion and poverty – them-
selves highly debated constructs (Phillips 2006, 104–131; Gough and McGregor
2007, 3) – is very complex, and heeding this complexity whilst exploring the by no
means straightforward relations between well-being and mobility is beyond the
scope of the current article; this task is left for subsequent work.
be maximised. The subjective stance holds that an individual’s perceptions and expe-
riences are the foundation for evaluations of how well s/he lives. In contrast, in the
objective perspective, well-being is established from the evaluation of the ‘objective’
circumstances in which people live, given (inherently normative) criteria based on
values, goals or objectives (Phillips 2006). One implication of the use of such criteria
is that the constituents of well-being are often defined a priori by experts. Proponents
of the subjective position hold that their perspective is theoretically sounder, as it
respects individual perceptions and experiences of well-being (Ringen 1995). Yet
defenders of the objective position hold that subjective understandings of well-being
are incomparable and/or unstable, because they are not directly observable and indi-
vidual perceptions and experiences are influenced amongst others by people’s aspira-
tions, degree of adaptation to external conditions, stable dispositional characteristics
(e.g. personality traits), social events and ‘whims of the day’ (Veenhoven 2002).
Importantly, objective and subjective perspectives do not equate to the use of
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of how one feels in the hedonic approach. Following Aristotle, the eudaimonic
stance foregrounds the elements of one’s flourishing, such as ‘meaning’ and ‘pur-
pose’ and activity. It is also wider in scope than the hedonic position and considers
‘happiness’ one of many potentially valuable constituents of well-being rather than
the overriding goal (Phillips 2006).
The hedonic stance has often been equated to the subjective position. However,
with the emergence of the eudaimonic approach in psychology and lay view
approaches, it has become increasingly important for scholars to separate the
utilitarian from subjective stances.
in this respect, which we label the ‘universalist’ and the ‘contextualist’ stance.
According to a strongly universalist stance, well-being is a singular and stable
‘thing’ that is independent of the particulars of time and place and of the actions of
the researcher (Rapley 2003). This view is founded on an essentialist view of reality
(in which a phenomenon encompasses a limited set of characteristics or properties
that can be precisely defined). A variant of the universalist position is the assump-
tion that there always is a minimum of common conditions that are valuable to all
humans, independent of time and place.
Alternatives to a strongly universalist position differ in terms of the extent to
which they can be labelled contextualist. A much weaker version of universalism,
which amounts to very mild contextualism, is expressed by Rapley (2003). For
him, the meaning of well-being may change from one point in time to another for a
given person: the relative importance of various aspects of the good life changes
over the life-course. This view is contextualist insofar as it acknowledges temporal
variability in notions of well-being; however, well-being is still considered some-
thing that is independent of the actions of the researcher. Relative understandings of
well-being – sometimes labelled gap perspectives – are also mildly contextualist.
These hold that understandings of well-being need to be understood in the context
of people’s past experiences and aspirations for the future, as well as comparisons
with others or a certain reference group in society (Bowling 1995a).
A clear contextualist stance is to say that well-being cannot be understood as
independent of geographical context and culture. It has been argued that adherents
to universalist perspectives export views and understandings of well-being that are
specific to European and US history across the world as human universals (Christo-
pher 1999; Carlisle, Henderson, and Hanlon 2009). Those views and understand-
ings, the argument goes, are characterised by a narrow individualised focus with
little regard for the social and cultural context to which they are tied. They may not
be compatible with views and understandings in other cultures (or to sub-cultures in
Western countries) where, for instance, the value of social relationships is favoured
over individual happiness.
The most radical contextualism is offered in scholarship inspired by Michel
Foucault (Gubrium 2000; Sointu 2005). Here it is suggested that well-being is not
one or several variables that represent particular parts of one’s experience. Rather it
is a social process and category through which realities are enacted: well-being is a
‘tool’ that is shaped and used in social interactions between people – a researcher
6 S. Nordbakke & T. Schwanen
and study participants, the media (including advertising) and individuals, individuals
amongst themselves in a conversation, and so forth – and through which
experiences are organised (Gubrium 2000). This implies that research into well-
being co-constructs and performs the very object it seeks to portray and that well-
being is not a stable object to be transferred readily across contexts. It is not simply
‘there’ for our perusal and assessment with identical meanings in different places
and times. Rather, what constitutes well-being changes and is redefined continu-
ously in social interactions. Approaches to well-being are seldom fully universal or
fully contextual, and it is often more adequate to position them on a continuum.
every human being across time and space. It can be criticised for being overly
individualistic, exporting Western ideas as human universals across the globe, and
narrowly understanding happiness via ‘utility’ as the ultimate goal behind human
actions. The notion of ‘utility’ as the ultimate goal is perhaps better seen as a
simplification and (taken-for-granted) assumption amongst researchers than a
universal and undisputable fact.
It has to be noted that the recent proliferation of interest in well-being amongst
economists (Kahneman and Krueger 2006) is fuelled primarily by the import of
ideas from hedonic psychology into economics. This process is related to the matur-
ing of behavioural economics and Kahneman’s collaboration with Ed Diener and
other hedonic psychologists.
This work suggests that Ryff’s model cannot be generalised to all of humanity.
We classify her work as universalist but also believe that the wider approach can
accommodate moderately contextualist understandings of well-being.
Over the past decade there has been some rapprochement between the SWB and
eudaimonic psychology traditions. Keyes, Shmotkin, and Ryff (2002) have exam-
ined how these approaches relate to each other, concluding that they are comple-
mentary and measure different phenomena. And various measurement scales have
been proposed that capture aspects of both happiness and eudaimonic psychological
well-being (Diener et al. 2010; McMahan and Estes 2011).
Well-being and Mobility 9
• To have: the material level of living (welfare) and the need for material
resources (i.e. work, education, money);
• To love: the non-material aspects of life and more specifically the need for
social relations, such as friendship and family ties; and
• To be: the need for self-realisation and positive judgment of oneself (which
might be fulfilled through e.g. education, work and friendships).
Evidently, the integral needs approach is both objective and subjective. It is also
eudaimonic in character. Not only does Allardt see satisfaction as one constituent of
well-being; he also understands it in terms of how individuals actively behave towards
others (loving) and by what they are (being) in relation to society, not only in terms of
what they have (having). Contrary to the basic needs approach but consistent with the
SLL approach, individuals are not considered receptacles for resource inputs but
active beings controlling and directing their lives. The approach is moderately univer-
salist. For Allardt (1981, 1993), needs are socially defined and can change, and no
generic list of needs can be formulated for all times and places. However, he also
argues that in at least certain societies and groups there exists a modicum of
agreement of what the most important needs are in at least some groups and societies.
the actions and conditions people have reason to value. A person’s capability in the
singular – also known as her/his capability set – is the set of potential functionings
s/he could attain and thus all alternative lives open to him/her, whilst capabilities in
the plural are the concrete functionings attainable to a person (Gasper 2007).
Functionings, then, are not only the achievements of a person but also become part
of her/his capabilities, which s/he can then draw upon to realise new functionings.
By emphasising people’s ability to make choices, Sen foregrounds agency, position-
ing ‘people as diverse, thinking, adaptive agents’ (Gasper 2007, 356) who have
their own values and goals and are entitled to make their own reasoned choices.
By emphasising freedom and potentialities, Sen bridges the gap between
objective and subjective approaches to well-being (Gasper 2007). His perspective is
clearly eudaimonic in outlook, as well as moderately contextualist: since what
amounts to well-being varies across social contexts, he purposely does not specify a
formal list of capabilities as objectively correct or universally valuable like Nuss-
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baum, for instance, has done (Nussbaum 2011). Yet, in practice, Sen tends to work
with basic capabilities, such as being healthy, well nourished and educated and
accepts that there might be further fundamental capacities that need to be derived
by democratic decision-making in specific times and places. Nussbaum’s approach,
which defines a set of minimum capabilities that should be satisfied irrespective of
time and place, should be classified as objective and moderately to strongly
universalist. It is, however, clearly eudaimonic and – even stronger than Sen’s work
– rooted in Aristotelianism.
evaluate a person’s perceptions and feelings, in that it seeks to elucidate which aspects
of life contribute to quality of life and how they do so (Bowling and Gabriel 2007).
The lay views approach is neither hedonic nor eudaimonic; this depends on study
participants’ responses to questions about what contributes to their well-being. It is
moderately contextualist. By putting people’s own views in centre stage, empirical
studies in particular locales automatically take account of how place, time and cul-
ture shape the constituents of well-being. At the same time, the approach takes it
for granted that understandings of well-being and the factors that shape it both
precede the research encounter and are stable enough to be measured reliably and
generalised to the level of the population.
lar sites – produced by assemblages of people, buildings, artefacts and other tangi-
ble entities, as well as social norms, shared understandings, affects and other
immaterial elements – shape people’s experiences, resources and capabilities. The
emphasis is very much on interconnections and reciprocity between selves and
wider social, cultural, biophysical and spiritual elements (Conradson 2005; Panelli
and Tipa 2007; Hall 2010).
For health geographers, place and space are key to well-being. Both are not
passive backdrops for a good life or locations where well-being occurs, but continu-
ously created out of human-environment interactions. Following this logic, Fleuret
and Atkinson (2007) suggest that ‘spaces of well-being’ emerge out of the interac-
tions between individuals with material and immaterial elements. These spaces can
enable mobility, self-fulfilment and positive social constructions of particular social
groups, including the elderly (spaces of capability). They can also contribute to
self-esteem and mutual valuing (integrative spaces); offer protection from social and
environmental risks (spaces of security); or physical, mental and emotional healing
(therapeutic spaces).
Understandings of well-being are both subjective and objective in place-based
approaches. They are also both hedonic and eudaimonic, although perhaps tilted
towards the latter. They are best considered a response to individualistic and
biomedical understandings of well-being, and thus to the approaches from hedonic
and eudaimonic psychology and the HRQoL tradition discussed previously.
Obviously, place-based approaches are contextualist, but they do recognise wider,
generic tendencies. For Panelli and Tipa (2007), a place lens on well-being is
useful, because it sensitises researchers to how general processes are mediated by,
and work out differently in, local contexts.
psychology opportunities to actively pursue one’s elsewhere, the experience of which one’s sense of autonomy,
self-realisation can influence one’s sense of all of environmental mastery and positive
Ryff’s (1995) dimensions of self- relations with others, and possibly
realisation personal growth and purpose in life
Basic needs approach Enhances one’s ability and Allows basic needs to be satisfied at Unclear
opportunities to satisfy basic needs a concrete place
The SLL approach Enhances one’s ability and As a resource it allows needs to be Unclear
(resource approach) opportunities to (better) satisfy needs satisfied at a concrete place
in a variety of domains
Integral needs approach Enhances one’s ability and Provides access to activities Movement is a time-space that can
opportunities to (more fully) satisfy (a elsewhere through which concrete directly satisfy (certain) needs
wider range of) needs regarding needs regarding having, loving and regarding loving and being
having, loving and being being can be satisfied
Capabilities approach Enhances one’s capability set and the Provides access to valuable Movement can itself be a valuable
freedom to make reasoned choices functionings at destinations functioning
HRQoL approach Enhances one’s ability and Provides access to activities Movement itself can be an expression
opportunities to achieve higher levels elsewhere that can contribute to of functioning and directly produce
of mental, physical, role and social higher levels of functioning and satisfaction
functioning and of satisfaction satisfaction
(Continued)
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Table 2. (Continued)
Actual movement (accessing Actual movement (during travel)
Potential movement (motility) destinations)
Lay views Car and public transport access, Provides access to activities that can Movement can directly contribute to
approach proximity to facilities, etc. are contribute to feeling well feeling well (independence, social role
constituents of what counts as a good (independence, social role and and relations, self-identity, health)
life relations, self-identity, health)
Ecological Person- Enhances one’s ability and Provides access to activities Experiences during trips can influence
perspectives environment opportunities to enhance elsewhere, which can influence psychological well-being, perceived
fit psychological well-being and psychological well-being, perceived quality of life. Movement can also
perceived quality of life quality of life and behavioural affect/enhance behavioural competence
competence
Place-based Enhances one’s ability and Provides access to spaces of Movement is itself a place emerging
opportunities to escape (undesired) capability, integrative spaces, spaces out of human-environment interactions
human-environment interactions in of security and therapeutic spaces and that affect one’s happiness,
certain places and to access places (cf. Fleuret and Atkinson 2007) freedom, safety and capability
where human-environment interactions
contribute more positively to
happiness, freedom, safety and
capability
Well-being and Mobility
15
16 S. Nordbakke & T. Schwanen
mobility are interrelated. This means that different approaches have to be considered
as complementary to each other and need to be combined for a deep understanding
of the links between mobility and well-being. Additionally, mobility is a facilitator
of being well: both motility and actual trips allow people to access activities at spe-
cific locations through which desires can be fulfilled, needs satisfied, and people
can experience happiness or realise their true potential. Movement can, however,
promote well-being directly in various ways too. Thirdly, a distinction needs to be
made between mobility as resource or capability and mobility as experience. As a
resource, more motility and – within bounds – actual trips tend to be beneficial
from a well-being perspective. Yet, as an experience actual movements are not nec-
essarily beneficial. This depends very much on the experience of events during trips
and/or during activities at accessed destinations. To us, this means that deep under-
standings of how actual travel contributes to well-being can only ensue from
research that probes the contexts of those movements – who/what is encountered
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during and/or following trips, the nature of the interactions with the encountered
persons, the means of transport and infrastructures used, a person’s past
experiences, embodied skills and capacities, goals, needs and values, and so forth.
(Continued)
17
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Table 3. (Continued)
18
tions of well-being that populate the existing literature in the remainder of this sub-
section in greater depth as the basis for an agenda for further research.
In Table 3, the greatest number of studies has been allocated to the eudaimonic
approach in psychology. These focus on the lived experience and meanings of driving
reduction and cessation, showing that these processes are often associated with loss of
independence, self-determination and spontaneity (Yassuda, Wilson, and Von Mering
1997; Burkhardt, Berger, and McGavock 1998; Kostyniuk and Shope 1998; Bonnel
1999; Coughlin 2001; Bauer, Rottunda, and Adler 2003; Davey 2007); negative
effects on self-esteem and identity have also been identified (Burkhardt, Berger, and
McGavock 1998; Bonnel 1999). Eudaimonic dimensions of well-being are thus well
recognised. It should be noted, however, that none of the studies draws on Ryff’s
model of psychological well-being (or equivalents as developed by others).
The relative importance of hedonic (SWB) psychology and the HRQoL approach
is not surprising. The former provides relatively straightforward measures and has
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iour and people’s subjective assessment the degree of unfulfilled travel needs. The
rationale behind these authors’ approach is that overt travel behaviour does not nec-
essary reflect a subjective satisfaction with travel behaviour. This reasoning resem-
bles Allardt’s criticism of objective needs perspectives, such as the SSL approach.
Finally, there is at least one study that takes an ecological perspective (Table 3).
The study by Cvitkovich and Wister (2001) is explicitly grounded in the person-
environment fit tradition. It differs from Lawton’s understanding of well-being in
that it only considers subjective dimensions of well-being. Yet, their measure of
subjectively experienced well-being is rather comprehensive. It includes indicators
of hope, purpose of life, a sense of futurity, persistence and self-efficacy and thus is
closer to eudaimonic than hedonic understandings of well-being.
refined using questionnaires and statistical analysis (which can, and perhaps need
to, be complemented with further use of qualitative methods – see also below).
At least three recommendations at a more detailed level can be made. Firstly,
whilst foregrounding subjective experiences of well-being is important, understand-
ing the links between well-being and mobility in later life also requires more
research that combines elements of subjective and objective approaches to well-
being. Given the malleability of perceptions, preferences and aspirations in light of
‘objective’ conditions (material resources, physical health, etcetera), socialisation
processes and research encounters, approaches that mix subjective and objective
understandings of well-being are particularly helpful for identifying on the basis of
explicitly normative criteria groups of older adults for whom interventions through
public policy is warranted.
Secondly, research on older adults’ mobility that is explicitly grounded in the
eudaimonic tradition of understanding well-being is clearly warranted. Even if some
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of the studies reviewed in the previous studies have touched upon eudaimonic ele-
ments, none has explicitly adopted the two approaches to well-being with the deep-
est Aristotelian roots – the psychological approach elaborated by Ryff and
colleagues and the capabilities approaches. Eudaimonic research into the link
between well-being and mobility is desirable for at least two reasons. Eudaimonic
studies of subjective experience capture multiple elements constitutive of human
flourishing and move beyond the SWB’s focus on satisfaction, affect and mood.
Since they do not consider happiness the ultimate goal of human life, eudaimonic
studies afford a richer set of hypotheses about how potential and actual movement
can contribute to well-being in later life and more generally than do SWB inflected
studies. Additionally, drawing on capability approaches (CAs) allows researchers to
explore the questions of how and why mobility is essential for individual well-being
(cf. Kronlid 2008). More explicitly than needs approaches do CAs posit that having
access to material resources, such as a private car, is no guarantee for well-being.
Whether and how flourishing ensues, depends on individuals’ abilities and the
social contexts in which they are embedded. And more than Allardt’s integral needs
and the SLL approaches does Sen’s CA highlights agency and choice. It thus offers
a stronger theoretical basis for understanding how individuals’ own actions mediate
and shape the links between their mobility and well-being. Moreover, Sen’s CA can
in principle address any aspect of well-being, whereas the integral needs and SLL
approaches are limited to specific sets of components of well-being.
Thirdly, a stronger eudaimonic focus should be complemented with a stronger
contextualist orientation. Whilst Sen appreciates the importance of context as
evidenced by his emphasis on the role of individual abilities and social contexts,
Ryff’s approach is more universalist. Too universalist, we believe, given cross-cul-
tural studies showing how understandings of what constitutes a desirable self and
well-being are culture and place specific (Christopher 1999; Ingersoll-Dayton et al.
2004; Panelli and Tipa 2007). Ecological perspectives from environmental gerontol-
ogy and especially geography can help researchers seeking to better understand the
links between well-being and mobility in later life in various ways. Work in those
fields can sensitise scholars to the multiple ways in which the physical and social
environments older people inhabit in everyday life affect their mobility and hence
well-being. Geographical scholarship can also be instrumental in highlighting
cultural complexity. It could help researchers to avoid the all-too-easy generalisation
of thoroughly western values and ideals, such as autonomy and control, to elders in
22 S. Nordbakke & T. Schwanen
other parts of the world or even to certain (ethnic) groups of older adults in Western
countries. It also sensitises researchers to the potential contributions that harmony,
reciprocity and connectedness with the humans and non-human agents constituting
the places older people inhabit may make to their well-being, and to how mobility
shapes and reconfigures place-based understandings of well-being.
Radical contextualist perspectives on well-being can also contribute to our
understanding of the links between well-being and mobility. By highlighting how
well-being is not (only) something that precedes social interactions, they draw atten-
tion to the extent to which research instruments, media representations and talking
about well-being shape and organise people’s understandings and experiences of
well-being. This obviously makes examining well-being as an already elusive phe-
nomenon more challenging than when more universalist perspectives are adopted.
But, contra Gubrium (2000), we suggest that adopting a radical contextualist
perspective does not invalidate quantitative measurement techniques. These are of
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