ORQUIOLA vs. TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORP.
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein named had
(G.R. No. 141463, August 6, 2002)
SYNOPSIS:
Petitioners purchased a registered parcel of land from Mariano Lising. Subsequently, private
respondent, the registered owner of Lot 689, filed Civil Case No. Q-12918 against
Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon her lot. The trial court
adjudged Pedro and Lising to pay damages, remove all constructions and relocate the
boundaries. Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to prohibit the judge from
issuing a writ of demolition and the sheriff from implementing the alias writ of execution
against their property. They claimed that they were not impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-12918,
hence, they would be deprived of their property without due process of law. The CA
dismissed the petition ruling that as buyers of Mariano Lising, petitioners were privies and
could be reached by the execution order. EHCaDS
The Supreme Court granted the petition and thereby reversed and set aside the assailed
decision. The Court noted that petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of
Civil Case No. Q-12918. They could reasonably rely on Mariano Lising's certificate of title
because at the time of purchase, it was still free from any third party claim. As builders in
good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners are proper parties in any case
involving subject property. But since private respondents failed to implead them in Civil Case
No. Q-12918, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case.
STONEHILL vs. DIOKNO
(G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967)
FACTS:
Upon application of the officers of the government (respondent prosecutors), several judges
(respondent judges) issued a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners & or the
corporations of which they were officers, directed to any peace officer, to search the persons
named and/ or the premises of their offices, warehouses, and/ or residences, and to seize
several personal properties as the "subject of the offense; stolen or embezelled or the fruits
of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense" as
violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws (TCC), NIRC and the RPC."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null & void, said petitioners Stonehill,
et.al. filed w/ the SC this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction.
ISSUES/RULING:
1) Whether the right against unlafwful search and seizures may be invoked by
artificial beings?
YES. Artificial beings are also entitiled to the guarantee although they may be required to
open their books of accounts for examination by the State in the exercise of POLICE POWER.
2) Whether or not the search warrants in question were validly issued?
YES. Two points must be stressed in connection with Art. III, Section 2 of the Constitution: (a)
that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth therein; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized. None of these requirements has been complied with. Indeed, the same were issued
committed a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code."No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The
averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence,
it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of a
probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of
the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of
the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the
whims, caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied
by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is
not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
"Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements."
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to ALL
business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal
or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the
aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described — as
well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
General search warrants are outlawed because they place the sanctity of the domicile and
the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners
and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the
explicit command of our Bill of Rights-- THAT THE THINGS TO BE SEIZED BE PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBED-- as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
3) Whether or not the articles seized by virtue of the warrants are admissible in
evidence?
NO. Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondent- Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners
herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the
position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely
"because the constable has blundered," upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion
of evidence unlawfully obtained, such as the common-law action for damages against the
searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment,
resistance, without liability to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be
provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of
Judge Learned Hand:
"As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will that
wrong be repressed".
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962 are null and void.
GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG vs. OLALIA
(G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007)
FACTS:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were
issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The
petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private
respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.
The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same
in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high “flight risk”. Private respondent filed
a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the
following conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that
he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold
himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If
accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed
with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE:
WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail
HELD:
YES. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in
the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under
the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process
resulting in a prolonged deprivation of one’s liberty.
In this case, the Court reviewed what was held in Government of United States of America v.
Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez,
a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007, that the constitutional provision on
bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal
proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling
their treaty obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law,
on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the
worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling
in Purganan, and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.
TIME, INC. vs. HILL
(385 US 374, 1967)
FACTS:
In 1952, three escaped convicts took James Hill, his wife, and their five children hostage in
their Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, home. After nineteen hours, the family was released
unharmed. The convicts were later apprehended in a violent clash with police during which
two of them were killed. In 1953, Joseph Hays' published a novel based on the Hill family's
ordeal. When the novel was subsequently made into a play, Life Magazine ("Life") printed an
article about the play that mirrored many of its inaccuracies concerning the Hill family's
experience. Alleging that it deliberately misrepresented his story, Hill sought damages against
Life. On appeal from an adverse ruling, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court
remanded for a new trial where a reduced adverse ruling was imposed on Life. Following an
unsuccessful appeal in the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court granted Life's
owner, Time Inc. ("Time") certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is a publication, containing misrepresentations about the subject of its coverage, protected
under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees?
HELD:
Yes. In a 6-to-3 opinion, the Court set aside the Appellate ruling against Time because the
lower court failed to instruct the jury that Time's liability was contingent upon a showing that
it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. The Court
explained that absent a finding of such malicious intent on the part of a publisher, press
statements are protected under the First Amendment even if they are otherwise false or
inaccurate. The Court remanded for retrial under the new jury instruction.
HUDGEN vs. NLRB
(424 US 507)
Hudgens owned a shopping mall. Some union members were protesting a shoe store in the
mall. Hudgens kicked them out.
The NLRB sued Hudgens claiming that he had infringed on the union’s 1st Amendment rights.
Hudgens argued that the Bill of Rights only applies to governmental actions, and this was
private property (aka the State Action Doctrine).
NLRB looked to Amalgamated Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. (391 U.S.
308 (1968)) and argued that that when a private entity is open to the public, or performing a
governmental function, they are bound by the Public Function Exception.
The US Supreme Court found for Hudgens and reversed their decision in Logan Valley.
The US Supreme Court looked to Lloyd v. Tanner (407 U.S. 551 (1972)), where they said that
people couldn’t distribute flyers unrelated to a store in a mall.
The Court extended the logic in Lloyd to cover all free expression on property owned by
private businesses.
Otherwise, the rule would be a content-based distinction (related to store business vs.
unrelated to store business), and content-based distinctions are held to strict scrutiny and
are almost never allowed.
Basically, this case said that just because a business is open to the public, it doesn’t
necessarily meet the Public Function Exception.
In order to meet the Public Function Exception, the business has to be actually doing a job
normally done by the government.
RUBI vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
(39 PHIL 660)
FACTS:
Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the province of Mindoro were ordered by
the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and
to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still in the province of Mindoro, and to
remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been
ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under
certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of “very
low culture”.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped from the reservation but was later caught
and was placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An
application for habeas corpus was made on behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the
province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating
the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code was challenged which provides: With the prior
approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the
interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
ISSUE/RULING:
1) Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code constitutes undue
delegation
No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section
of the Administrative Code. Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better position
to determine whether or not to execute the law but the provincial governor. It is optional for
the provincial governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is necessary to give
discretion to the provincial governor. The Legislature may make decisions of executive
departments of subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of
certain acts, final on questions of fact.
2) Whether or not the Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.
No. Among other things, the term “non-Christian” should not be given a literal meaning or a
religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term
“non-Christian” it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area,
and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this
case, the Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to promote peace and to
arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This will ultimately settle them down where they can
adapt to the changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither
discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: “. . . one cannot hold that
the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the
Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of
the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the
law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.”
US vs. BUSTOS
(37 PHIL. 731)
FACTS:
In 1915, 34 Pampanga residents signed a petition to the Executive Secretary regarding
charges against Roman Punsalan, the justice of the peace of Macabebe. They wanted to oust
him from his office.
Specific allegations against him included bribery charges, involuntary servitude, and theft.
The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still
found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an
auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or
suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial
court denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed. Making assignments of
error.
1. The court erred in overruling motion for retrial.
2. Error in not holding that the libelous statement was not privileged
3. Error in not acquitting defendants
4. Evidence failed to show gult of defendants beyond reasonable doubt.
5. Erred in making defendants prove that the libelous statements were true.
6. Error in sustaining the prosecution’s objection to the introduction in evidence by the
accused of the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the libelous charge was
based.
7. Erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in advertently interposed
by their counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente administrativo out of which
the accusation in this case arose.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice
of the peace in Pampanga.
HELD:
YES. Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small
efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand,
guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of
Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.
In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the guaranties of a free speech and a
free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a
matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit
subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge
the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively muzzled. Attempted
terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest
sort.”
“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of
any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the
part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of
those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.”
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions
and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of
citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that
any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch
or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and
petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been
the result of this. Privilged communications may in some instances afford an immunity to the
slanderer. Public policy is the “unfettered administration of justice.”
Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by
proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public official’s
conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the
protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith. There must be
a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party
communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter
which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring
home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood
and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might
well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable
conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to
a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct
touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have
present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges
predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express
malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably
not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good
faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or
misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to
secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way
did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous
matter but on instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were
sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness.
No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of
the justice of the peace was proper.
ARAULLO vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)
FACTS:
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth
of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget
Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement
Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables
the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of
waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as “savings” by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations
Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor
of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded;
to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and
several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning
the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings
and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
ISSUE/RULING:
1) Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art.
VI, Constitution).
No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
2) Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
executive.
No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
3) Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because
funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative
and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to
an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,
they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As
such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances,
when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied
with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn
from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as “savings” by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.

4) Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.

No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.

5) Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.

Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.