VILLANUEVA vs.
CA
(G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004)
CARPIO, J
FACTS:
On 13 October 1988, Eusebia Retuya filed a complaint before the trial court against her
husband Nicolas Retuya, Pacita Villanueva and Nicolas’ son with Pacita, Procopio Villanueva.
Eusebia sought the reconveyance from Nicolas and Pacita of several properties (subject
properties), claiming that such are her conjugal properties with Nicolas. Plaintiff Eusebia, is
the legal wife of defendant Nicolas, having been married on October 7, 1926. Out of the
lawful wedlock, they begot five (5) children. Spouses Retuya resided at Mandaue City. During
their marriage, they acquired real properties and all improvements situated in Mandaue City,
and Consolacion, Cebu. Nicolas is the co-owner of a parcel of land situated in Mandaue City
which he inherited from his parents Esteban Retuya and Balbina Solon as well as the
purchasers of hereditary shares of approximately eight (8) parcels of land in Mandaue City.
Some of the properties earn income from coconuts leased to corporations.
In 1945, Nicolas no longer lived with his legitimate family and cohabited with defendant,
Pacita Villanueva, wherein Procopio Villanueva, is their illegitimate son. Nicolas, then, was
the only person who received the income of the properties. Pacita, from the time she started
living in concubinage with Nicolas, has no occupation. She had no properties of her own from
which she could derive income. From the time Nicolas suffered stroke until the present, his
illegitimate son is already the one who has been receiving the income of his properties.
Settlement between parties was asked but not met. Trial court in favor of Eusebia Natuya.
Petitioners appealed. Eusebia died, and was then substituted by her heirs. CA upheld trial
court’s decision
ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject properties acquired during the marriage between Eusebia and
Nicolas are conjugal.
HELD:
YES, they are conjugal. Petition denied; decision of CA affirmed. The Family Code provisions
on conjugal partnerships govern the property relations between Nicolas and Eusebia even if
they were married before the effectivity of Family Code.
Article 105 of the Family Code explicitly mandates that the Family Code shall apply to
conjugal partnerships established before the Family Code without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. Thus, under the Family Code, if the
properties are acquired during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The
burden of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. This is counter-balanced
by the requirement that the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during
the marriage before they are presumed conjugal.
Nicolas and Eusebia were married on 7 October 1926. Nicolas and Pacita started cohabiting
in1936. Eusebia died on 23 November 1996. Pacita and Nicolas were married on 16
December 1996.Petitioners themselves admit that Lot No. 152 was purchased on 4 October
1957. The date of acquisition of Lot No. 152 is clearly during the marriage of Nicolas and
Eusebia.
Since the subject properties, including Lot No. 152, were acquired during the marriage of
Nicolas and Eusebia, the presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code is that all these
are conjugal properties of Nicolas and Eusebia.
BPI vs. POSADAS (Collector of Internal Revenue)
(56 Phil 215, 1931)
VILLA-REAL, J
FACTS:
BPI, as administrator of the estate of deceased Adolphe Schuetze, appealed to CFI Manila
absolving defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him in
recovering the inheritance tax amounting to P1209 paid by the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda
de Schuetze, under protest, and sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance
policy of the deceased.
Rosario and Adolphe were married in January 1914. The wife was actually residing and living
in Germany when Adolphe died in December 1927. The latter while in Germany, executed a
will in March 1926, pursuant with its law wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir. The
deceased possessed not only real property situated in the Philippines but also personal
property consisting of shares of stocks in 19 domestic corporations. Included in the personal
property is a life insurance policy issued at Manila on January 1913 for the sum of $10,000 by
the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila Branch. In the insurance policy, the
estate of the deceased was named the beneficiary without any qualification. Rosario is the
sole and only heir of the deceased. BPI, as administrator of the decedent’s estate and
attorney in fact of the plaintiff, having been demanded by Posadas to pay the inheritance tax,
paid under protest. Notwithstanding various demands made by plaintiff, Posadas refused to
refund such amount.
ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff is entitled to the proceeds of the insurance.
HELD:
SC ruled that(1)the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on
which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property,
and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2)if the
premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are
likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3)the proceeds of a
life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the
testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate
administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they
belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these
Islands or outside.
Hence, the defendant was ordered to return to the plaintiff one-half of the tax collected
upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the
late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first
premium.

JOCSON vs. CA
(G.R. No. L-55322, February 16, 1989)
MEDIALDEA, J
FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first intestate then
the husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the
husband of Agustina.
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio
Jocson during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina
Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third
(1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and
prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be
partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated
conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore,
cannot validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete,
because they were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.
ISSUE:
WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is conjugal property or exclusive property.
HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. The party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the
property in controversy was acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of
acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article
160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the
marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon
which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in
the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is no proof that the properties
were acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under
dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only
after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the
certificates of title as married to the latter.
Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the
properties were exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so because the
words “married to’ preceding “Alejandra Poblete’ are merely descriptive of the civil status of
Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is
the owner of the properties, the same having been registered in his name alone, and that he
is married to Alejandra Poblete.
JOVELLANOS vs. CA
(G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992)
FACTS:
Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a a lease and conditional sale agreement over a
house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he
had three children, the petitioners.
Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with
whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married
Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of
the premises.
With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of
absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title
and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died.
Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated
property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and
which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend
that the property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage
under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955.
ISSUE:
WON the house and lot pertains to the second marriage?
HELD:
YES. The conditional sale agreement in said contract is, therefore, also in the nature of a
contract to sell, as contradistinguished from a contract of sale. In a contract to sell or a
conditional sale, ownership is not transferred upon delivery of the property but upon full
payment of the purchase price. Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if
delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if
there is stipulation to this effect. The stipulation is usually known as a pactum reservati
dominii, or contractual reservation of title, and is common in sales on the installment plan.
Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force.
Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount
hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was
only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his
favor.
Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the
deed of sale in his favor. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a
thing, without other limitations than those established by law, 19 and, under the contract,
Daniel Jovellanos evidently did not possess or enjoy such rights of ownership.
Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel
Jovellanos. Since. as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this
property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding
reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot.
Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on property bought on installments, where
ownership is vested during the marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal
partnership.
price of P6,000. An undivided one-sixth (1/6) should be deemed paraphernalia and the
remaining five-sixths (5/6) held property of the conjugal partnership of spouses Marcelo
Castillo and Macaria Pasco.
It follows from the foregoing that, as the fishpond was undivided property of the widow and
the conjugal partnership with her late husband, the heirs of the latter, appellants herein,
were entitled to ask for partition thereof and liquidation of its proceeds. The ultimate
interest of each party must be resolved after due hearing, taking into account (a) the widow's
one-sixth direct share; (b) her half of the community property; (c) her successional rights to a
part of the husband's share pursuant to the governing law of succession when the husband
died; and (d) the widow's right to reimbursement for any amounts advanced by her in paying
the mortgage debt as aforesaid. All these details must be settled after proper trial.
MAGALLON vs. MONTEJO
(G.R. No. 73733, December 16, 1986)

CASTILLO, JR. vs. PASCO NARVASA, J

(G.R. No. L-16857, May 29, 1964)

REYES, J.B.L., J
FACTS:
In this case, a fishpond is the bone of contention by the petitioners headed by Marcello
Castillo Jr. on one hand and Macaria Pasco, his mother. Petitioners contend that the fish
pond in question was acquired during the marriage of Marcelo Castillo Sr. and Macaria Pasco
thus, should be considered conjugal for its having been acquired during coverture. The CA
found that the fishpond was acquired thru Macaria’s own money being a woman of means
even before she married Marcelo Castillo, Sr.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the fishpond is a property solely owned by Maria Pasco.

HELD:
It is not gain said that under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, that was the applicable law in
1932, the property acquired for onerous consideration during the marriage was deemed
conjugal or separate property depending on the source of the funds employed for its
acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said Code provided:
ART. 1396. The following is separate property spouse:
xxx
4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to the husband.

On the other hand, Article 1401, prescribed that:

ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:
1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of
the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one
of the spouses only.

As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money
of the conjugal partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both
patrimonies in common, in proportion to the contributions of each to the total purchase

mistress, she cannot pretend to any right thereto. But whether the petitioner, is a lawful wife
or live-in partner, the court simply cannot believe the she never became
LILIUS vs. MRC
(62 Phil 56, 1935)
VILLA-REAL, J
FACTS:
Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his
first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and
had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in
question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an
autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted
from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his
horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see
the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black
mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train. The
locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were
hospitalized.
Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every
allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation
of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be
absolved from the complaint.
The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors
on said judgement.
ISSUE/RULING:
1) WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages
YES. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is of the
opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant
company alone, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve
as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the necessary
precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees — the flagman
and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn
passers-by of the approaching train
Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant entity employed the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting its aforesaid employees, however, it did not employ such
diligence in supervising their work and the discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good
father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the
careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their
work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
2) WON the sums of money fixed by the court a quo as indemnities for damages
proper
a. With respect to the plaintiffs’ appeal, the first question to be decided is that raised by Lilius
relative to the insufficiency of the sum of P5,000 which the trial court adjudicated to him by
way of indemnity for damages consisting in the loss of his income as journalist and author as
a result of his illness. As to the amount of P10,000 claimed by Lilius as damages for the loss of
his wife’s services in his business, which services consisted in going over his writings,
translating them into foreign languages and acting as his secretary, in addition to the fact
that such services formed part of the work whereby he realized a net monthly income of
P1,500, there is no sufficient evidence of the true value of said services nor to the effect that
he needed them during her illness and had to employ a translator to act in her stead.
b. Taking into consideration the fact that the wife — in the language of the court, which saw
her at the trial — “young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead
caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and
that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very
difficult for her to walk”, and taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is
the sum adjudicated to her for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive.
As to the indemnity in favor of the child neither is the same excessive, taking into
consideration the fact that the lacerations received by her have left deep scars that
permanently disfigure her face and that the fractures of both her legs permanently render it
difficult for her to walk freely, continuous extreme care being necessary in order to keep her
balance in addition to the fact that all of this unfavorably and to a great extent affect her
matrimonial future.
c. Lilius also seeks to recover the sum of P2,500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon
common law “consortium” of his wife, that is, “her services, society and conjugal
companionship”, as a result of personal injuries which she had received from the accident
now under consideration.
Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband’s rights is to count on his
wife’s assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the
performance of household duties. However, nowadays when women, in their desire to be
more useful to society and to the nation, are demanding greater civil rights and are aspiring
to become man’s equal in all the activities of life, marriage has ceased to create the
presumption that a woman complies with the duties to her husband and children, which the
law imposes upon her, and he who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from
deprivation of her domestic services must prove such services. In the case under
consideration, apart from the services of his wife as translator and secretary, the value of
which has not been proven, Lilius has not presented any evidence showing the existence of
domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the accident, in order that it may
serve as a basis in estimating their value.
Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife’s domestic assistance and conjugal companionship are
purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses may be compelled to render,
it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the
person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be
willing to continue rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing.
However, in order that a victim of an accident may recover indemnity for damages from the
person liable therefor, it is not enough that the latter has been guilty of negligence, but it is
also necessary that the said victim has not, through his own negligence, , contributed to the
accident.
It appears that Lilius took all precautions which his skill and the presence of his wife and
child, driving his car at a speed which prudence demanded according to the circumstances
and conditions of the road, slackening his speed in the face of an obstacle and blowing his
horn upon seeing persons on the road. If he failed to stop, look and listen before going over
the crossing, in spite of the fact that he was driving at 12 miles per hour after having been
free from obstacles, it was because, his attention having been occupied in attempting to go
ahead, he did not see the crossing in question, nor anything, nor anybody indicating its
existence, as he knew nothing about it beforehand. The first and only warning, which he
received of the impending danger, was two short blows from the whistle of the locomotive
immediately preceding the collision and when the accident had already become inevitable.
VILLANUEVA vs. IAC
(G.R. No. 74577, December 4, 1990)
NARVASA, J
FACTS:
Modesto and Frederico Aranas inherited Lot 13 from their parents, Graciano Aranas and
Nicolasa Bunsa. Said lot was divided into a northern and southern portion (Lot 13-C) and was
distributed between Frederico and Modesto, respectively. Modesto had two illegitimate
children names Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas. These two loaned from Jeusu
Bernas an amount of P18,000.00 secured by Lot 13-C. A Loan Agreement with Real Estate
Mortgage was executed between the siblings and Bernas wherein they described themselves
as absolute co-owners of Lot 13. Raymundo Aranas and Consolacion Villanueva signed the
document as witnesses.
About a month later, Villanueva and Aranas filed a complaint against Bernas alleging that
they be declared co-owners of the land based on the will of Victoria Comorro bequeathing to
Villanueva and Aranas all of Comorro’s “interests, rights and properties, real and personal, x x
as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto Aranas x
x.” Modesto Aranas’ will, on the other hand, bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro all his
interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria “as well as his own capital property brought
by him to his marriage with his said wife.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not Consolacion Villanueva has any right over Lot 13-C and the improvements
thereon standing by virtue of Victoria Camorro’s last will and testament.
HELD:
NO, CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA DOES NOT BEAR ANY RIGHT OVER LOT 13-C AND THE
IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.
Lot 13-C was not part of the conjugal partnership property of Comorro and Aranas. It was
the latter’s exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from his parents and
registered solely in his name. It is inconsequential whether he acquired the property
subsequent to his marriage to Comorroo for Article 148 of the Civil Code decrees that to be
considered “the exclusive property of the spouse” is inter alia, “that which is brought to the
marriage as his or her own,” or “that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative
title. Such is the case in Modesto’s acquisition of Lot 13-C. Furthermore, the fact that
Comorro died 2 years ahead of Aranas clearly signifies that she never inherited anything from
her husband.
To claim for the improvements thereon, proof is needful of the time of the making or
construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used therefor in order to
determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to
one spouse separately. No such proof was presented by Villanueva.