RES IPSA LOQUITUR
PEDRO LAYUGAN vs. IAC (G.R. NO. 73998, NOV. 14, 1988)
SARMIENTO, J
FACTS: Pedro T. Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro,
alleging that while at Baretbet, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya, the Plaintiff and a
companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the
right side of the National Highway; that defendant's truck, driven recklessly by
Daniel Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and
hospitalized where he incurred and will incur more expenses as he recuperates
from said injuries; Plaintiff's right leg was amputated and that because of said
injuries he would be deprived of a lifetime income.
To free themselves from liability, defendants Isidro [owner] and Serrano [driver]
averred that he knows his responsibilities as a driver and further contends that it
was the negligence of plaintiff that was the proximate cause of the accident. They
alleged that plaintiff parked his truck in a manner which occupied a part of the
highway and he did not even put a warning sign.
Subsequently, a third-party complaint was filed by the defendant against his
insurer, the Travellers Multi Indemnity Corporation; that the third-party plaintiff
[Isidro], without admitting his liability to the plaintiff, claimed that the third-party
defendant [Travellers] is liable to the former for contribution, indemnity and
subrogation by virtue of their insurance contract which covers the insurer's liability
for damages arising from death, bodily injuries and damage to property.  The
Insurance company argued that it is only liable for the amount agreed in the policy
and the complaint was premature since no claim was made to it.
The RTC  ruled in favor of the Petitioners. The CA reversed the decision, stating that
it is the petitioners who were negligent since they did not exercise caution  by
putting warning signs that their truck is park on the shoulder of the highway.
ISSUE: Whether or not Isidro is liable as employer of Serrano.
HELD: YES. The SC held that the CA erroneously appreciated the evidence. It was
proven that the petitioner placed a warning sign within 3 to 4 meters from their
truck in the form of a lighted kerosene lamp. The existence of this warning sings
was corroborated by Serrano, respondent's driver, and further stated that when he
saw a parked truck, he kept on stepping on the brake pedal but it did not function.  
Thus despite this warning signs, the truck recklessly driven by Serrano and owned
by Respondent Isidro bumped the truck of petitioner.
The private respondent is sued under Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180, paragraph
5, of the Civil Code. In the latter, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection, or both. Such
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently, may be
rebutted. If follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that in the selection and in the supervision he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is
relieved from liability. In disclaiming liability for the incident, the private respondent
stresses that the negligence of his employee has already been adequately overcome
by his driver's statement that he knew his responsibilities as a driver and that the
truck owner used to instruct him to be careful in driving.  
We do not agree with the private respondent in his submission. In the first place, it
is clear that the driver did not know his responsibilities because he apparently did
not check his vehicle before he took it on the road. If he did he could have
discovered earlier that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut, and could have
repaired it and thus the accident could have been avoided. Moveover, to our mind,
the fact that the private respondent used to intruct his driver to be careful in his
driving, that the driver was licensed, and the fact that he had no record of any
accident, as found by the respondent court, are not sufficient to destroy the finding
of negligence of the Regional Trial Court given the facts established at the trial. The
private respondent or his mechanic, who must be competent, should have
conducted a thorough inspection of his vehicle before allowing his driver to drive it. 
In the light of the circumstances obtaining in the case, we hold that Isidro failed to
prove that the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of his
employees which would exculpate him from solidary liability with his driver to the
petitioner. But even if we concede that the diligence of a good father of a family
was observed by Isidro in the supervision of his driver, there is not an iota of
evidence on record of the observance by Isidro of the same quantum of diligence in
the supervision of his mechanic, if any, who would be directly in charge in
maintaining the road worthiness of his (Isidro's) truck. But that is not all. There is
paucity of proof that Isidro exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection of his driver, Daniel Serrano, as well as in the selection of his mechanic, if
any, in order to insure the safe operation of his truck and thus prevent damage to
others. Accordingly, the responsibility of Isidro as employer treated in Article 2180,
paragraph 5, of the Civil Code has not ceased.
RAMOS, et al. vs. CA (G.R. NO. 124354, DEC. 29, 1999)
KAPUNAN, J
FACTS: Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her
gall bladder (cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the
surgery at the De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he
would find a good anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr.
Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist
“botched” the administration of the anesthesia causing Erlinda to go into a coma
and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed by Herminda Cruz,
sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical Center.
The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the
anesthesiologist for damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing
that Erlinda's condition was caused by the anesthesiologist in not exercising
reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses heard the anesthesiologist
saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang
tiyan.”
Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo
surgery.
The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating
the patient, the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good
anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3 hours late and the hospital is liable for the
negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the operation after the surgeon
failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the DLSMC were all held
jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed the decision
of the Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused
the comatose condition of Ramos.
HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.
Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the
occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiff’s prima facie
case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation,
where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must present
expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.
This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda
Ramos already surrendered her person to the private respondents who had
complete and exclusive control over her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was
neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the procedure, she was comatose and brain
damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!
Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of
negligence on their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the
proximate cause of her condition. One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to
tell whether or not the intubation was a success. [res ipsa loquitur applies here].
The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw Erlinda for the
first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the patient
and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.
The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper
authority as the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist
observed the proper protocols. Also, because he was late, he did not have time to
confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the anesthesia delivery.
The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The
hospital was negligent since they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of
their “consultants”. While these consultants are not employees, hospitals still exert
significant controls on the selection and termination of doctors who work there
which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship. Thus, the
hospital was allocated a share in the liability.
Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or
compensatory damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. CA (G.R. NO. 137873, APR. 20, 2001)
KAPUNAN, J
FACTS:
Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M.
Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City.   He was
immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician,
Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM.
Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as
carpenter at the elevator core of the 14 th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower
Building were on board a platform.  Jose was crushed to death when the platform
fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.  Luckily,
Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and
filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Jose’s widow filed a complaint on
May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to Ratio: A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000. remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the
occassion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such
DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision. prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient
cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
ISSUE: condition or occasion.
Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the
death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund.
TOMAS BERNAL vs. J.V. HOUSE (G.R. NO. 30741, JAN. 30, 1930)
HELD:
The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code.  MALCOLM, J
Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for FACTS:
death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.  She filed the civil complaint for
damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioner’s
personnel. 
Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award
decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC).  Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that
awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the
Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom.

PLAINTIFF’S NEGLIGENCE
MANILA ELECTRIC vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO (G.R. NO. L-8328, MAY 15, 1956)

MONTEMAYOR, J
FACTS:
Efren Magno went to repair a ¨media agua¨ of the house pf his brother-in-law.
Whilw making the repair, a galvanized iron roofing which was holding came into
contact with the electric wire of the petitioner Manila Electric Co. strung parallel to
the edge of the ¨media agua¨ and 2 1/2 feet from it. He was electrocuted and died
as a result thereof. In an action for damages brought by the heirs of Magno against
manila Electric Co. the CA awarded damages to the heirs of Magno and that the
company was at fault and guilty of negligence because although the electric wire
had been installed long before the construction of the house the electric company
did not exercise due diligence. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
WON Manila Electric Co., is gulity of negligence.

HELD:
Decision of the CA reversed.
HELD:

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE vs. CA (G.R. NO. 97626, MAR 14, 1997)

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J
FACTS:
Rommel’s Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintains 2 current accounts with
petitioner Philippine Bank of Commerce. Respondent Romeo Lipana is the President
and General Manager of RMC. From May 1, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Lipana entrusted
RMC funds totalling P304,979.74 to its secretary Irene Yabut for the purpose of
depositing the funds to the company’s account with PBC. It turned out, however,
that all those deposits were not credited to the RMC, but to the account of Yabut’s
husband, Bienvenido Cotas, with the same bank. Yabut was able to defraud RMC by
using duplicate deposit slips. On the original copy which is being submitted to the
bank, she would write the account name and account number of her husband. On
the duplicate copy which is returned to the company, she would write the same
account number but would leave the account name blank. After obtaining the
validation stamp on the second copy, she would place thereon RMC’s account
name, and change the account number to that of the company. This went on for
more than a year without respondent’s knowledge. Upon discovery of the losses,
respondent demanded the return of its funds from the bank. Not being heeded, he
filed a collection suit. The trial court, and later on the Court of Appeals, found the
bank negligent. The bank filed this instant petition for review.
Petitioners submit that the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of RMC in
entrusting its funds to a dishonest employee, as there is no way for them to know
who the owner of the funds is. Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the
loss was due to the negligence of the bank’s teller, Azucena Mabayad, in validating
the duplicate deposit slips bearing no account name.
ISSUE:
What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the
private respondent RMC - petitioner bank's negligence or that of private
respondent's?
HELD:
There are three elements of a quasi-delict: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence
of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would do. The existence of
negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment
of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and
determines liability by that.
Applying the above test, it appears that the bank's teller was negligent in validating,
officially stamping and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms.
Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate copy was not completely
accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to
the proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate. The fact that the
duplicate slip was not compulsorily required by the bank in accepting deposits
should not relieve the petitioner bank of responsibility. The odd circumstance alone
that such duplicate copy lacked one vital information - that of the name of the
account holder - should have already put Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than
readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded more
cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the
account holder in the duplicate slip was left blank while that in the original was
filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook, line and sinker the
too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy
was only for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on. A
"reasonable man of ordinary prudence" would not have given credence to such
explanation and would have insisted that the space left blank be filled up as a
condition for validation. Unfortunately, this was not how bank teller Mabayad
proceeded thus resulting in huge losses to the private respondent. Negligence here
lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its
lackadaisical selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the
testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio, then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the
petitioner bank and now its Vice-President, to the effect that, while he ordered the
investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were
validated in total disregard of the bank's validation procedures. It was this
negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the negligence of the petitioner
bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate
cause of the loss suffered by the private respondent, and not the latter's act of
entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, as insisted by the petitioners.
Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as
"supervening negligence" or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the
culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that where both parties are
negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the
other, or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be
attributed to the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a
person does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence
of, or bar a defense against liability sought by another, if the latter, who had
the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting
cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to
defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that
the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury
incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation
procedure.
In the case of banks, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good
father of a family. Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the accounts of their clients with
the highest degree of care. As a business affected with public interest and because
of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of
its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of
their relationship.
While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of
account sent by the petitioner bank to RMC, the latter would have discovered the
loss early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to escape liability. This
omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were
it not for the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in
validating the incomplete duplicate deposit slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the
loss would not have occurred. The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied
that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in not checking its monthly
statements of account. This omission by RMC amounts to contributory negligence
which shall mitigate the damages that may be awarded to the private respondent.
We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the
damage on a 60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent
appellate court, except the award of P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by
private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be paid by the
petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the
petitioners.
FORTUITOUS EVENT
TEODORO HERNANDEZ vs. COA (G.R. NO. 71871, NOV 6, 1989)
CRUZ, J
FACTS:
NATIONAL POWER CORP. vs. CA (G.R. NOS. 103442-45, MAY 21, 1993)
DAVIDE, JR., J
FACTS:
At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the
Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties.
Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3
floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity
of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept
the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it
exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were
sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal
relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the
residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a
fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.
ISSUE:
At the height of the typhoon “Kading”, a flash flood covered the towns near the
Angat Dam, causing deaths and destructions to residents and their properties.
Respondents blamed the tragedy to the reckless and imprudent opening of the 3
floodgates by petitioner, without prior warning to the residents within the vicinity
of the dam. Petitioners denied the allegations and contended that they have kept
the water at a safe level, that the opening of floodgates was done gradually, that it
exercises diligence in the selection of its employees, and that written warnings were
sent to the residents. It further contended that there was no direct causal
relationship between the damage and the alleged negligence on their part, that the
residents assumed the risk by living near the dam, and that what happened was a
fortuitous event and are of the nature of damnum absque injuria.
HELD:
The obligor cannot escape liability, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an
act of God, a corresponding fraud, negligence, delay or violation or contravention in
any manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided in Article 1170 of the Civil
Code which results in loss or damage. Even if there was no contractual relation
between themselves and private respondents, they are still liable under the law
on quasi-delict. Article 2176 of the Civil Code explicitly provides "whoever by act or
omission causes damage to another there being fault or negligence is obliged to pay
for the damage done." Act of God or  force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which,
though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the event should
not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one
impossible to foresee or to avoid. The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
strictly requires that the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature.
Human intervention is to be excluded from creating or entering into the cause of
the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of
man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole
occurrence is then humanized and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of
God. In the case at bar, although the typhoon "Kading" was an act of God,
petitioners can not escape liability because their negligence was the proximate
cause of the loss and damage.
SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE vs. CA (G.R. NO. 126389, JUL 10, 1998)
PURISIMA, J
FACTS:
Private respondents filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Pasay City
against the petitioner for the damages. They alleged that on October 11, 1989, at
about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful typhoon "Saling" hit Metro Manila. Buffeted
by very strong winds, the roof of petitioner's building was partly ripped off and
blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private
respondents' house. After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision in
favor of the private respondents and ordering petitioner to pay the amount of
P117,116.00 as actual damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
attorney's fees and costs of suit. In its decision, the trial court gave credence to the
ocular inspection report conducted by Pasay City building officials to the effect that
subject school building owned by petitioner had a defective roofing structure. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision, but reduced the award of
moral damages from P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but to no avail. Hence, the instant petition.

HELD:
The Supreme Court finds the petition meritorious. The Court finds no clear and
convincing evidence to sustain the judgment of the appellate court. In this case,
other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine
the real cause of the partial unroofing of petitioner's school building. Private
respondents did not even show that the plans, specifications and design of said
building were deficient and defective. Neither did they prove any substantial
deviation from the approved plans and specifications. Nor did they conclusively
establish that the construction of such building was basically flawed. In sum, the
Court holds that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon
Saling was the proximate cause of the damage suffered by private respondents'
house. In view thereof, the petition is granted and the challenged decision is
reversed.