TOLENTINO vs.
COMELEC of the Constitution, the same should be submitted to them not separately
(G.R. No. L-34150, October 16, 1971)
FACTS:
A Constitutional Convention was called upon to propose amendments to the
Constitution of the Philippines, in which, the delegates to the said
Convention were all elected under and by virtue of resolutions and the
implementing legislation thereof, Republic Act 6132. The Convention
approved Organic Resolution No. 1, amending section one of article 5 of the
Constitution of the Philippines so as to lower the voting age to 18. Said
resolution also provided in its Section 3 that the partial amendment, which
refers only to the age qualification for the exercise of suffrage shall be
without prejudice to other amendments that will be proposed in the future
by the 1971 Constitutional Convention on other portions of the amended
Section or on other portions of the entire Constitution. The main thrust of
the petition is that Organic Resolution No. 1 and the other implementing
resolutions thereof subsequently approved by the Convention have no force
and effect as laws in so far as they are in contravention to Section 1 Article
XV of the Constitution. Under the said provision, the proposed amendment
in question cannot be presented to the people for ratification separately
from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and proposed by
the Convention.
ISSUE:
Is the Resolution approved by the 1971 Constitutional Convention
constitutional?
HELD:
NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and
the implementing acts and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they
provide for the holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution of the
respondent Comelec complying therewith are null and void. The Court is of
the opinion that in providing for the questioned plebiscite before it has
finished, and separately from, the whole draft of the constitution it has been
called to formulate, the Convention's Organic Resolution No. 1 and all
subsequent acts of the Convention implementing the same violate the
condition in Section 1, Article XV that there should only be one "election" or
plebiscite for the ratification of all the amendments the Convention may
propose. We are not denying any right of the people to vote on the
proposed amendment; We are only holding that under Section 1, Article XV
from but together with all the other amendments to be proposed by this
present Convention. Prescinding already from the fact that under Section 3
of the questioned resolution, it is evident that no fixed frame of reference is
provided the voter, as to what finally will be concomitant qualifications that
will be required by the final draft of the constitution to be formulated by the
Convention of a voter to be able to enjoy the right of suffrage, there are
other considerations which make it impossible to vote intelligently on the
proposed amendment. No one knows what changes in the fundamental
principles of the constitution the Convention will be minded to approve. To
be more specific, we do not have any means of foreseeing whether the right
to vote would be of any significant value at all. Who can say whether or not
later on the Convention may decide to provide for varying types of voters
for each level of the political units it may divide the country into. The root of
the difficulty in other words, lies in that the Convention is precisely on the
verge of introducing substantial changes, if not radical ones, in almost every
part and aspect of the existing social and political order enshrined in the
present Constitution. How can a voter in the proposed plebiscite
intelligently determine the effect of the reduction of the voting age upon
the different institutions which the Convention may establish and of which
presently he is not given any idea? Clearly, there is improper submission.
SANIDAD vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976)
FACTS:
President Marcos issued P.D. 991 calling for a national referendum on
October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies (―Barangay‖) to resolve,
among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present
powers. Thereafter, P.D.1031 was issued, amending P.D. 991 by declaring
the provisions of P.D. 229 applicable as to the manner of voting and
canvassing of votes in barangays for the national referendum-plebiscite of
October 16, 1976. P.D. 1033 was also issued, declaring therein that the
question of the continuance of martial law will be submitted for referendum
at the same time as the submission of his (President) proposed
amendments to the Constitution through a plebiscite on October 16, 1976.
Petitioner Sanidad filed suit for Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction,
seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from holding and conducting said
Referendum-Plebiscite on the basis that under the 1935 and 1973
Constitution, there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the
constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution, hence,
the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no legal basis. Petitioner
Guzman filed another action asserting that the power to propose
amendments to or revision of the Constitution during the transition period
is expressly conferred to the interim National Assembly under sec.16, Art.
XVII of the Constitution. A similar action was instituted by petitioners
Gonzales and Salapantan arguing that: 1. Even granting him legislative
powers under the martial law, the incumbent President cannot act as a
constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution, 2. A
referendum-plebiscite is untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and
1973, 3. The submission of the proposed amendments in such a short period
of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity, 4. To lift martial law,
the President need not consult the people via referendum, and 5. Allowing
15-year-olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution,
which confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18
years of age and above. The Solicitor General, in his comment for
respondent COMELEC, maintains that: 1. Petitioners have no standing to sue
2. The issue raised is political in nature, beyond judicial cognizance of the
court 3. At this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President
has the authority to exercise constituent power 4. The referendum-
plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
ISSUES/RULING:
1) Do the petitioners have the standing to sue?
YES. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds may be enjoined upon the theory that the expenditure of
public funds by the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.
2) Is the question of the constitutionality of the Presidential Decrees
991, 1031, and 1033 political or judicial?
It is a judicial question.
3) Does the President possess the power to propose amendments to
the Constitution as well as set up the required machinery and
prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposal, in the
absence of an interim National Assembly?
YES. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative
functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly
discharge the function of that assembly to propose amendments to the
Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative
power. This is not to say that the President has converted his office into a
constituent assembly of that nature normally constituted by the legislature.
Rather, with the Interim Assembly not convened and only the Presidency
and Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it
imperative upon the President to act as agent for and in behalf of the
people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its
very constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose
amendments without constitutional infractions. For the President to shy
away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process
would leave the governmental machinery at a stalemate or create in the
powers of the State a destructive vacuum. After all, the constituent
assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere
agents of the people.
4) Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments
within the time frame allowed therefore a sufficient and proper
submission?
YES. Art. XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date
when the plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that ―it shall be held
not later than 3 months after the approval of such amendment or revision.‖
The period from September 21 to October 16, or a period of three weeks is
not too short for free debates or discussions on the referendum-plebiscite
issues. The issues are not new. They are the issues of the day, and the
people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law
four years ago. The referendums of 1973 and 1975 carried the same issue of
martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion
is not without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional
amendments.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTOBATO vs. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RP PEACE
PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN
(G.R. No. 183591, October 18, 2008)
FACTS:
When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military
offensive against the MILF was suspended and the government sought a
resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF
member, initially responded with deep reservation, but when President
Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohammad to help convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table,
the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter
and, eventually, decided to meet with the GRP. The parties met in Kuala
Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian
government, the parties signing on the same date the Agreement on the
General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP
and the MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions. Formal
peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22,
2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
(Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the
following aspects of the negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect,
and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect,
the parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed ―that the same be
discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting.‖ A second round of
peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which
ended with the signing of the Implementing Guidelines on the Security
Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between
the parties. This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the
Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia.
Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence between government
forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003. Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman
Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj
Murad, who was then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad‘s
position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal. In
2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala
Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft MOA-AD in its final
form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008. Before
the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious ―consensus‖ ever
embodied in an instrument – the MOA-AD which is assailed principally by
the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893,
183951 and 183962. Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr. On July 23, 2008, the Province of
North Cotabato[and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol filed a petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for
the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern,
petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the
complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and
to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the
contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon.
Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional. This initial petition was followed by several other petitions
by other parties. The Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of the people‘s right to information on matters
of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy
of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987
Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic
Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991?
HELD:
YES. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta, the Court has recognized the statutory
right to examine and inspect public records, a right which was eventually
accorded constitutional status. The right of access to public documents, as
enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has
been recognized as a self-executory constitutional right. In the 1976 case of
Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,the Court ruled that access to public records
is predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of
public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a
legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. The
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the
fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. There can
be no realistic perception by the public of the nation‘s problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to
information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the
members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been
aptly observed: ―Maintaining the flow of such information depends on
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either
process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.‖ In the same way that free
discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their
time, access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic
decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues
confronting the nation, so that they may be able to criticize and participate
in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and effective
manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas
among a well-informed public that a government remains responsive to the
changes desired by the people. The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern
That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter
of public concern faces no serious challenge. In fact, respondents admit that
the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court found
that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of
Deeds, the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws, the
civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS
funds allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the
Marcoses’ alleged ill-gotten wealth,[120] and the identity of party-list
nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the
MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it
does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly
affects the lives of the public at large. Matters of public concern covered by
the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the
consummation of the contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory
nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically
ruled that the right to information ―contemplates inclusion of negotiations
leading to the consummation of the transaction.‖ Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information.
Otherwise, the people can never exercise the right if no contract is
consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public
to expose its defects. Requiring a consummated contract will keep the
public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous
to the government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the
State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a situation
which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a
requirement will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public
discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right
enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We can allow neither an emasculation of a
constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed ―policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.‖ Intended as a
―splendid symmetry‖ to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is
the policy of public disclosure under Section 28, Article II of the Constitution.
The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28
complements the right of access to information on matters of public
concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the
right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the
duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The policy
of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct
of public affairs in a genuinely open democracy, with the people‘s right to
know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by
following such policy. These provisions are vital to the exercise of the
freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people. Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the
records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose.
SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997)
FACTS:
Private respondent Delfin filed with the COMELEC a ―Petition to Amend the
Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People‘s
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Art. XVII of the
1987 Constitution. R.A. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2300. The
proposed amendments consist of the submission of this proposition to the
people—―Do you approve the lifting of the term limits of all elective
officials, amending for the purpose section 4 and 7 of Art.VI, Section 4 of
Art.VII, and Section 8 of Art. X of the Philippine Constitution?‖ The COMELEC
issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the notice of
hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Raul
Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN)
appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco moved to dismiss the
Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory party cognizable by
the COMELEC. Petitioners filed a special civil action directing respondents
COMELEC and Delfin‘s Petition to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of initiative under sec.2 of Art. XVII of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioners raise the following arguments: 1. The
constitutional provision on people‘s initiative to amend the Constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has
been passed. 2. R.A. 6735 failed to provide subtitle initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. It only provides for the
effectivity of the law after the publication in print media indicating that the
Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter
takes effect only upon ratification and not after publication. 3. COMELEC
Resolution No.2300, adopted on January 16, 1991 to govern the ―conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national
and local laws‖, is ultra vires insofar as initiative or amendments to the
Constitution are concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide
rules and regulation for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the
Constitution. Only the Congress is authorized by the Constitution to pass the
implementing law. 4. The people‘s initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, to the revision thereof. Extending or lifting of the term limits
constitutes a revision and is therefore outside the power of the people‘s
initiative. 5. Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people‘s
initiative, neither the COMELEC nor any other department, agency or office
of the government has realigned funds for the purpose. The Supreme Court
gave due course to this petition and granted the Motions for Intervention
filed by Petitioners-Intervenors DIK, MABINI, IBP, LABAN, and Senator Roco.
ISSUES/RULING:
1) Whether Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision?
NO. Although the mode of amendment which bypasses congressional
action, in the last analysis, it is still dependent on congressional action.
While the Constitution has recognized or granted that right, the people
cannot exercise it if the Congress for whatever reason, does not provide for
its implementation.
2) Whether R.A.6735 is a sufficient statutory implementation of the
said constitutional provision?
NO. R.A. 6735 is insufficient and incomplete to fully comply with the power
and duty of the Congress to enact the statutory implementation of sec.2,
Art.XVII of the Constitution. Although said Act intended to include the
system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it is deemed
inadequate to cover that system and accordingly provide for a local initiative
required for proposing Constitutional changes.
3) Whether the COMELEC resolution is valid?
NO. The COMELEC Resolution insofar as it prescribes rules and regulations
on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is void, as
expressed in the Latin maxim ―Potestas delegate non delegari potest. In
every case of permissible delegation, it must be shown that the delegation
itself is valid.
4) Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local
officials as proposed would constitute a revision, or an
amendment to the Constitution?
The resolution of this issue is held to be unnecessary, if not academic, as the
proposal to lift the term limits of elective local and national officials is an
amendment to the Constitution and not a revision. Thus, the petition was
granted, and the COMELEC is permanently enjoined from taking cognizance
of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficiently law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the
implementation of the system.
LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006)
FACTS:
On 15 February 2006, petitioners in G.R. No. 174153, namely Raul L.
Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other
groups and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August
2006, the Lambino Group filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold
a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under Section 5(b)
and (c) and Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative and
Referendum Act ("RA 6735"). The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952 individuals constituting at
least twelve per centum (12%) of all registered voters, with each
legislative district represented by at least three per centum (3%) of
its registered voters. The Lambino Group also claimed that
COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals. The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes
the 1987 Constitution by modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI
(Legislative Department) and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department) and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions." These proposed changes will shift the present
 Bicameral-Presidential system to a UnicameralParliamentary form
of government. The Lambino Group prayed that after due
publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification. On
30 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with
the COMELEC indicating modifications in the proposed Article XVIII
(Transitory Provisions) of their initiative.
ISSUE:
Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution
through a people's initiative.
HELD:
NO. The court declared that Lambino Group's initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to comply with the
requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution that the
initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition." The essence of amendments "directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition" is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the people. This
means two essential elements must be present. First, the people
must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon
a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition. These
essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments is first shown to the people who express their assent
by signing such complete proposal in a petition. Thus, an
amendment is "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" only if the people sign on a petition that contains
the full text of the proposed amendments. The full text of the
proposed amendments may be either written on the face of the
petition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must state the
fact of such attachment. This is an assurance that every one of the
several millions of signatories to the petition had seen the full text
of the proposed amendments before signing. Otherwise, it is
physically impossible, given the time constraint, to prove that every
one of the millions of signatories had seen the full text of the
proposed amendments before signing. Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution does not expressly state that the petition must set
forth the full text of the proposed amendments. However, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution clearly show that
the framers intended to adopt the relevant American jurisprudence
on people's initiative. In particular, the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission explicitly reveal that the framers
intended that the people must first see the full text of the proposed
amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign on a
petition containing such full text. Indeed, Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 6735, the Initiative and Referendum Act that the Lambino
Group invokes as valid, requires that the people must sign the
"petition x x x as signatories." The proponents of the initiative
secure the signatures from the people. The proponents secure the
signatures in their private capacity and not as public officials. The
proponents are not disinterested parties who can impartially explain
the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed amendments to
the people. The proponents present favorably their proposal to the
people and do not present the arguments against their proposal.
The proponents, or their supporters, often pay those who gather
the signatures. Thus, there is no presumption that the proponents
observed the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the burden of proving that they
complied with the constitutional requirements in gathering the
signatures - that the petition contained, or incorporated by
attachment, the full text of the proposed amendments. For sure, the
great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before
signing. They could not have known the nature and effect of the
proposed changes, among which are: 1. The term limits on
members of the legislature will be lifted and thus members of
Parliament can be reelected indefinitely; 2. The interim Parliament
can continue to function indefinitely until its members, who are
almost all the present members of Congress, decide to call for new
parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim
Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office;
3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments
or revisions to the Constitution. These three specific amendments
are not stated or even indicated in the Lambino Group's signature
sheets. The people who signed the signature sheets had no idea
that they were proposing these amendments. These three proposed
changes are highly controversial. The people could not have inferred
or divined these proposed changes merely from a reading or
rereading of the contents of the signature sheets. The Constitution
entrusts to the people the power to directly propose amendments
to the Constitution. This Court trusts the wisdom of the people even
if the members of this Court do not personally know the people who
sign the petition. However, this trust emanates from a fundamental
assumption: the full text of the proposed amendment is first shown
to the people before they sign the petition, not after they have
signed the petition.