CANON 10

1. CONRADO G. FERNANDEZ vs. ATTY. MARIA ANGELICA P. DE RAMOS-

VILLALON
A.C. No. 7084, 580 SCRA 310, February 27, 2009
BRION, J.:
This is an administrative case filed by complainant Conrado G. Fernandez against Atty.
Maria Angelica P. De Ramos-Villalon.
Facts:
It was discovered by Palacios that Fernandez had falsified a Deed of Donation that he
(Palacios) purportedly executed in Fernandez’ favor in order acquire the lot that Palacios
inherited the lot from his mother. Palacios then employed the services of respondent Atty.
Villalon to file a Complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation that
became
the basis for the issuance of a title in Conrado G. Fernandez’ name.
Fernandez claimed that the transfer of title in his name was proper on account of an
existing Deed of Absolute Sale between him and Palacios. He also alleged that it was
Palacios
who falsified a Deed of Donation by forging their signatures and having it notarized; Palacios
did this in order to cheat the government by paying only the donor’s tax, which was lower
than
the capital gains tax he would have paid had the transaction been represented as a sale. He
additionally alleged that Palacios intended to falsify the Deed of Donation in order to have a
ground for the annulment of the new TCT issued in favor of Fernandez and, ultimately, to
recover the property. He also filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Villalon
for
violation of Rule 1.01, Rule 7.03, Rule 10.01, Rule 10.02, and Rule 10.03 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Villalon be disbarred for suppression of evidence.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the charges against the respondent do not constitute
sufficient grounds for disbarment. A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to be
truthful
in all his dealings. However, this duty does not require that the lawyer advance matters of
defense on behalf of his or her client’s opponent. A lawyer is his or her client’s advocate;
while
duty-bound to utter no falsehood, an advocate is not obliged to build the case for his or her
client’s opponent. The respondent’s former client, Palacios, approached her to file a
complaint
for the annulment of the Deed of Donation. This was the cause of action chosen by her client.
Assuming arguendo that the respondent knew of the presence of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
its
existence, is, indeed, a matter of defense for Fernandez. The respondent cannot be faulted for
choosing not to pursue the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondent alleged
that her former client, Palacios, informed her that the Deed of Absolute Sale was void for
lack
of consideration. Furthermore, unlike the Deed of Donation, the Deed of Absolute Sale was
not
registered in the Registry of Deeds and was not the basis for the transfer of title of Palacios’
property to Fernandez. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for a lawyer to
conclude, whether correctly or incorrectly, that the Deed of Absolute Sale was immaterial in
achieving the ultimate goal – the recovery of Palacios’ property.
Adjudication:
The complaint for Disbarment is dismissed.

2. Intestate Estate of Jose Uy vs. Atty.

Pacifico Maghari A.C. No. 10525, Sept.
1, 2015
Facts:

Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the RTC praying that she be
designated administratrix of the estate of her common-law partner, the deceased
Jose Uy. Hofileña was initially designated administratrix. However, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofileña as administratix was filed by
Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy’s children, on behalf of Jose Uy’s spouse and other
children. In its Order the RTC designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy’s
estate. Subsequently, Hofileña’s claims in the settlement of Jose Uy’s estate were
granted. Hence, she filed a Motion for Execution.

In other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims to Jose Uy’s estate, Hofileña
was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El (Atty. Natu-el). In a
pleading filed in the course of these proceedings Atty. Natu-El indicated the
following details:

MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
10
MCLENO. 0015970  (Emphasis supplied)
Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash
Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of
Johnny K.H. Uy. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
15
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/09  (Emphasis supplied)

Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy’s Motion to Quash.

Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply to Wilson Uy’s Opposition. In
signing this Reply, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
18
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/09  (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC subsequently denied Magdalena Uy’s Motion to Quash. Thereafter,

Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for Reconsideration. In signing this
Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
21
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/09 (Emphasis supplied)

As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a
Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum. In signing this Motion, Maghari
indicated the following details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
24
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/09  (Emphasis supplied)

At this point, Wilson Uy’s counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the
March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar
examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records. Upon doing so, he
learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the professional details
indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying the professional
details of Atty. Natu-El.

Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for disbarment. Pointing to
Maghari’s act of repeatedly a changing and using another lawyer’s professional
details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer’s Oath and acted in a
deceitful manner.

For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III
engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper penalty may be meted on him.

Issue:

Whether the Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility when he

failed to put his correct Attorney Details in his pleadings?

Held:

Yes, A counsel’s signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply
with this requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of
legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of
satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one’s client. A
deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a client’s cause.As with the signature itself,
these requirements are not vain formalities: The inclusion of a counsel’s Roll of
Attorneys number, professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended to preserve
and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek to ensure that only those who
have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage in it. With the Roll of
Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer
has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar. With the professional tax receipt
number, they can verify if the same person is qualified to engage in a profession in
the place where he or she principally discharges his or her functions. With the IBP
receipt number, they can ascertain if the same person remains in good standing as a
lawyer. These pieces of information protect the public from bogus lawyers. Paying
professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise compliance
with a revenue mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local government
units.
 The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from)
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is
reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for
“keep[ing] abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the
profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of the practice of law.”

Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel’s address and contact details is designed to

facilitate the dispensation of justice. These pieces of information aid in the service of
court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and facilitate
better representation of a client’s cause.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having clearly violated

his Lawyer’s Oath and the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility through
his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.

3.

Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. vs. Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua

A. C. No. 6942 July 17, 2013
FACTS:
On September 5, 2005, STEELCORP applied for a search warrant directed against complainant
Sonic Steel Industries, Inc. which was later on granted by the RTC. Sonic Steel Industries, Inc.
was searched and its properties were seized. STEELCORP, thereafter, filed before the
Department of Justice a complaint against complainant and latter's officers. Complainant asserts
that respondent Atty. Chua, based on the three documents, deliberately misled the Court as well
as the DOJ in stating that STEELCORP is the exclusive licensee of the Philippine Patent No.
16269. The acts committed by respondent of storing, selling, retailing, distributing, importing,
dealing with or otherwise disposing of "SUPERLUME" metal sheet products which are similar
to "GALVALUME" metal sheet products constitute unfair competition because the entire process
of which has been lawfully and exclusively licensed to STEELCORP by BIEC International, Inc.
it also appears that respondent Atty. Chua deliberately misled and intentionally deceived the
Court when it refused to provide a copy of a Philippine Patent No. 16269 during the hearing for
the application for a search warrant.

ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua's acts violated Canon 10 of the Code on
Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
The Court suspended Atty. Nonnatus P. Chua from the practice of law for 6 months. In the
present case, respondent Atty. Chua claimed or made to appear that STEELCORP was the
licensee of the technical information and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands or
Philippine Patent No. 16269. Investigation made by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines'
Commission on Bar Discipline showed that STEELCORP has only rights as a licensee of the
technical information and not the rights as a licensee of the patent. Rule 10.01 of the Code of the
Professional Responsibility provides that, "A lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."

4.

DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR. v. ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL

A.C. No. 7325, January 21, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.

FACTS:

OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando
and Efren. When the agrarian reform law was enacted, emancipation patents and titles were issued to
Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to
complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) issued a decision ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from
OCT No. 433 stating that it was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to
and affirmed by the DARAB Central Board and the Court of Appeals. Atty. Caracol, as “Add’l Counsel for
the Plaintiffs-Movant,” filed a motion for execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for
the full implementation of the decision. Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of
Execution and Demolition which he signed as “Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela.” Villahermosa filed
this complaint alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no
authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have
authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already been dead for more than a
year. He claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly
bought the same parcel of land. Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as
“additional counsel”. He said that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the
filing. Moreover, he stated that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto
Aguirre’s favor. In its Report and Recommendation, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct.

ISSUE:

Is Atty. Caracol guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court?

RULING:
 YES. The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s
appearance on behalf of his client, hence:

SEC. 21.  Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him
to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a
case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to
any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires.  An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave
of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions. (Emphases supplied)

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without
being retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court. If an
attorney appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant
whom he purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance
unless the purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority. If a lawyer corruptly or
willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case without authority, he may be disciplined or
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.

Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for
Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious
lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented authority that he was
retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.

Atty. Caracol was found guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, he was suspended from the practice of law for one
year.

5.

Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray, Complainant, v. Atty. Deborah Z.

Daquis, Respondent | A.C. No 10868, 26 January 2016
December 20, 2017

Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray, Complainant, v. Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis, Respondent

A.C. No 10868, 26 January 2016
Facts:
    Complainant filed a complaint affidavit before the IBP on 30 July 2007, alleging the
respondent filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her
consent and forged her signature on the Petition. She also alleged that the respondent
signed the said Petition as “Counsel for the Petitioner.” referring to the complainant. The
complainant stated the respondent was not her counsel but that of her husband, Leomarte
Regala Tamaray.

Issue:
    Whether or not the respondent violated the canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Held:
    By pretending to be the counsel of the complainant, the respondent violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the CPR. For allowing the use of petition with the forged signature of the
complainant, the respondent violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
CPR.

    Other acts of the respondent that violated Rule 7.03, Canon 7 of the CPR are as follows:
engaging in a scuffle inside court chambers; openly doubting paternity of the complainant’s
son; hurling incentives at a Clerk of Court; harassing occupants of a property; using
intemperate language; and engaging in an extramarital affair.

    The Supreme Court fin the respondent guilty of violating the following provisions of the
CPR: Rule 1.01, Canon 1; Rule 7.03, Canon 7; Rule 10.01, Canon 10; and Canon 17.
Violation against Rule 15.03, Canon 15 by the respondent was dismissed. The respondent
was disbarred and her name removed from the Roll of Attorneys.

6.

In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty

AM No. 10-10-4-SC
 Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS:

On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was
promulgated with Justice Mariano del Castillo as its ponente.  Motion for
reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds but most
notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at
least 3 books and articles in discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga
omnes, but have also twisted such quotations making it appear contrary to the
intent of the original works.  The authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles
are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus
Cogens published in 2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2) Christian J.
Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in Internation Law published by the
Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On
Rape as an International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal
of Internation Law in 2006.  Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the
Supreme Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to
the Chief Justice expressing discontent by the questioned act of Justice del
Castillo.

On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on
the matter of plagiarism by issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A
statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on
the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court”
signed overall 37 faculty members.   In said article, the faculty expressly gave
their dismay saying that the court had the hopes of relief from those “comfort
women” during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty
and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the Land.” 

In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and

misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own, is considered as
“dishonesty, pure and simple.”  Hence, it was argued that since the decision in
the Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is
allowing dishonesty to be promulgated.  Furthermore, the plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial system of our
country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article
sought for the resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo.

In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the
remarks and choice of words used were such a great insult to the members of
the Court and a threat to the independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.  Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause on
why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for such alleged
violations.

In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common

Compliance stating therein that their intention in issuing the article in question
“was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and
to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein as
“focusing on constructive action.”  Also, it was alleged that the respondents are
correct in seeking responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he, indeed,
committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the article.  Furthermore,
the respondents argued that the article in question is a valid exercise of the
freedom of expression as citizens of a democracy, and an exercise of academic
freedom.

ISSUES:

                W/N the UP Law Faculty’s actions constitute violation of various

Canons and Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

Yes.  The Court ruled that the Common Compliance given by the respondent-
signatories in the questioned article is not sufficient in reasoning why they should
not be disciplined as members of the Bar.

“…the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to
use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their
clients.

“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage,
such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language.
Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

“On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain
from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s
language even in his pleadings must be dignified.

“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech.”

“In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as
lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound
by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not
claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the
same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established
ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees,
professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily
taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to
conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption
from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic
community or the law school to which they belong.”

The Court further reminded the respondent law professors “of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give
due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language
tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the Court and
the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.”