Building the

Returnee State
RETURNEE INTEGRATION IN SOUTH SUDAN

MAY 2013
 Building the
Returnee State
RETURNEE INTEGRATION IN SOUTH SUDAN

BY
PETER BIAR AJAK
ZECHARIAH MANYOK BIAR
GREG LARSON

MAY 2013

Standards for use of the UK aid logo June 2012

Acknowledgements
The Centre for Strategic Analyses and Research (C-SAR) wishes to express its sincere gratitude to colleagues
who helped in the production of this paper, in particular Megan Carroll for her contributions on the
literature review and inputs into the survey questionnaire; and Alireza Abdolahzadeh for his analysis of the
data used in the paper. Several other colleagues, particularly the members of the Board of C-SAR and peer
reviewers (who will not be mentioned here) provided extremely helpful comments and suggestions during the
drafting of this paper, and the authors are grateful for their encouragement and thoughtful perspectives.

C-SAR is also grateful to the National Bureau of Statistics for its assistance in collecting and collating the
data during the course of this research, and helpful comments into sampling strategies. We also appreciate
the hospitality of the government officials of Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal states, particularly
the two Secretaries General for their assistance in the coordination of our visits. Finally, C-SAR remains
extremely grateful to the Government of the United Kingdom through its Department for International
Development (DFID) for the financial and technical support it provided that made this paper possible.

Release date: May 2013

Centre for Strategic Analyses and Research

Hamza Inn
Juba Town,
Juba, South Sudan
www.csar-rss.org

© COPYRIGHT 2013. CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSES AND RESEARCH. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
ALL PHOTOS COURTESY GREG LARSON.
Executive Summary
“THE RETURNEE STATE”

As the world’s newest country, South Sudan faces countless challenges for development and post-conflict
reconstruction. Among these challenges is the daunting effort to repatriate and reintegrate a large portion of
its citizenry that was displaced during decades of war. Since peace came to the region, refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDPs) who left South Sudan during conflict have been returning home. The new nation is,
in a sense, a returnee state. The successful reintegration of returnees is a critical pillar of South Sudan’s state
building, and a crucial component in the transformation of this war-torn country into a viable economic and
political entity.

While complete data is unavailable, the first South Sudanese census reflected that 1.8 million returnees
repatriated to South Sudan between 2004 and 2008. More recent data reflects that a half million additional
returnees repatriated between late 2010 and early 2012. Many have yet to return; every day, members of the
South Sudanese diaspora travel from all over the world to return to their home country. The return of such a
large number of people poses many challenges to both the government and development partners. However,
there is also enormous potential in South Sudan, and the influx of returnees—many with advanced skills
and high levels of education—presents a distinct development opportunity.

The aim of this study is to better understand the reintegration process and the challenges faced by returnees,
and the policies employed by the South Sudanese government and its development partners to facilitate
smooth reintegration. The study employs both quantitative and qualitative data; 445 returnees and 274 host
community members were surveyed during the course of research, primarily in Northern and Western Bahr
El Ghazal states, and focus groups with key stakeholders were conducted.

Reintegration is explored within the larger context of South Sudan’s post-conflict reconstruction; as such,
the level of analysis is both micro-level (within returnee communities) and macro-level (issues and challenges
affecting the entire nation). The report provides recommendations to policymakers on broad strategies to
facilitate reintegration and help returnees get back to productive lives as positive contributors to South
Sudan’s reconstruction.

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING REINTEGRATION

C-SAR’s assessment employs three main instruments to assess the success of reintegration: access to
employment and economic opportunity; ability to set up permanent resettlement; and access to social
services. Each individual returnee arrives in South Sudan with a set of initial conditions—such as education,
previous work experience, and the holding of assets. These initial conditions comprise an individual’s
“returnee capital,” which is both valuable to the host community and essential in determining the success of
that returnee’s reintegration. Also important to consider are the “prevailing conditions” of the environment
to which the returnee comes back— such as security, economic opportunities, availability of natural
resources, the level of government regulation of markets, and the extent and quality of government service
delivery. This report analyzes the ability of returnees to obtain jobs, to put up permanent settlements, and to
receive social services through the interaction of “returnee capital” and the “prevailing conditions” in South Sudan.

3
KEY FINDINGS

Returnee Capital:
The study came to the conclusion that the current population of South Sudanese returnees holds only
minimal returnee capital. There were three observable features of returnee capital that were analyzed:

t Education: Overall average education levels between returnees and host community members is quite
small and is not even statistically significant.

t
Work experience: A substantial portion of returnees had access to jobs in their locations of exile.
However, the work experience possessed by returnees is not necessarily the type of experience currently
demanded in South Sudan’s labor market.

t
Physical assets: Some returnees brought physical assets upon their return, but the overwhelming majority
came with very little. Some returnees have had to sell their assets since returning, in order to
supplement family income.

Prevailing Conditions:
Aweil and Wau are both small-holder agro-based societies with limited industry and service sectors. Over
three-quarters of households in Northern Bahr El Ghazal and nearly two-thirds of households in Western
Bahr El Ghazal are engaged in crop farming and animal husbandry. The data shows that returnees do not
particularly hold a comparative advantage in farming compared to host community members, perhaps due to
the fact that they do not have experience.

In addition to difficult prevailing conditions, the private sector in Greater Bahr El Ghazal has been hit
by a host of exogenous constraints over the last few years, such as: shortages of dollars; border closure;
introduction of new currencies in Sudan and South Sudan; poor infrastructure; and increased fuel costs. The
researchers also observed endogenous constraints to private sector activity, which include: limited access to
finance; conflicts of interest among government officials; unmotivated and unskilled employees; and lack of
regulation in the market.

Access to Employment and Economic Opportunity:

Returnees have experienced less access to employment and economic opportunity compared to members of
the host community. These findings are somewhat counterintuitive, because one would expect returnees from
more developed regions to fare well, since they gained experience and skills. Perceptions among returnees
suggest that employers discriminate against them when hiring for paid positions.

Ability to Set up Permanent Settlement:

A vast majority of returnees have been unable to return to their ancestral homes and have instead remained
in the urban centers under poor settlement conditions. The most salient impediments to resettlement
are complications regarding land distribution and the issuance of land title deeds. Moreover, the size of
land allocated by the government is often only sufficient for housing alone and does not afford space for
cultivation.

Access to Social Services:

Most returnees who remained within urban areas did so to be near services; however, most have had dismal
experiences in accessing services. The poor delivery of services that returnees are experiencing in Northern
and Western Bahr El Ghazal is a phenomenon occurring across South Sudan; the majority of expenditures in
health, education, and agriculture are actually funded and implemented by donors.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The reintegration process in Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal has not been highly successful. While
this analysis does not suggest the process has been a total failure, it does underscore that reintegration is
riddled with constraints and complex challenges. The paper concludes with key micro- and macro-level policy
recommendations.

Relaxing constraints in South Sudan’s “prevailing conditions” will require addressing market failures and
government policy shortcomings, as well as the adoption of a whole array of pro-growth policies; unless
South Sudan’s private sector grows, jobs will not be created. Meanwhile, the data suggests that several micro-
level interventions would be effective in helping returnees more quickly transition to productive lives. These
include: distribution of agriculture and fishery inputs such as seeds, farming tools, fishing nets, and other
inputs to promote cultivation; skills training in relevant trades such as farming, carpentry, and basic business
skills; and microfinance and SME lending through banks to provide access to capital for entrepreneurs and
small business owners.

Several macro-level policy reforms can address larger systemic issues affecting the returnee reintegration
process. These center on building the capacity of the government, at both national and state levels. Quality of
government policy will improve only as capacity improves; this is true for improving economic management,
service delivery, the reintegration process, or any number of crucial challenges facing the new country.

At the state level, governments should attempt to create more efficient markets and remove the most binding
constraints to effective returnee reintegration. These include: formulating and implementing clear land
policies; improving service delivery; providing targeted subsidies to the private sector; protecting indigenous
companies; regulating public officials’ entry into private sector; and public works programs to spur job
creation.

To achieve the micro-level policy recommendations, the report suggests centralizing efforts and resources
for returnee reintegration, in order to achieve greater coordination and improved targeting by donors
and government. The report endorses the creation of a pooled fund to allocate resources directly to local
communities, to fund income-generating activities that are proposed, initiated, and executed by and through
the local returnee and host communities. Such a process would empower communities—providing them
with opportunities to “learn-by-doing” and to gain experience running their own affairs. Implementing
macro-level policy reform is substantially more precarious, requiring the government to address its core
challenges. The section and the report concludes with a detailed analysis of the feasibility of C-SAR’s major
macro-level policy recommendations.

A freshly independent post-conflict state, South Sudan has a long list of challenges to confront. This report
argues that returnee reintegration should be chief among this list—primarily because it is an issue that
underscores many of the most pressing public policy challenges facing the nascent country. Moreover,
returnee reintegration is a core component to the state-building project. The manner and efficacy with which
South Sudan handles its reintegration problem will, in many ways, profoundly shape the future course of this
modern returnee state.

5
List of Abbreviations
ANLA Annual Needs and Livelihoods Analysis

CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

C-SAR Centre for Strategic Analyses and Research

DFID Department for International Development

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

GoSS Government of South Sudan

KCB Kenyan Commercial Bank

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IOM International Organization for Migration

NBS National Bureau of Statistics

NCP National Congress Party

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

PPP Public-Private Partnership

RRP Relief, Reintegration and Peace-Building

RTGSS Reintegration Theme Group in South Sudan

SME Small and Medium-sized Enterprise

SPLM Sudan People’s Liberation Movement

SSRRC South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Program

UNMISS United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

WFP World Food Program

WHO World Health Organization

Table of Contents
9 PART I: INTRODUCTION

11 PART II: LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Displacement & Return in South Sudan: Brief History
2. Key Challenges of Reintegration
2.1. Overview of Livelihoods
2.2. Rural vs. Urban Reintegration
3. Current Efforts for Reintegration
3.1. Best Practices Thus Far
3.2. Shift from Humanitarian to Development

17 PART III: REPORT OF DATA ANALYSES

1. Setting the Stage
2. Data, Methodology, and Demographics
3. Results, Interpretations, and Discussions
3.1. Access to Economic Opportunity
i. Interpreting and Explaining the Findings
ii. Returnee Capital
a. Education
b. Work Experience
c. Assets
ii. Prevailing Conditions
a. Exogenous Constraints
b. Endogenous Constraints
3.2. Setting up Permanent Settlement
3.3. Returnees’ Access to Social Services
4. Conclusion and Some Caveats on the Findings

31 PART IV: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Introduction
2. Micro-Level Policy Recommendations
3. Macro-Level Policy Recommendations

37 PART V: IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES

Bibliography
Oral Interviews
Part I
INTRODUCTION
The signing of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 between the
National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan
Peoples’ Liberation Movement (SPLM) ended
decades of brutal civil war and unleashed an era
of reconstruction and development in the region
of newly independent South Sudan. The interim
Government of South Sudan (GoSS) faced the
daunting task of forming government institutions
for the first time, the challenge of providing security
in an environment used to constant strife, and
the burden of meeting the high expectations of its
citizens among a host of other challenges.
Amidst these challenges lies the critical task of
repatriating and reintegrating a large portion of
South Sudan’s citizenry that was displaced during
conflict, both internally within Sudan and externally
as refugees in foreign countries. As soon as the guns
went silent, the refugees and internally displaced
persons (IDPs) started to return to their homeland
in large numbers. The return continued during the
entire six-year transition period established by the
CPA, accelerating before the referendum and after
the declaration of the Referendum’s results (IOM,
2012a). The independence of South Sudan in July
2011, splitting one country into two, led Khartoum
to forcefully evict a large portion of South Sudanese
who had been living in current Sudan. These South
Sudanese returned in large numbers and under a
short timeframe, imposing a great burden on the
already fragile environment and nearly causing a
humanitarian catastrophe. Worse still, the large
evictions by Khartoum of South Sudanese occurred
amidst an oil row that further pressured the nascent
economy of the country (Ajak, 2012).
The reintegration of returnees is one of many
policy objectives facing South Sudan among the
overall goals of development and post-conflict
reconstruction. Development is most fertile in
environments of peace, improved state capability,
and improved economic growth. South Sudan
does not have the benefit of a fertile context;
the new country is striving to maintain a fragile
peace, and has only recently laid the foundation
for state institutions and for long-term economic
development. Given its legacy of massive wartime
displacement, South Sudan is, in a sense, a returnee
state. As such, successful reintegration of former
IDPs and refugees is a critical pillar of state
building, development, reconstruction, and the
transformation of a former conflict-ridden society
into a viable economic and political entity (Boutros-
Ghali, 1992).
Such are the lenses through which this paper
approaches the question of returnee reintegration.
The study employs both quantitative and qualitative
data to understand returnee livelihoods; access to
economic opportunity and the establishment of
settlements; and benefit from government services.
Data collection was conducted in the states of
Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal and as such,
the paper focuses in particular on these regions of
South Sudan.
The objective of this study is to better understand
the reintegration process and the challenges faced
by returnees, their coping strategies, and the policies
employed by the government and its development
partners to facilitate smooth reintegration. Further,
the paper explores how such policies enable an
environment conducive for economic growth,
employment, the ability to set up permanent
settlements, and enhanced access to services. The
paper provides recommendations to policymakers on
broad strategies to enable reintegration within the
overall framework of state building.
9
Part II
LITERATURE REVIEW
1. Displacement & Return in South
Sudan: Brief History
Forced migration occurred during different periods
of time in South Sudan. From 1956 to 1972, the
Anya-Nya 1 War displaced over one million people,
of which 220,000 were refugees; many returned
to South Sudan after the Addis Ababa Peace
Agreement of 1972, but a large number remained
in North Sudan (Akol, 1987). During the period of
stability between 1972 and 1983, other conditions
such as famine and flood-induced epidemics forced
many South Sudanese to immigrate north as well
(Assal, 2011). An estimated four million people
were displaced during the second civil war from
1983 to 2005. Displacement often occurred in
multiple successions; after fleeing to refugee camps
in Ethiopia during the early periods of the war,
South Sudanese including the so-called “lost boys”
group were forced back into war-torn Sudan after
the fall of the Derg in 1987. By 1991, more than half
a million refugees had already fled to neighboring
countries; additionally, nearly 1 million South
Sudanese lived in harsh conditions in the greater
Khartoum area. (Geoffroy, 2007).
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in
2005 ended the war; after a 6-year interim period,
South Sudan achieved independence on July 9, 2011,
and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) was
born. The CPA also established the South Sudan
Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC)
to oversee reconstruction efforts; the SSRRC is the
governmental authority concerning repatriation,
rehabilitation, resettlement, and reintegration of
returnees.
Many returns are voluntary and difficult to track,
making it difficult to obtain accurate numbers and
locations of returnees (Tadesse, 2012). According
to the 2008 census conducted by GoSS, around
1,812,300 returnees had repatriated to South Sudan
since 2004 (NBS, 2010). Recent data from the
International Organization for Migration (IOM)
shows that an additional 591,472 returned from
October 2010 to April 2012 (IOM, 2012a). Many
have yet to return from Khartoum, and every day,
members of the South Sudanese diaspora travel from
countries all over the world to return to their home
country (Peterson, 2012).
In recent years, the non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), UN agencies and GoSS have organized
and facilitated large-scale returns, mainly of
those living in North Sudan (Shanmugaratnam,
2010). Since the majority of returnees have been
displaced for many years (or were actually born
outside of South Sudan), the process of adjustment
and reintegration is difficult. Returnees can often
experience varying degrees of cultural differences
and language barriers upon resettlement; the youth,
in particular, know very little about the South.
2. Key Challenges of Reintegration
The return of such a large number of people poses
many challenges to both GoSS and development
partners. The two main governmental agencies
dealing with returnees are the Ministry of
Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management,
which deals with emergency response only, and the
SSRRC, which is responsible for both short and
long term reintegration. While there is no written
document or plan for reintegration, the informal
policy of GoSS is that returnees should resettle
in their areas of family origin (Interviews i, xii).
However, very few actions have been taken by the
government to implement this tacit policy, and
returnees are essentially free to settle where they
choose. Lacking any national or state guidelines,
local leaders at the county, payam, and boma
levels ultimately choose how to deal with returnees
(Interview xv). But the majority of returnees choose
to settle in urban areas, for a variety of reasons—
11
from preference to lack of social capital in their
areas of origin to a perceived availability of paid
employment in urban areas.
The details and implementation of reintegration are
thus mostly left to the development partners. The
leading agency for returnee issues is IOM, which
facilitates the physical transit of returnees and is
the leading partner on reintegration strategy. A
wide network of other UN agencies and NGOs
coordinate interventions aimed at supporting
returnees. Various government agencies are
tangentially involved; but across all agencies and at
all levels, the government is struggling to cope with
the increasing demands on resources and human
capacity in the process of the returnees’ reintegration
(Shanmugaratnam, 2010). Many government
programs aimed to support returnee reintegration
have encountered difficulties in implementation due
to lack of resources (Pantuliano, 2009).
2.1. Overview of Livelihoods
During the interim period and especially
approaching independence in 2011, South Sudan
experienced notable improvements in food security.
More recently, however, certain risk factors that
undermine such gains have also intensified. In late
2011 and early 2012, border tensions and the oil
shutdown led to higher food prices, declined cross-
border trade, and pervasive insecurity. Such shocks
negatively effected livelihoods, worsened food
security, and constrained access to service facilities
such as schools, health facilities, and markets
(ANLA Technical Group, 2012).
Considering the challenges to creating sustainable
livelihood opportunities in South Sudan, the high
returnee influx has only aggravated the already
fragile dynamic. An additional dimension is that
returnees often do not have the same knowledge of
distress or coping/survival strategies and skills as
those who remained in South Sudan throughout
the war periods (Interview xviii). While various
organizations conduct periodic livelihoods
assessments in areas of high return, there is very
little research that focuses specifically on livelihood
opportunities within returnee populations
(Abdelnour et al 2008). Such a dearth of statistics
and rigorous evidence makes planning for returnees’
needs more challenging.
However, there is also enormous potential in
South Sudan—and the influx of returnees (many
with advanced skills and high levels of education)
presents a distinct development opportunity. South
Sudan is well endowed with natural resources, in
addition to oil and minerals. Currently, only 4%
of arable land is cultivated, livestock production
is 20% of potential, and fish is about 10% of
potential (ANLA, 2012). These provide immense
opportunities to enhance overall economic and
social wellbeing in South Sudan. The unique aspects
of returnee reintegration make it a crucial issue that
can and should be harnessed to achieve progress on
the country’s development goals.
2.2. Rural vs. Urban Reintegration
Rural communities tend to be supportive of
reintegration, as returnees are often relatives
(Maxwell, Gelsdorf, & Santschi, 2012). However,
since the host community often shares food and
other assets with the newly returned community
members, the issue of returnee reintegration puts
a serious strain on already scarce resources. Rural
livelihoods are based on subsistence farming,
causing townspeople and villagers to run out
of resources quickly when a large number of
returnees come under their support. Such issues are
compounded in regions already suffering from high
rates of poverty—such as Northern Bahr El Ghazal,
which also experienced the shock of flooding in
2012—or regions suffering from additional conflict-
based displacement and malnutrition, such as Unity
or Upper Nile.
Returnees decide to settle in urban areas for various
social, political, and economic reasons. Many of
them are not accustomed to life in rural settings and
others are seeking employment. However, as will
be shown in the survey data, job prospects in urban
areas of South Sudan are already highly scarce.
The influx of returnees only makes matters more
difficult.
Access to land is another major issue for returnees
(Newhouse, 2012). In rural areas of South Sudan,
land is relatively plentiful. When returnees stay
in urban areas, however, land access is difficult.
Urban areas are rapidly growing—and as towns
grow, land for settlement is growing scarce, and
land for cultivation is not easily acquired close
to urban centers (Martin & Mosell, 2011). Even
when State Ministries of Physical Infrastructure
and Agriculture adopt policies that help returnees,
implementation of those policies is often
problematic. The South Sudan Land Act, 2009
has not been implemented consistently in all areas,
and many returnees (and South Sudanese citizens
in general) are not even aware of the Land Act’s
particularities (Interview xiv).
3. Current Efforts for Reintegration
Despite early and widespread anticipation of the
influx of returnees and its challenges, the process of
formulating a coordinated response has been slow.
As noted, initial efforts by GoSS as well as UN
agencies, NGO partners, and donors were focused
on humanitarian assistance (Maxwell, Gelsdorf,
& Santschi, 2012). The major concerns were
transporting returnees, repatriation, distributing
rations, and assessing levels of food security and
livelihoods.
Humanitarian assistance begins even before
a returnee arrives in South Sudan. IOM, in
coordination with the Ministry of Humanitarian
Affairs, assists returnees with transportation
logistics and coordination, to ensure safe transit
back to the returnees’ final destination. The World
Food Program (WFP) supplies each returnee with a
“reintegration package” comprising a 3-month food
ration. Depending on budget and partner support,
the packages may also contain plastic sheeting, soap,
and other non-food items to support the returnees’
settlement process. Health monitoring and support
are provided by the World Health Organization
(WHO), along with help from partners like Save the
Children and South Sudan Red Cross (Interview
vi).
After the returnees arrive at their final destination,
little follow-up is done on their integration,
especially if the area of final destination is
considered a food-secure area (Maxwell, Gelsdorf,
& Santschi, 2012). The returnees have to rely on
their host communities or even use their limited
assets to bridge the gap of their needs; as noted
by Maxwell et al, there is almost non-existence
between reintegration and recovery strategies in
humanitarian aid plans.
3.1. Best Practices Thus Far
Since most interventions targeting returnees have
been humanitarian in nature, they have lacked
strong emphasis on sustainability or community
empowerment. Recognizing the need for a
sustainable shift from humanitarian to development
support, donor agencies, UN organizations and
NGOs are beginning to focus on broad community-
based initiatives rather than humanitarian support
to individual returnees. Several recent successful
programs highlight the long-term development
potential of reintegration efforts; this section will
focus on a few such programs.
Community Empowerment
IOM has recently started community empowerment
programs in areas of high return, identifying
two main program areas to support its long-term
reintegration strategy: a) Community Security
through Youth Employment, which focuses on
creating vocational training and employment
opportunities for youth, and b) Peace and Stability
Quick Impact Fund, which initiates projects
focused on four sub-areas: small-scale community
infrastructure, such as the repair of water points;
livelihoods and market support, such as the
establishment of community markets; media and
advocacy; and dialogue efforts between returnee
and host communities. (Interviews vi, vii).
13
Sustainable Food-for-Work Assistance
The WFP’s Food for Assets program provides
food aid to individuals on the condition that they
are active in certain productive activities, such as
cultivation or community service. (Interview xxi).
In Northern Bahr El Ghazal (one of the field sites
for this study), Food for Assets represents about
40 percent of the World Food Program’s 2012
target population for Northern Bahr El Ghazal.
The conditionality of Food for Assets is more
geared towards sustainable development, because
it encourages the beneficiaries to become self-
sufficient.
Agriculture
The United Nations FAO’s programming
helps returnees engage in agriculture, animal
husbandry, and fishery activities. Primarily, this
program comprises distribution of seeds and
other agricultural inputs to farmers, such as
tools, irrigation pumps, and ox-plows. In 2012,
approximately 10,000 farmers benefited from the
program. Demand for this program continually
outpaces supply, and UNFAO has experienced “seed
gap” problems due to rising seed prices, inadequate
funding, and a nationwide lack of improved and
quality seeds; FAO is trying to increase domestic
seed production (Interview xvii).
FAO also implements “farmer field schools”—a
training program for agriculture, animal husbandry,
and fishery activities. This program complements
the input distributions, as farmers who receive
inputs like seeds are eligible for local trainings in
agricultural methods. To date, approximately 1,800
beneficiaries in Northern Bahr El Ghazal have
attended farmer field schools; the programs are
even larger in other states. Recognizing that access
to land and urbanization is an issue with returnee
reintegration, FAO also supports urban returnees
to cultivate small vegetable gardens by providing
gardening tools, small school irrigation and training.
Land
UNDP’s efforts with returnee reintegration focus
specifically on improving land management,
specifically by supporting the State Ministries of
Public Infrastructure in five states with the highest
levels of returnees. Immediate support extends
to the survey and demarcation of plots and the
establishment of a land registry system. In early
2012, the State Government of Northern Bahr el
Ghazal, supported by UNDP, demarcated nearly
10,000 plots, mostly for returnees. The first 900
plots were allocated to families in May 2012.
3.2. Shift from Humanitarian to Development
The focus of this study is on the long-term
development opportunities associated with the
returnee population—efforts that can be made
to help returnees get back to productive lives and
positively contribute in the reconstruction of South
Sudan. This reconstruction process is simply not
to reinvent what was there before the war and the
flight; rather, the process must establish the critical
institutions necessary for state management and the
creation of a conducive environment for economic
growth, secured and long-term settlements, and
enhanced delivery of services. To date, there have
been a relatively small number of interventions to
support long-term reintegration (Interview vi).
The reintegration literature suggests that the
reintegration of returnees and former IDPs
indirectly improves the capability of the government
by channeling more resources from donors and
NGOs through the government institutions,
therefore widening the involvement and capacity of
governments (Helling 2006). This contribution is
extremely important, especially for a nascent state
like South Sudan. The reintegration process can
directly and indirectly enhance government capacity
through the provision of resources and tasks that
support the establishment of a stable and strong
state.
Putting these shortcomings aside, the donors
agreed that most of the humanitarian activities
aimed at returnees did not address the issue of
skills enhancement, which is crucial to successful
reintegration. It was because of this gap that
the UNDP introduced the Sudan Post Conflict
Community-Based Relief, Reintegration and Peace
Building (RRP) section of the UN Mission in South
Sudan (UNMISS). The RRP is active in several
states across South Sudan and is aimed at improving
the livelihoods of an estimated 201,038 returnee
beneficiaries (Maxwell, Gelsdorf, & Santschi, 2012).
More recently, formal efforts are being made by UN
agencies to adopt a broader and more development-
oriented approach to returnee reintegration. Led
by IOM, the development partners are working to
rearticulate their strategy, noting, “reintegration
calls for a space in the continuum between
humanitarian and development interventions”
(IOM, 2012b). The new approach links short-term
humanitarian assistance to longer term, sustainable
solutions in areas of high return, so that overarching
development efforts may be achieved (RTGSS,
2012).
writing, the two year-old Theme Group has yet to
adopt a comprehensive operation plan (Interview vi).
An established norm in the literature regarding
prior contexts is that returnee reintegration can
directly and indirectly increase the capabilities
of a state. Thus far, this has not been the case for
South Sudan. Due to both the government’s lack
of a strategic plan for reintegration and the donors’
tendency to fill in such capacity gaps, the process of
reintegration has become fragmentary and subject
to several donor agencies’ overlapping mandates and
agendas. Efforts to harmonize these activities have
not achieved success, and the government still has
not assumed a more participatory role in managing
reintegration. Considering the current context of
affairs, it is unsurprising that the government (at
both national and state levels) has struggled to come
up with any coherent reintegration policy—aside
from informing all returnees that they should return
to their ancestral homelands.

In October 2010, the Reintegration Theme Group

for South Sudan was established. Spearheaded
by IOM and composed of UN agencies, NGOs,
UNMISS-RRP, representatives from the donor
community, and relevant government agencies,
the Theme Group was formed in response to the
sporadic and uncoordinated nature of reintegration
approaches. The multi-sectoral structure of the
Theme Group is intended to play a core role in
synchronizing, monitoring and tracking the
progress of reintegration interventions (Interviews
vi, vii, xxi).

In terms of shifting the aid community’s focus

from returnees’ immediate humanitarian needs to
more long-term development objectives, the Theme
Group is a step in the right direction. However, its
ability to fulfill its stated mandate has been limited.
Funding has not met needs. The focus remains
on transporting returnees, providing initial food
aid, and establishing temporary support at the
returnees’ final destination. Efforts and funding for
longer-term reintegration support mechanisms are
not sufficiently occurring. As such, at the time of

15
Part III
REPORT OF DATA ANALYSES
1. Setting the Stage
There is no clear-cut way to judge the success of
returnee reintegration. Some analyses focus on the
integration of returnees into the labor-market (Altai
Consulting, 2006), while others focus on access to
economic opportunity beyond employment (Islam,
2010; US Department of States, 2011). Building on
these prior analyses, C-SAR’s assessment employs
three main instruments to assess the success of
reintegration: access to economic opportunity;
ability to set up permanent resettlement; and access
to social services.
Often there is confusion of terminology. For the
purposes of this paper, reintegration is defined as:
“a process which enables former refugees and
displaced people to enjoy a progressively greater
degree of physical, social, legal and material
security. In addition reintegration entails the
erosion – and ultimately the disappearance – of
any observable distinctions which set returnees
apart from their compatriots, particularly in
terms of their socio-economic and legal status”
(UNHCR, 1997:87).
Such “greater degree of physical, social, legal and
material security” is affected by numerous factors,
including the returnees’ initial conditions in terms
of education, previous work experience, and the
holding of assets. To describe this cumulative set of
initial conditions Dominik Helling coined “returnee
capital,” which he defines as:
“the sum of characteristics, resources and
stimuli unified in a formerly displaced person
that derive from his/her life experience prior
to flight as well as during exile, and are of
value for the larger community’s livelihood (re)
construction”
(Helling, 2007:24).
Returnee capital is not only valuable to the host
community, it is essential in determining the success
of returnees’ reintegration process. Importantly,
it influences returnees’ ability to access economic
opportunity, to set up a permanent settlement, and
to access social services.
An individual’s returnee capital interacts with
the prevailing conditions of the host community
to determine the level and degree of his/
her reintegration. Each community in South
Sudan exists under a diverse and varying set of
prevailing conditions—such as security, economic
opportunities, availability of natural resources,
the level of government regulation of markets,
and the extent and quality of government service
delivery. In this sense, the prevailing conditions in
a given community serve as the supply side of the
reintegration process, while an individual’s returnee
capital serves as the demand side. The intersection of
the two provides the equilibrium level of integration
for a given community and a particular individual or
household’s returnee capital.
In the theoretical sense, it is helpful to think of these
processes as follows:
1) Returnee integration =
α(employment) +β(permanent settlement) + γ(social services) + Σ
2) Returnee integration =
α(returnee capital) + β(prevailing condition) + Σ
Combining both equations produces the following,
for a particular returnee i reintegrating into a
}
particular community j :
Employment
Permanent settlement = Returnee Capital +
Social services Prevailing Conditions
From the above, one can see that the ability of
a returnee to obtain a job, to put up permanent
17
 settlement, and to receive social services is
determined by their returnee capital and the
prevailing conditions in their particular host
community. While this paper does not get into the
mechanics of these estimations, the above equation
provides a framework for which the data can be
analyzed and policy options assessed.
who came from East Africa, Australia, the United
States, and European countries; such returnees were
not included in this research, primarily because they
are less likely to be found in Greater Bahr El Gazal.
Generally, such returnees returned voluntarily and
are on average more economically well-off compared
to those who returned from northern Sudan.

2. Data, Methodology, and In addition to quantitative data, C-SAR also

Demographics conducted focus group discussions among returnees
and host community members in Aweil and Wau,
The data includes 445 returnees and 274 host
as well as with key stakeholders, such as: GOSS
community members surveyed in Aweil (Northern
officials in Juba; high-level government officials
Bahr El Ghazal) and Wau (Western Bahr El
in both states, including the Governor and then
Ghazal) in July and September 2012 respectively.
Acting Governer of Northern and Western Bahr El
The data was collected through random sampling of
Gazal, respectively; representatives from the donor,
the heads of households. While C-SAR designed the
NGO, and UN community in Juba as well as both
questionnaire, it partnered with the Government of
states; the Chamber of Commerce in both states;
South Sudan’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
and representatives from the private sector in both
in collecting the data. NBS enumerators in the field
states. These interviews and focus groups provided
were employed in randomizing households and
rich qualitative evidence for C-SAR’s analysis of the
conducting surveys.
reintegration process.
The rationale behind the survey and data collection
Demographic breakdown by gender of the surveyed
was to obtain basic inferential statistics to analyze
population was as follows: 38% of returnees and 41%
the success of reintegration, and specifically to assess
of host community members were men. Among the
how the returnees are faring compared to host
women surveyed, 24% were either single, separated/
community members who never left. It is worth
divorced, or widowed. The ratio is significantly
noting that most of the returnees surveyed and
the same for both returnees and host community
interviewed returned from locations in the North
members.
Sudan. There are other returnees in South Sudan
FIGURE 1: APPROXIMATE DATE OF RETURN
FIGURE 1: APPROXIMATE DATE OF RETURN
50

40
PERCENT

30

20

10

0
< 1 YEAR 1 - 2 YEARS AGO 2 - 3 YEARS AGO 3 - 7 YEARS AGO
SOURCE: CSAR RETURNEES’ SURVEY, 2012
YEARS RETURNED
 The majority of the returnees surveyed had returned
to South Sudan within the last two years; this finding
is consistent with the literature (IOM, 2012a).
3. Results, Interpretations, and
Discussions
As mentioned, three main instruments will be used
to analyze the success of the reintegration process.
Recalling the basic theoretical framework for
also influence the opportunities available to
returnees. Following this analysis, the other two
instruments—ability to find permanent settlement
and access to social services—will be addressed.
3.1. Access to Economic Opportunity
The data reveals that returnees have not been
successful in obtaining jobs. Compared to members
of the host community, the returnee population
has a significantly smaller proportion of full time

}
returnee reintegration:
and part time jobholders. A significantly higher
Employment proportion of individuals within the returnee
Permanent settlement = Returnee Capital + population responded “no paid employment” as
Social services Prevailing Conditions their current employment status, and returnees
are proportionally more engaged in other forms of
The next section will analyze the data through the non-job livelihoods compared to host community
first instrument: employment. This analysis will members. As shown in Figure 2, the data reflects
thus explore (a) how returnee capital influences that host community members are more likely
the ability to access economic opportunity. and to hold full time paid employment and are more
(b) how the prevailing conditions in South Sudan, entrepreneurial compared to the returnees.
such as micro- and macro-level economic issues,

FIGURE
FIGURE 2:2:BREAKDOWN
BREAKDOWNOF
OF THE
THE CURRENT
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT
EMPLOYMENTBY
BYGENDER
GENDER

CURRENT PROFESSION

RETURNEE NON-RETURNEE RETURNEE NON-RETURNEE

FEMALES MALES
1.5% 1.7%

7.3% 4.7%
8.4%
17.5% 14.9%

5%
24.2%
26.2% 3.1%
4.7% 7.9%
23%
4.3% .8%
24.8% 50%
2.6%
10.2%

19.4% 5.3% 10.5%

4.1%
3% 22.5% 6.5%
10.9% 12.4% 7%
3.1% 4.4%
.4% 1.7%
2.5%
1.2%

FULL TIME IRREGULAR JOBS NO PAID EMPLOYMENT HOUSEWIFE ONLY UNEMPLOYED

PART TIME SELF EMPLOYED RETIRED/PENSIONED STUDENT OTHER

SOURCE: CSAR RETURNEES’ SURVEY, 2012

19
A probability analysis of the data showed that
a smaller proportion of returnees earns income
from crop farming compared to members of the
host community (15.5 percent and 27.3 percent,
respectively), as further shown in Figure 5. Crop-
farming is understood as an extension of self-
employment. The analysis also showed that having
no education and having work experience as a full/
part time employee is positively correlated with crop
farming. Women with higher levels of education
show relatively higher interest in crop farming,
whereas men who hold post-secondary education are
shown to earn less from crop farming.
It is clear that returnees have experienced less
access to employment and economic opportunity
compared to members of the host community.
Returnees have been unable to find paid
employment, and have not been successful in setting
up their own businesses.
i. Interpreting and Explaining the Findings
The significant high levels of unemployment
and non-paid work among returnees, coupled
with lower levels of entrepreneurial activity, are
counterintuitive. Most returnees fled South Sudan
not only because of conflict, but in pursuit of better
economic opportunities in North Sudan or in
Eastern African countries. These regions experienced
a high degree of service delivery while South Sudan
was under strife. One would expect returnees from
these regions to fare better in South Sudan than
members of the host community, since they gained
experience working with new technologies and
better methods that would translate into higher
income-generating activities (Akol, 1994; Cohen/
Deng, 1998; Perkin, 2002). However, the data
suggests that these expectations are false.
Perceptions among returnees suggest that employers
discriminate against them when hiring for paid
positions. While many returnees are qualified, they
are often unable to obtain jobs simply because they
are returnees. This observation also goes against
common wisdom, which would infer that returnees
are ideal candidates for employment due to their
experience and skills gained in exile. To shed light
on this issue, the following section will further
explore the notion of returnee capital—which, to
recall, includes all resources, experience, skills, and
impetuses acquired over the life of a returnee that
are integral to his or her productivity.
ii. Returnee Capital
There are three observable features of returnee
capital that can assist our analysis: education level,
previous work experience, and asset holdings. We
can then say:
Returnee capital =
α(education) + β(work experience) + γ(assets holding) + ε
This section will analyze the returnee data for
specific information about each of these components
to returnee capital.
a. Education
While common wisdom assumes that returnees
have better education indicators than members of
the host community, the data shows that returnees
actually have a much higher proportion of people
with no formal education (23 percent of male
returnees, versus 16 percent of male host community
members; 51 percent of female returnees, versus
46 percent of female host community members).
However, the overall average education levels
between returnees and host community members is
quite small and is not even statistically significant.
In terms of educational experience and skills
acquired through education, the returnees are
thus no better off compared to host community
members.
b. Work Experience
A substantial portion of returnees had access to
jobs in their locations of exile. The focus group
interviews that C-SAR conducted in Aweil and Wau
reveal that returnees from the Sudan had access to
types of jobs that were not available in South Sudan
during the civil war. For example, in Aweil, C-SAR
 interviewed a former ship operator from Port
Sudan, a government lawyer from Khartoum, and
an administrator for the SPLM from Saudi Arabia,
and a mechanic from Khartoum (for information
about focus groups, see Annexes 2 and 4). As seen
in Figure 3, the median past work experience of
returnees is 6-10 years. A host of returnees worked
in the construction industry in Khartoum, and
many others were teachers. Most of these returnees
are currently unemployed or engaged in subsistence
farming.
However, the work experience possessed by
returnees is not necessarily the type of experience
currently demanded in South Sudan’s labor
market. The labor sectors in which returnees hold
a competitive advantage over host community
members are simply not yet developed in the new
country; or, those sectors currently only employ a
very limited amount of labor. Construction is one
sector in which a significant portion of returnees
hold experience; however, the construction jobs
being created in Aweil and Wau are limited,
FIGURE 3: AMOUNT OF RETURNEES’
particularly in the wake of the oil shutdown in 2012
WORK EXPERIENCE OF THE RETURNEES BY GENDER
that largely depressed economic activities across
the nation. Figure 4 shows that a larger proportion
of returnees are agricultural workers, semi-skilled
manual laborers, unskilled manual laborers,
and construction foremen and supervisors when
compared to members of the host community.
c. Assets
The third component of returnee capital is the
holding of physical or financial assets, which might
have been acquired in exile. Some returnees brought
assets upon their return—most commonly furniture
items, cooking utensils, and clothing—but the
overwhelming majority came with very little; a large
number returned with absolutely nothing. In several
cases, trains and buses carrying returnees back to
South Sudan were raided and looted by northern
Sudanese tribal militias during the journey. Some
returnees have had to sell their physical assets since
returning, in order to supplement family income.—
for example, Angelo Bith Chol returned to Juba
with a number of trucks and set up a business,
beforePAST
having toWORK
sell them EXPERIENCE
to support his family’s

FIGURE 3: AMOUNT OF RETURNEES’ PAST WORK EXPERIENCE

WORK EXPERIENCE OF THE RETURNEES BY GENDER

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0.0
MALE FEMALE

1 - 2 YEARS 3 - 5 YEARS 6 - 10 YEARS 10+ YEARS

SOURCE: CSAR RETURNEES’ SURVEY, 2012

21
 basic needs. (For more anecdotal information from assets, it can be asserted that the current population
focus groups, see Annex 2.) of South Sudanese returnees holds only minimal
returnee capital. This could be attributed to a
In general, not many returnees arrived in South
number of factors, for example, poor treatment
Sudan with substantial amounts of capital to be
and marginalization during exile; in northern
invested in their new communities and converted
Sudan, IDPs of South Sudanese descent were
into income-generating activities. Additionally,
subjected to regular abuse by the Sudanese security
many returnees have had to contend with low-
forces and were denied opportunities available to
quality temporary housing, which is often flooded
other Sudanese. Under such circumstances, many
during rains and is prone to theft and robbery;
returnees came back to South Sudan with an initial
in many cases, this has resulted in returnees’ few
condition that was itself unfavorable, and it is no
physical assets being ruined or stolen.
surprise that reintegration, especially in terms of
Having considered education, work experience, and access to economic opportunity, has been challenging.

FIGURE 4: PAST PROFESSION, RETURNEE VS. NON RETURNEE

MANAGER WITH 10+
EMPLOYEES

MANAGER WITH LESS THAN

10 EMPLOYEES

70 FEMALES PRO: ADMINISTRATIVE

60 PRO: ACCOUNTING

50 PRO: TEACHING
PERCENT

40
NGO/INTERNATIONAL

30
PRO: GOVERNMENT

20
PRO: SERVICE INDUSTRY
10
PRO: OTHER
0
RETURNEE NON RETURNEE FOREMAN AND SUPERVISOR

SKILLED MANUAL WORKER

35 MALES SEMI- SKILLED MANUAL

WORKER

30
UNSKILLED MANUAL WORKER

25
FARMER: HAS OWN FARM
PERCENT

20
AGRICULTURAL WORKER

15
MEMBER OF ARMED FORCES,
SECURITY PERSONNEL
10
IRREGULAR JOBS
5

NEVER HAD A JOB

0
RETURNEE NON RETURNEE

SOURCE: CSAR RETURNEES’ SURVEY, 2012

 ii. Prevailing Conditions
In assessing the economic status of returnees, it is
important to understand the prevailing conditions
that impede access to economic opportunity.
Economic opportunity is a function of geography,
and the underlying realities within a particular
context affect the chances of obtaining work.
Aweil and Wau are both small-holder agro-based
societies with limited industry and service sectors.
Most farms are run by self-employed farmers
who are engaged in the practice largely to sustain
livelihoods.
Over three-quarters of households in Northern
Bahr El Ghazal and nearly two-thirds of households
in Western Bahr El Ghazal are engaged in crop
farming and animal husbandry (NBS, 2010). These
numbers are consistent with the findings in our
sample. However, analyzing differences in source
of income between returnees and members of the
host community, the data shows that returnees do
not particularly hold a comparative advantage in
farming compared to host community members:
15.5 percent of returnees report crop-farming
as their primary source of income, versus 27.3
percent of host community members (see Figure
5). This may be due to the fact that they do not
have experience in the profession of farming (and
especially farming in the unique conditions of
South Sudan), unlike members of host community,
who have always depended on farming for their
livelihoods and have learned over years the nuances
of agriculture, soil quality, weather patterns, and
other local context factors.
The remainder of households—those engaged in
wage labor—own or are employed by large farms,
local trading companies, timber producers, general
shops, auto-repair shops, restaurants and hotels,
construction, local transportation services, or by
government institutions (See Annexes 2 and 4).
These are by and large the sectors in which wage
jobs can be found in these two states. Aside from
the wage labor demanded by the government,
private sector activities in these states are scant
and can absorb only limited manpower. A small
proportion of host community members obtain
their income from animal husbandry; no returnees
in our sample reported animal husbandry as their
primary source of income.

FIGURE 5: COMPOSITION
FIGURE 5: COMPOSITION OF SOURCEINCOME
OF SOURCE INCOME
BY BY GENDER
GENDER
CURRENT INCOME

RETURNEE NON-RETURNEE RETURNEE NON-RETURNEE

FEMALES MALES
1.8%
7.9%
10.7%
20.6%
15% 16.6% 26.3%
28.1% 11.4%
1.3%
5.3%
24%
4.4%
5.3%
3.5%
1.8%
0.3% 16.3% 3.8% 2.6%
14.2% 0.6%
4.4% 0.9%
16%
2.2%
4.4% 0.6%
13.1% 21.3%
5.1% 26.3% 3.5% 46.5%

CROP FARMING ANIMAL HUSBANDRY WAGES/SALARY OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISE OTHER

REMITTANCES PENSION AID PROPERTY ASSET INCOME

SOURCE: CSAR RETURNEES’ SURVEY, 2012

SOURCE: CSAR RETURNEES’ SURVEY, 2012

23
a. Exogenous Constraints
In addition to the difficult prevailing conditions,
the private sector in Greater Bahr El Ghazal has
been hit by a host of exogenous and persistent
endogenous constraints over the last few years. The
following are the most recent exogenous constraints
to hit the private sector in Aweil and Wau:
t
4IPSUBHFT
PG
%PMMBST This is largely due to
the recent decision by the Government of
South Sudan to shut down the production
of oil in order to put extreme pressure on
Khartoum over a disagreement on transit
fees. At the time of C-SAR’s field visits (July-
September, 2012), the black market exchange
rate—the only rate available to traders in Aweil
and Wau—was $1USD = 5.30 SSP
(the official exchange rate remains $1USD
= 2.96 SSP). The high price and shortage
of dollars have negatively affected economic
activities in Aweil and Wau and throughout
South Sudan. With the signing of the recent
agreement between Sudan and South Sudan
and continuing negotiations, this constraint
may soon be relaxed.
t
Border closure: The decision by the
Government of Sudan to close down the
border in March 2011 also negatively affected
the activities of the private sector, especially
in border regions like Aweil and Wau. Since
Aweil and Wau are highly integrated into
the economy of North Sudan, the severity of
economic links between North Sudan and
South Sudan has adversely affected Aweil.
Many traders sourced their sorghum and other
agricultural products from North Sudan; when
the border was closed, they were forced to look
for their supplies elsewhere. Price increases
and limited product availability resulted. The
agreement and decision by Sudan in late 2012
to reopen its borders may relax this constraint
somewhat if relations improve.
t
*OUSPEVDUJPO
PG
OFX
DVSSFODJFT
JO
4VEBO
BOE
4PVUI
4VEBO Prior to South Sudanese
independence, traders from Aweil and Wau
used Sudanese Pounds to purchase products
from the North to be sold in the South in the
same currency. After independence, South
Sudan introduced its own currency. With two
different currencies operating in Sudan and
South Sudan, trade between the two countries
must now occur in international currencies
such as US dollars, which exacerbates the
constraint of dollar shortages.
t
1PPS
JOGSBTUSVDUVSF
The roads in South
Sudan are generally poor. With the closure of
the border and the severity of trade relations,
Aweil and Wau traders resorted to East Africa
for purchasing goods. These products would
come through Juba passing through poor
roads, which led to serious delays in receiving
products and price increases. The increased
transportation of products has also increased
risk for the traders, due to uncertainty and
poor security along the roads throughout
South Sudan.
t
*ODSFBTFE
GVFM
DPTUT The border closure and
shutdown of oil production have led to increases
in the price of fuel. At the time of field visits, a
barrel of diesel costs 2,800 SSP, while the same
cost only 800 SSP in April 2012. Increased fuel
prices means further increased transportation
costs.
b. Endogenous Constraints
Endogenous constraints to private sector activities in
Aweil and Wau are similar with general bottlenecks
to private sector activities in South Sudan. These
include:
t
-JNJUFE
BDDFTT
UP
íOBODF Throughout South
Sudan, lack of funding sources is a significant
constraint to economic activity. In the case of
Aweil, KCB has recently made provision to
provide local businesses with loans. However,
the maximum loan is 10,000 SSP, from which
a 12% interest is deducted; this is insufficient
for the kind of expansion and growth needed
for rapid private sector expansion. It is worth
noting that the process for acquiring these
loans is long and excruciating and nearly
 impossible without collateral assets.
t
$POîJDUT
PG
JOUFSFTU
BNPOH
HPWFSONFOU
officials: Senior government officials in both
Aweil and Wau have also entered the private
sector and are competing in the market.
Members of Parliament can borrow as much as
50,000 SSP from the KCB; in Aweil, Ministers
have access to over 100,000 SSP in loans.
These loans were intended to fund housing
costs, but some officials have used them to
establish businesses.
t
6ONPUJWBUFE
BOE
VOTLJMMFE
FNQMPZFFT
Many employees in Aweil and Wau do not
possess the skills required for their specific
roles and lack motivation to learn and adjust.
Businessmen complain that food distribution
by humanitarian organizations may be setting
the wrong incentives for employees (see Annex
3); food distribution also brings down prices in
the market.
t
-BDL
PG
SFHVMBUJPO
JO
UIF
NBSLFU

The few available indigenous private activities
are being outcompeted by incoming waves
of foreign business. Traders from the Sudan
states of Southern Kordofan and South Darfur
control substantial business interests in Aweil
and Wau. Foreign businesses often enter with
substantial amounts of capital, which cannot
be matched by the local South Sudanese
businessmen. Foreign businessmen are able
to lower their prices to levels where local
South Sudanese businessmen cannot compete
and are forced to exit the market. Also, this
constraint was exacerbated by the border
closures, since the traders who can manage to
transport merchandise across the closed border
are Sudanese from the north who have special
connections to get their goods across.
As such, the prevailing conditions and constraints of
the economic environment in Aweil and Wau have
made it difficult for private sector activities to grow.
This environment has also impeded the intentions
of individual actors to take risks and try their lot
in the market. The limited growth of the private
sector has not made it possible for a large quantity
of labor to be employed. In particular, the sectors in
which the returnees hold significant advantages are
25
either non-existent or slow in growth, making their
performance in the job market dismal.
3.2. Setting up Permanent Settlement
The second instrument to assess the success of
reintegration is the ability of returnees to set up
permanent settlement in their new communities.
Permanent settlement is an integral part of assumed
normalcy and provides a significant degree of
physical and social security, which are paramount to
effective reintegration.
In the context of the two states studied, a significant
portion of returnees have returned to their ancestral
homeland and set up permanent settlements. The
C-SAR team visited Manyiel and Wanyjok villages
on the outskirts of Aweil, where a significant
number of returnees have permanently settled.
These returnees have received housing assistance
from the UNHCR and farming assistance from the
FAO, and are well on their way towards successful
reintegration. However, a vast majority of returnees
have been unable to return to their ancestral homes
and have instead remained in the urban centers. The
goal of these groups is to permanently settle within
the urban centers, but there are several significantly
constraining factors.
The most salient impediments to resettlement
in urban areas are complications regarding land
distribution and the issuance of land title deeds.
While state governments have allocated specific
geographic areas for returnee settlement, most
returnees have still not received their allotted
lands or land titles. The government of Northern
Bhar El Ghazal has identified an area south of
Apada, the temporary returnee site, to be allocated
for permanent settlement; while some have been
given plots on paper, most are unable to pay the
land “fees” required of them (see Annex 2). Many
returnees are not even aware of the government
policy and intention. The result is a general
confusion, uncertainty, and disquiet among the
returnees.
Likewise, the government of Western Bhar El
Ghazal has identified the Alelchok area to be
allocated for permanent returnee settlement, but
the returnees are yet to obtain land titles (see Annex
4). Similar scenarios are unfolding throughout
South Sudan, underscoring the fact that returnee
 reintegration is an issue that affects the entire nation
but that must be resolved through strong local
leadership.
In cases where returnees are shown their designated
areas for settlement, many have been uncomfortable
with further movements. Some wonder why it is
that, in their own newly-independent home country,
the government keeps asking them to move from
place to place. Others fear the high transaction
costs associated with moving, and the distance from
services in their new settlements (many do not yet
have services connected to them). As such, many
prefer to remain in temporary housing (thatched
huts with plastic sheeting) in the temporary sites,
such as Apada and Maduany. These returnees
complain quite seriously about the conditions of
their temporary huts, having lived in them for 1-2
years by now (see Annex 2).
Moreover, the size of land allocated by the
government is often only sufficient for housing
alone and does not afford space for cultivation.
These lands (Apada and Alelchok) are mostly 20m
x 20m, or in some cases 30m x 40m. Such small
distributions assumes that the occupiers will be
FIGURE 6: SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE RETURNEES
VERSUS
FIGURE HOST COMMUNITY
6: SOCIO-ECONOMIC MEMBERS
STATUS BY GENDER
OF THE RETURNEES
VS. HOST COMMUNITY MEMBERS BY GENDER
CURRENT SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS
employed in sectors other than agriculture and will
need land simply for residence. As mentioned, the
prevailing private sector conditions in Northern
and Western Bahr El Ghazal do not support wage
employment. Thus, crop farming is the most
realistic way that the majority of returnees will
pursue to support their livelihoods—but the lands
designated for resettlement are not large enough
for cultivation. As a result, returnees may remain
unemployed and without meaningful source of
livelihoods, even once they have been given their
own land. Employment and settlement are strongly
correlated in this sense; to date, returnees have not
been successful in accessing employment, nor have
they been successful in establishing permanent
settlement.
3.3. Returnees’ Access to Social Services
Access to services is the final instrument for
assessing the success of reintegration. Most returnees
who remained within urban areas did so to be near
services; however, most have had dismal experiences
in accessing services—even those returnees who
settled within the larger town of Wau.

RETURNEE NON-RETURNEE RETURNEE NON-RETURNEE

FEMALES MALES

7.26% 5.09% 5.19%

5.88%
8.91%
11.09%
19.52%
14.3%

21.76% 32.5%
27.42% 19.62%
26.47%
34.36%
17.26%
29.44%

22.03% 32.11% 29.04%

30.75%

GOOD NOW VERY GOOD NOW REASONABLE NOW BAD NOW VERY BAD NOW

SOURCE: CSAR RETURNEES’ SURVEY, 2012

SOURCE: CSAR RETURNEES’ SURVEY, 2012

27
Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal are among
the poorest states in South Sudan. Western Bahr El
Ghazal has the second highest maternal mortality
rate in the country with 2,216 deaths per 100,000
births. Northern Bahr El Ghazal follows third with
2,182 deaths per 100,000 births, and also has the
highest under-five infant mortality rate in South
Sudan with 229 per 1,000 children dying before
their fifth birthday (NBS, 2010). As such, the
baseline conditions in these states are of minimal
service delivery. Returnees who returned to their
ancestral homes have essentially blended into their
communities and are receiving the same kind of
services as the host communities (which may not be
much, given the limited service delivery across all of
South Sudan). Meanwhile, the experience of those
in the urban centers is quite dire.
Apada, for instance, has only 7 water pumps
servicing a returnee population of 3,000, and a
clinic that is no longer functional (Interview xx).
There are no public toilets available in Apada, and
this has increased the spread of cholera; people often
die on their way to the clinic. Apada does not have
its own school, and returnee children go to the same
schools as host community children. These schools
tend to be quite far from the areas of settlement and
severely overcrowded. Yet, Apada is a temporary
settlement; the area designated by the government
for future settlement is located several kilometers
south, and is even further from services. A major
reason for returnee trepidation over movement to
the designated relocation site is total lack of services.
In Wau, returnees have access to health centers just
as other citizens in the city. However, these centers
are not free, and affording medical care can be
difficult for returnees, who tend to be even poorer
than host community members. One woman wailed
during the focus group: “My child is now sick, but
there is no way I can take her to the hospital because
I do not have money!” (Annex 4). Such is the case
with education as well; school fees are beyond the
financial capabilities of most returnee families, both
in Wau and Aweil.
The poor delivery of services that returnees are
experiencing in Northern and Western Bahr El
Ghazal is a phenomenon occurring across South
Sudan. Large parts of the government’s budget pay
for civil servant wages and the military, leaving
very little for service delivery. Northern and
Western Bahr El Ghazal are no exception from this
distortionary resource allocation; their budgets are
also consumed by a large public sector. The majority
of expenditures in health, education, and agriculture
are actually funded and implemented by donors.
An additional problem for the long-term
reintegration of returnees and for public service
delivery in South Sudan in general is that the large
donor expenditures are being executed through
projects outside of the government systems. As a
result, these resources do not contribute to long-
term governance capability; when the donor projects
come to an end, as they will, the efforts and their
impacts will abruptly end. It is understandable that
the capacity of the South Sudanese government
remains extremely limited, and their systems
opaque; this makes donors nervous about
channeling resources through government systems.
However, for the service delivery to improve,
and for the support of returnees to eventually be
handed over to the local authorities, there must be
gradual improvements in government planning,
management of resources, and overall capacity. This
current donor component contributes to the overall
trend: the reintegration process falls short in terms
of access to services for returnees.
4. Conclusion and Some Caveats on the
Findings
Clearly, the reintegration process in Northern
and Western Bahr El Ghazal has not been highly
successful. This analysis has explored returnee
data via three instruments: access to economic
opportunity, establishment of permanent
residence, and access to services. Returnee capital
and prevailing conditions have been assessed to
determine how they influence the reintegration
process. While this analysis does not suggest the
process has been a total failure, it does underscore
that reintegration is riddled with constraints and
complex challenges.
Regardless of socio-economic woes, the returnees
are particularly happy to be back in South Sudan.
The vast majority of returnees are extremely proud
to have an independent homeland; as Figure 6
reflects, many believe that their socio-economic
status has improved since returning to the South.

This appears to be a conundrum, but returnee

respondents repeatedly cited the incalculable
satisfaction of having returned to their homeland,
amidst a long-awaited peace, to live with their own
people in an independent South Sudan. The data
suggests that this psychological component of the
return process is enough to offset returnees’ relative
opinions of their current socio-economic problems.
Also, it is important to consider the place from
where most returnees are coming back. A large
majority of returnees in Aweil and Wau returned
from North Sudan, where many were subjected
to inhumane treatment by northerners. They were
not given the same opportunities simply because
they were South Sudanese; they were subjected to
arbitrary arrests and ill treatment by the security
forces, and as such, they lived in a constant state of
fear. This has all improved for the returnees since
coming back to South Sudan. They now have the
freedom to pursue any opportunity they desire, and
they are confident that they can be treated as equal
before the law.

The evidence also concludes that the returnees

are hopeful about the future. They are confident
that things will improve in the near term. Once
land titles are issued, they believe that they will be
able to take care of themselves and carry on with
productive lives.

29
Part IV
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Introduction
The most critical constraints to the reintegration of
returnees in South Sudan stem from the unfavorable
prevailing conditions. This is particularly true for
employment and access to economic opportunity;
lack of growth in the private sector is a major
binding constraint to successful reintegration.
Without government regulation, private sector
markets self-regulate inefficiently and inequitably.
The infrastructure essential for commerce and
growth is either not yet developed or in primitive
condition. Access to capital remains beyond
reach of average businesspeople. These and the
aforementioned exogenous issues constrain private
sector growth. Simultaneously, failure of government
policies—particularly land policy—has impeded
entrepreneurship among returnees. Those wishing
to farm cannot obtain land, largely due to improper
implementation of extant government policy. Such
growth-inhibiting market failures and governmental
policy failures must be addressed. Pro-growth
policies will help increase the number of private
enterprises in Northern and Western Bahr El
Ghazal, as well as in every other state. Unless the
private sector grows, jobs will not be created.
The problem of returnee reintegration, therefore,
must be addressed primarily through macro-level
policy reforms aimed at improving prevailing
conditions. However, several micro-level
interventions would help returnees more quickly
transition to productive lives. These micro-level
interventions should be implemented locally in a
targeted manner, simultaneously with macro-level
policy reforms at national and state levels.
Most importantly, returnee reintegration should
be framed as a key pillar of state building—South
Sudan is a returnee state. The new country must
build and invest in essential institutions to improve
the long-term environment for economic growth and
efficient delivery of services; returnee reintegration
should be seen as fundamental to this national
project.
Implementation of the following recommendations
will improve the prevailing conditions and promote
productive reintegration; these improvements
will lead to private sector growth and increased
employment for returnees as well as host community
members across South Sudan.
2. Micro-Level Policy Recommendations
Distribution of agriculture and fishery inputs
The ultimate goal of reintegration is to return to
productive life; providing returnees with seeds,
farming tools, and other inputs will promote
cultivation and allow beneficiaries to become food
independent. As mentioned, various government
and NGO programs already attempt to distribute
inputs to returnees; however, the C-SAR study
found that the process was working inefficiently.
Returnees in Apada, for example, received seeds
from the government after the rains had started, too
late for successful cultivation. Additionally, most
returnees consulted lacked access to farming tools.
While some returnees in Apada, Maduany, and
Manyiel have farmed, the amount of land cultivated
per household is extremely small (less than one-third
of an acre per household). Provision of better tools
would allow more land to be farmed; additionally,
farmers need assistance with clearing new land,
either with ox plows, tractors, or the formation of
work groups. Interventions to assist in this way
could be highly effective.
Additionally, many returnees’ livelihoods depend
on fish caught from the river (Wau) or from flooded
areas (Aweil). The provision of fishing equipment
would allow more households to take better
advantage of fisheries and increase their livelihoods
31
opportunities, especially if coupled with support for
fish preservation techniques, such as smoking.
Skills Training
Localities such as Wau and Aweil have a general lack
of skills; aside from agriculture, very few industries
are practiced in these urban centers, due to many
reasons but also lack of skills. While returnees are
often skilled, their particular experiences and skills
are not necessarily in market demand. Training
programs in the following skill sets will allow both
returnees and host communities to better themselves
and improve their chances of obtaining work:
a. Basic farming skills. The FAO’s “farmer field
school” program should be greatly scaled to
reach all areas of returnee reintegration. Such
programs afford returnees with self-employment
opportunities as well as jobs on large farms,
such as the Aweil rice scheme. FAO training
activities largely cater to rural returnees
who have returned to their ancestral homes;
urban returnees have been offered training in
gardening, but these efforts have been minimal.
Training services in crop farming should be
made available to returnees regardless of their
areas of resettlement, and should be provided
with greater governmental execution.
b. Carpentry and other technical skills.
Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal have
large reserves of mahogany and teak. These
states, like all of the states of South Sudan, are
embarking on the process of reconstruction;
while the construction industry remains small,
there is no doubt that it signifies great potential
for these states. Carpentry and other technical
skills related to construction will be extremely
valuable in the near future.
c. Entrepreneurial & business development
skills. There are enormous entrepreneurial
opportunities across South Sudan, and a lot
of areas for business creation. However, the
corresponding skill sets are not readily available
in the general population. Provision of business
skills to existing and future entrepreneurs will
help returnees and host communities run their
businesses better and help them seize productive
opportunities.
Microfinance and SME lending
In all areas of South Sudan and most certainly
in Greater Bahr El Ghazal, small businesses need
capital. The current loans that banks offer to
private businesses are too small for most businesses,
and they are exceedingly difficult to obtain.
Microfinance sequenced with business training can
assist returnees and host communities to take risks
and start up new small and informal companies.
Small and mid-sized enterprises should be supported
through SME finance loan products from banks.
The provision of small and medium loans has the
potential to relax—in the short-term—the current
lack of access to capital.
3. Macro-Level Policy
Recommendations
3.1. General Macro-Level Recommendations
While the “invisible hand” brings the market
to equilibrium, markets still require “necessary
conditions” to operate efficiently. These conditions
include security, arbitration, contract enforcement,
mobility of goods and services, and many other
institutional frameworks. Government must provide
these conditions and prerequisites in order to create
the enabling environment where markets can work
and flourish. Yet, government must first have the
capability to do so—and must intervene only where
the market benefits most. Such complex policy
interventions must be sequenced carefully.
In South Sudan, government at all levels is
largely inexperienced and faces daunting
capacity challenges. While this shortcoming is
understandable given the country’s historical
context, government must improve its ability to
formulate and implement judicious policies. If
the government’s bureaucratic capacity does not
grow, it will not be able to execute the essential
macroeconomic reforms for private sector growth.
Without growth, there will be no job creation.
Invest in the capability of the government
While government is large in South Sudan—at
national, state, and local levels—it has largely been
ineffective in addressing the three main issues of
reintegration: employment, permanent settlement,
and service delivery. In job creation, the investment
climate has not improved; in the resettlement
process, the government has not provided adequate
security for returnees; in service delivery to returnee
areas, government performance has been lackluster.
South Sudan certainly faces countless problems and
competing priorities, but the fundamental challenge
is an inherent lack of government capacity.
A major component to the capacity problem is
allocation of human resources. Qualified South
Sudanese are omnipresent in NGOs and donor
agencies, and others still are seeking employment;
but qualified nationals are often locked out of
the civil service—which was largely established
on the premise of political accommodation. The
government has not come up with a strategy to
reform the civil service into one of meritocratic
hiring that can manage complex public
administration, upgrade government performance,
and improve service delivery.
This lack of capacity is evident in the absence
of a government strategy on returnees question.
The government lacks strategic, action-based
policies to address service delivery; to resolve land
issues; to promote economic growth and attract
investments; and a host of other issues. National
and state governments should understand that
“we reap what we sow” and the efforts of today
will shape the challenges of tomorrow. Capacity
cannot be borrowed from donors and short-term
consultants. Government must invest in its own
capacity to formulate and execute policies. Such an
investment does not simply call for “more training”
of bureaucrats, but a broad and strategic embrace of
innovation that would allow South Sudan to attract
new young talent into the public service, at state and
national levels.
The donors, for their part, must also understand
that they are not a substitute for the government;
33
that “partnership” does not imply writing and
executing policies for the government to rubber-
stamp. True partnership involves tenacious
upgrading of government capacity through trial and
error, which must take place within the government
systems. In other words, government must be in the
driver’s seat for policy planning and execution, as
the donors provide support. Quality of government
policy will improve only as capacity improves; the
same is true for improving economic management,
service delivery, or the returnee reintegration
process. Ultimately, the government alone is
accountable to the South Sudanese people.
3.2. State-Specific Macro-Level
Recommendations
This section outlines specific actions that can be
taken by the Governments of Northern and Western
Barh El Ghazal to create efficient markets and
remove the most binding constraints to effective
returnee reintegration.
Formulate and implement clear land policies
Current land policies in both states are unclear.
The generic government mandate is that returnees
should return to their ancestral areas; certainly, this
is sound advice for returnees who still have family
networks in their ancestral areas, and are prepared
for and desirous of pursuing the livelihoods
opportunities in those areas. The C-SAR study
encountered flourishing returnee communities in
the rural areas of Manyiel and Wanyjok, outside
Aweil.
However, applying this policy broadly to the
entire returnee population is simplistic and
misunderstands the very idea of reintegration. The
return process is complex, with many returnees
having been outside South Sudan for decades, or
in some cases born in another country; imposing a
policy defined entirely by geography is misguided,
and assumes that there is always something in the
“ancestral areas” to which returnees can return.
In many cases, nothing may exist in such places;
in other cases, returnees may be unprepared or
unsuited for the demands of rural livelihoods.
Returnees are often like immigrants in a new
country, struggling to establish a new life. Assigning
returnees to specific areas is limiting and does not
consider their unique characteristics, particularly
in terms of returnee capital, potential employment,
and livelihood opportunities. Generally, lack of
clarity in land policy has constrained returnees from
establishing permanent settlements and engaging in
income-generating activities.
The government should clarify land distribution
procedures and provide returnees with land and
land titles. These titles will allow them to obtain
loans from banks and establish income-generating
activities. The government should also acknowledge
that agriculture is the sector in which the majority
of people are employed. Thus, when these lands
are issued, they need to include land that could be
used for cultivation. Expecting returnees to own
farms in designated agricultural areas far from their
homes (for instance the Aweil rice scheme, which
is a distance of 20-30km from returnee settlements
in Apada) is not realistic. Land for cultivation
should be adjacent to land for residence in order
to minimize transaction costs and maximize
productivity.
Improve service delivery—in urban and rural areas
Understandably, the government intends to use
land in urban centers to attract certain kinds of
investment; this is perhaps why returnees are advised
to leave urban centers and return to their ancestral
homes. However, people will resist settling in faraway
villages that lack clinics, schools, water sources, and
police stations. Ancestral ties alone are not enough to
convince returnees to settle there. Ironically, services
in urban areas are woefully inadequate as well; but
as the study shows, returnees remain in urban areas
due to the perception that urban services are superior.
The government must plan for and establish essential
services in rural areas before asking or forcing people
to move to such areas; and understanding that many
returnees will choose to remain in urban areas, urban
service delivery must also be addressed.
Provide targeted subsidies to the private sector Northern and Western Bahr El Ghazal. These
There are countless South Sudanese entrepreneurs states, like many others in South Sudan, have
working hard to make their businesses successful. large idle labor forces. While agriculture will
Some of these businesspeople employ hundreds absorb parts of this excess labor, public works—
of workers (see Annex 3). These businesses should particularly in construction—will also contribute
be supported to allow them to grow and create to absorption and will increase demand for
more employment. The government can encourage goods and services. There are feeder roads to be
geographically-specific investments—for example, built; drainage and canals to cope better with
investing in the timber sector in Aweil, since it floods; and countless other public infrastructure
is rich in mahogany. Targeted subsidies would projects to be undertaken. A certain portion of
increase the amount of private sector activities, public expenditures must be allocated to such
creating growth, employment and knowledge. efforts, because the economic impacts are so
important. Not only would these endeavors create
Protect indigenous companies employment and unleash cash into the economy,
they would provide learning opportunities for
Sudanese businesses face stiff competition
those willing and able to learn new skills.
from foreign entrepreneurs. In Aweil and Wau,
the major competitors come from the north.
Historically as well, northern traders dominated
markets in these regions, but with independence,
their dominance threatens to undermine the
development of a thriving indigenous private
sector in South Sudan. With the recent agreement
between South Sudan and Sudan, it is likely that
the competition will only grow fiercer. To prevent
foreign businessmen from crowding out nascent
South Sudanese entrepreneurs, the government
should assist indigenous companies; recommended
measures include tax incentives and guaranteeing
lenient bank financing for indigenous companies.

Regulate public officials’ entry into private sector

Current government officials involved in private
sector activities are creating a low equilibrium
outcome that will keep the private sector
stagnant for years unless pro-growth policies
are implemented. One cannot be a referee and a
player at the same time. Government must leave
the market to private actors. Public officials who
want to do business should leave the public sector
before engaging in private sector activities.

Create public works programs

Public works would provide immediate
employment and liquidity benefits in states like

35
Part V
IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES
Given the multitude of issues concerning returnee
reintegration, a sound implementation framework
is critical to the success of any government policy.
This section suggests how the aforementioned
recommendations might best be implemented,
and also provides analysis on whether such
recommendations are feasible, given the political
economy and capacity constraints in South Sudan.
Micro-Level Policy Recommendations
The motivations for C-SAR’s recommended
micro-level policies—provision of agricultural and
fishery inputs, skills training, and micro-finance
and SME lending—are to increase food security
and encourage entrepreneurship. Not only do
these proposals address the practical concerns
facing citizens on the ground, they would provide
politicians with support among the people. As such,
C-SAR’s micro-level policy proposals could find
political support.
A more challenging question is whether such
proposals could be implemented in the existing
capacity environment. While versions of
the recommended policies are already being
implemented by development partners such as IOM,
FAO, WFP, and the UN, the government only
provides “coordination,” which largely amounts to
rubber-stamping.
In addition to government capacity constraints,
the current donor-led reintegration efforts—while
enormously positive—have resulted in sub-optimal
outcomes. Particular inefficiencies include lack of
cross-agency coordination and inadequate targeting
of interventions to the diverse needs of distinct
communities. The underlying market fundamentals
are different from region to region, and each
community’s needs are highly heterogeneous;
reintegration efforts must be highly flexible and
responsive to constantly changing local contexts.
Centralizing efforts and resources for returnee
reintegration is one way to achieve greater
coordination and improved targeting. One
method for implementation is the creation of a
pooled fund to allocate resources directly to local
communities, to fund income-generating activities
that are proposed, initiated, and executed by and
through those local communities. Such a pooled
“Reintegration Fund” would be governed by a board
comprising the contributing donor agencies and
government institutions, but the resources would go
directly to the communities to fund locally-defined
reintegration activities. The “Reintegration Fund”
would have flexible disbursement rules to allow
for quick actions. Such a process would achieve
greater efficiency in coordination and targeting,
and would also empower communities—providing
them with opportunities to “learn-by-doing” and
to gain experience running their own affairs. Local
knowledge of this sort will evolve into sustainable
capabilities, giving birth over time to locally-owned
organic institutions.
Macro-level Policy Recommendations
While micro-level policies are relatively
straightforward, this report’s macro-level
recommendations involve addressing heads-on the
most complex and fundamental issues facing South
Sudan: lack of government capacity; confusing
land policy; lack of private sector strategy; limited
market intervention and regulation; conflict of
interest among governmental officials; and inherent
unemployment. While shortcomings in these areas
hinder the success of returnee reintegration, the
harm extends across all of South Sudan, which
is held back from laying the foundation for a
strong and stable state. Therefore, the political and
implementation feasibility of each macro-level policy
recommendation may vary, and a detailed analysis of
each is necessary.
37
1. Invest in government capacity:
While in theory this should sound amenable to any
politician, the mechanics of implementation present
a rather “hot potato.” All government bureaucrats
and politicians at national and state levels would
likely agree that South Sudan’s civil service is
largely unqualified and redundant; they would even
agree that the civil service should be reformed. But
disagreement emerges upon discussing how reforms
should be executed. The current civil service was
not set up for policy planning and state delivery,
but for political reasons—all various factions
and “contributors” in the liberation process were
accommodated, resulting in unqualified hires as well
as thousands of people on payroll who don’t exist,
colloquially referred to as “ghost employees.”
Purging the civil service has been difficult due to the
divergent interests of different stakeholders. Low-
skilled civil servants argue that they “contributed” in
the national liberation process and therefore deserves
their share of the national cake, and those earning
the salary of ghost workers are simply not willing
to let go of their income. All agree that these issues
distort the proper functioning of government and
yet nothing is being done. It is a problem simply of
lack of political will among top policy makers in the
country and the states. Government must be serious
and recognize the importance of having functional
institutions in charting a positive future for South
Sudan and in avoiding relapse to the violent, painful
past. Two things could help the government in this
endeavor:
a. Implement the pension law: A substantial
portion of the civil service has passed the
retirement age, yet they are still in the service.
These government employees must be retired.
b. Attract young graduates for public service:
The government must also think of innovative
ways to attract young people into government
and community work in rural and urban areas.
These young people could provide the much
needed capacity for planning and execution.
Communities could provide them with shelter
while their salary is covered by the government
or through a pooled “Reintegration Fund.”
It would be resource-intensive, but it would
not be nearly as costly as the amount donors
and NGOs pay for their employees providing
similar functions. Two young people could
be made available for each county, and could
work together with county commissioners in
outlining plans for locality. Civilians could
become involved in the planning process,
increasing the demand-side accountability of
the government. They could help operationalize
a “Reintegration Fund” and provide linkage
to communities, affording budgeting and
accounting support to the counties, which
would ease the disbursement process.
2. Formulate and implement a clear land policy:
While South Sudan has a Land Act, it does not have
the regulations necessary to operationalize the law.
The law itself must be amended to conform with the
Transitional Constitution. The distortions arising
from lack of clarity have dearly cost South Sudan
in terms of prevented investments and conflicts
associated with land. State governments have been
waiting for the national government to coordinate
and deliver on this issue; however, they do not have
to wait. The states should come up with their own
legislations on land and corresponding regulations
to distribute land, designing local policies that
would most contribute to local growth.
3. Provide targeted subsidies to private sector and
protect indigenous businesses:
These two policies should find broad political
support. Executing such a policy may prove
challenging, particularly given the limited capacity
and alleged corruption in government. The
protection policies can be implemented through
regulations. For targeted subsidies, the government
can set up joint ventures with the private sector
through the use of public-private partnerships
(PPPs). Ventures could then be managed by the
private sector, with government as a minority
shareholder. It would be advisable to start with
simple initiatives (such as timber) to build up
experience and momentum before moving into
more complex industries (such as dairy milk
production or slaughter-houses). All in all, these
initiatives can expand the activities of the private
sector, generate economic growth, and create jobs.

4. Create public works programs:

Public works programs could also find broad
political support. However, they take away business
from private contractors, who may also wield
influence among politicians with special interests.
Implementation of public works programs would
need to be in tandem with community plans. Each
community has its own needs, to be addressed
through different means. Public works would
be most relevant for communities with specific
proposals and needs (feeder roads, wells, etc.) which
could be done via intensive labor. Resources could
be allocated directly to the community (supported
by young technocrats, as mentioned), and the
community should take ownership of procurement.
The rules governing procurement plans would be
similar to the ones for the “Reintegration Fund,”
and should generally be flexible to encourage fast
disbursements.

As such, these proposals can be done within the

existing capacity environment, though some
may require enhanced political will from the
government. The provision of such political will is
the essence of leadership—the practice of making
tough choices to seek and execute what is morally
right and furthers the public good. The reintegration
process should be viewed as an element of state
building and the progress of South Sudan towards
greater development. South Sudan is a returnee
state, and a successful reintegration process would
go a long way towards building its state apparatus
and renewing the new nation’s social fabric.

39
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Oral Interviews
i. Afrangi, Abel Abdalla. A Chief and Secretary for Community Development Committee of Alelchok.
Western Bahr el Ghazal State, Wau. August 2012.

ii. Andrew, Raphael. The Owner of Car Garage. Western Bahr el Ghazal State, Wau. August 2012.

iii. Awan, Honorable Paul Malong. Governor of Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Aweil. July 2012.

43
iv. Bol, Honorable Ayii Akol. Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. Government of Northern Bahr El Ghazal,
Aweil. July 2012.

v. Chamber of Commerce. GoSS, Juba. July 2012.

vi.Chamber of Commerce. Government of Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Aweil. July 2012.

vii. David, Martin. The owner of Garage for Fuel-pumps Repair. Western Bahr el Ghazal State, Wau. August 2012.

viii. Deng, Honorable Ronald Ruai. Minister of Trade and Investments. Government of Northern Bahr El
Ghazal, Aweil. July 2012.

ix. Gawi, Suliman Gabriel. Focus Group Interviewee. Western Bahr el Ghazal State, Wau. August 2012.

x. International Organization for Migration (IOM). South Sudan Country Headquarters, Juba. 11 July 2012.

xi. International Organization for Migration (IOM). Northern Bahr El Ghazal field office, Malualkon. 23
July 2012.

xii. Kuot, Honorable Garang Kuot. Secretary General of Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Aweil. July 2012.

xiii. Ministry of Agriculture. GoSS, Juba. July 2012.

xiv. Ministry of Finance. GoSS, Juba. July 2012.

xv. Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare. GoSS, Juba. July 2012.

xvi. Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. GoSS, Juba. July 2012.

xvii. Ministry of Labour, Public Service, and Human Resource Development. GoSS, Juba. July 2012.

xviii. Norwegian Refugee Council. Northern Bahr El Ghazal field office, Aweil. 22 July 2012.

xix. South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC). GoSS. Juba. July 2012.

xx. South Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC). Government of Northern Bahr El Ghazal,
Aweil. July 2012.

xxi. United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO). South Sudan Country Headquarters,
Juba. 11 July 2012.

xxii. United Nations Mission in South Sudan - Relief, Reintegration and Peace Building (UNMISS-RRP).
Aweil. July 2012.

xxiii. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Northern Bahr El Ghazal field office,
Aweil. 25 July 2012.

xxiv. United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance,
Juba. 12 July 2012.

xxv. World Bank. Country Office, Juba. January 2013.

xxv. World Food Program (WFP). Northern Bahr El Ghazal field office, Aweil. 24 July 2012.
Annex 1
DATA ANALYSIS

Figure 1: Gender composition of survey population. Nearly 60% of respondents are female.

Figure 2: Approximate date of return to South Sudan. The majority of returnees arrived back
in South Sudan 1-2 years ago

Figure 3: Comparison of the Level of Male Education

45
Figure 4: Comparison of the Level of Female Education

Figure 5: Current Profession for Men

Figure 6: Current Profession for Women

Figure 7: Median of past work experience for returnees is 6-10 years.

Figure 8: Socio-Economic status for Female

Figure 9: Socio-Economic Status for Male

47
Figure 10: Composition of Source of Income for Male

Figure 11: Composition of Source of income for female

Figure 12: Composition of weekly meals

Figure 13: Paid Employment rate has significant difference between states

Figure 14: Unemployed, no paid jobs, and irregular workers have considerable
experienced workers

Figure 15: Previous employment before return

49
Annex 2
RETURNEE FOCUS GROUPS

On July 14, 2012, C-SAR conducted a focus group discussion with the returnees on the outskirts of Aweil in
the “temporary” returnee resettlement area called Apada. The following individuals participated in the focus group.

i. Mr. Aken Deng Aken

xviii. Mr. Thiec Nuoi Apiu
ii. Mr. Garang Dau Aher
xix. Ms. Atak Ater
iii. Mr. Garang Maluth
xx. Ms. Mary Atoc Akot
iv. Mr. Deng Angok Athian
xxi. Mr. Hong Dhol Thiec
v. Mr. Garang Akol Athian
xxii. Mr. Thiec Bar Akunu
vi. Mr. Majok Ngor Baai
xxiii. Ms. Awut Wek Marach
vii. Mr. Kawach Dhieu Mayar
xxiv. Mr. Anguch Deng Lual
viii. Mr. Abraham Wol Lual
xxv. Ms. Nyanjok Dut Achuil
ix. Mr. Garang Dut Akoon
xxvi. Ms. Rebecca Juer
x. Mr. Peter Marach Achien
xxvii. Ms. Bakhita Adau Tong
xi. Mr. Wol Bol Akot
xxviii. Mr. Maduok Adim Bol
xii. Mr. Berjok Deng Akol
xxix. Mr. Sultan Lual Lual Ayam
xiii. Mr. Wol Mawut
xxx. Mr. Manyok Akol Akol
xiv. Mr. Deng Ngor Deng
xxxi. Mr. Santino Kuol
xv. Mr. Tong Mon Deng
xxxii. Ms. Achuetwei Akol Ngong
xvi. Mr. Simon Maduok Dut
xxxiii. Mr. William Garang Garang
xvii. Mr. Deng Deng Diing

On September 9, 2012, C-SAR conducted a focus group discussion with the returnees on the outskirts of
Wau. The eight (8) participants elected to participate anonymously but the following participant groups
were represented: four (4) participants who had returned from North Sudan, three (3) participants who had
returned from Israel, and one (1) participant who had returned from the United States. Two of the eight
participants were women.
Annex 3
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE FOCUS GROUPS

On July 17, 2012, C-SAR conducted a focus group discussion with the Chamber of Commerce in Aweil. The
following individuals participated in the focus group.

i. Mr, Deng Garang Deng, Chairman (Farming, marketing, food sales)

ii. Mr. Wol Amuk Guot, Secretary (Farmer, wholesale food sales)

iii. Mr. Dut Athian Dut, Aweil North County Representative (Warehouse owner)

iv. Mr. Ajur Athian (Wholesale sugar and tea)

v. Mr. Diing Athian Deng (Wholesale of sugar)

vi. Mr. Dau Mou Mou (Farmer, grain mill owner)

vii. Mr. Bol Akok (Shopkeeper, timber, imports from Uganda)

viii. Mr. Deng Ater Ather (Farmer, marketing)

ix. Mr. Kong Yel Ngor (Wholesale of sugar, biscuits, and processed foods)

x. Mr. Angelo Bith Chol (Farmer, truck owner)

xi. Mr. Akok Akuei Wiew, Aweil East County Representative (Construction, brickmaker)

xii. Mr. Wiew Lual Wiew (Food dsistributor)

xiii. Mr. Aguer Ngong Aguer, Aweil West County Representative (Carpenter, shopowner)

On September 7, 2012, C-SAR conducted a focus group discussion with the Chamber of Commerce in Wau.
The following individuals participated in the focus group:

i. Muzmeil Ahmed, Administrator

ii. Natali Matthew, Membe

iii. Abel Abdalla Afrangi, Secretary for Alelchock Community Development Committee

51
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