Narratives: Constitutional Law II

Narratives
Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola

2005
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Table of Contents
Miranda vs. Arizona [384 US 436, 13 June 1966] … 1
People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001] … 3
People vs. Del Rosario [GR 127755, 14 April 1999] … 4
People vs. Bolanos [GR 101808, 3 July 1992] … 5
Rhode Island vs. Innis [446 US 291, 12 May 1980] … 6
People vs. Mahinay [GR 122485, 1 February 1999] … 8
People vs. Ayson [GR 85215, 7 July 1989] … 9
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sumilang [Administrative Matter MTJ-94-989, 18 April 1997] … 10
Gamboa vs. Cruz [GR L-56291, 27 June 1988] … 11
United States vs. Wade [388 US 218, 12 June 1967] … 12
People vs. Escordial [GR 138934-35, 16 January 2002] … 13

People vs. Piedad [GR 131923, 5 December 2002] … 15
Magtoto vs. Manguera [GR L-37201-02, 3 March 1975] … 16
People vs. Page [GR L-37507, 7 June 1977] … 17
People vs. Caguioa [GR L-38975, 17 January 1980] … 18
People vs. Tampus [GR L-44690, 28 March 1980] … 19
People vs. Galit [GR 51770, 20 March 1985] … 20
People vs. Bandula [GR 89223, 27 May 1994] … 21
People vs. Quidato [GR 117401, 1 October 1998] … 22
People vs. Rous [GR 103803-04, 27 March 1995] … 24
People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997] … 25

People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999] … 27
People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002] ... 28
People vs. Gallardo [GR 113684, 25 January 2000] … 29
People vs. Barasina [GR 109993, 21 January 1994] … 30
People vs. Morial [GR 129295, 15 August 2001] … 32
People vs. Castro [GR 106583, 19 June 1997] … 34
People vs. Wong Chuen Ming [GR 112801-11, 12 April 1996] … 34
Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division) [GR 109242, 26 January 1999] … 36
People vs. Andan [GR 116437, 3 March 1997] … 37
People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001] … 39

People vs. Ordono [GR 132154, 29 June 2000] … 41
People vs. Guillermo [GR 147786, 20 January 2004] … 43
People vs. Gomez [GR 101817, 26 March 1997] … 45
Illinois vs. Perkins [496 US 292, 4 June 1990] … 46
People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001] … 47
People vs. Luvendino [GR 69971, 3 July 1992] … 49
People vs. Alicando [GR 117487, 12 December 1995] … 49
Harris vs. New York [401 US 222, 24 February 1971] … 51
New York vs. Quarles [467 US 649, 12 June 1984] … 51
This collection contains forty (40) cases

summarized in this format by
Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student)
during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006
in the Political Law Review class
under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr.
at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL).
Compiled as PDF, September 2012.
Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002

and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006.
He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
berneguerrero.wordpress.com
Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
226 Miranda vs. Arizona [384 US 436, 13 June 1966]

Warren (J)
Facts: [No. 759; Miranda vs. Arizona] On 13 March 1963, Ernesto Miranda was arrested at his home and
taken in custody to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the complaining witness. The police
then took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective bureau. There he was questioned by two police
officers. The officers did not advise Miranda that he had a right to have an attorney present. Two hours later,
the officers emerged from the interrogation room with a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of
the statement was a typed paragraph stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or
promises of immunity and "with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may
be used against me." At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the
objection of defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior oral confession made by Miranda during
the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to 30 years'
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arizona held
that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining the confession and affirmed the conviction.
In reaching its decision, the court emphasized heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request
counsel.
[No. 760, Vignera vs. New York] Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on 14 October 1960, in
connection with the robbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn dress shop. They took him to the 17th Detective
Squad headquarters in Manhattan. Sometime thereafter he was taken to the 66th Detective Squad. While at
the 66th Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the store owner and a saleslady as the man who robbed
the dress shop. At about 3 p. m. he was formally arrested. The police then transported him to still another
station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for detention." At 11 p. m. Vignera was questioned by an assistant
district attorney in the presence of a hearing reporter who transcribed the questions and Vignera's answers.
This verbatim account of these proceedings contains no statement of any warnings given by the assistant
district attorney. At Vignera's trial on a charge of first degree robbery, the detective testified as to the oral
confession. The transcription of the statement taken was also introduced in evidence. Vignera was found
guilty of first degree robbery. He was subsequently adjudged a third-felony offender and sentenced to 30 to 60
years' imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without opinion by the Appellate Division, Second
Department, and by the Court of Appeals, also without opinion, remittitur amended. In argument to the Court
of Appeals, the State contended that Vignera had no constitutional right to be advised of his right to counsel or
his privilege against self-incrimination.
[No. 761, Westover vs. United States] At approximately 9:45 p. m. on 20 March 1963, Carl Calvin Westover
was arrested by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies. A report was also
received from the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in California. The local authorities took him to a
police station and placed him in a line-up on the local charges, and at about 11:45 p. m. he was booked.
Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. He denied any knowledge of criminal
activities. The next day local officers interrogated him again throughout the morning. Shortly before noon
they informed the FBI that they were through interrogating Westover and that the FBI could proceed to
interrogate him. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Westover was ever given any warning as to his
rights by local police. At noon, three special agents of the FBI continued the interrogation in a private
interview room of the Kansas City Police Department, this time with respect to the robbery of a savings and
loan association and a bank in Sacramento, California. After two or two and one-half hours, Westover signed
separate confessions to each of these two robberies which had been prepared by one of the agents during the
interrogation. At trial one of the agents testified, and a paragraph on each of the statements states, that the
agents advised Westover that he did not have to make a statement, that any statement he made could be used
against him, and that he had the right to see an attorney. Westover was tried by a jury in federal court and
convicted of the California robberies. His statements were introduced at trial. He was sentenced to 15 years'
imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed by
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
[No. 584, California vs. Stewart] In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one
of the victims had died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, Roy Allen Stewart was pointed out to Los
Angeles police as the endorser of dividend checks taken in one of the robberies. At about 7:15 p. m., 31
January 1963, police officers went to Stewart's house and arrested him. One of the officers asked Stewart if
they could search the house, to which he replied, "Go ahead." The search turned up various items taken from
the five robbery victims. At the time of Stewart's arrest, police also arrested Stewart's wife and three other
persons who were visiting him. These four were jailed along with Stewart and were interrogated. Stewart was
taken to the University Station of the Los Angeles Police Department where he was placed in a cell. During
the next five days, police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions. Except during the first
interrogation session, when he was confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart was isolated with his
interrogators. During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had robbed the deceased and
stated that he had not meant to hurt her. Police then brought Stewart before a magistrate for the first time.
Since there was no evidence to connect them with any crime, the police then released the other four persons
arrested with him. Nothing in the record specifically indicates whether Stewart was or was not advised of his
right to remain silent or his right to counsel. In a number of instances, however, the interrogating officers
were asked to recount everything that was said during the interrogations. None indicated that Stewart was
ever advised of his rights. Stewart was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his
trial, transcripts of the first interrogation and the confession at the last interrogation were introduced in
evidence. The jury found Stewart guilty of robbery and first degree murder and fixed the penalty as death. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed.
Issue: Whether the written confessions made in uncounselled interrogation, with the accused not appraised of
his right to consult with an attorney and to have one during the inerrogation, nor his right not to be compelled
to incriminate himself, are not admissible as evidence.
Held: In No. 759, from the testimony of the officers and by the admission of the State of Arizona, it is clear
that Miranda was not in any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present
during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in
any other manner. Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a
statement which contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of his "legal rights" does not
approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional rights.
Similarly in No. 760, Vignera was not warned of any of his rights before the questioning by the detective and
by the assistant district attorney. No other steps were taken to protect these rights. Thus he was not effectively
apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege or of his right to have counsel present and his statements are
inadmissible.
In No. 761, there is nothing in the facts that Westover knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain
silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the time he made the statement. At the time the FBI agents
began questioning Westover, he had been in custody for over 14 hours and had been interrogated at length
during that period. The FBI interrogation began immediately upon the conclusion of the interrogation by
Kansas City police and was conducted in local police headquarters. There is no evidence of any warning
given prior to the FBI interrogation nor is there any evidence of an articulated waiver of rights after the FBI
commenced its interrogation. The record simply shows that the defendant did in fact confess a short time after
being turned over to the FBI following interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents gave
warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view the warnings came at the end of the
interrogation process. In these circumstances an intelligent waiver of constitutional rights cannot be assumed.
Law enforcement authorities are not precluded from questioning any individual who has been held for a
period of time by other authorities and interrogated by them without appropriate warnings. A different case

would be presented if an accused were taken into custody by the second authority, removed both in time and
place from his original surroundings, and then adequately advised of his rights and given an opportunity to
exercise them.
Lastly in No. 584, In dealing with custodial interrogation, the Court will not presume that a defendant has
been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been adequately
safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or that any effective alternative
has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights be assumed on a silent record.
Furthermore, Stewart's steadfast denial of the alleged offenses through eight of the nine interrogations over a
period of five days is subject to no other construction than that he was compelled by persistent interrogation
to forgo his Fifth Amendment privilege.
227 People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]

En Banc, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house together with her
husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on
the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going
down the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was sleeping but
she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call of nature. Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the
place she slept but that her slippers were still there. After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she
stood up and began calling out for Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw
that the backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see if Nairube was there
but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The
sole of the slippers was red while the strap was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not
belong to any member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for help.
Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her child. She
also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went home while the
police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching
team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing
the panty, she cried. She was thereafter ordered to go home while the others continued the search. Thereafter,
they continued the search and found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the
sleeve hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed him that
the two items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around
7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He
then brought Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused denied
that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he admitted to
having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been
informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the PNP,
the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to find the body of
Nairube. It was only when they brought Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver, on
18 September 1997, that they found the body of Nairube. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape
with homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8 October 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found
Lugod guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Nairube Ramos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual
damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Lugod’s confession and subesequent act of pointing the location of the Nairube’s body may
be used against him as evidence.

Held: Records reveal that Lugod was not informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he
cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to
indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides, even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid,
the waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently, Lugod's act of
confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be
used against him for having transgressed Lugod's rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our
Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the
same vein, Lugod's act in pointing out the location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation of the
Lugod's right to remain silent. The same was an integral part of the- uncounselled confession and is
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Even if we were to assume that Lugod was not yet under
interrogation and thus not entitled to his constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the police station,
Lugod's acts subsequent to his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been voluntarily made
considering the peculiar circumstances surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by SPO2
Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if he told the truth. Furthermore, when ugod allegedly
pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2 Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly 100 of the
townspeople of Cavinti escorted him there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were antagonistic
towards Lugod and wanted to hurt him. The atmosphere from the time Lugod was apprehended and taken to
the police station up until the time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the body of the victim
was highly intimidating and was not conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a highly coercive
atmosphere, Lugod's claim that he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers raises a very serious
doubt as to the voluntariness of his alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that when he visited
Lugod in the jail cell, he noticed that Lugod had bruises on his face, corroborated Lugod's assertion that he
was maltreated. Considering that the confession of Lugod cannot be used against him, the only remaining
evidence which was established by the prosecution is the fact that several persons testified having seen Lugod
the night before the murder of Nairube and on several other occasions wearing the rubber slippers and black
T-shirt found at the house of the victim and Villa Anastacia respectively as well as the testimony of Romualdo
Ramos, the tricycle driver who stated that he saw Lugod in the early morning of 16 September 1997 leaving
Villa Anastacia without a T-shirt and without slippers. These pieces of evidence are circumstantial in nature.
The combination of the above-mentioned circumstances does not lead to the irrefutably logical conclusion
that Lugod raped and murdered Nairube. At most, these circumstances, taken with the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful evening and places Lugod at the
scene of the crime and nothing more. Lugod was acquitted.
228 People vs. Del Rosario [GR 127755, 14 April 1999]

En Banc, Bellosillo (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 13 May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m., Paul Vincent Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the side of
Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St., Cabanatuan City, when three women flagged him. Parked at a distance of
about 1½ meters in front of him was a tricycle driven by Joselito del Rosario y Pascual. At that point, Alonzo
saw 2 men and a woman (Virginia Bernas) grappling for possession of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one
of the two men (Ernesto "Jun" Marquez) armed with a gun started chasing a man who was trying to help the
woman, while the other snatcher ("Dodong" Bisaya) kicked the woman sending her to the ground. Soon after,
the armed man returned and while the woman was still on the ground he shot her on the head. The bag taken
by the man was brought to the tricycle of del Rosario where someone inside (Virgilio "Boy" Santos) received
the bag. The armed man then sat behind the driver while his companion entered the sidecar. When the tricycle
sped away Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the plate number of the tricycle. He also recognized the
driver, after which he went to the nearest police headquarters and reported the incident. Upon finding the
name of the owner of the tricycle, SP04 Geronimo de Leon and his team proceeded to Bakod Bayan in the
house of the barangay captain where the owner of the tricycle was summoned and who in turn revealed the
driver's name and was invited for interview. Del Rosario volunteered to name his passengers on 13 May 1996.
On the way to the police station, del Rosario informed them of the bag and lunch kit's location and the place

where the hold-uppers may be found and they reported these findings to their officers, Capt. Biag and Capt.
Cruz. After lunch, they proceeded to Brgy. Dicarma composed of 15 armed men where a shoot-out transpired
that lasted from 1:00 to 4:00 p.m. After a brief encounter, they went inside the house where they found
Marquez dead holding a magazine and a gun. While all of these were happening, del Rosario was at the back
of the school, handcuffed by the police because allegedly they had already gathered enough evidence against
him and they were afraid that he might attempt to escape. After the encounter, they went back to the police
station. The investigator took the statement of del Rosario on 14 May 1996, and was only subscribed on 22
May 1996. All the while, he was detained in the police station as ordered by the Fiscal. His statements were
only signed on 16 May 1996. He also executed a waiver of his detention. His Sinumpaang Salaysay was done
with the assistance of Ex-Judge Talavera. Del Rosario, on the other hand, claimed that he was hired for
P120.00 by "Boy" Santos to drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward Coliseum but was directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya; where the robbery homicide
occurred. He claimed that the 3 men alighted and warned del Rosario not to inform the police authorities
about the incident otherwise he and his family would be harmed. Del Rosario then went home. Because of the
threat, however, he did not report the matter to the owner of the tricycle nor to the barangay captain and the
police. Del Rosario, Marquez, Santos, and John Doe alias "Dodong" were charged with the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide for having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman, of
P200,000.00 in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her. While del Rosario pleaded
not guilty, Santos and alias "Dodong" remained at large. Thus, only del Rosario was tried. The trial court
found del Rosario guilty as co-principal in the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing him to death,
and to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas P550,000.00 as actual damages and P100,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation at the time he was
“invited” for questioning at the house ofthe barangay captain.
Held: Del Rosario was deprived of his rights during custodial investigation. From the time he was invited"
for questioning at the house of the barangay captain, he was already under effective custodial investigation,
but he was not apprised nor made aware thereof by the investigating officers. The police already knew the
name of the tricycle driver and the latter was already a suspect in the robbing and senseless slaying of Virginia
Bernas. Since the prosecution failed to establish that del Rosario had waived his right to remain silent, his
verbal admissions on his participation in the crime even before his actual arrest were inadmissible against
him, as the same transgressed the safeguards provided by law and the Bill of Rights. Herein, like victim
Virginia Bernas, del Rosario too was a hapless victim who was forcibly used by other persons with nefarious
designs to perpetrate a dastardly act. Del Rosario's defense of "irresistible force" has been substantiated by
clear and convincing evidence. Del Rosario was threatened with a gun. He could not therefore be expected to
flee nor risk his life to help a stranger. A person under the same circumstances would be more concerned with
his personal welfare and security rather than the safety of a person whom he only saw for the first time that
day. On the other hand, conspiracy between him and his co-accused was not proved beyond a whimper of a
doubt by the prosecution, thus clearing del Rosario of any complicity in the crime charged.
229 People vs. Bolanos [GR 101808, 3 July 1992]

Second Division, Paras (J): 4 concur
Facts: The death of the victim, Oscar Pagdalian, was communicated to the Police Station where Patrolmen
Rolando Alcantara and Francisco Dayao of the Integrated National Police (INP), Balagtas, Bulacan, are
assigned. Patrolmen Alcantara and Dayao proceeded to the scene of the crime of Marble Supply, Balagtas,
Bulacan and upon arrival they saw the deceased Pagdalian lying on an improvised bed full of blood with stab
wounds. They then inquired about the circumstances of the incident and were informed that the deceased was
with 2 companions, on the previous night, one of whom was Ramon Bolanos who had a drinking spree with
the deceased and another companion (Claudio Magtibay) till the wee hours of the following morning, 23 June

1990. When Alcantara and Dayao apprehended Bolanos, they found the firearm of the deceased on the chair
where Bolanos was allegedly seated. They boarded Ramon Bolanos and Claudio Magtibay on the police
vehicle and brought them to the police station. In the vehicle where the suspect was riding, "Ramon Bolanos
accordingly admitted that he killed the deceased Oscar Pagdalian because he was abusive," after he was asked
by the police if he killed the victim. Bolanos was charged for murder before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 14, under Criminal Case 1831-M-90. The trial court, even if the alleged oral
admission of Bolanos was given without the assistance of counsel when it was made while on board the
police vehicle on their way to the police station, found Bolanos guilty of the crime charged and imposed on
him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua (life imprisonment) and to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00. The
Office of the Solicitor General threafter filed a Manifestation (in lieu of Appellee's Brief), claiming that the
lower court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos while on board the police
patrol jeep.
Issue: Whether the extra-judicial confession of Bolanos while on board the police patrol jeep may be used to
prove Bolanos’ guilt.
Held: Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on the way to the
Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted, Bolanos should have been informed of
his Constitutional rights under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution which explicitly provides: (1)
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the service of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions
for violation of this section as well as compensation and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices and their families. Considering the clear requirements of the Constitution with respect to the manner
by which confession can be admissible in evidence, and the glaring fact that the alleged confession obtained
while on board the police vehicle was the only reason for the conviction, besides Bolanos's conviction was not
proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court has no recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review.
230 Rhode Island vs. Innis [446 US 291, 12 May 1980]

Stewart (J)
Facts: On the night of 12 January 1975, John Mulvaney, a Providence, Rhode Island taxicab driver,
disappeared after being dispatched to pick up a customer. His body was discovered 4 days later buried in a
shallow grave in Coventry, Rhode Island. He had died from a shotgun blast aimed at the back of his head. On
17 January 1975, shortly after midnight, the Providence police received a telephone call from Gerald Aubin,
also a taxicab driver, who reported that he had just been robbed by a man wielding a sawed-off shotgun.
Aubin further reported that he had dropped off his assailant near Rhode Island College in a section of
Providence known as Mount Pleasant. While at the Providence police station waiting to give a statement,
Aubin noticed a picture of his assailant on a bulletin board. Aubin so informed one of the police officers
present. The officer prepared a photo array, and again Aubin identified a picture of the same person. That
person was Innis. Shortly thereafter, the Providence police began a search of the Mount Pleasant area. At
approximately 4:30 a.m. on the same date, Patrolman Lovell, while cruising the streets of Mount Pleasant in a
patrol car, spotted Innis standing in the street facing him. When Patrolman Lovell stopped his car, Innis
walked towards it. Patrolman Lovell then arrested Innis, who was unarmed, and advised him of his so-called
Miranda rights. While the two men waited in the patrol car for other police officers to arrive, Patrolman
Lovell did not converse with Innis other than to respond to the latter's request for a cigarette. Within minutes,
Sergeant Sears arrived at the scene of the arrest, and he also gave Innis the Miranda warnings. Immediately

thereafter, Captain Leyden and other police officers arrived. Captain Leyden advised Innis of his Miranda
rights. Innis stated that he understood those rights and wanted to speak with a lawyer. Captain Leyden then
directed that Innis be placed in a "caged wagon," a 4-door police car with a wire screen mesh between the
front and rear seats, and be driven to the central police station. 3 officers, Patrolmen Gleckman, Williams, and
McKenna, were assigned to accompany Innis to the central station. They placed Innis in the vehicle and shut
the doors. Captain Leyden then instructed the officers not to question Innis or intimidate or coerce him in any
way. The three officers then entered the vehicle, and it departed. While en route to the central station,
Patrolman Gleckman initiated a conversation with Patrolman McKenna concerning the missing shotgun. Innis
then interrupted the conversation, stating that the officers should turn the car around so he could show them
where the gun was located. At this point, Patrolman McKenna radioed back to Captain Leyden that they were
returning to the scene of the arrest, and that Innis would inform them of the location of the gun. At the time
Innis indicated that the officers should turn back, they had traveled no more than a mile, a trip encompassing
only a few minutes. The police vehicle then returned to the scene of the arrest where a search for the shotgun
was in progress. There, Captain Leyden again advised Innis of his Miranda rights. Innis replied that he
understood those rights but that he "wanted to get the gun out of the way because of the kids in the area in the
school." Innis then led the police to a nearby field, where he pointed out the shotgun under some rocks by the
side of the road. On 20 March 1975, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Innis with the kidnaping,
robbery, and murder of John Mulvaney. Before trial, Innis moved to suppress the shotgun and the statements
he had made to the police regarding it. After an evidentiary hearing at which Innis elected not to testify, the
trial judge found that Innis had been "repeatedly and completely advised of his Miranda rights." He further
found that it was "entirely understandable that [the officers in the police vehicle] would voice their concern
[for the safety of the handicapped children] to each other." The judge then concluded that Innis's decision to
inform the police of the location of the shotgun was "a waiver, clearly, and on the basis of the evidence that I
have heard, and [sic] intelligent waiver, of his [Miranda] right to remain silent." Thus, without passing on
whether the police officers had in fact "interrogated" Innis, the trial court sustained the admissibility of the
shotgun and testimony related to its discovery. That evidence was later introduced at Innis's trial, and the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. On appeal, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, in a 3-2 decision, set
aside Innis's conviction. Contrary to the holding of the trial court, the appellate court concluded that the
evidence was insufficient to support a finding of waiver. Having concluded that both the shotgun and
testimony relating to its discovery were obtained in violation of the Miranda standards and therefore should
not have been admitted into evidence, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that Innis was entitled to a new
trial.
Issue: Whether Innis was "interrogated" by the police officers in violation of the former's undisputed right
under Miranda to remain silent until he had consulted with a lawyer.
Held: The special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply taken
into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation. "Interrogation," as
conceptualized in the Miranda opinion, must reflect a measure of compulsion above and beyond that inherent
in custody itself. The Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either
express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under Miranda refers
not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those
normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda
safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive
police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the
police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to
interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their
words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police
officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Herein, Innis

was not "interrogated" within the meaning of Miranda. It is undisputed that the first prong of the definition of
"interrogation" was not satisfied, for the conversation between Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna included
no express questioning of Innis. Rather, that conversation was, at least in form, nothing more than a dialogue
between the two officers to which no response from Innis was invited. Moreover, it cannot be fairly
concluded that Innis was subjected to the "functional equivalent" of questioning. It cannot be said, in short,
that Patrolmen Gleckman and McKenna should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from Innis. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the officers were
aware that Innis was peculiarly susceptible to an appeal to his conscience concerning the safety of
handicapped children. Nor is there anything in the record to suggest that the police knew that Innis was
unusually disoriented or upset at the time of his arrest. The Rhode Island Supreme Court erred, thus, in
equating "subtle compulsion" with interrogation. That the officers' comments struck a responsive chord is
readily apparent. Thus, it may be said, as the Rhode Island Supreme Court did say, that Innis was subjected to
"subtle compulsion," but that is not the end of the inquiry. It must also be established that a suspect's
incriminating response was the product of words or actions on the part of the police that they should have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. This was not established in the present case.
231 People vs. Mahinay [GR 122485, 1 February 1999]

En Banc, Per Curiam: 15 concur
Facts: Larry Mahinay y Amparado started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on 20 November 1993. His
task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction adjacent to her old residence situated inside
a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. mahinay stayed and slept in
an apartment also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house. The victim, Ma. Victoria
Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school
and play inside the compound yard, catching maya birds together with other children. On 25 June 1995, at
8:00 a.m., Mahinay joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. Around 10 a.m., Mahinay, who was already
drunk, left Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends. Sgt. Roberto Suni, also
a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-law's house between 6 to 7 p.m. met Mahinay along Dian Street. That
same evening, between 8 to 9 p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate of the unfinished house.
Later, at 9 p.m., Mahinay showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed
Mahinay that there was none left of it. She noticed that Mahinay appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought.
She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the compound.
Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She last saw her daughter
wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon, printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white
lady sando and blue rubber slippers. Mahinay failed to show up for supper that night. On the following day,
26 June 1995, at 2 a.m., Mahinay boarded a passenger jeepney driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa.
Mahinay alighted at the top of the bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter disappeared. That same
morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank. Boy
immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents, Eduardo and Elvira Chan. With the help of the
Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a
printed blouse without underwear. Her face bore bruises. Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and
SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were informed by Isip that her houseboy, Mahinay, was missing. At the second floor
of the house under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short pants, a
brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to belong to her daughter, Ma.
Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of blue slippers which Isip identified as that of Mahinay.
Also found in the yard, three armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair
of dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as Mahinay's belongings. These items were
brought to the police station. A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to
the office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the victim's underwear
from the septic tank. After a series of follow-up operations, Mahinay was finally arrested in Barangay Obario
Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to the Valenzuela Police Station. On 7 July 1995, with the assistance

of Atty. Restituto Viernes, Mahinay executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he
raped and killed the victim. Also, when Mahinay came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he
confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his
co-conspirators. Thus, on 10 July 1995, Mahinay was charged with rape with homicide, to which he pleaded
not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting Mahinay of the crime charged, sentenced
him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. Hence, the automatic
review.
Held: Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his constitutional
rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office voluntarily gave his
statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of Mahinay given with the assistance of
Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to
the proper authorities of any maltreatment on his person. He did not even inform the Inquest Prosecutor when
he was sworn to the truth of his statement on 8 July 1995 that he was forced, coerced or was promised of
reward or leniency. That his confession abound with details known only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer
from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he informed and
explained to Mahinay his constitutional rights and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That
he signed the statement given by Mahinay. A lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected to be
watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation and the physical conditions
of the accused. The post mortem findings show that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation;
Traumatic Head injury Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of Mahinay that he pushed
the victim and the latter's head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness. There being no evidence
presented to show that said confession were obtained as a result of violence, torture, maltreatment,
intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been
motivated to concoct the facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true,
correct and freely or voluntarily given. In his extrajudicial confession, Mahinay himself admitted that he had
sexual congress with the unconscious child. Such circumstantial evidence, besides 8 others, established the
felony of rape with homicide defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 11, RA 7659.
232 People vs. Ayson [GR 85215, 7 July 1989]

First Division, Narvasa (J): 4 concur
Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned at its Baguio City
station. It having allegedly come to light that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the
PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of 9 February 1986. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective
Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which
Ramos pertained. On the day before the investigation, 8 February 1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten note stating the at he was willing to settle irregularities allegedly charged against him in the
amount of P76,000 (approximately) subject to conditions as may be imposed by PAL on or before 1700/9
February 1986. At the investigation of 9 February 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio
City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo
Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was informed "of the finding of the
Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos'
answers were to the effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the
Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on paying
back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle
his obligation, and proferred a "compromise to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in
the next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that
he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his

statement (as he in fact afterwards did). How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all;
but it would seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated. About 2 months later,
an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in
Baguio City during the period from 12 March 1986 to 29 January 1987. On arraignment on this charge, Felipe
Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial thereafter ensued. At the close of the people's case, the private
prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated 21 June 1988, which included the statement of Ramos
taken on 9 February 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, as well as his handwritten admission given on 8
February 1986. Ramos' attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiffs Evidence." By Order dated 9
August 1988, Judge Ruben Ayson (Branch 6, RTC Baguio City) admitted all the exhibits "as part of the
testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever they are worth," except
Ramos' statement of 9 February and his handwritten admission dated 8 February. The private prosecutors filed
a motion for reconsideration. It was denied, by Order dated 14 September 1988. The private prosecutors, in
the name of the People of the Philippines, filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the orders
of 9 August 1988 and 14 September 1988.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of a person under custodial investigation comes into play during the
administrative inquiry.
Held: Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly
understood, prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in
which he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation did
not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, 9 February
1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the
trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his
superiors on 8 February 1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the
alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the
ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos. As to the danger of violation of
the right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by the complaining
companies or employers, it suffices to draw attention to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law
that disciplinary sanctions may not be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the
employee has been accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The requirement entails the
making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such administrative investigation in his defense,
with opportunity to solicit the assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of
course, refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so,
in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether at the
administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him, because he had not been
accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be
informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident
that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely
so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or
mitigation of his liability.
233 Office of the Court Administrator vs. Sumilang [Administrative Matter MTJ-94-989, 18 April
1997]
Second Division, Romero (J): 4 concur
Facts: Court interpreter Felicidad Malla, who was the officer-in-charge from 1 July 1992 to 15 November
1992, took a maternity leave for 1 month (16 November 1992 to 15 December 1992) and reassumed her
position on 16 December 1992, until her resignation on 31 August 1993. On 1 September 1993, Rebecca

Avanzado assumed the position of officer in charge. It was during her tenure on 8 August 1994, that an on-
the-spot audit examination was conducted by the Fiscal Audit Division of the Office of Court Administrator.
In the course of the examination, several anomalous transactions were discovered. One involved a manager's
check deposited in the name of Teodorico Dizon in connection with Civil Case 858, wherein Entero Villarica,
on 7 August 1992 during the tenure of Malla entrusted the amount of P240,000.00 to Malla instead of
handling it over to the Clerk of Court pursuant to Supreme Court Circular 13-92. When asked to explain
where the P240,000.00 was, Malla, explained that she deposited it at the Sta. Cruz, Laguna branch of the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) but she and Judge Sumilang later withdrew it allegedly under the belief that
Dizon would demand the delivery of the money upon the termination of the case. Upon further questioning by
the examining team, however, Malla admitted that she lent the amount of P87,000.00 to steno-reporter Edelita
Lagmay, P40,000.00 to steno-reporter Nieva Mercado, and P81,000.00 to Mrs. Sumilang, wife of Judge
Sumilang. She spent P32,000.00 for the hospitalization of her husband and the remaining balance for personal
purposes. Later on, she executed an affidavit stating that only Lagmay and Mercado borrowed P55,000.00 and
P40,000.00, respectively. On the other hand, she used P100,000.00 for her personal needs. Upon learning that
they were being implicated in the anomalous transaction, Lagmay executed an affidavit stating that the
amount of P55,000.00 was from the personal account of Malla and not from the P240,000.00 amount
deposited before the court and such loan has already been paid. Mercado, on the other hand, claims that the
amount of P40,000.00 was borrowed only two weeks before the audit took place, when Malla was no longer
employed with the court. Mrs. Sumilang, for her part, denied any involvement in any of the transactions.
Judge Augusto Sumilang, Felicidad Malla, Edelita Lagmay and Nieva Mercado, court employees of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pila, Laguna were charged in a memorandum report by the Office of Court
Administrator dated 16 August 1994, for misappropriating funds deposited by Spouses Entero Villarica and
Felicidad Domingo in Civil Case 858. On 5 October 1994, the Supreme Court issued a resolution treating the
memorandum report as an administrative complaint (Administrative Matter MTJ-94-989). In addition, a
second complaint was lodged against Malla for removing judicial records outside the court premises. The
Court decided to include this matter in the original complaint earlier docketed as AM MTJ-94-989 in a
resolution dated 6 March 1995.
Issue: Whether Malla's constitutional rights were violated when she signed an affidavit dated 14 September
1994 before the Office of the Court Administrator, where she admitted her misdeed.
Held: The constitutional provision under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution may be invoked only
during "custodial investigation" or as in "custody investigation" which has been defined as "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." The investigation is defined as an "investigation conducted by
police authorities which will include investigation conducted by the Municipal Police, P.C. (now PNP) and
the NBI and such other police agencies in our government." Thus, the Office of the Court Administrator can
hardly be deemed to be the law enforcement authority contemplated in the constitutional provision. At any
rate, Malla admitted during her testimony that she received the said check from Villarica covering the amount
of P240,000.00 payable to Dizon. However, when she tried to deposit it with the Municipal Treasurer, the
latter refused because there was no order from Judge Sumilang. Consequently, Villarica entrusted said check
to her. It was at this juncture that she used the money for personal purposes. During the investigation, Malla
repeated what she basically stated in her affidavit i.e., that she used a substantial amount of the P240,000.00
for her personal needs. This effectively refutes whatever pressure and coercion she claims was employed
against her. By repeating her confession in open court, Malla thereby converted it into a judicial confession.
234 Gamboa vs. Cruz [GR L-56291, 27 June 1988]

En Banc, Padilla (J): 9 concur, 1 concurs pro hac vice
Facts: On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 a.m., Christopher Gamboa y Gonzales was arrested for vagrancy,
without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, Gamboa was brought to Precinct 2,

Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together with several others. The
following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of 5 detainees, including Gamboa, Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to
Gamboa and said, "that one is a companion." After the identification, the other detainees were brought back to
their cell but Gamboa was ordered to stay on. While Bernal was being interrogated by the police investigator,
Gamboa was told to sit down in front of her. On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against
Gamboa. On 22 August 1979, Gamboa was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2 April 1980, the
prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case. On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel,
instead of presenting his defense, manifested in open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer
to Evidence. On 13 August 1980, Gamboa filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the
line-up, without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to counsel and
to due process. On 23 October 1980, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case
47622 issued the order denying the Motion to Acquit. Gamboa filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition,
with prayer for a temporary restraining order.
Issue: Whether Gamboa was entitled to a counsel, as part of his right in custodial investigation, at the time he
was placed in a police lineup.
Held: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating officer starts
to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the respondent/accused. At such
point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for
the commission of an offense. Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by
counsel. Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (similar guarantees in Section 12, Article III of the
1987 Constitution) are clear. They leave no room for equivocation. Accordingly, in several cases, the Supreme
Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of
counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the
waiver shall not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However, the police line-up
(at least, in this case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, Gamboa was not yet entitled, at such stage,
to counsel.
235 United States vs. Wade [388 US 218, 12 June 1967]

Brennan (J)
Facts: The federally insured bank in Eustace, Texas, was robbed on 21 September 1964. A man with a small
strip of tape on each side of his face entered the bank, pointed a pistol at the female cashier and the vice
president, the only persons in the bank at the time, and forced them to fill a pillowcase with the bank's money.
The man then drove away with an accomplice who had been waiting in a stolen car outside the bank. On 23
March 1965, an indictment was returned against Wade, and two others for conspiring to rob the bank, and
against Wade and the accomplice for the robbery itself. Wade was arrested on April 2, and counsel was
appointed to represent him on April 26. Fifteen days later an FBI agent, without notice to Wade's lawyer,
arranged to have the two bank employees observe a lineup made up of Wade and five or six other prisoners
and conducted in a courtroom of the local county courthouse. Each person in the line wore strips of tape such
as allegedly worn by the robber and upon direction each said something like "put the money in the bag," the
words allegedly uttered by the robber. Both bank employees identified Wade in the lineup as the bank robber.
At trial, the two employees, when asked on direct examination if the robber was in the courtroom, pointed to
Wade. The prior lineup identification was then elicited from both employees on cross-examination. At the
close of testimony, Wade's counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, to strike the bank
officials' courtroom identifications on the ground that conduct of the lineup, without notice to and in the
absence of his appointed counsel, violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. The motion was denied, and Wade was convicted. The

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial at which the in-court
identification evidence was to be excluded, holding that, though the lineup did not violate Wade's Fifth
Amendment rights, the lineup, held as it was, in the absence of counsel, already chosen to represent Wade,
was a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.
Issue: Whether Wade was compelled to testify himself during the pretrial lineup, to which the counsel of the
accused was not given notice to.
Held: Neither the lineup itself nor anything shown by this record that Wade was required to do in the lineup
violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The privilege "protects an accused only from being
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature." Compelling the accused merely to exhibit his person for observation by a prosecution
witness prior to trial involves no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial significance.
It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not compulsion to disclose any
knowledge he might have. It is no different from compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sample or Holt to
wear the blouse, and, as in those instances, is not within the cover of the privilege. Similarly, compelling
Wade to speak within hearing distance of the witnesses, even to utter words purportedly uttered by the robber,
was not compulsion to utter statements of a "testimonial" nature; he was required to use his voice as an
identifying physical characteristic, not to speak his guilt. The Court held in Schmerber that the distinction to
be drawn under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is one between an accused's
"communications" in whatever form, vocal or physical, and "compulsion which makes a suspect or accused
the source of `real or physical evidence.'" The Court recognized that "both federal and state courts have
usually held that [the privilege] offers no protection against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting,
photography, or measurements, to write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a
stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture." None of these activities becomes testimonial within the
scope of the privilege because required of the accused in a pretrial lineup. However, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees an accused the right to counsel not only at his trial but at any critical confrontation by the
prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might well determine his fate and where the absence of
counsel might derogate from his right to a fair trial. The post-indictment lineup (unlike such preparatory steps
as analyzing fingerprints and blood samples) was a critical prosecutive stage at which respondent was entitled
to the aid of counsel. There is a great possibility of unfairness to the accused at that point, (1) because of the
manner in which confrontations for identification are frequently conducted, (2) because of dangers inherent in
eyewitness identification and suggestibility inherent in the context of the confrontations, and (3) because of
the likelihood that the accused will often be precluded from reconstructing what occurred and thereby
obtaining a full hearing on the identification issue at trial. This case illustrates the potential for improper
influence on witnesses through the lineup procedure, since the bank employees were allowed to see
respondent in the custody of FBI agents before the lineup began. The presence of counsel at the lineup will
significantly promote fairness at the confrontation and a full hearing at trial on the issue of identification.
Further, in-court identification by a witness to whom the accused was exhibited before trial in the absence of
counsel must be excluded unless it can be established that such evidence had an independent origin or that
error in its admission was harmless. Since it is not clear that the Court of Appeals applied the prescribed rule
of exclusion, and since the nature of the in-court identifications here was not an issue in the trial and cannot
be determined on the record, the case must be remanded to the District Court for resolution of these issues.
236 People vs. Escordial [GR 138934-35, 16 January 2002]

En Banc, Mendoza (J): 14 concur
Facts: At around 8 p.m. of 27 December 1996, Jason Joniega, Mark Esmeralda and Mark Lucena were
playing inside a jeepney parked in front of a boarding house owned by Pacita Aguillon at No. 17 Margarita
Extension, Libertad St., Purok Amelia 2, Barangay 40, Bacolod City. As one of them hit his head on the rails
of the jeepney, the boys were told by a man sitting inside the jeepney to go home lest they would meet an

accident. The man was later identified by Joniega and Esmeralda as Anthony Escordial. Living in a boarding
house in front of which the jeepney was parked were Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, and Ma. Teresa
Gellaver. While the three were asleep, Erma was awakened by the presence of a man. The man had his head
covered with a t-shirt to prevent identification and carried a knife about four inches long. Michelle and Teresa
were awakened thereafter. The man was able to get P500.00 from Erma and P3,100.00 from Michelle. After
getting their money, the man gave a t-shirt to Erma to blindfold Teresa and another to Michelle to blindfold
Erma. He blindfolded Michelle himself and then began touching her in different parts of her body. The man
succeeded in inserting his penis into Michelle's vagina. Although Michelle was blindfolded and could not see,
she could feel that the man had no cover on his face when he was raping her. She felt that his chest was rough
and had some scars. When he placed her hands on his nape, she felt that it was also rough. On the other hand,
Erma claimed she was able to see through her blindfold and that she saw the man's face because of the light
coming from the lamp post outside the boarding house. After he had finished raping Michelle, the man sat on
the bed and talked to the three women. After a while, the man told Michelle he wanted to have sex with her
again. Michelle pleaded with him, but the man threatened to call his companions and said it would be worse
for her if his companions would be the ones to rape her. He ordered Michelle to lie on her stomach and then
inserted his penis into her anus. When he was through, he gave Michelle a blanket to cover herself and
returned to her a pair of earrings which he had taken from her. He then left, but not before warning the women
not to report the matter to anyone or he would kill them. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were so frightened that
they were not able to ask for help until 30 minutes after the man had left. They told their neighbor, Tiyo
Anong, that a man had come to the house and robbed them. They also called up Allan Aguillon, the son of the
owner of the boarding house, who in turn reported the incident to the police. When the policemen arrived,
they asked Michelle to describe the attacker, but she told them that she could only identify his voice and his
eyes. Accompanied by the police, the three women looked for the man around the Libertad area, but they did
not find him. Michelle, Erma, and Teresa were taken to the police station at Bac-Up for investigation. But, at
Michelle's request, Erma and Teresa did not tell the others that Michelle had been raped by their attacker.
Upon returning home, Michelle found her aunt and uncle. She embraced her aunt and told her about her
ordeal. Michelle was again taken to the police headquarters, where she was referred to the Women's Desk to
report the rape. They were able to go home to the house of Michelle's aunt at around 5 to 6 p.m. The
following day, P03 Nicolas Tancinco went around Margarita Extension and learned about the children playing
on the street around the time the intruder entered the boarding house. The description of the suspect fitted that
of a worker at a café called Coffee Break Corner, about two houses away from the boarding house. On 2
January 1997, Tancinco and some companions proceeded to the Coffee Break Corner and interviewed the
security guard, who told them that a certain Fidel Hinolan owned the café. When interviewed by Tancinco and
his companions, Fidel Hinolan told them that Escordial was his helper and that the latter had gone home on 27
December 1996 to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental. Based on the information furnished by
Hinolan, Tancinco and his fellow police officers, Michelle Darunday, Allan Aguillon, and Pacita Aguillon
went to Barangay Miranda, Pontevedra, Negros Occidental at around 10 a.m. of 3 January 1997 and asked the
assistance of the police there to locate Escordial. PO2 Rodolfo Gemarino asked one of his colleagues at the
Pontevedra police to accompany Tancinco and his companions. They found Escordial at the basketball court
and "invited" him to go to the police station for questioning. He was transferred to the Bacolod police station
for further investigation. At the Bacolod police station, Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and
Mark Esmeralda were asked whether Escordial was the same person they saw on the night of the incident.
They were taken one by one to the jail cell and asked to point to the person that they had seen that night. They
picked Escordial out of four people who were inside the jail cell. Escordial was charged with the crime of
rape in Criminal Case 97-18117. He was also charged with robbery with rape in Criminal Case 97-18118.
When arraigned on 25 February 1997, Escordial pleaded not guilty to the charges, whereupon the two cases
were jointly tried. On 26 February 1999, the trial court rendered a decision, finding Escordial guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape, the commission of which being attended by three
aggravating circumstances of (1) nighttime; (2) that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended
party, and (3) that craft, fraud and disguise were employed by the accused in the commission of the crime
under paragraphs 3, 6, and 14 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. The court sentenced Escordial to the

maximum penalty of death, and condemned him to pay Darunday the sum of P3,650.00, representing the
money taken by the accused; P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the costs.
Escordial appealed.
Issue: Whether the out-of-court identification in the show up at the police station, made after the start of the
custodial investigation, may be used in court.
Held: While it cannot be denied that Escordial was deprived of his right to be informed of his rights to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial
interrogation, the police obtained any statement from him – whether inculpatory or exculpatory - which was
used in evidence against him. No uncounseled statement was obtained from Escordial which should have
been excluded as evidence against him. However, Escordial was never assisted by counsel, whether of his
own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to
the time of his continued detention at the Bacolod police station. Although Escordial made no statement
during this time, this fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-court
identification of Escordial by the prosecution witnesses, namely, Michelle Darunday, Erma Blanca, Ma.
Teresa Gellaver, Mark Esmeralda, and Jason Joniega. As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of
counsel in a police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial inquest. However, the
previous cases are different inasmuch as Escordial, having been the focus of attention by the police after he
had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial
investigation when these out-of-court identifications were conducted by the police. An out-of-court
identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a show-up, the accused alone is brought face to
face with the witness for identification, while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a
group of persons gathered for that purpose. During custodial investigation, these types of identification have
been recognized as "critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution" which necessitate the presence
of counsel for the accused. This is because the results of these pre-trial proceedings "might well settle the
accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality." The Court thus ruled that any identification of an
uncounseled accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter, after the start of the custodial
investigation is inadmissible as evidence against him. Herein, Escordial was identified by Michelle Darunda
in a show-up on 3 January 1997 and by Erma Blanca, Ma. Teresa Gellaver, Jason Joniega, and Mark
Esmeralda in a police line-up on various dates after his arrest. Having been made when Escordial did not have
the assistance of counsel, these out-of-court identifications are inadmissible in evidence against him.
Consequently, the testimonies of these witnesses regarding these identifications should have been held
inadmissible for being "the direct result of the illegal lineup 'come at by exploitation of [the primary]
illegality.'"
237 People vs. Piedad [GR 131923, 5 December 2002]

First Division, Ynares-Santigao (J): 3 concur, 1 on official leave
Facts: On 10 April 1996, at around 11 p.m., Luz Lactawan left her house at No. 2 Scout Bayoran, Barangay
South Triangle, Quezon City, to follow Mateo, her husband, who had earlier gone. As she was walking by the
gate of the company compound where they reside, she heard Fidel Piquero shouting for help because Mateo
was being mauled by a group of men. She rushed out of the compound and saw her husband being beaten up
by Niel Piedad, Richard Palma, Lito Garcia and five others. She tried to pacify the aggressors, but was beaten
herself. Luz embraced Mateo in an effort to protect him. It was then that Niel picked up a large stone,
measuring about a foot and a half, and struck Mateo’s head with it. Then, Lito approached Mateo’s side and
stabbed him at the back, while Richard hit Mateo in the face. Mateo was rushed to the East Avenue Medical
Center where he later died because of the injuries he sustained. Niel Piedad y Consolacion, Lito Garcia y
Francisco and Richard Palma y Ider were charged with Murder. Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued thereafter. The trial court rendered a decision, finding Piedad and Garcia
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder with no modifying circumstances present, and

sentenced each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. Piedad and Garcia were likewise held solidarily liable to indemnify the heirs of the victim Mateo
Lactawan in the sum of P50,000.00. Richard Palma was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Piedad
and Garcia appealed.
Issue: Whether the way that Piedad was identified by prosecution witnesses was suggestive and fatally
flawed; that Piedad should have been put in a police lineup instead of being shoveled into a “confrontation”
with the alleged witnesses and immediately singled out by the police as suspects.
Held: The claim by the defense that Piedad’s pre-trial identification was suggestive due to the absence of a
police lineup is more theoretical than real. It must be pointed out that even before the incident, Luz Lactawan
knew the accused. Fidel, on the other hand, knew Piedad because they played basketball together. Hence, the
witnesses were not identifying persons whom they were unfamiliar with, where arguably, improper suggestion
may set in. On the contrary, when the accused were presented before the witnesses, they were simply asked to
confirm whether they were the ones responsible for the crime perpetrated. The witnesses did not incriminate
the accused simply because they were the only ones presented by the police, rather, the witnesses were certain
they recognized the perpetrators of the crime. Besides, there is no law which requires a police lineup before a
suspect can be identified as the culprit of a crime. What is important is that the prosecution witnesses
positively identify the persons charged as the malefactors. In this regard, the Court finds no reason to doubt
the veracity of Luz’s and Fidel’s testimony. The records show that Luz and Fidel positively, categorically and
unhesitatingly identified Piedad as the one who struck Mateo on the head with a stone, and Garcia as the one
who stabbed Mateo on the back, thereby inflicting traumatic head injuries and a stab wound which eventually
led to Mateo’s death. Indeed, if family members who have witnessed the killing of a loved one usually strive
to remember the faces of the assailants, the Court sees no reason how a wife, who witnessed the violence
inflicted upon her husband and who eventually died by reason thereof, could have done any less. It must be
stressed that Luz was right beside her husband when the concrete stone was struck on his head, hence, Luz
could not have mistaken the identity of the person responsible for the attack. She was only a foot away from
Piedad before the latter hit Mateo on the head. Garcia on the other hand was identified by both Luz and Fidel
as the one who was shirtless at the time of the incident. There was light from a bulb 5 meters away from the
scene of the crime. Experience dictates that precisely because of the unusual acts of violence committed right
before their eyes, eyewitnesses can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of the criminals at
any given time. Hence, the proximity and attention afforded the witnesses, coupled with the relative
illumination of the surrounding area, bolsters the credibility of identification of Piedad, et. al. Neither is the
lack of counsel during the pre-trial identification process of Piedad, et. al. fatal. Piedad, et. al. did not make
any extrajudicial confession or admission with regard to the crime charged. While Piedad and Garcia may
have been suspects, they were certainly not interrogated by the police authorities, much less forced to confess
to the crime imputed against them. Piedad and Garcia were not under custodial investigation. In fact, Piedad
averred during cross-examination that the police never allowed them to say anything at the police station on
the day they voluntarily presented themselves to the authorities.
238 Magtoto vs. Manguera [GR L-37201-02, 3 March 1975]; also Simeon vs. Villaluz [GR L-37424]
and People vs. Isnani [GR L-38929]
En Banc, Fernandez (J): 6 concur
Facts: No preliminary facts are available in the body of the case. Judge Miguel M. Manguera of the Court of
First Instance (Branch II) of Occidental Mindoro (in GR L-37201-02) and Judge Judge Onoftre A. Villaluz of
the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal (in GR L-37424) declarede admissible the confessions of the
accused in said cases (Clemente Magtoto in GR L-37201-02; and Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes
De Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion, and Rafael
Brill in GR L-37424). District Judge Asaali S. Isnani of Court of First Instance (Branch II) of Zamboanga de
Sur (in GR L-38928), on the other hand, declared inadmissible the confessions of the accused in said case

(Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion), although they have not been informed of their right to remain silent and
to counsel before they gave the confessions, because they were given before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution. Petitions for certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the right to counsel and to be informed in such right, incorporated in Section 20, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution, applies prospectively or retroactively.
Held: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the
last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be
inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and had been
violated. Consequently, because the confessions of the accused in GRs L-37201-02, 37424 and 38929 were
taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had
been violated as to render them inadmissible in evidence although they were not informed of "their right to
remain silent and to counsel," "and to be informed of such right," because, no such right existed at the time.
The argument that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, which was added by
Republic Act 1083 enacted in 1954, which reads that "In every case, the person detained shall be informed of
the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at anytime with
his attorney or counsel," impliedly granted to a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of
such right, is untenable. The only right granted by said paragraph to a detained person was to be informed of
the cause of his detention. But he must make a request for him to be able to claim the right to communicate
and confer with counsel at any time. The historical background of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution shows that the new right granted therein to a detained person to counsel and to be informed of
such right under pain of his confession being declared inadmissible in evidence, has and should be given a
prospective and not a retroactive effect. Furthermore, to give a retroactive effect to this constitutional
guarantee to counsel would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice in this country. It
may lead to the acquittal of guilty individuals and thus cause injustice to the People and the offended parties
in many criminal cases where confessions were obtained before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and in
accordance with the rules then in force although without assistance of counsel. The Constitutional Convention
could not have intended such a disastrous consequence in the administration of justice. For if the cause of
justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted.
239 People vs. Page [GR L-37507, 7 June 1977]

Second Division, Aquino (J): 3 concur, 1 concurs in result, 1 designated to sit in Second Division, 1 on
leave
Facts: At around 4:00 p.m. of 13 February 1972, Crisanto Camposano, alias Boy Sangkay, a resident of
Bagong Ilog, Baclaran, Parañaque, Rizal, went to the house of William Page y Ubina located at 143 Pildira
Street, near the Manila International Airport, Pasay City. They were friends since boyhood. Page was an 18-
year old third year high school student at the Arellano University in Pasay City. From Page's house, the two
went to Camposano's house, where they met the latter's father who was drinking with a companion.
Camposano's father gave Page some liquor to drink. Page and Camposano stayed at the latter's house up to
10:00 p.m. At past 10, Page and Camposano went to the rotonda or intersection of Taft Avenue and F. B.
Harrison Boulevard, where they boarded a Manila-bound jeepney. Page was armed with a balisong knife.
Camposano had a revolver. Page seated himself beside a male passenger who was near the driver on the front
seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the jeepney where two female passengers were seated. (The male
passenger turned out to be Randolf Scot, a 30-year old employee of the Hyatt Regency Hotel who was on his
way to work. The female passengers were the sisters, Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo and Cesarea Villaverde).
With the jeepney was in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank on Harrison Boulevard, Page and Camposano
told the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue, going to M. Roxas Boulevard, and then to turn left going to
Parañaque. There, they held up the driver and the three passengers. They got the money and pieces of jewelry

of the passengers and the driver. When the jeepney was in front of Casa Marcos and El Presidente Hotel, one
of the women (Veronica Balacapo) jumped out of the jeepney. (The husband of one of the women was a
waiter at Casa Marcos). The other woman (Cesarea Villaverde) shouted. Camposano kicked her, thus causing
her to fall out of the jeepney. Then, the two directed the driver to proceed to the airport. After the Page and
Camposano told the driver to stop (at Pildira Street, according to Page; or at Baltao Street near the airport,
according to Scot), the two malefactors fled to a dark alley. Balacapo was brought to the Philippine General
Hospital by a good Samaritan, Manolo Daval Santos. She was already dead when she reached the hospital.
Villaverde was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila. The record is not clear as to whether she survived. Scot and
the driver reported the holdup to the police of Parañaque at 11:00 p.m. Lieutenant Casiano Eugenio, the
precinct commander, showed them a photograph of Camposano. Dilla and Scot identified him as one of the
two hoodlums. Eugenio and the two robbery victims repaired to the residence of Camposano at Bagong Ilog,
Baclaran. They saw Camposano, whom Dilla fingered, but Camposano fired shots at them and was able to
elude pursuit due to the darkness of the night. He was killed by the Pasay City policemen while he was
committing another crime. The next day policemen went to Page's residence near the airport to apprehend
him. He was not there. His father, in the presence of his aunt, promised to surrender him. Page was arrested in
the morning of 24 February 1972 at the Jose Abad Santos High School of the Arellano University in Pasay
City. In the afternoon of that day, his statement was taken down by Patrolman C. Prepena and sworn to before
the municipal judge. On 25 February 1972, the chief of police filed a complaint for robbery with murder in
the municipal court of Parañaque against Camposano and John Doe (Criminal Case 30039). The complaint
was based on the investigation of Dilla and Scot. Page did not present any evidence at the preliminary
investigation. The case was remanded to the Court of First Instance where the fiscal filed an information for
robbery with homicide against Page and Camposano. After trial and on 21 July 1973, the trial court rendered
the judgment convicting Page of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering
him to pay the heirs of Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo an indemnity of P12,000 plus P20,000 as moral
damages. Page appealed.
Issue: Whether Page’s confession, without observing the requisites in Section 20 of Article IV, be admissible
as evidence.
Held: Page admitted that when he was brought before the municipal judge for the administration of the oath
on his confession, he could have complained to the latter about the alleged maltreatment. He did not
complain. The confession was voluntary. Certain details found in the confession are strong indicia of its
authenticity. Page specified therein that his residence was at 143 Pildira Street, an address which jibes with
the address in his school record; that his maternal surname is Ubiña; that he met Camposano at 4:00 p.m. of
13 February 1972; that they went to Camposano's residence, where Page was given liquor by Camposano's
father; that he directed the driver to follow a certain route; that Camposano was from Sorsogon; that Page was
acquainted with some hoodlums, and that Page was charged with theft. These details would not have been
embodied in the confession had not Page freely disclosed them to the police. Page's confession, having been
taken before the 1973 Constitution took effect, is admissible although the requisites in section 20 of Article IV
were not observed, in line with the ruling in Magtoto vs. Manguera (GR L-37201-2, 3 March 1975).
240 People vs. Caguioa [GR L-38975, 17 January 1980]

En Banc, Fernando (CJ): 8 concur, 1 concurs in result
Facts: The Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed on 14 September 1973, in the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y Gonzales (Criminal Case 146-V-73), with the
case, after the raffle, being assigned to Branch VIII, presided by Judge Eduardo P. Caguioa. Upon arraignment
on 5 October 1973, Yupo pleaded not guilty. The trial of the case then proceeded, the prosecution having
presented 6 witnesses, including the father of the deceased, Miguel Tribol, and his common-law wife, Lydia
Begnotia, who allegedly received the ante mortem statement of the victim, Rodolfo Tribol. Then, at the
hearing on 3 June 1974, the prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police

Department, before whom a written statement of Yupo and his alleged waiver of his right to remain silent and
to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was taken. After this witness had identified the statement of
Yupo and the waiver, he was questioned on the incriminating answers in such statement to the police, but
there was an objection on the part of the defense counsel based on the ground of such statement being
inadmissible in evidence, as the statement was taken by the police without any counsel assisting the accused
in the investigation. Judge Caguioa sustained the objection of the defense on the view that such judicial
confession of the accused is inadmissible in evidence for being unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused
was not assisted by a counsel when it was given. He likewise stated that such right could not be waived. Upon
his refusal to reconsider such ruling, the petition for certiorari was filed.
Issue: Whether the right to remain silent and right to counsel during custodial investigation may be waived.
Held: While there could be a waiver of the rights of an accused, it must be intelligently waived, otherwise a
court's jurisdiction starting at the beginning of the trial may be lost in the course of the proceeding. Statements
made during the period of custodial interrogation to be admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights, the suspect being warned prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that
any utterance may be used against him, and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained
or appointed. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective
means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity
to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that
he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does not make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of those rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however,
he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he
does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered
some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be
questioned. Tested by such a clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver herein falls far short. Yupo
merely answered in a monosyllabic "Opo" to Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the Police Force of Meycauayan,
worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na iyong
ginawa, bago ko ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung ayaw
mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado na iyong gusto, at dapat mo ring mabatid na anuman
ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng ayon o laban sa iyo, magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?" and that was
all.
241 People vs. Tampus [GR L-44690, 28 March 1980]

En Banc, Aquino (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: At around 10:00 a.m. of 14 January 1976, Celso Saminado, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at
Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in the emergency ward of the prison hospital, went to the toilet to answer a
call of nature and to fetch water. Jose Tampus y Ponce and Rodolfo Avila, prisoners in the same penal
institution, who were tubercular patients in the hospital, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of
their bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted 8 incised wounds on Saminado while Avila stabbed
him nine times. Saminado died upon arrival at 11:00 a.m. on that same morning in the prison hospital. After
emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their knives. They told the
guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami." The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus and

Avila, both members of the Oxo gang, avenged the stabbing of Eduardo Rosales (also a member of the Oxo
gang) in December 1975 by a member of the Batang Mindanao gang, a group hostile to the Oxo gang.
Saminado was a member of the Batang Mindanao gang. The officer of the day investigated the incident right
away. In his written report submitted on the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that,
according to his on-the-spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was seated in the comfort
room and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck. Two days
after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and Avila and obtained their
extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted Saminado. Tampus and Avila were
charged for murder before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch 36 (Criminal Case 18510).
After trial, the court convicted Tampus for murder, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs
of the victim, Celso Saminado, an indemnity of P12,000.00. In the same decision, Rodolfo Avila, the co-
accused of Tampus, was convicted of the same offense and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 14 years
and 8 months of reclusion temporal as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay the
same indemnity. Avila did not appeal. (Avila was sentenced to death, together with Frankisio Aro and Pedro
Lasala, in another case, Criminal Case 1187. The death sentence is under review in GR L-38141). The present
automatic review involves Tampus' conviction.
Issue: Whether the “custodial” investigation pursued by Lahoz, where allegedly Tampus was not informed as
to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent, negates the extra-judicial confession made by Tampus in the
killing of Saminado.
Held: As the confession in the present case was obtained after the 1973 Constitution took effect, section 20 of
Article IV applies thereto. There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. Investigator
Buenaventura de la Cuesta in taking it endeavored, according to his understanding, to comply with section 20.
Even considering that Vivencio C. Lahoz investigated the killing two days before the confession was taken by
investigator de la Cuesta on 16 January 1976 and that allegedly during said custodial interrogation Tampus
was not informed as to his rights to have counsel and to remain silent, Tampus and Avila had already admitted
it when, after coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the
first guard whom they encountered, and they revealed to him that they had committed an act of revenge. That
spontaneous statement, elicited without any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was
a voluntary confession of guilt. Not only that; the two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the
spur of the moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the right
to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of guilty and testimony in
court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction. It is further contended that after the fiscal had
presented the prosecution's evidence and when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify, the trial court
should have advised him of his constitutional right to remain silent. That contention is not well-taken
considering that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession. The court during the
trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who
should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he
waives that right. It should be stressed that, however, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of
guilt, confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence
of the prosecution.
242 People vs. Galit [GR 51770, 20 March 1985]

En Banc, Concepcion (J): 12 concur, 1 took no part
Facts: In the morning of 23 August 1917, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in the
bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of 7 wounded inflicted upon
different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. More than 2 weeks thereafter, police authorities of
Montalban picked up Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina, Rizal, or
suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, 8 September 1977, the case was referred to the

National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the
Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a team
headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who
allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. But the following day, 9 September 1977, Francisco Galit
allegedly voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He
implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime. Actually, Galit had been obtained
and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days, to no avail as he consistently maintained his innocence. The
investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. They covered his face with a rag and
pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. With Galit's will having been broken, he admitted what
the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Galit was charged
with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig,
Rizal. Trial was held, and on 11 August 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the presentation
of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding Galit guilty as charged
and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00,
and to pay the costs. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether a monosyllabic answer to a long question suffices as a voluntary admission that may be used
against the accused.
Held: As held in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, "At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the
arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any.
He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he
might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by
letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished.
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person
arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or
by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence." Herein, there were no
eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the
accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against Galit is his alleged confession. A long question
followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed
of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and
every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation. Galit
is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Galit
was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks
after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the
supposed reenactment, again Galit was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations
of his rights. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any
confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any
doubt as to the voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
243 People vs. Bandula [GR 89223, 27 May 1994]

First Division, Bellosillo (J): 2 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: On 27 January 1986, at around 10:00 p.m., 6 armed men barged into the compound of Polo Coconut
Plantation in Tanjay, Negros Oriental. The armed men were identified by Security Guard Antonio Salva of the
plantation as Aurelio Bandula, Teofilo Dionanao, Victoriano Ejan and Pantaleon Sedigo while the two others

who wore masks were simply referred to as "Boy Tall" and "Boy Short." At gunpoint, the 2 masked men held
Salva who was manning his post, disarmed him of his shotgun and tied his hands behind his back. They then
went up the house of Leoncio Pastrano, Chief of Security and General Foreman of the plantation, hog-tied
him, and divested him of his driver's license, goggles, wristwatch and .38 cal. snubnose revolver. From there,
the 6 armed men with Salva and Pastrano in tow proceeded to the house of Atty. Juanito Garay, Manager of
the Polo Coconut Plantation. Dionanao, Ejan and Sedigo stayed downstairs while Bandula and the two
masked men with Salva and Pastrano went up the house of Atty. Garay. After forcing their way into the house,
the masked men and Bandula ransacked the place and took with them money and other valuables. Thereafter,
the hooded men who were bringing with them Atty. Garay locked Pastrano inside his house together with
Salva. A few minutes later, Pastrano and Salva heard gunshots coming from the direction of the gate of the
compound. After succeeding in untying themselves, Pastrano and Salva went to report the matter to the
police. On their way, they found outside the gate the lifeless body of Atty. Garay (dead with 3 gunshot
wounds). On 28 January 1986, Dionanao was "picked-up for investigation" and interrogated by Cpl. Ephraim
Valles inside the Police Station in Tanjay where he implicated accused Sedigo. The following day, on 29
January 1986, he was brought to the Office of the Municipal Attorney of Tanjay, Atty. Ruben Zerna, where he
supposedly executed his extrajudicial confession in the presence of the latter. On 4 February 1986, upon the
suggestion of another investigator, Cpl. Valles took the Supplementary Sworn Statement of Dionanao, again
in the presence of Atty. Zerna. In his Sworn Statement, Dionanao supposedly admitted that he was with
Bandula when the latter, together with "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall," shot Atty. Garay. He added that he was
going to be killed if he did not join the group. He also said that Sedigo and Ejan were with them that evening.
Then, in his Supplementary Sworn Statement, he implicated 3 more persons but they were not thereafter
included in the Information. Pn the other hand, Bandula was arrested on 28 January 1986, at around 6:00 a.m.,
brought to the Tanjay Police Station and there interrogated. He was investigated by Cpl. Borromeo, Cpl.
Esparicia, Cpl. Ebarso, Pat. Moso and Pat. Baldejera. In that investigation, Bandula allegedly admitted that he
together with 2 others shot Atty. Garay with a .38 cal. revolver. At that time, there was no counsel present
"because that (investigation) was not yet in writing." Two weeks after his arrest, Bandula allegedly gave a
sworn statement in the presence of Atty. Zerna admitting his participation in the killing of Atty. Garay. In that
statement, Bandula narrated that after "Boy Short" and "Boy Tall" shot Atty. Garay, he (Bandula) was ordered
likewise to shoot the latter which he did. Bandula, Sedigo, Dionanao and Ejan were were charged for robbery
with homicide. On 5 May 1989, after hearing 12 prosecution and 9 defense witnesses, the trial court rendered
judgment finding Bandula guilty of the crime charged. However, his 3 co-accused were acquitted "for
insufficiency of evidence."
Issue: Whether admissions obtained during custodial interrogations requires mere counsel or independent
counsel present.
Held: Bandula and Dionanao were investigated immediately after their arrest, they had no counsel present. If
at all, counsel came in only a day after the custodial investigation with respect to Dionanao, and two weeks
later with respect to Bandula. And, counsel who supposedly assisted both accused was Atty. Ruben Zerna, the
Municipal Attorney of Tanjay. On top of this, there are telltale signs that violence was used against Bandua.
Certainly, these are blatant violations of the Constitution which mandates in Section 12, Art. III, that (1) Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel. (2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited. (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this
or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (4) The law shall provide for penal and
civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture
or similar practices, and their families. The present case is analogous to the more recent case of People v. De
Jesus, where it was held that admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of

counsel although later reduced to writing and signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution. The Constitution also requires that counsel be independent. Obviously, he cannot be a special
counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is
admittedly adverse to the accused. Granting that Atty. Zerna assisted Dionanao and Bandula when they
executed their respective extrajudicial confessions, still their confessions are inadmissible in evidence
considering that Atty. Zerna does not qualify as an independent counsel. As a legal officer of the municipality,
he provides legal assistance and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It is thus seriously doubted
whether he can effectively undertake the defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests. He
is no better than a fiscal or prosecutor who cannot represent the accused during custodial investigations.
244 People vs. Quidato [GR 117401, 1 October 1998]

Third Division, Romero (J): 2 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: Bernardo Quidato, Sr. was the father of Bernardo Quidato, Jr. and Leo Quidato. Being a widower,
Bernardo lived alone in his house at Sitio Libod, Brgy. Tagbaobo, Kaputian, Davao. He owned 16 hectares of
coconut land in the area. On 16 September 1988, Bernardo, accompanied by his son, and two hired hands,
Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita, went to Davao City to sell 41 sacks of copra. After selling the copra,
Bernardo paid the Malita brothers for their labor, who thereafter left. Bernardo Sr. and Bernardo Jr. went back
to Sitio Libod that same day. At around 6:00 p.m. of 17 September 1988, Bernardo Jr. asked Reynaldo Malita
to come to the former's house to discuss an important matter. Upon Reynaldo's arrival at Bernardo Jr.'s house,
he saw that his brother Eddie was already there. They started drinking beer. Bernardo Jr. thereafter proposed
that they rob and kill his father. They went to Bernardo's house only at 10:00 p.m., after the rain had stopped.
Reynaldo brought along a bolo. Upon reaching the house, Bernardo Jr. knocked on the door, asking his father
to let them in. When Bernardo opened the door, Eddie rushed in and knocked the old man down. Reynaldo
then hacked Bernardo on the nape and neck. Bernardo Jr. and Eddie ransacked Bernardo's aparador looking
for money but they found none; so, the 3 of them left. The body of Bernardo was discovered the next day by
Bernardo Jr.'s son, who had gone there to call his Lolo for breakfast. On 27 September 1988, Leo Quidato
confronted his brother regarding the incident and learned that Reynaldo and Eddie Malita were the ones
responsible for Bernardo's death. The two were promptly arrested by the police. Aside from arresting the latter
two, however, the police also arrested Bernardo Jr. On 29 September 1988, the Malita brothers were
interrogated by Patrolman Lucrecio Mara at the Kaputian Police Station. When Mara apprised them of their
constitutional rights, including their right to counsel, they signified their intent to confess even in the absence
of counsel. Aware that the same would be useless if given in the absence of counsel, Mara took down the
testimony of the two but refrained from requiring the latter to sign their affidavits. Instead, he escorted the
Malita brothers to Davao City and presented them, along with their unsigned affidavits, to a CLAO (now
PAO) lawyer, Jonathan Jocom. Informed of the situation, Atty. Jocom conferred with Reynaldo and Eddie,
again advising the two of their constitutional rights. The CLAO lawyer explained the contents of the
affidavits, in Visayan, to the Malita brothers, who affirmed the veracity and voluntary execution of the same.
Only then did Reynaldo and Eddie affix their signatures on the affidavits. On 17 January 1989, Bernardo Jr.
was charged with the crime of parricide before the Regional Trial Court of Davao. A murder case was
likewise filed against his co-accused, Reynaldo Malita and Eddie Malita. Bernardo Jr. and the Malita brothers
pleaded not guilty. The two cases were tried jointly. The Malita brothers withdrew their "not guilty" plea
during trial and were accordingly sentences. Only Bernardo Jr.'s case was tried on merits. After due trial and
on 2 March 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Davao, Branch 4, rendered judgment finding Bernardo Quidato,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal in the offense of Parricide which falls under Article 246
(of the Revised Penal Code), for the death of his father, Bernardo Quidato, Sr., and accordingly, was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to
indemnify the other heirs of Bernardo Quidato, Sr., the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay the costs. Bernardo
Jr. appealed.

Issue: Whether an initially uncounseled extrajudicial confession, signed in the presence of a counsel in a later
day, is admissible as evidence against the accused.
Held: The prosecution relied heavily on the affidavits executed by Reynaldo and Eddie. The two brothers
were, however, not presented on the witness stand to testify on their extrajudicial confessions. The failure to
present the two gives these affidavits the character of hearsay. It is hornbook doctrine that unless the affiants
themselves take the witness stand to affirm the averments in their affidavits, the affidavits must be excluded
from the judicial proceeding, being inadmissible hearsay. The voluntary admissions of an accused made
extrajudicially are not admissible in evidence against his co-accused when the latter had not been given an
opportunity to hear him testify and cross-examine him. Likewise, the manner by which the affidavits were
obtained by the police render the same inadmissible in evidence even if they were voluntarily given. The
settled rule is that an uncounseled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel —
that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel — is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that the
Malita brothers gave their statements to Patrolman Mara in the absence of counsel, although they signed the
same in the presence of counsel the next day. Given the inadmissibility in evidence of Gina Quidato's
(accused’s wife) testimony, as well as of Reynaldo and Eddie's extrajudicial confessions, nothing remains on
record with which to justify a judgment unfavorable to Bernardo Jr. He was therefore acquitted.
245 People vs. Rous [GR 103803-04, 27 March 1995]

Third Division, Melo (J): 4 concur
Facts: At around 3:30 a.m. of 15 December 1987; the victim Pastor Pasahol in his car driven by Rolando
Laygo who was only his companion, and left Candon, Ilocos Sur bound for Meycauayan, Bulacan. When they
reached Barangay Santiago, Bauang, La Union, 2 armed men who, according to Rolando Laygo, alighted
from a red car which stopped beside the victim's car, and then the 2 shot the victim. Thereupon, one of the
assailants took the clutch bag from the compartment of the victim's car which, according to the victim's wife,
Selwyn Pasahol, contained gold coins, earrings with diamond and refined gold worth more than P600,000.00.
Thereafter the hold-uppers took the victim's car a Mitsubishi Lancer bearing Plate DEF 888, which was found
abandoned by the peace officers at Barangay Urayong, Bauang, La Union, about 2 kilometers away from the
place at Barangay Santiago, where the crime was committed. 2 days thereafter or specifically on 17 December
1987; the victim died in the Lorma Hospital at San Fernando, La Union where he was brought by Rolando
Laygo, as a result of the inflicted gun shot wounds. Sgt. Gaddi invited Laygo to the CIS Office in the
afternoon of 15 December 1987, and interviewed the latter, who denied knowledge of the incident. On the
next day, Sgt. Gaddi again invited Laygo to the CIS Office and after questioning him for 30 minutes, Laygo
broke down and he admitted that he and Socrates Rous were parties to the conspiracy of the original plan to
commit Robbery and not to inflict harm on Pastor Pasahol. With Laygo's revelation, Sgt. Gaddi took his
sworn statement denominated as "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 16 December 1987 with the assistance of Atty.
Abraham Datlag, which is a confession of his participation in the commission of robbery and implicated
Socrates Rous in the commission of the crime. Laygo, on the same date, also executed a document entitled
"Kusang Loob na Kahilingan" also assisted by Atty. Abraham Datlag who assisted him in the custodial
investigation and witnessed by spouses Fely Laygo and Tiburcio Laygo. Both documents bear the signatures
of Ally. Abraham Datlag who assisted him in the custodial investigation and witness a by spouses Fely Laygo
and Tiburcio Laygo. Rolando Laygo also executed another "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 22 December 1987
without the assistance of a lawyer. On December 29 or 30, 1987, Socrates Rous alias Bobby was arrested by
Sgt. Gaddi when he accompanied Capt. Luvimindano Garcia in the latter's appearance before the CIS District
Commander, Lt. Col. Pimentel, in the CIS Office at San Fernando, La Union. With Laygo's confession, Sgt.
Gaddi also investigated Rous who, on 7 January 1987, executed the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" with the
assistance of Atty. Roberto Ferrer who affixed his signature thereon. Subsequently, on the basis of the
affidavit of the victim's wife, Selwyn Pasahol, the affidavit of Sgt. Roberto Gaddi and the sworn statements of
Rolando Laygo, the Provincial Fiscal filed on 17 December 1987 the case (Highway Robbery with Homicide)
against Rolando Laygo, Bobby Rous, John Doe and Peter Doe, and on 21 December 1987, the case for

Carnapping was filed against Bobby Rous, John Doe and Peter Doe. Later, the original Information in both
cases were amended after the identities of the other Does were known as Primitivo Pradis and Celestino
Rabina. After joint trial against Laygo and Rous only, as the other accused were never arrested and have
remained at large, the trial court rendered a decision acquitting Rous of the charge of carnapping, but finding
both Rous and Laygo guilty under the charge of Highway Robbery and sentencing each to an imprisonment
term of reclusion perpetua, aside from the payment in solidum of civil indemnity. From said decision, Laygo
and Rous appealed, with both of them ascribing as error the admission of their extrajudicial confessions.
Issue: Whether Laygo’s and Rous’ extra-judicial confessions, signed in the presence of the counsel, are
admissible as evidence even if the counsel arrived shortly after the custodial investigation has started and left
before the last 3 questions were asked.
Held: The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed Laygo of his right to counsel and
categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted the assistance of counsel, to which inquiry, Laygo expressed his
desire to be so assisted by counsel. Thereupon, the investigating officer, Sgt. Robert Gaddi, brought him to the
office of Atty. Abraham Datlag. Laygo and Atty. Datlag conferred for a while; thereafter, Sgt. Gaddi and
Laygo returned to the CIS Office of Sgt. Gaddi and Sgt. Gaddi started the investigation. Atty. Datlag arrived
soon after the investigation started and left before the last three questions were asked, instructing them to
follow him to his office. After the extra-judicial statement of Laygo was finished, Gaddi and Laygo went to
the office of Atty. Datlag, after which, Atty. Datlag conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign.
Laygo did so and Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise signed. Thus, there was more than substantial compliance
with the constitutional requirement that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with counsel, (Section 12 (1), Article III, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines). The
very purpose of said constitutional requirement is to prevent the use of coercion in extracting a confession
from a suspect. Nowhere in the evidence is it shown that coercion was ever employed by the investigating
officer in obtaining the confession of Laygo. The investigation was even witnessed by the relatives of Laygo.
The fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after the investigation of Laygo had begun and left before the
confession was concluded does not negate the validity and admissibility of said confession for the reason that
after the confession was put down in writing, Laygo and the investigating officer proceeded to the office of
Atty. Datlag and the latter then read the confession, conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign the
confession. It will be readily seen that the confession was voluntary and the signing thereof by Laygo was
done upon advice of counsel. The constitutional requirements were thus fully complied with. Moreover, the
presence of Rolando's uncle, Tiburcio Laygo, and the latter's wife, Fely, clearly precluded the use of coercion
in extracting the confession. A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime
unless prompted by truth and his conscience. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves
that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. There is not a
speck of evidence to show that the confession of Laygo was extracted by such means or promise. Atty. Datlag
would not have affixed his signature to the extrajudicial confession of Laygo as counsel for Laygo had he
known or had he been informed by Laygo of any infirmity in its execution. Said confession is, therefore,
admissible in evidence. The same ruling applies to the extrajudicial confession of Rous.
Note: Compare Rous ruling with other cases, especially People vs. Morial; as per aspect on
partial absence of counsel during custodial investigation, where the affidavit of the accused
was subsequently signed in presence of counsel.
246 People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997]

Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur
Facts: Vicente Dilanco Pons, Santiago Cid's cousin, purportedly acting upon the instructions of Doris Wolf,
borrowed from Myrna Temporas the amount of P48,500.00 and used the an Isuzu passenger type jeepney

(Plate DFB 550) as a collateral. The amount was given to Pons in P10,000.00 cash and the balance in a check
payable to Doris Wolf. The check was encashed as it was cleared from Myrna Temporas' account. It bore a
signature supposedly of Doris Wolf at its back portion and a second endorsement by Pons who subsequently
deposited it in his account. On September 11, Temporas asked Pons to secure a special power of attorney from
Doris Wolf. Pons promised to comply in one or two weeks. But Pons failed to pay the indebtedness. So,
Myrna Temporas repeatedly went to his house in Digmaan, Camarines Sur to collect the amount borrowed but
Pons always promised that he himself would go to her house to pay. Inasmuch as Pons also failed to produce
a deed of sale covering the jeepney, Temporas lodged a complaint against him for estafa before the NBI.
Meanwhile, Andrew Patriarca, Sr. reported the disappearance of his son, Andrew, Jr., the jeepney and its
driver to the police detachment in Bulihan, Silang, Cavite and the police stations in Silang and Imus, Cavite.
Two weeks after 4 September 1987, the body of 23-year-old Andrew Patriarca, Jr. was found in a sugarcane
plantation in Maguyam. His head was severed from his body. The body of the driver, Geronimo Malibago,
stepfather of Doris Wolf, the owner of the jeepney, was recovered after the harvest of sugarcane in the
plantation in Maguyam. Malibago's widow identified the body from its clothing. Acting on the complaint, the
NBI contacted the relatives of the owner of the jeepney who went to Camarines Sur, identified the jeepney
and informed the NBI that its driver (deceased Geronimo Malibago) and conductor (deceased Andrew
Patriarca, Jr.) had been killed by carnappers. Patriarca's widow also filed a complaint with the NBI. Upon
investigation, an NBI team led by Supervising Agent Magno Toribio found out that the carnapping of the
jeepney and the killing of Patriarca and Malibago were the "handiwork" of a group of 4 persons named Rene
Januario, Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita alias Toto, and Eduardo Sarinos alias Digo. The team also discovered
that the jeepney was disposed of through Cid. Januario and Canape, as well as Cid, were arrested in
Camarines Sur. The NBI then invited Pons and Temporas to shed light on the carnapping incident. The
jeepney was recovered in an auto shop with its engine partly dismantled. Upon being informed by the NBI
that the jeepney had been found, an insurance company brought it back to Manila. From the "oral
investigation" they conducted at the Naga City NBI office on 27 March 1988, the team learned that Sarita and
Sarinos took Patriarca and Malibago inside a sugar plantation where presumably they were killed. Because
Januario and Canape volunteered that their companions were their neighbors in Paliparan, Dasmariñas, Cavite
who could be in Manila already, the NBI team decided to take down their statements at the NBI head office in
Manila. The team traveled with Januario and Canape to Manila, arriving there at around 1:00 p.m. of 28
March 1988. At the Taft Avenue head office of the NBI, the team took the statements of Januario and Canae
one at a time. They asked Atty. Carlos Saunar, who was "just around somewhere," to assist Januario and
Canape during the investigation. Agent Arlis Vela took the statement of Januario while Supervising Agent
Toribio took that of Canape. On 7 November 1988, an Information signed by Assistant Provincial Fiscal Jose
M. Velasco, Jr., was filed against Rene Januario and Efren Canape, and their co-accused Santiago Cid, Eliseo
Sarita @ Toto and Eduardo Sarinos @ Digo charging them with violation of Republic Act 6539 (Anti-
Carnapping Law). Arraigned on 7 February 1989, Januario and Canape, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
not guilty. On 30 May 1989, Cid, assisted by counsel de parte, likewise entered a plea of not guilty. Sarita and
Sarinos remained at large. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch XVIII in Tagaytay City,
disposing of Criminal Case TG-1392-89, rendered judgment finding Januario and Canape guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 14, last sentence, of Republic act 6539, otherwise
known as the Anti-Carnapping Law, and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or
life imprisonment, and ordered them to pay jointly and severally, but separately, the heirs of their victims,
namely, Geronimo Malibago and Andrew Patriarca, Jr., the sums of: (a) P50,000.00 for moral damages; (b)
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages; (c) P25,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the costs of the
proceeding. Januario and Canape appealed.
Issue: Whether Saunar’s presence as counsel in the custodial investigations satisfies the requirements of
Article III, section 12 (1).
Held: Proof of Saunar's presence during the custodial investigation of Januario and Canape is, however, not a
guarantee that their respective confessions had been taken in accordance with Article III, Section 12 (1) of the

Constitution. This constitutional provision requires that a person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have no less than "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice." Saunar
was not the choice of Januario as his custodial investigation counsel. Arguendo that Saunar's competence as a
lawyer is beyond question, under the circumstances described by the prosecution however, he could not have
been the independent counsel solemnly spoken of by the Constitution. He was an applicant for a position in
the NBI and therefore it can never be said that his loyalty was to the confessants. In fact, he was actually
employed by the NBI a few months after. Further, although Saunar might have really been around to properly
apprise Januario of his constitutional right as reflected in the written sworn statement itself, the same cannot
be said about Canape. Canape was not properly informed of his constitutional rights. Perfunctorily informing
a confessant of his constitutional rights, asking him if he wants to avail of the services of counsel and telling
him that he could ask for counsel if he so desires or that one could be provided him at his request, are simply
not in compliance with the constitutional mandate. In this case, appellant Canape was merely told of his
constitutional rights and posthaste, asked whether he was willing to confess. His affirmative answer may not,
by any means, be interpreted as a waiver of his right to counsel of his own choice. Furthermore, the right of a
person under custodial investigation to be informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and to contemplate an effective
communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Canape's sworn statement, which reads
and sounds so lifeless on paper, fails to reflect compliance with this requirement. Neither does the testimony
of NBI Agent Toribio. Bearing in mind that Canape reached only the fifth grade, the NBI agents should have
exerted more effort in explaining to him his constitutional rights. The law enforcement agents' cavalier
disregard of Januario's and Canape's constitutional rights is shown not only by their failure to observe Section
12 (1) of Article III of the Constitution. They have likewise forgotten the third paragraph of Section 12 of the
same article which mandates that an admission of facts related to a crime must be obtained with the assistance
of counsel; otherwise it would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting.
247 People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999]

First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 28 March 1993, at more or less 10:30 p.m. while inside a motor vehicle in the national highway at
Barangay Agusan up to the road at Camaman-an, all of Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, Henry Feliciano y
Lagura and Orlando Labtan y Daquihon took away, through intimdation or violence, cash amounting to
P720.00, pioneer stereo, booster and twitters owned by and belonging to Roman S. Mercado, and a Seiko
Diver wristwatch owned by Ismael P. Ebon, all in all amounting to P10,800.00. Later on, on or about 16 April
1993, at about 2:30 p.m., more or less, at Buntong, Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines,
Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan robbed Florentino Bolasito of P30 in cash money. In the
course thereof, Orlando and Jonelto Labtan stabbed Bolasito to death. On 23 April 1993, an information was
filed against Feliciano, Orlando Labtan, and Jonelto Labtan charging them with robbery with homicide (as per
16 April 1993 incident). Subsequently, another information dated 20 May 1993 was filed against Feliciano
and Orlando Labtan charging them with highway robbery (as per 28 March 1993 incident). Only Feliciano
pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Orlando Labtan had escaped the Maharlika Rehabilitation and
Detention Center in Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City where he was detained while Jonelto Labtan has eluded
arrest. The two cases were tried together. After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch
25 found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation in the crime of robbery
with homicide and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the offended party (the heirs of
Florentino Bolasito) the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the offended party the sum of P35,000.00 representing
funeral expenses and to pay the cost. The trial court also found Feliciano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of highway robbery, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision mayor as
the minimum term to 14 years, 8 months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as the maximum term
and to indemnify Roman S. Mercado the sum of P8,000.00, representing the value of the P700.00 cash,
stereo, booster, and twitter and to indemnify Ismael Ebon the sum of P2,500.00, the value of the Seiko Wrist
watch divested from him and to pay the cost. The trial court convicted Feliciano on the basis of his sworn

statement which he repudiated during the trial. Feliciano appealed.
Issue: Whether the counselling of Atty. Pepito Chavez to Feliciano cured the initial lack of counsel.
Held: Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and independent counsel when he was
questioned in the Cagayan de Oro City Police Station. SPO1 Alfonso Cuarez testified that he started
questioning Feliciano at 8:00 a.m. of 22 April 1993 regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver
Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to counsel. Feliciano
had been subjected to custodial investigation without a counsel; inasmuch as when SPO1 Cuarez investigated
Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect in the killing of jeepney driver Bolasito. Further, Atty. Chavez did
not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not explain to Feliciano the
consequences of his action — that the sworn statement can be used against him and that it is possible that he
could be found guilty and sent to jail. Furthermore, Atty. Chavez’s independence as counsel is suspect — he is
regularly engaged by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the
services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his services.
248 People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002]

En Banc, Panganiban (J): 14 concur
Facts: Guillermo Samus was a farmer, tilling and living in the land of Miguel Completo at Barangay Niugan,
Cabuyao, Laguna. The victims, 62 year old Dedicacion Balisi and her grandson, 6 year old John Ardee Balisi,
were the neighbors of Samus’ father at San Ramon de Canlubang, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Laguna. At
4:20 P.M. on 2 September 1996, Senior Police (SP) Inspector Rizaldy H. Garcia was at his office at the 4th
PNP Criminal Investigation Group Regional Office at Camp Vicente Lim in Calamba, Laguna when he
received an order from his superior to investigate the murder of the two victims. Their office had received a
telephone call from a local barangay official informing them of the victims’ deaths. Arriving at the victims’
residence at Block 8, Lot 6 at San Ramon, Brgy. Canlubang, Calamba, Garcia and his team conducted an
investigation, making a sketch of the relative positions of the victims, lifting fingerprints from the crime scene
and taking pictures. Thereafter, an investigation report was prepared by Garcia and signed by his superior,
Colonel Pedro Tango. The investigators likewise found a pair of maong pants, a white T-shirt, a handkerchief
and dirty slippers in the bathroom and roof of the house. A pair of earrings worn by Dedicacion Balisi was
likewise reported missing from her body by her daughter, Nora B. Llorera. The victims’ bodies were brought
to the Funeraria Señerez de Mesa in Calamba. On that same day, Ponciano Pontanos, Jr., then a resident of
Barangay Niugan, Cabuyao and an acquaintance of Samus, happened to meet Samus at Sammy Pacheca’s
house in the same barangay where Samus asked Ponciano to accompany him to Ponciano’s wife to pawn a
pair of earrings. Ponciano’s wife was mad at first but upon Ponciano’s prodding, gave Samus P300.00 with
no interest. The earrings were placed in a jewelry box; thereafter, Samus received another P250.00. At 6:00
P.M. on 10 September 1996, Major Jose Pante of the Criminal Investigation Group received information that
Samus was the principal suspect in the killing of the 2 victims and that he was sighted inside the residence of
spouses Rolly and Josie Vallejo at Barangay Macabling, Sta. Rosa, Laguna. He then formed and led a team
composed of SPO3 Galivo, Intelligence Commission Officer Casis and SPO3 Mario Bitos. Arriving at the
site at past 7:00 P.M., the team, accompanied by local barangay authorities, asked permission from the Vallejo
spouses to enter the house, which was granted. Shortly thereafter, they heard loud footsteps on the roof.
Rushing outside, they saw Samus crawling on the roof. They ordered him to stop, but he suddenly jumped
from the roof and landed hard on the ground, sustaining an injury on his ankle and bruises on his left and right
forearm. At that point, the police team closed in on Samus who, while trembling and shaking, admitted the
killings upon a query from Rolly Vallejo. Samus was brought to the Camp Vicente Lim PNP Investigation
Office where he was informed of his constitutional rights by SPO3 Alex Malabanan. In the morning of 11
September 1996, Samus, assisted by Atty. Arturo Juliano, gave his statement admitting the killings. SPO3
Malabanan also took the statements of tricycle driver Rafael Baliso, the victims’ relatives Salvacion and
Mona Balisi and witness Mary Arguelles, who saw Samus enter the house of Dedicacion Balisi. On the same

day, PNP Fingerprint Examiner Reigel Allan Sorra took fingerprint samples from Samus. His prints exactly
matched with a set of prints found at the crime scene. Later that day, SPO3 Mario Bitos was able to recover
the pawned earrings from Ponciano who turned them over to SPO3 Malabanan. Two separate Informations
were filed on 27 November 1996, charging Samus (in Criminal Case 5015-96-C) with homicide for the death
of one Dedicacion Balisi y Soriano (61 years old), and (in Criminal Case 5016-96-C) with murder for the
death of one John Ardee Balisi y Soriano (6 years old). When arraigned on 28 May 1997, Samus, assisted by
his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty. In due course, the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch
36, found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide (Criminal Case 5015-96-C),
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as minimum up
to 20 years of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Dedicacion Balisi
the amount of P50,000.00 for her death and another P50,000.00 as and for moral and actual damages and cost
of suit. The trial court also found Samus guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder (Criminal
Case 5016-96-C), sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of
John Ardee Balisi the amount of P50,000.00 for his death and another P50,000.00 as and for moral and actual
damages and cost of suit. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible.
Held: After being illegally arrested, Samus was not informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel. Hence, any admission elicited from him by the law enforcers
during custodial investigation are normally inadmissible in evidence. In their affidavits, the police officers
readily admitted that Samus was subjected to a preliminary interview. Yet, during their examination in open
court, they tried to skirt this issue by stating that it was only the media that had questioned Samus, and that
they were merely present during the interview. However, an examination of the testimonies of the three law
enforcers show the folly of their crude attempts to camouflage inadmissible evidence. In the absence of
testimony from any of the media persons who allegedly interviewed Samus, the uncertainties and vagueness
about how they questioned and led him to his confession lead us to believe that they themselves investigated
Samus and elicited from him uncounselled admissions. This fact is clearly shown by the Affidavits they
executed on 11 September 1997, as well as by their testimonies on cross-examination. Nonetheless, even if
the uncounselled admission per se may be inadmissible, under the present circumstances the Court cannot rule
it out because of Samus' failure to make timely objections. Indeed, the admission is inadmissible in evidence
under Article III, Section 12(1) and (3) of the Constitution, because it was given under custodial investigation
and was made without the assistance of counsel. However, the defense failed to object to its presentation
during the trial, with the result that the defense is deemed to have waived objection to its admissibility. If only
Samus had made a timely objection to the admissibility of Pontaños testimony and the picture of a pair of
earrings together with the turnover receipt, which Samus identified during his testimony, the prosecution
could have been warned of the need to present additional evidence to support its case. To disregard
unceremoniously a major portion of its case at this late stage when it can no longer present additional
evidence as substitute for that which is now claimed to be inadmissible goes against fundamental fairness.
249 People vs. Gallardo [GR 113684, 25 January 2000]

First Division, Pardo (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 28 July 1991, the lifeless body of Edmundo Orizal was found in the rest house of Ronnie Balao in
Balzain, Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In an autopsy performed by Dr. Edmundo Borja, Tuguegarao Municipal
Health Officer, the victim was found to have sustained 7 gunshot wounds in the chest, abdomen, back, left
and right thighs, and two (2) grazing wounds on the left arm and back. Investigation by the Tuguegarao police
station identified the suspects in the murder of Edmundo Orizal as Armando Gallardo y Gander, Alfredo
Columna y Correa (alias Fermin), and Jessie Micate y Orteza. The police received information that the
suspects were detained at the Camalaniugan Police Station because of other criminal charges. So elements of
the Tuguegarao police went to the Camalaniugan Police Station in August 1991 to fetch the suspects. Only

Gallardo and Columna were in the custody of the Camalaniugan Police Station. Gallardo and Columna were
brought to the Tuguegarao Police Department. On August 18, 1991, they were investigated by Police
Investigator SPO4 Isidro Marcos, and they gave statements admitting that they, together with Jessie Micate,
killed Edmundo Orizal. During the investigation, the dialect used was Ilocano, the native tongue of the
accused, and during the taking of the statements, Atty. Rolando Velasco assisted them. Judge Vilma Pauig was
present. She administered the oath on the jurat of the statements. Galardo and Columna signed their
statements admitting the killing of Edmundo Orizal. On 7 November 1991, on the basis of the sworn
confessions of the accused, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Tuguegarao, Cagayan an information charging the accused with murder. On 2 December 1991, all three
accused entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued. In due course, the trial court found them guilty of murder
for the treacherous killing of Edmundo Orizal and sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and to pay in
solidum the heirs of Edmundo Orizal in the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for death and P150,000.00 as
moral damages. Gallardo, Columna and Micate appealed.
Issue: Whether the counsel provided by the State to the accused satisfies the Constitutionlal requirement that
a competent and independent counsel be present in a custodial investigation.
Held: The extrajudicial confessions of the accused were given after they were completely and clearly
apprised of their Constitutional rights. A lawyer assisted them and a judge administered their oath. while the
initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of
a lawyer is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he may reject
the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the former's appointment during the
course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer. Herein, although Atty. Velasco was provided by the State and not by the accused themselves,
the accused were given an opportunity whether to accept or not to accept him as their lawyer. They were
asked and they immediately agreed to have Atty. Velasco as their counsel during the investigation. There is no
requirement in the Constitution that the lawyer of an accused during custodial investigation be previously
known to them. The Constitution provides that the counsel be a competent and independent counsel, who will
represent the accused and protect their Constitutionally guaranteed rights. Further, to be an effective counsel,
a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not
intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in
our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false. The
counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Herein, Atty.
Velasco acted properly in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution and informed the accused of their
Constitutional rights. Atty. Velasco assisted the accused and made sure that the statements given by the
accused were voluntary on their part, and that no force or intimidation was used by the investigating officers
to extract a confession from them. Under rules laid by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy all four fundamental requirements, namely: (1) the confession must
be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3)
the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing. All these requirements were
complied with.
250 People vs. Barasina [GR 109993, 21 January 1994]

Third Division, Melo (J): 4 concur
Facts: It was around 6:40 p.m. of 17 July 1988 when Fiscal Lino Mayo of Olongapo City succumbed to a
single bullet on his side of his face fired by a gunman from an unlicensed .45 caliber firearm while the former
was walking at the VIP parking lot of the Victory Liner Compound at Caloocan City. The gun man continued
walking at the same time holding his gun with two hands trying to cock it. After walking a few meters, the
gun man tucked the gun in his right waist and began running away. Barangay Councilman Prudencio Motos

and about four other men (among them, Ruel Ganiola and Michael Estapia, both porters) chased the gun man.
When the gun man was about to reach the LRT Station, they shouted at the policeman conducting traffic in
the area and pointed at the running man. The policeman, Pfc. Napoleon Francia, shouted at the gun man, who
stopped and raised his hands. Pfc. Francia then confiscated a .45 cal. pistol from the gun man. Afterwards,
Pfc. Francia, Councilman Motos and others brought the gun man to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters
aboard a passenger jeep. The gun man was identified later as Elias Barasina y Laynesa. Barasina was charged
for violation of Preisdential Decree 1866 (illegal possession of firearms). Barasina, "John Doe" and "Peter
Doe" (true names, real identities and present whereabouts of the last two mentioned accused, still unknown)
were also charge for the crime of murder. When haled to respond to the inculpations, Barasina was indifferent
in entering any plea, thus the plea of not guilty to the two criminal charges was entered by the trial court in his
behalf. In the course of the trial, Barasina, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of double
jeopardy, i.e. in jeopardy of being convicted of two offenses — Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms. In
an Order, dated 17 August 1989, the Court denied the Motion to Quash. On trial, one of the principal defenses
set up by Barasina was that he was mauled, maltreated and forced to sign two documents by the Caloocan
policemen while he was inside a small cell inside the Caloocan City Police Headquarters. He identified those
2 documents, the "Paalala", dated 18 July 1988, and his statement dated 18 July 1988. He further claimed that
he never read any of those documents and that he was not assisted by any lawyer during their execution, and
that he does not know of any Atty. Abelardo Torres. He signed an Affidavit of retraction dated 22 July 1988.
On 28 February 1990, the trial court found Barasina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of (1) violation of Par. 1
of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm); and (2) Murder, and sentenced him (1) as a result of his
conviction under PD 1866 to suffer imprisonment of 17 Years, 4 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion Temporal as
minimum to 20 Years of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs, and (2) as a result of his
conviction of Murder, to suffer imprisonment of 10 Years and 1 Day of Prision Mayor, as minimum to 18
Years, 8 Months and 1 Day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, and to pay the costs. The trial court also
directed Barasina to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Fiscal Lino Mayo, the amount of P61,000.00
representing the funeral and burial expenses of the victim and the amount of P500 ,000.00 representing the
moral damages suffered by his widow and the loss of income as a result of the victim's death at the age of 50
years. On 29 December 1992, the Court of Appeals (de Pano, Elbiñas, Gutierrez [P], JJ.), acting on the appeal
interposed by Barasina, rendered a decision increasing the penalties imposed on Barasina to reclusion
perpetua for each of the two crimes committed. The records do not show that the case was certified by the
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure although the records of the case were forwarded to to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals
on 11 May 1993 after the assailed decision was promulgated on 29 December 1992. In any event, the appeal
was later accepted by the Supreme Court and Barasina was thereupon required to file his brief following
which the Solicitor General filed a brief for the People.
Issue: Whether the admissions made in the custodial investigation attended to by Atty. Abelardo Torres, a
lawyer which Barasina did not expressly choose as counsel to assist him therein, are inadmissible.
Held: Section 12 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution dealing with the rights of a person undergoing
investigation reads "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." The phrase "competent and independent"
and "preferably of his own choice" were explicit details which were added upon the persistence of human
rights lawyers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission who pointed out cases where, during the martial law
period, the lawyers made available to the detainee would be one appointed by the military and therefore
beholden to the military. Yet, the apprehension of the human rights advocates then along this line hardly
inspires belief in the present inasmuch as there was no indication below that Barasina did in fact choose Atty.
Romeo Mendoza to assist him while in the process of offering the inculpatory statements, to the exclusion of
other lawyers (The hiring of Atty. Romeo Mendoza as counsel by Barasina after the custodial investigation

appears to be an afterthought). Withal, the word "preferably" under Section 12 [1], Article 3 of the 1987
Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is
exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense. If the
rule were otherwise, then, the tempo of a custodial investigation will be solely in the hands of the accused
who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply selecting lawyer who for one
reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. This absurd scenario could not have been
contemplated by the framers of the charter.
251 People vs. Morial [GR 129295, 15 August 2001]

En Banc, Per Curiam: 13 concur, 1 out of town on official business, 1 on leave
Facts: At 6:00 p.m. on 6 January 1996, at Benjamin Morial's house at Barangay Cagnituan, Maasin, Southern
Leyte, Gabriel Guilao (62 years old) saw Nonelito Abiñon slapped Paula Bandibas' neck. Paula fell and was
stabbed by Edwin Morial with a small, sharp, pointed weapon. Leonardo Morial stood outside the house.
Gabriel also saw Paula Bandibas' grandson, Albert Bandibas, run towards his grandmother's garden, and later
heard the crushing sound of a stone against flesh. Abinon and the two Morials stayed in the house for about
10 minutes after the killing the victims. Thereafter, they departed and headed towards the nearby houses.
Benjamin Morial, Paula's common-law husband, who was in neighboring Barangay Maria Clara (7½
kilometers away from Barangay Cagnituan) when the incident took place, arrived at Barangay Cagnituan at
around 4:00 p.m. the next day. As was his wont, Benjamin called out Paula's name when he was some 5
meters from the house. There was no answer. Benjamin raced to the house, heading straight to the bedroom.
There, he found the clothes all topsy-turvy. The box where he and Paula hid their money was turned upside
down. Someone had ransacked their house. Benjamin moved back and saw Paula lying on the floor with a cut
in her neck. He shouted for help. Responding to his cries, Benjamin's neighbors, including barangay
kagawads Patricio Abiñon and Rufino Guilao, rushed to his house. Benjamin asked his neighbors to help
search for Albert, who was found shortly some 50 meters from the house. Albert Bandibas laid flat on the
ground with two stones near his head. Benjamin requested Patricio to send someone to report the incident to
the police. Upon learning of Benjamin's return to Barangay Cagnituan, Gabriel Guilao hurried to Benjamin's
house. He revealed to the grieving Benjamin that he witnessed Paula's killing and that Edwin Morial,
Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon were the perpetrators. Benjamin advised Gabriel not to tell anyone
about what he knew for fear that they would all be killed since the Abiñons were "saturated in their place."
Gabriel heeded Benjamin's advice. The police arrived at around 10:00 p.m. SPO4 Antonio Macion, along with
four other police officers, investigated the tragedy. They found wounds in Paula Bandibas' stomach, breast
and neck. Albert Bandibas, on the other hand, had a contusion on the right side of his head. Beside him were
two stones. After examining the victims' wounds, the police officers, along with Benjamin Morial, proceeded
to the bedroom. Benjamin informed the officers that P11,000.00 was missing from the moneybox. Other than
the cash, nothing else was missing. Outside the house, Benjamin disclosed to the officers his three suspects,
the accused in this case. He advised them, however, to bring only Leonardo and Edwin Morial into custody
and not to include Nonelito Abiñon, who had many relatives in Cagnituan. As a former barangay captain of 22
years, he knew that the Abiñons were "most feared" in Cagnituan. Benjamin did not tell the police that
Gabriel Guilao had witnessed the incident. The police found Edwin and Leonardo Morial in the house of
Nonelito Abiñon and invited the two to the police station, where they were turned over to SPO4 Andres
Fernandez. Leonardo Morial told SPO4 Fernandez that he had no money to pay for the services of counsel.
SPO4 Fernandez informed him that there are many lawyers in their municipality and named some of them.
Leonardo said he did not know any of the lawyers mentioned. SPO4 Fernandez thus volunteered to obtain a
lawyer for the suspect, to which Leonardo Morial consented. SPO4 Fernandez then contacted Atty. Aguilar. At
about 8:00 a.m. of 9 January 1996, Atty. Tobias Aguilar arrived. After being introduced to Leonardo Morial,
Atty. Aguilar had a short conference with him. He asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions
that may be propounded by the police investigator. Atty. Aguilar warned him that the statements that he may
give might be used in evidence against him. Leonardo said he was willing to answer the questions voluntarily.
According to Atty. Aguilar, Leonardo was bent on revealing what really happened. Thereafter, SPO4

Fernandez conducted the investigation in Cebuano. Midway into the investigation, after the police
investigator had asked "all the material points," Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator that he be given leave as
he had a very important engagement. The investigator agreed to the lawyer's request. Before leaving, Atty.
Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer the questions in his absence. He also instructed the police
that, after the written confession had been prepared, the accused and the document containing the confession
should be brought to his office for "further examination." Atty. Aguilar was in the police station for less than
thirty minutes from the start of the interrogation. At about 1:30 or 2:00 p.m., Leonardo and his policeman-
escort arrived at Atty. Aguilar's office. Atty. Aguilar asked the accused whether he was maltreated while he
was away and examined the suspect's body for contusions or abrasions. Leonardo told him that he was not
harmed by the police officer. The lawyer then studied the document to determine whether its contents
conformed to the answers given by the accused in his (counsel's) presence. He propounded questions to
Leonardo with reference to the document. Atty. Aguilar asked him whether he understood its contents and
whether he was willing to sign it. Leonardo replied in the positive and signed the document in the presence of
Atty. Aguilar and the policeman-escort. Edwin Morial, Leonardo Morial (@ Carding) and Nonelito Abiñon
(@ Noly) were charged with robery with homicide. Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty.
After trial, the Regional Trial court rendered a decision convicting all the three accused for the crime of
robbery with homicide, as defined under Article 293 and penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code and sentenced (1) Leonardo Morial and Nonelito Abiñon to suffer the supreme penalty of death by
lethal injection; and (2) Edwin Morial, due to his minority, to suffer the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.
On the civil aspect of the case, the court held the three accused libale jointly and severally (1) to indemnify
the heirs of Paula Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (2) to indemnify the heirs of Albert
Bandibas the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (3) to indemnify complainant Benjamin Morial the
amount of P20,546.00 as actual damages for the funeral, burial and wake expenses; (4) to pay to the heirs
[the] aforementioned moral damages of P60,000.00 for each death; and (5) to restitute or restore to Benjamin
Morial the P11,000.00 amount robbed. The court also ordered them to pay the costs. Hence, the automatic
review.
Issue: Whether Leonardo Morila’s extra-judicial confession was valid, inasmuch as the “material points”
were tackled when the counsel, Atty. Aguilar Tobias, was present.
Held: Leonardo Morial's extra-judicial confession invalid since he was effectively deprived of his right to
counsel during the custodial investigation. An accused under custodial interrogation must continuously have a
counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify Atty. Aguilar's leaving by
claiming that when the lawyer left, he knew very well that the suspect had already admitted that Leonardo and
his companions committed the crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize his abandoning his client by saying
that he left only after the latter had admitted the "material points," referring to the three accused's respective
participation in the crime. For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to counsel
from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination — indeed, "in every phase of the
investigation." An effective and vigilant counsel "necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present
and able to advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession." Furthermore, Section 2(a) of RA 7438
requires that "[a]ny person arrested, detained or under custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by
counsel." The last paragraph of Section 3 of the same law mandates that "[i]n the absence of any lawyer, no
custodial investigation shall be conducted." The right of Leonardo Morial to counsel was therefore completely
negated by the precipitate departure of Atty. Tobias before the termination of the custodial investigation. If it
were true that Atty. Tobias had to attend to matters so pressing that he had to abandon a client undergoing
custodial investigation, he could have terminated the same to be continued only until as soon as his schedule
permitted, advising the suspect in the meantime to remain silent. This he failed to do. Appallingly, he even
asked his client whether he was willing to answer questions during the lawyer's absence. The records also
disclose that Atty. Tobias never informed appellant of his right to remain silent, not even before the custodial
investigation started. Atty. Tobias, by his failure to inform appellant of the latter's right to remain silent, by his

"coming and going" during the custodial investigation, and by his abrupt departure before the termination of
the proceedings, can hardly be the counsel that the framers of the 1987 Constitution contemplated when it
added the modifier "competent" to the word "counsel." Neither can he be described as the "vigilant and
effective" counsel that jurisprudence requires. Precisely, it is Atty. Tobias' nonchalant behavior during the
custodial investigation that the Constitution abhors and which this Court condemns. His casual attitude
subverted the very purpose for this vital right.That the extra-judicial confession was subsequently signed in
the presence of counsel did not cure its constitutional defects. As Leonardo Morial was effectively deprived of
his right to counsel during custodial investigation, his extra-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
against him.
252 People vs. Castro [GR 106583, 19 June 1997]

Second Division, Romero (J): 4 concur
Facts: At about 5:30 p.m. of 19 March 1991, Capt. Allyn Evasco together with Sgt. Rogelio Raguine, Sgt.
Emilio de Guzman and CIC Julian Discargar formed a team for the purpose of conducting a buy-bust
operation. The team went to their target area in San Roque, San Miguel, Pangasinan and proceeded to deploy
themselves as planned. Sgt. de Guzman who acted as poseur-buyer and civilian informer Discargar proceeded
to Victoriano Castro y Calagno's house. Sgt. Raguine, meanwhile, hid in a grassy spot near the house.
Discargar introduced Castro to Sgt. de Guzman who said that he wanted to purchase a kilo of dried marijuana
leaves. After going inside the house, Castro emerged with a plastic bag which he handed to Sgt. de Guzman
who, in turn, paid him P600.00. After the exchange, Sgt. de Guzman made the pre-arranged signal, indicating
that the transaction was complete, by raising his right hand. Upon espying the signal, Sgt. Raguine and the
other team members approached Castro, introduced themselves as NARCOM (Narcotics Command) agents,
and arrested him. He was thereafter brought to the San Manuel Police Station. While the arresting team went
to San Fernando, La Union for further investigation, the marijuana leaves were sent to Camp Crame for
examination where it was discovered that the actual weight of the confiscated marijuana leaves was 930
grams. Castro was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan, Branch 38 in an information dated
21 March 1991, for violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
After Castro entered a plea of not guilty, trial on the merits commenced. On 29 April 1992, the trial court
rendered its decision finding Castro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P25,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of the proceedings. Castro appealed.
Issue: Whether Castro’s signature on the “Receipt of Property Seized” is admissible in evidence.
Held: Castro's signature on the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence as there is no
showing that he was assisted by counsel when he signed the same. Since this is a document tacitly admitting
the offense charged, the constitutional safeguard must be observed. Be that as it may, even disregarding this
document, there is still ample evidence to prove Castro's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the same having been
shown by the detailed testimonies of the law officers who took part in the buy-bust operation.
253 People vs. Wong Chuen Ming [GR 112801-11, 12 April 1996]
First Division, Padilla (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 7 September 1991, at about 1:00 p.m., Philippine Air Lines (PAL) Flight PR 301 from Hongkong
arrived at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila. Among the many
passengers who arrived on board said flight were Wong Chuen Ming, Au Wing Cheung ,Tan Soi Tee, Chin
Kok Wee, Lim Chan Fatt, Chin Kin Yong, Yap Boon Ah, Chin Kong Song, Chin Kin Fah, Chai Min Huwa
and Lim Nyuk Sun. Their respective passports showed that Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung are the
only British (Hongkong) nationals in the group while the rest are all Malaysian nationals. Their passports also
revealed that all Malaysians (except Lim Chan Fatt) originally came from Malaysia, traveled to Singapore and

Hongkong before proceeding to Manila. Upon the other hand, Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung, as
well as Lim Chan Fatt, directly came from Hongkong to Manila. Wong Chuen Ming, et. al. arrived in Manila
as a tour group arranged by Select Tours International Co., Ltd. Au Wing Cheung, an employee of Select
Tours International Co., Ltd. acted as their tour guide. After passing through and obtaining clearance from
immigration officers at the NAIA, the tour group went to the baggage claim area to retrieve their respective
checked-in baggages. They placed the same in one pushcart and proceeded to Express Lane 5 which at the
time was manned by customs examiner Danilo Gomez. Au Wing Cheung handed to Gomez the tour group's
passenger's manifest, their baggage declarations and their passports. Danilo Gomez instructed the tour group
to place their baggages on the examiner's table for inspection. They were directed to hold on to their
respective baggages while they wait for their turn to be examined. Chin Kong Song's baggage was first to be
examined by Gomez. Gomez put his hand inside the baggage and in the course of the inspection, he found 3
brown colored boxes similar in size to powdered milk boxes underneath the clothes. The boxes were marked
Alpen Cereals and as he found nothing wrong with them, Gomez returned them inside the baggage and
allowed Chin Kong Song to go. Following the same procedure, Gomez next examined the baggage of Wong
Chuen Ming. Gomez again found and pulled out 2 boxes of Alpen Cereals from said baggage and like in the
previous inspection, he found nothing wrong with them and allowed Wong Chuen Ming to go. The third
baggage to be examined belonged to Lim Nyuk Sun. When Gomez pulled out another 3 boxes of Alpen
Cereals from said baggage, he became suspicious and decided to open one of the boxes with his cutter. Inside
the box was a plastic bag containing white crystalline substance. Alarmed, Gomez immediately called the
attention of Appraiser Oreganan Palala and Duty Collector Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio to his discovery. Upon
learning about the boxes containing the white crystalline substance, Zenaida Reyes Bonifacio (Chief of the
Collection Division and Acting Duty Collector of the Customs Office at the NAIA) immediately ordered the
tour group to get their baggages and proceed to the district collector's office. Chin Kong Song and Wong
Chuen Ming, who were previously cleared by Gomez, were also brought inside together with the rest of the
group. Inside the collector's office, Gomez continued to examine the baggages of the other members of the
tour group. He allegedly found that each baggage contained 1, 2 or 3 boxes similar to those previously found
in the baggages of Chin Kong Song, Wong Chuen Ming and Lim Nyuk Sun. A total of 30 boxes of Alpen
Cereals containing white crystalline substance were allegedly recovered from the baggages of the 11 accused.
As Gomez pulled out these boxes from their respective baggages, he bundled said boxes by putting masking
tape around them and handed them over to Bonifacio. Upon receipt of these bundled boxes, Bonifacio called
out the names of accused as listed in the passengers' manifest and ordered them to sign on the masking tape
placed on the boxes allegedly recovered from their respective baggages. Also present at this time were Capt.
Rustico Francisco and his men, agents of the Bureau of Customs and several news reporters. A few minutes
later, District Collector Antonio Marquez arrived with General Job Mayo and then NBI Deputy Director
Mariano Mison. Shortly after all boxes of Alpen Cereals were recovered, Capt. Rustico Francisco, Officer in
Charge (OIC) of the Philippine National Police Narcotics Command Detachment at the NAIA, conducted a
field test on a sample of the white crystalline substance. His test showed that the substance was indeed
"shabu." Capt. Francisco immediately informed the 11 accused that they were under arrest. Thereafter, all
accused, as well as the Alpen Cereals boxes which were placed inside a big box, were brought to Camp
Crame. At Camp Crame, accused were asked to identify their signatures on the boxes and after having
identified them, they were again made to sign on the plastic bags containing white crystalline substance inside
the boxes bearing their signatures. The examination by Elizabeth Ayonon, a forensic chemist at the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, confirmed that the white crystalline substance recovered
from accused was "shabu." The total weight of "shabu" recovered was placed at 34.45 kilograms. 11 separate
criminal informations were filed against all of the accused individually. The counsel of Au Wing Cheung
earlier filed a petition for reinvestigation and deferment of his arraignment but the same was denied by the
trial court for lack of merit. At their respective arraignments, all accused with the assistance of their counsels,
includin Au Wing Cheung pleaded not guilty to the charge. The trial court conducted a joint and/or
consolidated trial of all the cases upon motion by the prosecution considering that the State had common
testimonial and documentary evidence against all accused. On 29 November 1991, the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109 of Pasay City, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 15, Article

III of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972; and sentenced
each to life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00. Wong Chuen Ming and Au Wing Cheung appealed.
Issue: Whether the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing "shabu", are
admissible in evidence.
Held: The Court holds that the signatures of accused on the boxes, as well as on the plastic bags containing
"shabu", are inadmissible in evidence. A careful study of the records reveals that accused were never informed
of their fundamental rights during the entire time that they were under investigation. Specifically, accused
were not informed of their Miranda rights i.e. that they had the right to remain silent and to counsel and any
statement they might make could be used against them, when they were made to affix their signatures on the
boxes of Alpen Cereals while they were at the NAIA and again, on the plastic bags when they were already
taken in custody at Camp Crame. By affixing their signatures on the boxes of Alpen Cereals and on the plastic
bags, accused in effect made a tacit admission of the crime charged for mere possession of "shabu" is
punished by law. These signatures of accused are tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession
which is not sanctioned by the Bill of Rights (Section 12[1][3], Article III, 1987 Constitution). They are,
therefore, inadmissible as evidence for any admission wrung from the accused in violation of their
constitutional rights is inadmissible against them. The fact that all accused are foreign nationals does not
preclude application of the "exclusionary rule" because the constitutional guarantees embodied in the Bill of
Rights are given and extend to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
254 Marcelo vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division) [GR 109242, 26 January 1999]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 10 February 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office, disclosed to his
chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage of mail matter in the post
office. Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag
opener in the Printed Matters Section, and Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office.
Merete likewise described the modus operandi of the group. For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the
Makati Post Office. On 17 February 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi
Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan
accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents in a private
car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of Adelantado and Gamboa
Streets, while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo Street, near the Esquerra Building. At 2:00
p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the Esguerra Building on
Adelantado Street. The passengers of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the
driver, Henry Orindai. Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside the
jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings going towards
Amorsolo St. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons, who were later
identified as Ronnie Romero and Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred the contents of the mail bag (i.e.,
assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two then secured the bag to the back of their motorcycle.
Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards Amorsolo St., moved their
car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to
Marcelo and Romero. At that point, Atty. Sacaguing and Arles Vela arrested Marcelo and Romero. Unaware
of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery jeep and proceeded toward
Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep, overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan. The NBI
agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also brought along with them the
motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail found in their possession. On their way to
the NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati Central Post Office, intending to arrest another suspect,
Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they were not able to find him there. The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo

and Romero consisted of 622 letters. The names of the addressees were listed. They were subsequently
notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim their letters. Many of them, after proper identification, were able to
claim their letters. Some letters contained money. Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their
signatures on the envelopes of the letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI
Administrative and Investigative Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time.
According to Director Ranin, they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very
same letters confiscated from them. Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza, Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Marcelo
y Cruz were charged with infidelity in the custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another
information for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan. On 8 March 1993, the Sandiganbayan
found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of qualified theft. The
Sandiganbayan sentenced Pasiclon the penalty ranging from 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day of Prision mayor, as
minimum, to 13 years, 1 month, and 11 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum; Romero and Marcelo, the
penalty ranging from 7 YEARS, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months,
and 21 days of prision mayor, as maximum, each. Marcelo filed the petition for review on certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the exclusion of the admission, made through the signatures on the envelopes, extend to the
exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves.
Held: The purpose for securing the signature of Marcelo, et. al. on the envelopes was to authenticate the
envelopes as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. This purpose and their signatures on the
envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the envelopes seized from Marcelo
were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help establish the guilt of Marcelo. Since these signatures
are actually evidence of admission obtained from Marcelo and his co-accused under circumstances
contemplated in Art. III. §§12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For indeed, Marcelo
and his co-accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial investigation,
defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. Under the Constitution, among the rights of
a person under custodial investigation is the right to have competent and independent counsel preferably of
his own choice and if the person cannot afford the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one.
However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly seized from
Marcelo and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that Marcelo's admission that the letters in
question were those seized from him and his companion on 17 February 1989 is inadmissible in evidence
does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters themselves. The letters can stand on their own,
being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the
possession of Marcelo and his companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and
Tumagan. Indeed, Marcelo and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures found
on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other prosecution witnesses.
255 People vs. Andan [GR 116437, 3 March 1997]

Facts: On 19 February 1994 at about 4:00 P.M., in Concepcion Subdivision, Baliuag, Bulacan, Marianne
Guevarra, 20 years of age and a second-year student at the Fatima School of Nursing, left her home for her
school dormitory in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. She was to prepare for her final examinations on 21 February
1994. Marianne wore a striped blouse and faded denim pants and brought with her two bags containing her
school uniforms, some personal effects and more than P2,000.00 in cash. Marianne was walking along the
subdivision when Pablito Andan y Hernandez invited her inside his house. He used the pretext that the blood
pressure of his wife's grandmother should be taken. Marianne agreed to take her blood pressure as the old
woman was her distant relative. She did not know that nobody was inside the house. Andan then punched her
in the abdomen, brought her to the kitchen and raped her. His lust sated, Andan dragged the unconscious girl

to an old toilet at the back of the house and left her there until dark. Night came and Andan pulled Marianne,
who was still unconscious, to their backyard. The yard had a pigpen bordered on one side by a 6-foot high
concrete fence. On the other side was a vacant lot. Andan stood on a bench beside the pigpen and then lifted
and draped the girl's body over the fence to transfer it to the vacant lot. When the girl moved, he hit her head
with a piece of concrete block. He heard her moan and hit her again on the face. After silence reigned, he
pulled her body to the other side of the fence, dragged it towards a shallow portion of the lot and abandoned
it. At 11:00 a.m. of the following day, the body of Marianne was discovered. She was naked from the chest
down with her brassiere and T-shirt pulled toward her neck. Nearby was found a panty with a sanitary napkin.
Marianne's gruesome death drew public attention and prompted Mayor Cornelio Trinidad of Baliuag to form a
crack team of police officers to look for the criminal. Searching the place where Marianne's body was found,
the policemen recovered a broken piece of concrete block stained with what appeared to be blood. They also
found a pair of denim pants and a pair of shoes which were identified as Marianne's. Andan's nearby house
was also searched by the police who found bloodstains on the wall of the pigpen in the backyard. They
interviewed the occupants of the house and learned from Romano Calma, the stepbrother of Andan's wife, that
Andan also lived there but that he, his wife and son left without a word. Calma surrendered to the police
several articles consisting of pornographic pictures, a pair of wet short pants with some reddish brown stain, a
towel also with the stain, and a wet T-shirt. The clothes were found in the laundry hamper inside the house
and allegedly belonged to Andan. The police tried to locate Andan and learned that his parents live in
Barangay Tangos, Baliuag, Bulacan. On February 24 at 11:00 P.M., a police team led by Mayor Trinidad
traced Andan in his parents' house. They took him aboard the patrol jeep and brought him to the police
headquarters where he was interrogated. Initially, Andan denied any knowledge of Marianne's death.
However, when the police confronted him with the concrete block, the victim's clothes and the bloodstains
found in the pigpen, Andan relented and said that his neighbors, Gilbert Larin and Reynaldo Dizon, killed
Marianne and that he was merely a lookout. He also said that he knew where Larin and Dizon hid the two
bags of Marianne. Immediately, the police took Andan to his house. Larin and Dizon, who were rounded up
earlier, were likewise brought there by the police. Andan went to an old toilet at the back of the house, leaned
over a flower pot and retrieved from a canal under the pot, two bags which were later identified as belonging
to Marianne. Thereafter, photographs were taken of Andan and the two other suspects holding the bags. By
this time, people and media representatives were already gathered at the police headquarters awaiting the
results of the investigation. Mayor Trinidad arrived and proceeded to the investigation room. Upon seeing the
mayor, Andan approached him and whispered a request that they talk privately. The mayor led Andan to the
office of the Chief of Police and there, Andan broke down and said "Mayor, patawarin mo ako! I will tell you
the truth. I am the one who killed Marianne." The mayor opened the door of the room to let the public and
media representatives witness the confession. The mayor first asked for a lawyer to assist Andan but since no
lawyer was available he ordered the proceedings photographed and videotaped. In the presence of the mayor,
the police, representatives of the media and Andan's own wife and son, Andan confessed his guilt. He
disclosed how he killed Marianne and volunteered to show them the place where he hid her bags. He asked
for forgiveness from Larin and Dizon whom he falsely implicated saying he did it because of ill-feelings
against them. He also said that the devil entered his mind because of the pornographic magazines and tabloid
he read almost everyday. After his confession, Andan hugged his wife and son and asked the mayor to help
him. His confession was captured on videotape and covered by the media nationwide. Andan was detained at
the police headquarters. The next two days, February 26 and 27, more newspaper, radio and television
reporters came. Andan was again interviewed and he affirmed his confession to the mayor and reenacted the
crime. Pablito Andan y Hernandez alias "Bobby" was charged with rape with homicide. On arraignment,
however, Andan entered a plea of "not guilty." In a decision dated 4 August 1994, the trial court convicted
Andan and sentenced him to death pursuant to Republic Act 7659. The trial court also ordered Andan to pay
the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P71,000.00 as actual burial expenses and P100,000.00 as
moral damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Andan’s confession to the police, the mayor, and the newsmen may be admitted as evidence
against Andan.

Held: Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right (1) to remain
silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of
such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible in evidence against him. The exclusionary
rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent. The incommunicado character of custodial interrogation or investigation
also obscures a later judicial determination of what really transpired. When the police arrested Andan, they
were no longer engaged in a general inquiry about the death of Marianne. Indeed, Andan was already a prime
suspect even before the police found him at his parents' house. Andan was already under custodial
investigation when he confessed to the police. It is admitted that the police failed to inform appellant of his
constitutional rights when he was investigated and interrogated. His confession is therefore inadmissible in
evidence. So too were the two bags recovered from Andan's house. The victim's bags were the fruits of
Andan's uncounselled confession to the police. They are tainted evidence, hence also inadmissible.
On the other hand, however, Andan's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any interrogation
by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question Andan at all. No police authority ordered Andan to talk to the
mayor. It was Andan himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the mayor for a private
meeting. The mayor did not know that Andan was going to confess his guilt to him. When Andan talked with
the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to him did not
violate his constitutional rights.
Andan's confessions to the media were properly admitted. The confessions were made in response to
questions by news reporters, not by the police or any other investigating officer. Statements spontaneously
made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in
evidence. The records show that Alex Marcelino, a television reporter for "Eye to Eye" on Channel 7,
interviewed Andan on 27 February 1994. The interview was recorded on video and showed that Andan made
his confession willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of his wife, child and other relatives. Orlan
Mauricio, a reporter for "Tell the People" on Channel 9 also interviewed appellant on 25 February 1994.
Andan's confessions to the news reporters were given free from any undue influence from the police
authorities. The news reporters acted as news reporters when they interviewed Andan. They were not acting
under the direction and control of the police. They were there to check Andan's confession to the mayor. They
did not force Andan to grant them an interview and reenact the commission of the crime. In fact, they asked
his permission before interviewing him. They interviewed him on separate days not once did Andan protest
his innocence. Instead, he repeatedly confessed his guilt to them. He even supplied all the details in the
commission of the crime, and consented to its reenactment. All his confessions to the news reporters were
witnessed by his family and other relatives. There was no coercive atmosphere in the interview of Andan by
the news reporters. Thus, Andan's verbal confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12 (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State. The
prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that certain rights of the
individual exist without need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be taken away by government,
rights that government has the duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and the Bill of Rights
lays down these limitations to protect the individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies.
256 People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001]

Second Division, Bellosillo (J): 4 concur
Facts: On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an emboldened Gerry

Galgarin (@ Toto), uncle of Edward Endino, suddenly and without warning lunged at Dennis Aquino and
stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis' girlfriend Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the
unexpected attack, pleaded to Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself
from his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was foiled when from out
of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As Dennis staggered for safety, the 2 assailants fled
in the direction of the airport. Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim
Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near death. Clara with the help of some
onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis expired even before he could receive medical attention. On 18
October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed against Edward Endino and Gerry
Galgarin and warrants were issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court
issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without prejudice to its reinstatement
upon their apprehension. On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts of
the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Niño, Antipolo, Rizal. He was immediately
taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was
fetched from the Antipolo Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the
Palawan police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly. On their way to the airport, they
stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of
the interview were taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward Endino
as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for Roxas, Palawan, where his sister
Langging who is Edward's mother, was waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They
took the boat for Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they separated,
with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give himself up to the authorities. His
interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening news program TV Patrol. During trial, Galgarin disowned
the confession which he made over TV Patrol and claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting
police officers. He asserted that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible
under the exclusionary rule provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the Constitution. The trial court found Galgarin
guilty of murder qualified by Treachery, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to indemnify
the heirs of Dennis Aquino in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual
damages.
Issue: Whether the ABS-CBN interview recording Galgarin’s confession is admissible as evidence.
Held: The interview was recorded on video and it showed Galgarin unburdening his guilt willingly, openly
and publicly in the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation as it
was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the
public. Besides, if he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the
newsmen who, in all likelihood, would have been sympathetic with him. However, because of the inherent
danger in the use of television as a medium for admitting one's guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon
in several cases, it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken in further
admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media
practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced extra-judicial confessions and place them beyond the
exclusionary rule by having an accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental
to the guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system. It is not suggested that
videotaped confessions given before media men by an accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of
police officers are impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and conduct
is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in
determining whether a confession was given under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere. A word of
counsel then to lower courts: "we should never presume that all media confessions described as voluntary
have been freely given. This type of confession always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly
examined and scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous task for the
courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating polluted confessions from untainted

ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution."
257 People vs. Ordono [GR 132154, 29 June 2000]

Facts: On 5 August 1994, the decomposing body of a young girl was found among the bushes near a bridge
in Barangay Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley Victore, 15 years old, a
resident of Barangay Guesset, Poblacion, Santol, La Union, who 3 days before was reported missing. Post-
mortem examination conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed that the
victim was raped and strangled to death. Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoño and Apolonio Medina
as the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon invited the 2 suspects and brought them
to the police station for questioning. However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to the crime,
they were allowed to go home. On 10 August 1994, Ordoño and Medina returned to the police station one
after another and acknowledged that they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the
police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions in writing. The investigators however
could not at once get the services of a lawyer to assist the 2 accused in the course of the investigation because
there were no practicing lawyers in the Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union.
Be that as it may, the statements of the 2 accused where nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused
were apprised in their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be assisted by a
competent counsel of their choice. Upon their acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights
and did not require the services of counsel, the investigation was conducted with the Parish Priest, the
Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to
and witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the 2 suspects who admitted their participation in the
crime. After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into tears. He then affixed his
signature on his statement and so did his wife, followed by all the other witnesses who listened to his
confession. Pacito Ordoño narrated his story in the afternoon. At the end of his narration Ordoño affixed his
thumbmark on his statement in lieu of his signature as he did not know how to write. Thereafter, Medina and
Ordoño were detained at the Santol police station. News about the apprehension and detention of the culprits
of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio station
DZNL, visited and interviewed them. In the interview, which was duly tape-recorded both accused admitted
again their complicity in the crime and narrated individually the events surrounding their commission thereof.
According to Medina, his remorse in having committed the crime was so great but his repentance came too
late. He and Ordoño hoped that the parents of Shirley Victore would forgive them. Upon conclusion of the
interview, Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played the taped interview on the air.
The same interview was played again on the air the following morning and was heard by thousands of
listeners. A couple of days later, the police brought the 2 accused to the office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan,
La Union, for assistance and counseling. In a closed-door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz apprised each
of the accused of his constitutional rights and, even though their confessions were already written in their
dialect, explained to them each of the questions and answers taken during the investigation. He likewise
advised them to ponder the consequences of their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their
second signature/thumbmark thereon. After a week or so, the 2 separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and
informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and thumbmarks for the second time in their
respective confessions. Once again Atty. Corpuz apprised the 2 accused of their constitutional rights,
explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally, accompanied them to Judge Fabian M.
Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan, La Union, who further apprised the 2 accused of their constitutional rights
and asked them if they had been coerced into signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their
statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance that they had not been coerced into
giving and signing their confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked Ordoño and Medina to affix their
signatures/thumbmarks on their respective confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty. Corpuz
then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed by a few members of the MTC staff who
witnessed the signing. Ordono and Medina were charged for rape with homicide. On arraignment, in a

complete turnabout, the 2 accused pleaded not guilty. On 11 December 1997, the trial court adjudged Ordoño
and Medina guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended with conspiracy, and imposed upon each of
them 2 death penalties on the basis of their extrajudicial confessions. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether the custodial investigation made in the presence of the municipal mayor, parish priest, etc.
and/or the taped interview containing the accused’s confessions are admissible as evidence.
Held: Custodial investigation began when the accused Ordoño and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol
Police Station to confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit information and/or
confession from them. At such point, the right of the accused to counsel automatically attached to them.
Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights the police sought to provide them with counsel.
However, none could be furnished them due to the non-availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union,
and the remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union, where practicing lawyers
could be found. At that stage, the police should have already desisted from continuing with the interrogation
but they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the investigation. To the credit of the
police, they requested the presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well as the
relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary execution by the
accused of their statements before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence of a
lawyer during the investigation. In the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol, the Municipal
Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police officers of the municipality could not
stand in lieu of counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the 2 accused in continuing with the investigation
was of no moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of counsel.
Consequently, any admission obtained from the 2 accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation
would be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer 5 to 8 days
later does not remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing that the PAO lawyer made a
thorough explanation of the rights of the accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their
admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid and valuable advice given by counsel
still came several days too late. It could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel
during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements were being taken. The second affixation
of the signatures/thumbmarks of the accused on their confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting
with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and other
witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing and later signed in the presence of
counsel are still flawed under the Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an indication therein that there was compliance with the
constitutional rights of the accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par. (1), are not
met. The standards utilized by police authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the accused therefore fell
short of the standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.
As with the interview taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite, the taped interview was offered to
form part of the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to whom the admissions were made and to prove
through electronic device the voluntary admissions by the 2 accused that they raped and killed Shirley
Victore. The defense objected to its acceptance on the ground that its integrity had not been preserved as the
tape could easily have been spliced and tampered with. However, as Roland Almoite testified, it was the
original copy of the taped interview; it was not altered; the voices therein were the voices of the 2 accused;
and, the defense never submitted evidence to prove otherwise. Under the circumstances, the Court is inclined
to admit the authenticity of the taped interview. A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland
Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any influence or intimidation from
police officers and was done willingly by the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority
ordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it may be expected that police officers
were around since the interview was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were within

hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview was being conducted. At most, the participation
of the police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview. The taped interview
likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for
having perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news
reporters on a televised interview are deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy,
statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should likewise be held admissible. The interview
was not in the nature of an investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to questions
asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other investigating officer. When the accused talked to the
radio announcer, they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was not, hence their
uncounselled confession to him did not violate their constitutional rights. Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art.
III, of the Constitution do not cover the verbal confessions of the 2 accused to the radio announcer. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights enumerated
under Sec. 12, Art. III, are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the
accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In relation
to this, the admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly tape-recorded are bolstered and
substantiated by the findings of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post
Mortem Findings.
258 People vs. Guillermo [GR 147786, 20 January 2004]

En Banc, Quisumbing (J): 13 concur
Facts: Victor Francisco Keyser, was the owner and manager of Keyser Plastic Manufacturing Corp., with
principal place of business at Sitio Halang, Lornaville, San Roque, Antipolo City. Keyser Plastics shared its
building with Greatmore Corporation, a manufacturer of faucets. Separating the respective spaces being
utilized by the two firms in their operations was a wall, the lower portion of which was made of concrete
hollow blocks, while the upper portion was of lawanit boards. The part of the wall made of lawanit had two
large holes, which could allow a person on one side of the wall to see what was on the other side. On 22
March 1998, Romualdo Campos, a security guard assigned to Greatmore was on duty. At around 8:00 a.m., he
saw Eric G. Guillermo enter the premises of Keyser Plastics. Campos ignored Guillermo, as he knew him to
be one of the trusted employees of Keyser Plastics. An hour later, he saw Victor F. Keyser arrive. Keyser
checked the pump motor of the deep well, which was located in the area of Greatmore, after which he also
went inside the part of the building occupied by Keyser Plastics. Campos paid scant attention to Keyser. Later,
at around 10:00 a.m., Campos was making some entries in his logbook, when he heard some loud noises
(“kalabugan”) coming from the Keyser Plastics area. He stopped to listen, but thinking that the noise was
coming from the machines used to make plastics, he did not pay much attention to the sound. At around
noontime, Campos was suddenly interrupted in the performance of his duties when he saw Guillermo look
through one of the holes in the dividing wall. According to Campos, appellant calmly told him that he had
killed Victor Keyser and needed Campos’ assistance to help him carry the corpse to the garbage dump where
he could burn it. Shocked by this revelation, Campos immediately dashed off to telephone the police. The
police told him to immediately secure the premises and not let the suspect escape, while a reaction team was
being dispatched to the scene. 10 minutes later, a team composed of SPO4 Felix Bautista, SPO1 Carlito
Reyes, and Police Aide Jovenal Dizon, Jr., all from the Antipolo Philippine National Police (PNP) Station,
arrived at the crime scene. With them was Felix Marcelo, an official police photographer. They were
immediately met by Campos, who informed them that Guillermo was still inside the building. The law
enforcers tried to enter the premises of Keyser Plastics, but found the gates securely locked. The officers then
talked to Guillermo and after some minutes, persuaded him to give them the keys. This enabled the police to
open the gate. Once inside, SPO4 Bautista and SPO1 Reyes immediately accosted Guillermo, who was clad
only in a pair of shorts, naked from the waist up. SPO1 Reyes then asked him where the body of the victim
was and Guillermo pointed to some cardboard boxes. On opening the boxes, the police found the
dismembered limbs and chopped torso of Keyser. The victim’s head was found stuffed inside a cement bag.
When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness, Guillermo said that he bashed the

victim on the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a carpenter’s
saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with a plastic foam. Guillermo then turned over to the police a
bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenter’s saw. Photographs were taken of the
suspect, the dismembered corpse, and the implements used in committing the crime. When asked as to his
motive for the killing, Guillermo replied that Keyser had been maltreating him and his co-employees. He
expressed no regret whatsoever about his actions. The police then brought Guillermo to the Antipolo PNP
Station for further investigation. SPO1 Carlos conducted the investigation, without apprising Guillermo about
his constitutional rights and without providing him with the services of counsel. SPO1 Carlos requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct a post-mortem examination on Keyser’s remains. The
Antipolo police then turned over the bloodstained piece of wood and saw, recovered from the locus delicti, to
the PNP Crime Laboratory for testing. Keyser’s death shocked the nation. Guillermo, who was then in police
custody, was interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto “Gus” Abelgas of
ABS-CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast
nationwide. Guillermo admitted to David that he committed the crime and never gave it second thought. He
disclosed to David the details of the crime, including how he struck Keyser on the head and cut up his body
into pieces, which he placed in sacks and cartons. When asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated
that Keyser had not paid him for years, did not feed him properly, and treated him “like an animal.” Both
Abelgas and David said that Guillermo expressed absolutely no remorse over his alleged misdeed during the
course of their respective interviews with him. On 23 March 1998, Guillermo was charged by State
Prosecutor Jaime Augusto B. Valencia, Jr., of murdering his employer, Victor Francisco Keyser. When
arraigned on 3 April 1998, Guillermo, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the charge. On 23 April
1998, however, Guillermo moved to withdraw his plea of guilty and prayed for a re-arraignment. The trial
court granted the motion and on 28 April 1998, he was re-arraigned. Assisted by counsel de parte, he entered
a plea of not guilty. The case then proceeded to trial. After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo
City, Branch 73, dated 7 March 2001 (Criminal Case 98-14724), found Eric Guillermo y Garcia guilty of
murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The court also ordered Guillermo to pay the mother
of the victim P50,000.00 for death indemnity, P50,000.00 for funeral expenses, P500,000.00 as compensatory
damages, P500,000.00 as moral damages, P300,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P100,000 plus P3,000 per
court appearance as attorney's fees. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Guillermo’s confession to the police officers, to the security guard of Greatmore Corp., and to
the newsmen are admissible as evidence.
Held: The confession Guillermo made while he was under investigation by SPO1 Carlito Reyes for the
killing of Keyser at the Antipolo PNP Station, falls short of the protective standards laid down by the
Constitution. The investigating officer made no serious effort to make Guillermo aware of his basic rights
under custodial investigation. While the investigating officer was aware of Guillermo’s right to be
represented by counsel, the officer exerted no effort to provide him with one on the flimsy excuse that it was a
Sunday. Despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover, the record
is bare of any showing that Guillermo had waived his constitutional rights in writing and in the presence of
counsel. Be that as it may, however, the inadmissibility of Guillermo’s confession to SPO1 Reyes at the
Antipolo PNP Station as evidence does not necessarily lead to his acquittal. For constitutional safeguards on
custodial investigation (known, also as the Miranda principles) do not apply to spontaneous statements, or
those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense. The rights enumerated in the
Constitution, Article III, Section 12, are meant to preclude the slightest use of the State’s coercive power as
would lead an accused to admit something false. But it is not intended to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such power. Herein, Guillermo admitted the commission
of the crime not just to the police but also to private individuals. According to the testimony of the security
guard, Romualdo Campos, on the very day of the killing Guillermo called him to say that he had killed his
employer and needed assistance to dispose of the cadaver. Campos’ testimony was not rebutted by the

defense, and thus Guillermo's statements to Campos are admissible for being part of the res gestae. Further,
when interviewed on separate occasions by the media, Guillermo not only agreed to be interviewed by the
news reporters, but he spontaneously admitted his guilt to them. He even supplied the details regarding the
commission of the crime to reporter Kara David of GMA Channel 7. The TV news reporters were acting as
media professionals when they interviewed Guillermo. They were not under the direction and control of the
police. There was no coercion for Guillermo to face the TV cameras. The interviews also took place on
several occasions, not just once. Each time, Guillermo did not protest or insist on his innocence. Instead, he
repeatedly admitted what he had done. He even supplied details of Keyser’s killing. As held in Andan,
statements spontaneously made by a suspect to news reporters during a televised interview are voluntary and
admissible in evidence.
259 People vs. Gomez [GR 101817, 26 March 1997]

First Division, Vitug (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 27 February 1990, Art David, an employer of Felipe Immaculata sent the latter to Bangkok,
Thailand, to canvass ready-to-wear clothes. David and Eduardo Gomez followed Immaculata about a week
later (04 March 1990). Immaculata fetched the two at the Bangkok Airport. Immaculata, David and Gomez
proceeded to and stayed at the Union Towers Hotel. After 2 days, they transferred to the apartment of one Lito
Tuazon where they spent the rest of their stay in Bangkok. On 14 March 1990, Immaculata, Gomez and Aya
Yupangco left Bangkok and boarded Manila-bound flight PR-731. Immaculata and Yupangco occupied seats
2A and No. 54D. Gomez was on the same flight. He checked-in two golfbags, and he was issued interline
claim tags PR 77-28-71 and 77-28-72. In Manila, Gomez deposited the two golfbags with the interline
baggage room for his connecting flight from Manila to San Francisco via United Airlines ("UAL") flight 058
scheduled to depart the following morning (15 March 1990). The golfbags were kept in the transit rack
baggage along with other pieces of luggage destined for San Francisco via the UAL flight. Well before flight
time on 15 March 1990, Romeo Dumag, a customs policeman at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
("NAIA"), was requested by Customs Collector Edgardo de Leon to help facilitate the checking-in of Eduardo
Gomez. Dumag sought from his security officer, a certain Capt. Reyes, the latter's permission. Having
received the go-signal, Dumag accepted from De Leon the ticket and passport of Gomez. Dumag proceeded
to the UAL check-in counter. The airline's lady staff, Annabelle Lumba, directed Dumag to first claim the
passenger's items to be checked-in at the interline baggage room. At the interline baggage room, Dumag
spoke to Michael Angelo Benipayo, a PAL employee assigned at the NAIA central baggage division and
baggage handling section, and presented the two claim tags of Gomez together with the latter's passport and
plane ticket. Convinced that Dumag had been duly authorized to retrieve the baggage, Benipayo released,
upon the approval of a customs examiner named Nick, the two golfbags wrapped in blue cloth. To
acknowledge the release, Dumag affixed his signature to the "unclaimed baggage/transit list." PAL loader
Edgardo Villafuerte helped carry the golfbags to the UAL check-in counter. Annabelle Lumba attached a San
Francisco laser tag (UA Tag 594513 and Tag 594514) and wrote the name "Gomez" on each side of the
golfbags. She then handed to Dumag the boarding pass and UAL plane ticket for Gomez. Dumag proceeded
to Patio Manila, a restaurant at the NAIA, where he turned over to Collector De Leon the travel papers of
Gomez. Gomez failed to board the UAL flight. The two golfbags were off-loaded from the aircraft. At around
4:00 p.m., PAL staff Dennis Mendoza brought the golfbags back to the check-in counter for a security check-
up. The x-ray machine showed unidentified dark masses. Alarmed, Mendoza immediately relayed the
information to Capt. Ephraim Sindico of the 801st Aviation Security Squadron of the Philippine Air Force
Security Command ("PAFSECOM") then deployed at the NAIA. Capt. Sindico rushed to the check-in area.
He instructed his men to get the golfbags pass through the x-ray machine once again. Satisfied that something
was indeed wrong, Capt. Sindico reported the matter to Col. Claudio Cruz who ordered his men to have the
golfbags go, for the third time, through the x-ray machine. The unidentified dark masses having been
definitely confirmed, Col. Cruz ordered his men to open the glued bottom zipper of the golfbags. The
golfbags yielded 31 single packs, each with an approximate size of 1" x 6" x 4," containing a white powder
substance suspected to be "heroin" with a total weight of 20.1159 kilograms. The examination by the

PAFSECOM personnel was witnessed by the NAIA manager, a representative of the UAL and other customs
personnel. Eduardo Gomez, a bartender, and Felipe Immaculata, a former bus driver, were implicated in the
crime of transporting 20 kilograms of heroin, estimated to be worth $40,000,000.00, contained in two
golfbags. Also charged, with having violated Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 21, Article IV, of
Republic Act 6425 (the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended, were Aya Yupangco, Art David, Lito
Tuazon and Benito Cunanan, who all were able to evade arrest. Gomez surrendered to the officer-in-charge
of the then Clark Air Force Base in Angeles City. The OIC of Clark Air Force Base turned over custody of
Gomez to the Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") of the United States in Manila. The DEA, in turn,
surrendered him to the NBI. On the other hand, on 22 March 1990, David and Immaculata left for Hongkong
reportedly to get some spare parts for David's Mercedes Benz car. In Hongkong, after buying the car spare
parts, David and Immaculata went to the U.S. Department of Justice in Hongkong. While waiting for David,
Immaculata was confronted by a group of people, who turned out to be from the Hongkong Immigration
Office, requesting for his travel papers. Immaculata was brought in for investigation because of an expired
visa, then turned over to the police authorities and finally to the court which decreed his imprisonment. In the
Hongkong prison, Immaculata was visited by NBI agents for his implication in the "heroin" case. He denied
the accusation. Later, he agreed, without the assistance of counsel, to execute a sworn statement at the Stanley
Prison. After his prison term, Immaculata was deported to Manila. Gomez and Immaculata entered a plea of
"not guilty" to the accusation. After trial, Gomez and Immaculata were each meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay a P20,000.00 fine by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 113
(Criminal Case 90-4717). While Gomez and Immaculata filed separate notices of appeal to the Supreme
Court from their conviction, only Immaculata, however, filed his brief. Gomez, assisted by counsel, filed a
"manifestation of withdrawal of appeal" to which the Solicitor General interposed no objection. The Court
would only thus consider the appeal of Immaculata.
Issue: WhetherImmaculata’s uncounselled statement made in Stanley Prison in Hongkong is admissible as

evidence in the Philippines.
Held: While the sworn statement taken from Immaculata by an NBI agent at the Stanley Prison in Hongkong
during his incarceration was not made the basis for Immaculata's conviction by the court, a word could be
said about the manner in which it was procured. It would seem that Immaculata was merely apprised in
general terms of his constitutional rights to counsel and to remain silent. He then was asked if he would be
willing to give a statement. Having answered in the affirmative, the NBI investigating agent asked him
whether he needed a lawyer. After that response, the investigation forthwith proceeded. This procedure hardly
was in compliance with Section 12(1), Article III, of the Constitution which requires the assistance of counsel
to a person under custody even when he waives the right to counsel. It is immaterial that the sworn statement
was executed in a foreign land. Immaculata, a Filipino citizen, should enjoy these constitutional rights, like
anyone else, even when abroad.
260 Illinois vs. Perkins [496 US 292, 4 June 1990]

Kennedy (J)
Facts: In November 1984, Richard Stephenson was murdered in a suburb of East St. Louis, Illinois. The
murder remained unsolved until March 1986, when one Donald Charlton told police that he had learned about
a homicide from a fellow inmate at the Graham Correctional Facility, where Charlton had been serving a
sentence for burglary. The fellow inmate was Lloyd Perkins. Charlton told police that, while at Graham, he
had befriended Perkins, who told him in detail about a murder that Perkins had committed in East St. Louis.
On hearing Charlton's account, the police recognized details of the Stephenson murder that were not well
known, and so they treated Charlton's story as a credible one. By the time the police heard Charlton's account,
Perkins had been released from Graham, but police traced him to a jail in Montgomery County, Illinois, where
he was being held pending trial on a charge of aggravated battery, unrelated to the Stephenson murder. The
police wanted to investigate further Perkins' connection to the Stephenson murder, but feared that the use of

an eavesdropping device would prove impracticable and unsafe. They decided instead to place an undercover
agent in the cellblock with Perkins and Charlton. The plan was for Charlton and undercover agent John Parisi
to pose as escapees from a work release program who had been arrested in the course of a burglary. Parisi and
Charlton were instructed to engage Perkins in casual conversation and report anything he said about the
Stephenson murder. Parisi, using the alias "Vito Bianco," and Charlton, both clothed in jail garb, were placed
in the cellblock with Perkins at the Montgomery County jail. The cellblock consisted of 12 separate cells that
opened onto a common room. Perkins greeted Charlton who, after a brief conversation with Perkins,
introduced Parisi by his alias. Parisi told Perkins that he "wasn't going to do any more time" and suggested
that the three of them escape. Perkins replied that the Montgomery County jail was "rinky-dink" and that they
could "break out." The trio met in Perkins' cell later that evening, after the other inmates were asleep, to refine
their plan. Perkins said that his girlfriend could smuggle in a pistol. Charlton said: "Hey, I'm not a murderer,
I'm a burglar. That's your guys' profession." After telling Charlton that he would be responsible for any
murder that occurred, Parisi asked Perkins if he had ever "done" anybody. Perkins said that he had and
proceeded to describe at length the events of the Stephenson murder. Parisi and Perkins then engaged in some
casual conversation before Perkins went to sleep. Parisi did not give Perkins Miranda warnings before the
conversations. Perkins was charged with the Stephenson murder. Before trial, he moved to suppress the
statements made to Parisi in the jail. The trial court granted the motion to suppress, and the State appealed.
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]), prohibits all
undercover contacts with incarcerated suspects that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Issue: Whether strategic deception may be employed by law enforcers to solicit confessions from suspects,
such as the deployment of an undercover agent posing as an inmate, and without the need to give Miranda
warnings.
Held: Conversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying
Miranda. The essential ingredients of a "police-dominated atmosphere" and compulsion are not present when
an incarcerated person speaks freely to someone whom he believes to be a fellow inmate. Miranda forbids
coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking advantage of a suspect's misplaced trust in one he supposes
to be a fellow prisoner. As recognized in Miranda: "Confessions remain a proper element in law enforcement.
Any statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of course, admissible in
evidence." Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of
compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda's concerns. Miranda was not meant to protect
suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in front of persons whom they believe to be their
cellmates. Herein, Perkins had no reason to feel that undercover agent Parisi had any legal authority to force
him to answer questions or that Parisi could affect Perkins' future treatment. Perkins viewed the cellmate-
agent as an equal and showed no hint of being intimidated by the atmosphere of the jail. In recounting the
details of the Stephenson murder, Perkins was motivated solely by the desire to impress his fellow inmates.
He spoke at his own peril. The tactic employed here to elicit a voluntary confession from a suspect does not
violate the Self-Incrimination Clause. As held in Hoffa v. United States (385 US 293 [1966]), that placing an
undercover agent near a suspect in order to gather incriminating information was permissible under the Fifth
Amendment. The only difference between the present case and Hoffa is that the suspect here was
incarcerated, but detention, whether or not for the crime in question, does not warrant a presumption that the
use of an undercover agent to speak with an incarcerated suspect makes any confession thus obtained
involuntary. Law enforcement officers will have little difficulty putting into practice the Court's holding that
undercover agents need not give Miranda warnings to incarcerated suspects. The use of undercover agents is a
recognized law enforcement technique, often employed in the prison context to detect violence against
correctional officials or inmates, as well as for the purposes served here. The interests protected by Miranda
are not implicated in these cases, and the warnings are not required to safeguard the constitutional rights of
inmates who make voluntary statements to undercover agents.
261 People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]

En Banc, Gonzaga-Reyes (J): 14 concur
Facts: On 15 September 1997 at around 7:00 p.m., Helen Ramos was asleep in her house together with her
husband (Danilo Ramos) and children, Nimrod, Neres and Nairube, the victim. Nairube slept close to her "on
the upper part" of her body. At around 12:30 a.m., her husband woke her up because he sensed someone going
down the stairs of their house. She noticed that Nairube was no longer in the place where she was sleeping but
she assumed that Nairube merely answered the call of nature. Nairube's blanket was also no longer at the
place she slept but that her slippers were still there. After three minutes of waiting for Nairube's return, she
stood up and began calling out for Nairube but there was no answer. Thereafter, she went downstairs and saw
that the backdoor of their house was open. She went outside through the backdoor to see if Nairube was there
but she was not. She found a pair of rubber slippers on top of a wooden bench outside of her backdoor. The
sole of the slippers was red while the strap was a combination of yellow and white; said slippers did not
belong to any member of her family. Thereafter, she proceeded to the house of Alma Diaz to ask her for help.
Then, in the morning of 16 September 1997, she went to the police station to report the loss of her child. She
also reported the discovery of the pair of slippers to SP02 Quirino Gallardo. She then went home while the
police began their search for Nairube. At around 12:30 p.m., Alma Diaz requested her to go with the searching
team. During the search, Alma Diaz found a panty which she recognized as that of her daughter. After seeing
the panty, she cried. She was thereafter ordered to go home while the others continued the search. Thereafter,
they continued the search and found a black collared T-shirt with buttons in front and piping at the end of the
sleeve hanging on a guava twig. Alma Diaz gave the shirt to SP02 Gallardo. Loreto Veloria informed him that
the two items were worn by Clemente John Lugod when he went to the house of Violeta Cabuhat. At around
7:00 p.m., SP02 Gallardo apprehended Lugod on the basis of the pair of slippers and the black T-shirt. He
then brought Lugod to the police station where he was temporarily incarcerated. At first, the accused denied
that he did anything to Nairube but after he told him what happened to the girl. Later, although he admitted to
having raped and killed Nairube, Lugud refused to make a statement regarding the same. After having been
informed that the body of Nairube was in the grassy area, Gallardo together with other members of the PNP,
the Crime Watch and the townspeople continued the search but they were still not able to find the body of
Nairube. It was only when they brought Lugod to Villa Anastacia to point out the location of the cadaver, on
18 September 1997, that they found the body of Nairube. On 19 September 1997, at around 3:30 p.m., Floro
Esguerra, the Vice-Mayor of Cavinti attended the funeral of Nairube. After the funeral, he visited the accused
in his cell. In the course of his conversation with Lugod, Lugod allegedly confessed to the commission of the
offense. On 10 October 1997, Lugod was charged for rape with homicide. Upon arraignment, Lugod with the
assistance of counsel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 8 October 1998, the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna found Lugod guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentenced him to
death, and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Nairube Ramos the sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for her death and P37,200.00 as actual damages. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether Lugod’s alleged confession to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Cavanti can be used against him.
Held: The records do not support the confession allegedly made by Lugod to the Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial. Moreover, the testimony
of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged confession made by Lugod is not conclusive. From the
testimony of the Vice-Mayor, Lugod merely responded to the ambiguous questions that the Vice-Mayor
propounded to him. He did not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped and killed Nairube. In fact,
the Vice-Mayor admitted that Lugod did not tell him that he raped and killed Nairube. In addition, the Court
notes the contradiction between the testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that he was alone when he spoke
to Lugod and that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present when Lugod confessed to the Mayor
and Vice-Mayor. Considering that the confession of Lugod cannot be used against him, the only remaining
evidence which was established by the prosecution are circumstantial in nature. The circumstances, taken
with the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, merely establish Lugod's whereabouts on that fateful
evening and places Lugod at the scene of the crime and nothing more. The evidence of the prosecution does

not provide a link which would enable the Court to conclude that he in fact killed and raped Nairube.
262 People vs. Luvendino [GR 69971, 3 July 1992]

Second Division, Feliciano (J): 10 concur
Facts: On the morning of 17 January 1983, 18-year old Rowena Capcap left her home at Deva Village,
Tambak, Taguig, Metro Manila to attend classes at the University of Manila where she was a sophomore
commerce student. She would usually be home by 7:30 to 8:00 on school evenings, but on that tragic day, she
would not reach home alive. On that particular evening, her father Panfilo Capcap arriving home from work
at around 7:30 p.m., noted her absence and was told by his wife and other children that Rowena was not yet
home from school. Later, a younger brother of Rowena, sent on an errand, arrived home carrying Rowena's
bag which he had found dropped in the middle of a street in the village. Panfilo Capcap lost no time in
seeking the help of the barangay captain of Hagonoy, Taguig. Not being satisfied with the latter's promise to
send for a "tanod" to help locate his missing daughter, Panfilo went to the Taguig Police Station to report his
daughter as missing. The desk officer there advised him that a search party would be mounted presently.
Panfilo returned home and, with the help of some neighbors, launched a search party for the missing Rowena.
The search ended in a grassy vacant lot within the Deva Village Subdivision, only about 70 to 80 meters from
the Capcap residence, where lay the apparently lifeless body of Rowena, her pants pulled down to her knees
and her blouse rolled up to her breasts. Her underwear was blood-stained and there were bloody fingerprint
marks on her neck. Rowena, her body still warm, was rushed to a hospital in Taguig, where on arrival she was
pronounced dead. The autopsy report stated that the multiple injuries indicated the victim had struggled
vigorously with her attacker(s); that the presence of spermatozoa showed that the victim had sexual
intercourse prior to death; and that death was due to asphyxia by manual strangulation. By 5 March 1984, an
information had been filed in the trial court charging Ernesto C. Luvendino, Cesar Borca alias "Cesar Putol"
and Ricardo de Guzman alias "Ric" with the crime of rape with murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against
all the accused but only Ernesto Luvendino was actually apprehended; the other 2 have remained at large. It
appears that Luvendino re-enacted the events that transpired in the evening of January 17 at the crime scene,
where pictures were taken by a photographer brought by the police officers. In the course of the
demonstration, Luvendino allegedly remarked: "Inaamin ko po na kasama ko si Cesar Borca sa pag re-rape
kay Rowena." At arraignment, Luvendino assisted by his counsel, Atty. Luisito Sardillo, pleaded not guilty
and then proceeded to trial. On 12 December 1984, the trial court rendered a decision finding Luvendino
guilty, sentencing him to death, and requiring him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Rowena in the amount
of P50,000.00 for the damages suffered as a result of her death.
Issue: Whether Luvendino’s re-enactment of the crime may be admitted as evidence against the accused.
Held: The trial court took into account the testimony given by Panfilo Capcap on what had occurred during
the re-enactment of the crime by Luvendino. The re-enactment was apparently staged promptly upon
apprehension of Luvendino and even prior to his formal investigation at the police station. The decision of the
trial court found that the accused was informed of his constitutional rights "before he was investigated by Sgt.
Galang in the police headquarters" and cited the "Salaysay" of appellant Luvendino. The decision itself,
however, states that the re-enactment took place before Luvendino was brought to the police station. Thus, it
is not clear from the record that before the re-enactment was staged by Luvendino, he had been informed of
his constitutional rights including, specifically, his right to counsel and that he had waived such right before
proceeding with the demonstration. Under these circumstances, the Court must decline to uphold the
admissibility of evidence relating to that re-enactment.
263 People vs. Alicando [GR 117487, 12 December 1995]

En Banc, Puno (J): 9 concur
Facts: In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was

drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1,
Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Arnel Alicando y Briones joined them but every now and then would take leave and return.
Alicando was living in his uncle's house some 5 arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m.,
Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, Luisa Rebada saw the victim at the
window of Alicando's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but Alicando closed the window. Soon she heard
the victim crying. She approached Alicando's house and peeped through an opening between its floor and
door. The sight shocked her — Alicando was naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She
retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children together and informed her compadre, Ricardo
Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left. Romeo
Penecilla returned to his house at 8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched for her
until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter
but did not tell them what she knew. Instead, Rebada called out Alicando from her window and asked him the
time Khazie Mae left his house. Alicando replied he was drunk and did not know. As the sun started to rise,
another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to answer the call of nature. He discovered
the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00
a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that Alicando
committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was arrested and interrogated by P03 Danilo Tan. He verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounseled verbal confession and
follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from Alicando's house, Khazie Mae's green
slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was charged with
the crime of rape with homicide. On 29 June 1994, Alicando was arraigned with the assistance of Atty.
Rogelio Antiquiera of the PAO, Department of Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty. After Alicando's plea of guilt,
the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence for
Alicando, if he so desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court found Alicando guilty and sentenced him to death,
and to indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00. Hence, the
automatic review.
Issue: Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains, evidence derived from the
uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from Alicando, may be admitted as evidence.
Held: It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselled
confession or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provide that "Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel"; and "Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible against him"; respectively. Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the
simple sense to reduce the all important confession of Alicando in writing. Neither did he present any writing
showing that Alicando waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel. It is not
only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom. The
pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived from the uncounselled confession
illegally extracted by the police from Alicando. The Court has not only constitutionalized the Miranda
warnings in Philippine jurisdiction. It has also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of
the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v.
United States. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully
obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated
otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle
that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally
illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. The burden to prove that an accused

waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before making a confession under custodial
interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence
derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by
clear and convincing evidence.
264 Harris vs. New York [401 US 222, 24 February 1971]

Burger (CJ)
Facts: The State of New York charged Harris in a two-count indictment with twice selling heroin to an
undercover police officer. At a subsequent jury trial the officer was the State's chief witness, and he testified
as to details of the two sales. A second officer verified collateral details of the sales, and a third offered
testimony about the chemical analysis of the heroin. Harris took the stand in his own defense. He admitted
knowing the undercover police officer but denied a sale on 4 January 1966. He admitted making a sale of
contents of a glassine bag to the officer on January 6 but claimed it was baking powder and part of a scheme
to defraud the purchaser. On cross-examination, Harris was asked seriatim whether he had made specified
statements to the police immediately following his arrest on January 7 - statements that partially contradicted
his direct testimony at trial. In response to the cross-examination, Harris testified that he could not remember
virtually any of the questions or answers recited by the prosecutor. At the request of Harris' counsel the
written statement from which the prosecutor had read questions and answers in his impeaching process was
placed in the record for possible use on appeal; the statement was not shown to the jury. The trial judge
instructed the jury that the statements attributed to Harris by the prosecution could be considered only in
passing on Harris' credibility and not as evidence of guilt. In closing summations both counsel argued the
substance of the impeaching statements. The jury then found Harris guilty on the second count of the
indictment. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion.
Issue: Whether the statements made by the accused after his arrest should be absolutely excluded, or whether
such statements can be used to impeach the accused who acted as his own witness.
Held: Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as indicating a bar to use of an uncounseled
statement for any purpose, but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court's holding and
cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda barred the prosecution from making its case with statements of an
accused made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving counsel. It does not follow from
Miranda that evidence inadmissible against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for all
purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfies legal standards. In Walder v.
United States (347 US 62 [1954]), the Court permitted physical evidence, inadmissible in the case in chief, to
be used for impeachment purposes. It is true that Walder was impeached as to collateral matters included in
his direct examination, whereas Harris here was impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the
crimes charged. There is no difference in principle that warrants a result different from that reached by the
Court in Walder. Harris' testimony in his own behalf concerning the events of January 7 contrasted sharply
with what he told the police shortly after his arrest. The impeachment process here undoubtedly provided
valuable aid to the jury in assessing Harris' credibility, and the benefits of this process should not be lost
because of the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby.
Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct, sufficient deterrence
flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief. The shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. The Court holds, therefore, that Harris' credibility was
appropriately impeached by use of his earlier conflicting statements.
265 New York vs. Quarles [467 US 649, 12 June 1984]

Rehnquist (J)

Facts: On 11 September 1980, at approximately 12:30 a. m., Officer Frank Kraft and Officer Sal Scarring
were on road patrol in Queens, New York, when a young woman approached their car. She told them that she
had just been raped by a black male, approximately six feet tall, who was wearing a black jacket with the
name "Big Ben" printed in yellow letters on the back. She told the officers that the man had just entered an A
& P supermarket located nearby and that the man was carrying a gun. The officers drove the woman to the
supermarket, and Officer Kraft entered the store while Officer Scarring radioed for assistance. Officer Kraft
quickly spotted Quarles, who matched the description given by the woman, approaching a checkout counter.
Apparently upon seeing the officer, Quarles turned and ran toward the rear of the store, and Officer Kraft
pursued him with a drawn gun. When Quarles turned the corner at the end of an aisle, Officer Kraft lost sight
of him for several seconds, and upon regaining sight of Quarles, ordered him to stop and put his hands over
his head. Although more than three other officers had arrived on the scene by that time, Officer Kraft was the
first to reach Quarles. He frisked him and discovered that he was wearing a shoulder holster which was then
empty. After handcuffing him, Officer Kraft asked him where the gun was. Quarles nodded in the direction of
some empty cartons and responded, "the gun is over there." Officer Kraft thereafter retrieved a loaded .38-
caliber revolver from one of the cartons, formally placed Quarles under arrest, and read him his Miranda
rights from a printed card. Quarles indicated that he would be willing to answer questions without an attorney
present. Officer Kraft then asked Quarles if he owned the gun and where he had purchased it. Quarles
answered that he did own it and that he had purchased it in Miami, Florida. Benjamin Quarles was charged in
the New York trial court with criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court suppressed the gun in question,
and a statement made by Quarles, because the statement was obtained by police before they read Quarles his
"Miranda rights." That ruling was affirmed on appeal through the New York Court of Appeals.
Issue: Whether the statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun itself should be excluded as evidence in
light of the officer's failure to read Quarles his Miranda rights before attempting to locate the weapon.
Held: There is a "public safety" exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before a
suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence, and that the availability of that exception does not depend
upon the motivation of the individual officers involved. In a kaleidoscopic situation such as the one
confronting these officers, where spontaneity rather than adherence to a police manual is necessarily the order
of the day, the application of the exception which the Court recognizes should not be made to depend on post
hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer.
Undoubtedly most police officers, if placed in Officer Kraft's position, would act out of a host of different,
instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives -- their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the
desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect. Whatever the motivation of individual officers in
such a situation, the Court does not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda require that it be
applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions reasonably prompted by a concern
for the public safety. The Miranda decision was based in large part on the Court's view that the warnings
which it required police to give to suspects in custody would reduce the likelihood that the suspects would fall
victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of police interrogation in the presumptively coercive
environment of the station house. The police herein, in the very act of apprehending a suspect, were
confronted with the immediate necessity of ascertaining the whereabouts of a gun which they had every
reason to believe the suspect had just removed from his empty holster and discarded in the supermarket. So
long as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it
obviously posed more than one danger to the public safety: an accomplice might make use of it, a customer or
employee might later come upon it. In such a situation, if the police are required to recite the familiar Miranda
warnings before asking the whereabouts of the gun, suspects in Quarles' position might well be deterred from
responding. Procedural safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable in
Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the primary social cost of those added
protections is the possibility of fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost. Here,
had Miranda warnings deterred Quarles from responding to Officer Kraft's question about the whereabouts of
the gun, the cost would have been something more than merely the failure to obtain evidence useful in

convicting Quarles. Officer Kraft needed an answer to his question not simply to make his case against
Quarles but to insure that further danger to the public did not result from the concealment of the gun in a
public area. Thus, the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety
outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination. The Court declines to place officers such as Officer Kraft in the untenable position of having to
consider, often in a matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions
without the Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them
to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of evidence they might uncover but possibly
damage or destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.
Here, Officer Kraft asked only the question necessary to locate the missing gun before advising Quarles of his
rights. It was only after securing the loaded revolver and giving the warnings that he continued with
investigatory questions about the ownership and place of purchase of the gun. The exception which the Court
recognizes, far from complicating the thought processes and the on-the-scene judgments of police officers,
will simply free them to follow their legitimate instincts when confronting situations presenting a danger to
the public safety. The Court hold that the Court of Appeals erred in excluding the statement, "the gun is over
there," and the gun because of the officer's failure to read Quarles his Miranda rights before attempting to
locate the weapon.

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People vs. Escordial [GR 138934-35, 16 January 2002] … 13

People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997] … 25

People vs. Endino [GR 133026, 20 February 2001] … 39

This collection contains forty (40) cases

Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002

226 Miranda vs. Arizona [384 US 436, 13 June 1966]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )

the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 2 )

227 People vs. Lugod [GR 136253, 21 February 2001]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 3 )

228 People vs. Del Rosario [GR 127755, 14 April 1999]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 4 )

229 People vs. Bolanos [GR 101808, 3 July 1992]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 5 )

230 Rhode Island vs. Innis [446 US 291, 12 May 1980]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 6 )

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 7 )

231 People vs. Mahinay [GR 122485, 1 February 1999]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 8 )

232 People vs. Ayson [GR 85215, 7 July 1989]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 9 )

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 10 )

234 Gamboa vs. Cruz [GR L-56291, 27 June 1988]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 11 )

235 United States vs. Wade [388 US 218, 12 June 1967]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 12 )

236 People vs. Escordial [GR 138934-35, 16 January 2002]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 13 )

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 14 )

237 People vs. Piedad [GR 131923, 5 December 2002]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 15 )

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 16 )

239 People vs. Page [GR L-37507, 7 June 1977]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 17 )

240 People vs. Caguioa [GR L-38975, 17 January 1980]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 18 )

241 People vs. Tampus [GR L-44690, 28 March 1980]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 19 )

242 People vs. Galit [GR 51770, 20 March 1985]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 20 )

243 People vs. Bandula [GR 89223, 27 May 1994]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 21 )

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 22 )

244 People vs. Quidato [GR 117401, 1 October 1998]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 23 )

245 People vs. Rous [GR 103803-04, 27 March 1995]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 24 )

246 People vs. Januario [GR 98252, 7 February 1997]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 25 )

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 26 )

247 People vs. Labtan [GR 127493, 8 December 1999]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 27 )

statement which he repudiated during the trial. Feliciano appealed.

248 People vs. Samus [GR 135957-58, 17 September 2002]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 28 )

Issue: Whether uncounselled admission are absolutely inadmissible.

249 People vs. Gallardo [GR 113684, 25 January 2000]

Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 29 )