CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
1. Police Power
2. Power of Eminent Domain
3. Power of Taxation
Why inherent?
- Because they belong to the very
essence of government and without
them no government can exist.
- A constitution can only define and
delimit them and allocate their exercise
among various government agencies. A
constitution does not grant them.
Similarities
 Inherent in the State, exercised even
without need of express constitutional
grant.
 Necessary and indispensable; State
cannot be effective without them.
 Methods by which State interferes with
private property.
 Presuppose equivalent compensation
 Exercised primarily by the Legislature.
Distinctions:
 Police power regulates both liberty and
property; eminent domain and taxation
affect only property rights.
 Police power and taxation are exercised
only by government; eminent domain
may be exercised by private entities.
 Property taken in police power is
usually noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose and may thus be
destroyed; while in eminent domain
and taxation, the property is
wholesome and devoted to public use
or purpose.
 Compensation in police power is the
intangible, altruistic feeling that the
individual has contributed to the public
good; in eminent domain, it is the full
and fair equivalent of the property
Sources:
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taken; while in taxation, it is the
protection given and/or public
improvements instituted by
government for the taxes paid.
Limitations: Generally, the Bill of Rights,
although in some cases the exercise of the
power prevails over specific constitutional
guarantees.
The courts may annul the improvident exercise
of police power.
1. Police Power
Definition
- The power of promoting public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of
liberty and property.
- State’s authority to enact legislation
that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote general
welfare. It consists of:
o Imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property
o In order to foster common good
[Philippine Association of
Service Exporters v. Drilon]
Scope/Characteristics
- Police power is the most pervasive, the
least limitable, and the most
demanding of the three powers.
- The justification is found in the Latin
maxims:
o salus populi est suprema lex
let the good of the people be
the supreme law
o sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas
use your own property in such a
way that you do not injure
other people’s
- Police power rests upon public
necessity and upon the right of the
State and of the public to self-
protection. For this reason, its scope
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
expands and contracts with changing
needs. [Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil.
580]
a. Police power cannot be bargained away
through the medium of a treaty or a
contract [Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil.
1155].
b. That taxing power may be used as an
implement of police power [Lutz v.
Araneta]
c. That eminent domain may be used as
an implement to attain the police
objective [Association of Small
Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform]
d. A law enacted in the exercise of police
power to regulate or govern certain
activities or transactions could be given
retroactive effect and may reasonably
impair vested rights or contracts. Police
power legislation is applicable not only
to future contracts, but equally to those
already in existence. Non-impairment of
contracts or vested rights clauses will
have to yield to the superior and
legitimate exercise by the State of the
police power [Ortigas & Co. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 4,
2000],
Thus, despite the retroactive effect of
PD 957 (Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers Protective Decree), there is no
violation of the non-impairment clause,
because the decree is a valid exercise of
the police power, and police power
prevails over contracts [PNB v. Office of
the President, 255 SCRA 5]
e. It is true that the Court has upheld the
constitutional right of every citizen to
select a profession or course of study
subject to fair, reasonable and
equitable admission and academic
requirements. But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter,
Sources:
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Constitutional Law by Bernas
their exercise may be so regulated
pursuant to the police power of the
State to safeguard health, morals,
peace, education, order, safety, and the
general welfare of the people. This
regulation assumes particular
pertinence in the field of medicine, to
protect the public from the potentially
deadly effects of incompetence and
ignorance [Professional Regulation
Commission v. De Guzman, G.R. No.
144681, June 21, 2004].
f. The right to bear arms is merely a
statutory privilege. The license to carry
a firearm is neither a property or a
property right. Neither does it create a
vested right. A permit to carry a firearm
outside one’s residence may be revoked
at any time. Even if it were a property
right, it cannot be considered as
absolute as to be beyond the reach of
the police power [Chavez v. Romulo,
431 SCRA 534].
g. Like timber permits, mining exploration
permits do not vest in the grantee any
permanent or irrevocable right within
the purview of the non-impairment and
due process clauses, since the State,
under its all-encompassing police
power, may alter, modify or amend the
same in accordance with the demands
of the general welfare [Southeast
Mindanao Goldmining Corporation v.
Balite Portal Mining, G.R. No. 135190,
April 3, 2002].
h. A license to operate a motor vehicle is
not a property right, but a privilege
granted by the State, which may be
suspended or revoked by the State in
the exercise of its police power, in the
interest of public safety and welfare,
subject to the procedural due process
requirements [Metropolitan Manila
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
Development Authority v. Garin, G.R. Torres, G.R. No. 127249, February 27,
No. 130230, April 15, 2005]. 1998].
i. R.A. 9257, otherwise known as the b. Unlike the legislative bodies of local
“Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003, government units, there is no provision in
is a legitimate exercise of police power. R.A. 7924 that empowers the Metro Manila
Administrative Order No. 177 issued by Development Authority
the Department of Health, providing (MMDA) or its Council to “enact ordinances,
that the 20% discount privilege of approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
senior citizens shall not be limited to the general welfare” of the inhabitants of
the purchase of unbranded generic Metro Manila. Thus, MMDA may not order the
medicine but shall extend to both opening of Neptune St. in the Bel-Air
prescription and non-prescription Subdivision to public traffic, as it does not
medicince, whether branded or generic, possess delegated police power [Metro Manila
is valid. When conditions so demand, as Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
determined by the legislature, property Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000].
rights must bow to the primacy of While Sec. 5(f),
police power because property rights, Limitations (Tests for Valid Exercise):
though sheltered by the due process 1. Lawful subject
clause, must yield to the general - The interests of the public in qeneral.
welfare [Carlos Superdrug Corporation As distinguished from those of a
v. DSWD, etal., G.R. No. 166494, June particular class, require the exercise of
29, 2007]. the power.
Who may exercise the power - This means that the activity or property
- The power is inherently vested in the sought to be regulated affects the
Legislature. general welfare; if it does, then the
- However, Congress may validly delegate enjoyment of the rights flowing
this power to the President, to therefrom may have to yield to the
administrative bodies and to lawmaking interests of the greater number.
bodies of local government units.
- Local government units exercise the
power under the general welfare clause
[Sec. 16, R.A. 7160], and under Secs.
391, 447, 458 and 468, R.A. 7160.
a. While police power may be validly
delegated to the President by law, R.A.
6939 and P.D. 260, as amended, do not
authorize the President, or any other
administrative body, to take over the
internal management of a cooperative.
Accordingly, Memorandum Order No. 409,
issued by the President, constituting an ad
hoc committee to temporarily take over and
manage the affairs of CANORECO is invalid
[Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative v.
Sources: M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
Political Law Review by Nachura
Constitutional Law by Bernas
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
ARTICLE III at any time. Even if it were a property right, it
Bill of Rights cannot be considered as absolute as to be
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, placed beyond the reach of police power. 5
liberty, or property without the due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the Right to life
equal protection of the laws. - not just a protection of the right to be
Life alive or to the security of one's limb
- includes the right of an individual to his against physical harm.
body in its completeness, free from - the right to a good life; the emphasis on
dismemberment, and extends to the the quality of living is found in Article II
use of God-given faculties which make where Section 6 commands the State to
life enjoyable1 promote a life of "dignity" and where
Liberty Section 7 guarantees "a decent
- includes “the right to exist and the right standard of living."
to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude, x x x” Due process of law
- includes “the right of the citizen to be - A law which hears before it condemns,
free to use his faculties in all lawful which proceeds upon inquiry and
ways x x x”2 renders judgment only after trial [Daniel
Property Webster]
- anything that can come under the right of o Reason: It has to be so if the
ownership and be the subject of contract rights of every person are to be
- represents more than the things a person secured beyond the reach of
owns; it includes the right to secure, use officials who, out of mistaken
and dispose of them3 zeal or plain arrogance, would
Public office is not property; but one unlawfully degrade the due process clause
ousted from it may institute an action to into a worn and empty
recover the same, flowing from the de jure catchword. (This definition is on
officer’s right to office procedural aspect)
One’s employment, profession or trade or - Responsiveness to the supremacy of
calling is a property right, and the wrongful reason, obedience to the dictates of
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. justice [Justice Enrique Fernando]
Thus, an order of suspension, without - The embodiment of the sporting idea of
opportunity for hearing, violates property fair play [Justice Felix Frankfurter of U.S.
rights4 Supreme Court]
The license to carry a firearm is neither a - Guaranty against any arbitrariness on
property nor a property right. Neither does it the part of the government, whether
create a vested right. A permit to carry a committed by the legislative, executive,
firearm outside one’s residence may be revoked or judiciary [Justice Isagani Cruz]
Essence: distilled in the immortal cry of
1
Justice Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear
2
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil 660
3 me first!"
Torraco v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197
4
Crespo v. Provincial Board, 160 SCRA 66
5
Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534
Sources: M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
Political Law Review by Nachura
Constitutional Law by Bernas
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
Aspects of Due process 3. A tribunal vested with competent
a. Procedural Due Process jurisdiction and so constituted as to
- This serves as a restriction on actions of afford a person charged
judicial and quasi-judicial agencies of administratively a reasonable guarantee
government [Bernas] of honesty as well as impartiality; and
- Guarantee of procedural fairness; it 4. A finding by said tribunal which is
refers to the regular methods of supported by substantial evidence
procedure to be observed before one’s submitted for consideration during the
life, liberty or property can be taken hearing or contained the records or
away from him. Simply stated, it means made known to the parties affected.
the procedure to be observed must be [23. Ang Tibay v. CIR] [26. Fabella v. CA]
fair [SUAREZ]
Requisites: 3. Procedural Due Process in School
1. These must be a court or tribunal Proceedings
clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired
over the person of the defendant or
over the property which is the subject
of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing. [18. El Banco Español-
Filipino v. Palanca]

Aspects of Procedural Due Process

1. Procedural Due Process in Judicial
Proceedings
2. Procedural Due Process in Administrative
Proceedings
Requirements:
1. The right to actual or constructive
notice of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondent's legal
rights;
2. A real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one's favor, and to defend
one's rights;
Sources: M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC
vs. HON. DRILON
G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988, SARMIENTO, J.
Facts:
The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service
Exporters, Inc. (PASEI), a firm "engaged principally in
the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female,
for overseas placement," challenges the Constitutional
validity of Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of
the Department of Labor and Employment, in the
character of "GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE
TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF
FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS," in
this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically,
the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" that it "does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills;" and that it is violative of the right to
travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power, police power being legislative, and
not executive, in character.
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition, PASEI,
challenges the validity of Department Order No. 1
(deployment ban) of the DOLE on the following
grounds:
1) it is discriminatory as it only applies to female
workers;
2) it is an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power
Issue:
Whether or not the enactment of DO No. 1 is a valid
exercise of police power.
Held: Yes, it is a valid exercise of police power.
 Police power has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare."
 It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the
plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the
Charter. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the
most vital functions of governance. It constitutes
an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights.
 However, police power is not without its own
limitations. It may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it
defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that
is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the
power is used to further private interests at the
expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of
the power.
 It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in
the nature of a police power measure. The only
question is whether or not it is valid under the
Constitution.
Petitioner’s Claim
“Discriminatory as it applies only to female workers”
 DO No. 1 applies only to "female contract
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workers," but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. ― Equality
before the law" admits of classifications, provided
that
1. such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions;
2. they are germane to the purposes of the
law;
3. they are not confined to existing conditions;
4. they apply equally to all members of the
same class.
 Discrimination in this case is justified.
“Invalid exercise of the lawmaking body”
 It is the objective of DO No. 1 to "enhance the
protection for Filipino female overseas workers.
 Police power is the domain of the legislature, but it
does not mean that such an authority may not be
lawfully delegated. The Labor Code itself vests the
DOLE with rulemaking powers in the enforcement
whereof.
 Hence it is a valid exercise of police power.
ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ
101 PHIL. 1155
Facts:
RA 1180 or “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business”
was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition
against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our
country.
Petitioner filed a suit to invalidate the Retail Trade
Nationalization Law, on the premise that it violated
several treaties which under the rule of pacta sunt
servanda, a generally accepted principle of
international law, should be observed by the Court in
good faith.
Issue:
Whether or not the Retail Trade Nationalization Law is
unconstitutional for it is in conflict with treaties which
are generally accepted principles of international law.
Held:
 The Supreme Court said it saw no conflict. The
reason given by the Court was that the Retail Trade
National Law was passed in the exercise of the
police power which cannot be bargained away
through the medium of a treaty or a contract.
 The law in question was enacted to remedy a real
actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the
retail business and free the citizens and country
from such dominance and control; that the
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the
police power of the State, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future.
 Resuming what we have set forth above we hold
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a
real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country from such
dominance and control;
 That the enactment clearly falls within the scope of
the police power of the state, through which and
by which it protects its own personality and insures
its security and future; that the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the
exercise of occupation regulated, nor the due
process of the law clause; because the law is
prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
 That the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry
out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident
- as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate
but actually necessary - and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the
legislature, with whose power and discretion the
judicial department of the Government may not
interfere;
 That the provisions of the law are clearly embraced
in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislature of the segment of
the population affected; and that it cannot be said
to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been
entered into on the subject and the police power
may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty
or any other conventional agreement.
WALTER LUTZ, et. al vs. ANTONIO ARANETA,
G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955, REYES, J.B L., J.
Facts:
Plaintiffs seek to recover tax from the respondent
alleging that such is unconstitutional and void, being
levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry
exclusively, which in plaintiff's opinion is not a public
purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally levied.
The action having been dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, the plaintiffs appealed the case directly to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the imposition of tax under the
CA No. 567 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
 Yes. The tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to
provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In
other words, the act is primarily an exercise of the
police power.
 The protection of a large industry constituting one
of the great sources of the state's wealth and
therefore directly or indirectly affecting the
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welfare of so great a portion of the population of
the State is affected to such an extent by public
interests as to be within the police power of the
sovereign.
The decision appealed from is affirmed.
FLORENTINA A. LOZANO vs. HONORABLE
ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, et.al
G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986, YAP, J.
Facts:
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short),
popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law
punishes a person "who makes or draws and
issues any check on account or for value,
knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of said check in
full upon presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had
not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment." Those who
question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist
that it offends the constitutional provision
forbidding imprisonment for debt and it
contravenes the equal protection clause.
Issue:
Whether or not the enactment of BP 22 is a
valid exercise of police power.
Held:
Yes. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise
of the police power and is not repugnant to
the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt. It may be
constitutionally impermissible for the
legislature to penalize a person for non-
payment of a debt ex contractu. But certainly
it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed
pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts
mala in se are not the only acts which the law
can punish. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum
in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The
state can do this in the exercise of its police
power. There is no substance in the claim that
the statute in question denies equal protection
of the laws or is discriminatory, since it
penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the
payee. Wherefore, the decision rendered by the
respondent judge is hereby set aside.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that
one-third of the entire money supply of the
country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists
of peso demand deposits; the remaining two-
thirds consists of currency in circulation. These
demand deposits in the banks constitute the
funds against which, among others, commercial
papers like checks, are drawn. The magnitude of
the amount involved amply justifies the
legitimate concern of the state in preserving the
integrity of the banking system. Flooding the
system with worthless checks is like pouring
garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's
economy.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check
transcends the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches
the interests of the community at large. The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the
payee or holder, but also an injury to the public.
The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a
thousandfold, can very well pollute the
channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the
welfare of society and the public interest.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid
exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt.
DECS v San Diego
180 SCRA 233, Cruz, J.
Facts:
Sources:
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The petitioner disqualified the private
respondent who had actually taken and failed
four times the National Medical Admission Test
from taking it again under its regulation. But the
private respondent contends that he is still
entitled and hence, applied to take a fifth
examination based on constitutional grounds:
right to academic freedom and quality
education, due process and equal protection.
He filed a petition for mandamus. The
respondent judge declared the said rule invalid
and granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the three flunk rule is a valid
exercise of police power.
Held:
Yes. The police power is validly exercised if:
(a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class,
require the interference of the State, and
(b) the means employed are reasonably
necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Thus, the subject of the challenged regulation
is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health. While every
person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he
does not have a constitutional right to be a
doctor. The private respondent has failed the
NMAT five times and this is sufficed to say that
he must yield to the challenged rule and give
way to those better prepared. The Court upheld
the constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical
schools only to those who have initially proved
their competence and preparation for a medical
education. The decision of the respondent
judge is reversed.
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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
Ynot v IAC
148 SCRA 659, Cruz, J.
Facts:
President Marcos issued E.O. 626-A amending
E.O. 626, which prohibits the transport of
carabaos or carabeefs from one province to
another for the purpose of preventing
indiscriminate slaughter of these animals. The
petitioner had transported six carabaos from
Masbate to Iloilo where they were confiscated
for violation of the said order. He sued for
recovery and challenges the constitutionality of
the said order. The lower court sustained the
confiscation of the carabaos. He appealed the
decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court
which upheld the lower court. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the purpose of E.O. 626-A is a
valid exercise of police power.
Held:
No. We do not see how the prohibition of the
interprovincial transport of carabaos can
prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere,
with no less difficulty in one province than in
another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in
one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another
province will make it easier to kill them there.
As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to
apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by
simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However,
if the movement of the live animals for the
purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be
prohibited, it should follow that there is no
reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not
to be flippant, dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the
means and the end were to be assumed, we
would still have to reckon with the sanction that
the measure applies for violation of the
prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation
Sources:
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of the carabao or carabeef being transported,
to be meted out by the executive authorities,
usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty
prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be
imposed by the court after trial and conviction
of the accused. Under the challenged measure,
significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the
property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the
measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
In the instant case, the carabaos were
arbitrarily confiscated by the police station
commander, were returned to the petitioner
only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00,
which was ordered confiscated upon his failure
to produce the carabaos when ordered by the
trial court. The executive order defined the
prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, which was
carried out forthright. The measure struck at
once and pounced upon the petitioner without
giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary
fair play.
In the instant case, the challenged measure is
an invalid exercise of the police power because
the method employed to conserve the carabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of
the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Moreover, there was no such pressure of time
or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory
treatment. The properties involved were not
even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. Thus, the Court cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, that there be a lawful method.
The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared
unconstitutional.
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
City Gov’t of Quezon City v Ericta
122 SCRA 759, Gutierrez, Jr., J
Facts:
Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed a petition
seeking to annul Section 9 of Ordinance No.
6118, S-64, requiring private cemeteries to
reserve 6% of its total area for the burial of
paupers, on the ground that it is contrary to the
Constitution. The petitioner contends that the
said order was a valid exercise of police power
under the general welfare clause. The
respondent court declared the said order null
and void. Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in
question is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
No. Section 9 cannot be justified under the
power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the
license fee, and regulate such other business,
trades, and occupation as may be established or
practice in the City.' (Subsections 'C', Sec. 12,
R.A. 537). The ordinance in question not only
confiscates but also prohibits the operation of
a memorial park cemetery. As defined, police
power is 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use
of liberty and property'. In the instant case,
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964
of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation
but an outright confiscation.
It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without
compensation. There is no reasonable relation
between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of
health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a
certain area from a private cemetery to
benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or
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maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose,
the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries. As a matter of fact, the petitioners
rely solely on the general welfare clause or on
implied powers of the municipal corporation,
not on any express provision of law as statutory
basis of their exercise of power. The petition for
review is hereby dismissed.
EMINENT DOMAIN
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., et. al
vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955, REYES, J.B L., J.
Facts:
In these consolidated cases, petitioners primarily assail
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc.
No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 arguing that no
private property shall be taken for public use without
just compensation. The respondent invokes the police
power of the State.
Issue:
Whether or not the taking of property under the said
laws is a valid exercise of police power or of the power
of eminent domain.
Held:
 It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain.
The cases present no knotty complication insofar
as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under
challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police
power for the regulation of private property in
accordance with the Constitution. But where, to
carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to
deprive such owners of whatever lands they may
own in excess of the maximum area allowed,
there is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking
contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use
of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said
excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
 This is definitely an exercise not of the police
power but of the power of eminent domain.
 Wherefore, the Court holds the constitutionality of
R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O.
Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all
expropriated properties shall be transferred to the
State only upon full payment of compensation to
their respective owners.
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
Manila Memorial vs. Secretary of DSWD,
G.R. No. 175356, December 3 2013 711
SCRA 302

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 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
TAXATION
Facts:
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao
Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal,
instituted this action for declaratory relief, with
injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act
No. 920, entitled "An Act Appropriating Funds
for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953,
contained, in section 1-C (a) thereof, an item
(43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals,
that, at the time of the passage and approval of
said Act, the said feeder roads were "nothing
but projected and planned subdivision roads
within the Antonio Subdivision situated at Pasig,
Rizal" near Shaw Boulevard, not far away from
the intersection between the latter and EDSA,
which projected feeder roads "do not connect
any government property or any important
premises to the main highway";
that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision
(as well as the lands on which said feeder roads
were to be construed) were private properties
of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time
of the passage and approval of said Act, was a
member of the Senate of the Philippines;
that on May, 1953, respondent Zulueta,
addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of
Pasig, Rizal, offering to donate said projected
feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal;
that, on June 13, 1953, the offer was accepted
by the council, subject to the condition "that
the donor would submit a plan of the said roads
and agree to change the names of two of
them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the
municipality of Pasig was, however, executed;
that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote
another letter to said council, calling attention
to the approval of Republic Act. No. 920, and
the sum of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for
the construction of the projected feeder roads
in question; that the municipal council of Pasig
endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to
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the District Engineer of Rizal, who, up to the
present "has not made any endorsement
thereon" that inasmuch as the projected feeder
roads in question were private property at the
time of the passage and approval of Republic
Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00
therein made, for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement of said projected feeder roads,
was illegal and, therefore, void ab initio"; that
said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by
Congress because its members were made to
believe that the projected feeder roads in
question were "public roads and not private
streets of a private subdivision"'; that, "in order
to give a semblance of legality, when there is
absolutely none, to the aforementioned
appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed
on December 12, 1953, while he was a member
of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged
deed of donation of the four (4) parcels of land
constituting said projected feeder roads, in
favor of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines; that said alleged deed of donation
was, on the same date, accepted by the then
Executive Secretary; that being subject to an
onerous condition, said donation partook of the
nature of a contract; that, such, said donation
violated the provision of our fundamental law
prohibiting members of Congress from being
directly or indirectly financially interested in any
contract with the Government, and, hence, is
unconstitutional, as well as null and voidab
initio, for the construction of the projected
feeder roads in question with public funds
would greatly enhance or increase the value of
the aforementioned subdivision of respondent
Zulueta,
Issue:
Whether the contested item of Republic Act No.
920 unconstitutional and, therefor, illegal?
Held:
No. The P85,000.00 appropriation for the
projected feeder roads in question, the legality
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
thereof depended upon whether said roads
were public or private property when the bill,
which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was
passed by Congress, or, when said bill was
approved by the President and the
disbursement of said sum became effective, or
on June 20, 1953 (see section 13 of said Act).
Inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged
then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that
said appropriation sought a private purpose,
and hence, was null and void.
The donation to the Government, over five (5)
months after the approval and effectivity of said
Act, made, according to the petition, for the
purpose of giving a "semblance of legality", or
legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not
cure its aforementioned basic defect.
Consequently, a judicial nullification of said
donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a
statute may be contested only by one who will
sustain a direct injury in consequence of its
enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions
nullifying, at the instance of taxpayers, laws
providing for the disbursement of public funds,
upon the theory that "the expenditure of
public funds by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional
act constitutes a misapplication of such funds,"
which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer.
Republic Act No. 920 is unconstitutional, since
the legislature is without power to appropriate
public revenue for anything but a public
purpose and the project feeder roads are at the
time private properties. The right of the
legislature to appropriate funds is correlative
with its right to tax, and, under constitutional
provisions against taxation except for public
purposes and prohibiting the collection of a
tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof
to another purpose, no appropriation of state
Sources:
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funds can be made for other than for a public
purpose.
Punsalan vs. Municipal Board of the City of
Manila
G.R. No. L-4817, 26 May 1954
Facts:
An ordinance was approved by the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila which imposes a
municipal occupation tax on persons exercising
various professions in the city and penalizes
non-payment of the tax by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of
not more than six months or by both such fine
and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.
The ordinance was in pursuance to paragraph
(1) Section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City
of Manila which empowers the Municipal Board
of said city to impose a municipal occupation
tax, not to exceed P50 per annum, on persons
engaged in the various professions above
referred to the plaintiffs, after having paid their
occupation tax, now being required to pay the
additional tax prescribed in the ordinance. The
plaintiffs paid the said tax under protest. The
lower court declared the validity of the law
authorizing the enactment of the ordinance,
but declared the latter illegal and void since its
penalty provided for the non-payment of tax
was not legally authorized.
Issue:
Is this ordinance and the law authorizing it
constitute class legislation, are unjust and
oppressive, and authorize what amounts to
double taxation?
Held:
NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we find
that the lower court was in error in saying that
the imposition of the penalty provided for in
the ordinance was without the authority of law.
The last paragraph (kk) of the very section that
authorizes the enactment of this tax ordinance
(section 18 of the Manila Charter) in express
terms also empowers the Municipal Board "to
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
fix penalties for the violation of ordinances
which shall not exceed to(sic) two hundred
pesos fine or six months" imprisonment, or both
such fine and imprisonment, for a single
offense." Hence, the pronouncement below
that the ordinance in question is illegal and void
because it imposes a penalty not authorized by
law is clearly without basis.
Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class
legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint
is not that the professions to which they
respectively belong have been singled out for
the imposition of this municipal occupation tax;
and in any event, the Legislature may, in its
discretion, select what occupations shall be
taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it
may tax all, or it may select for taxation
certain classes and leave the others untaxed.
(Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. 3393-
3395.) Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law
has authorized the City of Manila to impose the
said tax, it has withheld that authority from
other chartered cities, not to mention
municipalities. We do not think it is for the
courts to judge what particular cities or
municipalities should be empowered to impose
occupation taxes in addition to those imposed
by the National Government. That matter is
peculiarly within the domain of the political
departments and the courts would do well not
to encroach upon it. Moreover, as the seat of
the National Government and with a
population and volume of trade many times
that of any other Philippine city or
municipality, Manila, no doubt, offers a more
lucrative field for the practice of the
professions, so that it is but fair that the
professionals in Manila be made to pay a
higher occupation tax than their brethren in
the provinces.
Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust
and oppressive because they say that it creates
discrimination within a class in that while
professionals with offices in Manila have to pay
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the tax, outsiders who have no offices in the city
but practice their profession therein are not
subject to the tax. Plaintiffs make a distinction
that is not found in the ordinance. The
ordinance imposes the tax upon every person
"exercising" or "pursuing" — in the City of
Manila naturally — any one of the occupations
named, but does not say that such person must
have his office in Manila. What constitutes
exercise or pursuit of a profession in the city is a
matter of judicial determination. The argument
against double taxation may not be invoked
where one tax is imposed by the state and the
other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley on
Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely
recognized that there is nothing inherently
obnoxious in the requirement that license fees
or taxes be exacted with respect to the same
occupation, calling or activity by both the state
and the political subdivisions thereof.
Lladoc v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
GR L-19201, 16 June 1965
Facts:
In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod City,
donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz
then parish priest of Victorias, Negros
Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic
Church in the locality. The total samount was
actually spent for the purpose intended. On 3
March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor‘s gift tax
return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as
assessment for donee‘s gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental,
of which petitioner was the priest. The tax
amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges,
interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15
June 1960, and the compromise for the late
filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest
to the assessment and requested the
withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion
for reconsideration presented to the
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied.
The petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2
November 1960. After hearing, the CTA
affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue except the imposition of
compromise penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed
to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether a donee‘s gift tax may be assessed
against the Catholic Church.
Held:
Yes. The phrase ―exempt from taxation, as
employed in the Constitution should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds
of taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from
taxation cemeteries, churches and personages
or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively
for religious purposes. The exemption is only
from the payment of taxes assessed on such
properties enumerated, as property taxes, as
contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A
donee‘s gift tax is not a property tax but an
excise tax imposed on the transfer of property
by way of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was
not on the property themeselves. It does not
rest upon general ownership, but an excise
upon the use made of the properties, upon the
exercise of the privilege of receiving the
properties. The imposition of such excise tax on
property used for religious purposes does not
constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
Abra Valley College vs. Aquino
GR L-39086, 15 June 1988
Facts:
Petitioner Abra Valley College is an educational
corporation and institution of higher learning
duly incorporated with the SEC in 1948. On 6
July 1972, the Municipal and Provincial
treasurers (Gaspar Bosque and Armin Cariaga,
respectively) and issued a Notice of Seizure
upon the petitioner for the college lot and
Sources:
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building (OCT Q-83) for the satisfaction of said
taxes thereon. The treasurers served upon the
petitioner a Notice of Sale on 8 July 1972, the
sale being held on the same day. Dr. Paterno
Millare, then municipal mayor of Bangued,
Abra, offered the highest bid of P 6,000 on
public auction involving the sale of the college
lot and building. The certificate of sale was
correspondingly issued to him.
The petitioner filed a complaint on 10 July 1972
in the court a quo to annul and declare void the
―Notice of Seizure‖ and the ―Notice of Sale‖
of its lot and building located at Bangued, Abra,
for non-payment of real estate taxes and
penalties amounting to P5,140.31. On 12 April
1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of
facts adopted and embodied by the trial court
in its questioned decision. The trial court ruled
for the government, holding that the second
floor of the building is being used by the
director for residential purposes and that the
ground floor used and rented by Northern
Marketing Corporation, a commercial
establishment, and thus the property is not
being used ―exclusively‖ for educational
purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal,
petitioner availed of the instant petition for
review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing
said petition on 17 August 1974.
Issue:
Whether the College is exempt from taxes.
Held:
Yes. While the Court allows a more liberal and
non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase
―exclusively used for educational purposes,‖
reasonable emphasis has always been made
that exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. While
the second floor‘s use, as residence of the
director, is incidental to education; the lease of
the first floor cannot by any stretch of
imagination be considered incidental to the
M.A.D.D. SAN BEDA SCHOOL OF LAW
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
Derramas Notes and Cases
purposes of education. The test of exemption
from taxation is the use of the property for
purposes mentioned in the Constititution.
Adonis Notes: The SC stated that if only the
judge had read the 1973 Constitution, he should
have known the difference between the 1935
and the 1973 Constitution and he could not
have summarily dismissed the case. There is a
substantial distinction between the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitution. In the 1935 Constitution
the requirement for exemption for real
property taxes is “exclusively”, while the 1973
Constitution requires “actually, directly &
exclusively”. The SC remanded to the Court of
Origin for further hearing. (excerpts from
Sababan Notes)
-

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