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DPM
17,3 Floods in Jakarta: when the
extreme reveals daily structural
constraints and mismanagement
358
Pauline Texier
UMR 8586 Prodig, UFR GHSS, Université Paris 7 – Denis Diderot, Montréal,
2ème étage, Dalle des Olympiades, Paris, France

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze the root causes of disaster vulnerability in Jakarta,
to highlight the strategies and implications of official policies, and to consider alternatives for
vulnerability mitigation. The February 2007 floods which struck Jakarta emphasized the extreme
vulnerability of informal poor communities and the inefficiency of the disaster management policy set
up by the Indonesian government.
Design/methodology/approach – Detailed field investigations were undertaken before, during
and after the February 2007 flood event in several informal districts of Jakarta to collect secondary
data and conduct interviews with the population and some stakeholders of the disaster management
scene.
Findings – Human factors are dominant in explaining the magnitude of the 2007 flooding episode.
Urbanization is partially responsible for the extent of the flooding by waterproofing the soils. Yet
floods do not strike the inhabitants of formal and informal settlements in the same way. People from
the poor illegal areas are the most affected. Their behaviour and coping strategies during the crisis are
not due to a low perception of risk, but rather to some daily and non-hazard-related constraints which
are not taken into account by the government.
Practical implications – To prevent increasing vulnerability among these communities, it is
essential to refocus disaster management strategies on a daily pattern and to integrate them within a
global development framework, to de-marginalize them in terms of access to resources (public services,
economic values), and to favoir empowerment.
Originality/value – It is imperative to focus on poverty reduction and to develop economic projects
aimed at treating the causes of vulnerability.
Keywords Floods, Vulnerability, Resilience, Stakeholders, Jakarta
Paper type Research paper

Disaster Prevention and Management
Vol. 17 No. 3, 2008
pp. 358-372
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0965-3562
DOI 10.1108/09653560810887284
Introduction
Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, is a coastal conurbation of 20 million inhabitants. The
monsoonal climate brings very intensive rainfall each rainy season (typically between
the months of October and April). Jakarta is located within a deltaic plain where 13
rivers empty into the Jakarta bay. Jakarta’s site is therefore “naturally” highly prone to
flooding such as that experienced in 1996, 2002 and 2007. Flooding is today worsened
by a high subsidence rate due to the city weight and water extractions (Abidin et al.,
2001; Hirose et al., 2001). The floods of February 2007 were the worst in the history of
the Indonesian capital. Almost 60 percent of the urban area was affected (Figure 1).
Fifty eight to 74 people died and a total of 400,000 people were affected. In Kampung
Melayu, located near the main Ciliwung River, the water level reached as high as 11.20
meters from the thalweg[1]. Floodwaters destroyed one hundred houses located in
informal settlements. The scope of damage shows how vulnerable the communities
living in Jakarta are.
 Floods in Jakarta

359

Figure 1.
Map showing the areas
flooded in 1996, 2002 and
2007

In this paper, we propose first to analyze, through the 2007 event and a comparison
with the last two flood events (1996 and 2002), the causes of increasing flooding. This
analysis will be conducted in order to demonstrate the importance of human factors
that increase both the magnitude of the natural phenomenon, and the vulnerability of
DPM the city as a whole. Then, we shall examine the underpinning and daily social,
economic and political constraints which create this particular risky configuration, and
17,3 explain both the direct human causes, and the behavior and coping strategies of
poorest populations during those extreme events. We will focus on poor communities,
as variability in vulnerability is quite high between communities (Nigg, 1996; Maskrey,
1999) and “generally, the poor suffer more from hazards than the wealthy” (Chan and
360 Parker, 1996, p. 314). In Jakarta, the informal poor districts are the most affected by
flood related disasters. In a third part, we will provide an overview of the policies of
disaster management in Jakarta, to understand why official strategies failed to limit
damages in February 2007. We shall then discuss the reasons for the failure of the
system in the poor Jakartanese communities, and introduce possible management
alternatives.

Methodology
First, this study is based on secondary hydrological data. We analyzed separately daily
precipitations data for five stations and water level data for three stations all located
along the main Ciliwung River (2002 and 2007). Socio-economic data, official reports
and satellite imagery were collected to study the anthropogenic factors of flooding
events. Some of the most interesting results of our research are based on field
investigations undertaken between 2006 and 2007 in four different informal kampungs
(Indonesian word to designate urban quarters which compose the mosaic of Jakarta
city) during the dry season. The kampungs that were studied were Waduk Pluit and
Muara Baru Ujung near the Jakarta bay, Pademangan Barat in the lowest part of the
Ciliwung canal in North Jakarta, and Bukit Duri near the Ciliwung River in South
Jakarta (Figure 1). The field surveys consisted of 120 questionnaires (30 per district)
which were aimed at assessing firstly the perceptions of risk related to water hazards.
Secondly, these surveys intended to assess the inhabitants’ perception of official
strategies of disaster management, and of their own responsibility in increasing floods.
Finally, field investigations aimed to understand the underlying constraints which
influence the respondent’s behavior when facing risk. The sampling method adopted
was of random type (without stratification) applied in each hazard-designated area.
Three quarters of the respondents appeared to be migrants. Descriptive statistical
methods using Sphynx software were conducted to analyze the data. Stationary
observations were also undertaken during the heavy floods that occurred in February
2007 in the district of Bukit Duri, in South Jakarta. These observations were
complemented with interviews with institutional and non-institutional actors.

How natural are flood-related disasters in Jakarta?

Environmental factors which enhance flooding
In order to assess the contribution of “natural” factors in comparison to anthropogenic
factors in the explanation of the magnitude of this event, we compared the hydrological
data between 1996, 2002 and 2007 (Figure 2, Table I), then we analyzed the evolution in
land use during the same period.
The results show that rainfall for the five stations in 2007 was almost equal in terms
of total amount, even if it was more concentrated in time and more intense than in 2002.
However, differences in rainfall alone cannot explain the gap between the floodwater
level in 1996, 2002 and 2007 (more than one meter higher in 2007 in Bukit Duri), nor the
extent of the flooded area and casualties.
Floods in Jakarta

361

Figure 2.
Comparison of rainfall for
five stations in the
Ciliwung watershed, and
waterlevel for three
stations between 2002 and
2007
DPM
1995-1996 2001-2002 2006-2007
17,3
Total rainfall for five stations (mm) ND 7,100 7,483.9
Maximum rainfall upstream (mm/day) ND 168.1 247
Maximum rainfall downstream (mm/day) ND 172 234.7
Average rainfall intensity (mm/day) ND 21.1 25.8
362 Average rainfall intensity upstream (mm/day)
Average rainfall intensity downstream (mm/day)
ND
ND
20.6
21.9
24.8
27.3
percent average rainy day ND 69.9 67.0
Duration rainy event (day) ND 121 88
Water level in Manggarai (cm) 970 1,050.0 1,061.0
Table I. Flood level in Bukit Duri (m) 1.7 2.3 3.4
Comparison between the Duration last dry season 5-7 months
last three flood events in Casualties 10 50 58-74
Jakarta (1996, 2002 and Flooded area (spatial estimation) (%) 20-30 40-50 60-70
2007): hydrological Displaced people 28,000 350,000 450,000
patterns and
consequences Sources: Badan Meteorologi dan Geofisika, Ciliwung Cisadane Project, and Tempo (2007).

Anthropogenic causes of increasing floods

A number of anthropogenic factors determine the explanation of such a difference. The
first lies in the uncontrolled growth of the urban areas, despite the existence of a
greenbelt in successive master plans since 1965 (Figure 1). Urbanization has
progressively waterproofed the surface and prevented water from infiltrating during
floods, causing increased direct runoff to the 13 rivers of Jakarta. Upstream, numerous
villas have been built as secondary residences in the past 50 years by the upper classes
of Jakarta, while a flourishing tea plantation has progressively settled on the main
slopes of volcanoes causing a huge reduction in the forested area (Figure 3).
Downstream, two processes explain this uncontrolled urbanization. First; urban
development (Steinberg, 2007; Firman, 1998), which has been promoted by the
successive governments since Soekarno in 1945, has led to the construction of high
buildings, which waterproofed the downstream area. More recently (in the last decade),
large shopping centers and upper class residences have progressively been replacing
traditional neighborhoods (kampungs) and reducing vegetated areas (Figure 4).
Secondly, the urban housing policy has played a role in causing a housing crisis, by
giving the private sector the key to build new residences without enough governmental
control (Leaf, 1991; Firman, 2004; Harsono, 1999). As a result, people expelled from
traditional kampungs and migrants from rural provinces, were forced to dwell in the
remaining vacant and often marginal places, e.g. on the river banks, along the railway
or near the seashore (Figure 5a). These illegal settlements are seen by the government
as the main cause for the increase in the magnitude of the flooding in Jakarta. This is
because housing progressively encroaches on the natural flood expansion area of the
rivers. However, if the role of housing in urban waterproofing has often been assumed
by Scientists (Parker, 1999; Few, 2003; Programme des Nations Unies pour le
Développement, 2004), it seems that illegal settlements are not the single major player
in explaining the increase in flood magnitude. It seems to be one factor among many
others. It is further impossible to firmly assess their real impact and contribution in
comparison to other physical and anthropogenic factors. Moreover, these poor and
illegal communities not only contribute to increase flooding hazards by their
Floods in Jakarta

363

Figure 3.
Urban growth upstream
and downstream
DPM
17,3

364

Figure 4.
Illegal settlement on the
river bank and risky
behavior

settlement, but also by some specific behavior. Indeed, they contribute to the poor
drainage of continental waters to the sea by throwing their waste directly into the river.
98 percent of respondents in Bukit Duri confessed that they are used to doing so into
the Ciliwung River (Figure 5b). Fast and non controlled urbanization is thus largely
recognized, in Jakarta as in other developing cities, as a major factor which emphasizes
disaster risks (Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement, 2004).

Victims’ vulnerability and observed coping mechanisms, in the face of the

2007 flooding episode
Although these poor and informal communities appear to share part of the responsibility
in the increasing of floods magnitude, they are also the main victims as they live in the
most affected districts and appear extremely vulnerable. They expose themselves to
floods by living within flooded areas near the rivers. During the latest floods, a lot of
people among these communities refused to evacuate their houses. In total, 58 (according
to BAKORNAS, the National Coordinating Board for the Management of Disaster) to 74
 Floods in Jakarta

365

Figure 5.
A multirisk
perception-behavior
system to take into
account

(according to Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) people died from

hypothermia, drowning, or electrocution. Hundreds of fragile makeshift houses built on
the riverbank by informal settlers were washed out by flood onslaughts and thousands
more were destroyed or heavily damaged. Indeed, flood-affected people have to cope with
harsh daily conditions which increase their vulnerability during flood occurrences. The
very high density of population (which sometimes reaches 18,000 inhabitants per km2)
and the narrow road network complicate evacuation operations. Furthermore, a large
proportion of the dwellings do not have a second floor, so that many of the people who
did not evacuate had to clamber onto their roofs for safety. Furthermore, flood victims
had to cope with poor hygienic conditions both during the floods and the rehabilitation
phase. Our observations show that they washed themselves and cleaned their dishes in
muddy floodwater. Most seldom washed their hands before eating, and had to face
stagnant water (where mosquitos flourished). The poor hygienic conditions made flood
victims vulnerable to water-borne diseases. In February and March 2007, the Ministry of
Health recorded outbreaks of Dengue hemorrhagic fever (378 patients, 13 deaths),
leptospirosis (112 patients, 4 deaths) and diarrhoea (1,066 patients, 20 deaths) (OCHA,
2007). These diseases are directly linked with lack of hygiene toward water.

Tracking the underpinning factors of vulnerability

One of our main objectives is to identify the deeper causes influencing the structural
factors of vulnerability and the array of coping strategies used by the flood victims.
These strategies can be risky and lead to people’s limited capacity to resist floods and
DPM their consequences. In other words, it is essential to understand the decision making
processes that lead poor people to adopt such behavior.
17,3 Two paradigms can be opposed within the framework of research about risks
related to natural hazard and about vulnerable people’s behaviors. The first one
concerns responses to natural phenomena (rare in time and extreme in magnitude at
human scale), according to a hazard-related logic. According to this dominant
366 paradigm in social science research, the main factor influencing behavior and
vulnerability is the low perception of the phenomenon and its associated risks (Kates,
1971; Burton et al., 1978). The second factor appeared in the 1970s, highlighting the
vulnerability of potential victims, or their susceptibility to be affected by a
phenomenon. People’s behavior is thus considered as constrained by structural, social,
cultural, economical, political and non hazard-related factors (Waddell, 1977; Torry,
1979; Hewitt, 1983; Cannon, 1994; Wisner, 1998; Gaillard, 2007). Vulnerability is thus
“intimately connected with the continuing process of underdevelopment recorded
throughout the world” (O’Keefe et al., 1976, p. 560).
For our case study, we have first analyzed the perception of risks related to floods
among these vulnerable communities of target district. Our results show that their level of
knowledge and perception of risks related to water was relatively high. Before migrating
to flood prone districts of Jakarta, (since nearly three quarters of respondents are
migrants), 68 percent of migrants respondents already knew that it was flooded annually.
Moreover, even if the material damages are their main concern and fear, drowning risks
and water-borne diseases are mentioned as possible consequence of floods by more than
45 percent of respondents. They are also fully aware of basic hygiene rules like washing
hands before eating, and boiling water until 5 to 20 min before drinking (WHO actually
recommends to boil the water “at least five minutes and preferably up to a period of
twenty minutes” (WHO, 2005), depending on altitude). Their experience of floods is
important since almost all of them have already experienced a flood event. They also have
good knowledge of the natural and human causes of floods. Problems of waste evacuation
are evoked by 33.3 percent of all respondents, and by 40 percent of Bukit Duri
respondents, and appear as the second cause of floods behind rainfall from upstream
(quoted by 50 percent of respondents). The third cause suggested by the interviewees to
explain flooding is the encroachment of settlements on river banks.
The behavior of flood victims emphasized in section 4 seems to be contradictory to
their accurate perception of risks. But if we try to look for deeper and daily structural
constraints, as the vulnerability paradigm suggests, the causes of this behavior seem
clear. Indeed, these people have to face many more risks in daily life, and the most
important one is not floods, but economic, social, and political ones. Even though
flooding is a seasonal phenomenon, they do not consider floods as a main source of
danger compared to others. 40 percent of the interviewees actually mentioned fires as
the principal danger against 25 percent for floods. There are thus three components of
risk that influence the actions and decisions of the people surveyed.
The first component is that economic is risk linked to poverty: the monthly income
rarely exceeds 40 euro per family (1.20 Euro per day per family), and the non-official
unemployment rate is quite high. The official figures point to a 15 percent
unemployment rate among the active population of Jakarta (Badan Pusat Statistik,
2007), but more than 35 percent of the employed Jakartanese have temporary jobs, and
this rate is much higher in informal districts. Furthermore, the means of production are
often at home, where they also have all their belongings (low use of banking systems
for savings). If those people leave their home during floods, they have to take the risk of
losing their means of production. This explains why almost 40 percent of the Floods in Jakarta
respondents preferred to stay at home and face the last flood and its associated
dangers, than risk losing everything if they left their homes. Furthermore, even though
they were aware of the possibility of being affected by floods before arriving in the
area, their first aim was to look for better jobs. Secondly they had no other choice.
Thirdly, it was cheaper in this location than anywhere else. They have “chosen” to
accept the danger of floods in their struggle against their daily poverty (Pelling, 1999). 367
The second component is social and societal risk that can also explain why informal
settlers are willing to stay in flood-prone districts. They do not want to move from a
social environment they progressively managed to re-create from their original
province in Jakarta. They want to keep their social place in the community and in their
family. Vulnerability is thus a social production (Few, 2003). Some structural
constraints of political origin can further explain their behavior in facing harsh
hygienic conditions. For the Jakarta government, informal settlers are in “illegal”
situation. They have no right to stay in their settlements because many of them have
no Jakartanese ID. Informal settlements are thus marginalized in relation to other
areas, especially in terms of access to resources and public services. The government
refuses to develop basic services in areas they plan to clear from settlement. Between
2000 and 2005, 63,676 people were evicted and 1,592,011 people were threatened with
expulsion in poor districts touched by some public-private partnership projects
(Harsono, 1999; the Urban Poor Consortium NGO). Informal settlers’ access to the
official drinking water network is very limited. Data from Palyja local consumers
agency (French private firm who markets cleanwater for west Jakarta) show that in
Bukit Duri RW12, only 9 percent of total households and 4.8 percent of flooded
households are connected to the official PAM Jaya cleanwater network (Perusahan Air
Minum Jaya, Indonesian official Drinking water agency). On the other hand, the private
sector (Palyja) and the government (PAM Jaya) have been observed as being “against
pro-poor water supply development” despite their declarations to the contrary (Bakker,
2007, p. 1). Therefore, people marginalized from official network have to search for
alternatives to get water, which are in most cases more expensive because they buy
water at the end of a long chain of intermediary. In Bukit Duri, a lot of people have
installed electric pumps. These are less expensive despite a low quality of water. But
during floods, authorities cut electricity to prevent electrocution. As all the pumps are
out of order, people have no other choice than to use dirty flood water (Figure 5d) thus
exposing themselves to water-borne diseases. Illegal inhabitants are also deprived of
any official waste management system. If they did not throw garbage directly into the
river, it could be more dangerous for them because garbage may cause, through vermin
and pests proliferation, outbreaks of leptospirosis (transmitted by rat) or bird flu
(transmitted by chicken). Throwing garbage in the river (the less dangerous place for
their health) can be seen as a coping strategy in the face of daily hardship, as well as
pumping water where it is (within soils and rivers).
The vulnerability of these people is thus materialized by their behavior, which is the
result of a social and economically related decision processes, rather than hazard
related processes. Many other case studies came up with the same findings
(Penning-Rowsell, 1996; Nigg, 1996).

Which official strategy for enhancing disaster management?

We have already pointed out that official policies consider the poor communities of
Jakarta’s flooded kampungs as largely responsible for floods, just after the main cause
DPM which is generally recognized as heavy rainfall. However, the official explanations
(especially given by the Jakarta’s Governor Sutiyoso) actually correspond to political
17,3 issues. The government policies actually reflect economic needs. They are also aimed at
eradicating poverty and giving Jakarta a modern face. During recent decades, the
government thus acceded to big commercial firms or real-estate agencies who wanted to
build new projects. This Urban evolution did not conform to green belt objectives imposed
368 by successive official Masterplans. Moreover, the local government does not blame elite
developments which have led to an almost total deforestation of the area upstream of the
Ciliwung Basin. Conversely, developing poor kampungs will not bring enough benefit to
the political elite. Since these communities are apparently partially responsible for floods, it
appears necessary, from the government’s point of view, first to educate them and
secondly to relocate them. The governmental strategy is thus hazard-focused and based on
a “development-induced displacement and resettlement or DIDR” (Oliver-Smith, 2001).
The first objective is to fight floods by controlling the hazards with structural
measures. The government engaged in large-scale irrigation work, construction of
dikes, canals (the East Flood Canal for instance) and dams to channel the rivers.
Ultimately it is supposed to cause an end to the expulsion of more than 250,000 people,
according to calculations based on official budget data and to the Urban Poor
Consortium. DIDR can thus be felt by evicted or threatened communities as an
“aggression of development” (Heijmans, 2004).
The second objective of the government is to make the poor population more
conscious of flood hazards and sanitation by awareness campaigns, considering floods
as the main risk these people have to face. Yet, those programs seem to be
inappropriate as risk perception is already high among flood victims.
The third goal is to remove people from the flooded illegal districts and to relocate
them into social housing (flats) in Jakarta, or to transmigrate them to the outer islands.
The first option usually fails because the cost of living in flats is too high (between 10
and 20 Euro per month). Similarly, the second strategy turns out to be ineffective
because transmigration programs do not consider the origin of the people and social
ties, which are very important.
Finally, in times of flooding, the government focuses on evacuating people and
trying to give them as much food and medicine, and as many blankets as possible. This
type of response proved to be quite insufficient to sustain the needs of the victims of
the 2007 flooding event. For example, Bukit Duri (RW12), which was one of the most
affected districts, did not get support from the government and people managed to
organize evacuation by themselves. Therefore, the hazard-focused policy of the
government of Jakarta fails to address the underlying causes of vulnerability (Figure 6).
Furthermore, they seem to fight poverty, by fighting poor people, not by helping them
to reduce daily constraints.

Outlooks
The 2007 flood-related disaster in Jakarta can be explained by anthropogenic factors
which enhance the natural flooding process of a meteorological or hydrological nature
(monsoonal climate, subsidence and topography, rivers network). Furthermore, the
poorest communities are those who suffer the most from floods. However, the behaviors
and coping strategies of these people do not result from a low risk perception but can be
explained by daily underpinning socio-economical and political constraints. Jakarta’s
flood victims are principally people who are geographically, socially, economically and
politically marginalized (even of all social categories of population suffered from floods).
 Floods in Jakarta

369

Figure 6.
Factors behind people’s
behavior and policy
making in facing flooding
in Jakarta, Indonesia

The official policy of the Jakarta government to face flooding does not address the deep
causes of vulnerability but rather emphasizes natural hazards. It focuses on technical
measures to control floods and public awareness campaigns to enhance an alleged low
perception of risk. Moreover, the government considers the poorest communities as partly
responsible for flooding and plans to conduct development-induced displacements and
resettlements (DIDR) for these districts. Such programs would cause a loss of local
knowledge and social relations, and degrade collective memory.
Some alternatives do exist for marginalized communities. These alternatives aim at
reducing vulnerability by tackling underpinning constraints. Some private
foundations sponsor local projects to reduce poverty (Clay et al., 2005). These
projects however hardly cover informal communities considered to be less motivated
and able to succeed. Furthermore, they often give the project leadership to political
elites and finally tend to “reproduce embedded distributions of power and
vulnerability” (Pelling, 1999, p. 249). Some NGOs challenge the governmental
strategy by developing an alternative power of resistance to DIDR (Oliver-Smith, 2001)
to help people in securing land tenure (The Urban Poor Consortium for instance). Other
NGOs develop community-based disaster risk reduction (CBDRR) programs. They
activate local informal networks and rely on local capacities and knowledge based on
experience. CBDRR enables the empowering of victims in the face of floods. It reduces
significantly the vulnerability rooted in the larger access to resources (Rahayu, 2003;
Shaw and Okazaki, 2004; Winayanti and Heracles, 2004; Yayasan IDEP, 2005; Bosher
et al., 2007; Texier et al., 2007). The choice of a local trusted leader could avoid
problems of embedding existing inequalities.
On the other hand, the government policy should focus on reducing structural
vulnerability. First, it is crucial to integrate community-based projects and local coping
mechanisms and knowledge into the official disaster management system, although
informal systems are strongly contextualized and thus can hardly be applied generally
(Waddell, 1983; Parker et al., 1998; Mercer et al., 2007). This local knowledge should be
recognized as a resource able to enhance people’s capacities (Chan, 1995; Chan and
DPM Parker, 1996; Wisner, 1998). Alternative stakeholders should be, in the same way, part
of the formal development agenda, which should not be anymore a “top-down
17,3 monologue” (Oliver-Smith, 2001). Secondly, it appears essential to consider
vulnerability mitigation within a global development framework (Schipper and
Pelling, 2006). While disasters tend to intensify inequalities, a concerted local (and not
national) strategy of management should aim at treating the specific case of illegal
370 kampungs through positive discrimination (Johnson et al., 2007).

Note
1. Height measured on the 5th February from the thalweg to the highest point reached by
floodwater. Or 5 meters from the river bank, compared to 3.5 meters in 2002 (according to
several inhabitants’ evidences and measures).

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Further reading
Badan Pusat Statistik (BPS) (2004), Sensus Penduduk 2000-2004, Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta,
available at: http://bps.jakarta.go.id
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a solution for solid waste problems in Jakarta, Indonesia”, Waste Management, Vol. 27,
pp. 1924-38.
Unilever (2004), Unilever Engaging with Community and Environment, Unilever, Jakarta.
Unilever (2006), Unilever Sustainability Report, Unilever, Jakarta.
Wisner, B., Blaikie, P., Cannon, T. and Davis, I. (2004), At Risk: Natural Hazards, People’s
Vulnerability and Disasters, Routledge, London.

Corresponding author
Pauline Texier can be contacted at: pauline.texier@paris7.jussieu.fr

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