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Scripture and Philosophy:
) Essays Honoring the Work and Vision of
) Fernando Luis Canale
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© 2016 by Adventist Theological Society Publications

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$ ISBN 978-0-9831147-2-7
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t! Edited by: Tiago Arrais, Kenneth Bergland, and Michael F. Younker
Cover Design: Sarah Lee (sarahlealee@gmail.com)
) ). Cover Artwork: Clay Witt, Sights Unseen : Burning Bush II
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ESSAYS HONORING THE WORK AND VISION OF )

J
FERNANDO LUIS CANALE .'!

)
)

)
)
Dedicated to
Fernando Canale
EDITED BY )
Tiag o Arrais, Kenneth Berg land, and Michael F. Younker )
)
) r
)
)
) Table of Contents From Metaphysics to Templephysics: Situating the Significance of
Fernando Canale's Contributions for the
~
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 'Christian Philosopher' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
) Michael F. Younker with Tiago Arrais and Kenneth Bergland J\.1ichaelF. Younker
)
Life Sketch of F ernando Canale ........... . ........ . ......... 4 Part II: On the Horizons of the Vision
) Silvia Canale Bacchiocchi
)
Reading as a Disclosure of the Thoughts of the Heart . ..... . ....... 261
Part I: Understanding the Vision Kenneth Bergland
)
) An Introduction to Canale' s Criticism of Theological Reason ......... 11 The Influence of Macro-Herrneneutical Assumptions Upon Biblical
Sven Fockner Interpretation: A Brief Evaluation of the Historical
) Grammatical Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ 295
) Divine Passibility, Analogical Temporality, and Theo-Ontology: Tiago Arrais
) Implications of a Canonical Approach ................... . .... 32
John C. Peckham Scripture Authorizing Doctrine: A Case Study from the
) Epistle to the Hebrews ............. . ..................... 320
) Hermeneutics of Doctrine and Theological Deconstruction: Kessia Reyne Bennett
1
The Contribution of Fernando Canale for Doctrinal Studies ....... 54
) Biblical Hermeneutics at the Onset of Christianity:
Adriani Milli Rodrigues
) A Comparison between the Alexandrian and Antiochene
Narrowing the Herrneneutical Circle: Schools of Interpretation ............................... . .. 337
)
Fernando Canale on Reason, Revelation, and Truth.. . .... . ...... 72 C. Adelina Alexe
) Zane Yi
) Luther in the Eucharistic Debates:
God's Involvement in Inspired-Biblical-Language in Selected Sola Scriptura or Divination of Man? ....................... 355
) Silvia Canale Bacchiocchi
Works ofVemPoythress and Fernando Canale ................. 93
) Iriann Marie Hausted
What Makes Humans Human? Personal Ontology in the Creation
)
Canale's Utilization of Phenomenology: Narrative of Day Six (Gen. 1:24-31) ......................... 382
) Analyzing its Problems and Perspectives ..................... 109 Marla A. Samaan Nedelcu
) Oliver Glanz
Philosophy, Theology, and Language:
) A Study ofCanale's Historiography ... . ........................ 133 Ludwig Wittgenstein and Fernando L. Canale ..... . ........... 408
) Rodrigo Galiza Moises Estrada

) PostmodernismandHeidegger's Critique ofModernity ............. 430

The Biblical Sanctuary Motif in Historical Perspective . . ........... 154
) Denis Kaiser · Christian Wannenmacher
)
)
)
)
 r
Velocity and Technique in the Contemporary Era:
Understanding the Mediatic Logic through Martin Heidegger . . . 461
Tales Tomaz
The Collateral Effects of the Delay of Jesus' Parousia on the
Message, Mission, and Worship of the Church ............ . . . . 475
Elmer A. Guzman
Selected Bibliography of Fernando Canale's Works ....... .. ....... 491
Compiled by Rodrigo Galiza
)
)
Introduction
)
)
by Michael F . Younker,
with Tiago Arrais and Kenneth Bergland )
)
Like many graduate students in theology who began their academic careers )
with undergraduate degrees that did not include much if any formal philosophical
training, I found the experience of encountering philosophical ideas both )
stimulating and· very challenging in the lectures and books of my Seminary )
professor, Fernando Canale. As most can probably testify who have entered into
a new technical field of study, the vocabulary and concepts one works with when
first entering specialized fields like academic philosophy can be intimidating.
Although after some time they eventually grow to seem so natural we've almost
forgotten what it was like to not understand them, we usually can never forget those J
first few weeks when it appeared as if we were suddenly, and without practice,
standing on the edge of the high dive at a circus with the escape ladder pulled )
away-the experience of feeling that breeze pushing you while seeing only the now )
very small looking pool down below can be exhilaratingly .terrifying! How one
could ever train their body (and mind!) to master the numerous contortions a high )
diver must make as they rapidly descend toward the water, and then manage to }
penetrate the water's surface with a minimal splash, can appear as nothing short of
miraculous (I share this as someone who resisted jumping off a dive board ofmuch )
lower heights as a youngster).
)
This illustration has, of course, been chosen with an aspiring philosopher' s
intentionality. As with the high diver, if one wishes to smoothly: enter the water,
and appreciate the depth their pool of water provides to absorb their landing,
)
painstaking practice and timing is necessary to prevent "flat-landing" on one's
stomach, which has been known to sting many an amateur! It so happens that life )
often challenges people with profotµ1d questions, placing them time and again in
positions ofunsafe heights. The pool ofphilosophy contains very deep water, and
is adequate to handle the task _of absorbing their fall, but to enter into it smoothly
requires both perseverance and probably a few painful landings from the height of
many intermediate jumps. As such, the deep waters of philosophy are not in
themselves the problem. Shallow water wouldn't suffice to absorb our many
questions about life and reality, and to land in shallow water after our mind falls
through life's many questions would feel the same as landing on pavement. .)
Disappointing, if not fatal. The deep water is there to help make a safe landing )
possible, but to enter the water smoothly requires some mental and
phenomenological (and perhaps physical, I believe in a strong mind-body )
connection!) exercise along the way.
)
The above said, and after having made a few half-way successful attempts from
intermediate heights, it didn't take too much effort on Canale's part to convince me )
)
) •
)
)
) 2 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
) that philosophy influences theology in very profound ways, and that Scripture is
very capable of addressing the issues. I'm very grateful for his work that has
enabled myself and others to think more deeply about theology through an
) awareness of the concerns that philosophy has raised. But that didn't mean all the
questions I had were answered, nor did it mean that the quest to communicate the
) significance of Canale's forays (by himself and other students of his) into
) philosophy were a completed product, as he will readily aclmowledge. It is the
hope that this book will encourage others to continue his and our quest to "live
) philosophically" through the Word. It is a lifestyle that we have found ourselves,
oftentimes.joyfully, sometimes anxiously, immersed within, and we are glad to
)
invite others to end their journey within the refreshingly deep pools of the Bible.
) This volume had, as may be expected by aspiring philosophers, an interesting
beginning in itself. A couple of years ago, a smaller group ofus were inspired to
)
study together for a few different reasons. All ofus had already been inspired by
) Canale's contributions, but as time went on, and Canale's retirement from formal
teaching at Andrews University took place, we realized our own conversations and
) projects could be organized into a work dedicated to him. In other words, it was
) "actual philosophizing" along Canale's lines of research which first initiated this
project, and we are very pleased that it could grow into a festschrift in honor ofDr.
) Canale.
) The undertaking of this project saw many hands involved which must not be
neglected. I would like to thank the indispensable efforts ofKenneth Bergland, who
) at times single handedly conquered the challenge of organizing our meetings (with
his many busy fellow students!) and oversaw the editorial peer review process, of
)
Tiago Arrais, whose humor and encouragement to us all, and guidance and counsel
) into the "mind" of Canale, helped focus the overall direction of this book's •
structure, and also of our fellow contributors Oliver Glanz and John C. Peckham,
) more diving attempts we make, the closer the pool's pleasant water appears each
who are presently ably carrying on Canale's passion for philosophy as professors
) in the lecture halls ofthe Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary at Andrews
University. Another name of note would be that of Ed Zinke, who has encouraged
) and sponsored the publication branch of the Adventist Theological Society, with
) whose cooperation this project came to light. Of course, we the editors would also
like to thank every contributor ofthis volume for the interest in and commitment to
) scholarship of the highest caliber as they seek to understand, critique, and expand
the vision.
)
Below you will find essays by a number of former students and others who
) have lmown Canale and have, in one way or another, been motivated by his
contributions. Starting as a student-led study group, we ultimately decided to focus
) specifically on the inclusion of 'next generation' scholars, demonstrating the
) continuing passion for doing biblical philosophy that Canale has inspired. That
said, we thank his fellow scholars and peers. We are also pleased to have brought
) in Silvia Canale Bacchiocchi, Fernando's daughter, to our project, to offer not only
)
)
)
INTRODUCTION 3
a biographical outline of Canale's life (a philosopher is always who he has been),
but also to contribute her own excellent chapter.
This volume has been divided into two general sections. Although there is
some overlap in themes and coverage between the two, the first one focuses
especially on "understanding" Canale's vision, through explanations concerning
what it is he has uncovered and accomplished about how philosophy has influenced
theology, as well as including essays exploring some of the technical issues he has
engaged, such as phenomenology. Some of the essays aim to offer constructive
criticism, while others provide further support for his research by exploring areas
he has not yet had the time to engage himself, such as further historiographical
research and more support for the center ofhis philosophical emphasis, the biblical
Sanctuary. Some comparative chapters are also included to help position his work
amidst the rest of the scholarly world.
The second section emphasizes individuals whose work represents efforts to
explore the "horizons" ofCanale's work. For some, this means building upon his
foundation, while for others, this means exploring the world ofphilosophical issues
from within the themes Canale himselfhas. The diversity of topics addressed, from
ecclesiology to humanity, from hermeneutics and technology to ethics, illustrates
the depth and breadth of what it is philosophers can engage in as they explore the
frontiers oflmowledge as Christians.
To conclude, I'm sure Canale would accept my analogy that the Bible is the
deep pool which awaits our fall through life's many questions. It is worth the many
diving efforts we attempt, from any height, as we test its depths and purity. It alone
can provide satisfactory answers to our questions. On the other hand, of course, if
we approach it carelessly, not desiring to learn to "think" within its confines, failing
to train our minds and bodies to cooperate with the realities it declares, it may
appear- to provide a very flat landing indeed. Of course the reverse holds true. The
time we jump in.
Canale's continuing passion remains encouraging us all to jump into Scripture
with a philosophical mind. He has done his best to provide us with guidance on a
few of the mental twists and turns our minds must make as we come face-to-face
with the realities the Word declares. His ongoing project of encouraging a purely
biblical approach to penetrate into the temple of philosophy continues, including,
I trust, in the present collection of essays.
Michael F. Younker
Beirut, Lebanon
March, 2016
 r-··
Life Sketch of Fernando Luis Canale
by Silvia Canale Bacchiocchi
Like all things that occur in the course of history, Fernando Luis Canale was
born through the providence of God. And, like most births, this would necessitate
the bringing together of bis two progenitors, Nelly Block and Elio Canale, in
wedded union. Their story, which is interwoven with bis, begins our account ofbis
life.
Elio Mario Luis Canale came from a Roman Catholic family who, at the tum
of the century, immigrated to Argentina from Italy's Piedmont region. Little Elio
was a musically gifted child who, at the tender age of four, was already performing
Mozart piano sonatas and popular songs in packed concert halls across the country.
Though much ofbis life was on the stage, Elio also studied medicine and enjoyed
a double career as doctor and concert pianist-establishing both a piano conservatory
and medical clinic.
Like most concert pianists, Elio' s music was bis religion, the piano bis god. He
gave little thought to Catholicism until the momentous day when he observed an
attractive midwife walking through bis medical clinic. He soon learned her name
was Nelly Block and that she belonged to some novel religion, more so, her father
was one of its pastors! Nelly's father, Gottfried Block, was an impassioned and
well-respected Seventh-day Adventist pastor, a German who had emigrated from
Russia during the First World War. Gottfried insisted that any suitors to bis four
daughters be instructed in the Adventist faith and, should they desire to marry one
ofbis damsels, must become baptized members. It seemed a small sacrifice to Elio
to switch religions in order to gain the hand of the gracious and beautiful Nelly.
And so the two cerem onies, baptism and ensuing wedding, were easily effected.
Which brings us to the warm spring day of September 15, 1945 when, in the
city of Cordoba, a b_a by named Fernando Luis Canale made bis grand entrance. It
is told among the family that upon bis very first birthday little Fernandito walked
up to the front of the church and clearly pronounced: God loves a cheerful giver,
as he dropped his birthday offering in the plate. As little Fernando grew up, bis life
revolved around piano classes (which he loathed), public school (which he
tolerated), playing with bis cousins in his Nonno 's pool (which he absolutely loved),
and attending all church activities (which he enjoyed well enough, except for the
appalling lack of attractive girls).
Indeed, Nelly took great pains to ensure her two boys, Fernando and Juan
Carlos (who was five years bis junior), were front and center at all church functions.
Yet she was alone in this commitment as it was soon evident that her husband's
conversion had been on paper only, not in mind or heart. So while Elio allowed
Nelly to take their boys to church, he him.self would have none ofit. Instead, while
they prepared for church, he would quietly exit the home and head for the store to
BIOGRAPHY OF F ERNANDO C ANALE 5 }
)
buy bis fresh bread. Though saddened, Nelly was faithful in taking the boys to all
church functions and in maintaining the fear ofthe Lord in the home through family )
worship. She would also take the boys to visit their grandfather in the province of
Entre Rios. Young Fernando always enjoyed his weekend visits to the rural town )
of Crespo, visiting bis affectionate Groj3papa, and listening to bis moving sermons. )
And so bis days passed, most of them to the soundtrack of Chopin, Mozart and
Beethoven filling the house and, during concert seasons, also filling Fernando's )
dreams as his father practiced through the night and into the early hours of the )
morning.
A significant trial came to Fernando's life at the age of fifteen when he )
discovered that his father was having an affair with one ofhis piano students. This
)
carried on for some time until the teenage boy had had enough. He approached bis
mother and strongly urged that she give her husband an ultimatum: He must choose
between the family and bis girlfriend. Sadly, Elio chose the latter option and soon
)
moved out of the home. Decades later, near the end ofbis life, Elio ran into Nelly
at a train station and confided: I made the wrong choice, you had what I needed.
Whether he was referring to the family or to the God that they served will one day
)
be made clear. Sadly, Fernando and Juan Carlos, who was ten at the time of the
separation, would live out their lives in a divided home, soon after with the addition
of a half-sister, Lucy Canale. Angry and heartbroken, Fernando vowed that he
would never do this to bis future family, but promised to always remain faithful to
the wife he would one day marry. · )
Trying to make sense ofthis tragedy, Fernando held on to the promise that "All
things work for the good of those who love God" (Rom 8:28). But what good )
could come out ofhis father's leaving them? Then a thought struck him. His father
)
had always insisted that his sons must become doctors, like himself (Apparently
Elio realized there was little livelihood-and perhaps even less talent-for bis boys
in the musical arena.) As such, Fernando had always assumed he would take on the
family profession., he would study medicine and become a doctor like bis father.
But now that bis father had in large part abandoned bis paternal responsibilities and
rights, another father figure took prominence, that · of Gottfried Block, bis
)
affectionate and godly Groj3papa. Through Gottfried's and his m other's faithful
lives and teachings, Fernando was beginning to be drawn to his heavenly Father. )
And though bis natural bent was more earthly than divine, he now began t9
contemplate the possibility of serving God in a lifelong ministry. Maybe, just )
maybe, he thought, the door that my earthlyfather is closing is making room for my
J
heavenly Father to open another one. Maybe God wants to use this opportunity so
that I, like Groj3papa, can serve Him in ministry-something myfather would never
have permitted. As Fernando mused, another thought came to mind.
Providentially, during a camp meeting the previous summer, bis eyes had rested
J
upon the lovely Mirta Collins. Mirta, whose father was a pastor and president of )
a conference in northwest Argentina, not only encouraged Fernando to study
J
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)
)
) 6 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
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theology, but her mere presence at the college created an added incentive for
Fernando to move to Entre Rios.
)
So in I 963 empowered by the belief that God had a purpose for his life in
) ministry, Ferna~do began to study theolo~ at River Plate Co~lege, in the rur~l town
of Puigari, Entre Rios. Unfortunately, his father had made it clear that neither of
) his sons would ever be menial pastors, and although not present to assert his wishes,
he was able to withdraw his financial support. Without his father' s financial
assistance, Fernando had to pay his own way. So, during the next four years, the
) popular and wealthy city boy could be seen on campus cleaning bathrooms, pulling
) weeds, and making the rounds to collect the town's trash. This alone was a
noteworthy education!
) Though his mind and soul were stirred by the biblical truths he uncovered
during his theological studies, Fernando's heart was still not fully committed to
)
pastoral work. He never gave this issue much heed believing that, as some pastors
) had assured him, the call will come. However, by the third year of his seininary
studies a professor announced to the class, If you're not assured of your call to
) ministry and aren't completely committed, we don 't need you. Ifthere is anything
) else you would rather do, go do that instead! Fernando was shaken. Though his
heart was not in pastoral work, he knew of nothing else that interested him. In
) desperation he sought the advice ofWerner Vyhmeister, director oftheology at the
) university, who, to his great relief, suggested the much more palatable option of
serving God in a teaching ministry.
) And so in December of 1966, at the age of2 1, Fernando decided not to go into
the pastoral ministry but to switch gears and focus on a teaching career instead.
)
Most providentially, that very year the college began a program in philosophy and
) pedagogy. This was very attractive to Fernando, who threw himselfheadlong into
another four-year degree. When Elio heard his son was moving away from theology
) into a less offensive career, he offered to pay any remaining debts from his
) studies-but room and board fees only; he still refused to give a dime towards any
debt relating to his son's theological studies. Another notable event that
) December- more joyous than his father's renewed support or even the excitement
) of his new studies-was Fernando's marriage to Mirta Collins. His high school
sweetheart would now become his strongest supporter and lifelong friend.
j Now a newlywed and fledgling professor, Fernando began teaching theology
classes in Greek and Introduction to the Bible while pursuing his philosophical
)
studies. Shortly into the program it became evident he possessed both skill and
) passion for philosophy. Noting this, several ofhis teachers, who much preferred to
teach pedagogy and psychology, gladly handed off their philosophy classes to their
) precocious pupil. When the time came for Fernando to teach metaphysics the
) teachers cautioned him: you must teach only Seventh-day Adventist metaphysics!
Just what this entailed, they had no idea, but they had faith their talented student
) would figure it out. Fernando was definitively on unchartered ground!
)
)
)
BIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE 7
In 1970, with eight years of study and several years of teaching under his belt,
Fernando assumed that upon his graduation he would be offered a full-time teaching
position at the college. Instead he was told to pack up his little fainily (Mirta and
one-year-old son, Oscar) and move to Uruguay. There he spent one year as
assistant pastor in Montevideo, and two years as district pastor in CoIonia Suisa (the
first SDA church in Uruguay). It seems God knew that this academic egghead
needed a good dose of earthly reality that only the daily contact with a broad and
colorful spectrum ofGod's creation could offer. Among other things, Fernando saw
his knowledge of philosophy being put to good use, particularly when faced with
giving Bible studies to Marxists and atheists! But more than this, he confirmed that
philosophy was not an ethereal acadeinic idealization, but necessary for and evident
in every daily thought and action. Indeed, those years and people left their mark on
Fernando, and it was with a deep sense of love and gratitude that he left his
congregation, cherishing their gift of a beautifully framed portrait of Jesus which
hangs in his home to this day.
After three years of fieldwork, Fernando was called back to his preferred
acadeinic setting, and from January 1974 to December of 1978 he taught .
philosophy full time at River Plate. Two years into teaching he began to look into , ~
nearby postgraduate programs in philosophy and discovered one a few hours away
at the Catholic University of Santa Fe. Three times a week, after a busy day's
teaching, Fernando and two friends would hop into his Volkswagen bug and drive
three hours to the neighboring province of Santa Fe. For two years they did this, . i
often meeting with their professors-in typical philosophical fashion-in one ofthe
downtown cafes.
During his studies Fernando discovered that throughout the history of
philosophy and theology, ontology had been interpreted through the lens of Greek
dualism and timelessness. He was also excited to discover that Martin Heidegger
presented a novel way of interpreting ontology free of Greek presuppositions.
While he was making these breakthroughs, an opportunity arose for him to move
to the United States and study theology at Andrews University. Usually, the
University required overseas students to complete an MDiv program before
beginning a PhD, but Werner Vyhmeister (who had previously encouraged
Fernando towards a teaching career and was now serving as professor at Andrews),
was petitioning to have the theology students from Argentina enter directly into the
PhD program. Dr. Vyhmeister's strategy was a clever one. He sent Fernando's
transcripts, with his ten years of study in theology and philosophy, to-various
universities in Europe and North America, several ofwhich accepted Fernando into
their PhD programs. Dr. Vyhmeister then presented these acceptance letters to
Gerhard Hase! (Andrew University's doctoral director) who proceeded to grant the
change in protocol. Yet instead of being glad at this opportunity, Fernando was
hesitant to go to Andrews, preferring instead to stay and complete his philosophy
studies at Santa Fe. Fortunately, Mirta was insistent and convinced her husband
 r ·-
)
)

8 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCID BIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE 9 )

that this opportunity might not !mock twice. Fernando reluctantly agreed and they
began to pack their bags. . . . .
And so on the day after Christmas, 1978, Fernando and his little family (this
time including 6 year~old daughter, Silvia) flew to Chicago. Fernando threw
himself headlong into his doctoral studies at Andrews University working diligently
to learn English (as well as Hebrew) so that he could maximize his class time.
During this time he explored the nature of time and timelessness as primordial
presuppositions that define all reality, including God's very being. Fernando
realized that everything in theology-as well as life-hinges on whether God is
viewed as timeless or as analogically temporal ( encompassing time.and history yet
transcending beyond it). Traditional Catholic and Protestant theology supported the
timeless version. But what did the Bible teach? This presented an existential crisis
in Fernando's life, one which he struggled with for many months and dared not
share even with Mirta: If his studies proved that the Bible supported a timeless
view of being (as opposed to a historical view) he must leave the Adventistfaith.
Those next months were prayer-filled ones as God led Fernando in his search for
truth, reminding him, among other things, of Oscar Cullmann's work which
presented a temporal New Testament God. Finally, on a sunny day in April, 1983,
Fernando defended his dissertation entitled: "A Criticism of Theological Reason:
Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions." With relief and gratitude
he celebrated with Raoul Dederen, Gerhard Hasel, and Fritz Guy who had helped
guide his research. One other notable person at Fernando's defense was Catholic
theologian, priest, and later Cardinal Avery Dulles, who was likewise
congratulatory. But the greatest reward for Fernando was not the completion ofhis
PhD or graduating summa cum laude, it was that he had vindicated the only
denomination that teaches the biblical view of ontology. Now he could remain in
the beloved church of his dear Groj3papa, as he continued to serve God and His
church.
A couple of months after his defense, Fernando packed up the family and
returned to River Plate in Argentina. From 1983-1985 he taught philosophy while
writing the thesis that completed his philosophy degree from the Catholic University
in Santa Fe. During this time, Andrews University extended an offer for him to
return, this time as a seminary professor. With gratitude to God for His generous
providence, Fernando and his family moved back to Berrien Springs, Michigan, in
the fall of 1985.
For the next thirty years Fernando engaged in full-time teaching at Andrews
University's seminary, seeking to affirm his students, and the church at large, in the
principle of so/a Scriptura. He has written many articles and authored several
books along the same lines. In 2013 he received the Siegfried Horn Award for
Excellence in Research and retired later that same year. ' Though now retired,
Fernando is still at Andrews University and as busy as ever, advising his doctoral
students, writing and researching, and working on several committees, including the
)
SDA Bible Commentary committee and his dear Adventist Sola Scriptura Research
Group (ASSRG). )
The entire aim of Fernando Canale's life has been to encourage his students
and the church to "live by every word that proceeds from the mouth of God." )
Particularly in these days ofeasy ecumenical dialogue, he prays the Holy Spirit will )
awaken the church to the necessity of adhering to and advancing the sola Scriptura
principle. In order to be taken seriously by the thinking world at large, Canale J
believes the Adventist church must construct a biblical system ofthought that rivals )
that built by Roman Catholicism. Dr. Canale sees this as not only doable, but
essential to the survival of Adventism and the success of the biblical gospel )
commission. Just as the Great Controversy began as a logistical combat between )
truth and error, between the Word of God and its false interpretation by created
beings, so must the vindication of God's character happen on that same scale, but
applying a correct interpretation of the basic presuppositions of thought (being,
knowledge, God, mankind, the cosmos, and the principle ofunity), that upholds and . )
integrates every truth claim in Scripture. J
Dr. Canale believes that the Adventist movement arose as a vision generating
a systematic theology, but this foundational role was soon forgotten and the )
Adventist identity watered down as the leadership began to seek commonality with
other Protestant faiths. As such, the task at band, according to Dr. Canale, involves
the deconstruction (biblical scrutiny) of current religious tradition- including
Adventist tradition-and construction of a biblical system that upholds every )
teaching of Scripture in a coherent and persuasive system of thought. And it is in
this spirit that the current work seeks to honor and engage the thought and teachings )
of Dr. Fernando Canale.
)
J
)
)

J
)
 r
)
)
)
An Introduction to Canale's Criticism of
) Theological Reason
)
) Sven Fockner
i
r
)
)
AI; a student of theology, I had two things in common with many of my
classmates. First, we all had that awe-inspiring, dark purple book on our shelves.
Second, none of us had read it. A Criticism of Theological Reason1 can be an
) intimidating read. It is highly specialized and-as always with philosophical
) works-uses its own microcosm of technical language. I agree that "there is no
shallow end to the philosophical pool,"2 and I am convinced that nothing will be
) able to replace the labor of repeatedly plowing through Canale's dissertation.
) Part I: Nevertheless I think that it is possible to provide a sketch ofthe broad strokes of the
arguments presented therein, thus providing a framework that will facilitate clearer
) understanding, especially for the novice reader. This is the purpose of the present
) Understanding the chapter.
·1-
Introduction
)
)
Vision When Immanuel Kant was awakened from his dogmatic slumber by Locke,
Hume and Bacon, he found himself situated between two differing philosophical
approaches. Rationalism, on the one hand, held that truth or knowledge could be
)
attained through reason alone, without the help of experience. For rationalists like
Leibniz, Wolff or the pre-critical Kant, metaphysical systems were therefore
possible. Empirism, on the other hand, denied that there is anything in the mind that
) was not previously in the senses. Truth or knowledge can only come through
) experience. It is impossible to go beyond (meta) experience (physics).3 These
opposing claims inspired Kant to step back and examine the limits ofhuman reason,
) to see what it can legitimately claim to know.
In a similar manner, Canale was awakened by Heidegger from his dogmatic
)
slumber. In his classes Canale often recounted how he had learned, accepted, and
) taught theology from evangelical textbooks, thereby unknowingly adhering to what
he later found to be an unbiblical timeless understanding of God. At first, a timeless
) God doesn't sound so wrong after all. Doesn't the Bible say that time doesn't
) matter for God (e.g. Ps 90:4; 2 Pet 3:8)? And how could he be omniscient if not
because he is outside time? If you think it through however- which theologians
) like Augustin, Aquinas, Calvin and others have done-you come up with surprising

1
Fernando L. Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness As
) Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1983).
2
j P. F. Strawson, Analysis and Metaphysics: An Introduction to Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992), vii.
3
) Hans Joachim St5rig, Kleine Weltgeschich_te der Philosophie, Auflage, 4th ed.
(Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2003), 445.
Ji
)
 r ·
!, t' )

12
I )

i
SVEN FOCKNER CANALE'S CRITICISM OF 'THEOLOGICAL REASON 13 )

conclusions. A God who is outside of time cannot change. If you think this is What Canale wished to demonstrate through his analysis of the structure of )
biblical (<:f. Mal 3:6), consider that acting at a certain moment is a form of change. reason in the first part of his dissertation, is that knowledge is inevitably shaped by )
And so is speaking. A timeless God cannot act or even decide. And neither can you, the object and the subject. Kant would agree, but for him, the shaping happens
really. Because God's judgment will not take place at the end of the world, it through categories or conditions which are a priori (i.e. universal and necessary), )
eternally exists outside of time, just like God. No matter what you think you are like substance and plurality or time and space. Canale, on the other hand, would )
deciding, in the end you are only heading towards God's predestined decision. So argue that the interpretation ofreason through the subject happens spontaneously.
' .. 'i much for freedom of will. 1 By this he means that the subject has a choice-be it an unconscious one-the )
.;.!:! '1 •1 The timeless view was so predominant in the history of thought, that few
realized there could be an alternative. Heidegger4 was the one who opposed
t
r
outcome ofwhich is not predetermined. Where Kant .s aw no need or possibility of
a critique, because there is no human faculty to know God a priori, Canale attempts
I' Hl ( ·i
timeless ontology most prominently. Thus awakened, Canale faced a wide spectrum
't to level the field and put theological reason on the same plane as practical or pure
)
)
of theological controversy. Among the many differences, the contrast between on reason-which, according to him, also do not function a priori, but are in need of
the one hand Adventism and the writings of Ellen G. White and on the other hand "· a primordial presupposition. This prepares the way for a criticism ofreason on .t he J
l
IF ~ :ii
classical theology became more and more prominent to him..5 So he set out to
~xplore the limits ofreason. Not pure reason though, but what he calls theological 1
basis of a choice made by the subject.9 In the case of Christian theological reason,
Canale argues that reason needs to be interpreted from the viewpoint of Scripture.
)

reason-that is, reason as it is used in theological judgments. The fact that the title This delineates the two ' aspects of his dissertation, which in my view are J
i,,'! '·
·! :-
:;·,ti'
of his dissertation alludes to the monumental critical work of Kant indicates that
Canale was aware of the size of the task he had set for himself
So how does Canales work relate to Kant's? In a simplified manner, one could
say that Kant's critique of pure reason answers the question "What can I know?"
!
:!
t
essential for understanding Canale's endeavor. First is his analysis of the structure
of reason, which establishes the importance of the primordial presupposition.
Second is his exegesis of Exodus 3 and 6, which leads to Canale's specific
interpretation of the primordial presupposition. In the following paragraphs I will
J
outline his approach to both of these aspects and only briefly comment on his J
If }:ii, His critique ofpractical reason answers the question "What should I do?" The third
ofKant' s big questions "What can I hope?" touches upon the history, future and the ?
I overview of the history of thought.
II'
)
('/
I
meaning oflife.6 Yet this last question was not answered with a systematic criticism
of (historical or) theological reason. Instead, Kant concluded his critical work with The Critical Task )
I . the critique ofjudgment, in which he discussed aesthetics and teleology. The reason Contrary to atheist propaganda it is impossible to do theology without the use
f i
was not a lack of interest in the third question-he did develop a philosophy of of reason. Even a theological construction that appears to be unreasonable was not J
history and religion7--but Kant's conviction that there are only three faculties constructed without it. Because theology is more than a mere repetition of Bible J
j' '' within the human mind capable of working without experience and therefore verses, it cannot avoid thinking. And as soon as it starts to use forms of thought it
j : worthy of a transcendental criticism. 8 has entered into the realm of philosophy, because philosophy is-among other J
'I .' things-the study of reason and knowledge. If one says, for example, that God
. I:
,$ :, really exists, one has to have a concept of what it m eans to be, to exist. What one
• Martin Heidegger, Sein Und Zeit (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2006). means by the word "is," is a question that was traditionally answered by )
II, s There were of course other proponents of a temporal understanding of God outside
philosophy. Even the exegetes, as Hegel stressed in the first half of the nineteenth
I,, of Adventism, like Oscar Cullmann, Christus Und Die Zeit: Die Urchristliche Zeit- Und
century, reflect during the process ofinterpretation, though most are unaware ofit. 10
',:
1:,
:,
Geschichtsauffassun, 2nd ed. (Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1948). But these Canale
initially rejected, whereas he could not reject Ellen G. White. Nevertheless through reflection they involve in their exegesis categories ofthought )
I:i 6

7
Otfried Hoffe, Immanuel Kant (C. H. Beck, 2007), 246.
The central works on history are Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan
'ii Purpose, Conjectural Beginning of Human History and The Contest of Faculties. His
,.:, philosophy ofreligion is spelled out in Religion within the Limits ofReason Alone.
• "For all faculties or capacities of the soul can be reduced to three, which cannot be
11·;::: any further derived from one common ground: the faculty of knowledge, the feeling of
,I· pleasure and pain, and the faculty ofdesire. For the faculty of knowledge the understanding
' I'
is alone legislative.... For the faculty of desire, as a higher faculty according to the concept
111:;
of freedom, the Reason (in which alone this concept has a place) is alone a priori
·' legislative.-Now between the faculties of knowledge and desire there is the feeling of
pleasure, just as the judgment is intermediate between the Understanding and the Reason.
that were formed by philosophy . Hegel also stated that for this reason theology has
always been dependent on philosophy. 11 J
of pure judgment, and of pure reason, which faculties are called pure because they are j
legislative a priori" (Immanuei Kant, The Critique ofJudgment, trans. Bernard J.H., 2nd. ed. J
(London: Macmillan, 1914), 16-17).
9
Yet it is not a transcendental criticism, i.e. an inquiry into the conditions of the )
possibility of theological knowledge. Rather it is a criticism of the role which reason plays )
in theology conditioned upon the primordial presupposition.
10
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Werke in 20 Biinden Mit Registerband (Frankfurt J
am Main: Suhrkamp, 1986), 14:25.

~
I·, 1 . 11
... The critique ofpure reason .. . consists ofthree parts; the critique ofpure understanding, Ibid., 12:45.
:,i
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t J~:. J
)
 ,,
) r
)
)
) 14 SVEN FOCKNER
) A look into history seems to confirm the impression that theologians rarely
reflect independently upon the fundamental questions. Many have taken the
) foundational basis of their work from philosophical systems, often without any
) critical reflection. 12 Since the method always influences the result of one's work,
some go as far as to say that Christian theology is what it is today because of Greek
) philosophy. 13 The problem connected with that fact is that the Greek concept of
reality from which their theory of cognition was derived is different from the
)
concept of the Jewish Bible and the apostolic writings, which were supposed to be
) the main authority for Christian theology, especially in its early stages. 14 The
biblical statement "God created the heavens and the earth" means something totally
) different if God is defined as the Platonic One and the earth is seen as a mere
) material appearance of eternal ideas, which are taken to be the true realities behind
the appearances. But not only the objects of theological thought (God and the
) universe) but also the basic tool, namely thinking itself, is shaped in a very specific
way.is
) needs to be the meaning of something and meaningful for someone. This cognitive
Consequently, if the biblical writings are being thought about with Greek
) reason and taken to refer to a Greek reality, the true meaning of Scripture might be
lost. For Protestant Christians who hold a high view of the Bible, the necessity of
) finding a biblical way of thinking is obvious. If reason plays a major role in
) theology, the question of the nature, structure, and functioning of reason needs to
be addressed in order to enable theology to use reason without importing an alien
body of thought.
) Canale sets out to demonstrate the relativity of reason through a
) idea, which goes back to Husserl, is to go to the things themselves and describe them as they
) 12 See for example Wol:fhart Pannenberg, ''Die Aufuahme Des Philosophischen
) Gottesbegriffes Als DogmatischesProblem DerFriihchristlichen Theologie," ZeitschriftFur
)
)
Kirchengeschichte 70, no. 1 (1959): 12- 14.
13 Especially at the beginning of the 19th century, this philosophic influence was
harshly criticized. Both Ritschl and Harnack held that, through the intrusion ofmetaphysics
into the revealed religion, Christianity was distorted. See Albrecht Ritschl, Theologie Und
Metaphysik: Zur Verstandigung Und Abwehr (Bonn: Marcus, 1881), 42; Adolf Harnack,
) 17
LehrbuchDer Dogmengeschichte, 3rd ed. (Freiburg i.B.: J.C.B. Mohr, 1894), 1:596-601.
14 Gerhard von Rad, Oscar Cullman, and Karl Liiwith all emphasized that, as one
J example, the biblical conception of history as a linear movement towards an eschaton is
) markedly different from the Greek cyclical conception ofhistory in which everything returns
to its origin and starts anew. Cf. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, vols. 1 and 2
) (Peabody, MA: Prince Press, 2005), II: 106-119; Cullmann, Christus Und Die Zeit. Die
Urchristliche Zeit- Und Geschichtsaujfassung, 43-52; Karl Liiwith, Weltgeschichte Und
Heilsgeschehen: Die Theologischen Voraussetzungen Der Geschichtsphilosophie (Stuttgart:
J.B. Metzler, 2004), 14-16.
) 15 If the true reality is found behind the material world, reason, in order to have any
) knowledge at all, needs to be able to lay hold of that hidden reality. Therefore, reality,
whether present or past (history), which only deals with the appearances, is totally devalued
) as a source of knowledge. Truth can be found only in the ideas. See Julian Marias, History
ofPhilosophy (New York, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1967), 4 7-48.
J
)
CANALE'S CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON 15
"phenomenological analysis of the act of knowing."16 In developing his critical
analysis ofthe formal structure ofreason, Canale is aware that what he is describing
is not concrete but abstract. He explains: "In other words, the structure ofreason is
never given by itself alone--as if one could find reason's systematic 'functioning'
detached from all systematic 'content'-but it is only co-given in any actual system
ofmeaning." 17 Reason is never empty; it always does something, always constitutes
meaning. Nevertheless, Canale thinks one can phenomenologically abstract its
structure.
The Constitution of Meaning
Subject and Object
The logos which is a constituent of theo-logy is defined by Canale as "the
realm ofmeaning, which includes everything that is connected with the constitution
ofmeaning in general." 18 The most basic condition for any meaning is the existence
oftwo independent sides, a subject and an object. 19 In other words, meaning always
j
<
relationship is knowledge, the constitution ofan image of the object in the subject.
Concerning the structure of this relationship, classical thought assumed that the
I
subject is merely receptive,2° which means that knowledge is determined wholly by,
16
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 25. As a concept of method
f phenomenology "does not describe the 'what' of the object of philosophical investigation,
I
}
but the 'how' of this inquiry" (Heidegger, Sein Und Zeit, 27). This means that as a method
f of inquiry phenomenology limits itself to the phenomena, to that which shows itself. The
l present themselves, without any speculation about what they truly are or what might
constitute them. Hartmann explains that phenomenology sticks to the facts. What these facts
mean, whether they are metaphysical or not, does not concern phenomenology (Nicolai
! Hartmann, GrundzugeEiner MetaphysikDer Erkenntnis, 5th. ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1965),
3 8). According to Hartmann, the analysis ofthe phenomenon is indifferent to the problems
it raises. The next step would then be the analysis of the problems irrespective of their
possible solvability, which he calls aporetics. Phenomenology and aporetics together make
I.
up the preparatory work for problem solving.
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 46. He continues: "The
phenomenological analysis leads behind the actual content of meaning to the cognitive
dynamics which is responsible for the constitution of meaning as meaning." This "behind"
should not be understood however as an abstraction. Rather, the distin.ction between
structure and actual content is like the distinction between a function and its result.
18
Ibid., 20. In footnotes 1 and 2 on this page he makes a significant comment for the
theological reader, namely that logos is basically used as synonymous with reason in this
context and needs to be freed from all Christological connotations.
19
Ibid., 28.
20
Receptive does not necessarily mean passive, since, depending on the type of
ontology, the subject might have to extract the eternal truths from the sense impressions in
order to gain knowledge. "According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active
intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; ... But since Aristotle did not allow
that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not
I

16 SVEN FOCKNER
the object which is known. 21 However in his phenomenological analysis, following
Nicolai Hartmann, Canale argues for the creative participation of the subject in the
formation oflogos. 22 The image would then be an interpretation ofthe object by the
subject.
If both the object and the subject contribute to the constitution ofm eaning, the
ques tion about the nature of their contribution arises. The object needs to
communicate its properties to the subject.23 The basic input of the object therefore
is its existence. There must be an object, otherwise no knowledge is possible. So
the object contributes itself, its essence. "Knowledge is a grasping ofBeing."24 Of
actually intelligible; it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we
understand are not actually intelligible .... We must therefore assign on the part of the
intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from
material conditions..And such is the necessity for an active intellect'' (Thomas Aquinas, The
Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers ofthe English Dominican Province and Daniel J. Sullivan
(Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1955), Ia, 79, 3.
21
Independent of the question how the object determines the subject, the resulting
knowledge is obj ective or absolute. Aquinas put it this way: "But the human intellect, which
is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the perfection of the Divine
intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is at first 'like a clean tablet
on which nothing is written,' as the Philosopher says" (DeAnima Ill, 4)" (Ibid., la, 79, 2).
This Aristotelian notion of the human mind as tabula rasa (see Marias, History of
Philosophy, 79) existed up to the time of John Locke as a counter-understanding to the
innate ideas ofthe platonic tradition that were used by Descartes ( cf. Wolfhart Pannenberg,
Theologie Und Philosophie: 1hr Verhiiltnis Im Lichte Ihrer Gemeinsamen Geschichte
(Gottingen: Vandehoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 158). Kant changed all this with his claim that
the object (Ding an sich) is not available to the subject. The only things available are sense
impressions (phenomena). The innate ideas became categories of human
understanding- predetermined by the subject-into which the phenomena are pressed in
order to be intelligible. See Michael J. Young, ''Functions of Thought and the Synthesis of
Intuitions," in The Cambridge Companion to Kant, ed. Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 101- 105. Thus Kant established the subject as creatively
contributing to the act of knowing.
22
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 30-32. According to Hartmann, only
purely logical philosophy can construct meaning without considering the subject. Such an
ideal concept, however, has little to do with reality. In contrast to the logical procedure,
Hartmann adheres to the gnosiological approach, which re-establishes the knowing subject
(Hartmann, Grundziige Einer Metaphysik Der Erkenntnis, 36-37).
23
2
Canale, A Criticism of Th eological Reason, 30.
• Raymond Vancourt, "Preface," in Les Principes D 'une Metaphysique De La
Connaissance, by Nicolai Hartmann (Paris: Aubier, 1945), 20. One can understand this by
considering the fact that something needs to exist in order to be known. It is the final horizon
of knowledge. Only against this horizon is knowledge possible and if one abstracts all the
modes of Being and also the existence of a thing, then the ultimate thing that is to know is
Being. In this way, the object determines the subject in the act of knowing. However, this
does not result in realism, since what is really determined is not the subject itself, but the
image of the object in the subject. See Hartmann, Grundziige Einer Metaphysik Der
Erkenntnis, 48.
)
CANALE'S CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON 17
course, as pointed out above, the subject also has to exist if there is to be a
: relationship. For both sides ofthe structure ofreason, a theory ofBeing is necessary
to understand how meaning is established. 25 Reason therefore presupposes ontology
)
t or exists within an ontological framework. 26
On the subject's side, however, more than mere existence is required. It needs
/
•I' )
!l
"Canale, A Criticism a/Theological Reason, 37. Because of the technical nature of
Canale's study, a word ofexplanation and definition concerning the concept ofBeing seems
necessary at this point. The question of Being is the most foundational in philosophy and
from the time of the pre-socratics it has puzzled the greatest thinkers of history. It is the
)
)
i concept which can be predicated of everything: of that which is and even of that which is )
I not. Everything that can be imagined or named "has" Being. As a consequence, the most
basic statement about Being is the principle of noncontradiction: Being is that which )
I excludes nothing. If something is, then it is not not. This implies that apart from nothing,
everything "has" Being, which is the principle of the excluded middle. Another thing that
follows is that Being and existence have to be distinguished. There are "things" to which
Being can be accorded that do not actually exist. A Unicorn is imagination-it is. Things
j
)
ll that exist will be called entities or beings (with lower case b) in this chapter. Entities need
to be distinguished from Being. Being, since there is nothing outside of it, needs to be one,
unchangeable and infinite. If it was not infinite there would be something outside ofBeing,
which by definition is not possible. Ifthere were many "Beings" that could be differentiated,
they would exclude each other and consequently not be Being, which excludes only
J
)
t nothingness. The same is true if Being would change. Then the older Being would be )
i
f
distinguished from the newer Being and they would mutually exclude each other. Since
entities are many, finite, and subject to change, they cannot be identical to Being. Toe nature
ofthe difference between Being and beings cannot be discussed here. It will be assumed that
entities participate in Being through analogy. One could say that they "have" finite Being )
I but that would be a paradox. Nevertheless in English works one sometimes reads about the
I Being of entities- an imprecise wording that usually refers to the essence of entities. Since
the fact that something exists says nothing about what it is, traditionally an essence is
ascribed to entities. This essence answers the question what they are. The possible answers
(e.g., red, heavy, cold, etc.) are modes of Being. Something is red. Something has )
"coldbeing" (German: Kaltsein). So in a way the essence could be called the (way of) Being
of a thing. The relation ofexistence and essence has also been a subject ofmuch debate. For )
the present study it will be sufficient to say that, since Being is immutable and change or
motion was traditionally taken to be the measure of time, Being was interpreted as timeless.
f In such an understanding the essence was equally unchangeable or timeless (though it was
I individuated by matter) and therefore preceded existence. Only lately has philosophy
considered that essences might be subject to change and therefore in time. This of course
implies another definition of Being. This overview is based on Albert Keller, "Sein," in
Handbuch Philosophscher Grundbegriffe, ed. Herman Krings, Hans Michael Baumgartner,
and Christoph Wild, vol. 3 (Miinchen: Kosel, 1974), 1288- 1304.
)
26
Canale's analysis rejects the Kantian understanding according to which reason
functions completely independent of ontology as a closed epistemological system (Canale,
A Criticism of Theological Reason, 37, n. 2. The question remains however how ideal )
i! objects fit in the ontological framework. Hartmann sees cognition dependent upon the
ontological and the logical precisely because real and ideal objects (like mathematical
I sentences) can be known (Hartmann, GrundzugeEiner MetaphysikDer Erkenntnis, 50, 54).
I J
J
.,,
)
) r
)
)
) 18 SVEN FOCKNER

a certain ability or potentiality to receive the essence of the object.27 Without the
subject's cognitive capabilities the mere existence of the two poles of meaning
I
i
CANALE' S CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON

neither of them can be seen as "an absolute tribunal"34 about the functioning of
reason.
19

) would be useless. But this is not enough. If the subject would merely receive the t) It is this interdependence that makes a system of meanings necessary. If every
) properties of the object, this would result in "a perception of an existing other" "as part of the structure of reason is dependent on each other, isolated meanings are
a content of consciousness." In order for meaning to be constituted, this perception impossible. Canale states that "there are only interrelated meanings; for meaning

l
) needs to be "rendered meaningful by categories or concepts."28 This is what Canale is constituted and exists in a system."35 Outside the relationship of the ontological
calls the epistemological :framework ofreason that exists in the knower and is prior and epistemological :framework, no coherent or unified knowledge is achievable.
) Within this relationship, meaning flows from the whole to the parts. This means
to any subject-object relationship. 29 These categories constitute the potentiality to
know. Through its categories the subject contributes actively to the act of that even though the part is determinate and emits an
individual flow of meaning,

)
)
knowledge. However, the spontaneity of the subject does not affect the object, but
only the image of the object in the subject. 30 This is why the creativity of the
knowing subject does not diminish the primacy of the object, of the ontological I. this meaning is given only against the background of the whole. "The
understanding or interpretation of reality as a whole provides reason with ·the
context or background needed for the constitution ofmeaning."36 This whole, which
was traditionally studied by metaphysics, is what Canale calls the system. At the

:framework in the act of knowing.
) center ofthe system is the concept oftheos. Only through some notion of"divinity"
Interdependence of Being and Knowing
) is opposed to the many; the one, which unifies the many. Through much of history
Since Canale sees the categories not in a transcendental manner as Kant did,
) but rather, parallel to Aristotle, as categories of Being,31 the epistemological
framework appears as grounded in and requiring the ontological :framework. The
) ontological :framework on the other hand, as can be seen by the word logos in its
name, includes an epistemology.32 To have ontology, one needs to interpret it
)
through the spontaneity of the subject.33 This reveals the interdependence of the
) :frameworks of reason. Since both epistemology and ontology are vital for an
understanding of the constitution of meaning and each of them includes the other,
J system but is distinct from it. This concept is the end of the phenomenological
) analysis of reason. The structure ofreason appears as onto-theo-logical, with the
27
This is all that phenomenology can say about the relationship. Aporetics would have
) to point to the mystery how the subject, the consciousness, can grasp something outside of
itself and how the object can determine something outside of itself. See Hartmann,
)
Grundziige Einer Metaphysik Der Erkenntnis, 62-63.
28
) Gustave Weigel and Arthur G. Madden, Knowledge; Its Values and Limits (Westport,
CT: Greenwood Press, 1973), 17.
) 29
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 39. Inn. 1 of that page he stresses that
this a priori framework is not to be understood in a Kantian way as independent from sensual
J input. Without the object the framework is without content, unintelligible. But nevertheless,
"some aspects of the cognitive object-to-be-known are already present in the subject."
) 30
The subject's relation to the object therefore remains purely receptive. Only in the
) constitution ofthe image does the subject act spontaneously and creatively. The fact that the
image is never identical to the object is the impetus for the progressive improvement or
enlargement of knowledge. One could say that advancement in any area of knowledge is
based on the creative spontaneity of the subject in the formation ofa new, more adequate
) image ofthe object (cf. Hartmann, Grundziige Einer MetaphysikDer Erkenntnis, 55). Note
that an incomplete image is not necessarily a wrong image, while even a complete image can
) be a wrong one. A progression in knowledge is not necessarily a progression in truth and
vice versa (cf. ibid., 57).
) Kant's critique of ontotheology see ibid., 13 7- 78. For an overview ofHeidegger's critique
31
Marias, History ofPhilosophy, 67-68.
32
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 35.
33
Ibid., 40-41.
j
)
l
can the whole, the totality ofreality be thought as unity. The theos is the one, which
i the concept of theos was identical to the idea of God or something supernatural in .
the broadest sense, but even atheistic worldviews need some concept that will :,
structure and unite the world for them--otherwise no_meaning and knowledge ~
would be possible.37
The theos
For Canale-in.contrast to pantheism orpanentheism-the theos articulates the
theos providing the ultimate ground through the system which facilitates the
coherent interrelation of the logos (i.e., the epistemological framework) and the
ontos (i.e., the ontological :framework).38
34
Ibid., 37, n. 1.
35
Ibid., 44.
36
Ibid., 47. Inn. 1 Canale refers to Lee who explains the flow of meaning through
contexts. If two people have no common context at all, they cannot communicate
successfully. This shows that meaning comes from the context, which is what Canale calls
the whole.
37
Roy A. Clouser, The Myth ofReligious Neutrality: An Essay on the Hidden Role of
Religious Belief in Theories, 2nd. ed. (Notre Dame, IN; University ofNotre Dame Press,
2005), 9-128.
38
Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 49. Henrich ascribes the first usage ofthe
· term ontotheological to Kant. But since it was not included in the Critique ofPure Reason
it was not adopted by others. Heidegger was the next to speak about the ontotheological
nature of metaphysics. See Dieter Henrich, Der ontologische Gottesbeweis, Sein Problem
und seine Geschichte in der Neuzeit (Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1960), 1. For a discussion of
see Anthony J. Godzieba, "Ontotheology to Excess: Imagining God without Being,"
Theological Studies 56, no. l (1995): 3-20.
 )

i;.I ,.f
II 20 SVEN FOCKNER CANALE' S CRJTICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON 21
!j
j
Before Kant, the theos, which makes the unity of meaning possible, was with i they have to be decided for on the basis offaith.45 Nevertheless these a priori also )

Aristotle seen in God as Being. For K ant, this most basic concept, from which the
nature of the whole, that is, the system is being determined, was the "idea of pure
reason." 39 Canale agrees with the traditional Aristotelian notion that the theos is the
ultimate expression of the ontos, that is, Being .40 This means that even the concept
i' o f theos is not independent or absolute. Though the analysis of reason's structure
is complete, "the theos cannot constitute the final state in a search for the ultimate
!'
ground of meaning, b ecause theos . . . conceals a theo-logia, namely an
understanding or interpretation ofthe theos."41 Since theos is the ultimate ontos and
both are "logies," the solution has to be found in the logos itself, which, as Canale
~
belong to the realm of epistemology since they have to b e intelligible. The fact that
the cognitive subject is often unaware of their presence and operation does not
i
(
remove the necessity of intelligibility. Canale holds that in the ultimate realm )
beyond the theos there can be only one absolute presupposition.46 Because the
ultimate presupposition shapes the system by defining the theos , it determines both J
t the ontological and the epistemological framework. Consequently there cannot be )
lt different presuppositions for the ontos and the logos. This could only be the case
if the concept oftheos was replaced by two differing concepts. However, since the )
theos provides the ground of unity for the whole, such a split would eliminate a J

i
remarks without any irony, is the subject matter ofthe w hole investigation. 42 At this unified system of meaning, If·ontology and epistemology were worked out on
:i
J I point, his quest for the definitive ground of m eaning has to leave the differing ultimate premises, coherence, system, and truth would be impossible.47 )
·1 phenomenological analysis to take a step beyond ontos, theos, and logos into the This primordial presupposition, that necessarily needs to be unique, is what Canale )
!1 t
realm of foundational ontology where all three originated. 'i calls the dimensionality ofreason.48 It is here, at the "minimum meaning that the
';1, ' •

;i,r:_·r1 The Primordial Presupposition 1 structure of reason requires," that the actual criticism of reason would have to J
start.49 A representation ofCanale's analysis could look something like shown in
Phenomenologically the logos is reliant on the ontos which in turn needs the t fig. 1.
I
,,"...I.
... theos for the constitution ofmeaning. The theos, which shapes the system, again is )
1.. •: •.
\ : ·! :
1,ij1•!
:1•1:1
•Ill,.,
:
.
.
dependent on the logos (as is the ontos) and so the analysis comes full circle to
where it began. The structure ofreason therefore cannot give a cognitive ground for
meaning. All of its levels are a theoretical abstraction and rely on a priori
il )
)
presuppositions for their interpretation.43 Canale distinguishes between relative and
absolute a priori. Relative presuppositions are grounded in · ab solute
I
ONTOS <===:> )

I
i'ii•l1111i,

~
!1,1111
presuppositions. The absolute premises "are the 'ground floor' or 'source' of
m eaning for the whole rational system, and as such they stand beyond do ubt,
criticism, verification, and in this sense are neither 'true' nor 'false' .•'44 Accordingly I THEOS )
\

)
39
Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 48, n. 3. Consequently, for Kant, God )
was not necessary for reason to function. In his Critique ofPractical Reason Kant tried to ( 7L--BEING
re-establish the necessity for God within the realm of morality, which he had discarded in )
the Critique.ofPure Reason for the realm of thinking.
40
41
Ibid., 5 1.
Ibid. However, Canale points out, despite the fact that the theos is relative, Heidegger
in his task to overcome metaphysics was the first to dare to interpret the theos in a way that Figure 1. The onto-theo-logical structure ofreason.
j
diverged from Greek tradition.
2
• Ibid.
43
Ibid., 6 1.
◄◄ Ibid. They cannot be rationally questioned since a rational questioning would employ •• Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 56, 65, n. 4. )
reason, which is based on the presupposition it is trying to question. Of course they also •• Ibid., 59, n. 1. Here it is again important to distinguish between presuppositions as J
cannot be rationally proven. Collingwood emphasizes that a verification of them is not even functioning in the structure of the system ofreason and the actual presuppositions that are
1;,. applicable, since it doesn't matter if they are true or not, all that matters is if they are used in the spelling out of the system of reason. It is with regard to the first, structural j
!:- supposed or not R. G. Collingwood,An EssayonMetaphysics, 2nd. ed. (Oxford: Claredon, understanding that Canale argues for a single presupposition. Concerning the actual meaning
11
1998), 32. The certainty that is usually ascribed to them despite their unintelligible character of this single presupposition he insists on multiple interpretations. See Ibid., 61, n. 2. J
ii ' 47
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 74, n. 2. )
I
I·
(i.e., that one is held to be the only right presupposition) is criticized by Canale as
negligence of the hypothetical character ofreason. See Canale, A Criticism of Theological ◄a Ibid., 67.
0
Ibid., 66.
i ,I: I
I I,
Reason, 61, n . 1.

j
i ;·
I
•

' 1 '
' )
)
)
)
) 22 SVENFOCKNER CANALE'S CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON 23

) The two-sided arrows symbolize the interdependence of the ontos, logos, and Anaximenes, Xenophanes of Colophon, or Heraclitus, Parmenides did not seek the
theos. The primordial presupposition is encompassing all three elements as arche in nature but in the realm of thought. 51 He no longer discussed things; he
) discussed what things are, he discussed Being, 52 which he saw grounded in
determining ground (ellipse). The black arrow representing its influence could be
) also directed towards the ontos or the logos since the primordial presupposition timelessness. Parmenides argues for timelessness through a via negativa (i.e., by
pertains to all beings and is found in the epistemological realm. It is pointed at the stating what Being is not). He begins with uncreatedness (the absence of
) theos because on the one hand meaning flows from the whole to the part and on the becoming), which is similar to indestructibility and endlessness (the absence of
other the theos is understood by Canale as the ultimate expression of the ontos, perishing), and complements this notion with the thoughts of completeness (the
) absence of parts) and motionlessness (the absence of change). 53 Timelessness is
which means that the theos is the only "being" which is truly and completely. Being
\
I therefore is "materialized" in the theos. This is also the way it has been interpreted already included in the notion of changelessness or immutability, since in the Greek
in history. Why is the label "Being" ascribed to the black arrow, the influence of i view time is the measure ofmotion.54
)
)
the primordial presupposition on the system? Being is not an entity or thing; it
always "co-appears" with entities. Ifthere is something, Being also exists. Through IJ Parmenides affirmed the atemporality ofBeing. Instead of examining things
through sensory perception he examined Being through thinking, through the nous.
While things can be red at one point in time and green at another, they always are.
the concept of Being the basic minimal understanding of reality, including the
) By negating all the semata (representations) of sensory perception he constructed
theos, becomes interpreted. According to Canale, the only known possibilities are
to interpret it either as timeless/spaceless or temporal/spatial. Heidegger with his
i the idea of Being as the ground for everything there is (via negativa). If Being

i'
) really is to be Being, it has to be immutable and atemporal (since time is the
move from timelessness to temporality made Canale aware of the possibility of a
) temporal/spatial interpretation of Being. measure of motion/change).55 Thus timelessness became the first technical
The notion of Being characterizes all realities including God or some other interpretation ofthe primordial presupposition ofreason. As the dimensionality of
) concept of the theos. Through the theos, which is the center of the system, that is, reason, or the first basic understanding ofBeing as theos, it influenced the ontology ,
the determining factor of the whole, Being shapes the two frameworks of reason. and epistemology of the next two and a halfmillennia.56 ·
)
One can see how Being is the way through which the primordial presupposition In his dissertation Canale then analyzes a few selected philosophers and
) exerts its influence on the structure of reason. Therefore, the primordial theologians of the last 2,000 years, showing that all of them adhered to a timeless
presupposition is the interpretation ofBeing. With this basic knowledge (i.e., what understanding of Being. The first to think about this question from another
_)
Being is) reason first develops an ontological framework and on the basis ofthis the
st
) epistemological framework. However, the "procedures, functions and categories" For Parrnenides, in order for all things to be, there must be Being, which cannot be
of epistemology were already born and used in the formation of the ontology. 50 a thing since it is the condition for the existence of all things. Being could not be an object
) Again one sees the mutual conditionality and the necessity for a presupposed of sensory perception, but an object ofthought. Marias puts it lik:e this: "being and the noein
starting point. As has been mentioned above, the interpretation ofthis starting point or nous are the same" (Marias, History ofPhilosophy, 23).
) 52
cannot be justified by reason. See Ibid., 20, 23. and Canale,A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 77, n. 2. Being was
) The phenomenological analysis ofthe structure ofreason revealed the need for understood as an transcendent thought. Jaspers writes that "one was seen in the other, the
logical in Being and Being in the logical" (Karl Jaspers, Die groj3en Philosophen, vol. 2
a primordial presupposition to determine the theos as ground of meaning for the (Erfstadt: Hohe, 1957), 260).
)
epistemological ·and ontological framework. This presupposition cannot be 53
For a discussion of Parmenides criteria see Marlas, History of Philosophy, 22;
) rationally justified, which makes room for more than one possible "correct" Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 80-81. Jaspers also mentions being one (on in
interpretation. This decisive insight opens the way for a criticism of reason since contrast to onta) as asemata ofBeing (Jaspers, Die groj3en Philosophen, 2:259). Helferich
) it levels the field between pure or practical reason as understood by Kant and explains that all these criteria go back to the notion that nothing comes out of nothing (ex
) theological reason. Canale now turns to the history of philosophy to examine the nihilo nihil). Therefore Being had to be eternal and uncreated. It also had to be one and
dimensionality of reason. whole, since otherwise the parts had to be added to it out of a vacuum. Finally, since
) nothingness itself is unthinkable, Being exists necessarily. See Christoph Helferich,
Parmenides and Heidegger Geschichte der Philosophie: Von den Anflingen bis zur Gegenwart und 6stliches Denken
) (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1985), 7.
The nature of reason appears as hypothetical, yet, as Canale holds, this was 54
Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick and G. Cyril Armstrong (London: W.
j forgotten or denied through most of the history of Western thought. According to Heinemann, 1933), 12.1.5.
him, the first to touch upon the primordial presupposition was Parmenides (- 550 55
Of course if Being is timeless and the things are in time, then the things cannot be.
) B.C.). In contrast to other thinkers of his time such as Thales of Miletus, This was the problem that Parmenides left for the philosophers after him. See Marlas,
j History ofPhilosophy, 24.
56
so Ibid., 73. Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 84.
)
)

24 SVEN FOCKNER
perspective was Heidegger's teacher Edmund Husserl, who denied the existence of
the 'thing-in-itself' and thus set reason into a temporal ontological framework. 57 But
since Husserl was m.ore interested in the epistemological realm, this insight was not
fully developed and it remained up to Heidegger to bring the implicit into sharp
focus. Heidegger was the first after Parmenides to consciously address the issue of
the primordial presupposition of reason. Canale states that neither Plato, nor
Aristotle, nor Kant had dealt with this question, but simply assumed the
Parmenidian interpretation of the dimensionality of reason. 58 Consequently,
Heidegger saw himself as the first true philosopher and defined as his task the
destruction of the history ofphilosophy.59 Canale states that it is impossible within
the scope of his work to give even an introduction to the thought of H eidegger. 60
The implications for the present paper are obvious.
Heidegger is concerned mostly with ontology. He deserves credit for
developing the ontological framework of reason from a temporal concept of
Being. 61 This is done through Husserl's method ofphenomenology. Such a choice
already implies a temporal primordial presupposition, since it negates or ignores the
existence of the 'thing-in-itself' or the timeless realm behind the appearances.
While Kant limits the reach of knowledge to the appearances, Heidegger declares
the appearances to be reality. Consequently, if Heidegger speaks about Being he
speaks about the concrete existence ofhumans, their Dasein (being-there). Canale
summarizes the meaning of Dasein as "the concrete, factual, individual reality of
man as existent."62 The existence ofhuman beings then is the basis for the existence
57
Ibid., 116---118. Canale does not mention however the earlier denial ofthe 'thing-in-
itself' in German idealism. Schulze and Fichte criticized this Kantian concept. See
Pannenberg, Theologie Und Philosophie: Ihr Verhiiltnis Im Lichte Ihrer Gemeinsamen
Geschichte, 217. For Fichte there is nothing beyond the subject. The non-ego exists only
through the self-positing of the ego. Marias says that in Fichte "reality loses its character as
a substance and becomes pure dynamism" (Marias, History ofPhilosophy, 3 11 ). In a similar
manner, Schelling and Hegel also rejected the 'thing-in-itself:' and thus the timeless realm
of Kant's ontology. While this is not decisive in the light of the obvious temporality of
Heidegger's system, it is important to keep in mind this older move towards temporality.
58
For Plato and Aristotle see Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 89. For Kant
see ibid., l 02. Aristotle dealt briefly with it when he discussed the most general notion of
Being in his Metaphysics, yet not as detailed as Heidegger did.
'
9
Heidegger, Sein Und Zeit, 19-25. See Dorothea Frede, "The Question of Being:
Heidegger's Project," in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles B. Guignon
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 60.
° Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 122, n. 2. In his dissertation, Canale
6
focuses on Heidegger's Sein und Zeit. He does not deal with the developmentofHeidegger's
philosophy afteiwards.
61
Since epistemology is based on ontology, the resulting theory ofknowledge also has
to be temporal ifit is to be coherent. In this way, Heidegger's system, even ifit does not deal
with the epistemological framework, has a foundational bearing on this part ofthe structure
of reason as well. See ibid., 120, n. 2.
62
Ibid., 122, n. 1.
r ,.} )
i )
t l CANALE'S CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON 25 )
J of the study ofBeing.63 In Dasein as the basis of any consideration ofBeing, Being )
·~ is not something b ehind the appearances. Being appears to us in its everydayness
t' not as abstract entity, but as beings which we encounter primarily as we put them
~ to use.64 Heidegger does not start with neutral, present things that exist )
t independently of humanity. He starts with human beings and to them things are
I
•f
always in some relation, of some use. 65
It is clear that this opens up the possibility for Being to change over time, as
)
)
i usage changes. Existence now comes before essence. The temporal understanding
! also has consequences for knowledge, since a hammer would be something totally )
l
different for somebody who uses it as a chair. But not only the essence and )
knowledge of objects becomes relative, even our own existence, our Dasein, is
thoroughly temporal. Canale states that "Dasein is in a structure from which )
meaning flows to him [sic]. This structure springs from temporality and stands on
66
l
it." Marias puts it this way: "It is from the standpoint of time that Dasein
comprehends and interprets being."67 This means that Dasein as 'being-in-the-
63
Heidegger states that fundamental ontology must begin by "clarifying the possibility
.,' of having any understanding ofbeing at all- an understanding which itself belongs to the )
! constitution of the entity called Dasein" (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John
t Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, N. Y.: Harper, 1962), 274). There would be )
l no question ofBeing, no Seinsfrage, if it wasn't for some human being asking it. And every
answer to it will be given through and in a human being. Ifwe want to understand Being,
we have to start with ourselves. We are the starting point, our own existence as the
)
l
prerequisite for any ontology. Heidegger calls this our Dasein (being-there).
64
Piotr Hoffman, "Death, Time, History: Division II of Being and Time," in The
Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993), 125. Heidegger applies Husserl's method not merely to the modes )
of Being, but to Being itself. The category which corresponds to Being, like seeing colors
I
corresponding to red, would be usage. Through usage in our everyday business we perceive
the "Being" of things.
65
To put it in the famous example ofHeidegger's workshop and the hammer: a hammer
bas its perceivable properties, but for the most part, when we use it we do not perceive them.
Our focus is not on the hammer, but on its use. And this is true for the doorknob and most
'
:f
other things. It is this invisible functioning of equipmental things that is definitive of their
'being-in-the-world.' This means that we encounter the being of things through our usage.
So the hammer to us is not in the first sense brown or heavy or made ofwood and metal, but
it is that with which we drive nails into wood. We do not perceive it as a hammer that exists
independently or without any relation to us. Heidegger puts it this way: "The peculiarity of
what is proximally ready-to-hand (zuhanden) is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must as it
.)
were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically. That with which our
I
everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. On the contrary, that with
which we concern ourselves primarily is the work" (Heidegger, Being and Time, 99).
66
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 122, n. 3.
67
Marias, History ofPhilosophy, 428. According to the spelling rules of this paper,
being should be capitalized in this quotation. Julian Marias is also among the philosophers J
who thought in the direction ofa temporal dimensionality. Besides him Canale lists Ortega
y Gasset, Jean-Paul Sartre, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Ernst Bloch )
(Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 127- 129).
J
)
) ,-
t
r
l

) !
26 SVENFOCKNER CANALE'S CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON 27
)
) world' is on the one hand conditioned by our past existence. Heidegger calls this our knowledge comes from experience.75 The argument is subject to severe
Dasein's thrownness.68 In our everydayness we are in a certain context and this criticism up to this day.76
) Following Kant, Canale also attempts to ground his alternative construction of
context shapes what we are and thereby what things are for us. On the other hand
Dasein is open towards the future; it is to be determined by the future. This takes theological reason in what he calls a "fact of theological reason."77 The implicit
)
the form of a choice of possibilities of meaningfulness on the basis of our life reference to Kant is a bit misleading, however, since Canale does not use this fact
situations (past).69 With every possibility ignored or realized Dasein is shaped j to prove the possibility of an alternative. This is not necessary, since he does not
anew. This relative element is only extinguished at death. In dying the ultimate and come up with a third original interpretation ofreason, but limits himself to the two
) interpreti;i.tions that already exist. The fact oftheological reason for Canale functions
total understanding ofDasein becomes possible.70 This is why Heidegger could say
) that "Being is not something other than time."71 more like a "proof text." By analyzing a text about God from an authoritative
So while Heideggerrejected the predominant timeless understanding ofBeing, source, he means to demonstrate, what the "correct" dimensionality ofreason is. As
) Canale works "within the Christian tradition," for him such a theological fact can
he did not recognize the spontaneity of the subject in the structure of reason. For
him, there is only one possible dimensionality, namely time. This leads him to only come from the Bible.
)
conclude that Parmenides and philosophers after him built a groundless In addition, he attempts to find a text, which is not the product of any
) metaphysics. Of course, Canale rejects this view on the basis of the result of his philosophical interpretation of the primordial presupposition.78 Such a viewpoint,
he holds, can only be found prior to the incorporation of Greek thinking into

)
) preceding study which has shown the relativity of the primordial presupposition.72

The Constructive Task

Canale has established the need for a criticism of theological reason. But how
ij Christianity that limits the search to the NT church or earlier.79 In following
Heidegger, who in his search for the true meaning ofBeing went back to the origins
of Western thinking, namely pre-Socratic philosophy, Canale chooses to go back ~,
) as far as possible into the history of Christianity. This leads him to Exod 3: 14-15. ;.
should it be done? Kant was in a similar situation when he wrote his critique ofpure i According to Canale, this is the only text that reveals something about the biblical •
)
j
reason, Reason produced contradictory results and consequently something had to
be wrong with reason. 73 So, when inquiring into the possibility of synthetical a i view of Being and therefore "provides the background of intelligibility for the
Biblical constitution of meaning as a whole."80
priori sentences, he turned to the fact of synthetical a priori sentences in pure
mathematics as providing the proof for the possibility. This fact of reason,74 When examining the meaning of 'eh'yeh 'as Ver 'eh'yeh in Exod 3: 14 Canale
) chooses a phenomenological approach. He applies an epoche and suspends his
according to Kant, would have saved Hume from the erroneous conclusion that all
) presuppositions (as far as possible) to be able to describe, not construct or prove,
the meaning that shows itself in the text.81 One first result of this approach for
)
68
See Marias, History ofPhilosophy, 434.
69
Guignon, The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, 8. Canale, is the affirmation of the ontological character of the passage. Canale
70
Heidegger replaces Descartes' cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am") with a stresses that the text is identifying God with Being. But while the text gives "an
J moribundus ergo sum ("I die, therefore I am"). The reasoning behind this paradoxical view explicit biblical basis for interpreting God ontologically," Canale admits that "no
) is that death is the only instance where I cannot be replaced. Someone else could marry the qualification or definition whatsoever is made ... regarding the meaning in which
woman I would have married and somebody could fill my place in society. Other the divine Being should be understood." 82 Therefore it is critical for Canale that the
) appointments where I cannot be replaced, like a surgery, I can avoid if I want to. The only philosophy that fills this void must not be extra-biblical. Rather he tries to gain·
thing where I cannot be replaced and that I cannot avoid is death. Hoffinann puts it this way: further ontological clues from the text as to the form of such a philosophy. One
) "Death totalizes me, for due to death my identity will become complete. Death
) individualizes me, for it imposes upon me the one and only experience that is inescapably
75
mine" (Hoffman, "Death, Time, History," 199. See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Jens Timmermann and Heiner
71 Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," in Philosophy
) F. Klemme, Philosophische Bibliothek 505 (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998), 71-79 (Bl 9-B23).
in the Twentieth Century: An Anthology, ed. William Barrett and Henry David Aiken, vol. 76
See Hoffe, Immanuel Kant, 64-67.
) 2 (New York, NY: Random House, 1962), 214. 77
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 284.
72
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 125, n. 5. 78
In philosophical thinking the presupposition would be consciously chosen and
) n See Ibid., 285, n. 1. therefore could not provide the original theological reflection which is needed.
74 I'm using this term following Canale. Within the work of Kant, the "fact of reason" 79
) Cullmann affirms that the NT had a temporal understanding of time (Cullmann,
("Faktum der Vemunft") usually refers to an argument in Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Christus Und Die Zeit, 53). Yet this selection is of course open to criticism, as will be
praktischen Vemunft, ed. HorstD. BrandtandHeinerF. Klemme, PhilosophischeBibliothek discussed below.
J 506 (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 31. Kant tries to demonstrate that pure practical reason '° Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 289, n. 2.
) exists. This attempt could also be compared to Canale's endeavor, with the same results as :~ Jb~<11_296-297. Epoche means suspension ofjudgment.
the synthetic a priori: (1) it is highly controversial, and (2) the analogy is a bit misleading.
)
)
 rl ·
)
t.
28 SVEN FOCKNER

strong clue that Canale sees is what he calls the open ontological structure of the
'
t
,f
'
~
l
CANALE'S CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON

himself. The subject and the object are identical. 89 Accordingly the platonic
29
)
)
)
text. He interprets the sound-name of God in the present tense, as an affirmation of chorismos (division, separation) between God or Being and this world is rejected
God's presence. God is the one who exists. Such a statement however would be just
! by the text, as is the resulting notion of the analogia entis.90 If God as himself is in
)
an empty concept ifit were not for the identification with the God of the fathers. the same "level" of Being as Moses and Moses is temporal, God and Being, which
Furthermore the meaning ofthe name is also opened up for further development in ;,; co-appear, are also understood as temporal in Exod 3. Canale therefore concludes
)
the future through the declaration that the name will remain for all generations. 83 that the fact of theological reason operates within a temporal ontological
Thus the meaning of the name of God "is placed in temporal historical extension
which embraces the three temporal ecstasies, namely past, present, and future." 84
t framework. 91
In regard to the epistemological viewpoint Canale does not want to simply infer
)

Canale concludes that in the biblical interpretation of both God and Being,85 the
antic presence of God, which includes these ecstasies, must be the ground for an
interpretation of Being. Therefore in biblical thinking the study of ontology must
be preceded by the study of God, which implies a reversal of reason's classical
onto-thee-logical structure towards a thee-onto-logical one. 86
This rearrangement ofthe structure, however, does not yet answer the question
about the primordial presupposition of the text.87 To discover it, Canale examines
the ontological and epistemological framework of his fact of theological reason in
Exod 3. His goal is to uncover the dimensionality in which they function:
timelessness or temporality. God's ontic presence is taken as the basis of the
ontological understanding of his Being.88
Concerning the ontological viewpoint, Canale notes that the text identifies
Being and appearance. God reveals himself (Exod 3 :2) and what he reveals is he
83
Ibid., 334, n. 2.
84
Ibid., 334. Canale does not mention the parallels to Heidegger's concept of Dasein
at this point, maybe to avoid the impression that Heidegger's was a biblical philosophy.
Nevertheless the similarities are obvious. Later when discussing his examination of the text
in regard to the dimensionality ofreason, he refers to Heidegger's method of starting with
Dasein 's appearance. See ibid., 352, n. 2.
as Canale emphasizes that the two are closely connected in their meaning, yet they are
not identified as one. The meaning flows from God to Being. See Canale, A Criticism of
Theological Reason, 350, n. 3, 352.
86
Ibid., 347.
17
Here Canale is more careful or thorough in his investigation than Wolterstorff, to
whom the fact that something has a history, as in this instance God obviously does, is
enough. One needs to mention that Wolterstorff's investigation is not about the structure of
reason, but about the question whether God is in time or not: of course a temporal God, as
"theos of the biblical structure of reason would be equivalent to a temporal dimensionality
ofreason. See Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Unqualified Divine Temporality," in God & Time:
Four Views, ed. GregoryE. Ganssle (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001), 203.
1 that, because epistemology is based on ontology, the biblical epistemological )
1 framework also has to be a temporal one. Rather he tries to demonstrate a shared )
t primordial presupposition in which he sees the temporality of knowledge being
revealed through a biblical example. He chooses Exod 6:2-7 as a p arallel passage )
l to Exod 3, which addresses "Being (YHWH) from the perspective of the
Il epistemological framework, that is, of the categories and cognitive processes that
the subject is supposed to have and follow in order to grasp and constitute
meanings." 92 His goal, then, is not to discover the primordial presupposition, but to
see ifthe cognitive procedure in the text corresponds to the temporal interpretation
93
1. of Being. Canale stresses that in Exod 6 the object of knowledge is YHWH
himself, just as the appearance in Exod 3 was B eing. The logos knows Being in the
.i appearances. One first observation ofCanale is therefore that epistemology follows
l ontology in the rejection of the chorismos.94 A second point which Canale notes is
that the knowledge ofYHWH as expressed in vv. 3- 7 consists of the ecstasies past
)
1 (God of the fathers, covenant), present (God is with Israel in its bondage), and )
future (promise of delivery). This series will lead the people to know God as
YHWH, their God.95 The parallelism to temporal ontology is obvious. Canale
therefore concludes that the epistemological framework is grounded on the same )
temporal primordial presupposition as the ontological framework. The way of
knowing in this biblical text consists of a gathering of lines of intelligibility from )
the ontological extension ofGod. "Knowledge about God in himselfand knowledge
19
According to Canale "current theology" holds that God appears not as himself but
rather as he appears, though he does not give any references for this claim.
90
The analogia entis (analogy of Being) holds that beings exist through analogy to
Being. For Plato this analogy consists in some form of participation. Beings exist because
they participate in Being.
91
Canale, A Criticism a/Theological Reason, 359. He immediately points out that this )
must entail a redefinition oftemporality. By no means should this conclusion lead anyone

I
sa Canale, A Criticism a/Theological Reason, 354. Traditionally the ontic presence was to think that God is pulled down into the imperfect realm. Rather the temporal realm needs
devalued as appearance with the connotation ofinauthenticity over against the real, authentic to be freed from any derogatory connotations.
92
Being in the timeless realm. Such an understanding, however, results from a specific Ibid., 365. J
interpretation of the ontological framework, which is to be the result of the investigation n Ibid., 366.
9
' Ibid., 372.
)

l
itself. Therefore Canale puts any preconceived notions about the ontic presence under his
methodological epoche. u Ibid., 376-377.

j
)
)
)
)
30 SVEN F0CKNER CANALE' S CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON 31
)
) about His acts coincide."96 t individual can do in a lifetime. Canale is to be credited with initiating this quest and
by his dissertation awakening Adventism to the task. Through a phenomenological
)
Conclusion
} study he argued for the relativity ofthe primordial presupposition. The exegesis of
With this argument for the temporality of the dimensionality of reason in i a fact of theological reason showed the possibility of an alternative conception of
) t
Scripture Canale ends his book. It seems necessary to mention that this section is theological reason. In terms of the search for an independent, scriptural approach
) possibly the most controversial part of Canale' s dissertation. It gives rise to several to reason, Canale's work constitutes a major step. Within the Seventh-day
questions. One question is if these texts are really free from all philosophical Adventist church, his analysis ofthe structure ofreason is the groundwork on which
influences. The mere fact that they were written before Pannenides is no guarantee any future discussion of an autonomous biblical approach to reason will have to
) for it. It seems to me that such an assumption could be argued for on the basis of build. In addition he has applied this analysis to the history of Western thought and
inspiration only, and not on the basis of chronology. Given that the texts are exposed the two existing options for the interpretation ofreason. The way is open
) philosophically neutral, is it legitimate to question them for philosophical concepts for the study and construction oftheology's own ontology and epistemology on the
like Being? Is this really a concept that is touched upon (even indirectly) in the text, basis of Scripture. And whether the result of this search affirms Canale's
)
or is the text forced to speak on something that it never intended to comment? Is conception or not, the search itself will be his legacy.
)
)
phenomenology really a neutral tool? Another issue is the selection of the texts.
They are the locus classicus for this topic,97 but there might be other texts that add l Sven Fockner studied life in general at his parents' home for 23 years, before moving to
Bogenhofen (BA) and later Berrien Springs (MA) to study theology with an emphasis on
)
)
to or even contradict the statements in Exodus. So while Canale has demonstrated
(if one follows his exegesis) that there is a temporal conception of God in Exodus
3 and 6, he has not shown that such an understanding is "the biblical" interpretation.
A lot more research would be necessary to justify such a claim. Lastly, Canale
l Systematic Theology and Old Testament. He then worked as a pastor in southern Germany
for five years, forgetting a lot of what he had learned and learning a lot which had been
forgotten by his teachers. During that time he also pursued an MA in philosophy a~

I
Tiibingen, but abandoned the venture shortly before completion, to take up a position at the •-'
) limits himself to the two versions of the dimensionality of reason, which he has media center of the Inter-European Division of the SDA church, where he is currently in
discovered in the history of philosophy. What if the biblical paradigm was based charge ofthe Bible correspondence school department. He is married to Judith and they have
) neither on timelessness nor on temporality? Then the question-temporal or two sons, Jan and Ben. His dream is to create something which will have a massive spiritual
atemporal-would prevent one from seeing the biblical answer. impact in western society and inspire people to become followers of Christ. Email:
) sven.fockner@stimrne-der-hoffuung.de.
It is easy to question. It is much harder to construct a biblical model for the
) fundamental questions oftheology, as Canale has attempted. He would be the first
to agree that his work has raised more questions than it answered and that a truly
) biblical interpretation ofreason in theology will need much more research than one
)
) 96
Ibid., 378. This statement sounds very much like Pannenberg's first thesis in his
programmatic work Revelation as History: "According to the Bible, the self-revelation of
God did not happen directly, as for example through a theophany, but indirectly through his
actions in history" (Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Dogrnatische Thesen zur Lehre von der
)
0ffenbarung" in Offenbarung Als Geschichte, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg (Gottingen:
) Vandehoeck & Ruprecht, 1961), 91). This is not to be understood as a negation of
propositional revelation. Theophanies are not denied per se, but only as having God as
) content.
97
In 2001 Wolterstorffchose the same text as the basis for his argument for a temporal
) God. See Wolterstorff, "Unqualified Divine Temporality," 187-188, 203-208. Traditionally,
however, the passage was used to identify the biblical God with a preconceived, Greek
) notion ofBeing. See for example Augustine, The Confessions and Letters ofSt. Augustin,
ed. Philip Schaff, trans. J. G. Pilkington and J.G. Cunningham, vol. 1, A Select Library of
) the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers ofthe Christian Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
) 1988), Conf. 7.10.16, 7.11.17. And also the discussion in Eckhard Konig, Augustinus
Philosophus: Christlicher Glaube Und Philosophisches Denken in Den Friihschriften
) Augustins, ed. VinzenzBuchheit, vol. 11, Studia EtTestimoniaAntiqua(Miinchen: Wilhelm
Fink, 1970), 39.
)
)

Divine Pass ibility, Analogical Temporality,
and Theo-Ontology :
Implications of a Canonical Approach
By John C. P eckham
I consider it a great privilege to have been one ofFernando Canale's students.
I have learned a great deal from him in classes and p ersonal conversations and I am
delighted to be able to contribute to this volume in his honor. In my view, am ong
his greatest contributions to theological scholarship is his deconstruction ofthe idea
of divine timelessness and corresponding promotion of the concept of divine
analogical temporality. 1 This contribution has highly significant and far-reaching
implications for systematic theology in general and Adventist theology in particular
and has been instrumental in shaping the theological worldview ofmany Adventist
thinkers and leaders.
This essay suggests that Canale's conception of God's analogical temporality
is inextricably linked to other characteristics attributed to God such that one might
support and further inform Canale' s conception ofGod's analogical temporality by
focusing on particular canonical depictions of the God-world relationship.2
Although, in this essay, I do not attempt to definitively substantiate the truth of
God's analogical temporality, I suggest that attention to the issue of divine
passibility provides a fruitful avenue to the tentative conclusion that God, as
depicted in Scripture, is not only analogically temporal, but also not unqualifiedly
immutable, absolutely independent, or deterministic (among other things).3
1
This was a major theme of his dissertation and continues to be a very prominent
feature of his work. See Fernando Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and
Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Press, 1987).
2
As shall be explained further below, "analogical" here refers to the view that God's
relationship to time is analogous (both similar and dissimilar) to our relationship to time
rather than equivocal (entirely different) or strictly univocal (identical).
3
These attributes are put in negative terms here because this essay focuses only upon
that which passibility requires, which is a minimal rejection of impassibility and that which
flows from it, leaving the possibility ofconsiderable variety with regard to the "mutability"
or dynamic relationality, "dependence" on the world with regard to the divine experiences
(but not existence or ontological attributes), and the precise conception of indeterminism
(and how that relates to omniscience, omnipotence, etc.). I have made proposals regarding
initial implications on these areas but these cannot be put forth here. Suffice it to say that I
believe that the canonical evidence suggests that God is dynamically relational but his
character is.constant, God's existence is independent of the world yet God has voluntarily
bound up his own interests with those of the world. Nevertheless, God is ontologically
distinct from the world and omnipotent, though he does not exercise all ofhis power and has
granted power (including significant freedom) to other agents. See John C. Peckham, The
·r -
1 )
ii DIVINE PASSIBILITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 33
)
!
Deconstruction of Divine Timelessness )
i
1 In order to appreciate and a ddress Canale's contribution to the discussion of
l )
I God's relationship to time, it is necessary to first recognize: (1) the nature and
f significance of the historically dominant conception of divine timelessness that )
l
i
Canale deconstructs and (2) the model of analogical temporality he offers instead.
Regarding the former, Canale strongly criticizes the foundational tenets of the
•l concept of God that is often referred to as classic or Thomistic theism.4 This
l historically dominant conception of God holds, among other things, that God is
necessary and self-sufficient, perfect, simple, timeless, immutable, impassible, )
:t omniscient, and omnipotent.5 Taken together in their technical systematic sense,
'! these attributes depict a view of God that stands in considerable conflict·with-
crucial tenets of Adventist theology and, in particular, the conception of God that )
Canale promotes. 6 While he rejects a number of these attributes and modifies
others, Canale' s most robust and sustained criticism has been directed toward
divine timelessness. From Canale's dissertation to his most recent work, the
rejection and replacement of timelessness has played a central role. 7
Put simply, in the view that Canale deconstructs, divine timelessness means )
that God and time are incompatible (where "time" is defined as the succession of )
l
i Concept ofDivine Love in the Context of the God-World Relationship (New York: Peter
)
t Lang, 2015).
• See, among others, Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 160-87; Fernando
)
)
Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Lithotec, 2005), 40-55; Fernando Canale, "Doctrine of God," in Handbook ofSeventh-Day )
Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 140-
48; Fernando Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive
Foundation ofChristian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham, MD: University Press
I
ofAmerica, 200 I), 36-38, 77-89; Fernando Canale, ''The Quest for the Biblical Ontological
Ground of Christian Theology," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 16, no. 1-2 )
(2005): 1-20; Fernando Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?" Andrews
University Seminary Studies 44, no. 1 (2006): 108-11 . · )
li •Fora basic introduction to these elements of"classic theism" and a helpful contrast
to process theism, see Ronald H. Nash, "Process Theology and Classical Theism," in
Process Th eology, ed. Ronald H. Nash (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1987), 8-12. However,
so-called classic theism should not be thought of as a monolithic group but serves as a
helpful category for discussion of a dominant stream of Christian tradition. There are those
l who self-identify as "modified" classic theists and others would hold a minimal definition
of classic theism wherein even Canale's model might fall.
I
6
See Canale, "Doctrine of God." It is important to recognize that many thinkers in the
Christian tradition depart in various ways from some of the systematic implications that
these divine attributes mutually support, including many others within the
Arminian/Wesleyan stream of thought.
7
Consider Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason; Fernando Canale, "On Being )
the Remnant," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 24, no. 1 (2013): 132-34, I 42,
145-48, 152, 158-59.
)
)
)
) t
) 34 JOHN C. PECKHAM
lI
) past, present, and future). 8 Thus, divine timelessness is sometimes referred to as
divine atemporality.9 Consider, in this regard, noted Calvinist philosophical
) theologian Paul Helm's argument that: "(l) God is timelessly eternal. (2) Whatever
) is timelessly eternal is unchangeable. (3) Whatever is unchangeable is impassible.
( 4) Therefore, God is impassible." 10 If God is timeless in the way that Helm means,
) then God cannot experience any succession or sequence of events and can neither
enter into time nor temporally interact with creatures. He cannot be affected by any
)
other (impassibility) and can have no experiences (immutability). A host-of other
) implications follow, some of which will be taken up later in this essay. For now, it
is sufficient to recognize that timelessness, in Canale's view, is not a perfection of
j God's being but (ifapplied to deity) depicts an imperfection, that is, a deficient and
impoverishing limitation that is unworthy of God and, more importantly,
)
contradicts the biblical revelation regarding God's nature (ontology) and his
) relationship with the world.11 Rejecting the conception of God as timeless
(atemporal), Canale urges that it should be replaced in one's theological thinking
I
) In other words, while the influence of Heidegger's work regarding Being and time
by the view that (tensed) time co-appears with all reality and is, therefore,
) on Canale is substantial indeed, Canale should not be mistaken for
)
8
More specifically, divine timelessness requires God's incompatibility with time as
) Fernando Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology (Berrien Springs, MI:
understood on the tensed theory of time (aka the A theory oftime). Another view holds that
) "time" is tenseless (the "tenseless" or B theory oftime). On this view, the past, present, and
future are equally real. The human experience of the succession oftime as past present and
) future is ''usually explained as just a subjective illusion ofhuman consciousness." Gregory
E. Ganssle, ed. God & Time: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001),
) 133. Of course, some might predicate timelessness of God and mean something rather
different than the view under discussion here.
) 9
For Aquinas, then, God is "bereft ofmovement" and as "always the same, there is no
before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in numbering before and after
) Dialogue between Process and Free Will Theists (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000);
[succession] in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is
) outside movement, consists the idea of eternity." Further, "whatever is wholly immutable
can have no succession" such that ''what is eternal is interminable" and "eternity has no
) succession, being simultaneously whole." Summa theologica l. I 0.1. John W. Cooper
comments regarding the classic understanding: "Eternity is the enduring, simultaneous
) presence of the ;_,;finite divine life without any succession." Panentheism, the Other God of
the Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006),
) Cooper, Panentheism.
330. Nevertheless, numerous theologians (especially recent ones) use language of
timelessness and/or eternity with other (implicit or explicit) meanings, each ofwhich should
)
be engaged on their own terms.
) 10
Paul Helm, ''The Impossibility ofDivine Passibility," in The Power and Weakness
ofGod: Impassibility and Orthodoxy, ed. Nigel M. de S. Cameron (Edinburgh: Rutherford,
j 1990), 119. Of course, others might define the various terms timeless, unchangeable,
impassible, and/or the relationship between them in a way that does not lead to Helm's
) conclusion. This essay, however, refers to the view exemplified by Helm that stands in the
line of a long tradition of similar thought in this regard.
) 11
As shall be seen below, considerable progress can be made by approaching this issue
) not merely as the abstract conception of God's being but from the nature of the God-world
relationship. The former is revealed (partially) in the operation of the latter.
J
)
DMNE PASSIBILITY, TE1\1PORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 35
coextensive with God's being (analogical temporality). 12
Although he seems to have arrived at many theological conclusions stemming
from the rejection of divine timelessness independently, Canale is by no means
alone in his deconstruction of divine timelessness (atemporality). The ever-
bourgeoning movement of relational theology has led its own temporalist charge,
including Process theists (Charles Hartshorne, John Cobb, Jr., David Ray Griffin),
advocates of other forms ofpanentheism (Thomas Jay Oord, Philip Clayton) and
open theists (e.g., Clark Pinnock, William Hasker, Richard Rice, John Sanders,
Gregory Boyd). 13 Further, philosophical theologians of various stripes that might
best be thought of as modified classic theists have also deconstructed divine
atemporality and advocated various models of God's relationship to time (e.g.,
William Lane Craig, Alan Padgett, Nicholas W olterstorff and others). 14
Canale recognizes the considerable influence ofHeidegger ( and others) on his
own engagement with the philosophical conception of time, while also noting that
he departs significantly from Heidegger and other phenomenological approacheS:
15
a·
Heideggerian. Moreover, it need not be supposed that the truth ofthe theological
12
"Reality requires time, and time always co-appears as a quality of a real thing."
Andrews University Lithotec, 2005), 250. However, ''what God's temporality means is to
be discovered as God's Being and God's temporality co-appear in the 'ontic- presence' of
God." Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 360.Cf. Canale, The Cognitive Principle
ofChristian Theology, 250-3; Canale, Basic Elements ofChristian Theology, 67-68; Canale,
A Criticism of Theological Reason, 80, 359-64.
13
Clark H. Pinnock et al., The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the
Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994); David
Ray Griffin, John B. Cobb, and Clark H. Pinnock, eds., Searchingfor an Adequate God: A
Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2000); Philip Clayton and A. R. Peacocke, eds., In Whom We
Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panentheistic Reflections on God's Presence in a
Scientific World (Grand Rapids, MI: WilliamB. EerdmansPub., 2004); Charles Hartshorne,
The Divine Relativity, 2nd Printing ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964 ); Thomas
Jay Oord, The Nature of Love: A Theology (St. Louis: Chalice Press, 2010); John W.
14
See Ganssle, ed; Nicholas Wolterstorff, "God Everlasting," in Contemporary
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Stephen M. Cahn and David Shatz (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982); William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's
Relationship to Time (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 200 !); Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity,
and the Nature ofTime (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992).
15
For example,.Canale maintains: "Biblical rationality parts ways with traditional
philosophical rationality and with every single possible philosophical interpretation of
rationality, such as Heidegger's, Sartre's, and Merleau-Ponty's, that accepts the temporal
interpretation ofthe primordial presupposition." Canale,A Criticism ofTheological Reason,
363. Cf. Ibid., 360, 363-364, 384-385, 387; Fernando Luis Canale, "Revelation and
Inspiration: Method for a New Approach," Andrews University Seminary Studies 31, no. 3

36 JOHN C. PECKHAM
conception ofanalogical divine temporality depends upon Heidegger's thought; for
Canale, the concept of analogical temporality may be derived (at least minimally)
from a canonical approach to systematic theology (consonant with Canale's use of
sola Scriptura).16 To this we shall return below.
Canale's Biblical Model of God's Analogical Temporality
As introduced above, in Canale's view, time (in the sense ofsuccession ofpast,
present, and future) is coextensive with God's being. As such, Being and time are
ontologically inseparable.17 Upon encountering this view, some immediately object
to any hint that God might be "in time." 18 This very notion betrays a conception of
"time" as a container and the corresponding implication.that if God were "in time,"
he would be limited by it in some way that is unacceptable to posit regarding
divinity. It is therefore essential to have a basic grasp of what the theological
concept of timelessness means and what its rej ection entails and does not entail.
Consider again divine timelessness as the notion that God and time are
incompatible (where time is minimally defined as the succession of past, present,
and future). Here, divine timelessness would imply deficiency, a restriction on
God's activity and life. In other words, if God and time are incompatible this
suggests God cannot experience or enjoy anything temporal. 19 Conversely, the
(1993). Here, it is important to distinguish the manner in which one comes to an idea or
belief and the grounds of that belief. For example, I may come to believe in Christianity
through the influence of my parents but, as an adult, I do not believe in Christianity merely
because my parents taught me to do so.
16 "Both biblical and systematic theologies need to interpret the same issues as
philosophy interprets (i.e., God, human nature, reality, reason)... . However, theology does
not need to follow any humanly conceived interpretation. On the contrary, if biblical
thinking is taken seriously, theology should develop an understanding ofthese issues on the
basis of-,-and in full harmony with- the interpretation they receive in Scripture." Canale,
Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive Foundation of Christian
Theology in a Postmodern World, 55. Cf. Ibid., 49-56; Canale, Basic Elements of Christian
Theology, 16-29, 41, 57; Canale,A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 347, 363-364. Canale
maintains, in this regard, that "Scripture reveals a God that is not timeless but infinite and
analogically temporal." Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 98. Cf. Fernando
Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Lithotech, 2005), 147.
17
See Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 359-364.
18
I have noticed this personally with many students but it also appears in the
theological literature.
19 That is, if the experience or enjoyment of anything temporal requires change from
a state ofnot experiencing or enjoying to a state ofexperiencing or enjoying temporal object
x, and a change of state requires succession from temporal moment A to temporal moment
B, then, insofar as God and time are incompatible, God cannot experience or enjoy anything
temporal. One might posit, of course, that God "always" timelessly experiences and/or
enjoys the world as a whole but this would not amount to the experience or enjoyment of
any temporal object and appears to require that the world itself is not actually temporal but
only appears to be so (e.g., the "tenseless" or B theory oftime).
il )
.l DIVINE PASSIBJLITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 37 )
! majesty and greatness of God is not restricted by analogical temporality, as some )
l might initially think. Time must not be thought of as a container that includes or
envelopes God, but as a (partial) descriptor of the fabric ofreality and also of the
)
t divine life, including God's experiences such as: pleasure and displeasure, delight
and grief,joy and sorrow, passion and compassion, love relationship and unrequited
love.20 Divine temporality does not diminish the being or life of God but, on the )
f contrary, the richness of God's nature and relationship with the world is
exemplified by a kind of temporality that transcends the limitations of human
thought and about which we have limited revelation. 21
Here, "temporal" should not be confused with "temporary." Whereas
"temporal" simply conveys some relationship to the succession ofpast, present, and
future, "temporary" conveys that som ething or someone is impermanent, transient,
fleeting, etc.22 On Canale's view, God is both (analogically) temporal and
permanent. God is not negatively affected by time; he is not diminishing with "age"
as humans do or fading and withering as lilies and roses.For humans, time includes
II
the process of dying; not so for God.
Significantly, this rejection of divine temporariness does not depend upon an )
extra-canonical presupposition(s) regarding the nature of divine perfection (via
eminentiae) and correspondingly negating (via negativa) that which departs .J
therefrom. Rather, this contrast is taught in Psalm 102:24-27, "... Your [God's] )
years are throughout all generations. Of old You founded the earth, And the
heavens are the work of Your hands. Even they will perish, but You endure; And )
all of them will wear out like a garment; Like clothing You will change them and )
1
°Canale explicitly rejects the notion oftime as a container: ''We need to get rid of the
notion of time as a universal container and replace it with the notion that time is a )
characteristic of what is real." Canale, Basic Elements ofChristian Theology, 67.
11
As Canale puts it: "The analogical understanding of divine temporality allows God
to experience time in its fullness and, at the same time, within the limitations proper to
creatures. Here the principle that the more is capable of the less applies. According to
Scripture, in the analogical view of time, the 'more' of God's infinite time is compatible )
with and able to relate to the 'less' of creation's finite time." Basic Elements of Christian
Theology, 7 1. j
22
Perhaps one line of confusion in grasping the idea of divine (analogical) temporality
is the biblical contrast between temporal and eternal things, such as in 2 Cor 4: 18: "for the
things which are seen are temporal [proskairos, also translated "temporary" in some
versions], but the things which are not seen are eternal [aionios]." The contrast here is _)
between temporary (proskairos) and everlasting [a ion ios] things. This same contrast appears
frequently within Adventist contexts, particularly in the writings ofEllen White. To takejust
one ofmany examples ofthis line ofthought: "Life is too solemn to be absorbed in temporal j
and earthly matters, in a treadmill of care and anxiety for the things that are but an atom in
comparison with the tpings ofeternal interest" (COL 343). Here the contrast is between that
which is temporary (earthly, mundane) and that which is eternal (that is, everlasting). Within
philosophical theology, on the other hand, "eternal" is typically used as a synonym for J
timeless and "temporal" conveys the opposite (not timeless). One must be careful not to
confuse the biblical contrast between temporal and eternal things and the philosophical- )
theological contrast between temporality and eternity.
_)
)
 /

)
)
)
38 JOHN C. PECKHAM DIVINE PASSIBILITY, TEtv!PORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 39
)
) they will be changed. But You are the same, And Your years will not come to an analogous to our relationship to time, that is, it is like our relationship to time in
end" (cf. Ps 103:15-17; Heb 1:10-12).23 Regardless ofwhat we might say about i_ some ways and unlike it in other ways (cf. Job 10:4-5).26
)
)
various potential interpretations of this passage, the contrast between the
temporariness and transience of creation and the permanence of God is apparent in
these verses. In short, whatever it may mean, divine temporality does not mean that
I
i:
Importantly, this does not require any claim to know the extent of the "is" and
"is not" of divine temporality. What we know about this is limited to that which has
been revealed and even this we "see through a glass, darkly" (1 Cor 13:12, KJV).

I
) God is diminished or impoverished by his (somewhat mysterious) relationship to Accordingly, our human conceptualizations and language about God cannot reach
time as we know it in our experience. Yet, this last statement may notify the careful beyond analogy. 27 Yet, this should neither discourage nor dissuade us from
) confidence in the word of God and pursuit of the highest understanding ofit, even
reader to a further, fundamental issue. What is God's relationship to time and what
is meant by the modifier "time as we know it in our experience"? Is this the same while at the same time recognizing our limitations as creatures.
)
time that God knows in his experience and is his experience in this regard like ours? Canale not only refers to divine temporality as analogical, he accordingly
) makes the crucial conceptual distinction between created time and uncreated time. 28
Divine Temporality as Analogical The time that we know in our experience is "created time," for example, time that
) is measured by the movements of the astronomical bodies that God created out of
This brings us to the crucial modifier of Canale's conception of God's
) relationship to time as "analogical." This notion of analogical temporality serves nothing (i.e., astronomically measurable duration). 29 The minimal conclusion
to recognize the inadequacy of human conceptions of divine temporality. That is, suggested by many of the biblical texts Canale emphasizes in this regard ( cf.
) God's relationship to time is not identical to our relationship to time (univocal). On 102:24-27; 103 :25-27; Heb 1: 10-12) is that there is no incompatibility between God
the other hand, it is not wholly other than our relationship to time (equivocal).24 and "created time." That is God can and does act and interact with creatures in
)
Rather, there is an "is" and an "is not," a likeness and unlikeness, between God's created time and space, and, indeed, enters into the realm of created time and space, ,.
relation to time and ours (consider, for example, the "is" and "is not" of the imago most importantly in the incarnation. ;
dei). 25 Thus, by "analogical" Canale means that God's relationship to time is Beyond what humans know as "created time," on Canale's view, there is also
) "uncreated time" about which we know much less. For Canale, uncreated time is
) that succession of past, present, and future that is coextensive with God's being
23
Unless otherwise noted, all biblical quotations are from the NASB. . such that Scripture describes a "before" the foundation ofthe world (cosmos; John
24
) The distinction between the univocal, analogical, and equivocal use oflanguage has 17:5, 24; Eph 1:4; 1 Pet 1:20; cf Ps 90:2; Col 1:16-17; Rev 10:6), a "before" the
a long history. Consider, in this regard, Thomas Aquinas's influential treatment oflanguage
'; (itself engaging and utilizing Aristotle's treatment) in reference to God as "analogical" in
Summa theologica 1.1.13. Note, however, that the use of.these categories and terminology
) in this essay should not be confused with an endorsement of the manner in which Aquinas Rem)lthologizing Theology: Divine Action, Passion, andAuthorship (New York: Cambridge
employs them in his view of the analogia entis (the analogy of being) and his defense of University Press, 2010), 64. Cf. Abraham Joshua Heschel, The Prophets, Perennial Classics
) (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 349; Peckham, The Concept ofDivine Love, 17-32.
divine simplicity. There is a large spectrum of possible analogy between univocity and 26
equivocity such that one might mean by analogical a great deal of dissimilarity and a "In Scripture, God's time does not have exactly (univocally) the same meaning that
) time has for creation. Likewise, what time means for God is not completely different from
minimum of similarity or vice versa. The use of "analogical" here merely recognizes that
) there is similarity and dissimilarity between God's relationship to time and ours without what it means for man (equivocally). Instead, biblical thinking assumes that God's time and
attempting to specify that which appears to not be revealed regarding the extent of the created time are similar (analogical)." Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 70.
) similarity and dissimilarity in this regard. At the same time, a strong case can be made that See the discussion in ibid., 67-71; Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and
where Scripture does not appear to indicate the extent of similarity and dissimilarity (or Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, 217, 359-64.
27
where such indication is underdetermined), it seems prudent to err toward the univocal end Although the language of"analogy'' itself is not biblical language I do believe the
of the spectrum, in deference to the words of Scripture. minimal concept ofanalogy is a biblical one. For example, the fact that Adam and Eve were
,) created in the image of God without themselves being God presupposes a concept of
25
Often the analogical character of descriptions about God are explicitly noted in the
) canonical text of the Bible itself. Consider the analogical presentation of God's relation to analogy, minimally understood as entailing similarity and yet dissimilarity (or vice versa).
time in the statement: "a thousand years in Your sight are like yesterday as it passes by'' (Ps Moreover, the concept of analogy is apparent in the many instances where God compares
_) 90:4; cf. 2 Pet 3:8; Job 10:4-5; 36:26). To take another example, whereas God is often said and differentiates his own characteristics from those ofhumans. While the emphasis in such
to "repent" (niilzam, e.g., Gen 6:6-7; Ex 32:14; 1 Sam 15: 11, 35; Jer 18:8, 10; Jon 3: 1O; 4:2), instances may be on dissimilarity (e.g., Job 10:4-5) they also presuppose (at least a)
) the canon also proclaims that "God is not a man, that He should lie, Nor a son of man, that minimum of similarity (without which a comparison and contrast in the same terms would
He should repent [niilzam]; Has He said, and will He not do it? Or has He spoken, and will be impossible).
) 28
See Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 62-64.
He not make it good?" (Num 23:19; cf. 1 Sam 15:29). In this regard, perhaps biblical 29
) descriptions of God are not best thought of as anthropomorphic but, rather, "human This is not to suggest that what Canale calls "created time" requires astronomical
capacities to know, will, and love are themselves theomorphic." Kevin J. Vanhoozer, bodies by which it can be measured.
)
)
I

40 JOHN C. P ECKHAM
aion (1 Cor 2:7), and a "before" chronon aionion (Tit 1 :2; 2 Tim 1:9)30 in God's
own life and there is also a future to which God looks forward (cf. Zeph 3:16-17).31
Human knowledge about God's own relationship to time is based on, and limited
to, that which is revealed. For example, that God has a future appears in many
instances that describe God's future delight in H is people, such as Zephaniah 3: 16-
17, " In that day it will be said . . . the LORD your God is in your midst, a victorious
warrior. He wi ll exult over you with joy, He will be quiet in His love, He will
rejoice over you with shouts of joy" (cf. Isa 65:19; J er 32:41).32
With regard to both God's relationship to created time and uncreated time,
Canale views divine temporality as "analogical." This is because, as noted above,
we have an extremely limited conception of God before and apart from his
relationship with the world .33 Further, while humans possess a far better grasp of
created time since it is intrinsic to and inseparable from our own experience
(though, even here there are innumerable mysteries), there remains a great deal that
is unknown to us about God's relationship to created time, about which we need not
30
These texts by themselves are not obviously conclusive, as evidenced by the various
ways in which they are interpreted (including as affirmations of divine
timelessness/atemporality) and the potential ambiguity of the root aiiin (which various
translations render in these verses alone as "ages," "world," "eternal/eternity," et al.). Canale
gives considerable weight to what he sees as the seemingly undeniable temporal force ofpro
("before) in these contexts and much rests on the way the noun aion or the adjective aionios
is understood, especially in phrases such as chroniin aiiinion (2 Tim 1:9; Tit 1:2). See
Canale, Basic Elements ofChristian Theology, 62-64, 143. The only other NT appearance
of chronos with aiiinios appears in Rom 16:25-26 in reference to the "preaching of Jesus
Christ, according to the revelation of the mystery which has been kept secret for long ages
past [chronois aioniois] but now is manifested ... according to the commandment of the
eternal God [aioniou theou]."
31
This conception of God's own experience of uncreated time contrasts with William
Lane Craig's model of divine omnitemporality where God is temporal from the point of the
creation of the world (when time itself was created on Craig's view) but was timeless
without creation. See William Lane Craig, "Timelessness and Omnitemporality," in God &
Time: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 129-160, particularly 153-
159. On Canale's view, the biblical material presents uncreated time "before" the creation
of the world. This view ofuncreated time in the divine life before the creation of the world
might be supported further by reflection on intra-trinitarian love. In short, if divine love
within the Trinity is sufficiently similar to God's love in relationship to the world, as some
believe it is depicted to be in the canon (cf. John 15:9), then divine Jove within the Trinity
might suggest God's analogical temporality prior to the creation of the world (cf. John
17:24). See Peckham, The Concept ofDivine Love.
32
All of these (and many other) texts that suggest God's relationship to time and
temporal interaction with the world may be explained away by a method that takes all such
instances as merely human accommodation to divine language. However, this will not
suffice for theology because all of our language is human language and all revelation
encapsulated in words requires some accommodation. See Peckham, The Concept ofDivine
Love, 17-32.
33
Here and elsewhere ''world" is used to refer not merely to the earth but to the created
universe.
)
41 )
D IVINE P ASSIBILITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY
)
speculate. Scripture, however, claims that God can and does relate to created time
and enter into history but the supposition of analogical temporality includes no )
claim to knowledge of how this operates or p recisely how this affects God.
I am reticent to attempt any dogmatic definition of, or claims about, what
Canale refers to as God's "uncreated " time and (with Canale) I am wary of claims )
regarding how God relates to so-called created time (i.e., astronomically measurable
duration). 34 Indeed, it is questionable whether humans in our present (or any) state )
could conceive of this. well enough to formulate it into human thought. In this
regard, some might question whether Canale's view of analogical temporality is
sufficiently grounded and, accordingly, whether it should be adopted and utilized )
for further theological construction. Has Canale depended too heavily upon some
philosophical categories and conceptions (e .g., those ofHeidegger, among o thers)?
)
Is the analogical temporality of God sufficiently grounded by Canale's
interpretation of the much-disputed "I am" of Ex 3: 14? 35 Is the distinction between
uncreated and created time well-grounded and sufficiently explicated? These are
questions worthy of further exploration. Yet, whether or not one agrees with his
conclusion, I have no question that Canale intends to ground analogical temporality
in so/a Scriptura and he suggests numerous lines ofevidence to support this beyond
Ex 3:14.36 Each of these (and other) lines of biblical evidence deserves further
)
scholarly attention and careful exegetical and theological interpretation. Yet, I
believe the canonical data does point strongly to the conclusion ofGod's analogical )
temporality and should not be dismissed as merely accommodative and/or strictly
anthropomorphic language that is inappropriate to depict God as he truly is (more )
on this below).
It is beyond the scop e and pw:pose of this brief essay to directly address
,. )
questions such as these. However, perhaps an indirect approach to the issue of
divine analogical temporality via consideration' of particular concrete divine
attributes as manifest in the God-world relationship might be beneficial in this and
o ther respects, especially to those readers who might not be well-versed in
h istorical or systematic theology and, particularly, the implications of divine
timelessness (atemporality) in a significant stream of the classical Christian )
tradition.
)
Inverting Theological Method: A Canonical Approach to the Doctrine of God
Thus far, I have briefly explained the basic and limited meaning of analogical
)
temporality. The question remains, however, why should one adopt this notion,
3
' One who wishes to affirm that God is not incompatible with this-worldly "time"
(defined minimally as the succession of past, present, or future) without committing to )
Canale's distinction between created and uncreated time might refer to the time we know
in our experience as astronomically measurable duration. .J
35
See Canale,A Criticism ofTheo/ogicalReason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions.
36
See the few examples given in the discussion above. Consider also Canale's depiction )
of the doctrine of God in this and other regards in Canale, "Doctrine of God"; Canale, Basic
Elements of Christian Theology.
)
}
 /

)
) I
)
JOHN C. PECKHAM
DIVINE P ASSIBILITY, TE:M:PORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 43
) 42
Ps 145:3; Isa 55:8-9). Accordingly, divine ontology cannot be adequately grasped
) even on a minimal and tentative definition such as the one explained in this essay?
I believe that God's analogical temporality (minimally defined) is a conclusion by human speculation. However, God has provided special revelation about himself
) that may be reached from a consideration of the internal logic apparent throughout to humans in the divinely revealed and inspired canon ofScripture.40 Reversing the
the biblical canon. However, since the category of time is exceptionally broad and typical methodology, then, emphasizes and focuses upon the special revelation of
) God as he relates to the world. We know nothing about God outside of that which
encompasses all that humans have experienced or can experience, it is likewise an
) exceptionally broad starting point from which to engage Scripture and/or one's is received via the God-world relationship. Indeed, humans cannot know anything
theological worldview. It may well be that temporality co-appears with Being but about God other than that which comes via the God-world relationship since
) this need not be thought of as a: self-evident phenomenological conclusion or an humans are privy to no experience that transcends the purview of the God-world
unquestionable starting point. relationship. Yet, if God's revelation that is inscripturated in the biblical canon is
)
In my own research, I have seen strong evidence that the dogmatic trustworthy and accurately and adequately depicts God (as I firmly believe that it
) presupposition of broad ontological categories leads to often unforeseen and is and does, though communicated within the limitations of human cognition),
unintended yet far-reaching consequences. As Thomas Aquinas famously stated and whatever is revealed about God via the God-world relationship must be compatible
Canale often echoes, "a small mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end" with God as he is apart from the God-world relationship (though not univocally). 4 1
) indeed.37 The presupposition of any particular divine ontology (or particular On this kind of approach, through careful investigation of the canon of
characteristics thereof) logically implies other affirmations regarding the nature of Scripture, metaphysical implications become evident from the way that the God-
) world relationship is consistently described. After implementing just this approach
God. For this reason, we should not presuppose the conclusions of our divine
ontology when we approach the canonical text. Rather, we should seek to extract on the question of the nature of divine love in relationship to the world, I believe
)
ontological conceptions from the text, and intentionally endeavor to do so both that the notion of analogical temporality pervades the canonical depiction of God,
) unless divine revelation is circumvented via extra-canonical ontological and/or'·
tentatively and self-critically. Therefore, whereas many theological systems start
from a broad conception of who God is, Adventist theological construction should interpretative presuppositions. However, without merely asserting that my ~
) conclusion in this regard is correct, let me demonstrate how such a conclusion.
invert the typical methodology.38 Rather than assuming that one already knows
) what God is like (divine ontology), one should start from the particular revelation might be reached indirectly via a canonical approach that focuses not on the issue
in the canon of Scripture without privileging (as much as is possible) our of divine temporality or atemporality broadly, but specifically on the revelation of
) particular concrete divine attributes manifest in relationship with the world. 42
preconceptions ofdivine ontology and the God-world relationship. Toward this end,
'; and building on Canale's repeated calls for so/a Scriptura theological method, I Systematic Divine Perfections
have outlined and implemented a canonical approach that gives methodological In order to demonstrate this, it is crucial to first recognize the systematic
) priority to the canonical revelation that depicts God relating to the world. 39 relationship between various "perfections" ofthe classical doctrine ofGod.43 When
) This involves an intentional move from considering the doctrine of God
abstractly and prior to the particulars ofbiblical revelation to focusing on the God- 40
On the nature of biblical revelation-inspiration see Canale's groundbreaking work in
) world relationship as depicted in the canon. Such a move coheres with the notion Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching/or the Cognitive Foundation ofChristian
that the nature and attributes of God are beyond human understanding (cf. Job 11 :7; Theology in a Postmodern World; Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology;
)
Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New Approach"; Fernando Luis Canale,
) 37
Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, trans. Annand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical "Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground for a New Approach," Andrews University
Seminary Studies 31, no. 2 (1993); Fernando Luis Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The
Institute ofMediaeval Studies, 1949), 25, quoted in Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration:
Liberal Model," Andrews University Seminary Studies 32, no. 3 (1994); Fernando Luis
Searchingfor the Cognitive Foundation ofChristian Theology in a Postmodern World, 37.
38 For an example of this, see the discussion of the transcendent-voluntarist and Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration : The Classical Model," Andrews University Seminary
) Studies 32, no. 1-2 (I 994); Fernando Luis Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The
immanent-experientialist models of divine love, which promote mutually exclusive
) conceptions of love and mutually exclusive ontologies of God. Therein, each model's Historical-Cognitive Model," Andrews University Seminary Studies 33, no. 1-2 (1995).
41
In this way, quite different than the way in which Karl Rahner applied it, the
concept of God's love flows logically from their divergent divine ontologies. That is, "they
.) move from divine ontology to particular divine characteristics, the latter being shaped by the economic trinity is the immanent trinity.
42
former." Peckham, The Concept ofDivine Love, 3. By concrete I do not mean material or physical, of course, I mean attributes that are
) 39
See John C. Peckham, "The Analogy of Scripture Revisited: A Final Form Canonical demonstrated in specific particular relationship events, which are inscripturated in the canon.
Approach to Systematic Theology," Mid-America Journal ofTheology 22, (2011 ); Peckham, Thus, rather than moving from universal to particular, we invert the order.
) 43
Perfections are one traditional way of speaking of the attributes or characteristics of
The Concept ofDivine Love, 6-17. Cf. Fernando Canale, "Sola Scriptura and Hermeneutics:
Toward a Critical Assessment ofthe Methodological Ground ofthe Protestant Reformation," God. I use this description to emphasize the perfect-being theology that underlies this view
) of God and that is integral to its incompatibility with the Adventist conception of God as
.) Andrews University Seminary Studies 50, no. 2 (2012).

)

44 JOHN C. PECKHAM
one understands what the perfections entail (individually and collectively), it
becomes apparent that the classical (Thomistic) view of God does not stand on the
issue of timelessness alone but is likewise dependent upon a number of other
perfections. This is because the divine perfections proposed in the classical
(Thomistic) conception of God logically support one another (interdependence).
This might be seen in an especially compelling fashion by considering the
traditional view of divine impassibility, meaning that God cannot be affected by
anything outside ofhimself. 44 The issue of impassibility is particularly effective in
dealing with contemporary audiences because it is inextricably linked to the notion
of God's love, which is central to Christian theology and widely considered to be
among the most relevant (if not the most relevant) characteristics of God to
contemporary believers. Thus, whereas divine temporality may be the broadest
category, divine passibility or impassibility is among the attributes of God that are
most easily recognized to be relevant to contemporary audiences.
In this regard, note what divine impassibility suggests. If God cannot be
affected by anything outside ofhimself, he cannot enjoy humans; he cannot actually
be pleased or displeased by us; he cannot experience emotions ( defined as
conscious feeling(s) affected by and responsive to external stimulation). God's love
for us must be unilaterally and disinterestedly willed beneficence.45 As such,
humans cannot elicit God's delight or joy or evoke his wrath. Indeed, nothing that
humans do or that happens to humans could actually affect God. 46 These are very
expressed in Canale's work and elsewhere.
•• Divine impassibility may be defined in a variety of ways, with considerable
implications depending on the definition. Here and throughout this article I use it to refer to
the notion that God cannot be affected by anything outside of himself. Cf. Richard Creel's
definition: "That which is impassible is that which cannot be affected by an outside force.
Hence, impassibility is imperviousness to causal influence from external factors." Divine
Impassibility: An Essay in Philosophical Theology (New York: Cambridge UP, 1986), 11.
On various possible understandings of impassibility, see David Bentley Hart, "No Shadow
of Turning: On Divine Impassibility," Pro Ecclesia 11 (2002): 186-95.
45
As John Piper puts it, "'God is love' is this: it belongs to the fullness of God's nature
that he cannot be served but must overflow in service to his creation. The very meaning of
God is a being who cannot be enriched but always remains the enricher." John Piper, "How
Does a Sovereign God Love?: A Reply to Thomas Talbott," Th e Reformed Journal 33·, no.
4 (1983): 11. This echoes Anders Nygren's claim that God is altogether "indifferent to
value." AndersNygren,AgapeandEros, trans.,Philip S. Watson(London: S.P.C.K., 1953),
210.
46
Within the context of a considerable number of recent and influential criticisms of
divine impassibility, contemporary theologians who maintain that God is impassible fall in
at least two broad categories: those who assert an unqualified impassibility, wherein God is
not affected by anything external to himself and those who maintain a qualified
impassibility, wherein "God is both invulnerable to involuntarily precipitated emotional
vicissitude and supremely passionate about his creatures"' actions and experiences; God is
both "impassible and impassioned." Rob Lister, God Is Impassible and Impassioned:
Toward a Theology ofDivine Emotion (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2013), 152, 153, 143. In
this way, impassibilists propose competing definitions of divine impassibility with the
unqualified impassibilists rejecting entirely any view "that God experiences inner emotional
DIVINE PASSIBILITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 45 )
relevant considerations, especially in relation to consideration of the biblical
revelation about God (see below).
"
Beyond these implications, the issue of divine passibility or impassibility
entails a number of other things about God. Impassibility is required by divine self-
sufficiency (aseity) conceived as God's absolute independence from the world and
divine immutability, conceived as the inability ofGod to change at all, and, further,
divine timelessness is required by this kind of immutability.47 In other words, the
succession of one state of affairs after another and, thus, some kind of temporality
is required for any change (mutability), and passibility itself describes the capacity
for a specific type of change. A timeless God (in the sense defined in this essay)
must be utterly immutable and an utterly immutable God must be impassible. These
implications, taken together with divine omnipotence, omniscience, and the idea
that God "acts"48 upon the world, lend themselves to divine determinism. 49 That is,
changes of state .. . whether freely from within or by being acted upon from without."
J
Thomas G. Weinandy, Does God Suffer? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, )
2000), 39. Cf. Paul Helm, "The Impossibility of Divine Passibility"; Paul Helm, "B. B.
Warfield on Divine Passio," Westminster Theological Journal 69, (2007); Thomas G. J
Weinandy, "God and Human Suffering: His Act of Creation and His Acts in History," in
Divine Impassibility and the Mystery ofHuman Suffering, ed. James Keating and Thomas )
Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009). The qualified impassibilists, on the ( )
other hand, generally recognize that God can be "emotionally" affected by his creatures but
defining emotions in a way that they remain impassible (e.g., non-passive, voluntary, self- !
determined). See Lister, 36, 230. Cf. Paul L. Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible
God: The Dialectics of Patristic Thought, The Oxford Early Christian Studies (Oxford: )
Oxford University Press, 2004); Paul L. Gavrilyuk, "God's Impassible Suffering in the
Flesh: The Promise of Paradoxical Christo logy," in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of )
Human Suffering, ed. James Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2009).
47
By absolute independence I mean that God has no dependence on the world that )
affects his life, his knowledge, etc. Adventists, including Canale, agree with divine self-
sufficiency with regard to God's ontological independence from the world with regard to
God's existence. That is, God does not need any world. Further, I refer to "this kind of
immutability" because immutability might be used in other ways such as in reference to the )
constancy of God's character. See Canale, "Doctrine of God," 109-110. See also the brief
discussion later in this essay.
41
I put "acts" in quotation marks because, on the atemporalist view of classic theism,
"the whole universe from beginning to end has to spring from God in one timeless act."
Keith Ward, God: A Guide for the Perplexed (London: Oneworld, 2013), 142. As Carl F.
H. Henry puts it: " If God is eternal, transcendent being, how, it may be asked, can he act in
the world? The answer given by biblical theism [Henry's name for his form of modified
classic theism] is that God acts by predestination and tbat he is immanent in as well as
transcendent to his created universe." Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, 6
vols. (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976), 6:48. John S. Feinberg(a self-described Calvinist and
yet also a temporalist) comments: "This account of divine action raises several questions,
and atemporalists have replies. Is there temporal succession in God 's atemporal acts since
there is temporal succession in the effects? That is, since each event in time is separate, must
God outside oftime perform a separate act for each individual effect in time? Ifso, there still )
)
)
)
)
46 JOHN C. PECKHAM DMNE PASSIBILITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 47
)
) if God is timeless, thus unqualifiedly immutable, absolutely independent (self- Further, passibility requires that God can be affected by the world and the
sufficiency), and unqualifiedly impassible as well as omniscient, omnipotent, and, experience of being affected requires temporal succession of events (that is, the
) yet, "acts" upon the world, then it is not hard to see why such a God would change from a state of not being affected by something to being affected by
typically be thought of in deterministic terms. something or vice versa).
) Simply put, then, if one can demonstrate that the God of the Bible is passible,
As timeless, God can only act upon a temporal world by timeless
) predestination of particular effects within time. In order for God to timelessly then the God of the Bible cannot be unqualifiedly immutable, absolutely
determine all of ms own "actions" that will take effect in time, he must know independent, or timeless (among other things).52 Accordingly, one who is
) (timelessly) all the actions of any others. Yet, if God's knowledge (omniscience) unconvinced by the various biblical texts that appear to directly address the
is absolutely independent from anything other than himself(as would be required relationship of God to time (whether one trunks the texts point in a direction other
)
by unqualified, absolute self-sufficiency) then how could God know the actions of than divine temporality, are themselves inconclusive, and/or are merely the
) others unless they are determined by his will or his nature? The supposition that unavoidable product of tensed language leaving their implications in this regard
such a timeless, absolutely self-sufficient, immutable, and unqualifiedly impassible underdetermined) might be persuaded by other avenues that point toward the
) conclusion that the supposition of divine timelessness contradicts the biblical
God "acts" upon the world seems to presuppose determinism. If God determines
everything, he also determines evil and arbitrarily chooses to save only some, picture ofGod (in this case, divine passibility). And, iftimelessness is thus rejected,
calling into question his omnibenevolence.50 it follows that God's life must be compatible with created time in some manner,
) which is all that an affirmation of analogical temporality maintains.
Conversely, if God is passible in the sense that he is affected by and responsive
) to the external world, then God cannot be either absolutely independent (Thomistic
self-sufficiency/aseity), utterly immutable (in the Thomistic sense), or timeless (in Divine Passibility in the God-World Relationship as Key Concept
) the sense of incompatibility with time). This is because divine passibility, by With this systematic relationship of classical divine perfections and
definition requires that God can change in the sense ofhaving experiences (denying corresponding implications in mind, we are ready to see how implementing an
) inverted theological method that begins with the particular revelations of concrete
utter immutability) and, accordingly, the experiences of the divine life would not
) be absolutely independent of others (denying unqualified self-sufficiency). 51 divine attributes manifest in God's relationship with the world suggests
considerable theo-ontological implications, including, but not limited to, the notion
) of God's analogical temporality. In this regard, let us briefly consider the question
seems to be sequence and change in God's atemporal acting. The answer to this dilemma of whether the biblical God is depicted as passible or impassible. Just as I make no
'; is that God does not atemporally do each act as a separate exercise of his power. Instead, he attempt to definitively substantiate the truth of analogical temporality, this essay
does everything he plans to do at once. All his actions and responses to all of our actions are
) done in one timeless act." John S. Feinberg, No One Like Him: The Doctrine ofGod, Rev.
does not attempt to definitively substantiate the truth ofdivine passibility. However,
ed., Foundations of Evangelical Theology (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2006), 402. some lines of evidence that strongly point in this direction will be briefly
) mentioned.53
Feinberg explains further: "Though this may sound odd, it is less so for Calvinists who
) believe in God's unconditional decree. In their thinking, God chooses his plan for all of My implementation of the aforementioned canonical approach to address the
history all at once. What about Arrninians who hold afemporal eternity? Typically, they question of the nature of divine love in relationship to the world has led me to the
) reply that God does one act timelessly that includes everything he does and results in all the conclusion that Scripture does maintain that God is passible. Throughout the canon,
effects that occur. This answer is just as consistent with [atemporalist versions of] God is consistently depicted as being affected by the world. To take one strilcing
) Arminianism as with Calvinism, so long as the Arminian theologian believes God knows all example, in Hosea 11 :8 God proclaims, "How can I give you up, 0 Ephraim? How
things, including our future." Ibid.
) •• This is not even to mention the equally interdependent notion of divine simplicity.
This conception, however, is among the most disputed, even by classic theists themselves. passibilist conception of God is (1) absolute self-sufficiency that denies that God may enjoy
) and receive value from the world and, conversely, be displeased and grieved by the world
Thus, we will not broach this issue here due to space limitations.
) '
0
Jerry Walls states in this regard, "A being who determines (manipulates) another and (2) utter immutability, which rules out the ability of God to engage the world in
being to perform evil actions is himself evil. It is even more perverse if a being determines genuinely responsive, give-and-take, relationship (that is, one with bilateral, significant
) a being to perform evil actions and then holds him accountable, and punishes him for those freedom).
actions." Jerry L. Walls, "Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should "Analogical temporality is assumed by divine passibility. If God changes, there must
) Ever Be a Compatibilist," Philosophia Christi 13, no. 1 (2011): 88. be succession in his life, then the question moves to the primordiality of that succession,
" This is not to deny moderate conceptions of God's self-sufficiency taken to mean that which moves to a different canonical discussion. See the brief discussion of Craig's view
) of God as omnitemporal earlier in this essay.
God does not need any world and immutability, taken to mean that ontologically God is not 53
A survey of the canonical evidence can be seen in Peckham, The Concept ofDivine
) becoming greater or lesser and God's character of love is constant such that God does not
Love, 235-300, 399-456.
break his promises and always acts in the most loving way possible. What is denied on this
)
)

.,l-1
!~
48 JOHN C. PECKHAM
can I surrender you, 0 Israel? How can I make you like Admah? H ow can I treat
you like Zeboiim? My heart is turned over within Me, All My compassions are
kindled." This is passionate language that depicts God as experiencing intense (i.e.,
gut-wrenching) emotions that are prompted by his people's rebellion. By definition,
then, these are passible emotions. 54 Elsewhere, God is "moved to pity [na!iam] by"
his people's "groaning" (Judg 2: 18),55 "could bear the misery oflsrael no longer"
(Judg 10:16),56 and is " moved by prayer" for the land (2 Sam 21 :14; cf 24:25; 1
Kings 8:50-53). Conversely, God is repeatedly provoked to jealously by his
people's unfaithfulness (Deut 32:21; Ps 78:58); humans repeatedly grieve, vex, and
anger God: "How often they rebelled against Him in the wilderness and grieved
Him in the desert! Again and again they tempted God, and pained the Holy One of
Israel" (Ps 78:40-41; cf. Is 63: 10; 1 Cor 10:5). Many other texts also depict God as
passible in that he experiences profound emotions that are elicited or provoked by,
and responsive to, humans (see, e.g., Gen 6:5-6; Hos 9:15; 11 :8-9; Isa 49:15; 63 :9,
15; 66;13; Jer 18:7-10; 31:20; Ps 78:40-41 , 58-59; 103:13;Matt20:34; 23 :3 7; Mark
1 :41; Luke 15:20; James 5:11). 57 JohnN. Oswalt notes Scripture's return "again and
again" to God's "compassion: his tenderness and his ability to be touched by the
pain and grief of his people."58
Whereas many biblical texts suggest that God experiences passible emotions,
no biblical text or passage asserts divine impassibility. This is recognized even by
some i.mpassibilis ts. For example, Rob Lister states, "Scripture never makes a direct
assertion of a metaphys ical doctrine of divine impassibility;" the Bible "does not
54
The "heart" [leb] being turned over is an idiom similar to that of today (e.g., gut-
wrenching) that describes emotional feelings. The description ofGod's compassions (nifzum)
as "kindled" (kmr, niphal) is also a striking depiction of emotionality as kmr appears
elsewhere to depict the most intense of human emotions such as the mother who appears
before Solomon, "deeply stirred [kmr, niphal + rafziimfm ] over her son" whom Solomon
commands to be divided (1 Kings 3:26). Similarly, see Joseph's emotions over his brothers
(Gen 43 :30). Cf. Butterworth, NIDOTTE 3:1093; Stoebe, TLOT 3: 1226.
55
The word ne'ii.qd, "groaning," appears with a causative mem (minna' qatam, "because
of their groaning") indicating the causal relationship between God's hearing oflsrael' s pain
and his compassionate feelings for them. See Daniel I. Block, Judges, Ruth (NAC 6;
Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1999), 130. This usage "signifies sorrow at the hurt or pain
of another and a desire to come to the victim's aid." Dennis T. Olson, "The Book ofJudges,"
in New Interpreter 's Bible (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1998), 2:756.
56
This refers to deeply passible affection. Literally, God's "soul was shortened at the
trouble oflsrael" (Judg 10:16). In the only other three instances where the syntagm nepes
+ q,sr appears it refers to humans who have become weary or impatient (Num 21 :4; Judg
16: 16; Zech 11 :8). See Robert D. Haak, "A Study and New Inteipretation of Qsr Nps,"
Journal of Biblical Literature 101, no. 2 (1982), 161-7.
57 See also Heschel, 285-3 57. For a helpful discussion ofsome passibilist hermeneutical
approaches to language of divine pathos see Matthew R. Schlimm, "Different Perspectives
on Divine Pathos: An Examination ofHerrneneutics in Biblical Theology," Catholic Biblical
Quarterly 69, no. 4 (2007): 673-94.
58
The Book ofIsaiah: Chapters 40-66 (NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998),
299.
)
)
DIVINE P ASSIBILITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 49
supply" this "theological category."59 While biblical evidence for unqualified divine
impassibility (that which excludes that God is affected by the world) is entirely
lacking, an abundance of data that depicts God experiencing responsive emotions
appears throughout the canon. As Lister recognizes, " the biblical portrayal ofdivine
emotion is both p owerful and pervasive. One cannot r ead Scripture and come away
with the conclusion that God is affectionless."60
There is, then, compelling evidence for the conclusion that Scripture depicts )
God as passible, that is, God is consistently d escribed as experiencing emotions that
are affected by and responsive to human dispositions and/or actions and m any
scholars have also arrived at this conclusion. 6 1 Of course, impassibilists are n ot
unaware of the many texts that d epict God as being affected by the world . How,
then, can they claim that God is impassible? Some, such as Lister, d o so by
asserting qualified impassibility wherein "God is truly impassioned" yet God is also I I
"invulnerable to involuntarily precipitated emotional vicissitude."62 This maintains,
i )
in effect, that emotional language does correspond (analogically) to God but his
emotions ( and, for Lister, the events to which they respond) are determined by his·
will. In Lister' s words, God is emotionally "affected by his creatures" but "in ways J
that accord rather than conflict with his will."63 Thus, God remains qualifiedly .J
impassible because that to which he responds is itself a product of his own
)
determination. Under some definitions, this qualified impassibility is itself a form
ofpassibilism, and clearly departs from the (unqualified) impassibility that is the )
59
Lister, 190, 173. He recognizes that there is no direct textual evidence even for his ,.
own view ofqualified impassibility. It is, he claims, the product of"second-ordertheological
reflection on Scripture's first-order statements." Ibid., 173.
60
Ibid., 195. Lister rej ects the accornmodationist rationale for dismissing canonical
)
language of divine emotions and adopts a qualified impassibility that, he claims, does not
exclude the responsive divine emotions that appear in the biblical text. Ibid., 171.
61
To take just a few examples of the many scholars (from a broad spectrum of
backgrounds) that have embraced a passibilist perspective, see Jiirgen Moltmann, The
Crucified God: The Cross ofChrist as the Foundation and Criticism ofChristian Theology,
trans. R.A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Hatper & Row, 1974), 222; Wayne
Grudem, Systematic Theology: A n Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI:
Zondervan, 1994), I 66; Paul S. Fiddes, The Creative Suffering ofGod (Oxford: Oxford UP,
1988), 50; Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Suffering Love," in Augustine's Confessions: Critical
Essays, ed. William E. Mann (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 136.
62
Lister, 187, 175. In doing so, Lister breaks in a significant way from many traditional
tenets. For instance, he rejects the dissolution of "all of the affective connotations into )
expressions of the divine will" and the "adjustment of the Augustinian stance on divine
eternity, such that the eternal God is capable of having actual in-time [and responsive] j
relations with his creatures." Ibid., 106. At the same time, he considers his qualified )
passibility to be in agreement with the mainstream tradition. Ibid., 95, 103, 106. See also
Gavrilyuk, "God's Impassible Suffering in the Flesh: The Promise of Paradoxical
Christology," 13 1.
63
Lister, 36, 230.
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)
50 JOHN C. PECKHAM
focus of this essay. 64 Lister's view, then, agrees that God has responsive emotions.
It seems to me that the primary feature that differentiates Lister's qualified
) impassibility from the passibility suggested in this essay is his view ofdeterminism.
However, significant questions arise for a view that treats the biblical testimony of
) nature of biblical language. That is, since the language of Scripture is human
God's responsive emotions as responses to that which he has unilaterally and
) causally determined. Although I cannot make my case adequately here, I am
convinced that an indeterministic perspective prevails on a thoroughly canonical
) reading.65 Apart from presupposing that conclusion, however, one might ask how
) we should make sense of God's frequent laments (themselves examples ofpassible
emotions) ifhe himself is the unilateral cause of that over which he laments? Hosea
) 11 :8 is itself an example of this kind of scenario but consider also Christ's lament:
"Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those who are sent to her!
) language for this reason is self-defeating. Any attempt to replace the biblical
How often I wanted [thelo] to gather your children together, the way a hen gathers
) her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling [thelo]" (Mt 23:37; cf. Lk
\. 13:34; Jn,5:40; Ezek 3:7). 66 Would it not be exceedingly strange to suggest that
)
Christ is lamenting over that which he unilaterally willed to be the case when he
) could have just as easily willed it to be otherwise?
Unqualified impassibilists, on the other hand, who wish to maintain that God
) is not affected by the world at all, contend that depictions of divine "emotion"
should not be taken to describe God as he actually is but as accommodative
) understanding of the extent of the "is" and "is not" of biblical' ianguage as it
depictions of God in human language, presenting God in a way that does not
) actually apply to him to accommodate our human understanding. This method
appears to presuppose that one might know (or does know) what God is like apart
) from canonical revelation.
) This raises a crucial question: Should one understand biblical depictions of
divine emotion to mean that God is passible or is there some compelling reason(s)
) to suppose that God is impassible and, thus, reinterpret the many biblical instances
that depict God as affected by the world (i.e., passible)? To presuppose that God is
) seriously the apparent exegetical meaning of all canonical language about God as
impassible and thus reinterpret texts that would appear to suggest otherwise directly
) contradicts a sofa Scriptura approach to theological method (i.e., a canonical
approach). In other words, for one who affords primacy to the canon in theological
;,)
method, the presupposition ofimpassibility, left unjustified by the data ofthe canon
) itself, is insufficient.67 This is especially so when one considers that impassibility
J 64
Lister recognizes that his view might be labeled as passibilism on Creel's definition.
Ibid., 150.
') 65
See, in this regard, John C. Peckham, "Does God Always Get What He Wants? A
) Theocentric Approach to Divine Providence and Human Freedom," Andrews University
Seminary Studies 52/2; John C. Peckham, "Providence and God's Unfulfilled Desires,"
) Philosophia Christi 15, no. 2 (2013); Peckham, The Concept ofDivine Love, 577-584.
66
Notice that bilateral significant freedom and passibility dovetail in this instance of
) human rejection of God's love.
67
Texts that are sometimes offered to support this view, such as Mal 3:6 and Num
j 69
23:19, do not assert immutability or impassibility (that is, they do not assert that God is
unaffected by the world). Rather, they are situated within a context in which God is affected
)
and responsive and thus seem to refer to God's constancy of character rather than
)
)
DIVINE PASSIBILITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 51
is not only left unsubstantiated by the canonical data but there is an abundance of
data that points in the opposite direction (only a fraction of which was mentioned
earlier). 68
The maneuver utilized by some impassibilists is to rely on the accommodative
language that accommodates human thought patterns, it is claimed, one should not
nai:vely think that the biblical descriptions of God accurately describe him. Rather,
such depictions must be read with the traditional presupposition of impassibility as
a hermeneutical guideline. Yet, as already seen, this requires some compelling
reason, which, on a canonical approach, requires an appeal to canonical data, not
extra-canonical supposition. Moreover, all language available to any human
interpreter is human language. The dismissal of the exegetical upshot of figurative
description of God itselfrequires human language. In other words, any substituted
conception of God (e.g., impassibility) also makes use of imperfect human
language. Recognizing this limitation, one need not expect that human language
applies to God uni vocally but, if the language is to correspond to God somehow
(otherwise it is equivocal and conveys nothing at all about God)., there must be
some likeness between the description of God and God as he is.
On a canonical approach, the interpreter does not presume -to arrive at an
corresponds to God. Rather, the interpreter should look for canonical controls that
provide some clarity. Where none are apparent ( or are not yet uncovered), one may
err toward the univocal side of the spectrum in handling the text while recognizing
at the same time that we are always limited to seeing through a glass darkly (1 Cor
13: 12). As Nicholas W olterstorff puts it, "an implication of accepting Scripture as
canonical is that one affirm, as literally true, Scripture's representation of God
unless, on some point, one has good reason not to do so."69 This approach takes
understood in light of the entire canonical data, while recognizing that such a
procedure will still unavoidably produce an imperfectly analogical conception of
God.
Therefore, in light of the canonical evidence that depicts God as experiencing
passible emotions, and absent a compelling canonical rationale to interpret such
passages (individually or collectively) in a way that rejects passibility, I believe that
the God revealed in Scripture is passible. Conversely, I believe the canonical data
does not cohere with divine impassibility understood as God's imperviousness to
being affected by the world. Rather, the God depicted in the biblical canon is
emotionally affected by and responsive to the significantly free actions of
impassibility.
68
See Peckham, The Concept ofDivine Love, 235-300, 399-456.
Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Could Not God Sorrow If We Do?" in The Papers of the
Henry Luce III Fellows in Theology, ed. Christopher I. Wilkins (Atlanta, GA: Scholars
Press, 2002), 140.
 )

52 JOHN C. PECKHAM DIVINE PASSIBILITY, TEMPORALITY, AND THEO-ONTOLOGY 53 )

creatures. 70
If this interpretation of the canonical evidence is correct, then it appears that
the passible God of Scripture is not unqualifiedly immutable, absolutely
independent, timeless, or deterministic (among other things). Again, insufficient
evidence has been presented in this essay to properly judge this claim but I hope
that enough evidence has been presented to encourage those who might be
considering this claim to consider the wider canonical evidence along these lines.
The passibility of God, so understood, has numerous significant implications; it is
central to the operation of the God-world relationship, the notion of God's love as
ideally reciprocal, and a number of wider tenets of theology. Indeed, while
p assibility requires temporality many do not believe that temporality would require
passibility. Moreover, temporality by itself does not require indeterminism, but
p assibility (of the kind offered in this essay) does entail indeterminism.
Accordingly, divine passibility (as defined here), no less than analogical
temporality, is required for the coherent understanding of various doctrines of
Adventism (including, but not limited to, the Great Controversy and the sanctuary
doctrine). In this manner, divine passibility presents an important and promising
avenue to not only the acceptance of some form of divine temporality, but a
considerable number ofother potential theo-ontological implications. 7 1 In this way,
an inverted methodology that focuses on the particulars of the canonical depiction
of God in relationship to the world might bear considerable fruit.
)
(5) If this interpretation of the canonical evidence is correct, then the passible
God of Scripture is not unqualifiedly immutable, absolutely independent, )
timeless (that is, incompatible with temporal succession), or deterministic
(among other things). ' )
Attention to the canonically revealed God-world relationship thus brings )
relational divine attributes to the forefront, including God's love, delight, grief,
passion, and compassion (among others). In my view, this is a helpful avenue to the j
continued systematic construction of the Adventist doctrine of God and the )
communication of this construction to others. Proper recognition of how God
himself is canonically depicted in the God-world relationship highlights (among
other things) the fact that our lives are of immense import to God; he is deeply
concerned about us and passionately seeks love relationship with us. Even as he
actively works to providentially guide history to this end, God himself awaits and
longs for the ultimate eschatological reconciliation when his joy and the joy of all
those who love him will finally be full (Zeph 3: 17; 1 Cor 2:9; 1 John 1:4). )
John C. Peckham (Ph.D., Andrews University) is Associate Professor of Theology and
Christian Philosophy at the Theological Seminary ofAndrews University in Berrien Springs, )
MI. Guided by Canale, John's dissertation (The Concept ofDivine Love in the Context ofthe
God-World Relationship, New York: Peter Lang) won the outstanding dissertation award. )
)

)
Conclusion
This essay has suggested, then, that: )
(1) Analogical temporality in no way impoverishes God but, on the contrary, ,I I
removes from God the limitation of incompatibility with time (i.e.,
timelessness or atemporality).
(2) Analogical temporality is a characteristic that is inextricably bound up
with other conceptions of God's nature such that multiple avenues might .)
be taken that lead to a conclusion that supports Canale's contention that
God is not timeless but analogically temporal.
(3) One such avenue is that of divine passibility, which (so conceived) is
incompatible with divine timelessness and entails some form of divine
temporality.
(4) The canonical evidence strongly suggests that God is passible, where
passibility is minimally defined as b eing affected by the world.
J
10
As Robert Jenson puts it, despite the "subtle qualifications and real insights involved
in the tradition's sophisticated massaging of the notion of impassibility.... in any sense of
impassibility perceptible on the face of the word, it will not do as an attribute ofthe God of
Scripture and dogma." "Ipse Pater Non Est lmpassibilis," in Divine Impassibility and the
Mystery ofHuman Suffering, ed. James Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, )
MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 120.
71
In this way, it seems that much of what is most importantly entailed by Canale's
concept of God is covered by a basic acceptance of minimally defined passibility, and
temporality, minimally understood, is itself then required as a broader category. .J

)
)
)
)
HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 55
) Hermeneutics of Doctrine and Theological
Deconstruction: The Contribution of "the inner logic and contents of biblical thought."3 In other words, the systematic
theologian seeks to understand the biblical way of thinking regarding a particular
) Fernando Canale for Doctrinal Studies subject, and not merely provide an outline of what the Bible teaches about a
specific topic. The final task of systematic theology is to offer an interpretation of
) reality through the lenses of the biblical way of thinking, and not only a summary
) Adriani Milli Rodrigues 1 of biblical passages. In fact, Canale's definition seems to be close to John
Webster's affirmation that "systematic theology occupies itselfmore generally with
) Christian claims about reality."4 Apparently, they agree that the focus of systematic
) theology is on the interpretation of reality from a Christian (Webster) or biblical
The main idea presented in this chapter is that the understanding oftheological (Canale) perspective. This focus on reality implies a close relationship between the
) deconstruction offered by Fernando Canale constitutes a significant methodological study of theology and ontology.
framework for studies in systematic theology, particularly for a hermeneutical Another important clarification concerns the notion of doctrine. According to
) analysis of Christian doctrine. For the sake of clarity, before explaining Canale's Collin Gunton, systematic theology and Christian doctrine can be used as
) notion of theological deconstruction, I will ( 1) introduce key concepts that justify interchangeable terms but, strictly speaking, they have different meanings. In his
the need of deconstruction in doctrinal studies and (2) describe its hermeneutical words, "doctrine is what is taught by the church; as the officially agreed teaching
) nature. To enrich this discussion, I will present Canale's ideas in dialogue with of the institution; while theology is a more open-ended activity; whose efforts may
other theologians. Then, I will (3) indicate how he engages in the task oftheological or may not be accepted as doctrine in the course oftime. " 5 However, this distinction
) deconstruction in the context of the doctrine of revelation and inspiration, in order is not absolute, since "Christian doctrines are theological; while theology is of!en
) to show what this deconstruction looks like. After this example of theological centrally concerned with the church's official doctrine."6 Considering this
deconstruction, I will (4) conclude the present study by highlighting significant perspective, I assume in this chapter that studies on doctrine are part of the task' of
) limitations and possibilities of Canale's project of deconstruction in theological systematic theology.
) research.

) 1. Definition of Terms and the Need of Theological Deconstruction

'Fernando Luis Canale, "Is There Room for Systematics in Adventism?," Journal of
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify what is meant by systematic theology the Adventist Theological Society 12, no.2(2001 ): 121-122. See also Fernando Luis Canale,
) and doctrine in the context ofthis chapter. First, Canale's conception of systematic Basic Elements ofChristian Theology: Scripture Replacing Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI:
) theology goes beyond Wayne Grudem's definition of a "collection and then the Andrews University Lithothec, 2005), 26-27.
summary of the teaching of all the biblical passages on a particular subject. " 2 To be 4
John Webster, Introduction of The OxfordHandbookofSystematic Theology(Oxford:
) sure, the study of such biblical passages is crucial for systematic theology. Oxford University Press, 2009), 1. Wolfhart Pannenberg also refers to reality as an important
However, the goal of systematic theology is not merely a summary of the biblical component of his definition of systematic theology. For him, systematic theology is "an
) effort in constructive thought in order to exemplify how the God of the Bible can be
teaching, but an attempt "to interpret the whole of reality" through the lenses of
) understood as creator and Lord of all reality." Wolfhart Pannenberg, An Introduction to
Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991 ), 18. Similarly, Walter Kasper
) assumes a close relationship between theology and reality in his treatment ofChristology.
In his words, "in Christology we are ultimately concerned with the Christian understanding
) ' I have had the privilege of working closely with Dr. Fernando Canale in my PhD of reality in the broadest sense of the word." Walter Kasper, Jesus the Christ, New ed.
program. Actually, I was interested in his writings since my undergraduate studies in Brazil. (London; New York: T&T Clark, 2011 ), 9.
) 5
Colin Gunton, "Historical and Systematic Theology," The Cambridge Companion to
At Andrews University, I benefited from several courses taught by Dr. Canale. Currently,
) I have the opportunity ofbeing mentored by him in my doctoral dissertation. Dr. Canale has Christian Doctrine, edited by Colin E. Gunton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
been a major influence in my academic development as a systematic theologian. 2004), 17. Alister McGrath stipulates that '"doctrine' implies reference to a tradition and a
2
Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine community" and "'theology' more properly designates the views of individuals." Alister E.
(Leicester, England; Grand Rapids, MI: InterVarsity; Zondervan, 1994), 23.According to McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the Foundations of Doctrinal Criticism
J Grudem, "systematic theology is any study that answers the question, 'what does the whole (Oxford, UK; Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), 10-11.
6
Bible teach us today?' about any given topic. This definition indicates that systematic Gunton, "Historical and Systematic Theology," 17. As McGrath emphasizes, "in
) many ways ... the distinction between doctrine and theology is somewhat artificial at
theology involves collecting and understanding all the relevant passages in the Bible on
various topics and then summarizing their teachings clearly so that we know what to believe points, perhaps reflecting differences in emphasis rather than differences in substance."
) McGrath, The Genesis ofDoctrine, 12.
about each topic." Ibid., 21.
)
)

56 ADRIANI MILLI RODRIGUES
The assoc1at1on of the ideas that systematic theology focuses on the
understanding ofreality from a biblical perspective and that studies on doctrine are
an important task of systematic theology can be highlighted by the notion of
Hellenization of Christian doctrine. Studies on the historical development of
doctrine in Christian theology indicate an assimilation of Greek metaphysical
conceptions in the explanation of biblical material, promoted chiefly by "the
expansion of Christianity into a Hellenistic milieu in the first centuries of its
history."7 As Gunton indicates, in the context of the idea of Hellenization of
theology, the historical development of Christian doctrines is generally interpreted
in three ways: ( 1) the presence of Greek elements in Christian doctrines represented
a clear distortion of the original faith (Adolf von Harnack); (2) the use of Greek
categories in the development of doctrine basically unfolded "what was already
implicit in the original faith" (J. H. Newman); and (3) the development of Christian
doctrine involved an ambivalent rejection and assimilation ofHellenism (Jaroslav
Pelikan).8
Following this third interpretation,9 Alister McGrath discusses the
Hellenization ofChristian doctrine from a hermeneutical perspective. In his remarks
on "the expansion of Christianity into a Hellenistic milieu in the first century," he
argues that "the move from the repetition or reiteration of scripture to doctrinal
exposition through an already existing language [Greek] and conceptual framework
[Hell enism], inevitably carried with it the demand for an engagement with the view,
or range of views, ofreality already associated with that language and conceptual
7
McGrath, The Genesis ofDoctrine, 4. See in this volume Rodrigo's study on Canale 's
use of historiography, where he works with the concept of Hellenization.
8
Gunton, "Historical and Systematic Theology," 5. Pelikan highlights that "the
accusation" of Hellenization "recurred in the attacks of the Reformers on medieval
scholasticism, but it was in modern times that the idea of dogma as the hellenization of
Christianity became a widely circulated explanation of the development of early Christian
doctrine. Taken as it stands, 'hellenization' is too simplistic and unqualified a term for the
process that issued in orthodox Christian doctrine. Nevertheless, it is true that in its
language and sometimes in its ideas orthodox Christian doctrine still bears the marks ofits
struggle to understand and overcome pagan thought, so that what later generations of the
church (including those generations that were themselves ignorant of antiquity) inherited in
the dogma ofthe church included more than a little of Greek philosophy as well." Taking
the example of the early apologists "as the interpreters of the church to the Gentile world,"
Pelikan argues that "their attitude toward ancient culture is contradictory." Jaroslav Pelikan,
The Emergence ofthe Catholic Tradition (100-600), The Christian Tradition: A History of
the Development of Doctrine (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 45 (emphasis
supplied).
9
According to McGrath, "we fail to do justice to the pressures confronting early-
Christian thinkers ifwe represent them as simply incorporating pre-existing philosophical
or civil views of the divine attributes." He also affirms that, similar to the experience of the
early-Christian thinkers, "there is a temptation for every generation of theologians to bring
a cluster of inherited metaphysical commitments as self-evident, requiring no further
justification, to the task of theology. McGrath, The Genesis ofDoctrine, 5.
)
HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 57 )
)
framework." 10 As a result, "the data of scripture and the Christian tradition were
thus interpreted in the light ofpresuppositions, within a hermeneutical framework,
alien to their sources." 11 Therefore, McGrath emphasizes that the problem of
Hellenization is essentially hermeneutical, as Christian doctrine tends to be
interpreted through presuppositions of a Greek view of reality. According to
Canale, the main presupposition of the Greek hermeneutical framework that was
incorporated into Christian theology was the timeless conception of Being. He
summarizes the assimilation of this concept of reality of Greek philosophy into
Christian theology in four steps:
)
first, the most universal and all-inclusive of all hermeneutical principles
is the concept of Being. Second, Parmenides originated the classical
tradition that interprets Being from a timeless horizon. Third, when Plato
and Aristotle decided to build their ontologies from the timeless horizon
suggested by Parmenides, Western philosophy fixed the macro- )
hermeneutical direction from which classical and modern philosophies and
theologies would be constructed. Fourth, classical Christian theology
sealed its intellectual destiny when Justin Martyr (implicitly) and Origen
and Augustine (explicitly) interpreted God and human nature as
)
nontemporal and nonhistorical from within the Platonic ontological
tradition. 12
In fact, many scholars have argued that by assuming a Greek notion ofBeing,
Christian theology has traditionally conceived God guided by non-biblical
presuppositions, 13 particularly from a timeless perspective. 14 Since "theological
J
10
Ibid., 4.
11
Ibid., 5.
12
Fernando Luis Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?," Andrews University )
Seminary Studies 44, no. 1 (2006): 11 5.
13
See Anthony C. Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2007), 39-40; Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being: Hors-Texte, trans. Thomas
A. Carlson (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1995); Stanley J. Grenz, The Named God
and the Question of Being: A Trinitarian Theo-Ontology (Louisville: Westminster John
Knox Press, 2005), 15-89.
14
See Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and )
Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral
Dissertation Series IO(Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews UniversityPress, 1987); Canale, Basic
Elements of Christian Theology; Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical
Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2000), 17; Clark H. J
Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology ofGod's Openness, Didsbury Lectures (Carlisle,
UK; Grand Rapids, MI: Paternoster Press; Baker Academic, 2001), 7. Many scholars have
discussed the relationship between God and time, from different standpoints. See William )
Lane Craig, Time and Eternity: Exploring God's Relationship to Time (Wheaton, IL:
Crossway, 200 l); Garrett J. DeWeese, God and the Nature ofTime, Ashgate Philosophy of )
Religion Series (Aldershot, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004); Gregory E. Ganssle, ed.,
God and Time: Four Views (Cumbria, UK: Paternoster, 2001); Gregory E. Ganssle and
)
)
)
58 ADRIAN! MILLI RODRIGUES
)
) hermeneutics recognizes that our doctrine of God affects the way we interpret the
Scriptures," 15 and Christian "doctrine reflects the nature ofGod," 16 the concept of
) a timeless God has a major hermeneutical impact on the elaboration of doctrines.
By using the term onto-theo-logy scholars have indicated that Greek ontology
)
has traditionally been the metaphysical ground of Christian theology. 17 From
) Canale's perspective, this paradigm indicates that reason (logia) is informed by our
understanding of reality (ontology - ontos) and of God (theos), where Greek
) understand tradition, distinguish it from Scripture, anq criticize its contents, we will
ontology conditions the reality of God as timeless. 18 According to this view,
) Christian doctrines are epistemologically (reason) elaborated from this ontological
and theological standpoint. Similar to other theologians, Canale proposes that the
) acknowledgment ofChristian theology as ontotheological calls for a deconstruction
of this structure, 19 and then the replacement of onto-theo-logy by theo-onto-logy. 20
)
For him, a theo-onto-logy uses the reality of God, as informed by Scripture and not
) elements are not biblical, it is necessary to construct new conceptions from a
) should deconstruct all theological traditions including their own. Deconstruction is
) David M. Woodruff, eds., God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature (Oxford; New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002); William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, Cornell
) Studies in the Philosophy ofReligion (Ithaca, NY; London: Cornell University Press, 1998);
Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God without Time (Oxford; New York: Oxford
)
University Press, 2010); William J. Hill, Search for the Absent God: Tradition and
) Modernity in Religious Understanding (New York: Crossroad, 1992); Eunsoo Kim, Time,
Eternity, and the Trinity: A Trinitarian Analogical Understanding of Time and Eternity
) (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2010); Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity, Cornell Studies in
the Philosophy ofReligion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991 ); John J. O'Donnell,
) Trinity and Temporality: The Christian Doctrine of God in the Light ofProcess Theology
and the Theology ofHope, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford; New York: Oxford
) University Press, 1983); Alan G. Padgett, God, Eternity, and the Nature of Time (Eugene,
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2001); Nelson Pike, God and Timelessness, Studies in Ethics and the
) perspective.
Philosophy of Religion (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1970).
) ts Kevin J. Vanhoozer, First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers
Grove, IL; Leicester, England: InterVarsity; Apollos, 2002), 10.
) 16
Thiselton, The Hermeneutics of Doctrine, 63.
17
See Martin Heidegger, "The onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in
) Identity and Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Iain D. Thomson,
Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics ofEducation (Cambridge; New
) York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 7-43; Marion, God Without Being, 35-38; Grenz,
The Named God and the Question of Being, 15-130; Canale, A Criticism of Theological
) Bergson, Whitehead, and Hartshorne, ed. David Ray Griffin (Albany: State University of
R eason, 19-284; Brian D. Ingraffia, Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology: Vanquishing
) God's Shadow (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 119.
18
See Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 397.
) 19
See David R. Griffin, "Reconstructive Theology," in The Cambridge Companion to
Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge
J University Press, 2003), 102; Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?," 95-130;
lngraffia, Postmodern Theory and Biblical Theology, 167-224.
) 20
See Grenz, The Named God and the Question ofBeing, 90-373; Canale, A Criticism
) ofTheological Reason, 285-387. The term theo-onto-logy suggests an ontology defined by
God's self-disclosure in Scripture.
)
)
HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 59
by Greek philosophy, to formulate a view ofreality as a whole (ontology), which
provides an epistemological framework for the construction ofChristian doctrines. 21
This means that the transition from onto-theo-logy to theo-onto-logy demands
a work of deconstruction, which is intended as a preparation for a new theological
construction.22 Actually, Canale believes that the deconstruction of tradition is one
of the characteristics of Adventist hermeneutics, because "this methodological
approach is necessary for the application of the sofa Scriptura principle. Unless we
unavoidably confuse ideas received from tradition with biblical on~s."23
Canale defines deconstruction as a "methodological procedure by which we
analyze the systems ofbiblical interpretation and doctrinal construction. Beginning
from the totality of their claims, deconstruction follows the inner logic oftraditional
positions to identify the basic elements on which they stand."24 If these basic
biblical perspective. He adds, "theologians working from the sola Scriptura matrix
not an end in itself but the necessary step leading to biblical interpretation and
doctrinal construction."25 •
In short, I have indicated in this section that ( 1) systematic theology focuses Qn
the understanding ofreality from a biblical perspective; (2) studies on doctrine are
an important task ofsystematic theology; (3) in early Christianity, biblical doctrines
underwent a process ofHellenization; ( 4) this Hellenization is hermeneutical in the
sense that Christian doctrines were constructed based on ontological
presuppositions that follow a Greek view of reality (especially the timeless view of
God); (5) with this Hellenization in mind, the deconstruction of Christian doctrine
21
Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 401-402. The application ofthe language
of the-onto-logy to the elaboration of doctrine represents my conclusion of Canale's
22
According to Griffin, there are two types of postmodern deconstruction:
deconstructive/eliminative and constructive/revisionary. The former attempts to overcome
the modem worldview through the deconstruction or elimination of the ingredients
necessary for a worldview, and is mainly associated to Derrida's work. Conversely, the latter
aims to deconstruct the modem worldview "not by eliminating the possibility ofworldview
as such, but by constructing a postmodern worldview through a revision ofmodem premises
and traditional concepts." David R. Griffin, "Introduction to Suny Series in Constructive
Postmodern Thought," in Founders ofConstructive Postmodern Philosophy: Peirce, James,
New York Press, 1993), viii.
23
Fernando Luis Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist
Theology. Part I: Historical Review," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 15, no.
2 (2005): 9. He perceives this characteristic in early Adventists, who "were aware of the
traditions of Christianity their former churches embraced. Yet, instead of taking them as
either sources of theology or hermeneutical guides for the interpretation of Scripture or the
understanding of its doctrines, they decided to engage them critically." Ibid.
24
Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 23.
2
' Ibid.

60 ADRIANI MILLI RODRIGUES
is a necessary step in systematic theology for a construction of doctrine based on
a biblical view ofreality.
2. The Nature of Theological Deconstruction
The nature of theological deconstruction is essentially hermeneutical.26
Considering that the hermeneutical work focuses on the level of presuppositions,
a hermeneutjcal deconstruction facilitates a new construction of doctrine because
this work deals with its epistemological foundations. Canale points out that the
"principles that guide theological interpretation and construction"27 are found at the
hermeneutical level. This means that it is necessary to observe and evaluate how
theological models of doctrine have been structured from a hermeneutical
standpoint. Studies on hermeneutics indicate two helpful concepts for the
understanding ofthe cognitive process involved in the construction of a theological
model of doctrine: (1) the fusion of horizons and (2) the spiral movement of
induction and deduction. Christian theologians usually construct theological models
based on their reading and interpretation of Scriptures, and this process of
interpreting biblical data is characterized by a.fusion ofhorizons, which refers to the
horizon of the text and the horizon of the interpreter. This fusion "does not allow
the interpreter to speak of an original meaning of the work without acknowledging
that, in understanding it, the interpreter's own meaning enters in as well."28 To put
it differently, hermeneutics is not only about texts that are read, but also about the
mind of the reader, because interpretation "takes place when [these] two sets of
horizons are brought into relation to each other."29
The horizon ofthe interpreter encompasses the pre-understanding that he or she
brings to the text, which is defined as "the initial application of a tentative working
26
Canale indicates, "the hermeneutic method basically involves the identification of
the subject matter to be clarified and the presuppositions required for its clarification." Back
to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive Foundation of Christian Theology
in a Postmodern World (Lanham, MD; Oxford: University Press of America, 2001 ), 128.
27
Fernando Luis Canale, "Evolution, Theology, and Method: Part 3 Evolution and
Adventist Theology," Andrews University S eminary Studies 42, no. 1 (2004): 10.
28
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and M ethod, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G.
Marshall (London; New York: Continuum, 2004), 578. In this discussion, I do not fully
subscribe to Gadamer's notion of the fusion ofhorizons, as I assume that the horizon of the
biblical text is authoritative. Therefore, the horizon of the reader needs to be progressively
shaped by the horizon of the Bible. A potential criticism of my point here is that I advocate
not a fusion but a replacement of horizons, where the horizon of the reader is progressively
replaced by the horizon of the text. My answer to this challenge is that, descriptively
speaking, the fusion of horizon is what happens in the initial act of reading. Furthermore,
from a prescriptive standpoint, to be shaped by the horizon of the text does not necessarily
mean replacement. For example, the horizon of the text may refine, adapt, or correct the
horizon of the reader. Neither of these three possibilities require a replacement of the
horizon of the reader.
29
Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and
Philosophical Description (Carlisle, UK; Grands Rapids, MI: Paternoster; Eerdmans, 1993),
103. . Investigations 13 (New York Seabury, 1975), 61.
HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 61 )
)
assumption to set the understanding going and on its journey toward a fuller
appreciation of all that this might entail. " 30 As the "understanding begins to move )
and to grow, we may discover that certain aspects of our preliminary understanding
)
need to be corrected while other aspects seem to be proving their value."31
Therefore, the relationship between the horizon of the text and the pre-
understanding of the reader is not a matter of warfare involving "nonnegotiable
fixed presuppositions."32 Rather, "preliminary understanding and responsible J
journeys into fuller understand.ing leave room for renegotiation, reshaping, and )
correction in the light of subsequent wrestling with the parts and the whole."33
The process of understanding, described by the reshaping of presuppositions )
through the interactions between the parts and the whole, is properly explained by
Grant Osborne in terms of a spiral movement of induction and deduction.34 More
specifically, in the process ofconstruction oftheological models, theologians move
spirally using inductive and deductive reasoning. Inductively, they move from
observations of specific texts in Scripture (the parts) to the composition of broad
theories or concepts (the whole). Deductively, they apply"hermeneutical principles
and previously formed theological decisions [the whole] to the text itself [the
parts]." 35 In other words, the starting point ofthe inductive movement is the h orizon
ofthe text, while the deductive movement starts with the horizon ofthe interpreter.
Ideally, the theologian needs to work constantly in this spiral movement "to refine )
the model on the basis of an increased understanding of the data." 36 In an ideal
situation, the horizon of the interpreter is gradually shaped by the horizon of the
text, that is, the pre-understanding and presuppositions of the theologian are
progressively informed by the biblical data. Considering that theology is a "process
of human reflection upon the revelation of God," 37 the work of theological
deconstruction as a revision of what has been constructed by the mind of the
)
)
30
Anthony C. Thiselton,Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2009), I 3, 15.
31
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
34
Similarly, Bernard Lonergan argues that the process of understanding is "a self-
correcting process oflearning that spirals into the meaning of the whole by using each new
part to fill out and qualify and correct the understanding reached in reading the earlier parts."
Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Method in Theology (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990),
159.
35
Grant R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to )
Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1991), 298.
36
Ibid. )
37
Karl Rahner, Theology, Anthropology, Christology, trans. David Bourke, Theological
)
)
)
)
62 ADRIAN1 MILLI RODRJGUES HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 63
)
) theologian/interpreter is always necessary to keep Christian theology spirally According to Canale, one of the main presuppositions at the macro-hermeneutical
moving in a growing understanding of God's revelation in Scripture. 38 level is the principle ofreality (ontology), which includes the interpretation of the
) Even though Osborne correctly highlights that the presuppositions that reality of God, human beings, and the world. 42 Arguably, the discussion of any
theologians bring for the construction ofa theological model or system need to be theological issue involves God, human beings, and the world, which indicates that
) the principle of reality permeates the understanding of any theological issue.
shaped by the biblical data, he seems to discuss these presuppositions basically at
) the level oftheological traditions.39 Although this is a legitimate discussion, it is not Canale argues that the notions of time or timelessness function as primordial
able to properly grasp the philosophical influence ofthe onto-theology (mentioned presuppositions that condition the macro-hermeneutical principles. 43 This means
) that, with the influence ofGreek ontology on Christian theology, God and heavenly
above) that stands behind and informs those theological traditions. As Millard
) Erickson points ou t, "our interpretation ofthe Bible is affected by our philosophical realities have been conceived as timeless, therefore affecting the macro-
presuppositions."40 These presuppositions are at the level ofphilosophical or macro- hermeneutical principles of reality (interpretations about the reality of God,
) hermeneutical principles, which guide theologians in the interpretation of biblical humans, and the world) and, thus, distorting the interpretation of the biblical
texts and in the construction of theological models and systems. doctrines. 44 In contrast to this situation, Erickson seems to provide a general
) perspective for the development of a theo-ontology. He affirms the necessity of
For Canale, there are three levels ofhermeneutical principles according to the
) nature oftheological interpretation: micro-hermeneutics (biblical/textual principles using "the Bible to formulate our presuppositions, thus avoiding the problem of
of interpretation), meso-hermeneutics (theological/doctrinal principles of distortion from external presuppositions."45 Actually, he proposes a construction of
) interpretation), and macro-hermeneutics (the most inclusive ontological,
) epistemological, and articulation principles o f interpretation).41 This distinction of 42
Canale, "Evolution, Theology, and Method: Part 3," I 0. Christoph Schwebel stresses
the levels of hermeneutical principles implies that the influence of theological the need for constructing an ontology based on these three principles of reality (God,.,
) traditions, as Osborne's emphasizes, occurs at the level of meso-hermeneutics, humans, and the world), more specifically, taking into account "the interactions ofGod with:
while the influence of philosophical presuppositions behind the theological particular human beings in a world of particular characteristics." In this way, the biblical'"
) "descriptions of the interaction between God, human beings, and the world" needs to be
traditions, as Erickson highlights, takes place at the level of macro-hermeneutics.
taken "seriously in an ontological sense." In other words, "who God is, how God and what
) God is, becomes clear from the relationships he establishes, maintains, and restores with his
38
While affirming that theology is a "fallible human work," Barth emphasizes the creatures. And consequently, who, how, and what a human being is become clear from the
"human task of criticizing and revising its speech about God." In fact, he thinks that the way God relates to human beings and invites them to relate to their God, to one another, and
) existence oftheology is justified by its task of humbly guiding the talk of the church about to their world. A relational view of reality is therefore an exercise in descriptive biblical
God. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, I/1 (Peabody: Hendrickson, 2010), 3-4. metaphysics which hopes to avoid the risks of subjecting the biblical witnesses to a prior
) 39
"We do not simply move from the Bible to theological assertions, and those metaphysical scheme." Christoph Schwobel, "Recovering Human Dignity," In God and
assertions are not automatic reproductions ofbiblical truths. Rather, all decisions are filtered Human Dignity, ed. R. Kendall Soulen and Linda Woodhead (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
) 2006), 48.
through a network of tradition and preunderstanding, which itself exerts tremendous 41
influence upon our interpretations and choices. To this extent each decision we make is Canale, A Criticism a/Theological Reason. The notion oftimelessness refers to "the
) absence of time and space. A timeless reality does not experience the flow from past to
provisional and we must establish a continual dialogue between tradition and biblical text
) in the spiral upward to truth." The understanding of presuppositions in terms of theological present and future." On the other hand, time is not conceived as "a thing" or a "container."
tradition is also evident when he emphasizes the need of a conscious reconstruction of our Rather, it "co-appears with things," is "relative to reality," and implies "past-present-future
J pre-understanding: "if we desire an honest re-examination of the issue, we must define flow." Fernando Luis Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology: A
carefully where we and our tradition stand on the doctrine before beginning the study.... Hermeneutical Study of the Revelation and Inspiration of the Bible (Berrien Springs, MI:
) Andrews University Lithothec, 2005), 93, 250-252.
Unless these are brought to the surface they will dominate and skew the research, for it is 44
natural to want the evidence to corroborate rather than challenge our presuppositions." Canale summarizes this historical process in the following way: "first, the most
) universal and all-inclusive of all hermeneutical principles is the concept of Being. Second,
Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 308,315 (italics mine).
) 40
Millard J. Erickson, Truth or Consequences: The Promise and Perils of Parmenides originated the classical tradition that interprets Being from a timeless horizon.
Postmodernism (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001), 326. Third, when Plato and Aristotle decided to build their ontologies from the timeless horizon
) 41
Canale, "Evolution, Theology, and Method: Part 3," 21. Canale borrows the language suggested by Parmenides, Western philosophy fixed the macro-hermeneutical direction from
of macro-, meso-, and micro- from Hans Kung. See Hans Ku""ng, Theology for the Third which classical and modem philosophies and theologies would be constructed. Fourth,
) Millennium: An Ecumenical View (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 134; Fernando Luis classical Christian theology sealed its intellectual destiny when Justin Martyr (implicitly)
Canale, "Evolution, Theology, and Method: Part 1 Outline and Limits of Scientific and Origen and Augustine (explicitly) interpreted God and human nature as nontemporal and
) nonhistorical from within the Platonic ontological tradition." Canale, "Deconstructing
Methodology," Andrews University Seminary Studies 41, no. 1 (2004): 67n9. While Kung
employs these terms in his discussion of paradigms, Canale adapts them to his discussion Evangelical Theology?," 115.
) 45
Erickson, Truth or Consequences, 327.
of hermeneutics.
)
J

64 ADRIANI MILLI RODRIGUES
philosophical presuppositions (in Canale's language, macro-hermencutical
principles) through a spiral process of biblical study:
since the Bible is to supply our philosophical conceptions, but our
discerning of those within the Bible is itself affected by our antecedent
philosophy ... a series of incremental changes will be necessary. We
should seek to discern whether the Bible gives us a metaphysic, then
check against it our own conceptions, correcting them to fit, then repeating
the exegesis, again matching the results to our philosophy, and continuing
in this process. 46
In summary, theological deconstruction, at its deepest level, is an analysis of
the macro-hermeneutical principles of reality upon which theological models have
been constructed. The final goal ofthis deconstruction is to evaluate whether these
hermeneutical principles derive from the biblical data. Ifthe answer is negative, the
deconstruction may clear the way for a new theological construction.
3. Theological Deconstruction of the Doctrine of Revelation and Inspiration
In order to better grasp the application of Canale's notion of theological
deconstruction to the study of doctrine, a brief methodological description of his
study of the doctrine ofrevelation and inspiration is helpful. 47 In the book Back to
Revelation-Inspiration, after his introductory remarks (chapter 1), the author
explores the ontological ground of the meaning of revelation and inspiration
(chapter 2), and then conducts a hermeneutical analysis (expounded in chapter 3)
ofthe classical ( chapter 4) and liberal (chapter 5) models ofrevelation-inspiration.48
The hermeneutical analysis of these two models leads him to the elaboration of a
new model of revelation-inspiration, namely, the historical-cognitive model
(chapter 6). Even though the language of theological deconstruction d oes not seem
46
Ibid.
47
This description is focused on the book Back to Revelation-Inspiration. A more
popular and expanded version of the ideas presented in this book is found in The Cognitive
Principle ofChristian Theology: A Hermeneutical Study ofthe Revelation and Inspiration
of the Bible (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithothec, 2005). Even though
Canale has dealt with the doctrines of God, the Trinity, and Creation in Basic Elements of
Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University Lithothec, 2005), his more scholarly treatment of a doctrine is the analysis of
revelation and inspiration in Back to Revelation-Inspiration. This is the reason why I have
selected this doctrine and this book.
48
In The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 181-224, Canale adds a third
model, "the evangelical model," which is similar to the classical model. In his words, these
two models are different "only in selection and emphasis." The Cognitive Principle of
Christian Theology, 185.
)
HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 65 )
)
to be employed in the book,49 the conception of deconstruction is present in the
hermeneutical analysis of the classical and liberal models. )
According to the outline of the book depicted above, the hermeneutical
analysis of the models is preceeded by the definition of the ontological ground of )
the investigation of the referred doctrine. Based on the idea that Scripture is the )
starting point or the source of data for the study of the doctrine of revelation-
inspiration,50 Canale attempts to provide, from Scripture,5 1 an initial and general )
phenomenological description ofthe reality or the ontological ground ofrevelation- )
inspiration. He points out that "revelation involves God's action in the process of
generating ideas in the mind of the prophet, whereas inspiration involves God's )
action in the process through which the prophets wrote down the revealed ideas and
)
produced the Bible."52 The author assumes that this is only a formal definition of
the reality ofrevelation-inspiration, which broadly indicates an interaction between )
God and human beings (the prophets) that is initiated by the former. As a formal
description, there is no precise or material definition of the terms revelation and
inspiration at this point.53 Indeed, Canale argues that different understandings ofthe _,)
nature of God and human beings will generate distinct conceptions or models of the
doctrine ofrevelation-inspiration. 54 In other words, the nature of God and human )
beings are two crucial categories in the formal description of the doctrine of
revelation-inspiration, while the understanding these categories (God and human
beings) or the specific definition of their nature are crucial presuppositions or
principles of the material description of the doctrine. 55 In this sense, the author
explains that the hermeneutical analysis ofthis doctrine "proceeds by clarifiying its •)
subject-matter [revelation-inspiration] from the point ofview ofprinciples that play
the role of organizing presuppositions." 56
)
•• One explanation for the absence of this language in the book is that Canale attempts
to distance himselffrom the postmodern "deconstructive-eliminativeproject" that is usually )
associated to Derrida's philosophy. See Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 8.
so Ibid., 11, 17.
" He mentions passages such as Dan 2:28; Gal 1: 12; Eph I: 17; Rev I: I for revelation,
and 2 Tim 3: 16; 2 Pet I :21 for inspiration. Ibid., 35.
Sl Ibid.
)
s3 Ibid. For Canale, "the formal subject matter of revelation appears as the divine-
human encounter, which may be epistemologically interpreted by any possible doctrine of
revelation." Ibid., 58.
J
s, Ibid., 3 5-36. )
ss According to Canale, "the presuppositional structure that is uncovered by the
phenomenological analysis of the formal subject matter of the doctrine of revelation and
inspiration includes: first, an interpretation of God and His acts; and second, an
interpretation of human nature along with its cognitive and linguistic functions. Once these
ideas are given actual content by way of interpretation, they become the 'principles' that are )
required by hermeneutical methodology to process the biblical data in search of a
clarification of the subject matter itself, that is, of the revelation-inspiration process that )
originated Scripture." Ibid., 60.
s6 Ibid., 60.
)
)
)
)
66 ADRIAN1 MILLI RODRIGUES HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 67
)
As I mentioned above, Canale's conception of theological deconstruction is conclusions, the author suggests the historical-cognitive model of revelation-
) inspiration ( developed in chapter 6), which in his opinion is coherent with the
present in his hermeneutical analysis of the classical and liberal models. He
) basically attempts to deconstruct these models by uncovering their macro- claims of Scripture about itself and is also coherent with the actual characteristics
hermeneutical principles ofreality, more especifically the nature of God and human of Scriptures. The development of this model in chapter 6 provides a new material
) description of the formal elements of revelation-inspiration. This material
beings.57 The hermeneutical deconstruction of each model reveals the impact of its
) understanding of the nature of God and human beings on the interpretation of the description derives from the following key presuppositions: a temporal-historical
divine activity in revelation-inspiration, the human activity in revelation-inspiration, notion of God's nature and actions and also ofhumanity and its cognitive faculties.
) Canale acknowledges that this chapter is, in fact, a "sketch in broad strokes" of"a
the essence/nature of revelation-inspiration, and the content of revelation-
inspiration. Indeed, the focus of the author is on the material description provided preliminary outline of a revelation-inspiration model. " 60 At the end of the book, he
)
by the two models of the formal categories (God and human beings) that constitute recommends the development of an epistemology in the historical-cognitive model,
) hermeneutical principles that condition two different views of the doctrine of which will ground the discussion of the accuracy of Scripture, and then the
revelation-inspiration (the classical and liberal models). These hermeneutical development of a full doctrine of revelation-inspiration "from an analysis of the
) claims and phenomena ofScripture."61
principles-interpretations of the nature of God and human beings-determine the
) understanding of divine and human activities in revelation-inspiration, and the To sum up, the author performs a theological deconstruction of the classical
essence and content ofrevelation-inspiration. In short, Canale indicates the material and liberal models of revelation-inspiration by focusing on how the macro-
) differences of each model, while assuming that all models share the same formal hermeneutical principles of reality that undergird the doctrine (God and human
general structure of the doctrine. beings) are ontologically understood in each model. According to Canale, this
) deconstruction showed that the interpretation of these herrneneutical principles in
Overall, after the material description of the classical and liberal models of
) revelation-inspiration, the author concludes that "both models fall short of both models produced a picture ofrevelation-inspiration that is incompatible with
formulating a theoretical explanation of the epistemological origin of Scripture in the claims of Scripture about itself and with the actual characteristics of Scriptures:
) In addition, his theological deconstruction suggests that a new model is needed,
which the full scope of the claims of Scripture about itself-the so-called doctrine
) ofScripture-and the phenomena ofScripture--actual characteristics of Scriptures more specifically, a model that is based on a different interpretation of the
as they are given to us-are properly accounted for without contradiction."58 From hermeneutical principles (a different interpretation ofthe nature of God and human
a herrneneutical perspective, Canale argues, the key elements behind the beings). In this sense, Canale 's deconstruction facilitates the development of a new
inadequacy of these models are the timeless notions of God's nature and actions model ofrevelation-inspiration, which is broadly outlined by him in chapter 6.62
)
(classical and liberal models) and the timeless view of the essence of humanity or
) the human soul and its cognitive faculties (classical model).59 Based on these 4. Limitations and Possibilities
After this brief presentation of Canale's theological deconstruction as a
) herrneneutical analysis ofChristian doctrine, some questions regarding the viability
)
57
I have indicated above that there are three macro-hermeneutical principles ofreality ofthis methodological framework for studies in systematic theology can be raised.
in Canale's perspective, namely, the reality of God, human beings, and the world. While the In my concluding remarks, I do not cover all the possible questions. Moreover, even
) reality of the world is not explicitly addressed in Back to Revelation-Inspiration, Canale's the questions addressed here do not receive full treatment. Rather, my intention is
treatment ofthe doctrine ofrevelation-inspiration in each model seems to implicitly include to initiate a conversation about them. In my opinion, Canale's theological
) the understanding the reality of the world in the different interpretations of the interaction deconstruction constitutes an interdisciplinary approach that connects historical,
between God and human beings (the prophets) in the process ofrevelation and inspiration,
) philosophical, and biblical theologies in the process of doing systematic theology.63
particularly in the sense that these models assume a difference between the realm of God (a
) timeless/spaceless environment) and the realm of human beings (a temporal/spacial 60
environment), and therefore, they attempt to explain how this God performs the activity of lbid., 127.
61
revelation-inspiration in the human temporal/spatial world or how the prophets are elevated Ibid., 152.
) 62
This concise summary of the book Back to Revelation-Inspiration may give the
to the divine timeless/spaceless world.
) 58
Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 127. Concisely, "the classical model seems to have wrong impression that the book is simplistic. A proper understanding ofCanale's analysis
difficulties in properly accounting for the phenomena of Scripture while the liberal model ofrevelation-inspiration requires the reading of his book. The purpose of the present study
) appears to find greater difficulty in following what Scripture says about itself. ... the is not to describe or evaluate the arguments developed in the book, but to briefly depict the
classical model has difficulties accounting for the contributions of the human agency while methodological steps taken by the author.
) the liberal model is unable to properly include the divine as depicted in Scripture." Ibid.,
63
Millard Erickson appropriately indicates that systematic theology studies doctrine
115. The arguments that lead to these conclusions are developed in chapters 4 and 5. particularly in relationship with historical, philosophical, and biblical theologies. See Millard
) 9 J. Erickson, Christian Theology (Grand Rapids, Ml: Baker, 1985), 22-28.
' Ibid., 130-131.
)
)

68 ADRIANI MILLI RODRIGUES
First, the discussion of different models of a specific doctrine in Christian theology
requires some work in historical theology, where the ideas of
representatives/theologians of distinct views are studied. Second, the description of
the macro-henneneutical presuppositions that undergird each model involves
explorations in philosophical theology. Thirdly, the analysis and evaluation ofthese
presuppositions in the light of Scripture entails the study of biblical theology.
While this interdisciplinary endeavor constitutes an important feature of
Canale's approach, it also opens up a number of questions from these sam e
theological areas. For instance, historical theologians may question the use of
models to describe different views of a doctrine. When a model is being
deconstructed, what is actually deconstructed? Whose ideas are being analyzed? Do
the theologians m entioned in each model receive proper treatment? Are their ideas
described according to the framework of thought from where they were generated?
Canale acknowledges that "no particular theologian ... will fit exactly the type or
model that he or she represents."64 At the same time, he claims that "models are
useful tools" that show "the structural articulation ofthe main components involved
in the interpretation of any given doctrine," and "help to identify the general
characteristics of any theological position, school, or trend." 65 Therefore, the
general approach employed in the description of models is helpful for a depiction
of the basic ideas of a theological trend. 66 Furthermore, biblical theologians may
criticize the lack of exegetical analysis in Back to Revelation-Inspiration, especially
in the presentation of the historical-cognitive model. On this point, Canale suggests
that a "full doctrine of revelation-inspiration" still "needs to be d eveloped from an
analysis of the claims and phenomena ofScripture."67
In addition, those with philosophical concerns may criticize Canale's approach
by saying that he has a cognitive-propositionalist view of doctrine, meaning that
"doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective
64
Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 76.
6
' Ibid.
66
It is important to emphasize that the use of models in theology is not something
created by Canale. Rather, this is a regular practice adopted by many theologians. See, for
instance, Ian G. Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradig ms: The Nature of Scientific and
Religious Language (London: SCM, 1974); AveryDulles,Mode/s ofRevelation (Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis, 1992); Kevin W. Irwin, Models of the Eucharist (New York: Paulist Press,
2005); Ian T. Ramsey, Mode ls and Mystery (London; New York: Oxford University Press,
1964); Stephen B. Bevans, Models of Contextual Theology, Faith and Cultures Series
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002); Jeanine Diller and Asa Kasher, Models of God and
Alternative Ultimate Realities (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013); Avery Dulles, Models of the
Church (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974); Ku··ng; John F. O'Grady, Models ofJesus
Revisited (New York: Paulist Press, 1994); Howard A. Snyder, Models of the Kingdom
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 200 I); David Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order: The New
Pluralism in Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
61
Ibid., 152.
)
)
HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 69 )
)
realities."68 This criticism goes along the lines of George Lindbeck's analysis ofthe
nature of doctrine, who argues that doctrines are not really about "ontological truth )
claims."69 In Lindbeck's "cultural-linguistic" perspective, doctrines are a grammar
or a regulative language that expresses a Christian form of life (following )
Wittgenstein's idea oflanguage game).70 According to this view, when doctrines
are taken as the regulative language of a community instead of ontological
metaphysical claims, "attention is focused on the concrete life and language of the )
. community," as doctrines are "to be followed rather than interpreted."71 Concisely,
Lindbeck's contraposition of concrete life and ontological claims intends to
promote a view of doctrine that is focused on Christian life and practice. 72 This
rejection of ontology as a key aspect of Christian doctrine is highly problematic. In
his critique to Lindbeck, McGrath correctly emphasizes that a proper understanding
ofdoctrine as regulative language necessarily requires an ontological reference for
this language.73 For example, the apostle Paul indicates that the belief in the
eschatological resurrection is grounded in the resurrection of Christ as an .)
ontological claim (see 1 Cor 15 : 12-20). 74 Without this ontological claim, there is
61
George A Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine: Religion and Theology in a Post liberal
Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), 16. The cognitive-propositionalist view of
doctrine is the target ofLindbeck's criticism in this book. See ibid., 79-80. J
69
Ibid., 80. Lindbeck's rejection of doctrines as ontological claims is evident in the )
following statements: doctrines "assert nothing either true or false about God and his relation
to creatures, but only speak about such assertions." Ibid., 69. Doctrines "affirm nothing
about extra-linguistic or extra-human reality." Ibid., 80. Doctrines should not be taken as
J
affirmations about "the inner being of God or of Jesus Christ." Ibid., 94.
70
Ibid., 18. See also ibid., 81. Wittgenstein is a major influence on Lindbeck's view of
doctrine. See ibid., 24, 33. For further information about Wittgenstein's thought, see the .)
chapter written by Moses in this volume.
71
Ibid., I 07. Following the conception that doctrines are "intrasystematic rather than
ontological truth claims" (ibid., 80), Lindbeck argues that doctrines provide "a rule of )
speech" and not an "ontological reference." Ibid., 94. In fact, he affirms that "supernatural
explanations are quite unnecessary" (ibid., 83). He explains that "speculations on the
possible correspondence of the Trinitarian pattern ofChristian language to the metaphysical
structure of the Godhead" are not prohibited, but "these are not doctrinally necessary and
cannot be binding." In this way, "ontological interpretations ofthe Trinity do not, or should
not, be made communally normative for the way Christians live and think." To put it simply, )
"the question of the ontological reference of the theories may often be unimportant for
theological evaluation." Ibid., 106.
72
Lindbeck maintains that his "focus on praxis" requires an "opposition to the doctrinal
relevance ... of metaphysical oriented theological speculation." Ibid., 107-108.
73
McGrath, 29. McGrath argues that sometimes Lindbeck "seems to suggest that that
conceiving theology as the grammar of the Christian language entails the abandonment of
any talk about God as an independent reality and any suggestion that it is possible to make
truth claims (in an ontological, rather than intrasystemic, sense) concerning him." Ibid.
74
My point here is that the resurrection of Christ goes beyond the language of the
Christian community, because it actually happened as an ontological reality. Ifthis were not
the case, the Christian belief or teaching (doctrine) about the resurrection would be
meaningless. In the words of Paul, "if Christ is not risen, then our preaching is empty
)
)
)
)
70 ADRIANI MILLI RODRIGUES HERMENEUTICS OF DOCTRINE & THEOLOGICAL DECONSTRUCTION 71
)
'\,, no doctrine ofthe eschatological resurrection ofthe dead. This means that doctrines Adriani Milli Rodrigues is a Ph.D. candidate in systematic theology at Andrews University
and a professor of theology at the Adventist University of Sao Paulo (Engenheiro Coelho,
are a grammar of the Christian faith that is necessarily grounded in ontological
) Brazil). One ofhis research interests is the theme of the priesthood of Christ, explored from
claims. What is open to debate is to what extent the doctrines should specify the a biblical, systematic, and philosophical perspective. He is married to Ellen Rodrigues and
) details of the ontological claims, and not the necessity of those claims. has one daughter, Sarah. Email: adriani.milli@unasp.edu.br.
Despite this major weakness in Lindbeck's notion of doctrine, he properly
) contends that doctrines are connected to Christian life and practice. Commenting
on Lindbeck's conception of doctrine, McGrath recognizes that doctrines are "not
)
purely cognitive statements."75 Similarly, before dealing with the doctrine of God
) and other doctrines in his book Basic Elements of Christian Theology, Canale
assumes that theological reflection on doctrines is intrinsically related, among other
) things, to the Christian experience of faith and discipleship.76 With this practical
) conception in mind, the reading of Lindbeck's book warns that cognitive-
propositional accounts of doctrine tend to underemphasize the role of doctrine in
) Christian life. Considering that Canale's Back to Revelation-Inspiration invites a
full biblical analysis of Scripture (as I mentioned above), I would suggest that his
) work of theological deconstruction also invites a careful and intentional reflection
) on how the doctrines to be deconstructed are closely associated with the Christian
form oflife. In this sense, systematic theology, and therefore the study of doctrines,
) is not only about ontological realities, but also about the practical realities of
) Christian life and community.77
The questions mentioned above regarding the concerns of historical, biblical,
) and philosophical areas reveal that theological deconstruction is a vast
interdisciplinary task that demands ongoing efforts from theologians of different
)
areas of expertise. It would be unfair to minimize the contribution of the
) deconstruction provided by Canale, or by any other systematic theologian, for not
addressing all the specific aspects involved in the task theological deconstruction.
) In other words, Canale's project of deconstruction could be appreciated for raising
) issues for further research, and not immediately underestimated for what it lacks.
Indeed, the theological deconstruction conducted by a systematic theologian
) provides a general perspective ofa doctrine that can be inductively refined, adapted,
and criticized by the subsequent work of experts from other theological areas. As
)
a matter of fact, this would keep the hermeneutical spiral moving not only in the
) individual mind of one theologian, but also in the interdisciplinary conversation of
several theologians, who collectively seek a growing understanding of God's
) revelation in Scripture.
)
)
[Ke:-vov] and your faith is also empty [Ke:vri]" (1 Cor 15:14 NKJ). Of course, the belief in
J Christ's resurrection rests on faith. However, this faith makes an ontological claim.
15
Ibid., 20.
J 76
Canale, Basic Elements ofChristian Theology, 33-34.
77
) This perspective follows Vanhoozer's emphasis that Christian doctrine has the
"purpose of fostering truthful ways ofliving." In this sense, doctrine is "a prescription for
) reality."Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The Drama ofDoctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to
Christian Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005), xii, 14.
)
)

What is decisive is not to get out ofthe circle but to come into it in the right way.
... [O}ur first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-
sight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular
conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these
fore-structures in terms of the things themselves. Martin Heidegger 1
But where are the means to overcome the anarchy of opinions that then
threatens to befall us? Wilhelm Dilthey2
Narrowing the Hermeneutical Circle:
Fernando Canale on Reason, Revelation,
and Truth
Zane Yi
1. Introduction
"If you were my son, I would not advise you studying there." I still
remember, and deeply appreciate, the advice Fernando Canale gave me many
years ago. I had been admitted into a PhD program to study philosophy and
religion and was considering my next steps. Although I had never formally
studied with him, I took Canale's advice seriously. It was one of the contributing
factors to me not matriculating into this program. And a few years later, when I
was again considering graduate school, I ended up taking more of Canale's
counsel from that same e-mail exchange-"If you are serious about studying
philosophy, go study at a Catholic institution."
I didn't fully understand the wisdom of this rather counter-intuitive
recommendation until I progressed much further in my studies. Generally
spealcing, it turns out that the study o f philosophy at Catholic schools is done
with a serious appreciation of the history of the discipline, from ancient to
contemporary times, as well as its intersections with theological thought. Other
schools, including Protestant ones, tend to approach the study of philosophy with
less historical and cross-disciplinary sensitivities, focusing directly on various
philosophical problems. 3
1
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1962), 195.
2
Wilhelm Dilthey, "Reminiscences on Historical Studies at the University ofBerlin"
in Selected Works, vol. 4, Hermeneutics and the Study ofHistory (ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel
and FrithjofRodi; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 389.
3
These two approaches to philosophy are commonly referred to as 'continental' and
'Anglo-American' philosophy.
l _)
\ )
NARROWING THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 73
)
These two approaches to philosophy are not mutually exclusive, but one of
the beneficial outcomes of the former approach is the awareness it brings to the )
different ways human reasoning has been conceived and how this affects the
)
way one thinks of and approaches issues. According to numerous contemporary
philosophers, reasoning is fundamentally hermeneutical. What we experience,
and what and how we think about it, is shaped by a variety of factors; human
understanding always takes place against a framework of assumptions, with our )
assumptions shaping what we experience and how we experience it.4 . )
This is an insight that has been central to Canale's scholarship.5 His
approach to theology, cumulatively, is one that can be affirmed for recognizing )
and grappling with the epistemic reality of the hermeneutical circle. Yet,
Canale's affirmation of this view of reasoning en tails a view of meaning that
)
introduces numerous epistemic gaps; this raises several issues that need to be
more substantively addressed, especially when it comes to the interpretation of
Scripture. What applies to reason generally applies to reason when it engages
Scripture. There is no privileged or neutral position; rather there is a plurality of
interpretations. This means an approach to Scriptural interpretation that affirms a
hermeneutical view of reason calls for not only careful study of the text, but
critical and constructive dialogue between individuals, communities, and
)
traditions about their resp ective interpretations of the text. I will explore some
alternative approaches to theology that broach this reality, showing how they )
address the trajectory implied by the view ofreason Canale affirms.
)
2. Reason and the Hermeneutical Circle )
Canale's view of reason is one that has remained consistent throughout the
course of his publications. It is laid out for the first time in his dissertation "A
Criticism of Theological Reason" (CTR).6 All reasoning, for him, is guided by
presuppositions, and, therefore, interpretive ('hypothetical'). This view ofreason
has been significantly influenced by a variety of philosophers working from the )
phenomenological tradition. Following Nicolai Hartmann,' Canale assumes that
' In the words of Robert Pinto: "In the long run my guesses, anticipations, and
interpretations will prove ·correct only to the extent the presumptions I make are largely
correct. At the same time, the presumptions I make at any moment are influenced by my
anticipations and interpretations and in the long run will be largely correct only if my
anticipations and interpretations are reliable" (77). Robert Pinto, Argument, Infe rence and
Dialectic (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001).
' Due to practical constraints, in what follows, I will be focusing mainly on three works
from different periods-early, middle, and recent---0f Canale' s career.
6
In latter works, he repeatedly footnotes his dissertation. See Fernando Canale, A
Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions
(Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987). )
7
Canale claims in his dissertation that Hartmann's work Grundzuge einer Metaphysik
der Erkenntis is "the best available work" on the phenomena of knowledge, providing a
complete and detailed analysis (A Criticism ofTheological Reason, 27, fn. 2.) He proceeds
to draw extensively from this work, particularly section 1.5. Hartmann continues to be )
)
)
)
)
)
74 ZANE YI NARROWING THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 75
)
all cognitive meaning is derived from the interaction of 'subjects' (the ones that thinkers. The Pre-Socratic philosopher, Parmenides, distinguished between the
) observable, temporal world of change and flux with a timeless and changeless
are reasoning) together with 'objects' (what is being reasoned about). "If one
) pole is absent there is no knowledge, no meaning, no logos," Canale claims. 8 reality that can be grasped only by reason. According to Canale's analysis,
"These poles, in their structural relationship constitute equiprimordially the philosophers and theologians have accepted this basic distinction and
) understanding of reality, ultimately positing God as being timeless and
whole of the meaning of any possible knowledge." 9
) Furthermore, Canale has been influenced by hermeneutical philosophers changeless, and reason as capable of grasping timeless truth(s) about God and
who affirm that all reasoning is guided by basic 'frameworks,' or implicitly held reality. Canale argues that Christian theologians should derive their
theories, that influence what is explicitly experienced and reasoned about. In presuppositions from God's self-revelation in Scripture, which provides an
other words, reasoning is interpretive. In CTR, Canale identifies three main alternative primordial presupposition, one of 'temporality.' 12 According to
)
frameworks, the first dealing with the nature of reality ('ontology') and, the Canale's exegesis of Exod 3: 14, 15, "God's eternal and infinite reality
) second, how humans come to know that reality ('epistemology'). Together, these experiences the flux of time in its fullness, according to His own divine
form a system of meaning: nature." 13
) Although, the two issues are related, my interest in what follows is Canale's
) [T]here is no isolated meaning, there is only interrelated meanings; for view of reasoning itself. 14 Based on adapting the primordial presupposition of
meaning is constituted and exists in a system. Meaning exists only in temporality from Scriptures, he argues for a 'temporal epistemological
) the subject-object relationship in the context of both ontological and framework.' In short, rather than understanding reasoning to work ahistorically
epistemological frameworks which provide the ground for a coherent to reach conclusive truths, the temporal view of reasoning, first championed in
)
network of meaning that enables meaning to flow harmoniously among CTR, understands reason to be working in the flux of time, history, and
) the parts of the whole and between each part and the whole. 10 language, which makes its conclusions partial and provisional. 15
)
In typical philosophical reflection, this system of meaning finds its ultimate
} ground in some theos, or 'God,' i.e., a 'theology.' Ontology (view of reality),
epistemology (view of reasoning), and theology (view of ultimate ground)
)
together form the 'onto-theo-logical' structure ofreasoning.
) One's view about the ultimate ground of reality, i.e., 'theology,' for Canale,
provides the ground for the rest of the system, affecting one's view of reality
) (ontology) and reasoning (epistemology), and ultimately, meaning-"Absolute
) presuppositions are the 'ground floor or 'source' of meaning for the whole 12
Canale suggests a re-ordering of the prioritizations of the frameworks, i.e. a 'theo-
rational system." 11 Canale, therefore, focuses his attention on what he believes is onto-logical' structure rather than an 'onto-theo-logical one.' By this he means letting God's
) the ultimate or 'primordial' presupposition that grounds entire systems of self-revelation inform our understanding of reality and this, in tum, informing our
) meaning. understating of reasoning rather than vice versa.
.Canale argues that Christian theologians have uncritically derived their n This is a more recent summary of his view in Basic Elements ofChristian Theology:
) primordial presupposition, one of 'timelessness,' from Greek philosophy. He Scripture Replacing Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithotech, 2005),
supports his argument by providing a historical analysis of representative 72.
14
) For Canale, metaphysics and epistemology are connected, with assumptions about
one guiding the other.
) recognized in latter works. For example, see Creation, Evolution, and Theology: The Role
15
Canale gives an account of 'Biblical rationality' using Exodus 6:2-7 as his primary
of Method in Theological Accommodation (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University source. In this passage, God, speaking to Moses, declares that in the past, God had not made
) God's self fully known to God's people- "I did not make myself known to them" (6:2). But,
LithoTech, 2005). Canale, citing Hartmann, along with his own dissertation, explains,
) "Because knowledge always takes place as a subject-object relationship, this structural unit God promises, in the future "[Y]ou will know that I am the Lord your God ... " "Thus,"
is at the heart of experience formation" (7). concludes Canale, "the progression of meaning in the text flows from the past into the
) 8
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 29. Other significant influence on present, and toward the future on the basis of the remembrance of God's acts, of God's
Canale's views is Martin Heidegger, who is frequently cited in his works. presence, and God's promise." (A Criticism of Theological Reason, 376-77) This is an
) 9
Ibid., 32. indication, for Canale, that reasoning, in general, functions temporally, dependent on past
1
° Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason; 44. and future information. This, again, makes its conclusions historical, partial, and provisional
) 11 rather than universal, complete, or final.
Ibid., 60-61.
)
 )

76 ZANE YI NARROWING THE H ERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 77 ' )

Figure 1: Canale's structure of reason just passively receive what God has revealed, but plays an active and creative ' )
role in constituting that revelation. 18 )
Subject Meaning/Knowledge Object With this account, Canale is being consistent with his view of human

.,
)
reasoning in general; subject and object are understood to interact together in
order to produce meaning . Canale recognizes that the a priori categories the )
prophet uses are historically and culturally conditioned, rather than timeless
Frameworks: )
Primordial Ontology
structures. 19 This, however, seems to lead to the view that revelation itself is
·..p,c:esupposition Theology
Epistemology
) historically and culturally conditioned. If revelation is co-constituted by God and
prophet, God's intended revelation might be seriously distorted by the prophet's
historically and culturally constituted a priori categories. Canale, however,
argues that this is not the case. First of all, the a priori categories of the prophet
)

)
Timelessness Onto-theo-logy )
vs. vs. are derived from his/her community, which is already in possession of God's
temporality theo-onto-logy previous revelation in written or oral form. So Hebrew prophets, as p art of the
Hebrew people, would share fundamental, a priori assumptions based on
Reason vs. Revelation Biblical vs. non- previous revelation(s). )
Biblical Furthermore, "The prophet experiences providential, divine guidance in the
development of his or her a priori categories. " 20 While two prophets might have
This overview of Canale's view of reasoning shows that his view is a different life experiences, and, therefore, some difference in their a priori
sufficiently 'post-modem' one. Like many post-Kantian philosophers, h e affirms categories, this difference is only "cultural and personal", rather than
)
a di-polar view of meaning, rather than a mono-polar one. In other words, "systematic or doctrinal."21 This means that distinctions can be made between
subject and object create meaning together, rather than the subject passively different levels of a priori categories. Canale gives five, in order of importance: )
receiving data from the external world. Reason, on Canale's account, plays an
active role in the production of meaning and the understanding of truth. 1. presuppositional structure
2. doctrinal conceptions
3. Revelation, Inspiration, and the Hermeneutical Circle 3. sociocultural idiosyncrasies
Christian theologians, according to Canale, should derive their absolute 4. p ersonal life experiences
(theological) presupposition and frameworks ( ontological and epistemological) 5. individual personal traits22
from Scripture. This leads us to his understanding of Scripture. Canale has
developed a 'historical-cognitive model' of Scripture's origins which conceives These distinctions represent a development in Canale's thinking. In CTR, h e
of it as communication of cognitive content from God to humans. 16 A developed deals mainly with the first. 'Presuppositional structures' seems to refer to the
account of Scripture's genesis is found in Back to Revelation-Inspiration (BRI), 'absolute presupposition' and 'frameworks' dealt within CTR.23 However, in
which draws on and develops his understanding of human reasoning in CTR. addition to this, Canale, in BRI, recognizes the other kinds of a priori factors
Canale recognizes Scripture as being the product of both divine and human that shap e experience and reasoning. It turns out that a variety of factors shape
activity-"Scripture is both fully divine and fully human." 17 God reveals God's
self in a variety of ways, but this revelation is understood through the
18
historically conditioned and situated mind of the prophet. The prophet does not Ibid., 136. Canale distinguishes between five different 'patterns' of
revelation- theophanic, direct writing, prophetic, historical, and existential. He claims all
these are 'cognitive,' by which he means intelligible to reason, rather than mystical.
19
Ibid., 136. 'A priori categories' are best understood here to be synonymous with )
'presuppositions' or 'frameworks' in Canale's dissertation, rather than in the original
Kantian sense.
2
° Fernando Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 138.
21
16
Fernando Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive Ibid.
22
Foundation of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham, MD: University Press Ibid. )
23
of America, 2001), 131ff. The 'primordial presupposition' oftime and timelessness is perhaps the most basic
17
Ibid., 146. one.
( ..J
)
)
)
78 ZANE YI NARROWING THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 79
)
) experience, beyond fundamental assumptions about the nature of God, reality, thoughts and selection of words. On occasion, God directly intervenes. But even
and reason. 24 here, Canale insists, God is not to be understood as overriding the essential
) But this complicates matters even more, because variability at any of these aspects of human cognition and language, which is intrinsically limited,
levels, impacts what the prophet ultimately understands as revelation. indeterminate, ambiguous, and imprecise. 29
)
Recognizing this conundrum, Canale claims that while there can be some
) variability at the latter three levels, this is not the case with the first two: Figure 2: The historical-cognitive model of revelation/inspiration

) Prophet Scripture God

[I]t is reasonable to assume that Bible writers developed, through the
) divinely guided historical process of education, a common

)
)
understanding of the first two facets of the apriori: the presuppositional
structure and doctrinal teachings ... Thus, the a priori condition for the
understanding of God's historically generated meaning-full forms was A priori categories
m
~,~,
Revelation
developed not in isolation from God, but rather under His direct and '"
) pervasive influence.25
) In other words, while the prophet's personality, life experience(s), and cultural
mores plays a role in constituting the meaning of revelation, God can be I. Presuppositional
) structure
understood to be active in providing stability and continuity at the level of 2. Doctrinal
) fundamental assumptions and doctrine. 26 This model of revelation, according to conceptions
Canale, helps us understand both the diversity and harmony of Scripture; each 3. Sociocultural
) idiosyncrasies
viewpoint adds "color and harmony to the unfaltering melody of biblical 4. Personal life
) doctrine." 27 experiences
Canale recognizes yet another layer of hermeneutical complexity by 5. Individual
) personality traits
aclmowledging that the prophet's co-constituted experience of God's revelation
must reach verbal expression if it is to be shared. Canale calls this part of
Scripture's origin 'inspiration.' The prophet, for example, has a dream, but this Canale rightfully admits, due to the nature of the subject matter, his account
} dream can be described in a variety of ways. This raises the concern that the of revelation and inspiration is a cautious one.30 Yet he attempts to do justice to
prophet's own communicative preferences and choices might misconstrue the the variety of content that is found in Scripture and Scripture's claims about
) itself as being God-breathed.31 He avoids simplistic and reductionist accounts,
content of what has been experienced as revelation in the actual writing of
) Scripture. However, Canale argues, if God is affirmed to be involved in this i.e. verbal diction and divine-encounter theories that either make the contents of
process, "the process of writing does not need to add, modify, or upgrade what Scripture mechanically dictated words or purely human reflection on their
) has already been ·constituted through the process of revelation." 28 God, according experience of the divine. It can be affirmed as being nuanced, as well as, a
) to Canale, is aware of both the prophet's thought processes and linguistic consistent development with his view of reasoning expressed in CTR-subject
activities and, thus, plays a supervisional role, guiding the prophet's actual and object, together, constitute meaning.
) My purpose in providing this summary of Canale's theory of revelation and
24
One factor that is conspicuously absent from this list, but a topic ofconsideration by inspiration is two-fold. First, it marks a development and clarification of his
) hermeneutical view of reason in CTR, aclmowledging a variety of other
many philosophers, is language itself and the role it plays in constituting experience. See,
) for example, Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (trans. Albert Hofstadter; New hermeneutical factors. Secondly, it shows that Canale is aware of the possible
York: Harper Row, 1971) and more recently, the Jacques Derrida, OfGrammatology (trans.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). 2
25
Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 139. Ibid., 145.
•

) 26
Beyond having a priori categories shaped by previous revelation, Canale argues that
30
"Because of the absence of biblical reflection or examples of the way biblical
God is active in educating the prophet so that his/her a priori structures develop in a certain prophets experienced divine guidance in the moment ofwriting," Canale acknowledges, "it
) way. seems advisable that caution should be exercised in what we affirm on this issue" (Back to
27 Revelation-Inspiration, 145).
) 28
Ibid., 138. 31
2 Timothy 3:16.
Ibid., 144.
)
)

80 ZANE YI
epistemic gaps caused by these factors and attemp!s to address ~ e~. He
acknowledges the active role that the prophet plays m the co-constitution of
what God reveals (revela tion) and communicating (inspiration) what has been
revealed, but at the same time, wants to limit this role at both levels. At the level
of revelation, Canale appeals both to the prophet's community (with access to
previous revelations) and God's guidance in the prophet's personal development
to provide stability to fundamental and doctrin al a priori assumptions. Similarly,
at the level of inspiration, Canale again appeals to God's supervision and
intervention. In the end, God prevents revelation and inspiration from b ecoming
swallowed up by prophetic subjectivity. 32 Canale concludes: "[D)ue to the fact
God generated Scripture through the interrelated process of revelation-
inspiration, in spite of their humanly limited modes, the historically originated
contents of Scripture are directly, in their plain historical meaning, the word of
God."33
4. The Hermeneutical Circle and Interpretive Plurality
This appeal to Scripture's ' plain historical meaning,' however, seems a bit
quick and is puzzlin g in light of the gaps Canale so clearly recognizes and
addresses in his theory of revelation and inspiration. If reasoning in general
(CTR), and at the level of prophetic inspiration (BRI), is hermeneutical and
subj ect to a priori influences, so is reasoning when it interprets Scripture. In
other words, the meaning of Scripture is also co-constituted by subj ective and
objective poles. An appeal to 'plain historical meaning' oversimplifies the
complex issues that are involved in the interpretation of any text, let alone a text
like the Bible.
Yet, Canale has been insistent in making this kind of appeal. More recently,
in an essay entitled "Ab solute Truth in Postmodern Times?" (AT),34 he asks,
"Does the acceptance of hermen eutical reason unavoidably lead to theological
relativism?" His response is n egative. Although he affirms the 'post-modem'
critique and view of reason, he d enies the relativistic conclusions drawn by
philosophers and theologians who share this view. Canale argues that it is
32
A significant lacuna in Canale's discussion is an acknowledgement that editors may
have played in the production and compilation of Scripture. This is not to suggest that the
Scriptures are merely collection offragments, as some scholars claim, but that some sections
of the Scriptures clearly indicate editorial activity and that this needs to be addressed. One
must account for how the voice(s) of the prophets are preserved as a totality (both at the
level of individual books, as well as the whole of Scripture) to communicate what God has
revealed to them through the process of compilation.
33
Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 146. In CTR, Canale appeals outlines an
approach to Scripture he terms "phenomenological exegesis," differentiating it from both
the historical-critical and historical-grammatical approaches to Scriptural interpretation. See
Criticism ofTheological Reason, 294-97.
34
Fernando Canale, "Absolute Theological Truth in Postmodern Times?" A ndrews
University Seminary Studies, Vol. 45, No. I , 90.
)
NARROWING THE H ERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 81 . )
)
possible to " safeguard the absoluten ess of theological truth" by "consistently
following the so/a Scriptura principle." 35 )
Canale engages the work of theologian Stanley Grenz, agreeing with his
)
rejection of epistemological foundationalism and affirmation of the
hermeneutical reason. Yet, Canale resists the communitarian implications Grenz )
draws out for theology. According to Canale, Grenz ends up making the
'interpretive frameworks' provided by Christian communities the basis for )
theology. This, however, raises * e question about the conflicting claims of )
different communities-"Grenz's theological proposal implies theological
relativism," argues Canale.36 Canale is also dissatisfied with Grenz's solution of
grounding the confirmation of the theological truth in the future, i.e. at the
eschaton . This "leaves the question of present truth dangling in the uncertainty J
of cultural relativ ism, leaving no room for the absolute truth of Christianity." 37 J
Scripture, for Canale, is the sole authority in Christian theology, hence the
appeal to sola Scriptura. His response to Grenz betrays the concern that Grenz
collapses the meaning of Scripture into tradition, making one's tradition
authoritative over Scripture. Yet, Canale's response to Grenz and the appeal to
"absolute truth" is in tension with the implications of his own theory of )
reasoning. For the sake of argument, let us assume that the truths of Scripture are
)
primarily 'cognitive' in nature. (Canale seems to reject post-liberal approaches
to Scripture that relegate propositional and doctrinal formulation to second-order )
discourse.38) Furthermore, assume that these truths are universal and unchanging
truths about God, or pre-suppositions, i.e. 'ab solute ' truths.39 These affirmations, )
however, do not entail the conclusion that one's understanding of these truths are
absolute. As it does with subjective experience and objective reality and
prophetic expression and divine disclosure, a hermenuetical view of reason
introduces an epistemic gap at the level of textual interpreter and Scriptural text.
In other words, the meaning of the text is shaped by all the factors Canale
recognizes in his theory of revelation and inspiration: presuppositional )
structure(s), doctrinal conceptions, sociocultural idiosyncrasies, personal life
experiences, individual personal traits. 40 Although Canale acknowledges and
3
' Canale asks, "Can we embrace the historicity ofhermeneutical postmodern reason
)
and, at the same time, safeguard the absoluteness of theological truth? We can, ifwe engage
postmodernity not by way of tradition, but by way of consistently following the sola
Scriptura principle." Ibid., 92, 93. The theological truth(s) that seem to interest Canale the
most are what he has identified as ' the basic elements ' ofChristian theology. In addition to
God's relation to time, Canale identifies other presuppositions that he derives fro m his
reading ofScripture-the Trinity, God's forelmowledge, human free-will, and creation. See .J
Canale, Basic Elements.
36
Canale, "Absolute Theological Truth in Postmodern Times?," 89.
37
Canale, "Absolute Theological Truth in Postmodern Times?," 89. )
38
See George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine. Religion and Theology in a
Postliberal Age (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1984). )
39
Canale, "Absolute Theological Truth in Postmodern Times?," 92-96.
4
° Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 138.
J
)
)
)
)
82 ZANE YI NARROWING THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 83
)
) addresses them in his theory of revelation and inspiration, he does not do so in Merold Westphal provides a helpful example of Gadamer's point from the
his response to Grenz. world of performing arts. "If I am playing Hamlet I am not free to say 'To fish
) Grenz's recognition of the significant role that traditions play in shaping or not to fish' instead of 'To be or not to be.' Nor am I free to play an A-flat
one's interpretation of Scripture, that one always interprets it through a tradition, every time the score of the Harnmerklavier Sonata calls for a C-sharp." Good
) interpretation must submit to "the constraint of the script, the score, the text."46
is one that Canale should be more sensitive to in light of his earlier recognition
) of the role the community plays in the shaping of the prophet's a priori Simply reading one's own prejudices into a given text will not work in the long
assumptions. 41 Canale acknowledges this and tries to establish some sort of run. While recognizing that a text may occasionally align closely to one's
) preconceived expectations, Gadamer also describes the common experience of
harmony between prophetic presuppositions and divine revelation by appealing
"being pulled up short by the text."47 By this he means that as the interpreter
) to God's intervention. A similar move would be required here in order to
preserve God's intended meaning of Scripture, but such an appeal would be seeks to understand a given text, it often does not render any meaning at all.
logically circular: "I have the true understanding of Scripture because my Sometimes the meaning is not what was expected. In order for the text to be
community has provided me with the true presuppositions of Scripture because it meaningful, the interpreter must suspend or adjust his or her own prejudice and
has the true understanding of what the Bible really says because God has been acknowledge a possible different use of a word or phrase, and the possibility of a
guiding it through history." fundamentally differing perspective.48
The issue is consistency. If post-modem claims about the conditioned nature I think Canale would be in agreement with Gadamer on these points. Yet
) of experience in general are true, they apply to beliefs derived from the Bible Gadamer continues on to argue that because the meaning of a given text is one
that is co-constituted by text and reader, a point consistent with Canale's views
) because one uses the same powers of reasoning. Interpretations of the Scriptures,
which might be affirmed to be the sole, authoritative source of truth, are just that of reasoning, a degree of plurality cannot be eliminated:
) and susceptible to being shaped by all the historical, psychological, sociological,
economical, linguistic, etc. factors that condition reasoning generally. In other The real meaning of a text, as it speaks to the interpreter, does not
) depend on the contingencies of the author and his original audience. It
words, the affirmation that God has revealed universal and timeless truths does
) not entail that I have a universal and timeless understanding of what has been certainly is not identical with them, for it is always co-determined also
revealed. by the historical situation of the interpreter...Not just occasionally, but
) always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is why
This is not to suggest that the Bible can be interpreted in an entirely
subjective manner. Gadamer, like Canale and Grenz, argues that all understanding is not merely a reproductive but always a productive
)
interpretation is shaped by 'prejudice' and that one's prejudices are derived from activity as well. 49
j tradition. 42 Yet, Gadamer, as Canale notes, explains that one must "guard against
arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of Meaning, for Gadamer, is "always co-determined" by the interpreter and the text
) that is being interpreted. And this means that new meanings emerge as different
thought."43 He states that the interpreter needs to be "guided by the things
) themselves" and avoid "all the constant distractions that originate in the interpreters, from different times and places, engage the same text. This means
interpreter himself."44 This, according to Gadamer, is "the first, last, and that there is no 'plain-reading' of the text because every reading is an
) interpretation; every reader interprets from within the hermeneutical circle.
constant task" of the interpreter.45

41
When it comes to the sola Scripture principle, Canale admits his championing ofit
)
is rooted in a tradition-"! will continue the theological direction ofOld and New Testament
) writers and the tradition ofthe so-called 'Radical Reformation' (Basic Elements, 21 ). To the
first part of this claim, one might respond that the writers of Scripture seemed to borrow
) from other, extra-biblical sources. Furthermore, what makes the Radical Reformation
tradition preferable to other traditions? Canale's appeal to the Radical Reformation needs 46
) further justification. Without this, an appeal to this principle seems arbitrary. Merold Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation?: Philosophical
Hermeneutics for the Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 15.
42
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, (2nd revised ed., trans. Joel Weinsheimer 47
) and Donald G. Marshall; New York: Continuum, 2004), 278-285. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 270.
48
43
Ibid., 269. Yet, Gadamer is also clear: "Ifa prejudice becomes questionable in view of what
) 44 another person or a text says to us, this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the text
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 296.
45 or the other person accepted as valid in its place." Ibid., 298.
) Ibid., Gadamer, here is quoting Heidegger, who claimed the same thing. See the first 49
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 269.
epigraph above.
)
)

84 ZANE YI
.Figure 3: The implications of the henneneutical view ofreason for Scriptural interpretation
Reader Meaning Text
Tradition Pr,efudices
)
A
B X
C to different methods, and even those using the same method will derive different
Historically-effe cted consciousness Fusion ofhorlzons 50
So, while not every interpretation is a valid one (because some basic
constraints are set by the text), a plurality of possible meanings still remains.
Why? Because texts are interpreted by different humans, all who are finite and
historical beings, living in different times and places and with different concerns.
They do not and cannot stand outside of history. 5 1 And it is this place in history
that shapes their prejudices, which can be modified, but never eliminated.
Gadamer argues that " (r]eason exists only in concrete, historical terms- Le., it is
not its own master but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances
in which it operates."52 This is why the interpretation of texts is "never finished",
"an infinite process";53 new historical contexts and communities give forth new
meanings of the same text. If meaning is co-constituted by object and subject or
text and reader, different readers, faithfully reading the text, may derive different
meanings.
5. Engaging Interpretive Plurality
So while a given text provides some basic interpretive constraints, the
hermeneutical view of reason leads to the recognition that different meanings are
produced within those constraints. This is an unavoidable conclusion if one
consistently embraces the view of reasoning Canale champions. At this point,
one might make an appeal to exegetical method, but doing so overlooks the fact
'
0
The terms in italics are taken directly from Gadamer.
" Gadamer points out, "history does not belong to us; we belong to it... The self-
awareness ofthe individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits ofhistorical life" (Truth
and M ethod, 248).
52
Ibid., 277.
53
Ibid., 298.
)
NARROWING THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 85 . )
)
that an over-reliance on method is precisely what Gadamer is cnt1quing.
Gadamer is arguing that certain truths are beyond the scope of method. (Hence,
the title of the book.) The goal of securing a singular, 'objective truth,' secured
through method is itself an expression of historically effected reasoning and fails
to recognize the presuppositions that undergird its own understanding.54
This does not mean that the careful study of Scripture is unimportant.
Method has its place, but the demands of intellectual integrity and consistency
requires that we take the implications of hermeneutical reasoning for Scriptural )
interpretation seriously, regardless of the method that is being deployed.
Different readers will approach the text asking different questions and appealing )
conclusions. The text itself, as has been p ointed out, provides some basic
parameters, but within these parameters, a plurality of legitimate meanings is
still possible; one might narrow the hermeneutical circle through methodological
study, but it can never be completely closed. If 'meaning' is co-constituted by )
reader and text, revised meanings are still a co-constitution.55
This means that Christians who affirm such a view also affirm two claims
that are in tension with one another, (1) God has revealed God's self and (2) that )
our understanding of that revelation is partial and incomplete, one interpretation
amongst other possible interpretations. This means a critical discourse between )
possible interpretations is necessary. This is an option, however, Canale does not
consider sufficiently; hence, the simplistic sounding appeal to the 'absolute
truth' of the text.
The fact that reason is interpretive, of course, does not mean that any and all
interpretations are equally valid. As Paul Ricouer, a prominen t hermeneutical
philosopher, notes:
If it is true that there is always more than one way of construing a text,
it is not true th at all interpretations are equal. .. The text is a limited field ,)
of possible construction... It is always possible to argue for or against
an interpretation, to confront interpretations, to arbitrate between them,
)
54
The target ofGadamer's critique are the 'historical objectivists,' who acknowledge
the historical contingency of meaning, but, through rigorous method, seek to eliminate it.
See the second epigraph above (and the work from which it is drawn) by Wilhelm Dilthey
above, who in recognition of the issue, develops the approach Gadamer is critiquing. This
drive for certainty through method is influenced by the ideals of Enlightenment figures like
Descartes. In other words, this "prejudice against prejudice" is also, ironically, derived from
a tradition (Truth and Method, 273).
55 )
Hence, Gadamer argues, the meaning of the text cannot be reduced to the meaning
intended by the author-"The hermeneutical reduction to the author's meaning is just as
inappropriate as the reduction of historical events to the intentions of their protagonists"
(Truth and M ethod, 373).
J
)
)
)
)
86 ZANE YI NARROWING THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 87
)
and to seek for an agreement, even if this agreement remains beyond the interpretation of those texts, as I have argued, will inevitably be affected by a
)
our reach.56 variety of factors. Murphy acknowledges a degree of circularity here. Yet, these
) interpretations are susceptible to evaluation in light of their coherence to other
In other words, in light of a plurality of interpretations, one can attempt to beliefs already affirmed by the tradition, as well as its ability to respond to and
_) make sense of non-biblical traditions.
arbitrate between different interpretations, as well as to seek agreement. We can
) explore what both might look like by briefly examining the work of other
philosophers who also take the post-modern view ofreason seriously. Figure 4 : Murphy's tradition bound web.6 1
) Although Nancey Murphy does not work from the hermeneutical tradition,
she rejects Enlightenment models for knowledge and knowing. Rather than
understanding beliefs to rest on indubitable foundations, she argues that
) knowledge is better thought of as a web of beliefs.57 A particular belief is
accepted or rejected in light of its coherence with the other beliefs in that web. In
j
other words, it is the consistency of that belief with other beliefs, rather than to a
) singular foundational belief, that determines its acceptability. Because beliefs i
C,
::l.
can be evaluated in light of each other, one avoids relativism at the level of CD
=>
) individual beliefs. £
) This, however, leaves open the possibility of relativism at the level of the
web as a whole. There is the possibility of multiple, coherent webs that may
) make divergent truth claims. Murphy acknowledges this possibility and draws _______ ___ _______n_:12: ______________ _-
on the work of Alasdair Macinytre to argue that such webs can be understood as
)
large-scale historical traditions of belief and explanation.58 Traditions can be
) compared and evaluated in light of one another:
Murphy is referring mainly to the Christian tradition, broadly. At the same
) A tradition is to be called true if it has proved itself better than its live time, she acknowledges the existences of sub-traditions within Christianity. One
) competitors in terms of its abilities to overcome its own problems and could argue that same possibility of comparative judgments holds for the
even, in some cases, the problems of rivals that cannot be solved using interpretive claims made by various sub-traditions within the greater Christian
the rivals' own resources and, furthermore, is able to explain why tradition of both Scriptures and each other. So when it comes to different
things must have appeared as they did to its predecessors and interpretations of Scripture, within Christianity, one can avoid relativism, too.
)
contemporary rivals from their more limited or defective perspective.59 Murphy, in sum, acknowledges the legitimacy of the hermeneutical view of
) reason, but argues that relativism can be avoided by the use of holistic,
So by making holistic, comparative judgments about differing webs of beliefs, comparative judgments.
) again, one avoids a radical relativism. Charles Taylor clarifies how such comparative judgments might work. Like
) Scripture plays a central role in formation of the web of beliefs for the Murphy, he draws on the work of MacIntyre and debates from the philosophy of
Christian tradition and tradition, as Gadamer has pointed out, is inescapable. science, but applies them to ethical disagreements. His discussion is relevant to
) "Contributions to the Christian theological tradition, must, by definition, take the theological disagreement as well. Taylor argues that one can establish an
Christian Scriptures as authoritative."60 Yet, although the texts are simple givens, asymmetrical relationship between competing position, showing how the
)
transition from the former to the latter constitutes a gain in understanding-"we
) 56
Paul R.icouer, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, can sometimes arbitrate between positions by portraying transitions as gains or
and Interpretation (ed. and trans. John B. Thompson; New York: Cambridge University
losses, even where what we normally understand as decision through
) Press, 1981), 213.
" Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodemity: Philosophical Perspectives on criteria--qua externally defined standards-is impossible."62
) Science, Religion, and Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997).
• See Alaisdair MacIntyre, "Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the
5

) Philosophy of Science" in Monist 60 (1977), 453-72.

61
Ibid., 121.
62
59
Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodemity, 125. Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," in Philosophical Arguments
) 60 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 42.
Ibid.
)
)
 )

NARROWING THE HERMENEUTICAL C IRCLE 89 )

88 ZANE YI
)
This can be done in three ways. Assume X and Y represent competing performing arts, one can evalu_ate dif~erent classe_s of_ perfo~ance. Some ~imply
theories: get it wrong. Others are technically nght, but uninspired. Still others are Judged
to be masterful p erformances. In other words, one can qualitatively evaluate
(a) Y can be shown to make better sense of difficulties internal to X than X different interpretations and, in this sense, avoid radical relativism.
can. Westphal, however, continues to argue that there can still be a plurality of )
(b) Y can be shown to present a development that cannot be explained in performances that fall into this last category, each being different from each
other, although they are faithful presentations of the same work.68 In other )
X's terms.
(c) A transition from Y to X can be shown to be error-reducing-"the words, while comparative arguments may show some interpretations to be better )
removing of a contradiction, or the overcoming of a confusion, or the or worse than others, there is still the possibility of an irreducible plurality of
recognition of a hitherto ignored re levant factor." 63 masterful p erformances. If this is true of with the arts, might it also hold true for _)
textual interpretation? Westphal thinks it does and argues that " it would be
The shortcomings of X may not evident at the outset of the argument, but come foolish to claim that there is one 'definitive' theology that is right while all the
to light through the process of dialogue. Furthermore, the conclusions to such others are wrong. . .. Rather it would be wise to consult a variety of the ' best' )
arguments are provisional, rather than final: "The claim is not that Y is correct theologies." 69 "The way to objectivity," according to W estphal, " is not to flee
simpliciter but just that whatever is ' ultimately true,' Y is better than X. It is, one persp ectives but to multiply them."70
might say, less false. The argument is thus specifically addressed to the holders This does not result in a hodge-podge amalgamation of 'best' theological
of X. Its message is: whatever else turns out to be true, you can improve your interpretation; Westphal seeks genuine convergence. Drawing on the work of
epistemic position by moving from X to Y; this step is a gain."64 Future evidence John Rawls on political liberalism, Westphal looks for areas of ' overlapping
may show Y to be incomplete or false, but Y is still superior to X. consensus. ' 71
)
Some of the things that can come to light through dialogue are the implicit
assumptions that both parties might initially be aware of. Taylor explains : Figure 5: Westphal's overlapping consensus72 )
)
The range of rational argument is greatly extended .. . once we see that
not all disputes are b etween fully explicit positions . .. I would argue that
a great deal of. . . argument involves the articulation of the implicit, and
A/ / - , \ J
this extends the range of the ad h ominem far beyond the easy cases )
where the opponent offers us purchase in one explicit premise.65 I '
In other words, implicit assumptions can b ecome explicit beliefs through
dia logue, and these beliefs, once identified, can b e critically examined and
engaged. 66
Like Murphy and Taylor, Merold Westphal attempts to articulate a middle
option between hermeneutical despair (anything goes) and hermeneutical
arrogance (I or we have the interpretation). His model of Scriptural
·Cf), ------✓
)

)
interpretation, however, emphasizes 'agreement' over 'arbitration; to use
Ricouer's terminology.67 To return to the analogy above, in the world of the Take, for example, the record of Jesus' life and ministry found in the B ible; it is
found in four different Gospels, offering four distinct interpretations. T heir
63
Ibid., 51. distinctive characteristics are irreducible to each other, and at times, even are in
64
Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," 54. J
6
' Ibid., 55.
66
For an explanation and analysis of how Taylor uses such arguments as a philosopher 68
ofreligion, see Zane Yi, "Disclosure and Disruption: Charles Taylor's Post-Metaphysical Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation?, 15.
69
Ibid., I 07.
)
Philosophy of Religion" in Groundless Gods: The Theological Prospects of Post- 70
Metaphysical Thought, ed. Eric E. Hall and Harmutvon Sass (Eugene, OR: Wipfand Stock, Ibid., 142.
71
2014), 159-84 . See John Rawls, Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
72
67
Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation?, 15. Westphal, Whose Community, Which Interpretation?, 127.

,
)
)
)
90 ZANE YI NARROWING THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE 91
)
) tension with each other. 73 Yet, there is also a remarkable overlap in the account, agreement and consensus. Both alternatives recognize the plurality of possible
converging to provide a compelling representation of the central figure of the interpretations that the hermeneutical view of reason entails without simply
) Christian faith. appealing to the text or the given frameworks of a community and tradition.
) Recognizing the interpretive nature of human reasoning does not demean
the status of revelation or deplete it of meaning. Rather, such a recognition 6. Conclusion
) elevates it, affirming that in Scripture, we find an overflow of meaning.
74 One can distinguish several levels of the hermeneutical circle in Canale's
Scripture, it could be argued, is an example of what Jean-luck Marion calls writings. At its broadest level, there is a circle of general experience, with a gap
) between the phenomenological experiences of the subject and reality itself.
'saturated phenomena'-phenomena that exceed the limits of human
comprehension, therefore demanding more than one reading. 75 Westphal Canale attempts to close this gap by appealing to the self-revelation God's own
suggests that with the Bible we encounter a text rich enough to require a being, suggesting that our beliefs about the fundamental nature of reality be
) multitude of different readings, not just permit it.76 No one interpretation can guided by this revelation, rather than human speculation. This appeal to
exhaust it. revelation, however, introduces yet another gap. Christians affirm that God has
)
So we look for a convergence between interpretations. Convergence, revealed himself in Scripture, speaking through human agents. This means that
) however, is not the final arbiter of meaning. Westphal ultimately wants to open the prophet must interpret what God has revealed, expressing it in their own
readers to the voice of the divine Other who speaks through Scripture. thoughts and words. Canale attempts to close the gap(s) here by appealing to
) God's supervisional role and intervention.
) It is not enough to affirm the role of the Spirit in the production of Canale thinks that his theory of inspiration secures the possibility of
Scripture.... It is equally necessary to listen for and to hear what the communication of divine 'cognitive' content that can then be received through
) Spirit says (present tense) to the churches. Word and Spirit. As this the process of interpretation by the reader. His method is to be commended for_
slogan becomes practice and not just theory, the divinely transcendent its commitment to Biblical authority. Yet his appeals to the 'plain meaning' and ·
) 'absolute truth' of the text sounds overly simplistic in light of his nuanced
voice of Scripture will become incarnate in human language, and we
) hear the very voice of God in our finite and fallen interpretations.77 account of reasoning, raising numerous questions and issues.
According to Gadamer, "The hermeneutical task becomes of itself a
Aside from opening ourselves to humans, affirming the limitations of human questioning ofthings."79 This questioning of things challenges one to move from
interpretation also opens us to the possibility of receiving new, or 'present the comfortable position of certitude to an honest examination, and possible
)
uncomfortable position of doubting one's most fundamental and cherished
truths,' from God.78
Murphy, Taylor, and Westphal recognize the hermeneutical nature of reason assumptions. This approach to the interpretation of Scripture, one Canale
and provide resources for what this entails when it comes to the interpretation of commends to us, is helpful when applied to the interpretation of Scripture on at
) least two levels.
the Bible. The first two thinkers provide constructive resources for arbitrating
) between these differences- making comparative arguments for and against On the first level, the individual encounters the text. Most modem readers
various interpretations- and the latter points out the importance of seeking approach the Bible with assumptions that differ from that of the original writers
) and readers. For example, there are differing prejudices on the existence of God,
God's nature, and the possibility of God's action in the world. Modern readers
) nThe synoptic gospels- Matthew, Mark, and Luke- share more similarities than John. also have a different conception of human nature as well as values. Instead of
According to John, there a lot more to Jesus than what is recorded in the Bible-"But
74
reconstructing the text or imposing their prejudices onto it, Canale's emphasis
)
there are also many other things which Jesus did; were every one of them to be written, I
suppose that the world itself could not contain the books that would be written" (John on Scriptural authority encourages interpreters to gain awareness of his or her
) own prejudices and allows them to be called into question by the text. In this
21 :25).
75Jean-luc Marion, Being Given: Toward a Phenomenology ofGivenness (trans. Jeffrey way, Canale opens a window for Scripture to speak and influence the
L. Kosky; Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002). contemporary reader in fresh ways.
76 Westphal, Whose Community? Which Interpretation?, 26. Every interpreter is still limited by their prejudices, a factor of their
77
Ibid., 156. historicity and finitude. Canale recognizes this and seeks to bring prejudices into
) 78 One is reminded of Ellen White's words: "There is no excuse for anyone in taking
better alignment with Scripture. However, if he is to be consistent, he must
) the position that there is no more truth to be revealed, and that all our expositions of acknowledge the possibility that there may be several legitimate ways to read the
Scripture are without an error. The fact that certain have been held as truth for many years
) by our people is not proof that our ideas are infallible." See Ellen G. White, Counsels to 79
Gadamer, Truth and Method, 27 1.
Writers and Editors (Hagerstown: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1946), 35.
)
)

92 ZANE YI
same text in regards to these presuppositions and more substantively address this
issue. I have suggested the work of several philosophers who articulate
approaches of critical dialogue that recognize the inevitability of interpretive
plurality. Adopting approaches models along these lines would allow for
collaborative and constructive dialogue to take place even at the level of
presuppositions.
This has important implications for inter-denominational and inter-religious
dialogue. All too often, divergent positions from one's own are critiqued and
dismantled before one has taken the time to really listen and understand the
issues, i.e., the presuppositions that undergird disagreements. After so-called
dialogue, each side simply becomes more entrenched in their own respective
readings of a text rather than having recognized and addressed the substantive
issues· that hinder making genuine progress.
This seems to be the general desire with which Canale concludes his
dissertation, and one I am grateful to have learned through following his sage
advice many years ago and from an engagement with his work: "theological
reflection in all its areas should be flexible enough to adjust its own conclusions
80
in an ever-progressing discovering oftruth."
Zane Yi is an assistant professor in the School of Religion at Loma Linda University.
He received MA degrees at Fuller Theological Seminary (Theology) and Loyola
Marymount University (Philosophy) before completing a Ph.D. in Philosophy at
Fordham University. His research interests include phenomenology, hermeneutics,
ethics, and 19th century philosophy. He is particularly interested in the intersection of
these areas with religious/theological thought. Working with others, he helped found and
organize the Society of Adventist Philosophers. E-mail: zyi@llu.edu.
'"Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 408.
)
)
)
God's Involvement in Inspired-Biblical-
Language in Selected Works of Vern
,)
Poythress and Fernando Canale 1
)
I )
Iriann Marie Hausted
)
)
Introduction and Background to the Problem
J
The 'Linguistic Tum' 2 brought the study of language to its peak in the
scholarly world, including theological studies.3 As a consequence, one of the main )
1 Being a new student at the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary in 2009, I
often made trips to Fernando Canale's office. As his student, my motivation was twofold: )
to clarify questions from the material discussed in class, but also, and maybe more
importantly for me, to talk about finding the intersection between philosophy oflanguage
and Seventh-day Adventist theology. Regarding that last point, our meetings were more
brainstorming than anything else, but in every single conversation he encouraged me to )
pursue the study of language and hermeneutics. "Although I would like to," he would tell )
me, "I cannot do this anymore. But I encourage you to pursue this topic further. It is
needed." His words still encourage me today. This essay is a primitive effort, thus, to find )
- partly in his writings- some direction for the development ofan Adventist perspective on
language. )
2
Although the interest in linguistic issues is ancient, scholarly disciplines during the
last half of the twentieth century placed a special emphasis upon language. This
philosophical development is usually known as the Linguistic Tum, a movement that
developed as the attention of most fields of knowledge 'turned' to linguistic issues. The J
developments concerning the Linguistic Tum as a philosophical and historical movement
are rich and extensive, and will not be covered in this paper. Nevertheless, here are some
references for the one interested in studying it further. For a brief but excellent overview, )
see Craig L. Blomberg, "Foreword," in Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ls There a Meaning in This
Text? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998), xiii-xiv. For a more in-depth study see Rorty, The
Linguistic Turn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). For a rather technical
discussion that shows the development of linguistics as an academic discipline in the
twentieth century see William O'Grady, Michael Dobrovolsky, and Francis Katamba,
Contemporary Linguistics: An Introduction (Harlow: Longman, 1996). For more
information on the philosophical role of language in the twentieth century see Charles
Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers: Volume 1 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999). ,)
l See Craig Bartholomew, After Pentecost: Language and Biblical Interpretation;
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998);
Moises Silva, God, Language and Scripture (Grand Rapids: Zondervan 1990); Graham
Ward, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Postmodern Theology (Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 2001); Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida, and the Language of Theology )
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Oliver Davies, and Denys Turner, eds. ,
Silence and the Word (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Ronald T. Michener, )
Engaging Deconstructive Theology (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); Stanley E. Porter, The
Nature ofReligious Language: A Colloquium (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996);
i )
 )
)
) 94 IruANN MARIE HAUSTED
7 issues that h ave been revisited is God's relationship to language. There is a need to
re-establish , in a contemporary context, the relationship between God and language,
.)
man and language, and the r elation of God and man in regards to language,
) including the distinct category of biblical language.
For theologians who believe that God communicates intelligible truth through
) language in Scripture, language issues often relate particularly to inspiration and
) to God's involvement in inspired-biblical-language (hereafter IBL4 ). Therefore,
there seems to be a more specific need to address anew the question: ""What is
God's involvement in IBL?" This is the question that I will begin to explore in this
) chapter.
Following selected writings ofAdventist theologian and philosopher Fernando
Canale5 and Calvinist theologian and philosopher Vern Poythress,6 seems to be one
of m any possible good ways to begin to answer the question . Both Poythress and
) use language, we rely on what he has given us. We also rely on the mutual
Canale are committed to Scripture as the inspired word of God and both believe in
) God's involvement in IBL.1 Nevertheless, they come from diffe rent theological
backgrounds. That is, Poythress does theology within a Calvinist-Reformed
j community of faith that highly values determinism, while Canale does theology in
the context of a Seventh-day Adventist community of faith that commonly
identifies with Arminianism and thus highly esteems free will while avoiding
) determinism.
) of IBL. Other related topics within the area oflanguage and theology go beyond the scope
John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears ofJacques D errida: Religion Without Religion
) (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997); David F. Ford, and Rachel Muers, eds., The
Modern Theologians: An Iniroduction to Christian Theology Since 1918 (Malden: Blackwell
) 10
Publishers, 2005); Robert H. Ayers, The Bible and Contemporary Theology: The Questfor
Truth and Relevance (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2006); Jacques Ellul, The Humiliation
ofthe Word (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985); Ronald H. Nash, The Word of God and the
) Mind ofMan; Vern Sheridan Poytress, In the Beginning was the Word: Language - A God
Centered Approach (Wheaton: Crossway, 2009); John C. Peckham, "Theopathic or
) Anthropopathic? A Suggested Approach to Imagery of Divine Emotion in the Hebrew
Bible" (unpublished article).
) • IBL is a term that I have created for the sake of abbreviation and is not a term referred
) to by any of the authors hereby mentioned.
' Fernando Canale, is professor of Theology and Philosophy, at the Seventh-day
Adventist Theological Seminary in Berrien Springs, Michigan. Although the focus of his
work is not on philosophy oflanguage, I believe that Fernando Canale provides information
) regarding IBL as a bilateral issue in his extensive writings on inspiration. This is the closest
I could get to a Seventh-day Adventist treatment on the topic.
) 6
Vern Sheridan Poythress is professor ofNew Testament interpretation at Westminster
Theological Seminary in Glenside, Philadelphia. Poythress has written significantly on the
) Holy Spirit as the breath." (Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 31.)
topic of IBL and language in general. Poythress is one of the contemporary voices who has
) contributed to the construction of a biblical theology oflanguage.
7
The writings ofPoythress and Canale often refer to biblical texts to sustain and assert
) their various points regarding IBL, particularly to 2 Timothy 3: 16. The purpose of this
chapter, though, is to analyze what these writers have concluded as a result of their textual
) analyses, thus, direct biblical references will be lacking. The reader is encouraged to explore
these theologians' writings in order to become more familiar with their biblical foundation.
)
)
GOD'S INVOLVEMENT IN INSPIRED-BIBLICAL-LANGUAGE 95
Given Poythress' and Canale's different theological contexts, how do they
articulate and understand God's invo lvement in IBL? Does God deterministically
control words and their meaning or does he allow for the human's free
contribution?8
God's Involvement in IBL: Vern Poythress
Ontology of Language
P oythress' ontology oflanguage begins with Imago Dei.9 H e believes that
"language is a gift that belongs not exclusively to man, but is shared by God and
10
man," and that even when it comes to language "we are made in the image of
11
God." For Poythress, the character of the triune God inhabits human language:
God bas impressed his Trinitarian character on language. Whenever we
indwelling of the persons of the Trinity. Because of this indwelling, o ur
use of language holds together. In the use of language, we live in the
presence of God who through the Spirit gives us life and through the Spirit
empowers our u se of language. 12
8
I will analyze the divine involvement in language exclusively from the perspective
of this research.
9
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word. See chapters 1-4. See also "Reason,
Revelation and Language" in The Word ofGod and the Mind ofMan by Ronald H. Nash.
Poythress, "The Presence ofGod Qualifying Our Notions of Grammatical-Historical
Interpretation: Genesis 3: 15 as a Test Case" (Journal of the Evangelical Theological
Society 50/1 (2007) 87-103). In those lines, he presents God's attributes such as
omniscience, omnipotence and omnipresence and links them to foundational characteristics
that he identifies in God's speech and human language, such as "meaning and knowledge,"
"control," and "presence." (Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 31.) According to
him the Trinitarian character of God is the only starting point to understand language
because language is a mirror of the very constitution of the Trinity. This is the foundation
for his "God-Centered Approached" as it appears in the subtitle of the book. He further
explains it thus: "Man's speech shows meaning, control, and presence. In this respect it
images the meaning, control, and presence of God's speech." (Poythress, In the Beginning
Was the Word, 30.) In that sense, he argues for a mutual indwelling-general and
linguistic-among the persons of the Trinity, which at the same time extends to human
language in the form of divine presence and control. (Poythress, In the B eginning Was the
Word, 23-28.) He even identifies three functions of language and assigns them to each
person of the Trinity: " the Father as the speaker, the Son as the speech (the Word), and the
11
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 31.
12
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 22. Further on he concludes that "the
word of God is God speaking, not a 'something' detached and unrelated to God himself"
(Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 26), and that "the Trinitarian character of God
is the deepest starting point for understanding language." (Poythress, In the Beginning Was
the Word, 17).

96 lRIANN MARIE HAUSTED
In that sense, Poythress does not seem to portray an essential gap between
divine communication and human language. In fact, he argues that "approaches that
conceive of language only with reference to humans beings are accordingly
reductionistic" 13 because "language as we know it has its archetype in the very
being ofGod." 14 Establishing thus an ontological link between human language and
the divine, Poythress affirms:
God is present--everywhere. He is present in the structures of Language
that he gives us. He designed language as a means for communication
from him to us, and not merely from one human being to another. Human
language is not merely human, but also divine, both in its origin (God gave
it to us) and its cap acity (God can speak u sing it). 15
Again, it would seem that, for Poythress, God is not only involved in human
language but human language seems to be ontologically divine in both its source
and sustenance. Poythress' ontology of language is, in a sense, inseparable from
God's ontology.
At this point it becomes relevant to mention that although Poythress makes a
distinction between IBL and non-inspired language, his view of non-inspired
language is both foundational, most times applicable, and even interchangeable, to
what he believes about IBL. 16
13
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 18. He adds: "In the twentieth century,
structural linguistics has mostly assumed from the beginning, in the foundation of the
discipline, that language and communication are purely human, that is, that God either does
not exist or that he can be factored out of the picture .... But from a biblical point of view,
the move to exclude God ignores the single most important fact about communication and
the most weighty ontological fact about language." Poythress, In the Beginning Was the
Word, 38.
14
Poythress, "The Presence of God."
15
Poythress, Inerrancy and Worldview (Wheaton: Crossway, 2012), 101. This is
possible and even.beneficial on the basis ofPoythress' theological standpoint because, after
all, it would only provide the ideal foundation for his view of the inerrancy of Scripture.
Although the topic of inerrancy in Poythress is worth discussing, it goes beyond the scope
of this paper. For a clear and concise explanation of Poythress view of inerrancy see:
"Interview with Vern Poythress, Author of Inerrancy and Worldview, Part 2," Books at a
Glance, posted June 4, 20 14 (http://www.frame-poythress.org/interview-with-vern-
poythress-author-of-inerrancy-and-worldview-part-2/).
16
Again, Poythress' view of determinism in language is conducive to back up his
inerrancy perspective. Apart from that connection, Although Poythress does make a
technical distinction between inspired and non-inspired language, I find it challenging to
understand the fundamental difference. He identifies IBL as a special case oflanguage as he
writes: "with the apostles and with the people whom God appointed to write the Bible, we
have a special case, were the product is completely what God says, as well as being the
product of the human instrument" (Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 385).
Evidently, Poythress believes in a distinction between common and inspired language.
Nevertheless, as it will be seen throughout this section, the reader might be left with
)
)
GOD'S INVOLVEMENT IN INSPIRED-BIBLICAL-LANGUAGE 97 )
)
Extent o f God's Involvement in IBL
Following Poythress' ontology oflanguage we can expect God's involvement
in JBL to be significant. Indeed, Poythress writes: "God's control extends to
language . . . and to its details." 17 But what does this m ean? What kind of control? I
What 'details'? In this regard, he goes on to explain how God "controls and )
specifies the meaning of each word." 18 Further more, using the English word ' go'
as an example, Poythress argues that "the word 'go' .. . has meaning and sound and )
spelling that God has given it." 19 In this regard, he writes: "God sovereignly rules )
over and controls all [the] events in my past and the past of others who transmitted
the word 'go. '"20 In short, God's involvement in language consists of God's
detailed and total control of words and their meaning, even also of their spelling
and sound. For Poythress, then, "language, as a gift from God, comes to us
designed as a vehicle for God to speak to us exactly as he wishes ..." 21 To my
questions about whether or not that distinction is clear or justified by his explanations.
17
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 39-40.
" Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 39-40.
19
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 51.
20
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 51. Furthermore, he argues: "God knows
the word 'go' that I use. He controls not only my immediate memofY of the word 'go' and
its uses but also the entire process of centuries of English-speaking culture that transmitted
that word to me. I thank him for it. To many people nowadays, it might seem that such
thorough control from God is also thoroughly oppressive. But it is not. Human decision J
making, human choices, and human responsibility play a central role in this process. I decide
to go to the store. I decide to tell my wife what I am going to do. In the process I am
responsible to tell the truth. The language resources that God gave me through my past open
up a large number of possibilities: to say nothing, to lie, to tell a joke, to talk about the )
weather, and so on. The process of speaking involves a large number of choices, each of
which is linked to the preceding choices and to choices with respect to my overall plans"
(Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 54.). Poytress' research is strongly influenced )
by John M. Frame's work. In his article "Determinism, Chance and Freedom," Frame
explains their view of Soft Determinism, in which "all events, including human decisions,
are determined" while "some kind of freedom and moral responsibility also exists"
(http://www.frame-poythress.org/determinism-chance-and-freedom/).
Nevertheless, it is challenging to understand how, even under a perspective of soft
determinism, the responsibility and choices of the speaker do not hold oppressive
connotations, given that God has decided beforehand the very meaning of the words, the
immediate memofY related to the word and even the entire historical process of becoming
of the word. Maybe Poythress is trying to suggest that these elements can be totally
separated from the cognitive process of the individuals who make decisions, but this is very
unlikely since individuals normally use words and their meanings as a guide through which
they understand life, including the making of decisions.
21
Poythress, Inerrancy and Wordview, 101. Emphasis mine. Even though he mentions
that God can "speak to us exactly as he wishes," he also mentions elsewhere that we are not
to expect exhaustive precision. He argues that "truth is not to be equated with exhaustive
precision" (Poythress, Inerrancy and Wordview, 246). He apparently here refers to the
limitations that come from the "Creator-creature distinction" (Poythress, Inerrancy and
Wordview 246) in the sense that creatures do not have omniscient knowledge and not in the
r )
( )
 )
)
)
98 lRIANN MARIE HAUSTED
)
) judgment, Poythress' view seems to be highly deterministic.
) God's Involvement as It Relates to Human Contribution
After explaining God's involvement in IBL in terms of detailed and total
control, Poythress asks the following question: "How can God's control be
) consistent with human responsibility?"22 He answers his own question by affirming
that God's control does not undermine human participation and responsibility. 23
) message,"30 but he also believes that "what God says does not cease to be what _God
But, given his highly deterministic view regarding God's involvement in language,
) how can this be? He explains the matter by referring to the doctrine of God in the
Reformed theological tradition, arguing that the workings of language obey to a
J 'primary cause' ("God as creator and ruler") and a 'secondary cause' ("human
) beings"). 24 In other words, God, as first cause, allows for humans, as second causes,
to have a certain freedom or causal role, while he determines things at a superior
) level of causation. According to Poythress, both causes are "real and valid." 25 In
this sense, the described 'reality' and 'validity' of the second cause seems to open
.J up a space for human beings' legitimate participation, but the reader might be left
) to question the extent or legitimacy of that freedom, since this second cause is still
26
always under the control of the primary cause, God himself.
) Poyhtress mentions the following: "Christians are to obey God willingly. But what abou!_
sense of the language ofthe Bible failing to be precise as divine language. This can be better
) understood following his own explanation: "Let us consider an example. Mark 1:6 says that
'John [the Baptist] was clothed with camel's hair and wore a leather belt around his waist.'
) 27
That is true. That is actually how John dressed. If someone in those days had had a camera,
) or if someone had drawn a portrait that was preserved until today, we would have further
confirmation that what Mark 1:6 says is in accord with how John dressed. Ifwe are willing
) to believe what Mark 1:6 says, we have truth. We know some true facts about John. This is
one ofthe ways in which we today talk about what is true, and it is one of the ways in which
) people talked about what was true in the time of the New Testament (see John 4: 18, 37;
8:13; 3 John v. 12). I belabor the point because having truth does not imply that we have all
) the human author when we concentrate on what God is saying," Poythress, "Divine meaning
truth about all things. We can ask ourselves further questions about John. How wide and
how long was the leather belt? If we are going to be "precise," we may want a measurement
} 31
in millimeters or in tenths of an inch. We need also to know whether the belt was a
) millimeter or two wider at some points than at others. Give us exact dimensions. How thick
was it? Did John wear more than one such belt? If so, what were the exact dimensions of
) each? Did John's camel-hair clothing have long sleeves? Did it go down to his ankles or
only to his knees? How thick was it? How effective was it in keeping out the cold? We do
) not have answers to these questions. We do not know everything about John, and we do not
know everything about his clothing. That does not prevent us from accepting that he wore
) the Evangelical Theological Society 50/1 (2007) 87-103.) He also speaks of"contextual
a leather belt and that we know some true things about what he wore. Truth is not to be
) equated with exhaustive precision" (Poythress, Inerrancy and Wordview, 246).
22
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 40.
) 23
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 40.
24
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 40. He adds: "Both ofthe two are real and
) valid. But they are not on the same level."
" Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 40 (footnote 3).
) 26
One of the ways in which Poythress illustrates the allowances of the second-cause
) is that free will to 'break the linguistic rules' (grammar as well as meaning, etc.) is present,
but the breach in itself is always under God's sovereignty. That is, even a free violation of
. )
)
GOD'S INVOLVEMENT IN INSPIRED-BIBLICAL-LANGUAGE 99
Similarly, Poythress discusses what he calls creativity in language on the part
27
of the human agent. This human creativity, though, "does not mean independence
in the human will, but creativity in fellowship with God."28 "Creativity" according
to Poythress, "derives from God" and is "complementary to the fact that God is in
control."29 Interestingly enough, it is under this type of pre-determined creativity
or secondary cause level that Poythress places the role of the human writer in JBL.
Poythress believes that "the Bible affirms the prophet's inner participation in the
says just because a human intermediary is introduced."31 In other words, for
the rules would ultimately be part ofwhat is already purposed by God in his sovereignty. He
writes: "the violations of a rule are within the purpose of God for language. They take place
in accordance with his predictive and decretive word. So the power of any one rule ... is to
be understood in the context of other rules, including rules describing the possibility of
breaking the one rule" (Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 69). In my opinion, this
could not be considered a real breach, since God in his sovereignty seems to be decreeing
the breach in itself. In other words, if God both predicts and ordains the violation ofa rule,
then what space is there left for it to be a legitimate violation against God's order? A similar
situation is found in relation to evil speech. Regarding disobedience resulting in evil speech;
those who disobey God? They too carry out his will, that is, his plan" (Poythress, In the
Beginning Was the Word, 388). Is it hard to deny, then, that for Poythress even evil speecli
is under God's determinism.
See "Creativity in Language" in Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word.
28
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 386. My emphasis. But we can always
choose to violate that gift and thus we would be falling into sin. The concept of creativity
is not only applicable to craftiness but also to morality (See also chapter 8).
29
Poythress, In the Beginning Was the Word, 42.
30
Poythress, "Divine meaning of Scripture." Westminster Theological Journal 48
( 1986): 241-279. Emphasis mine. In fact, while he mentions that "we cannot simply ignore
of Scripture." Westminster Theological Journal 48 (1986): 241-279.
This is partly because "after all, it is God who chose the human intermediary and
who fashioned his personality." Poythress, "Divine meaning of Scripture." Poythress
explains this with what he calls 'organic inspiration,' a "general principle ... in which God
thought his providence brings it about that the human authors are just the people that God
designed to be, and that God then fully uses all their human faculties in the process of
thinking and writing." (Vern Sheridan Poythress, "The Presence of God Qualifying Our
Notions ofGrammatical-Historical-Interpretation: Genesis 3: 15 as a Test Case." Journal of
sensitivity," in other words, "in infinite wisdom, God harmonized with himself. And in this
harniony he takes into account the context that he himself has ordained for a particular act
of speaking, namely, the context of the prophet's own person or the person of an apostle.
God peaks in harmony with this context." (Poythress, Inerrancy and Worldview, 143-144.)
As it can be understood from the text, this means that God not only determines the words
of Scripture, but that God also determines the context that will bring them about through the
person of the writers. So, even though human authors participate in communicating God's
truth, God has already providentially determined their circumstances so that their
participation will be accurate.

100 lRIANN MARIE HAUSTED
Poythress, the biblical writer's creative contribution as secondary cause would still
happen under God's d eterminism.32
Again, the reader can b e left to wonder how much of this creativ e allowance
is indeed a legitimate human contribution, since it a lways seem s to fall, in the end,
under God' s total d eterm inism. In this regard, P oythress writes: " I suspect that
som e people may stumble here because they do not accept that kind of th orough
control by God. They wo uld say that it makes human b eings m ere puppets, and that
it nullifies human freedom. I b elieve that it does not, but I must leave that
discussion to other places." 33
32
lt is not strange at this point that he even extends this determinism to the author, text,
and reader triad: "God as Sovereign is present with humans authors, with the text of the
Bible, and with the recipients." Poythress, "The Presence of God Qualifying Our Notions
of Grammatical-Historical-Interpretation: Genesis 3: 15 as a Test Case."
33
Poythress,Inerrancyand Worldview, 250-25 1. I will basically reproduce his footnote
to this statement: "Some modern discussions about the authority ofthe Bible have insinuated
that some people who think the Bible is inerrant hold a ' dictation' theory of inspiration.
What does a dictation theory mean? According to the common meaning, a Bible produced
by 'dictation ' would involve human secretaries who wrote down word by word what God
dictated to them. Such a process or production would then imply that the human secretaries
did not need to exercise any significant mental or spiritual ability and that they essentially
had no active mental role. All that they needed to do was correctly recognize the words they
heard and write them down correctly. We can raise questions about this kind ofclaim. First,
in a case of ordinary human communication, would dictation eliminate the possibility of
human error? Suppose that a businesswoman Julie dictates word for word to her secretary
Ellen. If Ellen is compliant, dictation eliminates the possibility that she will deliberately
introduce an idea ofher own, or that she will consciously and purposely change the character
of the communication. But Ellen may still mishear a word, or write down a homonym, or
have a lapse of attention and fail to include a word, or reverse the order of words. It is
possible that Ellen's unwilling failures may be serious en ough so that the result is botched
and miscommunicates to its recipients. Dictation in and of itself does not eliminate such
possibilities. What would it take to eliminate the possibility of failure? It would take the
involvement of someone who sets himself not to fail and also has the full capability ofnever
failing when he sets himself to succeed. Those features are characteristic of God, but not of
any mere human being. God's control is such that he succeeds, whatever means he uses. The
means could in principle be dictation or could involve (as is usually the case in the Bible)
using the full me ntal, e motional, and spiritual capabilities of human beings whom God has
2aised up for the task. Dictation-or any specific means-is essentially irrelevant to the
question of truth and error. On the other hand, God's commitment to speak the truth, along
with his full control over the product, is decisive."
Also, in In the Beginning Was the Word, we can see a little more of what Poythress
believes in this r egard: "Some people oppose this view. These opponents want a picture of
independent human wills-for the sake, they may think, ofprotecting human freedom. They
may claim that the human spokesmen who wrote the Bible were an exception. These
opponents may say that, in the case ofthe Bible, God overrode the normal 'freedom' of the
will of the human writers in order to make sure that the product was exactly what he wished
it to be. My response would be that the human writers were indeed fully 'free,' but not in
the sense that the opponents mean it. The biblical writers were free with a freedom that
imitates the free dom of the decisions of the Son of God, who is at the Father's side (John
( )
GOD 'S lNvOLVEMENT IN INSPIRED-BIBLICAL-LANGUAGE 101
)
Summary
P oythress' ontology oflanguage is intrinsically linked to God's ontology from
a Reformed theological tradition 's perspective. Furthermore, God's involvement in
language consists ofGod's total control or d eterminism ofwords and their meaning. I
With the inclusion ofcreativity in human participation as a secondary cause ( on the I )
part of the writers) Poythress might seem to open up a space for free will to be
compatible with his d eterministic view of IBL, and yet, these elements are always )
under the detailed control of God as a primary cause. Thus, Poythress' arguments )
appear to function under a compatibilist or· modified model of determinism which
is conceivable only as part of a theological exercise that presupposes determinism
and in turn rejects legitimate human contribution to JBL.
;!
God's involvement in IBL: Canale34
Ontology of Language
In his historical-cognitive model for revelation-inspiration,35 Canale J
emphasizes the interdependency of revelation (mainly cognitive) and inspiration
(mainly linguistic).36 He defines "revelation and inspiration" as the inseparable "two
halves ofthe process that produced Scripture."37 This view seems to harmonize with
his p e rspective on language. Following H a ns-Georg Gadamer, Canale embraces
the belief that " thought and words b elong together," 38 thus d enying a dichotomy )
J •
1: 18). We do not need to take away the authors' ' freedom' in the proper sense of the word. > I
But if the opponents are willing to dispense with what they call human 'freedom' in the case I
of writers of Scripture, they have put themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, supp ose I
that this alleged 'freedom' is dispensable. Then we can dispense with it. No human being
needs it, any more than the writers of Scripture. It is not necessary for human dignity. Only
~ I
a freedom in harmony with God's will is necessary. On the other hand, suppose that this
'freedom' is so valuable that ordinary human beings must be allowed to have it. Then the
opponents, by suggesting that God sometimes takes away freedom, are in danger ofcharging )
God with underhandedness. The end, namely, the production of Scripture, does not justify
the means, namely, the annihilation' offreedom" (Poythress, In the Beginning, 386-387).
To follow up with this discussion, see Frame, "Determinism, Chance and Freedom"
(http://www.frarne-poythress.org/deterrninism-chance-and-freedom/).
3
• Canale does not elaborate an explicit theology oflanguage such as Poythress' but he
does provide information under the topic of inspiration that can help us to understand his
view on language as it relates to IBL. )
" See Fernando Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, and Back to
Revelation-Inspiration (Lanham: University Press of America, 200 ! ).
36
In a technical way Canale explains that revelation has to do with the thoughts of the
prophet, while inspiration has to do with putting revelation into writing. This means,
according to Canale, that "revelation is a cognitive process while inspiration is mainly a
linguistic one." Fernando Canale, Understanding Scripture, (Hagerstown: R eview and
Herald, 2005), 50. )
37
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 390.
38
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Th eology, 402. He also mentions that
"Thought and words belong together" (US, 59).
)
)
)
102 lRIANN MARJE HAUSTED
)
) between them39 and entreating his readers to "understand the folly of separating"
them. 40 In this sense, Canale points to an ontological aspect of language, that is,
) language is intrinsically linked to the cognition of the individual.41
Further on, Canale seems to portray a demarcation between the divine mode of
) "moving."52 Further than that, Canale does not go into much detail to explain the
communication and human language arguing that God "adapts" and "adjusts"42 to
) our corrupt language, both in "the human mode ofthinking" and to "human-writing
patterns."43 That is why, according to Canale, "the mode of thinking and writing,
we find in Scripture ... is not divine, but human."~ Under this view, Canale does
not seem to link human language and God ontologically, as does Poythress, but
instead focuses on language in the human context, with God condescending to work
within human language.
)
Extent of God's Involvement in IBL
) For Canale, "God is directly involved in the entirety of the processes of
revelation and inspiration,"45 that is, both cognitively and linguistically.46
) intrusive. He further explain~:
) 39
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 401.
4
°Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 403.
) 41
This ontological aspect oflanguage, as understood by Canale appears to be one of
the elements that contribute to his conclusion that "there must be an alternate view to both
J verbal and thought inspiration." (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology,
) 404). Thus he departs from other models ofinspiration that over-emphasize either cognition
(thoughts) or language (words), and proposes the historical-cognitive model which, among
) other things, is more consistent with his ontological perspective on language. Another
interesting element in this regard is that Canale's holistic approach leads him to consider a
) new route, while retaining valuable elements from the models he wishes to depart from:
"From 'encounter' revelation we should retain the biblical conviction that God's workofR-I
) takes place within a personal historical I-Thou relationship ... From 'thought' inspiration
we should retain the biblical teaching that God's work ofR-I focuses on the thought-process
) " Canale, Understanding Scripture, 49.
level of biblical writers ... From 'verbal' inspiration we should retain the biblical teaching
that the divine work ofR-I also reaches the level of the words" (Canale, Understanding
J 53
Scripture, 62).
) 42
Canale, Understanding Scripture, 64.
" Canale, Understanding Scripture, 64.
) 44
Canale, Understanding Scripture, 64. He adds on the same page: "Therefore, Ellen
G. White tells us 'the Bible is written by inspired men, but it is not God's mode of thought
) and expression. It is that of humanity. God, as writer, is not represented. Men will often say
such an expression is not like God. However, God has not put Himself in words, in logic,
) "These two patterns are not to be confused with Poythress' first and second causes.
in rhetoric, on trial in the Bible. The writers of the Bible were God's penmen, not His pen'
(ISM 21, italics supplied)."
45
Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 148.
46
Canale notes that "God must be involved in the writing of Scripture, or we are left
to question whether it properly represents His thoughts." (Canale, The Cognitive Principle
of Christian Theology, 393.) To this he adds: "divine inspiration ... is the component
insuring that divine thinking also permeates the words through which revelation is
) communicated to the world." (Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, 405.)
) He also believes that God "guided the expression of His thoughts into human language."
(Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 393.)
)
)
GOD'S INVOLVEMENT IN INSPIRED-BIBLICAL-LANGUAGE 103
Canale argues that "through inspiration, God has somehow reached the book's
words,"47 but that 'somehow' is only somewhat explained by the use of several
different terms, for example: "reaching out," "assist[ing]" or "contribut[ing];"48
"supervis[ing),"49 "helping" or "influencing;"50 "accompan[ying],"51 "guiding," or
manner and extent of that 'somehow.' 53
Nevertheless, looking at Canale's account of God's involvement inIBL as it
pertains to human contribution can shed more light on the matter.
God's Involvement as It Relates to Human Contribution
Canale explains God's involvement in regards to human contribution to IBL
by postulating two main patterns.54 First, there is "a general historical supervisional
pattem"55 which he defines as follows: "Through his omniscience and
omnipresence, God is directly aware of everything, including the thought process
and linguistic activities of the prophets."56 For Canale, this 'awareness' is non-
This side of inspiration is non-intrusive. God is not causing the thoughts
or the words, but supervising the process of their free production in the
mind ofthe writers, making certain that the contents are being recorded in
a trustworthy way. In other words, divine intervention in this pattern is
ancillary; it does not cause the writing through an act of overriding power,
but supports it by divine grace and wisdom.57
47
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 404. Emphasis mine.
48
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 390.
49
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 405.
'° Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 391.
2
' Canale, Understanding Scripture, 66.
I believe that Canale's ambiguity in regards to the exact way in which God reaches
the words of Scripture does not appear to be a result of idle analysis but rather an intentional
move in portraying the data available in Scripture itself, which seems to leave the matter
under a certain veil of mystery. Whether or not Canale intends to portray Scriptural data as
providing further clarification for this ambiguity is not clear from his writings at this point.
See, for example, his treatment of 2 Timothy 3: I 6 in Canale, The Cognitive Principle of
Christian Theology, 391.
"Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 144.
6
' Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 144-145. Again, see Elmer Guzman's essay
in this volume dealing with the question of divine omnipresence.
1
' Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 407. Emphasis mine. He
further argues that this is possible "through conversion, sanctification, and the meaningful
forms given them by God." Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, 410. The
reader might wonder if Canale's view here is really different from Poythress' concept of
divine control as first cause. While both seem to agree that God has control over the process
of inspiration, Poythress speaks in terms of causality, while Canale denies it. One possible

104 lRIANN MARIE HAUSTED
In that sense, according to Canale, the human authors have a role to play as free
agents and legitimate contributors, while God's 'supervision' is mainly non-
intrusive.
Furthermore, Canale sees the biblical writer as engaging in a legitimately
creative activity. He states that "writing is a thought process shaping revelation and,
therefore, the actual content of Scripture. " 58 This means that the words that the
writer freely and 'creatively' chooses in order to communicate God's thoughts, go
on to "give shape" or "alter" those very thoughts. 59 These alterations actually
"become part of divine revelation,"60 given that "the written text differs somehow
from the content ofrevelation."61 In short, Canale's view of creativity on the part
of the human writer seems to allow for legitimate human contribution, portraying
a writer that, through his free and 'creative' choosing of words, can even 'alter ' the
thoughts of God. This contribution, nevertheless, h appens in the context of the
second pattern.
The second pattern is identified by Canale as the "occasional, remedial,
corrective, historical-intervention pattern."62 In it God abnormally "overrule[s] the
prophet's discourse,"63 but "only in notable circumstances." 64 This otherwise called
reason for this is that although Canale may coincide in some sense with Poythress' view in
regards to God's control, he might still not agree with his theoretical explanation of that
control, thus avoiding the use of terms that could link him to such theoretical explanation.
Canale admits to his adherence to this type of dynamic when it comes to verbal inspiration:
"The historical-cognitive model does not reject the biblical affirmation that the words of
Scripture were inspired by the Holy Spirit; it does, however, reject the theoretical
explanation provided by verbal inspiration" (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian
Theology, 416). Nevertheless, whether or not Canale is participating in this dynamic also on
his view on God's control is not clear and the reader will have to be the judge ofit.
ss Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 404.
59
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 405.
6
61
° Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Th eology, 405.
Canale, The Cognitive Principle a/Christian Theology, 405. Here Canale seems to
be referring to the way that "human writers are responsible for the literary composition of
the biblical books,"in the sense that "even though God commanded them to write, he did not
seem to say how it should be organized, apparently leaving this to the human
agent."(Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 395)
Human beings, he adds, communicated divine truth (revelation) while using "their
mental and linguistic capacities to communicate the truths to their audiences (inspiration)."
62
Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 144.
63
Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 145.
64
Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration, 145. He further explains that "because the
general-supervision pattern introduces no modification into the human writing process, there
must be a complementary pattern of divine inspiration ... that keeps the Bible writers from
straying." (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 407) In this regard,
Canale refers to the example of Balaam, specifically when "Balaam's freedom was
overridden by the Holy Spirit" (Canale, Understanding Scripture, 65) to illustrate his
occasional divine intervention pattern. It would be worth noting that Canale does not seem
to differentiate between oral or written discourse when it comes to inspired language.
)
GOD 'S INVOLVEMENT IN INSPIRED-BIBLICAL-LANGUAGE 105
"remedial-corrective pattern"65 takes effect, according to Canale, only if the writer
somehow deviates from the truthful content that God wants to transmit and
"willingly or unwilling ly misrepresent[s] him.'>66 T hat is, "when the Bible writers
or their expressions depart from God's will.'' 67
Although the remedial-corrective pattern is to be understood both as a last
resort tool and in the context of the non-intrusive general pattem,68 up to this point
Canale's reader might b e left wondering if this pattern could be somewhat )
identified with a deterministic perspective. Another of Canale's statements that )
could provide more ground for this possibility reads as fo llows:
We should not conceive the continuous guid ance of the Holy Spirit in the
process of writing as continuo us divine intervention, causing the choice )
of every thought and word in Scripture. Instead we should consider a less
intrusive pattern of inspiration, one more consistent with the freedom of
human writers. 69
The challenge with such a statement is that a ' less intrusive pattern of
inspiration ' could in fact be understood as somewhat intrusive, which in tum could
portray God's involvement in IBL as somewhat deterministic. Elsewhere, Canale
also states: "God can intervene in prophetic thinking and freedom should he so J
choose.''70 Again, statements such as these can leave the reader wanting a clearer )
definition of what is meant by freedom in this context and how it relates to the
dynamics of the corrective-rem edial pattern.
At this point it b ecomes useful to remark that, in Canale's view, the " historical-
65
Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, 408.
66
Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Th eology, 412.
61
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 412. Its function is "to
maximize clarity of ideas and to prevent, if necessary, the distortion of revelation, or
changing divine truth into a lie." (Canale, Understanding Scripture, 65) Canale also clarifies
that "God is not causing the words by overruling the normal function of the human agency.
On the contrary, we se the writing process freely taking place in the human agency under
the careful guidance of the Holy Spirit" (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian
Theology, 65). He adds: "The Holy Spirit's 'guidance' or 'moving' harnessed the freedom
and literary skills of the human agencies in their historical and spiritual development )
Divine ovenuling of the human agency was not the main pattern of divine 'guidance' or
'moving' but a possible last resort to avoid human misrepresentation" (Canale, The
Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, 67). He argues that "though subservient . . . [the
writer] had freedom in serving as God's representative," Canale, The Cognitive Principle
of Christian Theology, 396.
68
Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, 407-412.
69
Canale, Understanding Scripture, 65. Emphasis mine. Even another similar statement
reads: "inspiration does not normally overrule human freedom or its normal rational and
)
linguistic processes." (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 391.)
Emphasis mine. The use of the word "normally" point to the fact that there is an "abnormal" J
overruling of human freedom.
1
°Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 411. Emphasis mine.
' I
)
)
)
)
106 IRIANN MARIE HAUSTED GOD'S lNVOLVEMENT IN INSPIRED-BIBLICAL-LANGUAGE 107
)
cognitive model understands divine providence differently than do the classical and Summary
}
evangelical models."71 In that sense, Canale's critique of the classical model of While Canale might not elaborate an ontology of language per se, he does
) inspiration, a model that embraces determinism and which Poythress can be seen point to the ontological nature of language when he advocates for the intrinsic
as belonging to, serves as clarification that he does not view his remedial-corrective relationship of thoughts and words. He also seems to imply a dichotomy between
) human and divine language (God accommodates to human language). While God's
pattern under deterministic terms but in a free will context. 72 In fact, Canale sees his
) exception-based pattern as beneficial, and not necessarily deterministic: "That God involvement inIBL is mainly that of a general supervision that allows for legitimate
is capable of overriding his writers' oral and written expressions of revelation creativity on the part of the human, it also provides for occasional exceptions when
) divine intervention takes place and overrules the human contribution. Canale' s view
grounds our certainty of Scripture's reliability."73
of JBL develops under presuppositions that uphold free will and discourage
) Having clarified that, I still wonder ifhis remedial-corrective pattern happens
to challenge some elements of his own critique to the classical model. determinism, and yet his remedial-corrective pattern seems to problematize those
) very presuppositions, at least at a minimum level.
) Conclusions
) Despite the fact that this research does not necessarily take into account all the
nuances assumed by Poythress or Canale in regards to IBL, some basic conclusions
) 71
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 405. may be reached.
72
Canale acknowledges that presuppositions related to detenninism and free will are While both Poythress and Canale affirm God's involvement inJBL, they differ
) crucial for understanding matters related to IBL (Canale, Understanding Scripture, 51-52),
and thus he contrasts his view with the deterministic "classical and evangelical views of
in the ontology oflanguage that they subscribe to (explicitly or implicitly), which
) inspiration"<Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 393.) He argues that leads them to emphasize the divine and human elements respectively. Thus, for
the classical/evangelical view tends to "bypass the human agency because they assume God Poythress, God does not condescend to human language, but instead he indwells
) human language through a divine-human ontological linguistic connection in which
acts according to the Augustinian-Calvinistic notion of divine, sovereign providence."
) (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 393.) Canale explains that in the God sovereignly defines the meaning of words for both God and humans. For
classical model "the biblical writer appears to possess a great deal of freedom and Canale, on the other hand, there seems to be a demarcation between divine
) contributes much to Scripture. But since God as primary cause also directs the prophet in language and human language, with God condescending or adjusting to human
the writing process, the human element in Scripture amounts to almost nothing. God is in language.
\
./ control of the ideas and the words of Scripture. The contribution of the prophet is Nevertheless, some of the phenomena and the descriptions of Poythress and
negligible." (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 128) He makes other
) similar statements: "God operated an irresistible sovereign influence, overruling any
Canale in regards to God's involvement in IBL seem to be similar. That is, despite
initiative originating in human freedom ... (therefore) God becomes not only the author of of their differences, it could be said that there is a sense in which Poythress and
) Canale would seem to be relating to each other in their internal discussion ofdivine
Scripture, but also the writer" (Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, 52);
) "On one hand, verbal inspiration claims God is the author of the words of Scripture, involvement in IBL. On the one hand, Poythress' compatibilist beliefs along with
apparently bypassing the thought processed of the Bible writers .... (but) God was in total his descriptions of human creativity and participation, might seem to at least
) control of his prophets' thinking and literary activities concerning Scripture. In this view distance his view from being umeservedly deterministic and to begin to open up a
biblical writers seem to think and write freely, yet at a deeper level of which they were way to somehow relate to a free will perspective. On the other hand, although
) unconscious, God was in control. Thus, the biblical words are not the prophet's, but God's" Canale's remedial-corrective pattern's intermittent nature allows room for it to
(Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 401). stand mainly under a non-deterministic view, its allowing for divine occasional
J Canale identifies the classical and evangelical models ofinspiration mostly.with verbal
intervention appears to grant some deterministic element. In other words, both
) inspiration. Further on, his writings point to the development ofa biblical view ofinspiration
that also intends to go beyond the thought inspiration model. He does not completely reject theologians' views can be seen as placing a main emphasis either on determinism
) thought inspiration, but he identifies the thought-verbal dichotomy as a false one. He argues: (Poythress) or on free will (Canale), while both still holding on to some minimal
"The historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration rejects the single-pattern strategy form of the opposite view.
) adopted by the classical, evangelical, and modem models, and instead advocates a It would appear that both Poythress' and Canale's. views are similar in yet
multiplicity of explanatory patterns" (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian another way: they both seem to present a challenge-perhaps unintentionally- to their
) Theology, 417). In that sense, it could be said that he is both continuing and innovating own presuppositions. That is, Poythress' proposal for a legitimate human
) within the Adventist tradition. For a more detailed explanation of Canale's view on this contribution to IBL does not seem to be consistent with his deterministic model of
matter see The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, Chapter 18. For a critique of God's involvement in IBL, while, similarly, Canale's remedial-corrective pattern
) thought inspiration in particular see The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 402.
73 ofIBL seems to include a deterministic element, which might not be consistent with
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 412.
)
)

108 lRJANN MARIE HAUSTED
a free will perspective.
Finally, the encounter with the apparent impasse between freedom and
determinism in /BL is not necessarily a challenge particular to Poythress or Canale,
but rather a complex theological issue that seems to transcend them. Still, I believe
that to see how both theologians wrestle with these issues to the best of their ability
has already provided some direction for the journey.
------------------
And, so, the question remains: What is God's involvement in/BL? Does God
deterministically control words and their meaning or does he allow for the human's
free contribution? How should we understand language in the context of the often-
juxtaposed theological concepts of free will and determinism ? Although the present
research offers more questions than answers, it could be considered at least a
tentative step on the way to both, (1) a more complete understanding of inspiration
as it relates to /BL, and (2) the development of a biblical theology of language for
A dventists.
lriann Marie Hausted loves experiencing divine grace (veiy often embodied in Nicholas
Hausted), and delights in sunny-windy days. She also holds a BA in Comparative Literature
and Hispanic Studies from the University of Puerto Rico, an MA in Theological Studies
from the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary at Andrews University, and currently
undergoes PhD studies at the same institution.
I.
)
)
Canale's Utilization of Phenomenology:
Analyzing its Problems and Perspectives )
}
Oliver Glanz
)
)
Biographical Notes )
A friend of mine, a committed Adventist who affirms the prophetic self-
understanding of the Adventist movement, used to say that aside from the writings )
of Ellen White and the Bible, A dventist literature is generally not very inspiring or
mind-opening; the b est books he h as read, he says, are from non-Adventist writers.
In many respects I agree with this experience. With some exceptions, Adventist
publications have not engaged deeply and in inspiring ways with the socio-political,
psychological, philosophical, and aesthetical realms of today's cultural discourse. )
Generally speaking, this observation applies to all streams within Adventism. One
ofthe fortunate excep tions the A dventist church h as produced is Fernando Canale's
dissertation A Criticism of Theological Reason1 and his book Back to R evelation-
Jnspiration. 2
P ersonally, I have profited greatly from his dissertation. I was educated in a
German classical humanist gymnasium where Latin was my only foreign language
class in the last 3 years before my high school graduation (Abitur). A year after
graduation, when I turned 20, I lost my Christian fatih. The philosophical and
historical critical education I had received in the formative teenage years led me to
embrace skepticism. Even though while in school I stood up against evolutionary
theory in my biology classes, rejected the historical critical school in my Lutheran )
religion classes (in my Abitur defense I had to argue against Pinchas Lapide's and
Ulrich Luz' historical critical take in "Der Jude Jesus"3), disagreed with the
consensus theory of Adorno and Horkheimer in my philosophy classes, and felt
uncomfortable with the democratization oftones through Schonberg's twelve tone
composition in my art classes. But the sharpness of the analysis and the power of
the rational coherence of what I considered to be my "great controversy" )
adversaries overwhelmed me when I left the social environment of the gymnasium.
Graduating from high school also meant graduating from defending my existence
as an Adventist in a non-Adventist educational setting. After my Abitur I took a
year offand worked on a farm in North Dakota. The long and lonely work hours on
fields whose sizes seemed to merge with the horizon delivered an ideal context for
1
Fernando L. Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as
Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987).
2
Fernando L. Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive )
Foundation of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham: University Press of
America, 2001 ).
' Pinchas Lapide and Ulrich Luz, Der Jude Jesus: Thesen eines Juden, Anworten eines
Christen (Patmos, 2003).
J
)
)
)
110 OLIVER GLANZ CANALE'S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 111
)
) self-reflection and intellectual honesty. I had to confess to myself that the 2. With Heidegger, the object ofthe phenomenological method has changed
arguments I entertained against the theory of evolution and against postmodern art (from consciousness to Being) and lead to the abandonment of the Cartesian
) and thinking did not truly engage those theories with their obvious benefits for dualism between subject and object. The subject-object distinction, however,
democracy and the progression of science. is retained as central point ofdeparture in Canale' s phenomenological analysis
The major turning point in my skepticist path took place on a weekend off from of Reason. This triggers the question in how far Canale phenomenological
) farming in North Dakota, when I visited Andrews University. Poking through the method is relating to the radicality of the post-Husserl phenomenology of the
books at the Andrews University bookstore, I noticed Canale's dissertation. Not 20 1b century.
) 3. While Canale suggest that the formal, i.e. antic structure of reason is of
knowing the author, I skimmed through the book and quickly came to the
conclusion that the foundational nature of this book would help me in my search for universal nature its ontological understanding is subjective. This distinction is
) based upon the assumption that no subjective elements can be detected in the
truth. Reading and rereading his work not only during my US Greyhound bus trips
) and later during college brought back to me appreciation for the Adventist transcendental formal structure of Reason. This has, however, been contested
movement. A couple years later, while finishing my graduate studies in philosophy during the 20th century, by phenomenologist themselves.
) 4. As phenomenology focuses in its particular way on human consciousness
at the Free University of Amsterdam, I returned deliberately and committed to the
) Adventist movement. it does not describe the "objective" world of natural science but the (universal)
I am very thankful for the philosophical ministry of Fernando Canale, for his inner mental dynamics that are required in order to produce conscious
) contribution to Adventism in general and the Seventh-Day Adventist Theological thoughts. At the moment where one brings a phenomenological understanding
Seminary at Andrews University in particular. It is lamentable that I have never of Reason into the dialogue with science and their particular theories (e.g.
)
been able to take any of his classes and learn from his oral teaching. evolution theory) it becomes difficult to achieve any power of persuasion on
) I consider it unfortunate that the occasional disagreement with Canale is either side of the dialogue partners. This can lead to the conclusion that
usually coupled with an ignorance of his philosophical work. His articles of recent phenomenology is ofno use for a critical analysis of scientific theories, while ,
) science theories are ofno use to understand the spiritual dimensions that any
years 4 are not appreciated in right measures when the phenomenological studies in
> his dissertation are not understood, appreciated, or taken into consideration. theory brings with it.
5. While the fourth problematic aspect searches to analyze the problematic
) 1. Introduction relation between phenomenology and science the fifth aspect will relate to the
In this paper I focus on the phenomenological method Canale utilizes in his relation betweenphenomenology and reality, the concept ofour consciousness
analysis ofReason. This is a necessary starting point for an assessment ofhis work, about reality and reality as such.
) because his hermeneutical understanding of Reason, its frameworks and necessary 6. Finally, I will end with some short notes on crucial elements that have not
dimensionality, foundational to his deconstruction of classical and Protestant become part of Canale's phenomenology of Reason. The lack of these
) elements can cause a too narrow understanding of the hermeneutical processes
theology and his construction of a specific Adventist understanding of the
) ontological foundations of theology, was enabled by his phenomenological and the ethical responsibilities that come with them.
analysis.
) My Festschrift contribution consists oftwo parts. In the first part I will explain The analysis intends to be critical in order to explore possibilities for further
how Canale relates to the phenomenological tradition as it was started by Husserl. research that seeks to continue the general strategy set up by Canale to progress a
)
As part of this section I will try to explain Canale's particular understanding and biblical Adventist understanding within the great controversy ofideas. There where
) use of the phenomenological method. The second part of my contribution offers a I see feasible approaches to defend or further develop Canale's phenomenological
critical analysis of Canale's understanding of phenomenology. This analysis will method I will indicate them without claiming to oversee the full route of needed
) research. This contribution rather searches to clarify the questions that Canale's
focus on six different aspects that appear to be problematic:
) phenomenological method brings to the fore in order to construct future research
1. Canale provides a very limited contextualization of his phenomenological with clear objectives.
method. This makes it difficult to understand how he relates to the general
phenomenological developments that took place after Husserl and the early 2. Phenomenology and Canale
)
Heidegger. I will reflect upon the nature of the late Heidegger's skepticism In the introduction to his dissertation Canale states that while "the need for a
) towards the phenomenological method and how this affects Canale's method. criticism oftheological reason is apparent [ ... ] its possibility is neither clear nor has

) 4
See a complete biography ofC;nale's work at the end of this Festschrift volume.
)
,)
112 OLIVER GLANZ
even been considered." 5 Searching for a viewpoint that enables a criticism of
Reason he finds the phenomenological approach of Marvin Farber and foremost
Nicolai Hartman6 as a promising and appropriate approach for his project. 7
Before describing Canale's phenomenological method it is important to
understand that one cannot speak ofthe phenomenological method. Phenomenology
comes in different versions and they are not all complimentary. The
phenomenological method was developed by Husserl and than further carried out
by different scholars of which the most prominent is Heidegger. Canale refers to
Husserl, Heidegger and Hartmann when developing his own particular
phenomenological method. For the purpose of this paper, however, I regard the
distinction between transcendental static and genetic phenomenology sufficient
enough for understanding Canale's phenomenological approach.
2.1 Transcendental Static P henomenology
In the early Husserl's L ogische Untersuchungen 8 (logical investigations) the
methodology of transcendental static phenomenology is developed. In contrast to
dynamic, static phenomenology observes the transcendental universal patterns that
constitute all objects of consciousness. One major insight through the study of the
phenomena of consciousness is that logical norms are not a product of subjectivity
'Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions, 11 .
6
The main Hartmann source Canale consults is Nicolai Hartmann, Grundziige einer
Metaphysik der Erkenntnis (Walter de Gruyter, 1941). See footnote no2 in Canale, A
Criticism ofTheo/ogical Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, 25.
and footnote no2 in ibid., 27.
7
Cf. footnote no. 2 in Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and
Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, 21- 22. Through this methodological choice
Canale differentiates himself (together with Hartmann) from the viewpoint chosen by Kant
who opts for a transcendental consciousness in the context of the empiricist-rationalist
controversy in his time. See here also footnote no l ibid., 23.
Nicolai Hartmann's critical realism has made him one of the major figures in the
revival of metaphysics in the 20'" century. He saw that idealism in its core did not create an
alternative to Kant but in fact was building its idealism on Kant's transcendence who
reduced the ultimate structure of consciousness from the individual human being to a
transcendental abstracturn. Hartman writes: "Das lehrt nicht [what is meant is the necessity
ofa metaphysical concept as condition for any theory] erst der nachkantische Streit urn das
'Ding an sich' oder die groBangelegte, offenkundig metaphysische Spekulation eines Fichte
und Hegel, sondem in aller Deutlichkeit auch schon Kants eigener Standpunk, der
Idealismus des 'transzendentalen BewuBtsein,' <lessen groBe Ratselfragen eben jene
spekulative Metaphysik heraufbeschworen haben. DaB die Systeme des deutschen
Idealismus metaphysisch wurden, ist nicht ein Abweichen vom Wege Kan ts, sondem gerade
eine konsequentes Beharren aufihrn, ein Ausharren bei seinen irn letzten Grunde eben <loch
rnetaphysischen Problernen." (Nicolai Hartmann, Grundziige einer Metaphysik der
Erkenntnis (Walter de Gruyter, 1965), 4.).
8
Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen: Prolegomena zur Reinen Logik, 2nd ed.,
vol. 1 (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913).
CANALE'S U TILIZATION OF PHENO:MENOLOGY 113
in the sense that they are fundamentally of psychological nature and subj ect to the
dynamics of a person's biography. The logic of phenomenology is best understood
on the basis of Frege's interaction with Husserl. 9 As a result of this interaction,
disciplines, like mathematics were no longer considered to have a psychological )
foundation. 10 The logic of phenomenology itself is not psychological but formal in _)
nature. In phenomenology then, the phenomena that we are conscious of are not
studied psychologically. Husserl, did not only differentiate his phenomenological J
method from the methodology of psychology, he also saw the limits of the )
methodology of natural sciences at the moment where human consciousness is
studied. While the natural sciences focus on the recognition ofneurophysiological J
patterns generated by a variety of sensory experiences of external objects,
psychology focuses on the biographical influence on consciousness as
psychological phenomena. Both approaches are valuable in their own rights, but
they do not study the nature of consciousness as such. While natural science
analyzes the physiological "hardware" of consciousness psychological analysis
focuses on understanding the software based "operatin g system" of consciousness.
In both procedures, however, the nature of the code, i.e. the grammar of the
programming language which enables the working of any operating system and thus
constituting the operational structure of consciousness is missed. For such an
)
analysis one needs to choose a methodology that enables the study of the
phenomena ofconsciousness without being influenced by ontological concepts (e.g. J
priority of hardware over software, or software over hardware), and at the same
time is geared towards the discovery of elements that have to be necessarily )
assumed ("grammar of programming language") for consciousness to take place.
The distinction between "hardware," "software," and "programming language"
itself is not problematic. )
Thus, the phenomenological approach has two steps: first, the concrete objects
of consciousness are studied; then, the conditions that allow for these objects to
become part of consciousness are uncovered (transcendental analysis).
Phenomenological thinking, therefore, is not only different from the methodologies
of the natural sciences and psychology, but is also very different from traditional
philosophical thinking as it tries to go "beyond the mere expression of a world
view" 11 into a rigorous analysis of pattern recognition that takes consciousness as
its object of study. In this transcendental analysis one needs to abstract the
repetitive (i.e. always present features of things we are conscious of) from the
particular things. These general properties are called "essences" in Husserl's
)
' Cf. Anthony Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy: In Four Parts (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012), 815-816, 873-874.
10
See Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen: Prolegomena zur Reinen Logik, 1:§ 17- 20. )
11
See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen: Untersuchungen zur
Phiinomeno/ogie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, 2nd ed., vol. 2a (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913),
375-377. See also Taylor Carman, "Husserl and Heidegger," in The Blackwell Companion
to Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Balckwell Publishers, 2003), 845.
)
)
)
114 OLIVER GLANZ
)
terminology and could be analogically described as static geological layers that
)
constitute the possibility of consciousness. 12
Through this process of abstraction, the structure of the object given to
consciousness is distinguished and filtered from the psychological episodes that
_)
make these structures manifest in the subject's consciousness. The transcendental
)
)
objects of our consciousness are then not "real" things but the structural elements
that allow for the awareness of concrete objects ("not roses but redness"). This
transcendental reduction has then two purposes:
)
)
1. Abstraction from the psychological and physiological concreteness. 13
2. Abstraction from concrete philosophical theory (ontology) by means of
bracketing out any ontological beliefs and assumptions.
) phenomenology with genetic phenomenology in order to include the study of the
) In this way, phenomenology is understood as a science. While factual enquiries
belong to the natural sciences, conceptual enquiries belong to phenomenology (or
) scientific, i.e. cognitive pattern detecting philosophy).
) Husserl believed that it is possible to execute an analysis of human
consciousness without ontological preconceptions and discover a transcendental
) self/transcendental-phenomenological sphere. Thus, one does not have to be an
idealist in order to come to a basic understanding of the structure of knowledge.
) Canale does not grapple with genetic phenomenology. Although he does not state
Problematic, however, is that the "programming language" thus the
) phenomenological core structure of consciousness was taken by Husserl as
"transcendental ego." Husserl, therefore, transitioned from a purely
J phenomenological description to a concrete ontological interpretation of the most
abstract phenomenological core of the structure of human consciousness.
) 2.2 Genetic Phenomenology
) Husserl has received criticism for his static understanding of the formal
structure of consciousness as it ignores that on a foundational level the detected
) formal structures of consciousness are much more interwoven, i.e., "higher
geological layers" influence "lower geological layers" during the temporal
) succession of consciousness. 14 While the matter of time and its influence on
) consciousness has been excluded in the transcendental static phenomenology it is
given attention in the genetic phenomenology. This allows to include the influences
) ofintuitions, memory and emotions in the analysis of consciousness. As a response
) 12
Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen: Untersuchungen zur Phanomenologie und
) Theorie der Erkenntnis, 2a:251-252; Henning Peucker, "Die Grundlagen der praktischen
Intentionalitiit. Ein Beitrag zu Husserls Phanomenologie des Willens" (presented at the
) Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft - XXI. Deutscher Kongress filr Philosophie, Essen, 2008), 3.
13
Since an object is transcendent "if only one side or aspect of it can be immediately
) present to us at any one time" (Carman, "Husserl and Heidegger," 846). It has often been
suggested that Husserl's phenomenological program is possible on the basis ofan explicit
) platonic realism (Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy, 816.).
14
Cf. Peucker, "Die Grundlagen derpraktischen lntentionalitlit. Ein Beitrag zu Husserls
) http://sweb.uky.edu/-rsandl/PDF_docs/Sandmeyer_Writing_Sample.pdf.
Phanomenologie des Willens," 3--4.
.)
CANALE' S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 115
to the critique, then, Husserl developed further his understanding of what the
phenomenological analysis should be able to do and started to integrate also the non
static elements of consciousness. He complements his static phenomenology with
his genetic phenomenology. While the earlier analyzes the formal structure of
consciousness, the latter studies the "anteroom" (Vorzimmer) of consciousness in
I which drives and emotions operate as "genetic" factors for the operation of
consciousness. Genetic phenomenology, then, studies the relative and subjective
elements of consciousness. As Geniusas puts it "the horizon [of genetic
I phenomenology] is the horizon ofsubjectivity." 15
As recent studies show, Husserl did not exchange static phenomenology with
genetic phenomenology. The application of static phenomenology was not
discontinued by the later Husserl. Rather Husserl tried to complement static
dynamic aspects of consciousness phenomenologically. Peucker has convincingly
demonstrated that even the late Husserl treated both methods as necessary but with
different areas ofvalidity. 16
2.3 Canale's Take on Phenomenology
When Canale discusses the phenomenological method in order to find his own
approach to a phenomenological analysis of Reason it becomes quickly clear that
this explicitly, his criticism ofHusserl leads to a variation of static phenomenology
leaving genetic phenomenology untreated and uninvolved. This becomes even more
obvious when Canale adopts to a great extent Hartmann's phenomenological
method. Hartmann's phenomenology builds upon Husserl's static phenomenology
but reworks those idealistic elements that can still be found in Husserl's
transcendental analysis. Consequently, Hartmann rejects Husserl's transcendental
t
15
Saulius Geniusas, The Origins ofthe Horizon in Husserl's Phenomenology, vol. 67,
Contributions to Phenomenology (Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), 89, http://www.
springer.com/philosophy/philosophical+traditions/book/978-94-007-4643-5.
16
Peucker writes that later Husserl texts treat both methods as valid "Dort [in lateer
Husserl texts] !assen sich iiberraschend eindeutige Au!3erungen dazu finden, <lass Husserl
sein fiiiheres Fundierungsmodell des Willens [static phenomenology] noch in den zwanziger
Jahren keineswegs aufgegeben hat." (Peucker, "Die Grundlagen der praktischen
Intentionalitlit. Ein Beitrag zu Husserls Phanomenologie des Willens," 8). Peucker concludes
that "Die beiden Methoden der statischen Aktanalyse und der genetischen Phanomenologie
waren m.a. W. aufverschiedene Phanomenbereiche bezogen - die statische Phanomenologie
mit ihrem Fundierungsmodel auf die eigentlich Willensakte selbst und die genetische
Phanomenologie aufdie motivationalen Urspriinge solcher Akte im Bereich der Triebe und
Strebungen. Beide Willensmodelle bleiben so giiltig, da sie sich auf unterschiedliche
Phanomene beziehen." (Ibid., 10). See also Bob Sandmeyer, "The Origins of Genetic
Phenomenology in Edmund Husserl's Philosophy," 3, 13, accessed October 27, 2014,

116 OLNERGLANZ
ego that was part of his static phenomenology. 17 With Hartmann Canale states that
18
"phenomenology may be used outside of the idealistic fence." Canale qualifies
Hartmann' s modified phenomenological analysis as "the best way to accomplish
the foundational task of getting acquainted with the subject matter of this study." 19
From this follows that any assessment ofCanale's phenomenological method
requires two important insights: First, a criticism of Canale that appears to be a
criticism ofgenetic phenomenology is misunderstanding Canale' s method. Second,
a criticism of Canale's transcendental static phenomenology that assumes that
Husserl abandoned static phenomenology with his development of genetic
phenomenology is not supported by the late Husserl research. For Husserl the
normative aspects of Reason's operation go hand in hand with the much more
relative and dynamic aspects of Reason's functioning. For the discovery of the
normative structure transcendental static phenomenology is applied while for the
analysis of the relative nature ofconsciousness genetic phenomenology is applied. 20
Using a redefined transcendental static phenomenological approach, Canale's
analysis "is focused on the interpretation of the dimensionality of reason's
structure." 21 Consequently, he targets at the transcendental elements of
Reason/awareness (from a phenomenological, not an ontological perspective!) and
names it "dimensionality''- which he uses synonymously with "primordial
17
See Hartmann, Grundzuge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 1965, 289). Hartman
saw the core structure of consciousness as the core structure of "Gnoseologie", i.e., the
structure of knowledge generation (Ibid., 6, 34-60). As such this structure does not testify
any transcendental reality and is approached by a tweaked method ofstatic phenomenology.
Hartmann writes "Eine rein am Problem orientierte und in diesem Sinoe 'laitische
Ontologie', wie sie als Grundlage der Gnoseologie anzustrebeo ist, kann so wenig beweisen,
daB es ein 'Erfassen des Ansichseiendeo' gebe, als sie beweisen kann, daB Gott existiere.
Ja sie kann beides so wenig beweisen als widerlegeo. Aber sie kann filr das Sein der
Erkenntnis, falls es ein solches gibt, sowie fiir das nicht weoiger fraglicher Sein ihres
Gegenstandes eine gemeinsame Sphare nachweisen, in welcher beide vergleichbar,
vereinbar, ja iiberhaupt in einer dem Problem geniigenden Bezogenheit dastehen." (Ibid.,
6-7.). See also Canale in footnote no2 in Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time
and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, 26.
18 Canale writes that Hartmann "uses the phenomenological method but at the same
time rejects Husserl's transcendental reduction." See Canale, A Criticism of Theological
Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, 26-27. See also my
explanations in footnote no7.
19 See footnote no. I in ibid., 27. Canale writes further "The phenomenologists are right
when they insist that the first step in philosophy is an analysis of the phenomenon, which
means an accurate description of the thing as that thing swims into our awareness."
20 Peucker, "Die Grundlagen der praktischen Intentionalitlit. Ein Beitrag zu Husserls
Phlinomenologie des Willens," 9- 10.
21 Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions, 13.
) .
CANALE' S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 117
presupposition" and "hypotheticity ofReason"22 - and clarifies that this is the realm
of Heidegger's No-thing "that pervades the whole ofreality and meaning." 23
)
3. Assessing Canale's Phenomenological Approach
In the following subsection, I intend to discuss the earlier mentioned six areas )
that remain unclear if not problematic in Canale's philosophical u ndertaking. The
problematic nature is not only to be sought in the realm of the philosophical
methodology, but in the applications ofCanale's phenomenological conclusions to
matters of theology and the greater discourse about natural science and its relation
to biblical Christian beliefs. )
)
3.1 Lack of Contextualization
A clear contextualization of Canale's understanding of his applied
phenomenological method is currently lacking. This creates confusion in different
areas which I try to explicate in the following sub-sections.
I \
3.1.1 Epoche and Ontological Assumptions
Due to the lack of contextualization the answer to the most central question is
missing: How can the logic of phenomenology be without ontic presuppositions
)
if any logic is to finally refer to an (hypothetical) w1derstanding of Being? We
therefore do not only lack a contextualization ofCanale's logic ofphenomenology )
but a justification or at least an explanation why phenomenological logic is world-
view free. 24 Two problem areas arise from this. )
First, the modified static phenomenology of Hartmann/Canale continues to
operate with Husserl's distinction between actual physical things and the objects of
the private world of human consciousness. Some critics of phenomenology argue )
on the basis of this separation that static phenomenology assumes the Cartesian
dualism: while we can be certain of our consciousness (inside world) we are not
certain of the concrete objects/content of our consciousness (outside world). This }
dichotomy is a modified version of platonic dualism between the sensory illusion
and the world of ideas. It can therefore be argued that the foundations for the
phenomenological method, i.e. the operational epoche (exclusion of ontological
preconceptions) "is not a neutral starting point that [ ... ] appears to be between
realism and idealism". 25 I assume that Canale would d isagree with me, that a
necessary identification of the phenomenological program has Cartesian-Platonic
22
Ibid., 66- 74.
23
The second time Canale mentions "dimensionality'' in ibid., 23- 24. he links it
directly with Heidegger's notion of No-thing. References to Heidegger are always given
when the concept of dimensionality is explained in his dissertation. See especially ibid.,
66-74.
24
Unfortunately, Canale does not elaborate on how he joins Putnam's criticism on
Husserl's remaining idealism. This leads to potential confusion as it is not clear on what
terms Canale is joining Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Pontywith regard to the possibility )
of phenomenological analysis that rejects transcendental reduction.
25
Kenny, A New History of Western Philosophy, 880.
J
' J
)
)
)
118 OLIVER GLANZ
)
) underpinnings. Personally, I am open to such possible disagreement, because
neither pattern investigation into the tapestry of thought (phenomenology) nor
) pattern investigation into the tapestry ofthe factual world (natural science) does not
need to be interpreted as being based upon platonic realism. Rather than indicating
) the basis of some minimal ontological assumptions.
ontic dichotomy, the discovered patterns point to the presence of some sort of
) normativity (somewhere between inexact regularities and exact laws) in some sort
of delimited realm, i.e. aspect ofreality, than that they assume ontic dichotomy. 26
) Second, the nature of the phenomenologically uncovered formal normativity
) of Reason functions as a minimum ontological insight despite the operational
epoche, i.e. the retention of any ontological beliefs is impossible. In my view,
) phenomenology does hold a minimal condition for ontology, namely that pattern
and structure recognition of interpretative constructions is possible, i.e.
) einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, Hartmann would leave his sympathies for neo-
interpretation necessarily requires norms. Thus the presence of normativity is
) assumed which itself is a minimal ontic belief. I do think, however, that it is
possible to argue on the basis of common practice in philosophy, science and naYve
) life, that this minimal normativity is assumed by any theory and should be regarded
) rather as the a priori for any ontology rather than it is the characteristic of a specific
ontology.27 How this minimal ontic assumption is ontologically conceptualized is
) due to different factors. Thus this minimal ontic belief rationally allows for many
different and contrasting ontologies.
) Due to Canale's relation to Hartmann's work one wonders how Hartmann's
The study of both problem areas could lead to a more nuanced application of
) transcendental static phenomenology in which one can continue to study the
"immediate data ofconsciousness, without reference to anything that consciousness
) might tell us, or purport to tell us, about the extra-mental world."28 Such an epoche
)
26
Rens Bod's work on the history ofthe humanities and its relation to pattern detection
) helps to relate our scientific understanding of phenomenology to the wider arena of the
) natural and human sciences. Such a move will help to establish phenomenology as a method
that functions like a context-free grammar and is not to be confused with neither idealism
nor realism. See Rens Bod, A New History ofthe Humanities: The Searchfor Principles and
)
Patterns from Antiquity to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
27
See Oliver Glanz, "Investigating the Presuppositional Realm ofBiblical-Theological
Methodology: Part 4: Critique and Transformation," Andrews University Seminary Studies
) 48, no. 2 (2010): 1-24; Oliver Glanz, "Investigating the Presuppositional Realm ofBiblical-
Theological Methodology: Part I: Dooyeweerd on Reason," Andrews University Seminary
) Studies 47, no. 1 (2009): 5- 35.
28
Husserl explains "Stelle ich den Gott Jupiter vor, so ist dieser Gott vorgestellter
) Sachlage des Erkenntnisphanomens entfemt und eine Behauptung aufstellt, die von vom
Gegenstand, er ist in meinem Akte ,immanent gegenwartig, hat in ihm 'mentale Inexistenz,'
) und wie die in eigentlicher Interpretation verkehrten Redeweisen sonst lauten mogen. Ich
stelle den Gott Jupiter vor, das heiBt, ich habe ein gewisses VorstelJungserlebnis, in meinem
) BewuBtsein vollzieht sich <las den-Gott-Jupiter-Vorstellen. Man mag dieses intentionale
Erlebnis in deskriptiver Analyse zergliedem, wie man wilJ, so etwas wie der Gott Jupiter
) kann mandarin natiirlich nicht finden; der 'immanente, mentale' Gegenstand gehort also
nicht zum deskriptiven (reellen) Bestands des Erlebnisses, er ist also in Wahrheit gar nicht
) (Carsten Johnsen, Day ofDestiny: The Mystery ofthe Seventh Day (Sisteron: Untold Story
immanent oder mental. Er ist freilich auch nicht extra mentem, er ist iiberhaupt nicht. Aber
das hindert nicht, daB jenes den-Gott-Jupiter-VorstelJen wirklich ist, ein so geartetes
) my emphasis on realism. But it would be difficult to be too emphatic on this point in this
Erlebnis, eine so bestimmte Weise des Zumuteseins, daB, wer es in sich erfahrt, mit Recht
)
)
CANALE'S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 119
would indeed be scientific as it brackets out many aspects of reality in order to
focus scientifically (i.e. microscopic and reductionist) on one aspect from one
angle: the content and logic of consciousness, i.e. the epistemic system under which
consciousness operates while accepting that what is shown can only be shown on
3.1.2 Sources of Realism
With his heavy reliance on Hartrnann's Grundziige einer Metaphysik der
Erkenntnis, 29 the critical reader wonders in how far Canale's realism, achieved by
overcoming the classical "analogia entis" on the basis ofa temporal ontology, is in
fact informed by Hartmann's critical realism rather than the analysis of Being in
Scripture. In the early 1920s it became clear that with the publication of Grundzuge
Kantianism and develop a position that rejects both idealism as well as materialism.
His repositioning, however, was not motivated by insights he received through the
Christian tradition. Hartmann rather saw the need to hold on to the subject-object
distinction without idealizing the difference between subject and object by treating
it as an ontological dichotomy. For Hartmann the subject-object distinction does not
proofthe presence ofidealistic relics but a structure that is assumed as the condition
for any theory.30
critique on Heidegger's phenomenology relates to Canale's appraisal of
Heidegger's take on Being. The careful Adventist reader's intuition suggests that
Canale's reference to Carsten Johnsen indicates that Canale assumes a developed
idea of what is realistic in Adventist thinking.31 This is since Johnsen believed that
the Adventist movement has brought an astonishing realistic and complete
philosophical system into the world that is biblical. 32 If this is the case, how does
sagen kann, er stelJe sichjenen mythischen Gotterkonig vor, von dem dies undjenes gefabelt
werde. Existiert andererseits der intendierte Gegenstand, so braucht in phanomenologischer
Hinsicht nichts geiindert zu sein. Fur <las BewuBtsein ist das Gegebene ein wesentlich
Gleiches, ob der vorgestellte Gegenstand existiert, oder ob er fingiert und vielJeicht gar
widersinnig ist" in Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen: Untersuchungen zur
Phiinomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, 2a:373.
29
There are more than 60 references to the work ofHartmann in Canale's dissertation.
30
Hartmann explains "In Wirklichkeit fiillt also die Beweislast gerade dem Idealismus
zu, eben weil er es ist, der sich vom natiirlichen Gegenstandsbewusstsein und von der
herein den Stempel der Widematiirlichkeit tragt" in Hartmann, Grundzuge einer Metaphysik
der Erkenntnis, 1965, 229.
31
See Canale's reference to Carsten Johnsen in footnote no2 in Canale, A Criticism of
Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, 358- 359.
32
Johnsen states: "Seventh-day Adventism emerged as a particularly realistic form of
Protestantism, embracing an astonishingly complete spectrum of Biblical philosophy."
Publishers, 1982), 130. See also " Some readers may think that I am overdoing things with

120 OLIVER GLANZ
Canale relate to common sense philosophy and Kant's implicit critique of Thomas
Reid? Perhaps, Canale finds this question answered in the work of Hartmann. If so
how then does Ha.itmann's critical realism33 relate to Johnsen's radical realism?
And again, how does Hartmann's critical take on Heidegger relate to the inspiration
Canale receives from Heidegger's work on Being? One could summarize the
question by asking: Where is Canale's realism coming from? This question rises
especially due to the unsatisfactory exegetical analysis of Exodus 3 and Exodus 6
in his dissertation. While the biblical scholar has difficulties in following Canale's
exegetical interpretational process he b ecomes suspicious and wonders how much
of the ontological findings are actually read into the text and stimulated by
interpretations that Johnson, Hartmann and/or Heidegger have provided.
3.1.3 Reason's Rationality and the Psyche's Logic
Hartmann's modifications did continue to exclude the matter of biography
(psychological determinations that shape man's subjectivity) in the analysis of
Reason. In focus is the abstraction from/reduction of concrete (individual)
subjectivity/ies, the transcendental subject (de-individualized subject). This
transcendental subject, most importantly, is not interpreted ontologically and is thus
not idealized.34 Instead it is understood as a formal structure facilitating anyone's
generation of knowledge. Canale's adoption of this strategy needs further
clarification. Canale should have had an interest in defending the basic
phenomenological assumption that phenomenological logic is not ofpsychological
nature. Such an explicit argumentation or at least a reference to such an explicit
argumentation is missing. While being critical towards the ontological dichotomies
that tradition has delivered to us, the psychic turn of the early 20th century is not
integrated in Canale's positioning of the phenomenological method. Such
integration would help to relate critically to any post-Husserl psychologizations of
his own work.
3.2 The Object of Phenomenology
The object ofphenomenological analysis has changed in the course of the last
hundred years. The need and possibility of shifting phenomenological objects (e.g.
from objects of consciousness to Dasein ["being-here" or "presence"]) has been
p art of intense philosophical debates. The central question here is: What can be
reduced, i.e. "epoched" in order to uncover the nucleus structure of rational b eing?
context. The Bible has other words for that realism. One designation is 'the love 'of the
truth.' So two characteristics of realism are outstanding: 1) Realism is not a built-in
equipment of man's present nature. It is a miracle. 2) It comes to man as a gift of grace. It
is freely offered by God. It is freely received (or refused) by man." (Carsten Johnsen, The
Maligned God (Sisteron: Untold Story Publishers, 1980), 226).
33
Hartmann clarifies after he wrote against Idealism "al3 Erkennen nicht Erzeugen,
sondern Erfassen ist" and that "die metaphysische Annahme des Idealismus zugunsten einer
ebenso metaphysischen realistischen aufgehoben werden sollte." (Hartmann, Grundzuge
einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 1965, 2.)
34
See ibid., 6- 7, 34-60.
)
CANALE' S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 121 )
)
The above outlined method of phenomenological reduction was applied by
Husserl's student Heidegger in Sein and Zeit. 35 However, here the object to be )
phenomenologically analyzed has changed. In fact Heidegger saw the need to
correct the object ofreduction. Husserl's phenomenology was not radical enough )
as his understanding of consciousness with the help of terminology like "subject," J
"object," "act," "content" testified the influx of philosophical theory/traditional
terminology and being misinterpreted as transcendental constituents of )
consciousness. Husserl's constituents of consciousness already assume the notion )
ofa gap between consciousness and re.ality. This gap, however, is not present in the
normal condition of human experience. Here we do primarily experience )
"significance" (Bedeutsamkeit) before we might encounter objects. We speak about
objects at the moment where the "worldling of the world is de-lived" (das We/ten
der Welt entlebt wircl).36 Objects appear to the eye only then when they are no
longer "at hands" (zu Hiinden).37 Thinking is only one mode ofDasein 's being- and
not even the most basic one. In contrast to Husserl, therefore, phenomenology
needs to be true to its program by reducing its object from conceptions that are of
theoretical nature: the entirety of being has to be taken into account: Dasein, which
in its totality can be described as "besorgen. " Consciousness is marked by the
experience of"Bedeutsamkeit" rather than by the experience ofobject-encounters.38
The phenomenological program, then, truly is radical. Its reductionist )
methodology is extensive (Husserl: "Zuriick zu den Dingen"). The reading of
Canale's dissertation, however, is not as radical, when one reads him as
participating naively in the phenomenological program. This becomes clear in the )
fact that his focus is on Reason and not on Dasein.39 While Canale's analysis of
Reason relies on Hartmann's work, his treatment of Being reveals Heideggerrean
underpinnings. One searches to understand how Canale relates Hartmann to .)
Heidegger especially since Hartmann was critical towards the work ofHeidegger. 40
35
Martin Heidegger, Sein Und Zeit, vol. 2, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Vittorio .)
Klostermann, 1977).
36
See ibid., 2:§14.
37
Cf. ibid., 2:§15.
38
See ibid., 2:§ 18.
3
• In my AUSS articles I have argued that from a hermeneutic perspective (not an ontic
perspective) meaning still transcends the holistic Reason description. See section 1.2.1.2 )
Glanz, "Investigating the Presuppositional Realm ofBiblical-Theological Methodology: Part )
4: Critique and Transformation."
40
Hartmann explains "Und damit beginnt der Verfall des Erkenntnisproblems, der zum
Psychologismus einerseits, zum Logizismus andererseits gefiihrt hat. Zurn letzteren sind alle
Auffassungen zu rechnen, die Erkenntnis und Urteil gleichsetzen, einerlei wie sie sich sonst ')
unterscheiden. So verschiedene Kopfe wie Natorp, Cassirer, Rickert, Husserl, Heidegger
sind in dieser Hinsicht demselben Irrtum erlegen. Mit dem Psychologismus aber, den sie
bekiimpfen, ist den logischen Theorien die Verkennung des Transzendenzverhii.ltnisses im
)
Erkenntisphiinomen gemeinsam. In beiden Lagern konnte man sich umso eher der
gefiirchteten Metaphysik gegeniiber in Sicherheit wiegen, als man das ontologische )
Grundproblem im Urteil genau so wenig zu fassen vermochte wie im seelischen Akt." See
Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grund/egung der Ontologie (Walter de Gruyter, 1965), 14. See also
J
)
)
)
122 0LNERGLANZ CANALE'S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 123
)
to ask whether Heidegger's relativization of phenomenology will fundamentally
) One could conclude that Canale either (a) did not contextualize his work clearly
enough in order to have the reader understand that he truly participates in the affect the validity ofCanale's work when it comes to its objectivists claims.
) radicality of phenomenology or (b) he does follow a different agenda than the one In the following I intend to sketch out Heidegger's journey in phenomenology
of phenomenology. We lack explicit explanations within his own work. It would and relate it to critical questions that rise when assessing Canale's own utilization
) of phenomenology.
be helpful for Canale to explicate how he relates to the terminology of "subject,"
) "object," "theos" in contrast to Husserl (of which Heidegger is highly critical of The phenomenological approach motivated Heidegger in the early 1920s to
from the perspective of Bedeutsamkeit as being prior to the experience of uncover-against Christian theology as it has developed historically- the original
) objectivization [see his critique on Husserl)41 ). The answer.to how Canale relates "facticity" (Faktizitiit) of Christianity. One of the central phenomenological tasks
to Heidegger's critique would solve many questions and possible was of linguistic nature: finding vocabulary that does not impose concepts on the
misunderstandings, including the matter of what role language plays in the facticity of Christian life that originates from theoretical and misleading ideas that
) functioning ofReason.42 numb one to the original experience of Christians. Phenomenology, as a
Personally, I think Canale's analysis of Reason can be justified, since there is philosophical discipline, then does not aim to find and abstract timeless truths as
) science attempts but to deliver the tools and contents of a true understanding of
a way to argue for the subject/Jch and/und object/Du structure as most basic to the
) reduced (non-abstracted) experience of Dasein. I would suggest that this structure temporal facticity of life. The aim of this understanding is not to transcend the
is both "at hand" (zu Hiinden) as well as "apparent" (sichtbar) in Dasein. As an facticity of life but to engage with it in a more existential way. 45 However,
) expert on Heidegger, Gunter Figal, who holds the Husserl-Heidegger chair at the Heidegger will clarify that phenomenology is not opposed to science but is a
University ofFreiburg, has pioneered the way into a non-Cartesian version of the scientific discipline itself, namely an "ontological scientific study of Being"
_) (ontologische Wissenschaft vom Sein). 46 Phenomenology attempts to uncover the~
subject-object relation without leaving the phenomenological tradition. 43 Further
) studies into the nature of the subject-object relation and its different "grammar" of our consciousness. If consciousness is the language we speak, the
conceptualizations have to be performed before this distinction can be judged as structure of its grammar is what makes any language possible. It does not analyze"
) the causality of this grammar, i.e., what produces the grammar itself(that is part of
resting per se on a Cartesian foundation.
) the cognitive sciences) but the logic that the language of consciousness presumes.
3.3 Phenomenology and Universality In that sense, it is also a science since patterns and systematisms are uncovered.
) Canale's phenomenological uncovered structure ofReason claims universality. This is also the reason why Heidegger argues that the "pre-christian existence"
This claim has been challenged by Heidegger himself. Phenomenology, as he (vorchristliche Existenz) is enclosed in the "Christian existence" (christliche
) Existenz). The first is of existential-ontic, i.e. the experience of reality without
envision it, is a very promising approach for the analytic deconstruction ofWestern
) philosophical traditions and theological concepts.44 While this approach was ideology, while the second of existential-onto-logical character, i.e. the experience
advanced by Heidegger as a science whose analytic results could claim universality, ofreality through the eyes ofa particular ideology.47 While the one is the grammar,
) the other is the specific language utilizing this grammar in its own way.
he moved away from these "scientific" claims at the end ofhis career. We will need
) Phenomenology is therefore interested in the universal ontic structures that underlie
any ontology. It is important that any ontology (be it of Christian flavor or not)
) ibid., 40-42. relates itself continuously and critically to the antic grammar (the structure of
41
See John D. Caputo, "Husserl, Heidegger and the Question of a 'hermeneutic' Dasein).
) Phenomenology," Husserl Studies 1, no. I (1984): 157- 78. However, in the 1930s Heidegger distanced himself more and more from the
42 Canale's Hartmann leaning enforces the· question in what way Canale relates to
) concept of phenomenology as a science. Zabarowski explains "He now also
Frege and Wittgenstein and the analytic philosophy. Canale does not relate to the linguistic
surrenders increasingly the 'terms' of philosophy and the 'terms' of
) tum as his reading does not seem to go beyond the early Heidegger.
43
Cf. Gunter Figal, Verstehensfr agen: Studien zurphiinomenologisch-hermeneutischen phenomenology and acts on the assumption that 'philosophy has come to an end
) Philosophie (Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 244-257. See also Michael Wheeler, "Martin
Heidegger," in The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2014,
) 2014, section 2.2.2 "Modes of Encounter," http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall20l4/
entries/heidegger/. 45
) 44
Roiger Zaborowski, "Die ,,ungeheure Schwierigkeit des christlichen Lebens" und die Ibid., 172.
46
,,Todfeindschaft" zwischen Philosophie und Glauben: Anmerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Ibid., 176; cf. Heidegger, Sein Und Zeit, 2:46---53.
.J Denkweg von 1919 bis 1928," in Vernunft Und Glaube: Perspektiven Gegenwiirtiger
47
Zaborowski, "Die ungeheure Schwierigkeit des christlichen Lebens und die
Philosophie, ed. Hanns-Gregor Nissing, Wortmeldungen 10 (Munchen: Inst. zFd Todfeindschaft zwischen Philosophie und Glauben: Anmerkungen zu Martin Heideggers
.J Glaubenslehre, 2008), 169. Denkwegvon 1919bis 1928," 178.
)
)

124 OLIVER GLANZ
and that thinking has to be given up. '"48 Heidegger continues herewith his deviation
from Husserl. As I understand it, I think this has to do with the overall reductionism
(in contrast to the abstraction of classic philosophical tradition) that Heidegger
pursues. He first rejects the timeless abstraction by reducing himselfto what is there
in basic experience, temporality forming the horizon of experience, and then he
reduces this experience to its grammar, and finally he reduces the grammar itself.
The recognition of temporality increased to such an extent that even bis earlier
claim of a universal ontic grammar was given up as a temporal perspective with
limitations. In my view Heidegger's reductionism goes too far, as it reduces even
the normativity with which Dasein comes (cf. 3.1. 1). In Heidegger's later years,
philosophy/phenomenology no longer claims to play a corrective role for theology.
Most radically, H eidegger will arrive at the conclusion that philosophy cannot be
a science "because supposedly she might not even be allowed to be a science."49
Heidegger's relativizing phenomenology is not examined by Canale. This is
probably due to the fact that Canale is not utilizing Heidegger's but Hartmann's
phenomenological understanding of cognition. From the perspective of the late
Heidegger Canale's understanding ofReason, and especially his constructive work
would have been critiqued as presumptuous attempts to absolutize a logic against
the flux of time. A critical examination of Heidegger's own critique on
phenomenology as science has to take place in order to better situate biblical
ontology and make it productive for philosophical and theological purposes. Such
a critical reevaluation of phenomenology and the conceptualization of the formal
(and thus universal) interrelation of temporality and normativity should not be
underestimated.50
3.4 Phenomenology and Science
In any phenomenological approach it is important to clarify its relations to (a)
metaphysics, (b) physics (empirical facts) and ( c) the analytic method itself (is it
introspective?). Such a clarification helps to prevent misunderstandings and
rejection. A close reading of Canale's dissertation clarifies how he himself
understands his phenomenological approach with regard to (a) metaphysics. 51
However, his methodological relation to {b) empirical facts and (c) the method of
introspection are not clarified. As a results it complicates a positive reception of
•s "Er gibt nun auch die, Begriffe' der Philosophic und der Phiinomenologie zunehmend
aufund geht von dem, Ende der Philosophie und der Aufgabe des Denkens' aus." (Ibid.,
182.)
49
Heidegger: "weil sie vermutlich iiberhaupt nichteine Wissenschaft sein darf' (quoted
by Zaborowski ibid., 183.)
50
Some experiments with making compatible temporality and normativity from a
biblical perspective have been performed in Glanz, "Investigating the Presuppositional
Realm of Biblical-Theological Methodology: Part 4: Critique and Transformation."
51
Again, his approach mirrors Hartmann's work in Hartmann, Grundziige einer
Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, 1965.
)
CANALE'S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 125 )
)
Canale's later publications on matters of the relation of natural science to theology
in general and evolutionary theory and the biblical creation account in particular.52 )
)
3.4.1. Rejecting Phenomenology in the Context of Science
Relating the m ethod of phenomenology to (b) empirical facts and (c) the )
method of introspection helps to prevent misunderstandings from the world of
natural science: the work of Daniel Dennett has expressed the bias of the natural )
sciences against phenomenology.53 This bias can be summarized as follows: 54
)
Phenomenology is another word for introspection. Therefore phenomenology is not
a clear and neutral method, as a third-person physical scientific perspective would
offer, by which one is made capable of collecting and organizing the data that
subsequently has to be explained. Rather phenomenology employs "an unreliable j
introspectionist methodology." As a consequence, it is impossible to arrive at
agreement on what the "noemata," i.e., the pure objects of conscious experience
are. An objective understanding of consciousness is not gained by an inside
perspective, but by an outside one. Thus, the operation of individual minds are
)
understood when we start generating data from other's minds, i.e. collect
representations of the world as it appears to a variety of subjects. This allows for J
"an intersubj ectively confirmable theoretical posit, and can consequently be studied
in a scientifically respectable manner. " 55 These representations are therefore not (as
phenomenology would see itselfin its own eyes) reports of scientific facts but data )
to be studied scientifically. Data from consciousness are therefore not taken as
representations of real experiences but rather taken as reports of phenomena as it )
app ears to a given individual. Bracketing out the question whether a phenomena is
real or not is Dennett's version ofHusserl's epoche.56 For Dennett, introspection is
more a matter of observation rather than theorizing . )
From this, follows that an "investigation of consciousness must focus on the
actual goings-on in the brain and such sub-personal mechanisms are not
)
52
Cf. Fernando L. Canale, "The Path of Scientific Truth Leads to God," Liberty
Magazine, 1993; Fernando L. Canale, "Adventist Theology and Deep Time/Evolutionary
Theory: Are They Compatible?," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 15, no. 2
(2004); Fernando L. Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology: The Role of Method in
Theological Accommodation (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithotbec, 2005).
53
Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1991).
54
Dennett distinguishes four types of possible understandings/takings of the term
"phenomenology'': (I) generic name for items of conscious experience that are to be
explained; (2) commensensical (pre-scientific) set of beliefs with regard to the working of
the mind; (3) specific philosophical tradition. In my contribution however I will focus only
on the latter one as Dennett's critique of phenomenology targets especially the latter one. J
See Dan Zahavi, "Killing the Straw Man: Dennett and Phenomenology," Phenomenology
)
and the Cognitive Sciences 6, no. 1-2 (2007): 21-43.
ss Ibid., 23.
56
Daniel Dennett, "Whos on First? Heterophenomenology Explained," Journal of
Consciousness Studies 10, no. 9- 10 (2003): 22; Zabavi, "Killing the Straw Man," 24.
)
,/

)
)
)
126 OLIVER GLANZ CANALE' S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 127
)
introspectively available"57 but only from a scientific third-person perspective. It is here where the epoche receives its importance. In order to prevent a
)
Consequently: philosophical phenomenology is "autophenomenology" which does narrow location of consciousness within the mind it is important to pause any
) not inquire about mental life of others, but expresses a concern about one's own metaphysical bias with regard to the location of items of consciousness and
mental life, inevitably leading to a form of methodological solipsism.58 These consciousness itself While the epoche does not exclude reality, it does suspend a
) fixation of its metaphysical location that usually comes both with the nai:ve as well
limitations lead to the lack of realizing how reports about our own consciousness
) are language-dependent. Within introspection alone, the inconsistencies that come as with the philosophic interpretation of surrounding objects. The epoche then tries
with two individual data sets cannot be settled. From a scientific perspective, data- to bracket out a certain naivety, namely "the naivety of simply taking the world for
) extraction has to be done by a well-controlled inter-subjective procedure (scientific granted, thereby ignoring the contribution of consciousness."62 In contrast to a
community) with the help of technical measuring devices. In this sense, first-person psychological investigation of reality, and in contrast to a material-physical
_)
data, is not data at all. (empirical sciences) investigation of reality, the phenomenological approach
) investigates the manifestation of reality to consciousness and the significance of
3.4.2 Justifying Phenomenology in the Context of Science this manifestation for consciousness. While the empirical sciences approach
) explores what biochemical processes constitute consciousness, the
Although it has been shown that Dennett's understanding of phenomenology
) as a specific philosophical undertaking is a misunderstanding,59 his phenomenological investigations are concerned with what ("non-material")
misunderstanding is helpful as it asks how to relate phenomenological research to phenomena constitute consciousness. The question for transcendental
) the research of neuro-science. But let us first try to summarize what phenomenology is: What are the structural elements that make consciousness of
phenomenology is-in contrast to Dennett's misunderstanding. anything possible. This is why the analysis of the subject-object relation with its
) two-sided contributions for consciousness is so important. Both the empirical
The fact that phenomenology is not introspection has been stressed not only by
) Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty but also by its founder Husserl "It is never allowed to sciences, as well as phenomenology, are concerned with reality. The latter is
blend inner perception with phenomenological perception."60 But then, what is the interested in consciousness because it is world-disclosing.
J difference between "inner perception" (innere Wahrnehmung) and Phenomenology is, therefore, not interested in "individual data" and
) "phenomenological perception" (phiinomenologische Wahrnehmung)? ( cf. 2.1 ). In incomparable to what is studied in psychology. It is not interested in the
contrast of being a mode of psychological self-observation, phenomenology is a psychological processes (psychic causalities), nor in the physiological processes
) type oftranscendental analysis that tries to uncover the conditions that make human (biochemical causalities), but rather the logic of consciousness, i.e., the structural ·
experience and cognition possible. These conditions, however, are not discoverable relations of the phenomena of consciousness as such. These structures can only be
) disclosed when intersubjective data of consciousness is available. In this sense its
in a science laboratory. As a philosophical discipline, it tries to uncover something
) different from any empirical science discipline. While both are complimentary, analysis is open for correction and can be controlled. Intersubjective consciousness
their subject-matter is of a different nature. In contrast to psychology, data is possible because "consciousness is not something that is visible to one
) person only [ ... ] not something exclusively inner."63 This is because the
phenomenology tries to uncover the non-psychological dimension that structures
) consciousness. It differentiates itselffrom psychology, as well as physics, by saying intentionality of consciousness is made visible in the individual's behavior. The
that what is relevant to consciousness is not located exclusively within phenomenological structure of consciousness is visible in the logical structure of
consciousness and must therefore be studied by a careful transcendental analysis human thought and activity. Unless "self-experience is embodied and embedded,
of its contents. Such a localization does not do justice to what Husserl will call inter-subjectivity will be neither possible nor comprehensible."64
)
"intentionality," namely that consciousness has always the character of aboutness, We can conclude that the phenomenological approach is not per se subjective.
i.e., concerned with something, thinking of something. Thus, consciousness can Objectivity is inter-subjectively constituted; otherwise consciousness could not take
never be only fully contained solely within the mind.61 place. Therefore the intersubjective structure ofconsciousness has to be studied. On
) the basis of a manifold report of consciousness of many subjects usable data is
) generated for a phenomenological analysis by which the transcendental elements
that constitute the conditions of consciousness can be uncovered.
) 57
Zahavi, "Killing the Straw Man," 26.
Daniel C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 153-154.
58

) 59
See e.g. Zahavi, "Killing the Straw Man."
60
Husserl: "Niemals dtirfen innere Wahmehmung und phanomenologische
) Wahmehmung vermengt werden." (Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und
62
Cf. Zahavi, " Killing the Straw Man," 30.
63
Erkenntnistheorie, Husserliana, XXTV (Dordrecht, Boston: Martin us Nijhoff, 1984), 216.) Ibid., 32.
) 61
64
Ibid., 33.
Cf. Heidegger, Sein Und Zeit, 2:83/62.
)
)

128 OLIVER GLANZ
3.4.3 Phenomenology Accompanying Science
While the matter of introspection is not that difficult to address the interrelation
of science and phenomenology is. The question at stake is, how the findings of
philosophical phenomenology relate to the empirical facts that come to us through
natural scientific investigations. As long as this is not clarified the faith-science
dialog based upon Canale's analysis of Reason is complicated if not impossible. 65
In what way phenomenological facts can be logically and conceptually
independent of empirical facts? Or to put it different in what way can
phenomenological facts be conceptually settled "without settling any other
questions about the natural world" and still making "meaningful epistemic
commitments"?66 Relating this question to our understanding of Canale, the
question is not whether Canale's understanding of Reason is autonomous as it so
often was in the humanistic tradition.67 The question is in how far his way of
analysis leads to reliable results if it operates independently from the findings of
cognitive science. Although I do not agree with Noe's overall analysis of pure
phenomenology, she is right in stressing that "after all, experience does depend
(causally, metaphysically) on the brain and the physical world."68 Knowing the
limitation of human sensory capacities in how far then can any philosophical
theorizing on the basis of the prior established phenomenological analysis of
consciousness claim to be correct? These questions gain force in the light ofthe fact
that the conceptual language (e.g. subject, object, being, Being) we are using for our
phenomenological analysis and synthesis are of different nature and could even be
incompatible with the concepts that come to us from the sciences.
If phenomenology would claim that its own subject matter, the
phenomenological conditions for human consciousness belong to the natural world,
it would derive from this that it belongs to the natural causal nexus as well.
Consequently, phenomenological findings would contribute to our understanding
of nature itself. However, in doing so we need to be careful not to conclude what
Noe does, namely that "Phenomenological reflection demonstrates that p erceiving
is, for us, an encounter with situations and things; it is not, for us, an encounter with
mental images or some other kind of interior data of sense."69 If "encounter with
situations and things" is meant in the way that situations and things are taken as
things that are predefined entities through either common sense or science it would
not conflict with the epoche of the phenomenological program. The question is
rather how human intentionality (the structure of the aboutness of our
65
Cf. Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology: The Role ofMethod in Theological
Accommodation.
66
Alva Noe, "The Critique of Pure Phenomenology," Phenomenology and the
Cognitive Sciences 6, no. 1- 2 (2007): 231- 232.
67
Canale correctly stresses that his understanding of Reason is per se not autonomous
as Reason comprises any subject-object relation and therefore cannot be autonomous.
Further, ftom his phenomenological standpoint Reason is also not an entity but an event,
autonomy as attribute would therefore not do justice.
68
Noe, "The Critique of Pure Phenomenology," 233.
69
Ibid., 235.
_)
)
CANALE'S UTILIZATION OF PHENOJvIBNOLOGY 129 )
)
consciousness) relates to the sciences (especially neurophysics and cognitive
sciences). In Canale's program, the sciences are in no way interacting/informing the
phenomenological analysis of Reason. Rather, the role of science, the place of its
observations and theorizing is not resolvable ifthe phenomenological analysis and )
synthesis (including the interpretation of a specific dimensionality of Reason) has )
not been accomplished beforehand. After the phenomenological analysis, the
metaphysical theorizing can take place in which science will understand its proper )
role (what that role is depends on the sources that inform the hypotheticity of
Reason)- not earlier. ·
The issue is whether science can only contribute on the level of metaphysics
or if it has relevance for phenomenology. The work before us is to clarify how the
role of ontology in conceptualizing our manifold data generation, i.e., philosophy )
as an explanatory theory for science and naive life, relates to phenomenology as an J
explanatory theory for consciousness.
3.5 Risk of Naivety
It follows that if determining the role of scientific contributions is postponed
(as it would belong to the metaphysical task), the phenomenological understanding J
of the subject-object relation that constitutes consciousness will lead to a naive
understanding ofperception. Phenomenologically, one of the basic constituents of
consciousness is the encounter with/perception ofan object. While phenomenology )
distinguishes sharply between perceiving something and failing to perceive
something (no consciousness), it cannot distinguish between perceiving and )
hallucinating.70 It seems to me that a description of such differences needs to draw
on intersubjective analysis.
Canale stresses that within the dimensionality of temporal ontology our I )
interpretation of consciousness/Reason will make us conclude that in encountering
objects (e.g. God, children, and trees as they are in the temporal flux) we can
experience them as real. The following question comes to the fore: At the moment )
where we judge such a conclusion as naive would we automatically unmask a
specific hermeneutic horizon as operating under the conditions of timeless
ontology? Or could it be possible that our judgment merely indicates that a solely )
phenomenological analysis of Reason dangerously limits the complexity or
Reason 's conditions and activities due to the exclusion of scientific information
during the phenomenological analysis?
If the answer to the latter is positive, phenomenology needs to be aware that
it lacks a detailed conscious representation of the whole scene of temporal reality.
But even more important is that this lack is also visible in the structural and pre-
metaphysical understandings of what an object is and what not. The limitedness of
any object is not only grounded on the temporality of our experience (ifwe would
chose a timeless ontology as viewpoint) but the limitation of our senses-a
conclusion that can only be drawn powerfully when scientific data is involved. The )
70
See footnote no. 19.
J
)
)
)
130 OLIVER GLANZ
)
comprehensive question therefore is in what way Canale's radical realism relates
to Hartmann's critical realism (see section 3.1)?
) from being static remains a puzzle (see 3.3). Any concept ofnormativity
3.6 Necessary Further Developments in the
) further studies. In what way are fundamental universal claims based on a
Phenomenological Analysis of Reason
) In my AUSS articles I showed that Canale's analysis of Reason misses some
important features. 71 To the above list of critical observations (3.1-3 .5) one should
) add that Canale's phenomenological understanding of Reason misses an essential
) part: the self as the functional center ofReason's unity where both Reason's setting
(i.e., Canale's dimensionality) as well as Reason's direction (the idea of origin) are
) applied to all of consciousness. With the integration of the self as an important
factor in the operation ofReason comes the possibility ofrunning several mutually
) material interpretations of these patterns) that the hermeneutical
exclusive primordial presuppositions simultaneously, similar to virtual machines
) that run on the same hardware by means of a hypervisor. This is not only a
phenomenological given but also a psychological one. Further investigations into
) the interplay of beliefs (accepted particular interpretation of Reason's setting and
direction) and hermeneutical processes that lead to new knowledge and potential
) Further phenomenological studies would need to be performed in order to
rejection ofaccepted interpretations ofReason' s structure (setting and direction) are
) necessary if a realistic description of human cognitive life is to be achieved.
)
4. Conclusion
) We can conclude that the phenomenological approach chosen by Canale must
be regarded as very promising, but often unclear. We can summarize the following
) critical points and suggestions.
) a limited being-knowledge transfer.
1) The lack of contextualization (see 3.1) makes it difficult to accept his
) whole project from the beginning, as he endorses on one side the
phenomenological tradition but seems to ignore the tradition's own
)
reservations. Since Canale does not participate in the philosophical
discourse about matters ofphenomenology the reception ofhis insights are
severely compromised. Adventist systematic theology would need to
) relate to the larger discourse on the phenomenological method in order to
) justify and nuance Canale's approach. Some suggestions for improving
elements of his method have been made. 72
2) The analytic focus on Reason is necessary but too narrow if it is not
structurally related to the phenomenon ofDasein (see 3.2). As long as the
)
structural relation between Reason and Dasein is not explained there will
) be the tendency to suppose that Canale's terminology (subject-object,
Being-being, antic-epistemic, time-timelessness, etc.) reveals his
) dependence upon non-biblical dichotomies that were uncritically received
) as presuppositions from the tradition of occidental philosophy.
J 71
Glanz, "Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of Biblical-Theological
) Methodology: Part 4: Critique and Transformation."
72
See especially ibid.
)
)
CANALE' S UTILIZATION OF PHENOMENOLOGY 131
3) The relation of the phenomenological insight into Reason's structure on
the one side and the temporal flux structurally relativizing any insight
will remain challenged as long as this relation is not clarified through
temporal ontology possible?
4) Canale's use of his phenomenological framework for engaging the
discourse oftheology and science is very problematic (see 3.4). This is not
to say that it is not possible. But the relation of phenomenological pattern
recognition in the operation of Reason with the pattern recognition of the
natural sciences in the operation of the material world has to be studied
and worked out. The latter patterns are subdued to the patterns (and
understanding of Reason has brought to the fore. As long as this relation
is not clarified there are justified reasons to accuse Canales engagement
with the faith and science discourse as being nai:ve (see 3.5).
5) Finally, the understanding of Reason's structure is incomplete (see 3.6).
get to a deeper understanding of the multiplicity of ontologies that can
(and must?) be operated by one person. ·
Responding to the above challenges will help to understand the following gaps
within the framework of temporal ontology:
1. The source ofrevelation (God as he is) and the revelations as always being
a. On the formal side of this gap: the subject's fullness of
knowledge vs. the subject's self-limitation of co=unicated
knowledge.
b. On the interpretative side of this formal structure: this formal
structure has operated as the host (hosting the material
interpretation of this formal structure) for the epistemic gap
between the fullness of knowledge as timelessness and the
limitedness of communicated knowledge as belonging to
temporality. Further research will have to clarify, how the gap
between existence and revelation has to be structurally
understood within a temporal framework. Only then the idea of
normativity and universality can be entertained convincingly.
2. What is revealed and what is understood to be revealed: Here the relation
between spoken language and received speech should be object of further
study. Insights into this relationship will help to nuance any understanding
of normativity and universality. Not only a philosophical study of
language is necessary but a scholarly study of the Bible's different text-
traditions as they constitute the conditions for developing a proper, data-
oriented, understanding ofsola-prima-tota-scriptura. Only then a coherent

132 OLIVER GLANZ
hermeneutic horizon for the development of a biblical Adventist
Weltentwurfis possible.
Both gaps exist, even though the classical dichotomy is abandoned.73 They are
of formal nature. These gaps have to be materially interpreted within the further
work of Adventist systematic theological and philosophic thinking if a persuasive
engagement with the sciences and a development of a comprehensive Adventist
systematic theology is to take place.
Oliver Glanz was raised by a Dutch mother and a German father. He studied theology
(Bogenhofen, Erlangen, Leiden, Amsterdam) and philosophy (Amsterdam). His interest in
hermeneutical methodology has led to an interdisciplinary PhD (Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam) with focus on literary criticism, Hebrew text-linguistics, e-humanities and
philosophical hermeneutics. His philosophical studies concentrated on Herman Dooyweerd's
transcendental critique of theoretical thought and Fernando Canale's phenomenological
analysis of the Structure of Reason. Before Oliver joined the faculty at Andrews University
he worked for several years as a researcher for the Eep Talstra Center of Bible and
Computing at the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam investigating the algorithmic limits of
language (biblical Hebrew) as an integral part of human communication. He is married to
Karen and has an impressive tower (Migdali) and a beautiful bird (Yonati) as daughters.
Email: glanz@andrews.edu.
73
See Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions, 358, 386.
' )
' )
A Study of Canale's Historiography
)
Rodrigo Galiza
)
Introduction )
I have always been interested in history and Seventh-day Adventist prophetic
interpretation. Raised as an Adventist, hearing my father teaching the book of )I
Daniel and Revelation to non-Adventists, my impression was that the Adventist '
)'
position about who were the people of God was clear and unquestionable. This
clarity, in my mind, was based on both biblical and historical facts, which is
necessary in the historicist method of interpreting prophecy.
)
Because of my fascination with how the biblical prophetic texts relate to the
history of Christianity, I started my studies in theology to understand how and why
throughout time Christians have abandoned clearly biblical doctrines like the
seventh-day Sabbath, the conditional immortality ofthe soul, and the mediatory role
of C hrist in the heavenly sanctuary.
The encounter I had with Fernando Luis Canale, as my teacher at the Seventh-
day Adventist Theological Seminary, challenged my perception of how to identify
biblical adherence in the history of Christianity, which at that point in my mind was
only about some specific teachings of Scripture. Canale's elaboration about time •)
as a major idea to understand the history of Christian theology was to me new and )
revolutionary. It gave me a system to evaluate Christian doctrine and opened new
venues for my investigation. This systematic way of understanding the history of
Christian doctrinal interpretation changed the way I would understand Adventist
prophetic interpretation.
Ifrny reading ofCanale's ideas is correct, his criticism of theological reason
related to the issue of time offers a new method for understanding prophetic history
and consequently the development of Christian theology. This is so because the
)
definitions oftime and being ( ontology) are basic to any description ofreality. And
since the biblical message and prophecies specifically are about God and time,
Canale's theoretical framework applied to the understanding of Christian history )
is extremely valuable. )
Canale's Historiography and Criticism of Theological Reason
History seems to lie at the center of Canale' s criticism of theological reason,
which for Canale is not only an attempt at correcting the historical "departures" of
Christianity related to specific biblical teachings, as I had thought, but also deals )
with the notion ofhistory itself or how God relates to time. The first criticism is part
of the Protestant and Adventist heritage, which divides the history of Christianity )
into three basic phases: (a) pure gospel ofthe Apostles (first century); (b) corrupted )
or paganized Christianity (from the second century to the Reformation); and to use
Canale's terminology, (c) back to Revelation (Scripture)-starting with )
J
)
)
)
134 RODRlGO GALIZA
)
) Protestantism and reaching its climax with Adventism. 1
In his theological criticism, Canale is not satisfied with only pointing out some
) deviations in the history of Christianity. Adding nuance to the history of Christian
theology informed by the notion of time and timelessness, Canale evaluates the
) Canale's theological criticism. I concur with him that Christian theology has
three major periods of Christian history- the Classical, Modem, and
) Postmodern- based on his interest in how Christian theologians understood God
and time. In the Classical period he describes the early influence of Greek
) philosophy on what became catholic (universal) theology based on the timeless
ontological definition of God. The Modem period roughly comprises the
)
Reformation and the Enlightenment; he gives special attention to Kant's ideas and
) the influence of the Enlightenment on evangelical theology.
For Fernando Canale, both of these periods (Classical and Modem) are
) early history, because it influences the way historical sources are used in his
basically the same regarding their theological development; to him, when these
) periods are understood through the theological lens of time and timelessness, they
are very similar. Canale thinks that the epistemological structures used by
) theologians ofthe Classical and Modem periods are not biblical but grounded in the
timeless definition of Being. 2 Thus, his criticism of theological reason calls
) This paper then scrutinizes Canale's usage ofhistorical sources in building his
attention to the point that Christian theology based on this foundation is not biblical.
) Finally, Canale sees hope in the third period, the Postmodern. He sees in the
age ofHeidegger, open theism, and Seventh-day Adventist theology a challenge to
) early church period, (b) analyzing his usage of early church material in order to see
the timelessness assumption of Christian theology that can bring Christian theology
) back to its biblical basis. By suggesting a historical definition ofbeing (ontology),
some theologians, including Canale himself, are trying to reread Christian theology
) through the temporal definition of God that they think is more coherent with the
biblical worldview. 3
)
) 1
Restorationism in Christian history is the impulse to go against traditional forms of
ecclesiastical authority/power while looking for an identification with the so-called primitive
) Christian practices (from the New Testament time). For a review of Protestant movements
with restorationist bend see Mark G. Toulouse, "Restoration Movements," in The
) Encyclopedia of Christianity, ed. Fahlbusch, et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005),
659-664. For the importance of history and restorationist ideas in Adventism see George R.
) class but in some personal conversations I had with him that some work still needed to be
Knight, Millennial Fever and the End ofthe World: A Study ofMillerite Adventism (Boise,
) ID: Pacific Press, 1993), 38-40, 68; Knight, Ellen White's World: A Fascinating Look at the
Times in Which She Lived (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1998), 53-55; Knight,
Joseph Bates: The Real Founder ofSeventh-day Adventism (Hagerstown, MD: Review and
Herald, 2004), chs. 7-9.
) 2
It is not my intention here to explain in detail Canale's model on the Classical and
Modem understanding ofGod. For a recent explanation ofCanale's main idea see Adriani's
.)
article in this volume.
) ' This historiography is not set in one particular work of Canale but throughout his
writings. The closest to a systematization of this history is Canale, Basic Elements of
) Christian Theology: Scriptures Replacing Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University Lithotech, 2005). Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology: A
) Hermeneutical Study ofthe Revelation and Inspiration of the Bible (Berrien Springs, MI:
Andrews University Lithotech, 2005).
) Theology and Ministerial Practices," JATS 21.1- 2 (2010): 133-165.
J
)
A STUDY OF CANALE'S HISTORlOGRAPHY 135
Since history is an integral part of his main argument and system-the
temporal aspect of divine revelation-it is important to evaluate how he articulates
his argument historically. My goal here is to give a brief analysis and critique of
Fernando Canale's historiography. 4 It is not the intention of this paper to critique
suffered a transformation through unbiblical assumptions brought from Greek
philosophy. My thesis is that Canale and other Adventist authors have built an
incomplete historiography argl,ling this point, although they are correct in their
broad historical criticism. By not engaging sufficiently with primary sources from
the formative period of Christianity, they tend to leave gaps in their historic-
theological framework. 5
So, what I am suggesting here is an evaluation of the way Canale lays out this
argumentation. I point out that Adventism needs a deeper historical study of the
original sources in order to refine Canale's main argument-the corruption of
timelessness in Christian theology-with a focus on the formative period of the
early church.
narrative of Christian theological development with a focus on apostasy or the
eclipse ofScripture6 by (a) describing how he identifies the foundational role of the
the coherence of his argument about the importance of the early church for
Christian theology, and (c) reflecting on the implications ofCanale' s historiography
for Adventist theology. Finally, it gives some suggestions to refine Canale's
theological project in Adventism.
4
As a personal note, I start investigating the historical argumentation of Canale based
on his suggestions. I had the privilege of taking three classes he offered in the Seventh-
day Adventist Theological Seminary at Andrews University and in one of them (Doctrine
of God) he challenged the students to scrutinize in more detail the early church sources
and the biblical material in the original languages. He acknowledged not only during this
done in Adventism regarding the formative period of Christianity and the Israelite religion
during the Second Temple period to refine his systematization of Christian theology. So
the idea of this article has as a starting point Canale's own suggestion.
5
Canale himself recognizes the lack in Adventist publications of a deeper historical
study of Christian theology. See Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of
Adventist Biblical and Systematic Theologies Part 2," JATS 16.1- 2 (2005): 119-120.
6
In this work I use the terms apostasy and Hellenization applied to the history of
Christianity with the same intent of Canale, which is the replacement of Greek ontological
ideas into the Hebrew worldview of the New Testament in Christianity. Canale, "The
Message and Mission of the Remnant: A Methodological Approach," in Message, Mission
and Unity of the Church, ed. Angel Manuel Rodriguez (Silver Springs, MD: Biblical
Research Institute, 2013), 262. Canale, "The Eclipse of Scripture and the Protestantization
of the Adventist Mind Part 1: The Assumed Compatibility of Adventism with Evangelical

136 RODRIGO GALIZA
Canale's H istoriography: The Importance of Second Temple
J udaism and Early Christianity for Christian Theology
Canale's Claim of the Early Departing
In one of his strongest statements about the foundational role of early church
ideas for Christian theology, Canale affirms that by adopting the Platonic ontology
of timelessness "shortly after the close of the New Testament canon, Christian
theologians .. . almost destroyed the distinctive features ofNewTestament thinking
7 "they [the rabbis] cannot be understood as expressing the Thomistic interpretation
. .. and settled the fate of Christian theology" (emphasis supplied).
This statement is a bold one that asks for some data to back it up.
Unfortunately, in this article Canale uses mostly secondary sources and only a few
references to Augustine. This illustrates w hat seems to be a tendency in his
publications, as I explain below. In another article a little later, he writes that
"classical Christian theology sealed its intellectual destiny when Justin Martyr
(implicitly) and Origen and Augustine (explicitly) interpreted God and human
nature as non-temporal and non-historical from within the Platonic ontological
tradition."8 Again, no reference is given in the immediate context, and in the whole
article A ugustine's work is the only source qu oted or referred to from this historical
period.
Throughout Canale's articles and books, he tries to show explicitly or
't
implicitly that "from the very beginning,"9 "muy temprano," 10 "shortly after the
close of the New Testament canon,"11 or "from very early in the history of the
church or Christian thought," 12 the Greek idea oftimelessness overcame the biblical
7 In full: "Shortly after the close of the New Testament canon, Christian theologians
I
recognized the pivotal role that cosmology played in the construction ofChristian theology.
As contemporary theologians do with the/evolutionary theory, early Christian theologians
did with Platonic cosmology: they incorporated the broadly accepted cosmology of their
times into the material condition of their theological method. This perspective guided them
in their interpretation of the reality (i.e., ontology) of God and of human beings (i.e.,
anthropological ontology). The cosmology of the times was Neoplatonism. Gnosticism
followed it so closely that it almost destroyed the distinctive features of NT thinking....
This moderate use of ·Neoplatonic cosmology settled the fate of Christian theology."
(Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method Part 3: Outline and Limits of Scientific
Methodology," AUSS 42.1 (2004): 22- 23.)
8 Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?" AUSS 44.1 (2006): 115. See also
pp.108- 109.
9 Canale, "Doctrine of God," in Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology, ed.
Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 105-159.
1°Canale, "Deconstrucci6n yTeologia: Una Propuesta Metodo16gica," DavarLogos I . I
(2002): 12. See also p.17.
11 Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method Part 3," 22.
12 Canale, Basic Elements ofChristian Theology, 42. See also pp. 44 and 52. For similar
statements or idea see Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New Approach,"
A USS 31.3 (1993): 177; Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary,"
A USS36.2 (1998): 187; Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology? In Search
of a Working Proposal," Neue Zeitschrift far Systematische Theologie und
)
)
A STUDY OF CANALE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY 137 )
)
definition of a historical God and creation (human reality), transfonning Christian
tradition (teaching) into an unbiblical system of thought. Despite this bold claim, I )
few primary works from this foundational historical period in Christianity are cited
and discussed by Canale. )
A lso, in a few places he seems to express that the Hellenization or apostasy )
in early Christianity was not so widespread. For example, in his dissertation, A
Criticism of Theological R eason, he seems to affirm the Jewish perception of on- )
tological categories during this formative period of theology when he writes that
of Being, but rather as expressing an understanding of the original ontological
meaning that is found in Exodus 3:14,15 on which both the rabbinic and the NT
)
rendering find their ground and source." 13
He expresses elsewhere a similar idea that not all things were lost in the )
Christian tradition: "During the first eighteen centuries [till Kant) following the
death of Christ [which includes the early church] the doctrine of revelation- .J
inspiration was not disputed. Following Christ's example, his followers took the
')
biblical teaching about its inspiration at face value. They had no reason to think
otherwise. They assumed God, through human instrumentality, wrote the B ible."
Religionsphilosophie 43.4 (2001): 373; Canale, Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching/or )
the Cognitive Foundations of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World (Lanham, MD:
University Press of America, 2001), 37, 52. Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian )
Theology, 16, 92; Canale, "The Quest for the Biblical Ontological Ground of Christian )
Theology," JATS 16.1-2 (2005): 11, and implied in Canale, "From Vision to System:
Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology Part 1 - Historical Review," JATS 15.2 (2004):
30; Canale, "The Message and Mission of the Remnant," 262.
13 )
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1983), 300. This quote
is in the context of his discussion ofExod 3:14,15 under the subtitle 'The Biblical Expres-
sion of Being" (p. 298). In this section he gives his historical overview of the "relevant _)
ontological interpretation" in history divided in three phases: (a) before Thomas Aquinas,
(b) Thomas Aquinas and (c) after Thomas Aquinas. This division tells a lot about Canale's
theological historiography. Although I cannot demonstrate it here because it is not the
purpose of this paper, Canale's historiography relies heavily on Aquinas' influence in )
Christian theology, as the quote and subtitles suggests. For Canale it is mostly because of
Aquinas that Christian theology today is deficient and in need of restoration. Although he
may be correct, based on his strong affirmation that "very early" in Christianity the rules
for building theology were set, Aquinas is a very late (thirteen century) example to argue
)
it. It seems that to use more Aquinas without the groundwork of the early church theolo-
gians seems somewhat inadequate in relation to the assertions about the foundational role
of early Christianity in theology. And by rabbinic sources he means the Mekilta of Exodus
3:14,15 (most probably the Mekilta ofRabbi Ismael) and a certain Rabbi Isaac of the fourth
century who also interpreted this biblical text. Both of the sources are mentioned through J
secondary literature, in a commentary on Revelation (J. Massyngberde Ford, Revelation,
AB 38 [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975)) and an article on the tetragrammaton (Henry )
Barns, "La Revelation du Norn Divin 'Tetragrammaton,"' Rl3 2 (1893)). On p. 299 he also
uses the LXX as part the section on Jewish exegesis ofExod 3:14,15 before Aquinas.
'J
) 'T
)
.)
A STUDY OF CANALE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY 139
) 138 RODRIGO GALIZA

) 14 Canale's Usage of Primary Sources

(emphasis supplied)
Although this quote suggests that Christian theology had it right until the When Canale's publications under consideration here (fifty-six in total) 17 are
) Enlightenment and the influence of naturalism in biblical interpretation through analyzed regarding his usage of early church theologians, in more than half (thirty)
historical-criticism, this seems not to be the case. In the same article from which the he refers or alludes to the importance of the early church period. The numbers
) suggest the importance of this period for Canale's historiography, which is
above quote is taken, under the subtitle ''Models of Revelation-Inspiration in
) Christian Theologies," Canale again tries to set history as key to his Adventist confirmed by his strong statements about this matter, as I laid out above.
restorationist argument, that is, the return to the biblical past instead of the Canale's claim about the foundational role of the early church and Second
) Temple period for Christian theology is clearly made sporadically from 1993- 2007
unbiblical tradition in Christian theology. Right after the somewhat positive
) in thirteen of his publications. 18 By the language he uses, his strongest assertions
statement about Christian tradition, Canale says that:
about it were written in 2002, 2004, and 2006. 19 But it is mostly in other works,
) early in the history of Christianity, theologians began to define their
Athens and Jerusalem: The Role ofPhilosophy in Theology (New York: Paulist Press, 1993).
) macro-hermeneutical principles from Greek philosophical sources. Canale uses them to show that it is somewhat accepted in the scholarly world that Christian
Through a process that took centuries to reach its climax, the biblical theology had Greek ontological influence in its structure. But how widespread was this
notion of God was slowly replaced by the Greek idea of God. God was no influence in Christianity and Judaism and how early? Canale's suggestion is the object of
longer a being who dwells among his people and acts directly within the reflection here in this study.
) 15 17
flow of history, but a distant, timeless, nonhistorical being. For a somewhat full bibliography ofCanale's publication see http://femandocanale.
) eu.pn/about/publications (consulted latest August 26th 2014). Here I would like to add
Thus, it is proper to question at this moment how and why, in Canale's system, that by the time ofmy research the list contained in this website address was updated to his
) early church theologians were important to the process ofHellenization in Christian works of2012. I have for this particular research looked all the written resources available
to me plus the ones since until August of 2014. So the numbers given here are almost
) theology. Taking Canale at his own word, it is paramount to investigate this early
) comprehensive regarding his published written material. Although I recognize I may have
process. Here I try to clarify Canale's understanding by showing how he used early
missed something and I had no access to "Hacia el fundamento teol6gico de la misi6n
) Christian sources to build his argument for the eclipse of Scripture and the need to Cristiana," in Misi6n de la Iglesia Advenlista, ed. Werner Vyhrneister (Villa Libertador San ·
restore the biblical basis of Christian theology. Martin, Argentina: Editorial C.A.P ., 1980), 182- 210. Also to simplify the count done above
) A note is necessary at this point. Since Canale is a systematic theologian, one I have taken out ofmy analysis the reprinted works giving preference to its earlier and more
should not require him to thoroughly evaluate the primary sources of Christian comprehensive versions regarding history. For example, Canale, Creation, Evolution and
theology directly. It seems to be the work of a historian to probe the details of the Theology: The Role of Method in Theological Accommodation (Berrien Springs, MI:
) schemes of historical theologians to see if their systems are built from careful Andrews University Lithotech, 2005) is basically the putting together of three articles
analyses of historical data. It is in this latter capacity that I approach Canale's published in 2003-2004 on A USS. From this work there are two more editions published in
) Argentina and one in Brazil.
works. 16 18
) Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: Method," 177; Canale, "Philosophical
Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 187. Canale, "Doctrine of God," Canale, Back to
14
Canale, "The Revelation and Inspiration of Scripture in Adventist Theology Part l ,"
) Revelation-Inspiration, 37, 52. Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology?"
AUSS 45.2 (2007): 204. · 373. Canale, "Deconstruccion y Teologia: Una Propuesta Metodologica," DavarLogos 1.1
)
15
Canale, "The Revelation and Inspiration," 205. (emphasis supplied) Notice that this
is a more refine statement ("began to define...through a process ... slowly" ) compared to (2002): 12, 17. Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method Part 3," 22, 23. Canale, "The
Quest," 11. Canale,BasicElements ofChristian Theology, 42, 50, 52. Canale, The Cognitive
) other statements quoted above where early Christian theologians for Canale "settled" ,
Principle of Christian Theology, 16, 92. Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?"
"sello", "decided" wrongly the destiny of Christian teaching.
16 Canale seems to rely on secondary literature about history of Christian thought most 108, I 09, I 15. Canale, "The Revelation and Inspiration," 205. Canale, "The Message and
) Mission of the Remnant," 262.
probably because they agree with him in the stance that Greek philosophical presuppositions 19
) Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: Method,"-"shaping"; Canale, "Philosophical
shaped Christian theology. But doing it without checking the primary sources, maybe
Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary,"-"decided the scientific structure soon after New
sufficient for theological purposes, but there is a probability of arriving at wrong
) conclusions. Some of the works he mentions most frequently are: Adolf von Harnack,
Testament"; Canale, "Doctrine ofGod,"-"heavily influenced" and "conditioned"; Canale,
"Deconstruccion y Teologia,"-"definir," "sello su destino," Canale, "Evolution, Theology
) History of Dogma, 7 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1961). Justo L. Gonzalez, A
and Method Part 3,"-"settled fate", "almost destroyed the distinctive features of New
History of Christian Thought, 3 vols. (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1987). Jeroslav
Testament thinking"; Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, -"decided"; Canale,
J Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, 5 vols.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971 ). Paul Tillich, A History ofChristian Thought
"The Quest,"-"shaped"; Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, "claimed";
Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?"-"draw from," "sealed"; Canale, "The
) (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). And since the 90s with more frequency Jack A. Bonsor,
)
)
.>

140 RODRIGO GALIZA
especially in 2005, that he explains his historical framework in more detail. Still,
in his more extensive treatises on his system (The Cognitive Principle and Basic
Elements), Canale relies heavily on Augustine (mostly Confession) and secondary
sources about the formative period of Christianity, engaging little with the primary
20
sources of this important phase in his system.
Out of the thirty publications where he does refer to the early church and/or
Second Temple period, in fifteen of them Canale provides primary sources through
quotations or simply a reference. 21 In these publications, which examine a period
of about 500 years (from Philo [first century CE], to Augustine [fourth century
CE]), Canale refers to twenty-three primary works by ten individuals.
22
These primary sources are not necessarily investigated by Canale and
Revelation and Inspiration,"-"defined."
20 An exception to the rule, which is explored a little later, is his 1998 article
"Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary." This article is one of the few places
where he tried to engage a little more with the primary sources related to early Christianity.
I may concur with the idea that since Canale is a systematic theologian and his works are
theological it is not his burden to perform a thorough (detailed) historical research. His
selection of figures such as Augustine and Aquinas may just be because undoubtedly they
are major theological figure in Christianity. This being said, still there is a need to have
coherence in his historical argumentation. As I point out below there is a tendency of
generalizing an early adoption of the timelessness presuppositions to the whole fabric of
Christian theology. Even if this is so, why the heavy dependence on Augustine, since he is
somewhat "late" in the history of early Christian theology.
2 1 Canale, A Criticism a/Theological Reason, 300, 302, 303; Canale, "Revelation and
Inspiration: The Ground for a New Approach," AUSS 3 1.2 (1993): 94. Canale, "Revelation
and Inspiration: Method," 176. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model,"
AUSS 32.1- 2 (1994): 27. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Historical-Cognitive
Model," AUSS 33.1- 2 (1995): 13. Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical
Sanctuary," 189. Canale, "Doctrine of God," 141- 144. Canale, Back to Revelation-
Inspiration, 45, 65, 66, 156. Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method Part 3," 18, 26, 32.
Canale, "Adventist Theology and Deep Time/Evolutionary Theory: Are They Compatible?,"
JATS 15.1 (2004): 97. Canale, Basic Elements a/Christian Theology, 49, 74, 131, 162, 163,
187, 188, 195. Canale; The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 11 0, 13 7, 178, 179,
219, 220. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration," in Understanding Scriptures: An Adventist
Approach, ed. George W. Reid (Silver Springs, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 2006), 72.
Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology Part 3 -
Sanctuary and Hermeneutics," JATS 17 .2 (2006): 4 7. Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical
Theology?" 108.
22 The list is as follows in alphabetic order by the first name of the author: Augustine
( City of God; Confession; On Christian Doctrines; Soliloquies; The Trinity; Treatise on
Rebuke and Grace; A Treatise on the Predestination ofthe Saints); Clement of Alexandria
(Stromata); Dionysius the Areopagite or Pseudo-Dionysius (The Divine Names); Flavius
Josephus (AgainstApion); Hillary ofPointiers (On the Trinity); Ireneaus (Against Heresies);
John Cassian (The Conferences); Justin Martyr (Apologies, Hortatory address to the Greek);
Origen (On the First Principles); Philo (De Opificio Mundo; De Plantatione; De Sacrificiis
Abe/is et Caini; De Specialibus Legibus; Questions et Solutions in Exodus; Quad Deus
Immutabilis Sit).
)
A STIJDY OF CANALE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY 141 .. >
sometimes just referred to through secondary literature.23 Even when the primary
sources of these theologians are mentioned by Canale, he quotes them or discusses
their ideas only a few times.24 Their role, however, is clearly defined as the
statements about the early apostasy or Hellenization in Christianity frame them.
These theologians are, for Canale, some of those responsible for shaping Christian
theology in the light of a non-biblical ontological premise. So, how does Canale
articulate this historically?
Taking into account that the ancient writers cited by Canale from this early
p eriod of Christianity, Philo (six works mentioned) and Augustine (seven 'works
mentioned) are the most important figures in his early history of Christian theology. )
It seems an intentional play on the approximate beginning and end of the Patristic
period to use them as key thinkers who "shaped" Christian theology. Despite the
important role these theologians play in Canale's historiographical argumentation,
their ideas and the relation they have to Christian theology in general are not
discussed in length. As explained below, Philo's ideas and their impact on
Christianity are discussed in one article, although Canale uses Augustine more
extensively.
Interestingly, by comparing the dates of Canale's bold statements about the
foundational role ofthe early church period, which were mostly after 2000, with his
works where he mentions Philo and Augustine, I found some tendencies in Canale's
historiography. To put this into perspective, in A Criticism ofTheological Reason
( 1983), Aquinas is the central figure in Christian theology and Augustine takes on
a secondary role. Besides that, in this first work Canale describes some Jewish
sources (although very few and secondary) as representing a biblical-historical view
of God, thus giving the impression that the apostasy of timelessness in Christianity
occurred later. 25 ")
23
The best example is found in Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: Method," 176,
where Canale mentions 5 personages (Aristides, Clement, Justin, Origen and Philo) and two
of them without referring to their works (Aristides and Philo). References to ancient
)
theologians without any primary or secondary reference are found elsewhere. Names such
as Marcion (Canale, "Secularizaci6n e Historia de la Cristiandad," Enfoques 5.1 [1 993):
12- 14. Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 51. Here Marcion is mentioned )
through a Catholic Encyclopedia.), Noetus of Smyrna (Canale, "Doctrine of God," 142.),
Paul ofSamosata (Canale, "Doctrine ofGod," 142.), Theodotus (Canale, "Doctrine of God," )
142.), Arius (Canale, "Doctrine of God," 142. Canale, Basic Elements of Christian
Theology, 162.), Jerome (Canale, Basic Elements ofChristian Theology, 203.), Gregory of
Nazianzus (Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 203.) and Lucian (Canale, The
Cognitive Principle ofChristian Tradition, 167.) are mentioned by him but also without any
primary reference.
24
For example, in his Canale, "Doctrine of God," many primary works are mentioned
but just one quote, from Augustine On the Holy Trinity. This seems to be the tendency of
Canale to quote Augustine and dismiss the others. There is a need to investigate if bis
interpretation of these works is appropriate in order to see if his system of theological
criticism is coherent. Here I just raise some issues through an overview of his usage of
primary sources.
.)
25
See footnote 13.
)
)
)
142 RODRIGO GALIZA
)
) Canale wrote again about the subject more than a decade later, in a series of
five articles in A USS from 1993- 1995. 26 In four of these five articles, he articulated
) for the first time the "pre-Aquinas" stage of Christian theology, which was briefly
sketched in A Criticism of Theological Reason. In this series of articles, Augustine
is the only source from the early church quoted and explained. 27 This is the case
) until 1998. Although some other theologians of the period are mentioned in one
other article, they are referred to through secondary sources in a footnote without
) any quotation from the primary sources or any good explanation of their particular
role in bringing the Greek ontology to Christian theology. 28 In the aforementioned
)
article, however, Canale hints in a footnote that it was through Alexandria that the
) influence of timelessness arrived in Christianity, starting with Philo. This
connection between Philo and early Christian theologians is a progression in his
) Jewish philosopher/theologian adopted ontological ideas about the timelessness of
own historiography.
~ two pages ofhis article, it shows progress in his historiography, for he is filling the
26
Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground," Canale, "Revelation and
) Inspiration: Method," Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," Canale,
"Revelation and Inspiration: The Liberal Model," AUSS 32.3 (1994):169-195; Canale,
) "Revelation and Inspiration: The Historical-Cognitive Model."
)
27
In three articles of the series he quotes Augustine once in each article. To argue the
timeless non-temporal view of God Canale uses Augustine Confessions 11.11, 14 in Canale,
) "Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground," 94. To argue the timeless ontological impact on
the doctrine of Scriptures Canale uses Augustine On Christian Doctrine 1.39.43 in Canale,
) "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," 26---27. And Augustine Confessions
11. 7.9 in Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Historical-Cognitive Model," 13.
) 28
Canale writes: "At least since the time of Justin's Apologies, philosophical concepts
-.) have been called to assist the constitution of Christian theology."" In Footnote 17 it is
written, "While Justin did not 'mean to bring Christians and philosophers more closely
) together' (Adolfvon Harnack, History of Dogma [New York Dover, 1961], 2:188), his
conception of an essential continuity between Plato's ideas and those of the Old Testament
) (Hortatoty Address to the Greeks 29) and his idea that Christ was the fullness of the same
reason used by Socrates (Apology 2.10) seem to represent a clear movement away from
) Paul's warning against 'deceptive philosophy' (Col 2:8). Sharing the same apologetical role,
Aristides did not hesitate to present himself as a philosopher to the Athenians (Harnack, 2:
) 177). The apologists of the second century A.D., however, represent only the initial stage
(see Justo L. Gonzalez, A History of Christian Thought, [Nashville: Abingdon, 1970], l:
109-1 IO) of what would become a substantial and systematic role in the School of
) Alexandria, notably in the writings ofClement (Stromata, 6.5; see also Gonzalez, 1:197) and
Origen ( see G. W. Butterworth, 'Introduction' to Origen' s On First Principles [Gloucester:
j Peter Smith, 1973], lvii). The role ofphilosophy as constitutive of the theological task has
also its antecedent in the Judaism of Alexandria, in which Philo became the most notable
) exponent ofa thoroughgoing attempt 'to interpret Jewish theology in terms of Hellenistic
) philosophy'(J. N. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, 4th ed. [London: Adam & Charles
Black, 1968),18-1 D 9). Richard Kroner expresses the rather debatable idea that specific
) contents of Greek philosophical speculation are already present in the Gospel of John
(Speculation and Revelation in the Age ofChristian Philosophy [Philadelphia: Westminster,
) 1959),23-24; cf. Rudolf Bultmann, The Gospel of John: A Commentary, trans. G. R.
Beasley-Murray [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971], 19-36)." (Canale, "Revelation and
_) Inspiration: Method," 176.)
)
•
A STUDY OF CANALE' S HISTORIOGRAPHY 143
In 1998 with his "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary",
where he suggests that "soon after the NT was written" timelessness was adopted
by Christianity, he skips Augustine and uses Philo to build his historical argument
of apostasy. Though the statement seems all-inclusive, as a representation of this
fact Canale had previously quoted only Augustine, who lived not so "soon after the
New Testament."29 Notice that while in 1993 he connected the influence of
timelessness in Christian theology with Augustine, possibly through Origen of
Alexandria, 30 in "Philosophical Foundations," Canale uses Philo, also from
Alexandria, as the precursor of timelessness in Christian theology that would later
come through Aquinas and Calvin.
In his elaboration of Philo's influence in Christian theology, Canale quotes
eight times from five works of Philo to explain how this Alexandrian Hellenistic
God in his understanding of the sanctuary.31 Though this discussion comprises only
gaps of this Greek early connection in Christian theology. The next time Canale
mentions primary sources of the early church period is in Doctrine ofGod (2000),
where he connects Philo with Justin Martyr.32 So, by 2000, Canale starts to build
29
Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 187. After A ,
Criticism ofTheological Reason (1983) the first reference to the early church occurs in 1993
(see footnote 21 and 22). And unlike A Criticism ofTheological Reason that puts Augustine
before Aquinas, in 1998 with "Philosophical Foundations," Canale puts Philo ofAlexandria
as a precursor to Aquinas in the application of the timeless idea of God and the Reformation
(Calvin).
30
"In the writing of influential theologians, such as Origen ofAlexandria or Augustine
of Hippo, philosophy was already playing an important role in the shaping of Christian
theology." Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: Method," 177. See also Canale,
"Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?" 115.
31
Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 189- 190. In these
two pages he quotes from Quod Deus lmmutabilis Sit, 31-32; De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini,
76; De Opiflcio Mundo 4.16, 17, 5.20; Questions et Solutions in Exodus 2.51, 69; De
Specialibus Legibus 1.66. And he refers to De Plantatione 12.50. He also mentions the
important role of Philo in Canale, "Deconstruccion y Teologia," 12 through secondary
source (Bonsor).
32
Canale, "Doctrine of God," 141. In this article he also makes the claim about the
influence of Greek ontological categories in Christian theology. ''From the very beginning,
the Christian interpretation of God was heavily influenced by extrabiblical philosophy.
Because the Christian doctrine of God has become a synthesis between philosophical and
biblical ideas, we need to briefly sketch the main philosophical trends that have conditioned
the formulation of the Christian doctrine of God." (p.140) Till here Augustine and Philo
were the primary sources quoted and explained. Interestingly Philo here is just mentioned
in connection with (as influencing) Justin Martyr. This is the work of Canale that contains
the most amount of primary sources. Most of them nonetheless are just reference and not
direct quote and the discussion of the ideas about God in the Patristic period is very short.
He mentions Justin Martyr (First Apology, Second Apology, Dialogue with Trypho) and
Origen (On First Principles) as understanding God timelessly as Plato. Irenaeus (Against
Heresies), like the rabbinic period in A Criticism of Theological Reason, is approved by

144 RODRIGO GALIZA
a picture of the Hellenistic influence in Christian theology through Alexandria. The
scheme could be represented as:
Philo➔ Justin➔Origen➔ Augustine➔ Aquinas
The theologians between Philo and Augustine in the scheme above are not
discussed by Canale, giving the impression that Philo and Augustine represent the
history of Christian apostasy. Even Philo, who is associated to Christianity because
he was appropriated by Christians and not so much by Jewish writers, is discussed
just once, in "Philosophical Foundations." Augustine, on the other hand, is used
extensively by Canale. In all the instances from 1983- 2006 wh ere Canale uses
primary references to articulate his historiography of this formative period,
Augustine is the most cited.33
I already mentioned that Augustine is the only one quoted and discussed by
Canale in the series of AUSS articles from 1993- 1995.34 In "Doctrine of God"
(2000), which contains the greatest variety and number ofpatristic theologians and
different sources cited in Canale's written works, Augustine is the most referred to
and the only one quoted.35 From his remaining seven works (from 2004-2006),
where primary sources of early church theologians are mentioned, in five of them
only Augustine is quoted or mentioned.36 The other two works where he uses
someone besides Augustine from the early period ofChristianity are Basic Elements
and The Cognitive Principle. These are the works that most clearly represent his
Canale because of his "lack of philosophical speculation". But he suggested that Irenaeus
"was considered naive and was overcome by later theological reflection". (p.141) Augustine
has the most amount of references by far (many passages of the Confessions, On the Holy
Trinity and The City ofGod) and he is the only quoted theologian of the period (once - On
the Holy Trinity 5.9). Canale also gave brief references to some ecclesiastical councils
regarding the Trinitarian belief, but nowhere is the discussion historically detailed to back
up the idea that Greek ontological assumptions took over Christian theology. To the
contrary, for example, Irenaeus is given as "uncorrupted" evidence but his influence in the
Trinitarian debate later in Christian theology is muted according to Canale. For a contrary
view about the importa·nt role of Irenaeus see e.g. Geoffrey Wainwright, "Trinity," in
Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker, 2005), 815-8 I 8. Alister E. McGrath, The Christian Theology Reader
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 174-175.
33
In Canale, "The Quest," 11 , footnote 27, Canale summarizes the importance of
Augustine in his historiography: "Perhaps more than any other theologian, Augustine should
be credited with constructing Christian theology on the timeless understanding of being
derived from Neoplatonic ontology."
"See footnote 27.
35
See footnote 32.
36
The five articles where Augustine is the only Patristic source mentioned: Canale,
"Adventist Theology and Deep Time," 97. Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method Part
3," 18, 26, 32. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration," 72. Canale, "From Vision to System
Part 3," 47. Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?" I08. The other two works are
Basic Elements ofChristian Theology and The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology.
)
)
A STUDY OF CANALE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY 145 )
historiography. J
In 2005, with the publication of Basic Elements and The Cognitive Principle, )
Canale elaborated a little more on his history of apostasy. This elaboration was not
done by discussing other figures at any length, but by elaborating on Augustine,
who by this time had become the major figure in Canale's history of early Christian
theology. These two books are the ones where he gives his most extensive
explanation of Augustine's theology and consequently where he quotes and refers
the most to Augustine's works.
In Basic Elements, Augustine and Hilary of Poitiers are the ones mentioned
representing Christian early theologians. Hilary ofPoitiers is mentioned once in the )
context ofhis interpretation of Prov. 8 against Arius ' doctrine of God.37 Augustine
meanwhile is quoted and referred to throughout the book, which again gives the )
impression that the theologian of Hippo is the major figure in the Christian
tradition.38 Also, in Basic Elements Philo is alluded to briefly as the carrier of
timelessness to Christianity, but Canale does not explain how this happened or give j
any reference for this assertion. 39
In The Cognitive Principle this impression continues. Here Philo is dropped,
and instead Flavius Josephus is used as the Jewish voice about the issue under
discussion: inspiration. Canale quotes this Jewish historian to represent the good
biblical-historical Jewish interpretation,40 similar to the idea expressed about Jewish )
literature in A Criticism ofTheological Reason, discussed above. Besides Josephus, )
in The Cognitive Principle Canale makes brief allusions to John Cassian and
Lucian.4 1 As in Basic Elements, Augustine is the only one quoted and discussed. 42 )
By now the tendency in Canale's historiography ofhow Hellenization entered
.)
37
Canale, Basic Elements ofChristian Theology, 162. Here he refers to On the Trinity )
12.36-45.
38
Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 49, 74, I 31 , I 36, 166-1 70. )
Augustine's works used by Canale: Confessions, The Trinity, The City ofGod. Most ofthem
are quotes. )
39
Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 44.
4
° Canale, The Cognitive Principle ofChristian Theology, 121 . He uses Against Apion
l.8 to argue that Jews understood that the Bible (OT) was given by God and Christians
follow this understanding "without attempting a theological understanding ofit."
41
Discussing the historical-critical method Canale says first without any reference that )
"for centuries theologians played down the historical meaning ofScriptures. Origen and the
Alexandrian school oftheology tended to interpret the Bible allegorically. In contrast, during
the fourth century A.D. Lucian and the school ofAntioch tried to interpret the Bible literally
and historically. During the same period, John Cassian distinguished between the historical 1>
and spiritual senses, arguing that the latter included the tropological (practical-ethical), )
allegorical (what is hidden beneath the literal sense), and anagogical (eschatological)
senses.9 " (p.178) In footnote 9 he gives the only primary reference, John Cassian The
Conferences 2:8. (Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 167.)
42
Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 93, 121, 171, 187.
Augustine's works used by Canale to explain the influence of the idea of timelessness upon
Christian theology are Confessions, The City ofGod, A Treqtise on the Predestination ofthe
Saints and Treatise on Rebuke and Grace.
)
_,;

)
) T
)
)
146 RODRIGO GALIZA I A STUDY OF CANALE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY 147

)
)
Christian theology is clear. Augustine is the conduit through whom the Alexandrian
way of interpreting Scripture (timelessly) shaped Christian theology. In Basic
Elements, the way the non-biblical understanding (Hellenization) entered
I Augustine of Hippo, also from North Africa. 45
This investigation also shows that besides Canale' s groundwork in A Criticism
of Theological Reason, four publications stand out as part of his early history of
Christianity is clearly portrayed: the ontological presupposition of timelessness Christian apostasy. In "Method for a New Approach" (1993), he started filling the
) gaps between Plato and Aquinas. These two authors are explained in his first work,
influenced Christianity in the following sequence:
) A Criticism ofTheological Reason. In "Philosophical Foundations" (1998), Canale
introduced Philo as the Alexandrian connection in Christian theology, elaborating
Parmenides ➔ Plato ➔ Philo ➔early Christians ➔ Augustine ➔ Aquinas
) a little more on the understanding of God and the biblical sanctuary and how this
➔ Reformers 4 3
)
This scheme is more than a generalization in Canale's historiography of
I affected Christian theology as a whole. In 2005 with Basic Elements and The·
Cognitive Principle, he expanded his understanding of the influence of Greek
) timelessness in Christian theology through the doctrine of revelation-inspiration,
Christian apostasy. When attention is given to the particular way Canale uses
using Augustine more extensively.
) primary sources, four individuals44 from Second Temple Judaism and early
Christianity are quoted, and two of them are emphasized: Philo and Augustine. In
Implications of Canale's Historiography for Adventist Theology
the 1,500 years between Plato and Aquinas, who are the major players in Canale's
So what are the consequences ofCanale's ideas in Adventist historiography?
historiography of Christian theology, Philo and Augustine are the only ones
) First, his main argument is that apostasy in Christianity did not necessarily come
discussed by him.
through change in particular doctrines like the change from the Sabbath to
) This data is relevant to understand Canale's historiography. In his scheme, it
Sunday,46 the spiritualization of the sanctuary,47 prophetic interpretation,48 or
)
)
was through Philo and Augustine that Christian theology was changed from its
biblical premises. D espite some affirmations elsewhere indicating that the Jewish-
rabbinic and apostolic church traditions did understand God and revelation
anthropology (immortality of the soul).49 The falling away from truth was more··
45
-------

historically, for Canale, what became normative in Christian theology was the idea
) of timelessness from Greek philosophy (Parmenides-Plato-Aristotle) adopted by
early Christian theologians. And this came into Christianity through the Hellenized
.)
Jew Philo of Alexandria.
) Alexandria and later Augustine (p.55-56).
Partial Conclusion
) In Canale's historical argument, the formative years of Christianity were
) foundational for the introduction of Greek thought into the fabric of Christian
theological thinking and discourse. Analyzing his usage of primary sources (by
) reference or quote) reveals that the main figures Canale discusses in the
Hellenization process of Christian theology are Philo and Augustine. Philo's
)
method of interpreting Scripture led to apostasy of Christian theology in the
) Alexandrian environment (by Justin Martyr and Origen), which influenced
) 43
Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, Basic Elements, 44, 48.
44
In order ofleast to most referred: Josephus Flavius, Dionysius, Philo and Augustine.
) The only quote ofFlavius Josephus is found in The Cognitive Principle (p.121) and deserve
a comment. He quotes Against Apion I. 8 to argue that the Israelites in the time of the Bible
) is given special attention but, unlike Canale in Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers, as in The
believed in divine revelation without questioning it. This evaluation is very similar to the
) one he gives in A Criticism of Theological Reason, 300 (see footnote 15). Again the
impression is that the Israelite and early Christian (Apostolic) understanding of God was
) biblical in contrast to the Greek ontological definition of God, which infiltrates Christian
tradition.
) Carsten Johnsen, Man - The Indivisible: Totality Versus Disruption in the History of
)
)
)
-1
For the importance ofNorth Africa in Christianity see Oden, How Africa Shaped the·
.
Christian Mind: Rediscovering the African Seedbed of Western Christianity (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2007). Explaining the influential role of North African
theologians in the shaping ofChristian theology Oden highlights Origen (pp.45-46) and later
the influence of Neoplatonism in Christianity through Philo, Plotinus into Clement of
46
Cf. Bacchiocchi, From Sabbath to Sunday: A Historical Investigation ofthe Rise of
Sunday Observance in Early Christianity (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 1977).
47
Cf. Rodriguez, "El Santuario y Sus Servicios en la Literatura Patristica," Theologika
7.1 (1992): 24--73.
48
Cf. Froom, The Prophetic Faith ofOur Fathers, 4 vols. (Hagerstown, MD: Review
and Herald, 1982). In this landmark of Adventism regarding historical theology Froom
elaborates on the history of prophetic interpretation focusing on the history of major
interpreters of the prophecies of Daniel and Revelation. In the first 21 chapters (out of 36)
of the first volume he discusses on the history from pre-Christian times till Augustine and
Gregory the Great in the turn of the fifth to sixth century CE. For our purposes here it
suffices to say that up until now it is the major Adventist study of the early church period.
And in this study he highlights some key figures like Irenaeus, Tertullian, Hippolytus, Julius
Africanus, Cyprian and specially Augustine with his interpretation ofthe millennial kingdom
as the Church of Rome in City of God. Like Canale, in Froom's historiography Augustine
Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers, Froom gives a somewhat thorough review of early
church theologians through primary sources to establish his case.
49
Cf. Froom, The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers: The Conflict ofthe Ages over
the Nature and Destiny of Man, 2 vols. (Washington DC: Review and Herald, 1965-66).
Western Thought (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971 ); Jean Zurcher, The Nature and Destiny
148 R ODRIGO G ALIZA
foundational and had its roots (or its macro-hermeneutical assumptions) in its
ontological foundations through the definitions of God, man, and how they
communicate (revelation-inspiration and the sanctuary). 50
Canale's claim is that when the timeless view ofreality was ad opted , the basic
structures to interpret everything else changed. In this apostate Christian theology,
God is not seen as historical. Therefore, the process of divine interaction with
humanity (creation, incarnation of Christ, revelation-inspiration, sanctuary,
prophecy, spiritual manifestation) is not only mistaken but misleading. Canale, in
my opinion, makes a compelling case for broadening the way to set the history and
development of Christian doctrines in a Protestant-Adventist p erspective. By doing
this, he goes beyond any Seventh-day A dventist historian or theologian who has
tried to explain the falling away of Christian tradition, 51 and there is much to be
commended in that .52
ofMan, trans. Mabel R. Bartlett (Philosophical Library, 1969). Regarding Froom's work I
would add that like in The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers, in The Conditionalist Faith of
Our Fathers he traces a history of the understanding ofa particular teaching ofChristianity,
in this case anthropology, throughout history from the primary sources. And he uses primary
sources throughout his discourse. Of course in both works he limits himself to special points
related to this teaching. Here he focuses on the understanding ofconditionalism or the belief
in the mortality or immortality of humanity. Like in prophetic interpretation Augustine is
singled out as a main figure of the apostasyofChristian understanding, here ofanthropology
(See ch. 64). Interestingly enough, despite Froom's more thorough historical work and
similar argumentation, he is heavily criticized by Canale in the latter' historiography of
Adventism because in Canale's analysis Froom was one of those responsible for the
Protestantization of the Adventist mind due to Froom's other works, Movement ofDestiny
and Question on Doctrines. For Canale's criticism ofFroom see Canale, "The Eclipse of
Scripture and the Protestantization of the Adventist Mind Part 2: From the Evangelical
Gospel to Culture," JATS 22.J (2011). It would be interesting to see the relevance of
Froom's historiography in his theological system and compare to Canale's analysis of
Froom.
so I have noticed that a few times Canale elaborates on how specific doctrines are
influenced by the timelessness ontological framework. They are Revelation-Inspiration
(doctrine of Scriptures); immortality of the soul (anthropology), Trinity (doctrine of God)
and Creation.
51
Most of the early church references in Seventh-day Adventist works occur in
prophetic interpretation especially in commentaries on the biblical books of Daniel and
Revelation, to generally argue for the apostasy of Christianity in its early years. But not
many works develop on the details of how and why apostasy came about. So the
contribution ofthe works mentioned in footnote 46-49 is extremely important to Adventist
historiography of Christian theology. This is a general statement based on my ongoing
research ofthe handling of early church materials in Seventh-day Adventist historiography,
which I have been doing during my Ph.D. program.
52
E lsewhere I have notice Canale's important insight to explain the apparent
contradiction between the decline of Catholicism in Brazil and other parts of the world with
the Seventh-day Adventist eschatological expectation that the apostate influence ofRoman
Catholicism will increase and dominate the religious world. In that case a punctual
description of apostasy related to the Roman Catholic doctrines do not suffice. But with
A STUDY OF CANALE'S H ISTORIOGRAPHY 149
However, the generalization of Canale's historiography, of attributing )
timelessness to the whole fabric of C hristian theology, com es with a price of
oversimplification. Many of his assertions about the r ole of the early church in the
Hellenization ofChristian theology are all-encompass ing, but he gives little support
for them, historically speaking. This may be the origin of some contradictory
statements about how widespread and influential timelessness was in Christian
doctrinal formation. )
One simple example is Canale's description of the timelessness influence in the
theology ofMarcion, who explained God through the dualism of Greek ontology. 53
Canale does not nuance his categorization of Marcion who, as a witness of the )
timelessness influence in Christian theology, in the broader context is placed
together with Irenaeus, T ertullian, Origen, and Augustine. 54 Since Christianity in
general rejected Marcion as a h eretic for being dualistic, Canale's argument of
generalizing the intellectual apostasy in Christianity is at minimum questionable or
in need of refinemen t. 55 .)
This generalization deficiency is also seen in other Adventist evaluations, in
comparison with Canale's m anner of framing early church theologians. One recent
example is found in Norman Gulley. In the first volume ofhis Systematic Theology,
_)
he approves C anale's system atization and argues that Augustine and other church
fathers adopted a pagan v iew of inspiration (mechanic and inerrant) based on the
timelessness idea of God, which is unbiblical. But at the same time, Gulley uses
some of the same theologians labeled unbiblical to support the historical cosmic
)
Canale's systematization of Christian apostasy one can easily explain it.
" Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology, 51. For another apparent conflicting )
argument see footnote 14 and 15.
54
See pp. 43- 51, 77. In these pages Canale argued how the timelessness understanding ' .J
of God influenced Christian theology. However when describing the understanding ofGod
among these theologians, Canale mentioned that Irenaeus used "economy" to designate a
"historical level of reality where God reveals Himself and carries on His works of creation _)
and redemption." (p.77) And Tertullian and Origen, according to Canale, also adopted
timelessness to describe God but because they saw the Bible speaking of God in history
added the concept ofimmanence to describe God (Trinity) and distinguished divine realities
(pp.77- 78). These two examples demonstrates that the understanding of some theologians )
in early church is not so simple as Canale suggests.
55
Another case of possible inconsistency in his historiography is found in Canale,
"Absolute Theological Truth in Postmodern Times," A USS 45.1 (2007): 93. In this work
Canale criticizes Stanley Grenz postmodern relativistic approach. Interestingly Canale
quotes John Paul II, Hillary of Poitiers (On Th e Trinity 12.39) and Hegel to show that .)
Christianity is about absolute truths. Normally church fathers, Roman Catholic
representatives and modern philosophers are used negatively by Canale since they adopt a
timeless notion of God. But here he was able to use them against Grenz relativism. I just
want to show by this cases that, as Canale himself points out, Christian theology(ies) are
complex and one does an injustice by giving broad generalizations without pointing out the )
distinct nuances of it.
 ~ -,
)
)
150 RODRJGO GALIZA
)
) battle worldview of Scripture, called by Adventists the Great Controversy. Like
56
Canale's, Gulley's generalization introduces a certain tension and also does not
) explain in detail how the tiplelessness framework influenced specifically early
) Christian theologians.
) Conclusions and Suggestions
The comparisons above demonstrate the need in Adventism to better evaluate
) ontological assumptions in a given theologian.
the early sources of Christian theology. I concur with the suggestion that Canale
) and Gulley are not historians, so it is not their role to go into the details of history.
However, the task remains for Adventists as a group. Canale, in my opinion, as a
) great theologian, set the framework and left some gaps to be filled by historians. So,
I further his call to Adventist historians.
)
As Adventist historians go about refining this theological framework, some
) issues need to be solved. I highlight a few questions left in Canale's historiography
related to the early period of Christian theology. Why are Philo and Augustine the
) seem closely related to the Scriptures and should be an alternative way to
) 56 Gulley, Sys tematic Theology: Prolegomena (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University Press, 2003). 10-12, 295, 398, 423-424. In this first volume of his systematic
) theology Gulley sets his historiography ofChristian theology. Doing it he approves Canale' s
contribution to the understanding of the timelessness influence in Christianity (pp. I 0-12).
) Later discussing Biblical Inspiration (chapter 7) giving more details of how early church
) theologians developed their system Gulley wrote that Athenagoras, Irenaeus, Gregory of
Nazianzen and Augustine (although not convincingly except Augustine) adopted the pagan
) view of inspiration (mechanic and inerrant). However when discussing "Biblical
Worldview" (ch. 10) Gulley argued based on quotes of primary sources that many church
fathers (Origen, Tertullian, Gregory Thaumaturgus, Jerome, John Cassian and Augustine -
some of the same theologians he uses to argue that early church adopted mistaken
) mechanistic view of Scriptures) adopted the biblical worldview of the Great Controversy
advocated by Seventh-day Adventism (pp.398, 423-424). To nuance a little more the
) complex contradiction that such evaluations creates one need to look at Gulley's history of
) hermeneutics ( ch 12). Here Gulley, like Canale in A Criticism ofTheological Reason, argued
that rabbinic Judaism used the Hebrew Bible worldview contrary to Greco-Roman cultural
) developments seen in Philo through the allegorical method of biblical interpretation. Gulley
however puts the documents of Qumran in the same line with Philo' s allegorical method and
) ignores that the Christian fathers, that are quoted with approval by him, in their
interpretation ofpassages such as Isa 14 and Ezek 28 about the Great Controversy also uses
) "allegory". I include a last example comparing Canale's with Gulley's usage of church
fathers. While Canale in "Doctrine ofGod,"posited positive things about Irenaeus' doctrine
) of God (see footnote 32) Gulley portrays him negatively in the same way of Augustine
) related to the understanding oflnspiration (Systematic Theology: Prolegomena, 295-296).
Based on this and other examples I found the necessity ofnuancing a little more the way
ancient Israelites and church fathers used Scriptures in the shaping of their theological
systems so the historiographical argument of Adventist theologians may be refined. As
) recent reviews ofpatristic exegesis have demonstrated, the picture of the past is not a simple
one, but rather a very complex image ofhow Christians understood God and Scriptures. See
) most recently, Michael Graves, The Inspiration and Interpretation ofScriptures: What the
) Early Church Can Teach Us (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2014).
)
)
A STUDY OF CANALE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY 151
major influences on Christian theology in this period and not others?57 Does his
choice of figures from this period make a difference in his main argument about the
role of timelessness in shaping Christian theology? Is Canale correct in pointing to
Alexandria,58 through Philo and Augustine, as the seedbed of Christian apostasy?59
Further studies of the early church by Adventists may also investigate specific
details in Christian theology that may support the general idea Canale has laid out,
as well as the macro-hermeneutical presuppositions or the biblical or unbiblical
Finally, as a committed Seventh-day Adventist and supporter of Canale's
project to set the Christian doctrinal system straight based on Scripture, I would like
to suggest that Seventh-day Adventist scholars should engage more fully with
literature closely related to Christian origins. Its importance to understanding
Scripture has been recognized by.n on-Adventists, but slowly picked up in Adventist
circles.60
The Dead Sea Scrolls and the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, for example,
understand Christian theology in its formative period instead of going to
Alexandria. Some studies I have done on selected texts from these corpuses have
borne fruit for comparison with the Adventist understanding of Scripture. 61 Issues·.,
such as historicism in prophetic interpretation, the pre-advent judgment, and the "
57
A good start would be based on David T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature:
A Survey, Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum 3 in Tradition in Early
Christian Literature 3 (Assen, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1993).
58
"Following the lead of Alexandria theology, Augustine shaped the notion (sic of]
God's being and actions (not just his eternity) in light of Greek timeless ontology." Canale,
"The Quest," 11.
59
Oden has clearly put hirnselfagainst this idea, which he attributes to AdolfHamack's
critical historiography of Christianity. For Oden, the North-African influence was positive
and he does not see a negative side in the ontological ideas ofPlatonism in Christianity. See
Oden, How Africa Shaped the Christian Mind, 57- 59.
60
See footnotes 46-49. In addition to these more detailed works on early church
sources by Adventists I highlight more recent efforts in Raoul Dederen ed., Handbook of
Seventh-day Adventist Theology (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), which gives
in every chapter a brief historical overview of each doctrine discussed. Also Gulley in his
Systematic Theology: Prolegomena has referred to early church materials. But in neither of
them the discussion are sufficient to meet the breadth ofwhat Canale's call for and in some
cases the insufficiency is almost synonymous with incoherency (see discussion of Canale
and Gulley above).
61
I have done some work on the issue of agents of contamination in the temple as
portrayed in portions of the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha and Dead Sea Scrolls. I am
continuing this research in comparison with Adventist understanding of such topic in my
doctoral studies at Andrews University. See my unpublished papers Barbosa, "Agents of
Contamination of the Temple in the Damascus Documents and the Community Rule:
Another Look at the Enemy in the Temple Figure of Daniel 7-8 and 2 Thessalonians 2"
(Hebrew University ofJerusalem, 2013 ). Barbosa, "Agents ofContamination ofthe Temple
in the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha" (Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2013).
 )
)

152 RODRIGO GALIZA A STUDY OF CANALE'S HISTORIOGRAPHY 153 )

)
importance of the law of God in the end times all appear in these sources, Rodrigo Galiza loves to teach things related to the Bible and the history of religion. H is
suggesting that they wer e not fully influenced by the timeless assumption of Greek special interest is in the relationship between Jewish and Christian beliefs and the )
philosophy.62 This is in agreement with Canale 's remarks that some Jewish sources developments of their religiou s ideas. He is currently working on his doctoral research
about agents of contamination of the Sanctuary in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Church )
in the early Christian period were not influenced by unbiblical assumptions such as
fathers at the SDATS (AU). He has a BA in Journalism and another in Theology from
the Greek timelessness. UNASP-EC (Centro Universitario Adventista de Sao Paulo), an MDiv from Andrews )
My hypothesis is that by investigating the literature of the Second Temple University, and spent one year as a visiting graduate student at the Hebrew University of
period and church father, scholars could fill the gaps in Canale's historiography and )
Jerusalem. He works for eteachergroup.com, an Israeli based company, teaching courses
support his major idea. The importance of this period for Canale's historiography in Jewish Backgrounds of Christianity and Biblical Geography since 2014. He is married to J
and theological criticism seems clear. This is the period of transition when Grazieli V. M artins de Galiza and they have one daughter, Hadassa, and are expecting their
Hellenism shaped the religion oflsrael, the canon of both the Hebrew Bible and the second child in May 201 6.
Christian Scriptures was formed, and Christianity originated. 63 Such issues are core
) ;
to Canale's theological framework (canon, inspiration, revelation, formation of
Christianity) and should not be taken for granted by just alluding to them through
secondary sources.
One possibility for future endeavors is to evaluate Canale's understanding of )
divine revelation in light of Second Temple literature. One way this could be done
is comparing chapters fifteen to seventeen of The Cognitive Principle, where
Canale describe his understanding ofa biblical worldview, with portions ofQumran
material to see if this Jewish source is closer to Canale's understanding ofa biblical
worldview than the church fathers.
So, what this study has demonstrated is that although Canale and the Adventist .)
movement call Christians back to the proper context of Scripture to fix the apostasy
that occurred in Christian history, only partial historical argumentation is given for
the apostasy and there is a lack of deeper engagement with the literature of the
formative period of Christianity. There is work to be done. It is time for us,
Adventists, who uphold a biblical understanding ofhistory and God's involvement
in it, to have a ready answer for everyone who asks about the reason for our hope
based on the period when the greatest revelation of God in history occurred, Jesus
Christ.

62
I am not affirming here that this literature had the same theological framework in the
details as do Adventists. For such claim to be made more work need to b e done. What I am
saying is that many similarities are perceptible between this Israelite literature close to the
formation of the NT and the Adventist literature. For a comparison of the Dead Sea Scro11s
and Pauline theology which also arrives at the same conclusion of a lack of Greek
philosophy, see Flusser, Judaism and the Origins ofChristianity (Jerusalem: M agnes Press,
1988).
63
The issue of formation of the Canon and textual criticism in relation to the idea of
God' s involvement in history is little discussed by Canale without any reference to the maj or
sources of the period. For example see how little is mentioned about it in his model of
Inspiration Canale, Th e Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology, 390- 41 9. See also
Gulley, Systematic Theology: Prolegomena, 31 6-325 who deals with the issue of Canon
formati on more directly than Canale, but neither satisfactorily in light of the system they
propose.

_)
j
)
)
) The Biblical Sanctuary Motif
) in Historical Perspective
)
) Denis Kaiser
) of the biblical sanctuary was generally conditioned by a Platonic-Aristotelian
) interpreted biblical sanctuary passages as metaphors. These theologies are steeped
Introduction
) Christianity's source text is undeniably the writings of the Old and New
) Testaments. These writings contain numerous genres ofliterature, including legal,
historical, wisdom, poetic, lyric, narrative, epistolary, prophetic, and apocalyptic
) literature. Surprisingly, the Bible fails to present us with a dogmatic or systematic
theological section, even though much of Christian theology was pursued in a
) dogmatic way. Not only does it lack systematic explanations of foundational
) beliefs, but the Bible also fails to utilize philosophical terminology to communicate
its presuppositions about being, metaphysics, ontology, and epistemology. Because
) of the lack of systematization, Christian thinkers began early on to try to fill the gap
) themselves, assuming the ontological and metaphysical presuppositions of Plato
and Aristotle and then explaining, interpreting, and systematizing biblical teachings
1
) through the glasses of these philosophical presuppositions. Of course, this
influenced the formulation ofChristian beliefs quite heavily. In particular, Fernando
) Canale, professor emeritus of theology and philosophy, suggests that these
) philosophical presuppositions "played a foundational hermeneutical role in the
theological interpretation" of the biblical teaching of a spatio-temporal sanctuary
) in heaven, destroying it almost b eyond recognition.2 He argues in favor of a
) deconstruction and reconstruction of Christian beliefs to rid them of unbiblical
presuppositions and to establish them on a truly biblical foundation.
) Considering the enormous theological and practical significance ofthe doctrine
of the heavenly sanctuary for Seventh-day Adventists, it is the aim of the present
chapter to summarize Canale's remarks on the philosophical conceptions
) concerning a heavenly sanctuary and outline the theological and exegetical ideas
of Christian thinkers on the sanctuary motif throughout Christian history to
) determine whether Canale's observations correspond with the primary sources.
These sections will be followed by a survey of studies of more recent Adventist
) vol. 10 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987), 285-287; Canale,
scholars and conclude with some reflections on the potential universal and personal
) relevance of the sanctuary doctrine. In the end it will be possible to determine
whether Canale's call for the development ofa theological system circled around
) the biblical sanctuary motif is valid and worthwhile. While a comprehensive and
1 Fernando L. Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method, Part 3: Outline and Limits
) 39; Fernando Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task ofAdventist Biblical and
of Scientific Methodology," Andrews University Seminary Studies 42, no. 1 (2004): 22, 23;
) Fernando L. Canale, "Deconstrocting Evangelical Theology?," Andrews University
Seminary Studies 44, no. 1 (2006): 108, 109, 115.
) 2 Fernando L. Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary,"
Andrews University Seminary Studies 36, no. 2 (1998): 187.
)
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 155
exhaustive study of these subtopics would be desirable, this chapter can only point
at a number of future research topics.
Canale on the Biblical Sanctuary Motif
Canale has argued that throughout the history of Christianity the interpretation
perception of reality. Classical, medieval, and modern theologies consistently
in the philosophical notions of divine perfection as an absolute state of
timelessness, immaterialness, and impassability, negating any divine involvement
in time, history, and space. Although biblical passages such as Exod 25:8 describe
the sanctuary as a place where God dwells among human beings, such a presence
of God in time and space is incompatible with the presuppositional framework of
theologians, especially as it pertains to the notion of God. Since these assumed
presuppositions resulted in metaphorical interpretations of the biblical sanctuary,
earthly and heavenly, Canale has called for a deconstruction of these philosophical
presuppositions and a reconstruction of the sanctuary doctrine and Christian
theology as a whole based on the biblical conception of God as being compatible
"with our space, time, and history."3
Yet the idea of a biblical ontology that stems from the sanctuary was not an
idea that originated with Canale; rather it stems from early Sabbatarian Adventist
theology. Canale has written a series of three articles in which he calls for the
development of complementary theological methodologies based on the
hermeneutical key of the sanctuary doctrine. 4 He emphasizes that early Sabbatarian
Adventists started from a herrneneutical premise that inherently carried a different
philosophical perspective than that which influenced the development of Christian
theology. Instead of the classical ontological view ofGod as a timeless, non-spatial
3
Ibid., 204, 205. To avoid an unconscious adoption ofthe above philosophical notions
Canale suggested (1) to deconstruct "the classical and modern interpretations of the God
principle" and (2) to select a new "starting point from which to think anew and formulate
a reconst!Uction of the God principle in harmony with the biblical text." He argued that
Scripture should be that starting point for the Christian interpretation of the God principle.
See Fernando L. Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as
Primordial Presuppositions, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series,
"Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 201,202. For a discussion ofhow
Canale articulates the biblical conception oftime see the chapter "Divine Divine Passibility,
Analogical Temporality, and Theo-Ontology: Implications of a Canonical Approach" by
John C. Peckham in this volume.
4
Fernando Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task ofAdventist Theology,
Part I: Historical Review," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 15, no. 2 (2004): 5-
Systematic Theologies Part II," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 16, 1-2 (2005):
114-142; Fernando Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist
Theology, Part III: Sanctuary and Hermeneutics," Journal of the Adventist Theological
Society 17, no. 2 (2006): 36-80.

156 DENIS KAISER
being, they adopted the view of a God who is analogically temporal, relates as such
within history, and operates within a literal-spatial heavenly sanctuary. This
ontological paradigm shift indicated that early Sabbatarian Adventists saw heaven
as a temporal-spatial p lace. Quoting Seventh-day Adventist co-founder and
prophetic voice Ellen G. White (nee Harmon; 1827- 1915),5 Canale states that this
belief was a "key that unlocked the mystery of the disappointment" and "opened to
view a complete system oftruth."6 This new hermeneutical vision gave the small
group ofSabbatarian Adventists unity, identity, and a sense of mission.
While later generations ofSeventh-day Adventists inherited this hermeneutical
vision encapsulated in the sanctuary doctrine, it does not seem that it was ever fully
developed, and soon the Lutheran notion of justification by faith became an
increasingly competing hermeneutical view. Eventually the Lutheran view replaced
the former view as Adventism's new hermeneutical vision, and the sanctuary
doctrine was relegated to being just another doctrine among others. 7 A striking
example ofthe adoption ofthe Lutheran soteriological view replacing the sanctuary
as hermeneutical vision came with Desmond Ford in the late 1970s. Ford equated
the Day of Atonement with Calvary because he felt that the sanctuary doctrine was
incompatible with his view of justification by faith. Canale notes three different
responses within Seventh-day Adventism to the challenges posed by Ford: (1)
Evangelical Adventists either radically reinterpreted the sanctuary doctrine or
entirely abandoned Adventism because, like Ford, they felt the sanctuary doctrine
was incompatible with the Protestant soteriological view. (2) Historical Adventists
affirmed the sanctuary doctrine but interpreted it through the ontological vision of
Christ's fallen human nature and the believer's absolute sinless perfection before
the second coming. (3) Biblical Adventists held fast to the sanctuary doctrine and
pursued a number of exegetical studies on issues related to that doctrine, but they
continued to neglect the macrohermeneutical role of the sanctuary doctrine in
Seventh-day Adventist theology.8 Because the hermeneutical notion of the early
• For biographies on Ellen G. White see, e.g., Arthur L. White, Ellen G. White, 6 vols.
(Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 1981-1986); Jerry Moon and Denis Kaiser, "For
Jesus and Scripture: The Life ofEllen G. White," in The Ellen G. White Encyclopedia, eds.
Denis Fortin and Jerry Moon (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2013), I 8-95; Terrie
Dopp Aamodt, Gary Land, and Ronald L. Numbers, eds., Ellen Hannon White: American
Prophet (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
6
See Ellen G. White, The Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan: The Conflict
ofthe Ages in the Christian Dispensation (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 191 1),
423.
7 10
Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology, Part I,"
12-17; Fernando L. Canale, "The Eclipse of Scripture and the Protestantization of the
Adventist Mind, Part 1: The Assumed Compatibility of Adventism with Evangelical
Theology and Ministerial Practices," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 21, 1-2
(2010): 155-160.
8
Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology, Part I,"
17-37; Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task ofAdventist Theology, Part III,"
58, 62, 79.
)
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY Morn, IN HISTORJCAL PERSPECTIVE 157 )
t )
I Seventh-day Adventists was never developed philosophically, and because the Ford
crisis began due to the lack of exploration of the ontology of the sanctuary,
Seventh-day Adventists have never reestablished the sanctuary doctrine as a
hermeneutical vision which opens to view a complete system of theology.
1)
' )
Exposing the current lack of an integrated system of Adventist beliefs, Canale ' )
emphasizes the need to move beyond reaffirmations ofthe so/a Scriptura principle,
the sanctuary doctrine, and other Seventh-day Adventist pillars and progress instead i )
to their application as a hermeneutical vision in order to discover a complete,
harmonious, interconnected, and relevant system of theology and truth. Finding
deficiencies with the current theological disciplines, he suggests new approaches )
to these disciplines to allow for a proper expression of the sanctuary doctrine as a
hermeneutical vision of such a system. He suggests that by avoiding historical-
critical presuppositions and through ongoing research, exegetical theology has been
able to put the sanctuary doctrine on solid biblical ground, yet it has failed to
J provide room for a consistent application of the sanctuary doctrine as a
hermeneutical vision for a complete system of theology. Canale argues that by
)
implicitly assuming that the exegetical approach is the only valid way of studying
Scripture, exegetical theology may have contributed to the forgetting and replacing
of the sanctuary as Adventism's hermeneutical vision. Similarly, while biblical
theology has processed, understood, and connected the biblical data of the
sanctuary doctrine to the rest of the biblical material through passages about God,
it may also have contributed to the forgetting-replacing process, because theology
within Seventh-day Adventism developed primarily as biblical theology. Canale
I concludes that systematic theology would naturally be the discipline best suited for
the development of an overall system of theology and truth, given that it aims to
l understand nature, reality, and life as they relate to God following the ontological
evidences and connections present in Scripture. He observes, however, that
Seventh-day Adventists are not known for having developed a systematic
interconnected system of theological beliefs. Thus, he emphasizes the need for
I complementary disciplinary methodologies to join in the discovery ofbiblical truth
in order to allow for a proper expression of the sanctuary doctrine as a
hermeneutical vision ofa complete system oftheology. 9
l
The Sanctuary in Christian History
In his 1998 article "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary,"
Canale has surveyed how Platonic and/or Aristotelian philosophical presuppositions
influenced Philo of Alexandria (20 B.C.-A.D. 50), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274),
and John Calvin (1509-1564) in terms ofhow they "dealt with the biblical sanctuary
motif" The present section will concentrate on how a number of early Christian,
medieval, reformation, and post-reformation writers perceived both the earthly
Israelite tabernacle and the heavenly sanctuary. Whereas the idea of a tangible
)
9
Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist Biblical and )
Systematic Theologies Part II," 118, 120, 126-133, 137-142.
'° Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 188-195. J
.)
_)
)
)
)
158 DENIS KAISER
)
) sanctuary in a temporal-spatial heaven was almost absent throughout the Christian
era, the biblical sanctuary motif was interpreted in a number of ways.
) Augustine stressed that Christ is the one main theme of Scripture and that the entire
Ancient Christianity
) its spiritual or figurative meaning (reality), he tried to get to the expression ofdivine
Most early Christian writers discerned a correlation between the earthly
) tabernacle and the true tabernacle, yet they generally considered the church to be
the true tabernacle. They still maintained the idea of Christ as the heavenly high
>. priest but they generally focused on spiritual activities and localities on earth.
) Because they assumed that Plato's metaphysical conceptions were based on Moses,
the prophets, and the ancient Hebrews, early Christian writers considered their
'
) adoption ofPlato's ideas and presuppositions suitable. 11 And because the ecclesia,
that is, the believers, were viewed as the sanctuary, the Church Fathers identified
) Heavenly Realms/Mysteries: Some early Christian writers explicitly linked the
the soul of each believer as the Most Holy Place.
) Origen (c. 185-254) was probably one ofthe most prolific and influential early
Christian theologians. Strongly influenced by Platonic philosophy and the works
) of Philo and Clement of Alexandria (150-215), he aimed at getting beyond the
) literal or plain meaning of a given biblical passage to its hidden spiritual meaning
by use of the allegorical method of interpretation. It was specifically through the
) commentaries of Jerome (347-420), "which relied heavily on Origen's
commentaries," that the allegorical interpretation became the standard method of
) correlation between the Levitical priesthood and Christ's high-priestly ministry, he
interpreting the Bible well into the Middle Ages. While Origen did not necessarily
) ignore the historical and literal nature ofthe text (as is evident from his attempts to
interpret biblical passages verse by verse, to place the biblical books in their
)
historical context, and to analyze their themes), he often employed the allegorical
method by linking OT and NT passages "on the basis of christological and
typological connections already established in the New Testament or already
) familiar from Christian tradition and early Christian writings." 12 His rather
structured application of the allegorical method of interpreting Scripture is evident
)
from his consistent interpretation of the "temple" as a symbol of the church as
) Christ's body. 13
In his understanding of Scripture, Augustine (354-430) was influenced by
)
Ambrose (337-397), who "utilized the techniques and interpretive traditions of
) Philo, Origen, and the Alexandrian school," and by Jerome, "whose commentaries
) 16
11 See, e.g., Justin, I Apo!. lix; Pseudo-Justin, Graec. ver. rel., xiv, xxv, xxvi, xxxiii;
Clement ofAlexandria, Protr. vi.68.1-71.1. Origen, e.g., argued that Plato borrowed his idea
) Church" (Term paper, Andrews University, 1971), 8.
of heaven from the writings of the OT. See Cels. xix.
) 12
Alan J. Hauser and Duane F. Watson, "Introduction and Overview," in A History of
Biblical Interpretation: The Ancient Period, eds. Alan J. Hauser and Duane F. Watson
) (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 1:45, 46. See Frances Young, "Alexandrian and
Antiochene Exegesis," in A History ofBiblical Interpretation: The Ancient Period, eds. Alan
) J. Hauser and Duane F. Watson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 1:335-338; Dennis
Brown, "Jerome and the Vulgate," in A History of Biblical Interpretation: The Ancient
) 19
Period, eds. Alan J. Hauser and Duane F. Watson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003),
) 1:365, 371.
13
Hauser and Watson, "Introduction and Overview," 1:46.
)
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 159
he read and who supplied him with Latin translations of Origen' s commentaries. " 14
To refute the Manichean assertion of the dichotomy between the two testaments,
OT foreshadowed the NT. Distinguishing between the letter of the text (sign) and
thoughts regarding morals and the truth of the church found throughout the words
of Scripture. Being aware ofthe multiple interpretations Christian interpreters drew
from the same biblical texts, he argued that there are many valid readings of
Scripture. 15 Given the influence ofAugustine's views on later theologians, it should
not surprise us that several different interpretations of the heavenly sanctuary
appear next to each other in the writings oftheologians after him. A number of such
interpretations are described below.
sanctuary to the heavenly realms, yet it should be noted that most of these
statements remain somewhat ambiguous and that the same writers often interpret
the biblical sanctuary motif in different ways, as will be seen further below.
McClay inferred from Athanasius' (296-373) quote from Heb 9:23 that he had a
deep understanding of the significance of the heavenly sanctuary and its services, 16
yet it should be noted that Athanasius does not provide any further explanation as
to why he was quoting the passage. Although Athanasius saw a type-antitype
remained ambiguous regarding the nature of the heavenly sanctuary when he stated
that the "service performed in the Tabernacle was a type of the heavenly
mysteries." 17 Interestingly, he)11entioned Christ's high-priestly ministry frequently
in the context of his sacrifice at the cross. 18 Ephrem the Syrian (c. 306-373)
suggested on the other hand that the tabernacle and its services were "symbolic
shadows of this heavenly ministry." 19 That this was not his only interpretation of
the sanctuary motifwill be seen below. Gregory ofNazianzus (330-390) argued that
14
Ibid., 1:48, 49. See Richard A. Norris, Jr., "Augustine and the Close of the Ancient
Period oflnterpretation," in A History ofBiblical Interpretation: The Ancient Period, eds.
Alan J. Hauser and Duane F. Watson (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 1:383, 384,386.
15
Hauser and Watson, "Introduction and Overview," 1:49, 50; Norris, "Augustine and
the Close of the Ancient Period oflnterpretation," 1:389-399, 403-405.
Bruce Edward McClay, "The High Priesthood, Mediation, and Intercession ofChrist,
and the Heavenly Sanctuary in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Early Christian
17
Athanasius, C. Ar. ii.8. See McClay, "The High Priesthood, Mediation, and
Intercession of Christ, and the Heavenly Sanctuary in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
of the Early Christian Church," 6, 9.
18
Athanasius, C. Ar. ii.8; McClay, ''The High Priesthood, Mediation, and Intercession
of Christ, and the Heavenly Sanctuary in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Early
Christian Church," 7.
Ephrem of Syria, Comm. Heb.; Erik M. Heen, Philip D. Krey, and Thomas C. Oden,
Hebrews, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, New Testament, vol. 10 (Downers
Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2005), 132.

160 DENIS KAISER
the earthly tabernacle symbolized the whole creation, things visible and invisible.
That being the case, he called for believers to p ass through the veil, in other words,
to move beyond the realm of sense in order to see the holy place, which is the
"intellectual and celestial creation." 20 Similarly, Theodoret of Cyrus (393-457)
defined the "tent" as heaven created by Jesus but also as the place where Jesus
ministers as man, suggesting the possibility of a human being living in the heavenly
realms. 21 On the other hand, he also suggested that the tabernacle symbolizes the
entire cosmos, with the Holy Place representing "the way oflife on earth" and the
Most Holy Place signifying the " life in h eaven." Accordingly, the veil which
separated the Holy from the Most Holy Place was a symbol of the firmament. 22
The Church: A number of early Christian writers interpreted the earthly
tabernacle as an imitation and representation ofthe coming ecclesia. T hus, although
Ephrem the Syrian stressed the similarities between the earthly and the h eavenly
tabernacles, one should notice that he emphasized how the transient and temporal
earthly tabernacle pointed to the church, "the perfect prototype which lasts
forever." 23 He suggested that "all those ancient religious institutions were shadows
and symbols of this institution of the church, which is established in its spirituality
and divinity before him," implying that this was the pattern that Moses had been
shown and ordered to build (Exod 25 :9). 24 Whereas the previous statement suggests
a clear conception of how the biblical passages on the sanctuary were to b e
understood, he aclmowledged elsewhere that the meaning of the san ctuary
symbolism was unclear, saying that "the sanctuary in the very tabernacle of truth"
may be located either in the kingdom of heaven or in this world where Christ
ministered to his disciples during his earthly life.25
Spiritual Activities: Other writers extended the spiritual interpretation of
biblical passages on the heavenly sanctuary to all kinds ofreligious and spiritual
activities on earth. Thus, while Origen aclmowledged that the tabernacle could be
seen as representative of the whole world, he also suggested that every "individual
can have an image of the world in [himself]." He argued tha t every person is able
to "fulfill the form of the sanctuary in [himself]" and each soul can "act the part of
20
Gregory ofNazianzus, Theo!. 2.3 I ; John Baillie, John T. McNeill, and Van Dusen,
Henry P., eds., The Library of Christian Classics, 26 vols. (London: SCM, 1953-1966),
3: 158; Heen, Krey and Oden, Hebrews, 132.
21
Theodoret of Cyrus, Comm. Heb. 8; Jacques Paul Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus
completus: Series graeca, 166 vols. (Paris: Migne, 1857-1886), 82:736; Heen, Krey and
Oden, Hebrews, 12 1.
22
Theodoret of Cyrus, Comm. H eb. 9; Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus, 82:737-
740; Heen, Krey and Oden, Hebrews, 132.
23
Ephrem of Syria, Comm. Exod. 25. 1. See Roy J. Deferrari, ed., Fathers of the
Church: A New Translation (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University ofAmerica Press, I 947-
201 3), 91:261; Joseph T. Lienhard, Ronnie J. Rombs, and Thomas C. Oden, Exodus,
Leviticus, Numbers, Deuteronomy, Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture, Old
Testament, vol. 3 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001), 122.
24
Ephrem of Syria, Comm. H eb. ; Heen, Krey and Oden, H ebrews, 123.
" Ephrem of Syria, Comm. Heb.; Heen, Krey and Oden, Hebrews, 12 1.
.)
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY M OTIF IN H ISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 161 )
)
[a) priest."26 Eusebius' (263-339) understanding was similar to Origen's view, for
he suggested that the believers are the "greatest and truly holy sanctuary" and that )
the soul of a person is the "holy ofholies. " 27 While he stated that Christ is "the great
High Priest ofthe universe" who presents the incense and sacrifices of the believers
before the Father in Heaven, he also suggested that the bishops were performing
priestly functions here on earth.28 John Chrysostom (c. 347-407) interpreted the
"heavenly things" ofHeb 8:5 as spiritual things performed on earth. Consequently )
baptisms, hymns, the altar, the sacrifice, the rites, and the church became heayenly )
things when believers employed their will and thinking to connect their soul with
Heaven. 29 John Cassian (360-435) began by interpreting every item in the Most )
Holy Place in a spiritual manner. Thus the soul was to become the Ark of the
Covenant in which the two tablets of stone were laid; these tablets he interpreted
as the "perpetual strength of the two Testaments." The golden urn, the "pure and
unstained memory," contained the manna which symbolized the "eternal, heavenly
sweetness of spiritual meanings." Aaron's rod was "the saving standard of our )
exalted and true high priest, Jesus Christ." Consequently, Cassian argued, the soul
of a person not only becomes the Ark of the Covenant, it will also be "carried
forward into a priestly realm."30
)
The Medieval Church
Medieval writers continued to assume the philosophical foundations of )
Platonism and to apply the allegorical method of interpreting Scripture. Some
writers went to great lengths to interpret almost every minute detail of the ancient j
Jewish tabernacle and its rites, whereas others (such as Anselm of Canterbury) had
nothing to say concerning the sanctuary or Christ's high priestly ministry. It was
especially in the writings of Thomas Aquinas tha t the heavenly sanctuary service )
was replaced by the sacraments and activities ofhuman priests. Thus O'Collins and
Jones suggest that it is in his writings that "Christ and his sacraments form a bridge
between human activity and God. In particular, the Eucharist becomes the )
26
Origen, Hom. Exod. 9.4; Heen, Krey and Oden, Hebrews, 132, 133; Origen,Homilies
on Genesis and Exodus, transl. by Ronald E. Heine, The Fathers of the Church: A New
Translation, vol. 71 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University ofAmerica Press, 1982), 340-
343.
27
Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History: Books 6-10, Transl. by Roy J.
Deferrari, 64 vols., The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation, vol. 29 (New York:
Fathers of the Church, 1955), 25 1. See McClay, "The High Priesthood, Mediation, and J
Intercession of Christ, and the Heavenly Sanctuary in the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
of the Early Christian Church," 4, 5.
28
.J
Eusebius of Caesarea, Ecclesiastical History, 266, 267. See McClay, "The High
Priesthood, Mediation, and Intercession ofChrist, and the Heavenly Sanctuary in the Nicene
and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Early Christian Church," 4, 5. )
29
John Chrysostom, Hom. Heb. 14.3; John Chrysostom,Hom. Heb. 16.7- 10.
30
John Cassian, Coll. dee. quart. 10; John Cassian, Conferences, transl. by Colm )
Luibheid, Classics ofWestern Spirituality (New York: Pauli st Press, 1985), I 64; Heen, Krey
and Oden, Hebrews, 133.
)
)
}
)
)
DENIS KAISER THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 163
) 162
two compartments of the OT tabernacle. He argued that since the OT was a figure
) sacramental means of entry into the offering and fruits of Christ's priestly
of the NT and the NT "a figure of the heavenly fatherland," the OT was signified
sacrifice."31 It was during this time that the sacraments received increasing
) significance as the means of grace. by the Holy Place and the NT by the Most Holy Place. Similarly, Aquinas
Writing around the early 7th century, Oecumenius suggested that the mercy suggested that the Holy Place referred to "the present church" and the Most Holy
) Place to the heavenly glory. 37 This last aspect seems to reflect the writings of a
seat signified Christ. Assuming that the altar of incense actually stood in the Most
) Holy Place of the OT tabernacle (Heb 9:3, 4), he concluded that the high priest number of early Christian writers who suggested that the earthly sanctuary
went into the Most Holy Place twice a day to bum incense (Exod 30:7, 8). This idea prefigured the church. Aquinas was especially concerned with the bridge that
) Christ's priesthood and the sacraments formed between God and human activity.38
conflicted, of course, with the biblical statement that the high priest entered the
) Most Holy Place only once a year (Heb 9:7; Exod 30:10). In order to solve this In the same vein, Aquinas argued that the sacraments, particularly the Eucharist, not
conflict Oecumenius argued that the high priest went into the Most Holy Place only only signify grace but actually "cause grace." Although God was still the principal
once a year with blood; at other times he entered it with the offering of incense.
32 cause of grace, it was the sacraments which were the "instrumental cause."39
Bede (672-735) interpreted all items in the Most Holy Place as symbolic of Consequently, the sacraments, the channel of divine grace, could only be received
) through the church by the administration of the priests. It may be argued, therefore,
Christ. Thus he argued that the golden urn signified Christ's soul, the budding rod
) the invincible power of Christ's priesthood, and the tablets of the law "all that the church and the sacraments replaced the Holy Spirit in the medieval
33
knowledge of the Father's secrets and all power ofjudgment ... in Christ." At the understanding as the true channel of divine grace.40 A perusal of Anthony C.
) same time, Bede followed John Cassian's line of thought by also applying these Thiselton's extensive work on the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in Christian history
seems to lend support to that conclusion since it leads to the astounding realization
) items to the personal spirituality of a believer. Thus the ark signified the holy
that, except for a few mystic works on the Holy Spirit, the salvific work ofthe Holy
church, with the incorruptible wood of the ark being a figure of holy souls. The
) different items were reminders ofthe continual meditation on God's law (tables of Spirit seems to be almost nonexistent in medieval writings. 41 Thus the church on ·
stone), the guarantee of Christ's incarnation (golden um), and a sharing in his earth, with its priests, sacraments, and the Mass, superseded the heavenly sanctuary -
) and its services in every possible way.
kingship and priesthood (Aaron's rod). As the cherubim were set over the mercy
) seat, so the city of God-that is, the holy church- was built upon a mountain which
is Christ himself.34 Suggesting that the author of Hebrews used the allegorical Reformation and Post-Reformation Times
) Although the Reformation brought about a new understanding of the role and
method in his explanations, Bede interpreted the veil between the two holy places
of the tabernacle as heaven. As true priests of God and Christ, the saints may importance of Scripture, ofjustification by grace through faith, and of the function
)
"ceaselessly atone for the daily errors oftheir frailty ... through the daily sacrifices of the sacraments and Mass, it failed to remove the philosophical foundations and
) of good works and the daily libations of their own tears."35 Likewise, about two presuppositions of Platonism that had influenced Christian theology and practice
hundred years later, Arethas ofCaesarea (c. 850-944) stated that the heavens are for more than a millennium. It is nevertheless interesting to see the parallels and
) differences between the Protestant Reformers and later Protestant writers such as
"the tent," yet he added that Christ's body was "the true tent."36
) Commenting on Heb 9:2-3, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), best known for his
j
Summa Theologica, suggested two interpretations for the distinction between the
37
Thomas Aquinas, Com. Heb. 418 on Heb 9:1-5.
38
j 31Gerald O'Collins and Michael Keenan Jones, Jesus Our Priest: A Christian O'Collins and Jones, Jesus Our Priest, 108.
39
Approach to the Priesthood of Christ (New York: Oxford University Press, 20 I 0), I 08. Paul J. Landa, "Medieval Perspectives on the Atonement: A Survey from Anselm of
j Canterbury to Thomas Aquinas," in The Sanctuary and the Atonement: Biblical,
" Oecumenius, Fr. Heb. 9.5-7; Karl Staab, ed., Pauluskommentare aus der
griechischen Kirche, 2nd ed. (Munster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1984), 15:465; Heen, Krey and Theological, and Historical Studies, eds. Arnold V. Wallenkampf, W. Richard Lesher, and
) FrankB. Holbrook, abridged ed. (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 283.
Oden, Hebrews, 135. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae iii.62.1.
) 33 Bede, Tab. 1.4.17; Bede, Bede: On the Tabernacle, ed. Arthur G. Holder, I st ed.,
40
Alan Strange, "Inerrancy, Charles Hodge and the Spirituality of the Church," Paper
Translated Texts for Historians, vol. 18 (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1994), 16;
) presented at the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, Baltimore, Md.,
Reen, Krey and Oden, Hebrews, 134.
34 Bede, Tab. 1.5.20-21 ; Bede, Bede: On the Tabernacle, I 8:20, 21; Reen, Krey and November 20, 2013.
41
) See Anthony C. Thiselton, The Holy Spirit: In Biblical Teaching, Through the
Oden, Hebrews, 134.
35 Bede, Tab. 2.7.71; Bede, Bede: On the Tabernacle, 18:79; Heen, Krey and Oden, Centuries, and Today (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013), 222-254. There are about 160
) pages covering the biblical writings, sixty pages the period from 100 to 550 AD, and about
Hebrews, 135.
210 pages the period from 1520 to 2000 AD, yet there are only about thirty that deal with
) 36 Arethas of Caesarea, Fr. Heb. 8.2; Reen, Krey and Oden, Hebrews, 121; Staab,
the time between 550 and 1520 AD.
Pauluskommentare aus der griechischen Kirche, 15 :661.
)
)

164 DENIS KAISER
the Puritans on one hand and early Christian and medieval writers on the other
hand.
Martin Luther (1483-1546) was aware of three interpretations of the OT
tabernacle. Since his primary statements on the biblical sanctuary stem from his
lectures on the Epistles to the Hebrews given between April 1517 and March
1518, 42 it is probably somewhat anachronistic to place them in the Reformation
period. The first view Luther treated was reminiscent of the view advocated by
Theodoret of Cyrus, suggesting that the tabernacle prefigured the entire universe,
with the Most Holy Place representing the celestial and invisible world, the Holy
Place symbolizing the visible world, and the veil referring to the starry sky. Yet,
Luther disagreed with that view because he thought it was "somewhat forced" and
did "violence to the text." The second view understood the tabernacle
"tropologically," suggesting it referred to the world in "man himself."
Demon strating some similarities to the views ofseveral early Christian writers, this
view proposed that the Most Holy Place pointed to the "higher part of reason
(which] dwells among the things that are invisible and b elong to God" (the
intellect), whereas the Holy Place referred to "the lower reason which . . . is
illumined by the light ofnatural reason" (reason). Luther failed to comment on this
second view, yet since he quickly turned to the third view and continued to
elaborate on the sanctuary based on that third approach, it may be assumed that he
favored the last view. According to that final view, the apostolic writer ofHebrews
was referring to "a kind of spiritual world" or "the holy church of God." Moving
through salvation history, Luther argued that the court of the temple referred to the
synagogue; his reasoning was that the synagogue depended on the five books of
Moses, which corresponded to the height of the court (five cubits). Holy Place was
then pointing to the "church militant" and the Most Holy Place to the "church
triumphant." The different pieces of furniture in the tabe rnacle were equated with
different aspects of the spiritual life of the church, the believer, and Christ's nature
and acts of salvation.43 While it would seem that Luther la ter took a biblical
approach, as seen in his opposition to invoking the saints and his emphasis on
Christ as "High Priest, Advocate, Mediator, Reconciler, and Comforter" who
"appeared in the presence of God in our behalf' to intercede for us,44 it is clear that
42
Jaroslav Pelikan, "Introduction to Volume 29," in Lectures on Titus, Phi/emon, and
Hebrews, vol. 29, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Walter A. Hansen (St. Louis, MO: Concordia
Pub. House, 1968), xii.
43
Martin Luther, Lectures on Titus, Philemon, and Hebrews, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and
Walter A. Hansen, Luther's Works, vol. 29 (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Pub. House, 1968),
199,200, cf. 200-211.
•• V. Norskov Olsen, "The Atonement in Protestant Reformation Thought," in The
Sanctuary and the Atonement: Biblical, Theological, and Historical Studies, eds. Arnold V.
Wa!lenkampf, W. Richard Lesher, andFrankB. Holbrook, abridged ed. (Silver Spring, Md.:
Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 287-289; O'Collins and Jones, Jesus Our Priest, 128-148.
)
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 165 )
)
Luther nevertheless continued to assume a timeless interpretation of the divine
realm. 45 )
John Calvin ( 15 09-15 64) argued that "the greater and more perfect tabernacle"
in Heb 9: 11 refers to "the body of Christ" because it was through the sacrifice of )
his own body that Christ was able to enter the glories of heaven. The Day of )
l Atonement, which occurred once a year, prefigured the "unique sacrifice ofChrist"
on the cross. While the high priest was allowed to enter the Most Holy Place only
one day a year, Christ's entry into heaven is "for ever to the end of the world"
)
I because his sacrifice is valid for ever and needs no repetition. 46 Although Calvin
sometimes stated that Christ "entered the heavenly sanctuary" to appear in the )
l Father's presence for us, 47 it does not seem that he envisioned a tangible physical
sanctuary in heaven but rather merely employed biblical phraseology to convey the
idea that Christ is interceding for us before the Father by virtue ofhis own sacrifice.
I Calvin emphasized that the high priestly ministry of Christ is "untransferable"
because that ministry includes both his death, which "appeased',48 God, and his
continuing intercession before the Father. Thus his death and intercession are the
)
two parts of Christ's priesthood. 49 Consequently, Calvin rejected the "Roman
Catholic understanding and practice of the ordained priesthood and its connection
with Christ's priesthood" as well as the practice of "ministerial priests taking it
upon themselves to offer the daily sacrifice of the Mass."50
In his book The English Connection: The Puritan Roots of Seventh-day )
Adventist Belief(l 98 1), Bryan W. Ball outlines the thoughts ofseveral 17th-century
Puritan writers on Christ's high priestly ministry in heaven.51 While these writers )
emphasized his intercessory ministry, they rarely dwelt on the nature of the
heavenly sanctuary and usually failed to recognize a corresponding typology
between the earthly and the heavenly sanctuaries. Ball claims that some Puritan
writers advocated the view of a two-apartment heavenly sanctuary, though closer
examination shows that they might not have held such a view after all.
45
Denis Kaiser, '"He spake and it was done': Luther's Creation Theology in His 1535
Lectures on Gen I: 1-2:4," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 24, no. 2 (2013):
120, 121.
46
John Calvin, The Epistle ofPaul the Apostle to the Hebrews and the First and Second
Epistle ofSt. Peter, transl. by William B. Johnston, eds. David W. Torrance and Thomas F.
Torrance, Calvin's Commenta ries, vol. 12 (Edinburgh and London: Oliver and Boyd, 1963),
105, 119, 120, 128, 129.
47
Olsen, "The Atonement in Protestant Reformation Thought," 291-293.
48
The idea ofChrist who, through his death, had to "appease the anger of God" appears
in Calvin's commentary on H ebrews. See Calvin, The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the
Hebrews and the First and Second Epistle ofSt. Peter, 33, 59. This aspect is discussed by
l O'Collins and Jones, Jesus Our Priest, 152, 153.
49
50
Olsen, "The Atonement in Protestant Reformation Thought," 293, 294.
O'Collins and Jones, J esus Our Priest, 153-156, 162.
" Bryan W. Ball, The English Connection: The Puritan Roots ofSeventh-day Adventist
)
I Belie/(Cambridge: James Clarke, 1981), 102- 119.
l . )
)
)
)
166 DENIS KAISER THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 167
)
of his Church." However, he said, our sacrifices can only be acceptable to God if
) One of the writers Ball covers is William Perkins (1558-1602) who concluded
accompanied by the merits of Christ' s death.59
that the OT sacrificial services clearly prefigured the substitutionary death of
) Christ. 52 Speaking ofChrist's high priestly ministry in heaven, he stated that Christ, Ball refers to the Puritan writer George Lawson (1598-1678) as another clear
as our priest, pleaded with the Father to accept his sacrifice after his ascension.
53 example of someone who advocated the two-apartment heavenly sanctuary idea.60
) However, the context of Lawson's seemingly plain statements suggests once again
"The workes of Christs priesthood which follow his death, serve not to make any
) satisfaction to God's justice for sinne, but only to confirme or apply it," Perkins that when Lawson talked about the "heavenly sanctuary" and the "better
argued.54 In his attempt to explain the significance of the high priestly breastplate tabernacle," he was employing biblical phraseology but interpreting the relevant
) passages in line with traditional conceptions of the nature of the heavenly
of judgment (Exod 28:22-25; Songs 8:6) Perkins suggested that "Christ our high
priest being now in his sanctuary in heaven, hath in memory all the Elect, and their sanctuary. Lawson objected to two views which saw the tabernacle as a symbol of
)
very names are written as it were in tables of gold before his face; and he hath an either (1) "the Church both Militant and Triumphant, and especially the
) especiall love unto them and care over them."55 Whereas Ball understands this Triumphant, because of Christ's bodily presence there," or (2) "the Body of Christ,
statement as a clear affirmation ofthe Puritan beliefin a heavenly sanctuary56, other wherein the Schekina, or the divine Glory and Majesty, fixed it's habitation."61 In
j his view, the typical tabernacle on earth signified the antitypical sanctuary, yet it
remarks by Perkins sound a note of caution. For example, Perkins elsewhere stated
) that the rending of the inner veil in the earthly temple "figureth unto us that by the should be noted that Lawson considered the Holy Place of the earthly tabernacle as
death of Christ" the way is open to heaven because "the holy ofholies signified the a figure of the body ofbelievers (the church) here on earth, who serve God and pray
) third heaven, where God sheweth himself in glory and majesty unto his Saints." to him after being converted, sanctified, and made priests. The Most Holy Place he
regarded as "a type of heaven" where Jesus as the high priest entered once to
) Here, Perkins suggested that the typology between the earthly and the heavenly
perform a more excellent ministry. 62 Thus it could be argued that Lawson
sanctuaries is not a typology of correspondence but ofantithesis (heaven is the Holy
) of Holies). 57 Considering the link between the OT priesthood and Christ's new interpreted the OT tabernacle as a type of the whole cosmos ( earth-heaven),
covenant priesthood as it is described in Scripture, Perkins argued that the Roman although he saw the Holy Place as only including the spiritual realm of the earth.
j Interestingly, when Canale refers to Ball's conclusions, he exercises caution
Catholic liturgy, Mass, sacraments, priesthood, and papacy actually bereave Christ
) of his nature and offices. Thus these elements were "instruments of Satan" and by using a variety of conditional phrases, such as, "if Ball's assessment of Puritan
"blasphemy" because they suggest that Christ's perfect and complete once-and-for- theology is correct," or "his study seems to irnply."63 Since Ball's interpretation of
J all sacrifice was imperfect and incomplete, and that self-appointed human priests the statements by the two clearest examples of Puritan advocates for a literal
were to sacrifice him repeatedly on a daily basis.58 He stressed the scriptural heavenly sanctuary building displays imprecision and misinterpretation, Canale has
)
teaching that "all Christians are priests," whose role is not to sacrifice Christ again, done well to be cautious. More in-depth analysis of the primary sources that Ball
) but "to offer up spiritual sacrifice[s]" in prayer (Mal. 1: 11; 1 Tim. 2:8) and to presents as Puritan precursors for the Adventist sanctuary doctrine are needed to
dedicate "our bodie and soules, our hearts and affections, the workes of our lives, determine what view the Puritans really held.
)
and the workes of our callings ... to the service of God for his glorie and the good
) Early Seventh-day Adventists
Seventh-day Adventists esteem the doctrine of Christ's numstry in the
j heavenly sanctuary as one of their official fundamental beliefs.64 Since a number
'
2
William Perkins, The Workes ofthat Famous and Worthy Minister of Christ in the
j Universitie of Cambridge, Mr. William Perkins, vol. 1 (London: John Legatt, 1626), 206,
,. Ibid., 219,221.
213,218,219. 60
Ball, The English Connection, 109, 110.
" Ibid., 218. 61
,. Ibid.,213. George Lawson, An Exposition of the Epistle to the Hebrewes Wherein the Text Is
) Cleared, Theopolitica Improved, the Socinian Comment Examined (London: George
'' Ibid., 218. Perkins's interpretation was usually rather literal and his "typological
exegesis was quite consistent with that employed by his Protestant contemporaries." Yet, Sawbridge, 1662), 135. Lawson mentioned the names of the two Reformed theologians
) Theodore Beza (1519-1605) and Franciscus Junius (I 545-1602) as the principal exponents
sometimes he also resorted to allegorical interpretations. For a general description of his
) interpretations see Erwin R. Gane, "The Exegetical Methods of Some Sixteenth-Century of the second view. See ibid., 135, 136.
62
Puritan Preachers: Hooper, Cartwright, and Perkins, Part II," Andrews University Seminary Ibid., 94, 95, 132-134, 136, 158, 162-164. He suggested that this view was held by
) Studies 19, no. 2 (1981): 101-104, 107-111.
most expositors.
63
56
Ball, The English Connection, 109. Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 199-200 fu. 63.
) 64
H. E. Rogers, ed., 1931 Yearbook of the Seventh-day Adventist Denomination
57
Perkins, The Workes ofthat Famous and Worthy Minister ofChrist in the Universitie
(Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 1931), 378, 379; Seventh-day Adventist Yearbook
) of Cambridge, Mr. William Perkins, 225.
58 2013 (Silver Spring, MD: Office of Archives, Statistics, and Research, General Conference
Ibid., 210, 218-220, 225.
)
)

168 DENIS KAISER
of scholars have already researched the historical development of the s anctuary
doctrine in the 19th century, 65 the present section will summarize these
developments only briefly.
The Millerites of the late 1830s and early 1840s placed much emphasis on the
p rophecies and the prophetic time periods of D aniel and Revelation, and the
cleansing of the sanctuary at the end of the 2,300 evening-mornings (Dan 8:14)
received particular attention in this context. Interpreting the "sanctuary" as both the
church and the earth, they classified the cleansing as a two-dimensional horizon tal
process. Accordingly, they believed that the church was cleansed spiritually and the
earth was cleansed by fire at the literal second coming of Christ.66 Even tually they
reached the conclusion that the 2,300 evening-mornings would conclude with
Christ 's return on October 22, 1844. When the expected event did not materialize
of Seventh-day Adventists, 2013), 9.
6
' See, e.g., Robert Haddock, "A History of the Doctrine of the Sanctuary in the Advent
Movement, 1800-1905" (B.Div. thesis, Andrews University, 1970); P. Gerard. Darnsteegt,
Foundations of the Seventh-day Adventist M essage and Mission (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1977); Robert W. Olson, One Hundred and One Questions on the Sanctuary and
on Ellen White (Washington, D.C.: Ellen G. White Estate, 1981); Paul A. Gordon, The
Sanctuary, I 844, and the Pioneers (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 1983); FrankB.
Holbrook, ed., Doctrine of the Sanctuary: A Historical Survey, Daniel and Revelation
Committee Series, vol. 5 (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1989); P. Gerard Damsteegt, "The Sanctuary and
Adventist Experience," Ministry, October 1994, 34-38; C. Mervyn Maxwell, Magnificent
Disappointment: What Really Happened in 1844 .. . and Its Meaning for Today (Boise,
Idaho: Pacific Press, 1994); Alberto Ronald Tirrun, The Sanctuary and the Three Angels•
Messages: Integrating Factors in the Development of Seventh-day Adventist Doctrines,
Adventist Theological Society Dissertation Series, vol. 5 (Berrien Springs, MI: Adventist
Theological Society Publications, 1995); Denis Fortin, "Ellen G. White's Understanding of
the Sanctuary and Hermeneutics," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 9, no. 1
(1998): 160-166; Merlin D. Burt, "The Historical Background, Interconnected Development
and Integration of the Doctrines of the Sanctuary, the Sabbath, and Ellen G. White's Role
in Sabbatarian Adventism from 1844 to 1849" (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University,
2002); Alberto R. Timm, "The Seventh-day Adventist Doctrine of the Sanctuary (1844-
2007): A Brief Historical Overview," in "For You Have Strengthened Me": Biblical and
Theological Studies in Honor ofGerhard Pfandl in Celebration ofHis Sixty-Fifth Birthday,
eds. Martin T. Probstle, Gerald A. Klingbeil, and Martin G. Klingbeil (St. Peter am Hart,
Austria: Seminar Schloss Bogenhofen, 2007), 33 1-345; Richard M. Davidson, "Sanctuary,
Doctrine of the," in The Ellen G. White Encyclopedia, eds. Denis Fortin and Jerry Moon
(Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2013), 1130-11 33.
66
William M iller, "Cleansing of the Sanctuary: A Letter from Wm. Miller," Signs of
the Times, 6 April 1842, 1; William Miller, Letter to Joshua V. Himes, on the Cleansing of
the Sanctuary (Boston: Joshua V. Himes, 1842), 3-9. P . Gerard Damsteegt stated that this
twofold interpretation was "the predominant view among the Millerites." See Damsteegt,
Foundations of the Seventh-day Adventist Message and Mission, 34. Differing only very
slightly from him, Alberto R. Timm pointed out that there were also some Millerite
interpreters who perceived the sanctuary ofDan 8: 14 as a symbol ofthe Promised Land. See
Timm, "The Seventh-day Adventist Doctrine of the Sanctuary (1 844-2007)," 332.
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTIJARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 169 )
)
on that date, a number of different solutions were proposed to explain the
disappointment. The majority of the Millerites maintained the basic horizontal )
interpretation of the sanctuary an d the cleansing, yet they calculated new d ates for
' )
the end ofthe 2,300 evening-mornings (Albany Adventists). The minority held fast
to the calculation of that time period but reinterpreted the expected event in one . )
form or another (Bridegroom Adventists). Most of these Bridegroom Adventists
"spiritualized away" 67 the expected coming of Christ, claiming that he had already )
returned on that date, albeit spiritually (Spiritualizers). Yet, there was also a small )
group of Bridegroom Adventists which interpreted the sanctuary as a heavenly
sanctuary, suggesting that at the end of the 2,300 evening-m ornin gs Christ did not )
return to the earth but rather entered the Most Holy Place of the heavenly sanctuary
)
for the first time to commence the Day of A tonement (Literalists). Thus, instead of
viewing the cleansing of the sanctuary as a horizontal process, they interpreted the )
cleansing as a two-dimensional vertical process (heavenly sanctuary and church). 68
A small group of Literalists led b y Franklin B. Hahn (1809-1866), H iram
Edson ( 1806- 1882), and 0. R. L. Crosier (1820-1912) had studied the questions
surrounding the sanctuary in Dan 8. It was p articularly Crosier's article "The Law
o f Moses," which was published in early February 184669, that caught the attention
of o ther Literalists. Although they did not accept every point in the article, they
agreed with much of it. 7° Crosier recognized that the OT sanctuary could be defiled J
in two ways. The first way was through God's designated mode for transferring sin )
from the r epentant sinner to the sanctuary (Num 5:6-8). A person confessed his s ins
over a sacrificial animal by placing his hands on the head of the animal and killing )
the animal. A p riest would sprinkle some of the blood before the inner veil, put
some ofit on the horns of the altar ofincense, and pour the rest at the bottom ofthe
67
Sabbatarian Adventists frequently used the phrase "spiritualize away'' to describe the
spiritualizing interpretations of the Spiritualizers. See Joseph Bates, The Opening Heavens:
Or a Connected View of the Testimony of the Prophets and Apostles, Concerning the }
Opening Heavens, Compared with A stronomical Observations, and of the Present and
Future Location ofthe New Jerusalem, the Paradise ofGod (New Bedford, MA: Benjamin
Lindsey, 1846), 28; James White, Life Sketches: Ancestry, Early Life, Christian Experience,
and Extensive Labors of Elder Jam es White, and His Wife Mrs. Ellen G. White (Battle
Creek, MI: Press of the Seventh-day Adventist Pub. Assn., 1880), 230; Ellen G. White,
Spiritual Gifts: My Christian Experience, Views, and Labors in Connection with the Rise
and Progress ofthe Third Angel's Message, vol. 2 (Battle Creek, MI: James White, 1860),
73. Cf. White, The Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan, 674,675.
68
Burt, "The Historical Background, Interconnected Development and Integration of
the Doctrines of the Sanctuary, the Sabbath, and Ellen G. White's Role in Sabbatarian
Adventism from 1844 to 1849," 60-272; Gordon, Th e Sanctuary, 1844, and the Pioneers,
12; Damsteegt, ''The Sanctuary and Adventist Experience," 35-4 1.
69
0. R. L. Crosier, "The Law ofMoses," Day-Star, Extra, 7 February 1846, 37-44.
0
' Sabbatarian Adventists disagreed with his interpretation of the tamfg'. in Dan 8: 11-13
)
and his "Age to Come" views. See Denis Kaiser, "Ellen White and the 'Daily' Conflict,"
Ellen White and Current Issues Symposium 6 (2010): 11-13; Denis Kaiser, "Guilt by
Association: Why Sabbatarian Adventists Rejected 0. R. L. Crosier 's Interpretation of the
Tamfd in Dan 8," Journal ofAsia Adventist Studies 16, no. 1 (2013): 33-49.
)
' )
)
)
_)
DENIS KAISER THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 171
) 170
these two doctrinal elements made the Sabbatarian Adventists realize that they were
) altar of burnt offering. The second way in which the sanctuary was defiled was
a prophetically foretold movement (Rev 12: 17).73
through apostate transgression. Crosier suggested that the heavenly sanctuary was
) defiled in like manner as the earthly. Specifically, confession of sin and acceptance It was through the study of the Bible that Sabbatarian Adventists came to
of the substitutionary sacrifice of Jesus on the cross transferred human sin to the believe that the heavenly sanctuary was a literal, objective reality located in the
) heavenly Jerusalem. This discovery was confirmed by the visions of Ellen G.
heavenly sanctuary, which was one avenue of defilement, but apostasy also defiled 74
) the heavenly sanctuary. Citing Dan 8:11- 14, 11:30-31, and other passages, Crosier White. While they therefore opposed all attempts to spiritualize the physical
suggested that the heavenly sanctuary had been polluted through Rome and apostate reality of Jesus, the Father, heaven, and the sanctuary, they also emphasized that
) "the sanctuary of the new covenant is not on earth, but in heaven."75 That discovery
Christianity when they ascribed divine titles and names to the pope, established a
constituted a hermeneutical and philosophical shift that set them apart from other
) counterfeit temple on earth, and claimed to forgive sins. According to Crosier, Heb
9: 11-12, 23-24 indicates that the "heavenly things" (heavenly sanctuary) had to be Millerite groups and religious denominations and had even more ramifications for
) purified like the "patterns" (earthly sanctuary), as typified in the cleansing on the other theological beliefs. This simple understanding would inevitably break with
Day of Atonement. Thus, while it was through the agency of Christ that the the conception of reality as timeless that had reigned in Christian theology for
sanctuary was defiled by the sins of the people, so it will also be cleansed by the centuries. Although Sabbatarian Adventists believed in the necessity of a truly
) "same agency" on the Day of Atonement. Meanwhile, the unrepentant and spiritual experience and the importance of spiritual gifts, from a philosophical
apostates have to bear their own sins and their names are blotted out ofthe book of perspective they were avowed materialists and opposed to any form of
) spiritualization. 76 They viewed heaven as a tangible spatial place where the saints
life.71
This small group ofLiteralists discovered several other biblical teachings, such will live in their resurrected material bodies. Thus they were not only opposed to
j spiritualizing interpretations of Scripture but also to the spiritualistic (i.e. demonic) -
as the seventh-day Sabbath and the end-time gift of prophecy, and they later
) became known as Sabbatarian Adventists. In the spring of 1847, these Sabbatarian manifestations that emerged in the early 1850s.77

) Adventists began linking the seventh-day Sabbath to the heavenly sanctuary.72 They
observed that Rev 11: 19 provides a look at the Ark of the Covenant in the Most 73
Uriah Smith, "The Relation Which the Sabbath Sustains to Other Points of Present
) Holy Place of the heavenly temple, something that is usually only seen by the high Truth," Review and Herald, 25 July 1854, 196; R. F. Cottrell, "The Sanctuary," Review and
priest on the Day ofAtonement. They further noted that following this introduction Herald, 15 December 1863. 21. Cf. John N. Andrews, "The Opening of the Temple in .
) to the eschatological part of the Book of Revelation were descriptions of a people Heaven," Review and Herald, 6 April 1869, 114.
74
) ''who keep the commandments of God" (Rev 12:17; 14:12). They concluded that Ellen G. Harmon, "Letter from Sister Harmon," Day-Star, 14 March 1846, 7, 8; Ellen
it was the looking into the inner sanctum of the heavenly temple that gave a new G. White to Leonard W. Hastings and Elvira Hastings, Milton, MA, 21 April 1849, Ellen
) emphasis to God's law. In fact, the discovery of the continued significance of the G. White Estate, Silver Spring, MD (Lt 5, 1849); White, Early Writings ofMrs. White, 32-
rather neglected fourth commandment, the seventh-day Sabbath, came after the 35, 42, 43, 54-66, 252,253.
)
t
75
Crosier, "The Law of Moses," 38; Damsteegt, "Among Sabbatarian Adventists
antitypical Day of Atonement commenced. Thus, not only did the sanctuary
(1845-1850)," 43, 44. See, e.g., Bates, The Opening Heavens; James White, "The Parable,
) message give more weight to the seventh-day Sabbath, but the connection between MatthewXXV,1-12," Review and Herald, 9 June 1851, IOI; James White, "Who May Hear
) the Truth?," Review and Herald, 17 February 1852, 94.
76
Thomas McE!wain, Adventism and Ellen White: A Phenomenon of Religious
) Materialism, Studies on Inter-Religious Relations, vol. 48 (Uppsala, Sweden: Swedish
Science Press, 2010), 25-53. While I appreciate McElwain's contribution to the view that
early Seventh-day Adventists were materialists, there are a number of other aspects of his
71
P. Gerard Darnsteegt, "Among Sabbatarian Adventists (I 845-1850)," in Daniel and study I disagree with. See Denis Kaiser, "[Book Review of] Adventism and Ellen White: A
) Phenomenon of Religious Materialism, by Thomas McE!wain," Andrews University
Revelation Committee Series, vol. 5, Doctrine of the Sanctuary: A Historical Survey, ed.
Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seminary Studies 51, no. I (2013): 132-136.
) 77
Before mid-1853, Sabbatarian Adventists used the term "spiritualism" and its
Seventh-day Adventists, 1989) 38-41. See Crosier, "The Law of Moses," 38-43; Hiram
j Edson, "An Appeal to the Laodicean Church," Advent Review, Extra, September 1850, 3. derivatives only in the sense of interpretations of biblical prophecies that "spiritualized
72 Joseph Bates, Second Advent Way Marks and High Heaps: Or a Connected View of away" their literal meaning, such as the reality and existence of a literal Jesus in a literal
) the Fulfillment ofProphecy, by God's Peculiar People, From the Year 1840 to 1847 (New heaven with a literal heavenly sanctuary, the literal second coming of Christ, etc. In mid-
Bedford, MA: Benjamin Lindsey, 1847); Ellen G. White, A Word to the Little Flock 1853, however, the term began to be used also in reference to the new reports of "spirit
) manifestations." Both forms of spiritualism deny materialism in the sense of the material
(Gorham, ME: James White, 1847), 18; Ellen G. White, Early Writings of Mrs. White:
reality of things. See Denis Kaiser, "The Origin of a Leading Doctrine: Conditionalism
) Experiences and Views, and Spiritual Gifts, Volume One (Battle Creek, MI: Review and
among Sabbatarian Adventists (1845-1860)," unpublished manuscript, Berrien Springs, MI,
Herald, 1882), 32-35.
)
)

-i
172 DENIS KAISER
Adventist historians Alberto R. Thrun and Merlin D. Burt have described the
important role that the sanctuary doctrine played in the integration of several
theological beliefs held by Sabbatarian Adventists.78 The sanctuary allowed the
integration of the seventh-day Sabbath, the third angel's message, and the sealing
into a coherent theological system.79 Increasingly, Sabbatarian Adventists
recognized that the sanctuary doctrine did not only unlock "the mystery of the
disappointment" but also "opened to view a complete system of truth."80 They
frequently depicted it as the great central doctrine that connected all their beliefs
into a coherent and harmonious system oftruth.81 Sabbatarian Adventists saw that
20 14, 13, 14. Interestingly, Dudley M. Canright (1840-1919), a Seventh-day Adventist
pastor who in the late 1880s turned into one of the most severe critics of Seventh-day
Adventists, argued that the judgment which takes place in the heavenly sanctuary suggested
the futility ofa belief in the immortality of the soul. It would not make any sense to send the
righteous already to heaven and the wicked to hell at death, and then after hundreds ofyears
call them back to heaven for a judgment. Were some taken accidently to heaven and others
falsely sent to hell? Did God make a mistake? The Bible, Canright suggested, taught that
God will not give the reward until the heavenly judgment comes to a close. Thus he
connected the doctrine ofthe heavenly sanctuary with the beliefin conditional immortality.
See Dudley M. Canright, "The Two Absurdities," Review and Herald, 19 January 1869, 27.
78
Timm, "The Seventh-day Adventist Doctrine of the Sanctuary (1844-2007)," 335-
337; Burt, ''The Historical Background, Interconnected Development and Integration ofthe
Doctrines of the Sanctuary, the Sabbath, and Ellen G. White's Role in Sabbatarian
Adventism from 1844 to 1849," 273-389.
19
Ibid., 402-404, 406-409.
'
0
Ellen G. White, The Spirit ofProphecy: The Great Controversy Between Christ and
Satan from the Destruction ofJerusalem to the End ofthe Controversy, vol. 4 (Battle Creek,
MI: Steam Press of the Seventh-day Adventist Pub. Assn., 1884), 268; Ellen G. White, The
Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan During the Christian Dispensation (Oakland,
CA: Pacific Press, 1888), 423; White, The Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan,
423. See also "The Twenty-three Hundred Days," Review and Herald, 18 April 1854, IO I;
R. F. Cottrell, "The Original Advent Faith," Review and Herald, 18 September 1855, 44;
"The Sanctuary," Review and Herald, I December 1863, 5; "A Friendly Word with the
Voice of the West," Review and Herald, 9 August 1864, 84; James White, Life Incidents,
in Connection With the Great Advent Movement, as Illustrated by the Three Angels of
Revelation XIV (Battle Creek, MI: Steam Press, Seventh-day Adventist Pub. Assn., 1868),
309, 308.
81
Cottrell, "The Sanctuary," 21; John N. Andrews, "The Sanctuary," Review and
Herald, 19 April 1864, 164; reprinted in John N. Andrews, "The Sanctuary," Review and
Herald, 18 June 1867, 12; White, Life Incidents, in Connection With the Great Advent
Movement, as Illustrated by the Three Angels ofRevelation XIV, 309,308; Uriah Smith, The
Sanctuary and the Twenty-three Hundred Days ofDaniel 8: 14 (Battle Creek, MI: Seventh-
day Adventist Pub. Assn., 1877), 10, 11 ; also slightly adapted in Uriah Smith, Looking Unto
Jesus: Or Christ in Type and Antitype (Chicago, Ill.: Review and Herald, 1898), 57; White,
The Spirit of Prophecy, 268; White, The Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan
During the Christian Dispensation, 423; White, The Great Controversy Between Christ and
Satan, 423; Ellen G. White, "The Two Dispensations," Review and Herald, 2 March 1886,
129; Ellen G. White, "The Two Dispensations," Present Truth, I April 1886, 51.
( )
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 173 )
)
the sanctuary doctrine and this broader system of truth explained their past
experience and gave them an identity, a message, and a worldwide mission. The )
reference to a "complete system of truth" could be interpreted as a call for a
detailed, fixed, and unchangeable systematized dogmatic theology. However, they )
also had an understanding of "present truth" as a growing set of important
theological truths that need to be proclaimed in this time of the end, and they
continued to oppose an unalterable creed. This suggests that any interpretation of )
the "complete system of truth" as fixed and unchanging would go far beyond early
Adventists' sentiments and actually contradict their intentions.
The connections that Seventh-day Adventists saw between the sanctuary )
doctrine and other b eliefs may b e seen in two examples. One of these is the way
that the heavenly sanctuary and Christ 's ministration formed a prominent part in
)
Ellen G. White's description of her famous vision ofthe great controversy between
Christ and Satan, suggesting a fundamental link between the heavenly sanctuary
and the great controversy. 82 The second is Uriah Smith's succinct summary, first
in 1881 and again in 1887, of the ramifications that a belief in the sanctuary
doctrine has for other teachings. In 1881, his list of teachings showed ten points
whereas six years later it contained thirteen teachings; altogether there were
seventeen distinct points of teaching mentioned in these two lists. In the lists, he
argued that this "great central subject of that system of truth" suggests (1) a pre-
Advent judgment; (2) Christ's work of intercession and denial; (3) a blotting out of )
sins or of names from the book of life; (4) avoidance of new time setting; (5)
distinction between the atoning sacrifice and the high priestly work of atonement
for sin; (6) "the immutability of the law and the perpetuity of the Sabbath"; (7) "the
soon coming of Christ"; (8) "the unconscious state of the dead"; (9) clearer, more
"definite, and beautiful views of Christ's position and work" than any other subject
does; (10) the recognition that the present message bears the "seal of divine truth
and ofdivine providence"; (11) "an understanding ofmany ofthe prophecies"; (12)
an explanation of"the great Advent movement of the p ast"; (13) the avoidance of )
the errors of universalism and predestination; ( 14) a clear manifestation of
tangibility and reality of Christ's personhood and work of redemption; (15) an
understanding of the parable of Matt 22: 1-14; (16) an understanding of the parable
ofMatt 25: 1-13; and (17) the basis of the "third angel's message of Rev 14."83 The
fact that Uriah Smith expanded that list ofteachings in 1887 suggests that this basic )
system was open and quasi flexible.
)
82
White, Early Writings of Mrs. White., 250-253; cf. White, The Great Controversy )
Between Christ and Satan During the Christian Dispensation, 409-450.
83
Uriah Smith, "The Great Central Subject," Review and Herald, 22 November 1881, )
328; Uriah Smith, "The Sanctuary," Review and Herald, 27 September 1887, 616. See
Timm, "The Seventh-day Adventist Doctrine of the Sanctuary (1844-2007)," 336,337.
J
I )
)
)
)
174 DENIS KAISER
)
) Recent Adventist Studies on the Sanctuary
The sanctuary doctrine has been challenged by a number ofpeople throughout
) the history of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, most of them suggesting that the
Day of Atonement began long before 1844 with Christ's ascension in 31 A.D.
84
Probably the most influential detractor was Desmond Ford (1929- ), who argued
) that the Day of Atonement occurred at the Cross. His views on prophetic
interpretation, the heavenly sanctuary, the Day of Atonement, the investigative
) judgment, and salvation have challenged traditional Adventist beliefs. As
mentioned before, Canale has observed that numerous studies have emerged within
)
the last thirty some years in response to Ford's interpretations and assumptions. 85
J Attempting a more precise definition of the biblical sanctuary doctrine, these
studies have dealt with the OT sanctuary service and its rites, their relationship to
)
the heavenly sanctuary, cultic and juridical motifs in various biblical books,
) eschatological passages in Daniel and Revelation, and cultic language in Hebrews.
The present section briefly summarizes the findings and conclusions of these
) studies, focusing first on those that deal with biblical typology, terms, concepts, and
passages in the OT writings and NT writings, then concluding with some survey
)
works.
) tabernacle was contaminated and purified. Whereas Treiyer has studied the
) context,88 Rodriguez focuses on the transfer of sin in Leviticus.89 Winandy has
) examined the meaning, use, and function of the word kipper (atone) in the context ·
84
) See, e.g., Albion Fox Ballenger (1861-1921), William Warde Fletcher (1879-1947),
Ludwig Richard Conradi (1856-1939). See Gary Land, "Ballenger, Albion Fox (1861-
) 1921 )," in The Ellen G. White Encyclopedia, eds. Denis Fortin and Jerry Moon (Hagerstown,
MD: Review and Herald, 2013), 302, 303; "Fletcher, William Warde (1879-1947)," in
Commentary Reference Series, vol. 10, Seventh-day Adventist Encyclopedia, rev. ed.
(Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 1976), 464; Gilbert M. Valentine, W. W. Prescott:
) Forgotten Giant of Adventism 's Second Generation, rev. ed., Adventist Pioneer Series
(Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2005), 320, 321; Daniel Heinz, "Conradi, Louis
)
(Ludwig) Richard ( 1856-1939)," in The Ellen G. White Encyclopedia, eds. Denis Fortin and
) Jerry Moon (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2013), 348. An interesting comparison
between the views on the sanctuary in the writings of Uriah Smith (1832-1903), A. F.
) Ballenger, and M. L. Andreasen (I 876-1962), whose ideas on the last generation and
atonement will be discussed further below, is made in Roy Adams, The Sanctuary Doctrine:
Three Approaches in the Seventh-day Adventist Church, Andrews University Seminary
Doctoral Dissertation Series, vol. 1 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1981 ).
) 8
' Several more general publications also appeared in that context or in response to
.) more recent challenges. See Richard M. Davidson, "In Confirmation of the Sanctuary
Message," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 2, no. 2 (1991 ): 93-114; Roy Adams,
) The Sanctuary: Understanding the Heart ofAdventist Theology (Hagerstown, MD: Review
and Herald, 1993); Jack J. Blanco, 'The Sanctuary and the Mission of the Church," Journal
) of the Adventist Theological Society 9, no. 1 (1998): 245-261; Roberto Ouro, "The
Apotelesmatic Principle: Origin and Application," Journal of the Adventist Theological
) Society 9, no. 1 (1998): 328-344; Clifford Goldstein, Graffiti in the Holy of Holies: An
Impassioned Response to Recent Attacks on the Sanctuary and Ellen White (Nampa, ID:
) Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 3 .169-197.
Pacific Press, 2003).
)
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 175
Biblical Typology
Richard M. Davidson sheds more light on the biblical usage of several terms
associated with typology and Dan 8. In his study of biblical passages that use the
terms tabnft, paradeigma, and typos (type, example, pattern, construction) and
hypodeigma (antitype, copy, image), Davidson discovered five typological
structures (historical, eschatological, christological-soteriological, ecclesiological,
prophetical) in Scripture. These always exhibit a correspondence between two
realities in the linear sequence of history; one reality is the absolute augmentation
of the other reality. There is not always a direct correspondence of all the details,
but those having a soteriological significance generally correspond with each other.
Thus Scripture presents a corresponding typology rather than an antithetical
typology, Davidson concluded.86 Similarly, William G. Johnsson's work critiques
metaphorical/figurative interpretations of the heavenly sanctuary and discusses a
realistic/literal interpretation.87
Cultic Terms and Themes in the Pentateuch
The word kipper (atone) is central to Lev 16 (Day of Atonement) and has
therefore been a focus of study for those wanting to understand how the Israelite
principles of the contamination and purification of the sanctuary in its biblical ~
86
Richard M. Davidson, Typology in Scripture: A Study of Hermeneutical Typos
Structures, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series, vol. 2 (Berrien
Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1981); Richard M. Davidson, "Typology in the
Book of Hebrews," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 4, Issues in the Book
ofHebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1989), 121-186. See also Alberto R. Treiyer,
"Antithetical or Correspondence Typology?," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series,
vol. 4, Issues in the Book ofHebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical
Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1989), 187-198.
87
William G. Johnsson, "The Heavenly Sanctuary-Figurative or Real?," in Daniel and
Revelation Committee Series, vol. 4, Issues in the Book ofHebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook
(Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day
Adventists, 1989), 4.35-51.
88
Alberto R. Treiyer, "The Day of Atonement as Related to the Contamination and
Purification of the Sanctuary," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 3, The
Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, and the Nature ofProphecy, ed. FrankB. Holbrook(Washington,
D.C.: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1986),
3.198-256.
89
Angel M. Rodriguez, "Transfer of Sin in Leviticus," in Daniel and Revelation
Committee Series, vol. 3, The Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, and the Nature of Prophecy, ed.
Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of

176 DENIS KAISER
of Dan 9:24.90 Gane's work expands on the meaning and system of purification
offerings, the phases of kipper (atone), and the connections between cult and
theodicy. He argues that God's sanctuary where God as Israel's king and judge "is
enthroned stands for his character, reputation, and authority." As the condition of
any nation affects the reputation and "throne" of their king, so God's reputation
receives the impact of the imperfections and faults of his subjects. For him to
continue dwelling among them, "his reputation must be cleared periodically so that
it will not become too seriously compromised." Gane concludes that " this clearing
takes place on the Day of Atonement," when God's honor and reputation are
absolved of any perceived taint (1) with regard to the physical
imperfections .. . of the Israelites because they are purified, (2) with
regard to the wanton/defiant sins ... of the disloyal because they are
condemned, and (3) with regard to the forgiven sins ... of the loyal
because they have accepted the sacrificial remedies that he has provided
and demonstrated their ongoing loyalty and penitence by obediently
practicing self-denial and resting from work on the Day of Atonement.
While it would be pointless to demand absolute perfection from a people
unable to give it, he can require loyalty that includes acceptance of his
remedies for imperfection.
Elucidating the reasons for the Day ofAtonement, Gane states that God incurs
judicial responsibility when he forgives guilty people, resulting in an "imbalance
between justice and kindness that affects his reputation as ruler (cf. 2 Sam 14:9)."
The Day of Atonement restores this equilibrium "through the ritual purification of
the sanctuary" and thus vindicates God's administrativejustice. 91
Cultic Terms and Themes in D aniel
By examining the cultic motif in the b ook of Daniel as it relates to time and
space, Vogel has convincin gly demonstrated that the idea ofa conflict between two
opposing systems of cult and worship plays a dominant role. He also points out the
relation of the cultic motif with the main themes of Daniel such as judgment,
eschatology, kingdom, and worship.92
In the context of cultic studies in the book of Daniel, chapters 7-9 have
received the most attention. Thus, for instance, Arthur J. Ferch and Loron Wade
90
Pierre Winandy, "The Meaning of Kipper in Daniel 9 :24," in Daniel and Revelation
Committee Series, vol. 3, The Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, and the Nature ofProphecy, ed.
Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of
Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 3. 1 I 9-127.
91
Roy Gane, Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and
Theodicy (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 379; Roy Gane, ''Temple and Sacrifice,"
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 10, no. 1 (1999): 357-380.
92
Winfried Vogel, "Cultic Motif and Space and Time in the Book of Daniel" (Th.D.
dissertation, Andrews University, 1999); Winfried Vogel, The Cultic Motif in the Book of
Daniel (New York: Peter Lang, 2010).
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL P ERSPECTIVE 177 )
I )
have referred to the possibility that the judgment scene of Dan 7, which describes
one like a "son of man" coming to the Ancient of Days, contains allusions to the
Day of Atonement event in the heavenly sanctuary. 93
Further, based on the OT usage of the term .s dq (be just/righteous) Davidson )
suggests that its Niphal form n~sdaq in Dan 8:14 may have three extended I )
meanings: (1) the meaning "to correct" in the sense of "to restore" or "to put
something back to its rightful place," which is often found in a relational context; )
(2) the meaning "to cleanse," "to purge," or "to purify," which is often used in
poetic synthetic parallelisms and occurs particularly in cultic contexts; and (3) the
meaning "to justify," "to vindicate," or "to judge," which is used in legal contexts.
It seems that all three contexts are present in Dan 8:9-14. While the author could
have used other words to express each single meaning, he employed the word )
n(sdaq to indicate the solution to all three problems caused by the little horn power.
Thus the tam id (regular, continual, daily) service ofthe heavenly sanctuary that was
taken away is restored to its rightful place (restoration). Also, the cleansing of the
sanctuary removes the pesac (rebellion) that causes horror in the sanctuary and
illegally contaminates it (cleansing). Whereas the trampling down of the sanctuary
and the host defamed God, his character, and his plan of salvation, the n(sdaq
process vindicates him, his character, and his way of salvation (vindication). 94
In his massive 871-page dissertation, Probstle employs linguistic, literary, and )
intertextual approaches to investigate Dan 8:9- 14. His study, probably one of the )
most significant studies on the passage and the subject, supports previous studies
on the terminology and concepts used in the text. He discovered that the Day of _)
Atonement motif serves as the macro theme of the passage and "typifies the divine
reaction to the cosmic challenge created by the cultic war of the horn." 95 Several
93
Arthur J. Ferch, The Son ofMan in Daniel 7, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral
Dissertation Series, vol. 6 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1983); Loron j
Wade, "'Son of Man' Comes to the Judgment in Daniel 7:13," Journal of the Adventist
Theological Society 11 , no. 1 (2000): 277-281. .1
94
Richard M. Davidson, "The Meaning ofNisdaq in Daniel 8:14," Journal of the
Adventist Theological Society 7, no. 1 (1996): 107-119. Cf. Niels-Erik Andreasen,
"Translation of Nisdaq/Katharisthesetai in Daniel 8:14," in Daniel and Revelation
Committee Series, vol. 2, Symposium on Daniel: Introductory and Exegetical Studies, ed.
Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of )
Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 475-496; Angel M. Rodriguez, "Significance of the Cultic
Language in Daniel 8:9-14," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 2, Symposium
on Daniel: Introductory and Exegetical Studies, ed. FrankB. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.:
Biblical Research Institute, General Conference ofSeventh-day Adventists, 1986), 537-549.
9
' Martin Probstle, "Truth and Terror: A Text-oriented Analysis of Daniel 8:9-14"
(Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University, 2005), abstract; cf. Martin Probstle, "A Linguistic
Analysis of Daniel 8: 11 , 12," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 7, no. I (1996):
81-106. For previous brief studies of the passage and its language see, e.g., Gerhard F.
Hase!, "The 'Little Horn,' the Heavenly Sanctuary and the Time of the End: A Study of
Daniel 8:9-14," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 2, Symposium on Daniel: )
Introductory and Exegetical Studies, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.: Biblical
Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 378-461;
' )
)
)
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 179
) 178 DENIS KAISER
examined six particular passages in Hebrews that are often central to the question
) scholars have discussed the historical evidence ofthe beginning date for the seventy
96 of whether Hebrews denies a two-phase ministry (regular/daily service and Day of
weeks ofDan 9 in order to support the dating of the 23 00-year prophecy ofDan 8.
} Atonement) in the heavenly sanctuary. He concludes that the book has a different
The Heavenly Sanctuary and Ministration of Christ in Hebrews purpose; it intends "to emphasize the superiority of Christ's blood over animal
A number of other scholars have discussed ta hagia (the holy [place], the blood" and that sin no longer presents "a barrier between God and man." 99 Salom
) briefly outlines various aspects of Hebrews' sanctuary theology, including the
sanctuary) in the context ofHebrews.97 Since most of these studies are in one way
sanctuary itself, Christ's heavenly ministration, the "right hand of God" theme, the
or another connected to the question of whether Hebrews suggests a beginning of
"free access" theme, the Day ofAtonement allusions, and the two-phase ministry. 100
the antitypical Day of Atonement in the first century A.D., some have investigated
the specific allusions to the Day of Atonement.98 For example, Kiesler has In the late 1980s, George E. Rice analyzed prevalent presuppositions
) concerning the term katapetasma ( curtain, veil) and concluded that in Heb 6: 19, 20
Siegfried J. Schwantes, "Ereb BoqerofDaniel 8: I 4 Re-examined," in Daniel and Revelation the term is used in a context that is quite different from its use in the LXX,
Committee Series, vol. 2, Symposium on Daniel: Introductory and Exegetical Studies, ed. suggesting that Heb 6:19, 20 does not specify what veil is meant. 101 Gane has
) demonstrated that Rice was correct in stating that katapetasma may refer to any of
Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of
) Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 462-474; William H. Shea, "Spatial Dimensions in the the three veils, yet Gane argues that Rice overlooked the fact that the word belongs
Vision of Daniel 8," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 2, Symposium on to the phrase esoteron tou katapetasmatos (into the inside of the veil), which
) Daniel: Introductory and Exegetical Studies, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.: appears four times in the LXX (Exod 26:33; Lev 16:2, 12, 15) and has the same
Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 497-526; meaning in each case: within the inner veil. Thus Gane concludes that the phrase
Rodriguez, "Significance of the Cultic Language in Daniel 8:9-14," 527-549; Clifford seems to be a technical expression to refer to the inner veil of the sanctuary. 102
Goldstein, 1844 Made Simple (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1988).
) 96 Arthur J. Ferch, "Commencement Date for the Seventy Weeks Prophecy," in Daniel Norman H. Young and Richard M. Davidson have each responded to and built on
and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 3, The Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, and the Nature of Gane's work in the form ofan exchange of articles between the two of them. While
) Young agrees with Gane in his identification of the veil based on the usage in the
Prophecy, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Research Institute, General
Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 3.64-74; William H. Shea, "When Did the LXX, he argues that Heb 6: 19, 20 has its background in the Day of Atonement and
Seventy Weeks ofDaniel 9:24 Begin?," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 2, no. is in its nature parallel to Heb 10: 19-2 l, suggesting that both passages picture the
) I (1991): 115-138; William H. Shea, "When Did the Seventy Weeks of Daniel 9:24 same veil, namely the inner veil. 103 Like Gane and Young, Davidson emphasizes
Begin?," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vols. 6-7, Symposium on Revelation, the need to recognize Hebrews' dependence on the LXX. He nevertheless stresses
ed. FrankB. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference that he finds a different answer to the question, "What OT event provides the
of Seventh-day Adventists, 1992), 6.375-394; Brempong Owusu-Antwi, The Chronology background for this passage?" Davidson suggests that Heb 6:19, 20 actually has
ofDan 9:24-27, Adventist Theological Society Dissertation Series, vol. 2 (Berrien Springs,
MI: Adventist Theological Society Publications, 1995); William H. Shea, "Supplementary three parallel sanctuary "entering" passages in the book ofHebrews (9: 12, [18], 24;
) 10:19, 20) which seem to refer to the same veil. Interestingly, all three parallel
Evidence in Support of 457 B.C. as the Starting Date for the 2300 Day-Years of Daniel
) 8:14," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 12, no. 1 (2001): 89-96; William H.
Shea, "A Review of the Biblical Evidence for the Use ofthe Fall-to-Fall Calendar," Journal 99
j Herbert Kiesler, "An Exegesis of Selected Passages," in Daniel and Revelation
of the Adventist Theological Society 12, no. 2 (2001): 152-163. Cf. Siegfried H. Hom and
Lynn H. Wood, The Chronology of Ezra 7, 2nd rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Review and Committee Series, vol. 4, Issues in the Book of Hebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver
) Herald, 1970). See Gerhard F. Hase!, "Interpretations of the Chronology of the Seventy Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists,
1989), 4.53-77.
Weeks," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 3, The Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, 100
)
and the Nature of Prophecy, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, D.C.: Biblical Research
Alwyn P. Salom, "Sanctuary Theology," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series,
Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 3-63, for a survey and vol. 4, Issues in the Book ofHebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical
! discussion of amillennial, dispensational, historical-critical, and historicist interpretations Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1989), 4.199-218.
101
GeorgeE. Rice, "Within Which Veil?," Ministry, June 1987,20, 21; GeorgeE. Rice,
) of the seventy-weeks chronology.
"Hebrews 6: 19- Analysis of Some Assumptions Concerning Katapetasma," in Daniel and
97
Alwyn P. Salom, "Ta Hagia in the Epistle to the Hebrews," in Daniel and Revelation
j Revelation Committee Series, vol. 4, Issues in the Book ofHebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook
Committee Series, vol. 4, Issues in the Book of Hebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver
Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day
) Adventists, 1989), 229-234.
1989), 4.219-227. 102
98
William G. Johnsson, "Day of Atonement Allusions," in Daniel and Revelation Roy E. Gane, "Re-Opening Katapetasma ('Veil') in Hebrews 6:19," Andrews
) University Seminary Studies 38, no. 1 (2000): 5-8.
Committee Series, vol. 4, Issues in the Book of Hebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver 103
Norman H. Young, "Where Jesus Has Gone as a Forerunner on Our Behalf
) Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists,
(Hebrews 6:20)," Andrews University Seminary Studies 39, no. 2 (2001): 165-173.
1989), 4.105-120.
).
)
180 D ENIS KAISER
passages employ the three terms tragos (goat), moschos (calf), and the enkainizo
word group (renew, inaugurate, dedicate), which appear together in the LXX only
in N um 7, a chapter that deals with the inauguration of the tabernacle. Considering
the context of Heb 6:19, 20 ("describing a point in time of Christ 'having become'
[genomenos] high priest;" cf. Exod 40:9- 15), Davidson concludes tha t
"inauguration should also be seen as the most probable OT background for H eb
6: 19, 20 as for the other sanctuary 'entering' p assages." He suggests that "n either
inauguration nor the Day of Atonem ent take center stage" in the central cultic
section of Hebrews. Instead, there is "a complex of motifs" that reveal the
"superiority of Christ (and the gospel realities brought a bout by him) over the
shadows of the OT cultus." The sanctuary "entering" passages show the
inauguration of the sanctuary, the initiation of C hrist's heavenly mediatorial work
as high priest, and the provision of an ongoing access ofthe believers to the benefits
of Christ's mediation and God's presence. 104 Young contends that Hebrews' use of
Philo' s writings concerning the word tragos and the idea of a high priest entering
the M ost Holy P lace are strong arguments for the Day of Atonement. He further
dismisses the connection between the word enkainizo and the inauguration of the
sanctuary since the word itself does not appear in Exod 40, Lev 8, and Num 7.
While he concedes that Heb 9:18-23 and perhaps 10:19, 2 0 may contain allusions
to dedicatory ideas, Young remains "convinced that the Day of Atonement is the
OT background for Heb 6: 19-20 and 9: 11 -12." He apparently favors an antithetical
sanctuary typology in Hebrews, interpreting the sanctuary primarily in m etaphorical
terms. 105 Reminding Young that it was not so much the word itself but the word
group enkainizo that appeared in Num 7 (four times), Davidson adds that it is
repeatedly and exclusively used in inauguration contexts, yet not once in the
context of the Day of Atonement. He further states that in the cultic parts of the
LXX Torah, tragos appears only in N um 7 and that tragos and moschos together
appear only in inauguration contexts. The three paralleling sanctuary "entering"
passages mentioned ab ove are always located in the context of "the transition
between the two covenants with their respective sanctuaries and the official starting
up of the heavenly sanctuary ministry." Yet, in the OT, the Day ofAtonement never
occurred with the inauguration. Davidson contends that the context of the parallel
passages does not require ta hagia to b e limited to the Most Holy Place but allows
the possibility that the reference is to the entire h eavenly sanctuary, which, in turn,
would be in harmony with the usage of the term in the LXX and the fact that in the
OT it was always the entire sanctuary that was inaugurated and not merely the Most
Holy Place. He observes a key difference between himself and Young concerning
the view of typology in Hebrews. Davidson suggests a "fundam ental continuity
10
• Richard M. Davidson, "Christ's Entry 'Within the Veil' in Hebrews 6:19-20: The
Old Testament Background," Andrews University Seminary Studies 39, no. 2 (200 I): I 75-
190.
10
Norman H. Young, "The Day of Dedication or the Day of Atonement? The Old
'
Testament Background to Hebrews 6:19-20 Revisited," Andrews University Seminary
Studies 40, no. 1 (2002): 6 1-68.
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF lN HISTORICAL P ERSPECTIVE 18 1 )
)
between the basic contours of type and antitype" except where the OT itself
announces discontinuity (as in Ps 40:6-8 and 110:4), whereas Young seems to
assume a "radical discontinuity between type and antitype." While Davidson
believes in the "existence of Christ's ongoing priestly ministry in a real, )
spatiotemporal heavenly sanctuary, he keeps away from overly literalistic ' )
applications ofall the minute details ofthe OT tabernacle to the heavenly sanctuary.
He notes that these basic contours of the OT sanctuary typology that the book of )
Hebrews revealed as being fulfilled in Christ were (I) "his sacrifice, coalescing the
many daily and yearly sacrifices into his once-for-all death in light of Ps 40:6-8;"
(2) "his inauguration of the heavenly sanctuary to officially start up its services and
provide access into the presence ofGod;" (3) "his ongoing high priestly mediatorial
I ministry in the heavenly sanctuary;" and (4) "his future (from the author's )
p erspective) Day of A tonement work of investigative and executive judgment for
I the professed people of God. " 106
Studying p assages on the ascensionofJesus to heaven (Heb 1 :6; 4: 14-16; 6: 19,
20; 9:11-14; 10:1 9-22), Felix Cortez has discovered that the writer of Hebrews
)
associated the ascension with "Jesus' enthronement," "his appointment as high
priest," and the "inauguration of the new covenant," forming "part of Jesus'
exaltation at the right hand of God" and "contributing to his identity as 'Son'." He
further notes that the epistle argues that Jesus, as the "Son," fulfilled the J
I expectations of a future Davidic king (2 Sam 7: 12-15; Heb 1 :5). Cortez considers
the imagery of the inauguration ofthe covenant a more important background to the
exposition of Jesus' ascension in the Epistle to the Hebrews than the often assumed
~)
)
l imagery of the Day of Atonement. 107
J ohnsson emphasizes the necessity for biblical interpreters to consider "the full
theological perspective" of a book when interpreting a specific passage in that
t book. Interpreters of Heb 9:23 should therefore consider that the book ofHebrews
wants to show the one true solution to the sin problem, the one "sacrifice that is
able to purify decisively." Discussing the purification theme in Heb 9:23, h e )
I concludes that the text does not refer to the time of the cleansing of the heavenly
sanc tuary but only shows the need of the heavenly sanctuary "to be purified by the
better sacrifice of Christ." It also does not suggest that Christ's death on Calvary
was the antitype of the Day ofAtonement but rather presents his sacrificial death as
the anti type of all OTsacrifices. Johnsson concludes therefore that the passage does )
not equate Calvary with the Day ofAtonement but refers its readers to the specific
I point in time when God gave the "single, all-sufficient Answer to sin." 108
106
Richard M. Davidson, "Inauguration or Day of Atonement? A Response to Norman
Young's 'Old Testament Background to Hebrews 6: 19-20 Revisited'," Andrews University J
f Seminary Studies 40, no. 1 (2002): 69-88.
101
Felix Cortez, "The Anchor of the Soul that Enters Within the Veil: The Ascension
of the 'Son' in the Letter to the Hebrews" (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University, 2008),
1 abstract, 30, 3 I.
108
William G. Johnsson, "Defilement / Purification in Hebrews 9:23," in Daniel and
I
)
Revelation Committee Series, vol. 4,Jssues in the Book ofHebrews, ed. Frank B. Holbrook
(Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day
( )
! )
)
)
')
)
)
)
182 DENIS KA.ISER

At this point I want to make a brief excursion to note two recent studies ofnon-
Adventist scholars which are of interest to the discussion in this chapter. Using
Canale's "dissertation on the prescriptive analysis ofExodus ... as a paradigmatic
l
I
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 183

) model" 109 for his own work, King L. She has done a descriptive text-oriented
analysis of Exodus to find significant ontological and hermeneutical markers ofthe
and the assumption of the bodily "ascension of a human being through the
heavens." The contrast is therefore not so much between the material and the
spiritual realm, but between "the realm of sin, corruption, and impurity and the
I realm of life, purity, and God's presence." 112 Referring to Jonathan Klawans,
Moffitt suggests that ancient Judaism knew at least two models for relating the

l
) doctrinal system of the author ofHebrews in order to determine which theological
positions on Heb 9:22-23 are ontologically consistent or inconsistent with the
) represented the earth and the sanctuary symbolized heaven. The second view saw
system of the author. Discovering that Exod 3:14 and 25:40 serve as such markers,
) She utilizes these passages to demonstrate that the hermeneutics of the author was
a Christocentric-typological biblical pedagogy with Exod 32-34 serving as the
) controlling revelation of the author's hermeneutic. He further states that it was
foundational for the estimation ofthe significance of Christ's high-priestly ministry
)
in the heavenly sanctuary to consider that the author's audience must be connected
) to the Exodus generation via the book of Exodus. In his discussion of the validity
earthly temple to the heavenly realms. One model viewed the earthly temple as a
metaphorical representation of the entire cosmos, i.e. earth and heaven. The court
the earthly temple as a model of a real temple in heaven, suggesting an analogy.
This second view always correlates with the views that God's presence dwells fully
in that heavenly space and that angels serve as priests in that heavenly temple. The
primary sources usually advocate one view or the other, not both together. Moffitt
concludes that Hebrews clearly fits into that second category of writings,
envisioning a temple in heaven, but not a temple as heaven. This conception of

and consistency of three theological positions on Heb 9:22-23, She concludes that
) both the classical pedagogy (heavenly sanctuary as heaven itself; metaphorical
) immaterial sanctuary) and the modem pedagogy (heavenly sanctuary idea is
incomprehensible) build on ontological presuppositions that are foreign to
) Scripture. However, he finds a truly biblical pedagogy reflected in the position of
.) Alberto T reiyer and Kevin Conner, who interpret Heb 9:22-23 ontologically as
I
heaven having spatial dimensions is compatible with the idea previously mentioned
of embodied human beings in the heavenly realm, suggesting that "heaven need not
be an immaterial place." 113 Commenting on various aspects of Jesus' life, death,
resurrection, and ministry in this context, he concludes,
t' With this kind of approach, the author is able to correlate elements of the

I
referring to a bipartite spatiotemporal heavenly sanctuary. 110 basic story of Jesus with the sacrificial ritual ofYomKippur in a way that
·., does not devolve into a reduction of the heavenly Yorn Kippur ritual into
David M. Moffitt, senior lecturer at University of St. Andrews, has challenged
the view generally accepted among Protestants that Hebrews should be interpreted the one historical act of Jesus' crucifixion. By way of analogy the author
j
)
metaphorically against the background ofPhilo 's dualistic cosmology. Based on his
study of Jewish apocalyptic writings and the Old Testament he has come to the
conclusion that the author of Hebrews assumed a literal-spatial sanctuary within
I is able to identify Jesus' death as the initial act or trigger that puts into
motion a series of ritual events. In this way Jesus' death is a sacrificial
element. The narrative of Jesus' resurrection, ascension, and session can
heaven. Although the documentary evidence attests to the "influence of be further correlated with the ritual process by linking Jesus' resurrection
philosophical ideas permeating Jewish religious thought," Moffitt nevertheless with his qualification to serve as high priest, his ascension as his entering
) into the holy precincts in heaven and ultimately into the true tabernacle in
holds that there are marked differences between Jewish apocalyptic and Middle
) Platonist assessments concerning the perception ofreality, the relationship between heaven. There he presents his offering-which is nothing less than himself
the earthly and the divine realm, the future existence, and the moral status of the (cf. 7:28) before God. Having made a purification for sins (1:3), he is then
j invited by God to be the first human to be elevated above the angels and
material nature. 11 1 A number of features of Hebrews suggest that Jewish
) apocalypticism forms the most likely context of the book, including the references sit down on the heavenly throne. In this way the story of Jesus is
to God's throne in heaven, the veil of the temple, God's glory, participation in correlated with the ritual actions of Yorn Kippur such that Jesus' life,
J
)
angelic worship, the future world, the present time as the last days, the final
embodied resurrection and the final judgment, "the pesher adjacent hermeneutic,"
J death, resurrection, ascension and session can also be shown to be the
events that enact the true atoning Yorn Kippur ritual in the one true
,f tabernacle that, by analogy, the earthly one is modeled upon. 114
) Adventists, 1989), 79, 80.

l
109
King L. She, The Use ofExodus in Hebrews, Studies in Biblical Literature, vol. 142
) (New York: Peter Lang, 2011), 7.
110
Ibid., 7, 9,169, 171-174.

I
) 111
David M. Moffitt, "Serving in Heaven's Temple: Sacred Space, Yorn Kippur, and
112
Moffitt, "Serving in Heaven's Temple," 4, 5.
113
Jesus' Superior Offering in Hebrews," Annual Meeting of the Society ofBiblical Literature Jonathan Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple: Symbolism and Super-
) sessionism in the Study ofAncient Judaism (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,
(Chicago, IL, 2012), 3; David M. Moffitt, Atonement and the Logic ofResurrection in the
) Epistle to the H ebrews, Supplements to Novum Testamentum, vol. 141 (Leiden, Boston: 2006), 111-144; Moffitt, "Serving in Heaven's Temple," 10-13.
Brill, 2013). 1
I
11
• Ibid., 15, 16.

) I-
)

184 DENIS KAISER
Although Seventh-day Adventists would generally disagree with him in his
s uggestion that the antitypical Day of Atonement began with Christ's ascension,
Moffitt has unearthed much evidence that supports the Adventist view of the
heavenly sanctuary and Canale's suggestions regarding the philosophical
foundations of the biblical sanctuary motif.
The Heavenly Temple in Revelation
In their discussion of the literary patterns of the Book of Revelation, Richard
M. Davidson, Jon Paulien, and later on Ranko Stefanovic have all suggested a
I
sevenfold structure of successive major sections (chaps. 2-3; 6:1- 8:1; 8:6-11:18;
12:1- 15:4; chaps. 16-18; 19:11-21 :1; 21:9-22:5), which are always introduced by
a generally briefheavenly sanctuary scene (1 :9-20; chaps. 4-5; 8:2-5; 11: 19; 15:5-8;
19:1-10; 21:2-8), and framed by a prologue and epilogue ( 1:1-8; 22:6- 11).
Following the previous studies of Davidson and Paulien, Stefanovic suggests that
these introductory sanctuary scenes indicate "two definite lines ofprogression: first,
there is a complete circle moving from earth [1: 12-20] to heaven and then back to
earth again [21 :1-22:5]. Then, there is a definite progression from the inauguration
[ chaps. 4-5] of the heavenly sanctuary to intercession [8:3-5], to ju dgment [1 1: 19],
then to the cessation [15:5-8] of the sanctuary function, and finally to its absence
[19: 1-10]." The heavenly sanctuary seems to be "the center of all divine activities,"
and "the entire Revelation-vision," as Stefanovic suggests, "is apparently p erceived
from the vantage point ofthe heavenly temple."115 Interestingly, while the first part
of the book follows the order of the tiimfd (regular, continual, daily) service, the
second part, starting in Rev 11 :19, frequently alludes to the Day of Atonement. 116
115 Richard M. Davidson, "Sanctuary Typology," in Daniel and Re velation Committee
Series, vols. 6-7, Symposium on Revelation, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD:
Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1992), 6: 112-
115; Jon Paulien, "Seals and Trumpets: Some Current Discussions," in Daniel and
Revelation Committee Series, vols. 6-7, Symposium on Revelation, ed. Frank B. Holbrook
(Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day
Adventists, 1992), 6: I 87, I 88; Jon Paulien, "The Role ofthe Hebrew Cultus, Sanctuary, and
Temple in the Plot and Structure of the Book of Revelation," Andrews University Seminary
Studies 33, no. 2 (1995): 247-255; Ranko Stefanovic, "Finding Meaning in the Literary
Patterns ofRevclation," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 13, no. I (2002): 32,
33. They differ from Kenneth A. Strand who suggested a structure of eight basic sections.
See Kenneth A. Strand,Interpreting the BookofRevelation: H ermeneutical Guidelines, with
BriefIntroduction to Literary Analysis, 2nd ed. (Naples, FL: Ann Arbor Pub., 1979), 51, 52;
Kenneth A. Strand, "The Eight Basic Visions in the Book of Revelation," Andrews
University Seminary Studies 25, no. I (1987): 107-121; Kenneth A. Strand, "The
'Victorious-Introduction Scenes' in the Visions in the Book of Revelation," Andrews
University Seminary Studies 25, no. 3 (1987): 267-288.
116
Paulien, "The Role of the Hebrew Cultus, Sanctuary, and Temple in the Plot and
Structure ofthe Book ofRevelation," 225-257; Stefanovic, "Finding Meaning in the Literary
Patterns ofRevelation," 33-3 5; William H. Shea, "The Cultic Calendar for the Introductory
Sanctuary Scenes of Revelation," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 11, no. I
(2000): 120-147.
·1
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN H ISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 185
)
In the same vein, Revelation seems to follow the sequence of the spring and fall
117
festivals. The structure of the book, Stefanovic concludes, suggests therefore that )
Rev 1-11 describes the entire Christian age whereas Rev 12-22 focuses on the final
events of the history of this world. The same point is proven by the chiastic )
structure ofthe entire book. The central segment (11 :19-13:18) deals with the great
controversy between Christ and Satan which seems to be "the central theological
theme of the book." 118 )
Several other studies deal with specific issues and topics in the book of
)
Revelation. For example, Paulien surveys the relation between the sanctuary and
the judgment inRevelation. 119 In his master's thesis, Stefanovi6 focuses specifically
on the reality and meaning of the heavenly sanctuary and its services in the Book
120
of Revelation. There have also been a few discussions revolving around the
question of whether the scenes presented in Rev 4-5 show the inauguration of the
heavenly sanctuary or the judgment scenes of the Day of Atonement. 121
)
Survey Works on the Sanctuary Doctrine
Alberto R. Treiyer has shown the cultic, theological, typological, and
eschatological aspects of the Day of Atonement and the heavenly judgment,
especially as seen in Leviticus, the OT prophets, Hebrews, and Revelation. He
points out the correlation between the heavenly sanctuary and its earthly counterpart )
and describes the principles of contamination and purification of the sanctuary. 122
Elias Brasil de Souza has investigated the function of the heavenly sanctuary and
its relationship to the earthly counterparts, as reflected in forty-three OT passages. )
These passages depicted the heavenly sanctuary as a location where God
"supervises the cosmos, performs acts of judgment ..., hears the prayers of the
needy, and bestows atonement and forgiveness upon sinners." It is also presented
117
Paulien, "Seals and Trumpets," 6.190-192; Paulien, "The Role ofthe Hebrew Cultus,
Sanctuary, and Temple in the Plot and Structure of the Book of Revelation," 257-261;
Davidson, "Sanctuary Typology," 119-126, 130; Stefanovic, "Finding Meaning in the
Literary Patterns of Revelation," 35-37.
118
Ibid., 35, 38.
119
Jon Paulien, "Sanctuary and Judgment," in Daniel and Revelation Committee Series,
vols. 6-7, Symposium on Revelation, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical
Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1992), 7.275-294. _J
120
Ranko Stefanovic, "The Heavenly Sanctuary and Its Services in the Book of
Revelation: Its Reality and Meaning" (M.A. thesis, Adventist International Institute of
Advanced Studies, 1990).
12 1
Alberto R. Treiyer, The Day ofAtonement and the Heavenly Judgment: From the
Pentateuch to Revelation (Siloam Springs, AR: Creation Enterprises International, 1992),
474-494; Norman R. Gulley, "Revelation 4 and 5: Judgment or Inauguration?," Journal of
the Adventist Theological Society 8, no. I (1997): 59-81; Ranko Stefanovic, "Revelation 4
and 5: Inauguration or Day of Atonement?," Paper presented at the "Current Issues in
Eschatology" Symposium co-sponsored by the Adventist Theological Society and the Old
Testament Department, Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University
on March 1-3, 2007, Berrien Springs, MI, 2007.
122
Treiyer, The Day ofAtonement and the Heavenly Judgment.
J
)
)
)

186 DENIS KAISER THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 187
)
) as "a p lace of worship, a meeting place for the heavenly council, and an object of The Significance of the Antitypical Day of Atonement
attack by anti-YHWH forces, thus playing a pivotal role in the cosmic battle and the Heavenly Sanctuary
) between good and evil." Further, de Souza points out that these passages reveal In my experience, pastoral students and church members generally believe in
I
the sanctuary doctrine, but when asked to explain why the antitypical Day of
) structural and functional correlation between the heavenly and the earthly
sanctuaries, suggesting that "the activities of one could affect the other." 123
j Atonement is necessary, they are unable to give an answer that goes beyond the
) Several writers have highlighted Christ's function, ministry, and work as mere idea of the heavenly sanctuary being cleansed from our sins. Many students

)
sacrifice, high priest, intercessor, and king. 124 In the same vein a number of
publications have elaborated on the salvation and atonement aspects illustrated in
\ affirm the importance of the doctrine, but when asked regarding its practical
significance, they fail to specify its universal and personal dimensions. t 27 This
) the biblical sanctuary motif. 125 Judgment proceeding from the sanctuary is another observation corresponds with Canale's estimation that many Adventist leaders
subject that has been examined by a number of scholars. Noting that the judgment (pastors, administrators, teachers, etc.) look at the sanctuary doctrine through the
) encompasses several phases, they have emphasized that divine judgment is an event lens of an Evangelical understanding of justification by faith, and they tend to
) of both salvation and damnation. One phase of the judgment takes place during the
antitypical Day ofAtonement before the second coming of Christ. It vindicates God
I borrow the hermeneutical principles on which Roman Catholic and Protestant
theology was built. Thus they have difficulties seeing the relevance and significance
ofthe sanctuary doctrine. 128 While the sequence of actions on the Day ofAtonement
) in his act of saving some and condemning others, answering Satan's accusations
that God cannot be just and merciful at the same time. 126
{ can be easily comprehended on the literal level, many people find it difficult to
)
I
fathom the actual universal and personal meaning of these actions. Since sin is
) generally conceived as an action or a condition-in other words, as an abstract
thing-many wonder how it can be kept in the sanctuary over an extended period
) of time as if sin were a physical object. It is hard for us to grasp why there may be ~
)
.J a need to "keep" our sins "stored" in the sanctuary until the Day of Atonement.
Therefore one may ask whether that need arises from the behavior of the believers
123 Elias Brasil de Souza, The Heavenly Sanctuary/Temple Motifin the Hebrew Bible:
) or from reasons that go beyond them. While older generations considered doctrines
Function and Relationship to the Earthly Counterparts, Adventist Theological Society important because they were firmly grounded in Scripture, younger generations
) Dissertation Series, vol. 7 (Berrien Springs, MI: Adventist Theological Society Publications, tend to estimate the significance of a belief based on its practical value and
2005), abstract. significance. The what of a doctrine (content level) takes second place to the why
) 124
FrankB. Holbrook, "Christ's Inauguration as King-Priest," Journal ofthe Adventist
of that doctrine (level of meaning and importance). Should Adventist scholars fail
Theological Society 5, no. 2 (1994): 136-152; Frank B. Holbrook, The Atoning Priesthood
) of Jesus Christ (Berrien Springs MI: Adventist Theological Society Publications, 1996); to provide adequate answers to the question of the significance of the sanctuary
Alberto R. Treiyer, "The Priest-King Role of the Messiah," Journal of the Adventist doctrine, they will convince younger people ofits unimportance. That is why I want
) to draw attention to a few aspects that should receive more attention in the context
Theological Society 7, no. 1 (1996): 64-80. Cf. Erwin R. Gane, Heaven 's Open Door: The
) Seven Seals ofRevelation and Christ Our Heavenly High Priest (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, of the sanctuary doctrine.
1989). The biblical sanctuary, its services, and the Day of Atonement seems to
J 125
Hans K. LaRondelle, "Salvation and the Atonement," Journal of the Adventist provide an answer to the question of whether God's justice and mercy can be
J
Theological Society 3, no. 1 (1992): 22-51; George W. Reid, "Salvation and the Sanctuary," f harmonized. This provision may come in response to Satan's accusations that God
Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 3, no. 1 (1992): 97-104; Roy Gane, Altar Call
(Berrien Springs, MI: Diadem, 1999); Angel M. Rodriguez, Spanning the Abyss: How the
) 127
A recent survey among undergraduate students at Andrews University seems to
Atonement Brings God and Humanity Together (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald,
2008). substantiate this personal impression. See Leane M. Sigvartsen, Jan A. Sigvartsen, and Paul
) 126 B. Petersen, Beyond Beliefs 1: What Millennial Young Adults Really Think ofthe 28 Beliefs
Richard M. Davidson, "The Good News ofYom Kippur," Journal ofthe Adventist
) Theological Society 2, no. 2 (1991): 4-27; Roy Gane, "Judgrnent as Covenant Review," ofthe Seventh-day Adventist Church (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University, Department

)
)
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 8, no. 1 (1997): 181-194; Jiri Moskala,
"Toward a Biblical Theology of God's Judgrnent: A Celebration of the Cross in Seven
Phases of Divine Universal Judgrnent (An Over-view of a Theocentric-Christocentric
I ofReligion and Biblical Languages, 2014), 41, 44, 45, 375-386. The authors noted that the
results may not represent the overall picture ofAdventist young adults in North America due
to the particular demographics of those who choose to study at Andrews University and
decided to take the class in which that survey was done.
Approach)," Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 15, no. 1 (2004): 138-165; Roy 128
Gane, Who's Afraid ofthe Judgment?: The Good News About Christ's Work in the Heavenly Of course, without a proper large-scale survey it is difficult to determine whether
) these reasons are the common underlying causes of the perceived practical insignificance
Sanctuary (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 2006); Martin Probstle, Himmel auf Erden: Gott
) begegnet uns im Heiigtum, 2nd en!. ed. (Vienna, Austria: Seminar Schloss Bogenhofen, of the sanctuary doctrine. Personal observations may nevertheless suggest that the reasons
2013). mentioned above are among several issues that create problems for many.
)
_)

188 DENIS KAISER
is either too strict (requiring every creature to keep a law that is impossible to keep),
or he is too lenient (remitting everyone's failures and sins). The basic question is,
how is God both just and merciful in saving some and condemning others? This
question judges God at the core of his character of love and holiness.
It has been mentioned earlier in this paper that the sins and transgressions of
God's professing people defile the sanctuary in two ways. Some repent of their sins
and follow the divinely appointed way of removing sin from the transgressor.
Others commit sins ofrebellion and follow their own alternative plan of salvation,
yet their sins are associated with God and bis sanctuary because as members of his
community they represent him. The first group trusts in God's means offorgiveness
and salvation; the second group pursues their own way of salvation, thereby
replacing the true sanctuary service. While the first course of action transfers sins
legally to the sanctuary and defiles it, the other one illegally contaminates the
sanctuary through the air. Since both groups are professed members of God's
people, their behavior and actions either represent or misrepresent his character and
plan of salvation. That is why a final assessment is required which comes in the
form of the Day of Atonement. The high priest (Jesus Christ) who functions as the
people's representative and substitute entered the Most Holy Place in place of all
those who during the daily service trusted in God's means of forgiveness and
salvation. Thus God is vindicated in his act of saving them. Other members of
God's people who take alternative ways contaminate the true sanctuary illegally.
On the Day of Atonement their sins fall back on them and they are blotted out from
among the people. God is vindicated in his act of judging them. This assessment
allows God to be just and merciful at the same time. Therefore the sanctuary can
be cleansed from the transgressions and sins of the people, and ultimately from
Satan's charges against God. These incidents describe both the salvific and the
condemnatory aspects of the Day of Atonement. It is both a day of salvation and a
day of judgment. There is no creative leeway for humanity in regard to salvation.
God shows very clearly how salvation can be brought about and how he will
eventually solve the sin problem and the issue it poses to the wellbeing and destiny
of the universe. A deviation from his plan distorts the illustration of how salvation
comes about and how ultimate reconciliation will take place. T he Day of
Atonement shows that God is both just and merciful. Before the entire universe God
is vindicated in his character against Satan's charges.
Beyond the universal dimensions of the Day of Atonement, there are also
practical earthly dimensions of that event. In 1844, the knowledge of God's true
heavenly sanctuary and its services began to be restored. The proclamation of the
sanctuary message through the Sabbatarian Adventist movement pointed people to
that true sanctuary in heaven and Jesus' high-priestly ministry. The proclamation
of this message called attention to the true worship, the true way of salvation, and
the true intercessory ministry. While in that sense the heavenly sanctuary ministry
was restored, it also clarified that religious denominations that reproduced a
sanctuary, priesthood, sacrifices, etc. on earth and restricted the attention of the
believers to these earthly services actually erected a counterfeit sanctuary service
and salvation plan. Thus God 's true heavenly sanctuary with its services (his true
)
)
THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORJCAL PERSPECTIVE 189 )
plan of salvation) and bis character of love and holiness began to be vindicated )
before humanity. Seventh-day Adventists have engaged in this work of cleansing,
restoring, and vindicating God, his character, his plan of salvation, Christ's
ministration, and his way of dealing with the sin problem. That is why this )
movement was called into life. Hence it is the work of each believer to personally )
participate in that work.
Possible ramifications of a slightly limited view of Satan's claims, the nature )
of sin, salvation, the work of the Holy Spirit, the vindication ofGod, and atonement
may be seen in the teaching of the "Last Generation Theology" as it was developed )
by M. L. Andreasen (1876-1962), an influential Adventist educator and theologian
in the 1930s and 1940s. Since his view of the antitypical Day of Atonement results
from his assumptions and presuppositions, these will be explained before his view
of atonement is mentioned. The section will conclude with a comparison of )
Andreasen's view to Ellen G. White's writings, which are often seen as the source
for Andreascn's view. 129 Concentrating on only one of the two charges, namely that
God asked obedience to a law that could not be kept, Andreasen concluded that it
was necessary to prove only that man can keep the law. He argued that Jesus '
perfect life provided humans with an example of how they can keep the law, but it
was still not sufficient to disprove Satan's charge. While he viewed Job as the
prime example of perfect human obedience, Andreasen argued that it was )
nevertheless only an imperfect example because it did not occur under common )
circumstances. In order to vindicate God there has to be at least one person or one
generation that will demonstrate beyond a doubt that humans can keep the law
without divine aid and intervention. Thus it will be the struggle of the last
generation of believers on this earth to live a perfect sinless life. Andreasen
concluded that this generation will conquer Satan and disprove his charge. It is only )
when believers stop sinning, he argued, that sin can be removed from the heavenly
sanctuary. Consequently, complete atonement depends on human performance. 130
Whereas many people assume that Andreasen 's concept corresponds with Ellen G.
White 's view oflast-day events, it should be noted that Andreasen went beyond the
basic elements common to both him and White, integrating them systematically into
a special end-time scenario and assigning to the last generation's victory a
significance that is foreign to her writings. Ellen G. White mentioned that Satan
accused God of two things: God is too strict, for he requires humans to keep a law
that is impossible to keep, and God is too lenient, because he just forgives them.
Depending on the circumstances, Satan employs either the first or the second
129
This paragraph depends on the comparison found in Paul M. Evans, "A HistoricaJ- j
Contex:tual Analysis of the Final-Generation Theology of M. L. Andreasen" (Ph.D.
)
dissertation, Andrews University, 20 IO); Woodrow W. Whidden, Ellen White on Salvation:
A Chronological Study (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1995), 132-142; Woodrow
W. Whidden, The Judgment and Assurance: The Dynamics of Personal Salvation J
(Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 201 2), 146-152.
130 )
M. L. Andreasen, The Sanctuary Service, 2nd rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Review
and Herald, 1947), 302, 303, 309-321.
)
)
)
)
190 D ENIS KAISER THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 191
)
) charge. 131 Ultimately, he claims that God cannot be just and merciful at the same gained the victory over Satan. 138 Another striking difference appears regarding the
time, an accusation that cuts at the root of God's character ofholy love. While both cleansing of the heavenly sanctuary. White emphasized that believers should
White and Andreasen affirmed that Jesus ' life on earth demonstrated that it is confess their failures and sins as long as Jesus is still ministering in the heavenly
possible for man to keep God's law, White places another emphasis which is absent sanctuary so that these sins may be blotted out. Then God will place his seal on
) them to protect them through the time of trouble. 139 Thus atonement and the
in Andreasen' s writings, namely that Jesus ' obedience did, in fact, vindicate God's
) character and his dealings with the rebellion of Satan. 132 Talking about the last and cleansing of the sanctuary are based on what God has done rather than on human
complete demonstration to be given in the time of trouble, White suggested that it performance. The two different views have an impact on the practical Christian life.
) While M. L. Andreasen urged believers to obey the. law because the last generation
was to be a demonstration of evil so that once and for all the true character of Satan
)
)
and the terrible consequences of sin become visible. This will uproot even the last
sympathy and affection for him and his temptations in a way that nothing else
could. 133 In the context of the last-day events, White did not connect the last
l has to live victoriously without divine help through the time of trouble to rebuff
Satan's charge (behavior-oriented), Ellen G. White urged believers to confess their
sins and put their faith in Jesus because the last generation will be lost without trust
generation's overcoming of sin with the vindication of God. It is rather in the in Jesus and complete dependence on him.
)
context of the pouring out of the last plagues or the postmillennial execution Not being aware ofthe herrneneutical principles on which Roman Catholic and
) judgment that she talks about God's vindication. 134 Similarly, the struggle of the Protestant theology were built, we tend to adopt views, trends, and practices from
believers in the last generation is not primarily to maintain perfect obedience but other religious denominations. Thus it may not be surprising for us when some
) to persevere in their faith and trust in Jesus, the power of his forgiveness, and the Adventists refer to the church building or the worship room as the sanctuary,
) divine promises. 135 Although the restraining influence ofthe Holy Spirit is removed temple, or tabernacle. Accordingly, chairs, benches, pulpits, and the room itself are
from the wicked, he will not leave the believers alone when the powers of darkness regarded as possessing sacred qualities, and it is suggested to avoid common use
) break loose. Realizing the depth of their own weakness, helplessness, and the of these pieces of furniture and locations. Others attribute sacred qualities to the
inherent sinful tendencies, they will hold fast to their Redeemer in faith, trust the emblems of the Lord's Supper. Still others surmise that the act of ministerial
)
guidance of the Holy Spirit, and be comforted and protected by angels. 136 ordination transmits special virtues, qualifications, and powers. 140 While I believe
) Interestingly, White referred to Joshua the high priest, Jacob, and Enoch (rather that we should stand and kneel in awe and reverence before God, I also believe that
than Job) as examples for the last generation to emulate during the time of trouble, all these common sacerdotal and sacramental understandings have their origin in
) emphasizing the endurance of their faith. 137 While she mentioned the victory ofthe other traditions and are incompatible with the biblical motif of the true heavenly
) saints over temptations and trials, she emphasized that it was Christ who ultimately sanctuary. In fact, they may unconsciously turn people away from the true heavenly
ministry to an earthly sanctuary and earthly services. It is therefore necessary to
) 131
Ellen G. White, The Desire ofAges (Oakland, CA: Pacific Press, 1898), 761; Ellen study the similarities and dissimilarities of the ancient sanctuary service and the
G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets: or, The Great Conflict Between Good and Evil as sanctuary service of the new covenant. Since both clergy and laity are a royal
) priesthood who aid their heavenly high priest Jesus in his ministry, one may ask
Illustrated in the Lives ofHoly Men of Old (Oakland, CA: Pacific Press, 1890), 69.
) 132
Ellen G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 9 vols. (Mountain View, CA: Pacific what it means to serve as a priest here on earth. Clearly, the one true sacrifice was
Press, 1948), 8:207, 208; Ellen G. White, "Christ and the Law: Or the Relations ofthe Jew
) and Gentile to the Law," Signs ofthe Times, 25 August 1887, 513; White, Patriarchs and
Prophets, 68, 69.
j Ellen G. White, "Unity and Love," Review and Herald, 12 August 1884, 513.
133

) Ellen G. White, The Great Controversy between Christ and Satan: The Conflict of
134

the Ages in the Christian Dispensation (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 1911), 504, 138
627,628. White, The Desire of Ages, 758; Ellen G. White, Selected Messages, 3 vols.
) (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald, 1958, 1980), 1:255, 349.
Ellen G. White, Spirit of Prophecy, vol. 1 (Battle Creek, MI: Steam Press of the
135
139
) Seventh-day Adventist Pub. Assn., 1870), 125; Ellen G. White, "Our Advocate and Our White, Early Writings ofMrs. White, 48, 43.
140
Adversary," Review and Herald, 22 September 1896, 598. See Denis Kaiser, "Setting Apart for the Ministry: Theory and Practice in Seventh-
j 136
White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 20 l; Ellen G. White, Spiritual Gifts: Testimonyfor day Adventism (1850-1920)," Andrews University Seminary Studies 51, no. 2 (2013): 198,
the Church, Number One-Ten (Battle Creek, MI: Steam Press ofthe Seventh-day Adventist 199. Interestingly, some early Seventh-day Adventist writers connected specific views and
) Pub. Assn., 1864), 44; White, The Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan, 620, 623, practices of ordination with apostate Christianity. Thus, talking about Christianity in the
631. second century, E. J. Waggoner stated that the church introduced "mysterious forms of
) ordination," connected them ''with the Old Testament priesthood," and attached to them
137
Ellen G. White, The Captivity and Restoration ofIsrael: The Conflict ofthe Ages
) Illustrated in the Lives ofProphets and Kings (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1917), "external tokens ofpeculiar sanctity." See E. J. Waggoner, "The Church-True and False,"
588, 589; White, The Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan, 619,620. Present Truth, 14 December 1893, 582.
)
)
 )

)
192 D ENIS KAISER THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY MOTIF IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 193
f )
already offered two thousand years ago and does not need to be repeated. Yet, we special attention to considerations ab out the practical significance of these beliefs
are to bring sacrifices oflove, praise, thanksgiving, obedience, and consecration. 141 -j as younger generations of believers estimate the importance of a particular belief )
based on its manifest practical relevance. If scholars fail to take these
)
Summary and Conclusion considerations into account and fail to communicate them in intelligible language
Although the theme of Jesus Christ as our h eavenly high priest has not been to the church, they have to expect that an increasing number of p eople will thrust
absent from the writings of theologians in the history of Christianity, the aside the sanctuary doctrine and other pivotal beliefs of the Seventh-day Adventist
documentary evidence seems to suggest that theological reflection about the biblical Church. Fernando Canale may be commended for his efforts to call attention to )
sanctuary motif was heavily influenced by the philosophical presuppositions of developments regarding the role and place of the sanctuary doctrine within the set )
such influential philosophical and theological thinkers as Plato, Philo, Origen, and of Adventist beliefs. While he probably wished to see the materialization of a
Augustin e. The philosophical foundations ofa timeless and non-spatial view of the complete and harmonious system of truth centering around the sanctuary doctrine
nature of God and the heavenly realm precluded the idea of a spatio-temporal during his academic years, there may possibly be no greater honor than for him to )
building in heaven. The allegorical interpretation of Scripture drove the typological see how former colleagues and students work towards the materialization of such
understanding of particular passages to extremes. Thus most early interpreters a system that is still open for future improvements.
concluded that the OT tabernacle prefigured the Christian church as the body of
Christ who is the true tent of God. It seems that in the medieval period interpreters Denis Kaiser, a native of Germany, studied in his home country, Austria, and the United .)
applied more and more details of the biblical sanctuary to the structure, liturgy, and States, and earned degrees in tax law, theology, and church history. He is currently
practices of the Roman Catholic Church. It could be argued that the knowledge of completing a Ph.D. in Adventist Studies and Historical Theology at the Seventh-day
a literal spatial heavenly sanctuary disappeared, being replaced by spatio-temporal Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University, and is teaching Adventist history at
the same institution as well as serving as assistant annotator of Ellen G. White's letters and
temples on earth where, during Mass, priests repeatedly offered Christ afresh as a manuscripts for the Ellen G. White Estate. His research interests include the life and
sacrifice on an altar. The Protestant Reformers took issue with this sacrificial J
ministry of Ellen G. White and the development of beliefs and hermeneutics in Adventist
understanding, but they were unable to divest themselves of the philosophical history. He is happily married to Angelika. Email: denis@andrews.edu. )
foundations of Greek philosophy and pierce through that wall to an understanding
of a literal sanctuary in heaven. It seems that it was not until the mid-19th century,
when Sabbatarian Adventism discovered the biblical sanctuary doctrine, that a
hermeneutical shift took place in this regard. These considerations are in harmony
with Fernando Canale's views.
Reflecting on the discoveries ofthe early Sabbatarian Adventists and the recent
scholarly contributions of Seventh-day Adventist scholars, I agree with Canale that
future generations of Adventist theologians, philosophers, and historians should
engage in summarizing, systematizing, and consolidating these discoveries and
contributions into a coherent doctrine of the sanctuary which is fumly founded in J
Scripture and easily comprehensible. Beyond the mere systematizing of that
doctrine, there is a need to seriously study the relationships between the biblical
sanctuary motif and other beliefs such as the nature of man in death, the second
corning of Christ, the Great Controversy, last-day events, the phases ofjudgment,
justification and sanctification, the Sabbath, atonement, divine-human relationships,
the vindication ofGod, Christian priesthood, worship, prayer, intercession, etc. This
task is in accordance with Canale's as well as the early SabbatarianAdventists' call
for a development of a complete and harmonious system of truth. Furthermore,
beyond the mere affirmation of traditional beliefs, this study process should give

1 1
• See Rom 12:1; Eph 5:2; Phil 4:1 8; Heb 13:16; 1 Pet 2:5. Cf. Michael Allen, "The
Theo-Logic of Exaltation in the Epistle to the Hebrews: A Reply to David Moffitt," Paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society, Baltimore, MD,
November 20, 2013.
J
; )
)
)
)
From Metaphysics to Templephysics:
)
) Situating the Significance of
) Fernando Canale's Contributions for the
'Christian Philosopher'
) words, I share Canale's conviction that the tasks of the Christian theologian and
I
by Michael F. Younker
) grounded in Scripture. 3
)
1. Background
) For the Christian, in what ways are philosophy and theology different? What
is it, exactly, that philosophy does that contributes to or affects the task of the
) theologian? Why can't theologians just ignore 'philosophical' issues and stick with
theology? Within Christian scholarship, the contributions ofFemando Canale 1 have
)
raised the level of critical dialogue for these questions and other related issues in
) recent times, and it is the purpose of this essay to briefly explain the overall
significance of just what, exactly, Canale has accomplished for the 'Christian
) example-but in importantly different ways, which is why there is bound to be ·'
philosopher,' and point the way forward to some work that should call for the
) attention of those following after him.
The approach I will follow here will be one that aims for the 'big picture,' and
) not one focusing on various specific technical details that sometimes distract the
) reader. 2 First, I will illustrate just what it is Canale has uncovered about the
historical origin and current trajectory of traditional metaphysics, alongside some
) of my own insights. Second, I will describe how the traditional primary task of
) philosophy, that is, the development of a 'metaphysics,' is fundamentally
transformed through Canale's recovery of its starting point in Scripture. In other
) l Canale insists, despite some objectors, that "there is such a thing as a biblical
words, Canale points us towards a fundamentally new sort of metaphysics that is
) biblically grounded. I will label it templephysics for some very specific reasons I'll
share below (see section 6). This transformation will prove to require a little
j explanatory unpacking because it not only solves, I believe, but also creates a
.J
) 1
I had the distinct privilege of enjoying several courses with Fernando Canale during
his time teaching at the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary in Berrien Springs,
) Michigan, and his lectures and published works fundamentally reoriented the direction of
my own academic research. I am gratefully indebted to his contributions, and have become
) 4
similarly committed to raising up an awareness ofjust how important it is for Christians to
j carefully reflect upon their one and only foundation, the Scriptures which reveal Jesus
Christ, as they live their lives in service toward and witness of their Creator.
.) 2
For other portrayals focusing on different (though not all ofthe) technical aspects that
Canale has addressed, see the excellent treatments in this volume by Sven Fockner, Dennis
) Kaiser, Zane Yi, and Oliver Glanz. I will further comment upon some of the "technical
details" about what it is philosophy is struggling with throughout the essay where
) Seminary Studies, 31#3 (Autumn, 1993), 184.
appropriate.
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 195
number of questions and challenges for the traditional philosopher, questions that
many theologians and some philosophers might overlook.
Proceeding with the hope that theologians might become more interested and
engaged with the important challenges of philosophy that have occupied Canale
throughout his career is the hope of this chapter. To summarize it in just a few
Christian philosopher, respectively, should be merged together into one unified task
2. Introduction
Without any doubt, as academic disciplines, 'philosophy' (the love/search for
wisdom) and 'theology' (study of God) have experienced a long and complexly
intertwined history. 4 Although every philosopher and theologian will acknowledge
the mutual interdependence of their crafts throughout history, each will be just as
quick to point out that much of their shared history has also been contentious,
especially in recent times. The basic problem rests upon the fact that both
"philosophy and theology make claim to much the same turf-both are interested in
the questions of God and of the good life and of what being 'human' means, for
competition and conflict between them, along with the possibility of cooperation. " 5
Similarly, it is the conviction ofCanale that the parallel histories ofphilosophy
and the history of theology have a very intentional relationship owing to their
overlapping interests, such as that of God, human nature, reality, reason, etc. 6
Furthermore, whil_e it may be true that there are specific interests that reside more
philosophy and a biblical system. In Scripture, ofcourse, neither the system nor the answers
to classical philosophical issues are formulated in the technical language of the scholarly
world," Fernando Canale, "Is There Room for Systematics in Adventist Theology?," in The
Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 12#2 (Autumn, 2001), 130. Canale believes
that "[Seventh-day] Adventist theology stands or falls on the sola Scriptura principle" and
that "its system" can "be drawn from Scripture itself," Ibid. Canale also cites Ellen White,
who asserts that Scripture ''unfolds a simple and complete system of theology and
philosophy," Fundamentals ofChristian Education, 129. See also, Fernando Canale, "On
Being the Remnant," in The Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 24#1 (Spring,
2013), 152,168,170,171.
It is also a history that is frequently revisited. For one recent survey by a Christian
theologian and philosopher, see John M. Frame, A History of Western Philosophy and
Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 2015).
5
John Caputo, Philosophy and Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2006), 5.
6
Fernando Canale affirms, "both biblical and systematic theologies need to interpret
the same issues as [those that] philosophy interprets (God, human nature, reality, reason,
etc.)," "Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New Approach," in Andrews University

196 MICHAEL F. YOUNKER
comfortably within one of the respective disciplines per se, it is truly impossible to
fully separate the central concerns which interest both the philosopher and
theologian. Some theological questions require specific philosophical
presuppositions, and certain philosophical assumptions result in definite theological
conclusions.
It has b een the overarching theme ofCanale's writings to return the scholarly
dia logue about philosophical issues to the Bible, to see if Scripture itself addresses
concerns that are perceived as more philosophical in nature in contrast to those
which are more traditionally categorized as theological. He has done this in order
to understand how Christian theology might have received, consciously or
unconsciously, incorrect(non-biblical)philosophical assumptions.7 Canale adheres
to the conviction that there is a distinct significance to be found in utilizing
Scripture alone (the sola-tota-prima Scriptura approach8) as one's foundational
interpretive starting point for philosophical questions, and, as such, we should be
open to modifying the ways in which biblical theology ought to proceed. Canale
has done this by both offering a critical and descriptive deconstruction, as well as
the beginnings of a reconstruction.9 Canale's belief is that sincere Christian
7
As Canale shares, "While it should be recognized that neither systematic nor biblical
theologies are independent from philosophical issues, they may be developed in
independence from human philosophical interpretations. Therefore, a momentous
methodological distinction needs to be decisively drawn between philosophical issues and
their interpretation. The human discipline we designate as philosophy involves both issues
and interpretations. Issues are the problems to be addressed, for instance, God, man, reality
as a whole, [and] reason. Interpretations are the way in which these issues have been
understood by various philosophical schools throughout the history ofphilosophy. Human
philosophy provides solutions to the issues on the basis of natural information and the use
of human reason and imagination" apart from any divinely revealed Revelation, Canale,
"Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New Approach," 184.
• Canale details this approach in Fernando Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology:
Th e Role of Me thod in Theological Accommodation (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University Lithotech, 2005), 98-99. "The so fa Scriptura view maintains that Scripture alone
can provide theological data. The prima Scriptura conviction maintains that Adventist
theology should build its doctrines upon a plurality of sources, among which Scripture has
the primary or normative role." "The Iota Scriptura principle refers to the interpretation of
all biblical contents and the inner logic form the biblically interpreted hermeneutical
condition of theological method (so/a Scriptura)," Ibid.
9
Canale undertakes his overall endeavor through two major steps to prepare the way
for a third, final, leap. First, he critically analyzed the role ofReason and its relationship to
fundamental ontology and classical metaphysics in the history of theology and the biblical
context ofExodus 3: 14-15; see Fernando Canale, A Criticism ofTheolog ical Reason: Time
and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Press, 1983). Second, Canale further elaborated on the role of hermeneutics and how
biblical hermeneutics is affected by philosophical issues such as the subject-object
relationship; see Fernando Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology: A
)
)
FROM M ETAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 197 )
f
philosophers, claiming Scripture as their primary (and only foundational) source,
t should refer to themselves more precisely as 'biblical philosophers' 10 as they fully
invest themselves in the task ofdeveloping a systematic and metaphysically attuned
)
biblical theology, and not merely 'Christian philosophers,' as this label is too
J encumbered with unwanted connotations about what it is a 'Christian philosopher' )
ought to be doing, and leaves open questions about from where he is deriving his
sources for philosophical reflection- natural reason or Scripture. 11
In the following sections I will provide an overview explaining the overarching )
:l significance ofCanale's philosophical contribution concerning the temporality and
historicality of Being and God in light of the current status of the discipline of
philosophy and its quest after metaphysics. To do so, first I will describe what it )
is that Canale has helped uncover about both the crisis and direction of
contemporary theology and philosophy, with some additional insights from my own
research inspired by his work, before I then turn toward explaining the significance
of his own achievements thus far. Note, I will not primarily be explicating his
project in itself(that has been done elsewhere in this volume), but rather applying
his way ofthinking to the world of contemporary philosophy in a way he has not yet
done. I will attempt to "think alongside" Canale on a journey through contemporary )
philosophy and metaphysics, and conclude with my proposal that his work may be
more properly classified as templephysics.
3. The Status of Philosophy Today
It so happens that in the world of mainstream secular academic philosophy
today, there is som ething of a crisis, both technically speaking and more
)
Hermeneutical Study ofthe Re velation and Inspiration ofthe Bible (Berrien Springs, MI:
Andrews University Lithotech, 2005). Canale's third step, centering on the biblical
Sanctuary, will be described below, and is outlined in his overarching article, "On Being the
Remnant."
10
As supported by Christian Wannenmacher, The Problem ofEvil-Vital Changes in
the History ofan Idea (Mfinchen, Germany: Inaugural-Dissertation, Ludwig-Maximilians-
Universitat, 201 1), 189; 49-62. See also, Canale, "Is There Room for Systematics in
Adventist Theology?," 130. I recall Canale making comments to the effect that the only true
philosopher that is a Christian is a 'biblical philosopher,' as there is no other kind of
philosophy that a Christian ought to be doing.
11
This is because, both historically, and even today, most theologians are uncritically
borrowing their metaphysical (philosophical) ideas from both Christian and non-Christian
philosophers who are relying on "reason" rather than grounding their ideas about the
fundamental nature of reality (metaphysics) within Scripture itself, suggests Fernando )
Canale, "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology, Part III:
Sanctuary and Hermeneutics," in The Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 17#2 J
(Autumn, 2006), 42-44.
)
)
)
)
)
198 MICHAEL F. YOUNKER
)
) "sociologically." 12 It has been long in awakening, and has no easy solutions in
sight, though some alarming patterns and possible directions for philosophy's future
are nevertheless developing. One of the key reasons for the present crisis is that
) while in the past it may have been acknowledged there were unresolved problems
in philosophy, the methods to solve such issues were more agreed upon than today
) (this does not in itselfrepresent a good thing, such methods may have been flawed).
Presently, however, it seems people literally don't know what it is philosophy ought
to be doing anymore (seeking for wisdom, knowledge, or God?), and there seems
little hope for people to agree upon much of anything anytime soon. Society, and
its socio-cultural-political movements, are fragmenting, even as they spiral in some
predictable directions. 13 In part owing to the "fragmegration" 14 of society, overt
) criticisms of philosophy have also emerged from various segments of our culture.
Notably, not just in the halls of the academy, but now even through popular media
)
figures, 15 philosophy is criticized as a discipline cast adrift in a sea of conflict.
What frames the debate today, as Canale is well aware, is the predominance of
modern science and the rise of postmodernism. 16 On the one hand, developments
_) in modernistic science, deemed by most as tremendously successful and helpful for
society, have actually encouraged an anti-metaphysical leaning amongst many, and
) metaphysics, yet it is the foundation of what created metaphysics, rationalism and
thus, in some ways, actually helped create postmodernism. It is an irony, however,
) empiricism, that created both scientific modernism and its ultimate collapse into
because those who work directly in the so-called 'hard sciences' are often the
) Burtt's now widely accepted thesis that the foundations ofmodern science and mathematics
) mysticism," Stephen Prickett, Narrative, Religion and Science: Fundamentalism Versus
12
John McCumber, On Philosophy: Notes from a Crisis (Stanford, CA: Stanford
) A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations ofModern Science (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003).
University Press, 2013). Mccumber describes the situation concerning the relative respect
) "philosophers" have in society-one of increasing irrelevance. See also, Aaron Preston,
Analytic Philosophy: The History ofan Illusion (New York, NY: Continuum, 20 IO); and
) Christopher Stephen Lutz, Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: Relativism,
Thomism, and Philosophy (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2004), I.
13
See my own effort to describe this and its consequences, Michael F. Younker, "The
American Socio-Political Spider Web and the Rise of Global Christianity," in The Journal
ofthe Adventist Theological Society 25#1 (Spring, 2014), 132-188.
J 14
Note the work of sociologist James N. Rosenau, Distant Proximities: Dynamics
Beyond Globalization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). "The label ...
.) ' fragmegration' ... is intended to suggest the pervasive interaction between fragmenting and
integrating dynamics unfolding at every level of community," Ibid., 11. Overall, "the
) fragmegration label has the virtue of sensitizing us to the contradictory tensions wherein the
world is simultaneously moving in opposite directions," Ibid., 12.
) 15
For example, Matthew Facciani, "Bill Nye is Completely Ignorant
) aboutPhilosophy,"athttp ://www.patheos.com/blogs/accordingtomatthew/2016/02/bill-nye
-is-completely-ignorant-about-philosophy/. Accessed March 13, 2016.
) 16
See, for example, Fernando Canale, "Absolute Theological Truth in Postmodern
Times," in Andrews University Seminary Studies (45#1, 2007), 90-91; and Canale's
) 21
response to Ervin Taylor, an anthropologist specializing in C14 dating. Fernando Canale,
) "On the Future ofAdventism: Reason or Debate?" in Andrews University Seminary Studies
(46#2, 2008), 215-227.
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 199
strongest critics of 'metaphysics,' thinking empirical science is all that is needed. 17
Yet, at the same time, those who are immersed in postmodernism have also become
averse to metaphysics. 18 However, the postmoderns' skepticism toward
metaphysics can be traced, to a large degree, to their observation of the collapse of
the amazing (and seemingly undeniable) successes of contemporary science 19 into
20
scientism. They have become skeptical of any program which aims to provide an
overarching picture of what it is philosophy ought (ethically) to do, and therefore
they must also reject anything resembling the classical notion ofmetaphysics, which
postmoderns now see most insidiously, as it is hidden, in modern science itself(as
scientism),2 1 even as the community of scientists openly deny any metaphysical
17
Some scientists remain confident, for example, that modernistic "western science will
likely outlive postmodernism. It may already have," Howard V. Hendrix, "Fighting Out of
Context: Culture Wars Within and Without Science Fiction, from Snow to Sokal," 37-48,
in Science Fiction and the Two Cultures: Essays on Bridging the Gap Between the Sciences
and the Humanities, ed. Gary Westfahl and George Edgar Slusser(Jefferson, NC: McFarland
& Company, 2009), 46. The irony is that both scientists and postmoderns have rejected
postmodernism (see also n. 37). Note Stephen Prickett, who makes reference to "E. A.
lie not in the Aristotelian tradition of observation and experiment, but in Platonic
Irony, 1700-1999 (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 185. See also, E.
18
"The mast majority ofcontemporary so-called postmodern continental philosophy of
religion is post- or anti-metaphysical," Christopher Ben Simpson, Religion, Metaphysics,
and the Postmodern: William Desmond and John D. Caputo (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2009), 2.
19
As Gary Madison observes, "scientific knowledge is nothing more than the
expression of a certain intellectual technique: the scientific method. This technique has
proven useful for certain purposes, but the failure on our part to realize its inherent
limitations has had as its consequence the accelerating reduction of all cultural values to
those ofscience," G. B. Madison, Understanding: A Phenomenological-Pragmatic Analysis
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 11.
20
"Scientism is the belief, or the ideal, that there are no genuine explanations other than
those of the natural sciences. Positively stated, scientism is the ideal that the explanations
ofscience be in principle complete, not needing supplementation by philosophy or theology.
This ideal provides a strong incentive to deny the existence of causes except those with
which natural science can deal, namely, natural causes," David Ray Griffin, God and
Religion in the Postmodern World: Essays in Postmodern Theology (Albany, NY: State
University ofNew York Press, 1989), 75. See also, Mikael Stenmark, Scientism: Science,
Ethics and Religion (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2001).
Robert Eaglestone, "Postrnodernism and Ethics Against the Metaphysics of
Comprehension," in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Steven Connor
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 183, 190-192.

200 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
agenda. So the postmoderns complain that at least the traditional Christian
metaphysicians were more transparent about their goals, while today's community
of scientists profess an anti-metaphysical stance even as their views implicitly
l
contain a metaphysics.
The contentious situation above is important because the application of the
empirical sciences through technology have had an ever increasing influence upon
the now agnostic and relativistic Western society at large, and likewise upon
theology, through the rise of theistic evolution and panentheistic theories. 22
Whether or how modern science may have created or influenced agnosticism and
postmodern relativism remains in itself an intriguing issue.
In any case, the profound influence of modern science upon society has come
about so rapidly that the wider world of both the secular and Christian academy has
actually had trouble understanding or even perceiving its actual consequences and
possible destinations.23 We ' re on the verge ofa 'new dawn' ofrapidly evolving and
often conflicting24 philosophical reflections in the secular and religious worlds and
Christians are ill-equipped to cope with the changes which often match scientific
conclusions against traditionally accepted Scriptural dictums. Those who oppose
Christianity have been happy to support these clashes, pointing to the u selessness
of Scripture to help us resolve philosophical problems. The sum of it is that the
dominance of modern natural science, and the technological culture that has
developed around it, has banished and therefore restrained all "religious talk" and
traditional metaphysics to the Seminaries (which sometimes advance aggressive
defensive apologetic efforts to revive classical metaphysics). Simultaneously,
however, our technological culture has encouraged the secular mainstream academy
22
Note, for example, John W. Cooper, Panentheism-The Other God of the
Philosophers: From Plato to the Present (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006); and
Robin Attfield, Creation, Evolution and Meaning (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing,
2013).
23
"A contradiction, sometimes noted, more often overlooked, has long characterized
discussion ofthe relationship between science and technology and ethics. On the one hand,
it has been maintained that science and technology are morally neutral, and that when and
if moral issues do arise, it is society, not science, that is responsible for dealing with them.
On the other hand, it has been customary, and often among those who simultaneously make
the first claim, to extol the moral qualities demanded of the scientists: a devotion to truth,
impeccable honesty, respect for the evidence, and so forth. Obviously the two claims are
incompatible. . . . The ethical foundation of science is prior and primary to the pursuit of
science." Furthermore, "the tragedy of many scientists today who have been concerned
about the many problems that threaten the earth: there is no grounding in the dominant
scientistic world view fo r their own commitments as scientists or for their own highest ideals
as to how science ought to be used," Douglas Sloan,Insight-lmagination: The Emancipation
of Thought and the Modern World (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983), 92-94.
24
James N. Rosenau, The Study ofWorld Politics, Vol. 2 (New York, NY: Routledge,
2006), 27, 104-105.
)
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 201
)
to seek to replace the practical side of theology's influence upon society, that is,
social ethics, with "ever better science" that now lacks the "baggage" of any )
religious traditions. In other words, the claim is made that social ethics, based on )
good science, can displace or replace the need for any theology and religious ethics.
For example, one can only muse over the ironies of an atheistic scientist who
denies free-will, such as Sam Harris, insisting that science can determine ethical
(moral) values and g uide society toward the truth of what is "right."25 I pause-just J
what has happened to enable the world of scholarship to take somewhat seriously )
an atheist who denies free-will to be free to guide us on a discussion about
morality?26 (Could there be any position more antithetical to that of Scripture's
)
)
25
For example, see the noted atheist Sam Harris, The End ofFaith: Religion, Terror,
and the Future ofR eason (London, UK: W.W. Norton & Company Ltd, 2005); Sam Harris,
Letter to a Christian Nation (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2008); and Sam Harris, The
Moral Landscape: How Science Can Determine Human Values (New York, NY: Free Press,
20 l 0). Harris explains, "if there are right and wrong answers to ethical questions, these
answers will be best sought in the living present. . . . The pervasive idea that religion is
somehow the source of our deepest ethical intuitions is absurd. We no more get our sense
that cruelty is wrong from the pages of the Bible than we get our sense that two plus two
equals four from the pages of a textbook on mathematics," Harris, The End ofFaith, 171- )
172. Elsewhere Harris observes, "while the argument I make in this book is bound to be
controversial, it rests on a very simple premise: human well-being entirely depend on events
in the world and on states of the human brain. Consequently, there must be scientific truths
to be known about it. A more detailed understanding of these truths will force us to draw
clear distinctions between different ways ofliving in society with one another,judging some
to be better or worse, more or less true to the facts, and more or less ethical. Clearly, such
insights could help us to improve the quality of human life-and this is where academic
debate ends and choices affecting the lives of millions of people begin," Harris, The Moral
Landscape, 2-3. · .
26
Atheists who invoke ethics have, by default, fallen prey to scientism. "The ideology
of scientism, the belief that the methods and insights of science are applicable to the entire
sphere of human activity, aims to validate moral acts on scientific grounds. Indeed, this
perspective sees scientific knowledge as the only kind of authentic knowledge. From this
viewpoint, the only rational alternative would be an ethical nihilism under which everything )
is permitted, since the traditional theological grounding of ethics is seen as a morass of )
irrational superstitions belonging to a prescientific age. This perception is widespread, and
underlies the broad popular appeal ofscientism, despite its more or less general rejection by
contemporary philosophers and the often-repeated exposure of its potentially dangerous
political consequences as a rational basis for the totalitarian state," Gunther S. Stent, "The
Poverty of Scientism and the Promise of Structuralist Ethics," in The Roots of Ethics:
Science, Religion, and Values, ed. Daniel Callahan and H. Tristram Englehardt, Jr. (New
York, NY: Plenum Press, 1981 ), 243. See also, Tom Sorell, Scientism: Philosophy and the
Infatuation with Science (New York, NY: Routledge, 1991); Richard N. Williams and
J
Daniel N. Robinson, ed., Scientism: The New Orthodoxy (New York, NY: Bloomsbury,
2015); Huston Smith, Beyond the Postmodern Mind: The Place ofMeaning in a Global
Civilization (Wheaton, IL: Theosophical Publishing, 2003); and Alan Tjeltveit, Ethics and
)
)
)
)
202 MICHAEL F. YOUNKER
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 203
)
) 'natural' and 'supernatural.' Mathematics is not a part ofphysics or nature, and yet
position?) The answer to this phenomena in the modern academy can only be found
is also not 'super' natural. Mathematics is 'meta' physical. To emphasize the
by carefully examining the history ofphilosophy.27 The suggestion I'll posit for the
subtle dualistic usages ofthe phrase metaphysics, note the famous scientist William
moment is that atheistic scientism and its common denial of free-will is the logical
Kelvin, who stated, "mathematics is the only goodmetaphysics,"28 and contrast him
) conclusion of Platonic philosophy applied to nature (scientism).
with the distinguished philosopher Immanuel Kant, who observed that it was
For my present purpose, the question is, what is the relevance of the above
) context for Canale's contributions as a philosophical theologian interested in
actually an understanding of God, freedom, and immortality, that were the aim of
metaphysics.29
Scripture? I propose there are several layers of relevance, some beyond what
I cannot emphasize enough how much confusion has been caused by the mixing
Canale himself has yet fully articulated. Below I shall briefly outline the major
) contours and salient points that relate to Canale's contribution, and the ways in
together ofthe two categories given above-arguably all philosophical problems that
we have and continue to face are the result of mixing these two categories
which the future may yet further reveal the significance of what he has uncovered.
intentionally or unknowingly-mathematics and God. 30 Historically, it evidently
I begin with an overview of what exactly metaphysics is and where it is leading,
) started with two ancient Greek philosophers, Pythagoras and Parmenides, the latter
alongside lines in harmony with Canale's works.
of whom has been where Canale's emphasis has been focused for his introduction
) of timelessness into Being,31 and continued with Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and
4. What is Metaphysics About?
Thomas Aquinas, and thus proceeded to dominate all of the history of Western .
A working definition is necessary for this key term, metaphysics, in part
thought (Western logic and reasoning) in a very distinct way. On the one hand,
because it is this very term (and the concepts it implies or applies to) that serve as
) such a point of confusion for so many people. Of course, defined simply, some have blamed these fathers ofWestern thought for our philosophical struggles
today, but I would suggest a more realistic approach. I believe they merely _
) 'metaphysics' refers to that which is beyond or after 'physics' (what physics is is
)
another question for another place). More broadly and technically, metaphysics
seeks after an understanding of the underlying principles or ideas concerning the
t
) whole ofreality-how things fit together as a system, about the 'one and the many,'
of understanding 'essences,' 'existences,' and 'substances,' etc. Philosophers long I 28
E.T. Bell, Men ofMathematics (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1937), xvii. See
also, Morris Kline, Mathematical Thought From Ancient to Modern Times, Vol. 3 (New
)
J
ago assumed that discovering answers to these questions was one of their primary
tasks-this is what "wise people" should do. l York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1972), 1026.
29
It is none other than the eminent philosopher Immanuel Kant to whom we will grant
the goal of clarifying this purpose for metaphysics- that of explaining God, freedom, and

I
What is of significance for the present purpose is that there are two general
) immortality. See Immanuel Kant, Critique ofJudgment, tr. J. H. Bernard, with Marc Lucht
categories of 'things,' or two specific parts of 'reality,' that are specifically thought
(New York, NY: Barnes & Noble Books, 2005 [1790]), 277-278. "God,freedom, and
to be beyond physics and thus warrant special inclusion under the designation
) immortality, are the problems at the solution of which all the preparations of Metaphysic

j
metaphysics. And they are (1) mathematical/geometrical "objects," and (2) God,
freedom, and immortality (which includes both time and the conditions for living
forever, ethics). I hope it is obvious just why both of these categories are
I aim, as their ultimate and unique purpose," ibid, 277. The "unavoidable problems ... are
God, freedom and immortality." "The science whose final aim in all its preparations is
directed properly only to the solution of these problems is called metaphysics," Immanuel
) Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York, NY:
'metaphysical,' and, as such, physics and metaphysics are not simply synonyms for
) Cambridge University Press, 1998), 139.
'
0
Jean-Yves Lacoste, ed., Encyclopedia of Christian Theology: Vol. 1 (A-F) (New
_) York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 1010. Interestingly, and demonstrative of their traditional
Values in Psychotherapy (London, UK: Routledge, 1999), 111- 114.
27 Although time will not permit me to trace out the history, I would suggest, alongside
relationship, "The nature of the reality of mathematical objects and the objectivity of
) mathematical statements constitute two of the deepest problems in the philosophy of
Carl Raschke, that "the techno-scientific spirit. .. emanates from the same historical forces
mathematics. . . . [Similarly,] the nature of the reality of theological objects and the
) which undergirded Christian subjectism. [Therefore, the classical fusion of platonic
objectivity of theological statements constitute two of the deepest problems in the
philosophy with] Christian theology is the precondition, according to [Martin] Heidegger,
) philosophy ofreligion," Ibid. Note that I concur that these two realities are mysterious!
for the 'process of secularization,"' Carl A. Raschke, The Alchemy ofthe Word: Language 31
For example, see Fernando Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?" in
and the End of Theology (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979), 71. Cf., "For Heidegger,
) Andrews University Seminary Studies 44#1 (2006), 115. See also, Mike Hockney, Science's
modem science and technology is but the culmination and ultimate logical consequence of
War on Reason (Lulu Press, 2016), where he embraces the mathematical rationalists against
) Platonic rationalism," Madison, Understanding: A Phenomenological-Pragmatic Analysis,
the empiricists, even going so far as to claim that science has rejected rationalism, an
13. In other words, the false philosophical foundation of Christianity eventually led to
extreme position- Hockney is a pure Pythagorean; and Arnold Hermann, To Think Like God;
) philosophy's collapse into atheism-platonic 'historical Christianity' is the cause ofatheism.
Pythagoras and Parmenides (Parmenides Publishers, 2004).
Most of Christianity has not yet realized this! See also, n. 88 below.
)
)

204 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
uncovered puzzles about reality that we s till have not answered concerning how all
ofreality relates to itself. Indeed , I would point toward the fact that in the Far East,
the ir intellectual his tory reveals the same problems were uncovered and left
umesolved as well, they just responded to them somewhat differently .32 B elow I
will show h ow history has demonstrated that our efforts to combine the goals of
understanding and applying m athematics to the quest to grasp after God, human
freedom, and immortality (the e thical conditions to live forever through ' time') are
central to understanding how Christianity, and Roman Catholicism in particular,
l 33
created the ir understanding of sacramentality as the means through which
m etaphysics is experientially "experienced ." Additionally, I will explain the
significance and extent of what this means today.
4.1. Ontology, Mathematics, and M etaphysics
The ch allenge raised by mathematics and God, and their relations hip to
philosophy, is simple and 'intuitive.' Some of the early Greek philosophers,
primarily individuals like Pythagoras, Parmenides, Plato, and later others like
Iarnblichus, reasoned that what they ought to be d oing as they began their quest for
"ultimate reality" is to locate those "truths" which are most certain, m ost
incorruptible, and therefore most enduring and "objective." They wanted to create
an 'ontology' ofreality, a collective and universal understanding of that which was
most certain, and for which no one could question or doubt (universality of truths).
(To put a fine point on things, the difference between ontology and epistemology
is that ontology discusses the nature of what it is that is knowable at all, whereas
ep istemology m erely, or d erivatively, discusses theories about how we can know
what we know about the things that are knowable. The nature of the things
themselves, however, is reserved for ontology. Ontology is primary in this respect.)
The Greeks considered the empirical world around them, dominated by organic and
32 For example, the ancient Chinese culture traditionally held a higher esteem for
"organic naturalism" (a temporal reality of becoming) and regarded the study of"history as
the most exalted form of knowledge." This is to be contrasted with the West, which held a
higher regard for timeless "mathematics as the queen of the sciences" and considered
"inorganic naturalism" (physics) as the foundation ofnature, J. T. Fraser, "The Problems of
Exporting Faust," in Time, Science, and Society in China and the West: The Study ofTime
V, ed. J. T. Fraser, N. Lawrence, and F. C. Haber (New York, NY: Springer-Verlag, 1986),
1. Frank Swetz and T. I. Kao assert similarly, for example, that although differences exist,
the more typical attitude toward mathematics in ancient China may be that of the
"humanistic scholars of the Middle Kingdom," who thought that "mathematics was a shu,
a technique, necessary for the ends it could accomplish and unworthy, in itself, as an object
of speculation; in fact, mathematicians enjoyed a social status equivalent to a common
clerk," in Was Pythagoras Chinese?: An Examination ofRight Triangle Theory in Ancient
China (The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977), 16.
)
)
FROM M ETAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 205 )
)
temporal life and death, and the movement and motions of the natural p hysical
world, as less than certain.33 The natural world appeared temporal and transitory. )
Mathematics, on the other hand, revealed a d istinct category of"truths" which
)
appeared permanent, beyond the mere app earances of the p hysical world. 34 Its
)
It is thought that the Pythagoreans were the first to articulate this view around 600
B.C. As Iamblichus writes ofPythagoras around 304 A.D., "He was the first to give a name
to philosophy, describing it as a desire for and love of wisdom, wh ich later he defined as the
)
)
)
science of objectified truth. Beings he defined as immaterial and eternal natures, alone
possessing a power that is efficacious, as are incorporeal essences. The rest of things are
beings only figuratively, and considered such only through the participation ofreal beings;
)
such are corporeal and material forms, which arise and decay without ever truly existing.
Now wisdom is the science of things which are truly existing beings, but not of the mere
figurative entities. Corporeal narures are neither the objects of science, nor admit of a stable
knowledge, since they are indefinite, and by science incomprehensible; and when compared
with universals resemble non-beings, and are in a genuine sense indeterminate. Indeed it is
impossible to conceive that there should be a science of things not naturally the objects of
science; nor could a science of non-existent things prove attractive to any one. Far more J
desirable will be things which are genuine beings, existing in invariable permanency, and j
always answering to their description. For the perception of objects existing only
figuratively, never truly being what they seem to be, fo llows the apprehension ofreal beings,
just as the knowledge of particulars is posterior to the science of universals .. .. For those
genuine beings are intelligible and incorporeal natures, while others are corporeal, falling
under the perception of sense, communicating with that which is really existence only by
participation," Algis Uzdavinys, ed., The Golden Chain: An Anthology ofPythagorean and
Platonic Philosophy (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2004), 28. Pythagoras "frequently
repeated to his disciples" that "'all things accord in number,"' 29.
34
"The idea that there is a world of mathematical objects which is independent of
humans and their ways of thinking, but which is accessible to humans through the exercise
ofreason, is known as Platonism. ... Another name for this view is mathematical realism. )
According to this view, the world of mathematical objects is real (though abstract), and
mathematical knowledge is a matter of discovery, not creation," Jennifer Fisher, On the
Philosophy of Logic (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), 125. Stewart Shapiro .)
cites Bernays who stated in 1935 that "platonism reigns in mathematics today," Steward
Shapiro, Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 27. Mathematics in this view becomes the paradigm, par
excellence, of certainly knowable knowledge that has universal application. As Roman
Murawski explains, "Plato's philosophy ofmathematics grew out of his theory of ideas. He
claimed that the subject of mathematics are mathematical (arithmetical and geometrical)
ideas (or forms). They are real entities conceived as being independent of perception and
being apprehended, as being capable ofabsolutely precise definition and as being absolutely
permanent, that is to say timeless or eternal. Hence a mathematician does not create
mathematical objects and their properties but does discover them.... Mathematics is very
)
close to Plato's ideal of knowledge because it abstracts from changeable phenomena and
concentrates on unchangeable, timeless, mind-independent and definite objects and relations )
between them.... Hence mathematics is a science whose aim is the description of timeless,
mind-independent and definite mathematical objects (ideas) and their mutual relations," J
)
)
)
206 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
)
) formulas and relationships revealed a "hidden" world, uniquely accessible to
mankind, which demonstrated the kind of stability they were looking for in their
) quest for certainty. And thus began the historically foundational grounding ofwhat
) we now call the discipline ofontology, or the study ofreality, best attained through
an understanding of the "beings" of the timeless mathematical world, which
) together in their unity of natures (all numbers are timeless), presented Being in its
timeless perfection, containing unity and multiplicity (the one and the many) in a
)
distinctly timeless relationality. The longstanding• fascination with platonic
) everything in the physical world, an idea which would also appear in philosophers like Kant
rationalism in Western history was, and remains, the result of the early Greek's
fascination with the unique nature of mathematical truths.
Naturally, so they thought, if this timeless mathematical world revealed a
) hidden order of timeless permanency, it was surely in this dimension of reality
where "divine" realities existed, as well as the human intellect or soul. For it is
) specifically "the mind [that has] access to the Platonic world of pure forms
) ( especially mathematics). This view is still held by many today, although it is now
rationalized scientifically. " 35 What is particularly important here is to note that it
) was this timeless mathematical world which provided not only the "rational
) evidence" for Plato's world of ideal Forms, but it also contributed to his
understanding of the concepts of "God" and the "Good," as well as, logically
) enough, the immortality ofthe soul.36 They were all interrelated through the Forms,
) The issue is how empiricism and rationalism relate. R. Hooykaas insightfully states
) Roman Murawski, "Did Leibniz and Newton Discover or Create the Calculus?," in Topics
in Logic, Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics and Computer Science, ed. S.
) Science (Edinburgh, Scotland: Scottish Academic Press, 1972), 35-36; cf., Ian Mueller,
Krajewski et. al. (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: !OS Press, 2007), 250. For a modem
) assessment addressing the various alternative options besides platonism available to explain
the nature of mathematics, see New Directions in the Philosophy of Mathematics: An
) Anthology, ed. Thomas Tymoczko (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Now,
one can find claims such that "mathematics is perhaps more akin to physics than
) empiricist make it a paradigm of knowledge for the rationalist. He finds no difficulty in the
mathematicians have been willing to admit," which might appear startling to many! The
question is whether mathematics is empirical like the laws ofnature and discovered through
) experience. Mathematics may well be an important factor in Plato's postulation of ideal
experience, or are acts of creation, or whether they exist already. Gregory Chaitin, "Godel' s
) Theorem and Information," 300, in New Directions in the Philosophy ofMathematics, ed.
Tymoczko.
} " Lawrence M. Ward, "Mind in Psychophysics," in Psychophysical Approaches to
Cognition Vol. 20, ed. Daniel Algom (Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1992), 216.
) 36 "For Plato, the Good or God is the world of interrelated ideas which forms the
) substructure of all existence, as in mathematics, where, for example, all spacial relations in
our world ofexperience ultimately follow the rules ofgeometry. It is a world in which God,
J who Plato says is the interrelation of all ideas, is immanent in all creation. It is also a world
in which the soul ofhuman beings ... is God within us. Thus all intelligence is directly in
) each human soul, and needs only to be brought out by philosophy. . . . [The world ofideas,
of which mathematics is the model], is the timeless, intelligible world which supplies the
) Metaphysical Foundations ofModern Science (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003, 1932), wherein
prototypes or models of all the things in the world of process, which are just variants or
) shadows of these eternal ideas....
Ideas not only inform all the world's particulars, but their interrelation in the world of
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 207
existing in the same timeless world. This 'immanence' of the eternal Forms in
humanity is what constitutes the imago Dei for many Christian platonists. Thus,
when we see that Plato's reflections would also prove, as history demonstrates,37
ideas is the basis for their interrelation in the laws of nature. Mathematics is the model, for
Plato, of the unification of ideas, and their involvement in the daily world. . . . This is the
thinking of Sir Isaac Newton in the 17'" century who believed that mathematics underlies
and Hegel. The world's spacial and temporal relations-the laws of nature-are accurately
described by mathematics, which can be seen as its underlying structure ....
For Newton, the world, however vast, realized only a fraction ofthe possibilities offered
by mathematics. Other worlds, other systems could come into being and be explained by
mathematics. This sense of an immanent, underlying structure with its infinite possibilities
is what Plato means by the Good, which he also calls God. This timeless world, which the
soul can understand, is curiously much like the soul. Plato writes, ' The soul is most like that
which is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, and ever self-consistent and
invariable, whereas the body is most like that which is human, mortal, multiform,
unintelligible, dissoluble, and never self-consistent.' The soul has within itself the entire
timeless world of ideas, which is God, so that God is immanent in each of us,'" Craig
Eisendrath, Beyond Permanence: Great Ideas ofthe West (Xlibris Corporation, 2011), 58-
59.
37
that the fathers of modem scientific thought, "Kepler and Galileo, in contrast to Plato, put
forward a mathematical empiricism," thus combining the basic insights of Plato with his
empiricist minded student, Aristotle. See R. Hooykaas, Religion and the Rise of Modern
"Geometry and Scepticism," 69-95, in Science and Speculation, ed. Jonathan Barnes,
Jacques Brunschwig, Myles Bumyeat, and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), 70. Mueller shares, "As a rule mathematics has not sorted well with
empiricism. . . . The very characteristics which make mathematics a problem for the
idea that there can be certain knowledge of a reality which is not directly related to sensory
objects. Aristotle, of course, rejects Plato's ontology and insists that mathematics is true of
the sensible things of this world, not, he adds, qua sensible but rather qua bodies or planes
or lengths or indivisibles. Although Aristotle's theory has a certain empiricist cast to it, it
is not really compatible with strict forms of empiricism. For, according to him, our
awareness of mathematical objects depends on an ability to 'abstract' from the sensible
properties of things, and mathematics is true of the sensible world only in a very odd way;
our senses do not confirm that, for example, a sphere and a straight edge touch by sharing
a single point," Mueller, 70.
But Aristotle's quasi-mathematical empiricism would not last. Rather, the mathematical
empiricism of the scientific age was already anticipated in a simple combination of Plato's
and Aristotle's two perceived emphases, which is confirmed further by E. A. Burtt, The
Burtt argues that contrary to the opinions of some, Plato is the greater influence than
Aristotle on the development of modem science. As such, although it may be true that

208 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
to dominate the rise of modem natural science, it is not so far a leap to see how
Plato also would influence a the is tic ethics.38
4.2. The Mathematics B ehind the M etaphysics ofSacramental Theology
Once the human mind, soul, and intellect were intuitively located within the
timeless mathematical-platonic realm, 39 it only followed that the nature of ultimate
"Aristotelianism had won out in the long preceding period of human thought because it
seemed to make intelligible and rational the world of common-sense experience .. . , Kepler
early realized that [a] revived Neo-Platonism ... would find its historical justification in the
remarkable developments in the sciences of mathematics and astronomy.... K epler offers
us the fundamentals of a metaphysics based in outline upon the early Pythagorean
speculations, but carefully accommodated to the new ideal and method," Mueller, 70.
Modern science, is, then, a carefully interwoven mixture of Platonic rationalism and
Aristotelian empiricism, and "Aristotle's philosophy shows the difficulty that is often
encountered when attempting to clearly separate the philosophies of rationalism and
empiricism .... Aristotle embraced both rationalism and empiricism. He believed that the
mind must be employed before know ledge can be attained (rationalism) but that the object
of rational thought was the information furnished by the senses (empiricism). Aristotle's
position is not unique, however. Throughout history, most rationalists have recognized and
accepted the importance of sensory experience, and most empiricists have postulated one or
more mental operations that are presumed to act on sensory information. In other words,
finding a pure rationalist or empiricist is very difficult," B. R. Hergenhahn, An Introduction
to the History ofPsychology (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2009), 51.
38 See above, n. 25. Atheists like Harris can only make claim to "ethics" by concluding
that science somehow "tells us" how things ought to be to be optimum (i.e., "good"), like
with physical health, for example. The beginning and end of ethics is then to be found in
what science tells us is optimally functional. Of course, sometimes this will be true, even
for the theist! The pro.blem is, if nature is "deterministic," as Harris believes, then there is
no free-will involved in the ethical decisions scientists will make for society.
39 The significance of the fact that many early thinkers, as well as later scientists, arrived
at the same conclusion should not be underestimated. "When we gain mathematical
knowledge, we tap into the resource of innate primal knowledge that is stored in the Soul.
M athematical truths appear to have a timeless status beyond the transient beliefs of the
sensuous world. But how do we come to gain such timeless knowledge? There must be
something in the knower akin to what is known," Ashok K. Gangadean, Meditations of
Global First Philosophy: Quest for the Missing Grammar of Logos (Albany, NY: State
University ofNew York Press, 2008), 228. The answer seemed clear, " The mind was that
part ofus that [had an) understanding [of] theoretical sciences such as mathematics, logic
and philosophy; in other words, its subjects were timeless. For this reason the mind itself
must be considered timeless," I. M. N. Al-Jubouri, History ofIslamic Philosophy: With View
of Greek Philosophy and Early History ofIslam (Hertford, England: Authors OnLine Ltd,
2004), 71.
FROM M ETAPHYSICS TO T EMPLEPHYSICS 209 )
)
existence or B eing was symbiotically timeless as well, as Canale has observed .40
As such, Parmenides' reflections on the nature of the unity of Being (fund amental
ontology; whereas regional ontologies explore things like history, economics, etc.,
)
and the ontical positive sciences study different areas of nature, such as biology,
phys ics, chemistry, etc.), and ofthe one and the m any, 41 app eared intuitively logical )
.t )
4
°Canale offers his guiding definition oftimelessness in Fernando Canale, "Revelation )
and Inspiration: The Ground for a New Approach," in Andrews University Seminary Studies
31#2 ( 1993 ), 94. Canale states that "the idea of timelessness in philosophical/theological )
discussion is a technical one.... Timelessness is the conception that reality in general and
God in particular are essentially and necessarily voided of, and incompatible with, time and
space. Consequently, a timeless conception of reality necessarily eliminates from the realm
ofgenuine reality anything that may be considered as historical, or analogical to what we call
history," Ibid. This definition correlates well with what has been shared about how )
mathematical truths are often conceived by mathematical platonists (seen. 34). Noteworthy
is that I actually differ slightly from Canale, as will be shown in part below, on how "time )
and space" relate to timelessness. This is because the most common notion of (causal)
determinism in the contemporary (particularly 16 th -20•• centuries) natural sciences contains
within itself the heart of timelessness as Canale has described it, and is furthermore applied )
to the "space-time" of Albert Einstein. If something is absolutely determined in our
scientific/natural space/time world, then it is also, essentially, timeless, creating a dualism )
between the human and his world. The irony here is the Greeks did not see nature as
mechanistic the way, say, an Isaac Newton did. Canale has only directly addressed the role )
of"timelessness" in the scientific/natural world on a few occasions that I am aware of, and
only relatively briefly. Given the influence of science in today's world, this issue warrants
much more attention than he has yet given it, and it may modify the ways that he expresses
the concept of timelessness in certain contexts. See for example, Fernando Canale,
"Evolution, Theology, and Method P art I : Outline and Limits of Scientific Methodology,"
in Andrews University Seminary Studies 41#1 (2003), 82-83. There are only three presently
foreseeable "ways out" of the problem of timelessness in nature-I) an infinite ontological
regression ofpsycho-physical dimensionalities, such as has been suggested by David Bohm,
Wholeness and the Implicate Order (New York, NY: Routledge, 1980); 2) an arbitrary
epistemological limit to the dimensionalities, such as suggested by Herman Dooyeweerd, )
A New Critique of Th eoretical Thought: The General Theory of the Modal Spheres (H. J.
Paris, 1955), or 3) the admission of outright paradox/aconceptuality underlying the J
dimensions, as suggested by Pauli Pylkko, The Aconceptual Mind: Heideggerian Themes
in Holistic Naturalism (Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins, 1998); and Louis S.
Berger, The Unboundaried Self: Putting the Person Back Into the View from Nowhere
(Victoria, BC: Trafford, 2005). See also my discussion in Michael F. Younker "A Dialogue
Between Contemporary Perspectives and Ellen White on Divine Action and Quantum j
Physics," in The Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 23# I (Spring 2012), 120-1 54,
esp. 131-137.
41
''Parmenides' argument [on Unity] is compatible with the view that numbers are
timeless objects neither generable nor destructible; it is also compatible with the view that )
numbers are simple essences incapable of analysis into ontologically (as distinct from )
numerically) prior and posterior e lements." Therefore, "unity combines qualified and
particular becoming b ecause it ever is just one and ever is b oth one and many, and ever is
J
)
)
)
210 MICHAELF. YOUNKER FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 211
)
) and helped cement into Western history the dualistic contrast of the timeless and do,43 that is, participate in the sacraments and advance technological progress in
temporal, with primacy granted to the timeless, and the temporal considered merely society. But all this needs more explanation.
) an "appearance" of the real timeless reality. (One might actually suggest the early In the Catholic understanding ofthe metaphysics behind the sacraments, divine
Greeks unwittingly favored an epistemological approach to an ontical positive power from the timeless realm "zaps" like lightning into the especially selected
science at the expense of ontology itself) temporal earthly vessels of the bread and wine, etc.,44 in a directly analogous
) Plato, Aristotle, and their neo-Platonic successors' later refinements and
articulations of this pathway of thought, inaugurated through Augustine into
43
Christianity, gave birth to a Christianized flavor of the two realms of the timeless Of course, this is because their origin is in "Plato's [moral realism which] provides
) divine realm and the temporal earthly realm that, as Canale has clearly pointed out, us with a picture according to which moral facts exist in a non-concrete realm of abstract
rests as the foundation for Roman Catholic sacramental theology. Of course, it is universal properties," Daniel Star, "Moral Metaphysics," in The Oxford Handbook of the
History ofEthics, ed. Roger Crisp (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013), 821. It
on precisely this point with which Canale suggests we rethink things, insisting that must be remembered that ''what was always" Plato's "primary ... concern ... [was] to make
) the temporality and historicality of Being is what is ultimate in Scripture.42 the soul as good as possible." Eventually, "Plato decided to posit transcendent Forms as an
However, my present task becomes unpacking what it means to have the entirety of essential part of his defense of objective morality," John M. Rist, Plato 's Moral Realism:
) metaphysics defined along timeless platonic lines. Just what is the practical The Discovery ofthe Presuppositions ofEthics (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University
) significance ofthe influence ofmathematical metaphysics upon theology throughout ofAmerica Press, 2012). If the Catholic church has "inherited" the authority to mediate this
history? objective ethical realm, then one can imagine some possible consequences.
) Put simply, if 'metaphysics' is about mathematics, and also about attaining a
44
"The Catechism makes it clear the effectiveness of the sacraments is absolutely
practically significant understanding of God, freedom, and immortality, then dependent upon Jesus Christ. 'Sacraments are "powers that come forth" from the Body of
) Christ, which is ever-living and life-giving' (Catechism, no. 1116). In describing the
Catholic sacramental theology is the perfect philosophical fusion of the two classes
) sacraments as ' powers that come forth' form Christ, the Catechism is alluding to the story
of metaphysical objects of study. Through the sacraments, we attain access to the of Jesus' healing of the hemorrhaging woman in Luke 8:42-48," Tim Gray, Sacraments in
) (timeless) salvific power of God (originating from a timeless 'dimension' akin to Scripture: Salvation History Made Present (Steubenville, OH: Emmaus Road, 2001), 25.
the mathematical realm), experience more freedom through the technological or Christoph Shonbom explains, "When we on earth celebrate the liturgy, we participate in this
) applied aspect of metaphysics through the mathematization of nature, and achieve heavenly liturgy ... in the divine eternity. The risen Lord is now with us in many different
ultimate heavenly immortality (salvation), by doing what we ought (ethically) to ways ... [including] through his apostles and their successors, to whom he has entrusted 'his
j power of sanctifying' (CCC 1087), especially in the celebration ofthe Holy Sacrifice ofthe
) Mass (for 'the same now offers, through the ministry ofpriests, who formerly offered himself
on the Cross'). Above all he is present under the Eucharistic species (CCC I 088). It is his
) liturgy; we celebrate it through him, with him, in him," Christoph Shonbom, Living the
Catechism of the Catholic Church: The Sacraments (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press,
) 2000), 3. "Just as Christ then seemed insignificant to many people, as merely the carpenter's
son (CCC 423), so now his sacraments often make an impression of something
unprepossessing to those who do not look on them with the eyes of faith. For the divinity
) of Christ was hidden then, just as now the divine power in the sacraments remains invisible.
We see water in Baptism, bread and wine on the altar, and yet in these visible signs the
.J divine power of Christ is invisibly efficacious," 5. It is commendable that Donald Bloesch
rejects this view, explaining, "In upholding the need for sacraments in the life ofthe church,
) not and ever is in time." Reginald E. Allen, Plato's Parmenides (Yale University, 1997), we must at the same time resist a pansacramentalism which sees every phenomenon in nature
266, 309, and see also, 134-138. and history as a potential means of grace. Paul Tillich mirrors this mentality: 'Any object
) 42 or event is sacramental in which the transcendent is perceived to be present. Sacramental
Fernando Canale, "The Eclipse ofScripture and the Protestantization ofthe Adventist
) Mind: Part 2-From the Evangelical Gospel to Culture," in The Journal of the Adventist objects are holy objects, laden with divine power.' From my perspective, only God himself
Theological Society 22# 1 (Spring, 2011 ), 117. See also, Canale, "From Vision to System: is divine . . . . The preached word and sacraments are signs and tokens of divine action in
) Part III," 49, n. 22. ''The way in which the timelessness ofGod and the soul shape Christian history, but they are not vessels that hold divine energy," Donald G. Bloesch, The Church:
doctrines depends on the nature of each doctrine," but "in general issues-for instance, Sacraments, Worship, Ministry, Mission (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2002), 174. For
) spirituality, salvation, sacraments, revelation, eternal life, and eschatology-there is broad more on the Catholic view of the sacraments, see Paul McPartlan, Sacrament ofSalvation:
agreement across mainline denominations," Ibid; and see also Canale, "On Being the An Introduction to Eucharistic Ecclesiology (Edinburgh, Scotland: T & T Clark, 1995); and
) Tim Gray, Sacraments in Scripture: Salvation History Made Present (Steubensville, OH:
Remnant," 148.
)
)

212 MICHAEL F. YOUNKER
manner with which the secularist (through political authority) invests special
significance to the numbers on a dollar bill. Certain manifestations of the number
"100," on authorized pieces ofpaper, possess more power than the "100" seen here,
that is some "100" numbers have a metap aper power, which the number assumes
when it is p rinted on p aper by an authorized source.
In the same way, God has authorized his C hurch to dispense of His actual
power through design ated physical forms that otherwise would be worth nothing
more than the equivalent of some paper, or bread, wine, etc. Scientifically, there
is no directly visible power in the bread, but this is b ecause the power is of another
sort, metaphysical power. God h as "imprinted" "His Power number" onto certain
forms, the bread and wine, which is then dispensed of when officiated by an
authorized priest.45 The origin of this power is from a realm present to us but
simultaneously absent from us, just like mathem atical truths, and money. Note that
the authorization process contained here is itself the origin of bierarchicalism, a
p oint that should not be forgotten, as it divides ontology from epistemology while
still retaining the core of timelessness within them both. Hierarchicalism depends
upon subjugating the temporal to the timeless, understood h ere as ontological
(mathematical empiricism) realism in the natural world.46
Emmaus Road, 2001).
45
As Matthew Levering explains, "sacramental actions mediate divine power through
visible, corporeal signs. Since this is true [according to tradition] ... , those who perform
sacramental actions should also be corporeal agents, rather than having the sacraments come
directly from God or from angels," Matthew Levering, Christ and the Catholic Priesthood:
Ecclesial Hierarchy and the Pattern ofthe Trinity (Chicago, IL: Hillenbrand Books, 2010),
164, n. 94. He continues, "this spiritual power dispensed through the sacraments, is what
characterizes the priesthood," Ibid. Walter Kasper confirms, "since the mediation of
salvation has a sacramental structure, it follows for Thomas that this mediation also has a
hierarchical structure. Under a sacramental structure, the administration of the sacraments
can occur only through visible human persons; and since it is impossible for human persons
to perform this ministry out of any personal competence of their own, the initiation into
ecclesiastical office must itself be a sacrament that mediates grace. This sacrament bestows
the spiritual power (virtus) necessary for the correct exercise of the ministry and empowers
the minister to help build up the body of Christ without any risk to the salvation of his own
sou l," Walter Kasper, Leadership in the Church: H ow Traditional Roles Can Serve the
Christian Community Today (Crossroad, 2003), 98-99.
•• A platonic view ofmathematics, and its application to the natural and social sciences,
creates, by definition, a hierarchical view of reality. This is because any realist (platonic)
ontology will lead to an hierarchical epistemology in both the modem and postmodern ages.
Eu gene Rosa explains, "human perceptual and cognitive capabilities are inherently limited.
As a consequence, we can neither generate perfect knowledge about the world, nor can we
create a ' true' understanding of our physical and social environments .... Facts seldom
speak for themselves and considerable ambiguity surrounds even the most basic facts ....
Thus, our claims to knowledge about our worlds are always subjective, and always fallible.
Many phenomenological thinkers and strong constructivists take this fact as a basis for
)
l )
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPlfYSICS 213 )
Everything h ere may appear complex. To aid with understanding the issues,
it must be remembered that the sacraments become our access to the metaphysical,
which is here a transformative 'under standing' of God, freedom, and immortality.
There is indeed a d irect parallel and circularity ofreasoning contained here with )
i mathematics and natural science, as it is mathematical metaphysics which originally )
inspired the reasonin g behind h ow we should understand the divine realm, or
theological metaphysics. We now access the divine realm through the physical
manifestatio n of timelessness in physical forms which somehow contain timeless
power, just as physics today 'contains' timeless mathematics ' inside' itself, wh ether
we are aware of it or not as we utilize physical objects as tools, etc. The parallel is )
a direct one, conceptually, which brings about significant implications for how
)
_m etaphysical power can be used and controlled.
In other word s, wh en mathematics was fused with natural science, this J
combination of the timeless and temporal become the ultimate exemplar ofhow the
divine timeless realm manifests itself in the temporal sacrament of the eucharist,
which was previously assumed naively. Furthermore, I trust it is obvious that
Scripture is barely needed here, except to provide the au thorized 'symbols' that
should liaise the power transfer from the timeless divine realm into the temporal )
earthly-human realm . Rather, it is a presup position of natural reason about the )
universality and ( ethical) significance of the nature of mathematics that
prenominates the possibility of sacramental metaphysics. It's worth elaborating a )
bit more on the consequences ofthis and h ow mathematical-platonisrn b oth grounds
claiming that all claims to knowledge about our worlds are, therefore, relative; one claim is
generally as good as any other." Rosa rejects this view, having embraced "ontological
)
realism" instead, an ontological realism that is compatible with mathematical empiricism.
However, recognizing the inevitable relativeness of our knowledge claims about the world,
he connects his realist ontology to the notion of an "hierarchical epistemology."
"Epistemological hierarchicalism does not deny the fallibility ofall knowledge claims. What
it denies is that all knowledge claims are equally fallible. Indeed, if all knowledge claims
were equally fallible ( or equally valid), we all would be living behind a veil of ignorance
where there would be no knowledge at all. Instead, hierarchicalism comprises variations in J
the quality of knowledge claims along a continuum ranging from those of considerable
agreement to those ofgreat disagreement. Knowledge claims, while always short ofabsolute
truth, admit to degrees ofapproximation to what is true." Thus, "ontology and epistemology
[are] .. . logically independent, but complements of one another," Eugene A. Rosa, "The
Logical Structure of the Social Amplification ofRisk Framework (SARF): Metatheoretical
Foundations and Policy Implications," in The Social Amplification of Risk, ed. Nick
Pidgeon, Roger E. Kasperson, and Paul Slovic (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), 62-63. The inherent authoritarianism in this "practical" situation is that any
realist ontology based on mathematics will inevitably lead to a hierarchy of"experts." In the
secular world, this would imply a priesthood of scientists, as they are the ones whose )
knowledge claims are "closer" to the truth, and truth contains 'power.' Rosa's view is what
I would estimate the most common solution to postmodern relativity in a world still
dominated by platonic idealism through science. See also, n. 63.
)
( )
)
)
)
214 MICHAELF. YOUNKER FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 215
)
,1 image of eternity in time,"48 a special manifestation of the timeless within the
) sacramental metaphysics as w ell as leads us toward the crisis of contemporary
philosophy through secular atheistic scientism. Additionally, ofcourse, it also leads
us toward an opening for appreciating Canale's metaphysical alternative, what I am
I temporal. Therefore, human freedom and the church exist within our 'temporal'
world as shining manifestations of the timeless, which is where God, freedom, and
) calling templephysics (see section 6). immortality (salvation) reside. Therefore, when put all together, it should come as
To flesh out the picture of what the timeless-temporal metaphysical interface no surprise that sacramentalist metaphysics are grounded upon this specific and
) described above means, it may prove helpful to understand that the traditional peculiar timeless-temporal interface-everything in philosophy was (and remains)
description of the metaphysical location of individual human freedom was in a centered around this timeless-temporal interface.49
)
timeless realm as well, 47 and that this timeless-temporal picture also emerges as an
) explanation of how the Roman Catholic church exists in the world, as the "living
48
Georges Florovsky, as cited in Timothy Ware, The Orthodox Church (London, UK:
Penguin Books, 1993), 126. See also, Sergei Nikolaev, "Bulgakov and Florovsky: In Search
) of Ecclesiological Foundations," in Orthodox and Wesleyan Ecclesiology, ed. S. T.
47
Martin Gardner, The Whys ofa Philosophical Scrivener (New York, NY: St. Martin's Kimbrough (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2007), 94; FrencescaMurphy,
Press, 1999), 413, n. 8. Representing the traditional position, "Kant's view can be "The Kenotic Mariology ofHans Urs von Balthasar," in Maryfor Time and Eternity: Essays
) compressed as follows: In the space-time world of our experience, the world investigated by on Mary and Ecumenism, ed., William McLaughlin and Jill Pinnock (Herefordshire, UK:
science, causal determinism must be assumed; in this sense the will is not free. But morality Gracewing,2007),256.
) is meaningless unless the will is somehow free. For practical reasons, therefore, we must
49
The explanation of Keith Ward is helpful: "The [Roman Catholic] Christian faith
assume that the human soul, considered as a noumenon, a thing in itself, belongs to a distinguishes itselffrom the other Abrahamic faiths by replacing the divine law with the idea
) of living by the power of the divine Spirit. It distinguishes itself from many faiths of the
transcendent, timeless realm, and in this realm it is truly free. How empirical determinism
) and noumenal freedom can be reconciled, however, is a mystery utterly beyond our finite Indian tradition by refusing to renounce the world entirely, and insisting on the goodness of
minds," Ibid. Note also, to grasp the implications of the way the temporal-timeless interface created things. The sacramental principle which lies at the heart of Christianity affirms the
) has been described: "It has been traditionally assumed [since Newton] that history belongs goodness of creation, and seeks to unite it to the divine by enabling it to become a vehicle
peculiarly to the human condition and that nature functions in some achronic realm, subject of divine liberating and self-expressive action. The eucharist, in which the bread and wine
) to unchanging laws. What is beginning to dawn on modem consciousness is the which cements ordinary social life is transfigured to become the vehicle of the self-giving,
comprehensiveness ofthe category history. Nature, too, is historical. It is not timeless," Ted unitive, and fulfilling action of God in history, both affirms and sanctifies creation. It thus
) expresses a distinctive way of spiritual understanding and action, in which humans aim at
Peters, Science, Theology, and Ethics (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003),
) 114. In Kant's description, however, we must note carefully that the "time" referenced here the fulfilment ofall creation by their conscious participation in the active power ofthe divine
is still based upon timelessness; therefore, the contrast between nature and the human is love.
) deceptive, and the temporality here is, in actuality, a concealed timelessness. See Charles R. "When the dominant philosophical system ofWestem Europe regarded the timeless as
Varela, Science For Humanism: The Recovery of Human Agency (New York, NY: superior to the temporal, and regarded God as essentially timeless and immutable, this
) participation in the divine had to be seen, ultimately, as a participation in the timeless. Time
Routledge, 2009), 9, 34-35, 245, 299. The problem with Kant's view is that the "time"
referenced here is best understood as world-time, sequential time, or "vulgar" time, wherein becomes, in Platonic fashion, at best an imperfect image of the timeless, which can add
) nothing to the timeless ....
it is a numerically (mathematically) conceived common-sense time, as postmodern
) philosopher Heidegger often put it. But such vulgar time does not ultimately represent what "Using the conceptuality of traditional Platonism, the eucharist was construed as the
is "true time" for some postrnodems. Pierre Keller, Husserl and Heidegger on Human appearing of the timeless in time, and as essentially changeless....
j Experience (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 184. Pierre comments that "The sacramental principle is that the material ... is transfigured by the creative Spirit
according to Heidegger, the "vulgar" notion of time "has dominated the philosophical of God to become a vehicle and instrument of the exemplary Word of God. This is a
) distinctive approach to spirituality. It is not simply obedience to divine law, though the
tradition and the natural sciences. It is based on the assumption that time, regardless of
whether it is identified with tense or not, is something that is essentially measurable by Christian will aim to obey the will of God in all things. The notion of a written or fixed
)
clocks. From Heidegger's point of view, the vulgar notion of time is a distortion of divine law has been abandoned ... in favour of participation in the ... life of the Spirit,"
j temporality," Ibid. Contrastingly, then, for Heideggerians, "Freedom is not temporal Keith Ward, Religion and Community (New York, NY: Oxford, 1999), 203-204. See also
because it is 'in' time or because it is in a world that happens to be temporal, so that it Anthony Towey, An Introduction to Christian Theology (New York, NY: Bloomsbury,
) participates in time by the same token that, as body, it is determined by the world. Quite the 2013), 269. Towey explains, "in a sacramental context ... the appearances of bread and
contrary, freedom is necessarily temporal precisely because it must determine itself wine remain, but their substance or inner reality is transformed into the presence of Christ.
) Transubstantiation is both as simple and as miraculous as that. But philosophically it is
independently ofthe world. Freedom is not in time and therefore temporal; it is temporally.
risky, since (technically) it requires dimension rather than substance to be the cohering
) Its being is such as to require temporality ofitself," J. Melvin Woody, Freedom's Embrace
(University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 146. 'reality' principle. . . . Jesus was truly present as the essential constituent of the eucharistic
)
)

216 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
That is, to reiterate, the metaphysics grounding the sacraments depend ed upon
an explanation of h ow it is that the seemingly invisible and timeless regions of
reality, namely mathematics (par excellence), enter our world. Mathe m atics
provides the exemplary templa te for "where" God, and therefore, e thics, resides. so
Therefore, mathematics ends up playing the key explanatory role behind how a
fundamental ontology of Being relates to both theology and its subsidiary areas, as
well as explaining how th e various regional ontologies of the physical and social
sciences timelessly relate. 51 Given that this explanatory m odel is also present in the
elements, but not in a repulsive fleshly way that would be intolerable to the faithful. The
communicant would not be in some non-physical [classical] Platonic relationship, but truly,
consummately and bodily j oined to the Lord, present in distinctive, timeless, [neo-platonic]
sacramental manner," Ibid.
,o The issue here to be explained, philosophically, was how Plato's timeless Forms
could transmit themselves into earthly temporal "vessels." Bypassing the technicalities of
Aristotelian causation and neo-platonism and its critical contribution of a cascading
emanationism, the basic logic flows as follows: mathematical numbers, or, better yet,
geometrical shapes based upon numbers, "cannot be accurately or fully represented in this
world. Instead, the perfect prototypes, or Forms ... must exist somewhere else" in another
dimension , Helen Buss Mitchell, Roots of Wisdom: A Tapestry ofPhilosophical Traditions
7 th Ed. (Stamford, CT: Cengage Learning, 2015), 64. Therefore, if " the best we can do in
this world is to imitate or mimic the perfect Forms," by talking about the imperfect examples
we see around us, then we must live in "a world of appearances, and we make a big mistake
if we confuse it with the real thing," Ibid. H owever, by reflecting upon our world of
appearances, we nevertheless are drawn to participate with our bodies and minds with and
within that which is real and timeless; we think about and use mathematics and geometry.
In like manner, Catholic sacramentalism assumes a virtually identical explanatory structure.
As Dennis Smolarski notes, "I am not sure if the world of mathematics and the world of
liturgy are all that different when it comes to moving/ram principles to practice or from
science to art," Dennis C. Smolarski, Sacred Mysteries: Sacramental Principles and
Liturgical Practice (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1994), 12. As stated by Augustine, the
"symbol of a sacred thing" mediates "a visible form of invisible grace," cited in Kenan B.
Osborne, Sacramental Th eology: A General Introduction (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press,
1988), 107. As Osborne further adds, the "sacraments have as theirreality something divine.
The reality of the sacraments is transcendent . . . . In sacraments we are not dealing with
something created, but with God himself," in other words, the intransitory realm made
manifest in transitory imperfect vessels, Ibid. "Just as [Christ's] humanity was an instrument
in the hand of his divinity, so too are the sacraments a sort of [neo-platonic] cascade of
Divine power. . . . While these (sacramental) mysteries themselves have their proper
space/time stamp, having occurred, they nevertheless touch all times and spaces and are
applied by means of signs which have their proper space/time existence," Matthew Kauth,
Charity as Divine and Human Friendship: A Metaphysical and Scriptural Explanation
According to the Thought ofSt. Thomas Aquinas (TAN Books, 2012), np.
' ' See below, n. 67. This was a central observation ofMartin Heidegger, upon whom
Canale has relied for some of his own insights. Heidegger asserted that, in h is day,
"theology, as a positive science, is in principle closer to chemistry and mathematics than to
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 217 )
)
conte mporary manifestation of p ostmodern Emergent theology, one can see h ow
modernism and postmodernism can truly be two sides of th e same false coin, as
Canale h as observed.52
)
The key practical issue to draw from the above insight is that the n ature of
ethics and the scien ce or exp erience of salvation also becomes "timeless," or )
mechanical, as well. It becomes something w e may physically p articipate in but
from which the thinking h eart can b e all too easily excluded.53 It is little more than
)
)
philosophy," Martin Heidegger, "Phenomenology and Theology," tr. James G. Hart and John
C. Maraldo, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNiell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press, 1998), 41. See also, Martin Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of
Metaphysics," in Identity and Difference, tr. Joan Stambaugh (University of Chicago Press,
2002) 42-74; and Carlos R. Bovell, Ideas at the Intersection ofMathematics, Philosophy,
and Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2012), 34-45.
52
Fernando Canale, "The Eclipse ofScripture and the Protestantization ofthe Adventist )
Mind: Part 2-From the Evangelical Gospel to Culture," in The Journal of the Adventist
Theological Society 22#1 (Spring, 2011), 74-75. "By locating the presence of God 'in' the
)
physical domain, the Emerging Church indicates openness to modem and postmodern )
philosophical and theological panentheism," 74. Canale concludes "although there may be
disagreements about the finer ontological details regarding the way in which God is present
in the material realm ofreality, the emerging church's conviction that God becomes present
through matter coincides with the sacramental worship paradigm central to Roman ' )
Catholicism," 75.
53
See Kenneth Bergland's essay in this volume. Fernando Canale also observes this
when he shares that "the classical conception of the 'sacraments' is at the basis of a )
mechanical conception of salvation advocated by Roman Catholicism, P rotestantism, and
most sectors ofAmerican Evangelicalism," "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of
Adventist Theology Part I: Historical Review," in The Journal ofthe Adventist Theological
Society 15#2 (Autumn, 2004), 32 n. 110. Ellen White describes it this way: "Were the men )
for whom Christ has died devoid ofmoral nature, or were the gospel to be submitted to the
understanding, to be decided by the intellect alone, men might approach it as they approach
a mathematical problem. But this is not the case. The great truths of salvation are to be
planted in the heart. The science ofredemption is as high as heaven, and its value is infinite.
This truth is so broad, so deep, so high, that beside it all the wisdom of earth's wisest men .)
sinks into insignificance. In comparison with the knowledge of God, all human knowledge
is as chaff. And the way of salvation can be made known only by God," Ellen White,
"Ms69-1897" (June 17, 1897), par. 56. Thus, when White shares that "the ethics inculcated )
by the gospel acknowledge no standard but the perfection of God's mind, God's will. God
requires from His creatures confon:ruty to His will. Imperfection of character is sin, and sin )
is the transgression of the law. All righteous attributes ofcharacter dwell in God as a perfect,
hannonious whole. Every one who receives Christ as his personal Saviour is privileged to
possess these attributes. This is the science of holiness," White is referring to ethics as a call
)
to be transformed. The science or study ofethics is not theoretical, it is practical, demanding
one live accordingly by their heart in accord with God's revealed will, White, Reflecting )
Christ, 35. Cf. n. 49. Thus, White is consistent when she explained Jesus' words to
Nicodemus to mean that "it is not theoretical knowledge you need so much as spiritual
)
I )
/

)
)
}
218 MICHAELF. YOUNKER FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 219
)
) an economic exchange, this for that. It leads, on the one hand, to a ritual/works-
based expression of religion, or on the other, to a profession/grace-only based
religion that doesn't tran~form; again, two sides ofthe same false coin. One holding
il
l transformation into the background,55 along with any serious desire to grow
intellectually in Christ through the Scriptures. 56

to a timeless ethics can much more easily find ways to dispose of the problem of
living with guilt through the priestly system of confessions, indulgences, and the ""Popery is the religion of human nature, and the mass of humanity love a doctrine
) communion through the eucharist, 54 pushing heartfelt repentance and behavioral that permits them to commit sin, and yet frees them from its consequences. People must have
) \ some form ofreligion, and this religion, formed by human device, and yet claiming divine
authority, suits the carnal mind. Men who think themselves wise and intelligent tum away
)
l in pride from the standard of righteousness, the ten commandments, and do not think it is
in harmony with their dignity to inquire into the ways of God. Therefore they go into false
ways, into forbidden paths, become self-sufficient, selfinflated, after the pattern ofthe pope,
not after the pattern of Jesus Christ. They must have the form of religion that has the least
) requirement of spirituality and self-denial, and as unsanctified human wisdom will not lead
them to loathe popery, they are naturally drawn toward its provisions and doctrines. They
) do not want to walk in the ways of the Lord. They are altogether too much enlightened to
) seek God prayerfully and humbly, with an intelligent knowledge ofhis word. Not caring to
know the ways of the Lord, their minds are all open to delusions, all ready to accept and _
) believe a lie. They are willing to have the most unreasonable, most inconsistent falsehoods
palmed off upon them as truth," Ellen White, "Romanism the Religion of Human Nature,"
) in The Signs ofthe Times (February 19, 1894).
56
) The contrast is clear when examining Ellen White's perspective: "The gospel does
, Ii not address the understanding alone. If it did, we might approach it as we approach the study
i
of a book dealing with mathematical formulas, which relate to the intellect alone."

)
)
regeneration. You need not to have your curiosity satisfied, but to have a new heart," White,
The Desire ofAges, 171.
54
From the medieval period onward, the eucharist or "communion and confession were
.l "The Word of God is what it claims to be in the sixth chapter of John-the bread of
life- for it represents the body and blood ofthe Son of God. Its aim is the heart. It addresses
our moral nature, and takes possession of the will," Ellen White, "Lt5-l 898" (April 12,
bound together." The church intentionally tied them together, such that they "designed the 1898), par. 13-14. "True religion unfolds and calls out the mental energies. Conviction and
) eucharist and communion so that eventually confession became essentially a form of repentance of sin, renunciation of self, and trust in the merits of the blood of Christ cannot
preparation for communion. Confession dignified people and prepared them for eucharistic be experienced without the individual being made more thoughtful, more intellectual, than
) reception." Thus, "the rhythm of instruction ... was meant to" lead one to see "the he was before," That I May Know Him, 134. "The law and the gospel cannot be separated.

)
confessional, then the penitential and finally the sacramental moods conceptualized and
sealed [as] a cognitive and sensory whole." Therefore, although "penance was essentially 1 In Christ mercy and truth are met together; righteousness and peace have kissed each other.
The gospel has not ignored the obligations due to God by man. The gospel is the law

)
private, and its private, personal, corrective, exhortative nature encompassed and enacted
demands for conformity," the "eucharist which followed it, however, introduced the
universal, cosmic, timeless, supernatural intervention in the world which legitimated and
explored the very grace to which access was made through the sacrament of confession and
t unfolded, nothing more nor less. It gives no more latitude to sin than does the law. The law
points to Christ; Christ points to the law. The gospel calls men to repentance. Repentance
ofwhat?-Ofsin. And what is sin?-It is the transgression of the law. Therefore the gospel
calls men from their transgression back to obedience to the law of God. Jesus, in His life
) penance. Although internally bound these two sacraments were not interchangeable." and death, taught the strictest obedience. He died, the just for the unjust, the innocent for
Rather, "the public ritual of the mass, in which God was exposed and with him a multitude the guilty, that the honour of God's law might be preserved, and yet man not utterly perish,"
j of benefits, was bound to private penance, but was a different type of ritual and symbol Ellen White, "Bible Echo," (February 8, 1897). However, "Man, who has defaced the image
altogether." This combination cleverly linked the private experience of the heart with of God in his soul by a corrupt life, cannot, by mere human effort, effect a radical change in
) himself. He must accept the provisions ofthe gospel; he must be reconciled to God through
benefits that were to be transmitted almost immediately following the 'act' of penance from
j the timeless divine realm. This process simplified and expedited the 'experience of
Christianity,' mixing the internal struggles of the heart with immediate timeless benefits in
t obedience to His law and faith in Jesus Christ. His life from thenceforth must be governed
by a new principle. Through repentance, faith, and good works he may perfect a righteous
) one protracted ceremonial context. Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi: The Eucharist in Late character, and claim, through the merits of Christ, the privileges of the sons of God," Ellen
) Medieval Culture (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 84-85. See also,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/13/sin-and-its-indulgences/comment-pa
:l White, Testimonies for the Church Vol. 4,294. Note also, "There is need of true reformers,
who will point transgressors to the great Lawgiver and teach them that 'the law of the Lord
is perfect, converting the soul' (Psalm 19:7). There is need of men mighty in the Scriptures,
) ge-2/; and http://ncronline.org/news/vatican/pope-authorizes-granting-indulgences-year-
faith-events. 1 men whose every word and act exalts the statutes of Jehovah, men who seek to strengthen
)
)

220 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
4.3. The Mathematics Behind the Sociality ofthe Sacraments
The significance of the above section has implications for the social reality of
Christianity as well. The timeless mathematical-platonic (therefore scientific57)
roots of the metaphysics behind sacramentalism can make the justification of
coercive socio-political movements aiming for social justice58 a nd the common
good appear more palatable, even necessary, for example, with environmental
justice.59 It is not hard to conclude that it may be necessary to "help" people do the
faith. Teachers are needed, oh, so much, who will inspire hearts with reverence and love for
the Scriptures," Ellen White, Lift Him Up, 165.
57
Seen. 17, n. 34, and n. 37.
58
For example, Immanuel Kant's answer to the general question "how are synthetic
judgments a priori (knowledge without experience) possible?"was shaped by his conception
of mathematics and its achievements as a well-grounded science. Keeping this in mind,
observe that Thomas Hugson believes that "the emergence ofan attraction to and convictions
on social justice in all people comes ultimately and originally from the universal, creating
immanence of the divine Logos, who is Jesus acting through his divine nature. The light of
reason or conscience is a dimension of a priori solidarity that engages experience,
understanding, judgment, and decision in associated efforts to promote social justice,"
Thomas Hughson, Connecting Jesus to Social Justice: Classical Christology and Public
Theology (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2013), 230 (see also, ix, where he praises
Islam). It's not a leap- what mathematics and social justice have in common here is that
absolute equality in economics can only be understood mathematically, and thus it is
mathematics that drives most understandings of what equality is in the real world of social
justice. At the end of the day, from the perspective of social justice, one's quality oflife is
measured quantitatively, not qualitatively. See Eric Gutstein and Bob Peterson, ed.,
Rethinking Mathematics: Teaching Social Justice by the Numbers (Milwaukee, WI:
Rethinking Schools, 2013). William F. Tate states plainly: "the use of mathematics in our
democratic society is almost always linked to an attempt to secure control of property," in
"Race, Retrenchment, and the Reform of School Mathematics," Ibid., 39. See also, Anita
A. Wager and David W. Stinson, Teaching Mathematics for Social Justice: Conversations
with Educators (Natio.nal Council of Teachers of Mathematics, 2012); and Cristina Frade
et al., "Beyond Deficit Models of Leaming Mathematics: Socio-cultural Directions for
Change and Research," in Third International Handbook ofMathematics Education, ed. M .
A. Ken Clements, et al., (New York, NY: Springer, 2013), 121.
59
This is particularly the case when public issues, for example, environmental issues
(climate change/global warming, which claim the authority of mathematical science), are
discussed in relationship to social justice. For example, see Willis Jenkins, The Future of
Ethics: Sustainability, Social Justice, and Religious Creativity (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2013). Jenkins believes that "ethics is in jeopardy'' because
"a problem like climate change forces humans to recognize responsibilities for managing
earth systems as influential participants," 2. "Recogniz ing anthropocene power
acknowledges that managing earth systems as influential participants means learning to
manage ourselves. . . . Our ethical traditions seem incompetent to the trouble our powers
create. . . . Now that human powers have become 'titanic,' ethics must find a way to
generate corresponding dimensions ofresponsibility. .. . The very powers that make ethics
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 221 )
)
right thing by enacting it authoritatively from above for the good ofeveryone, ifthe
good is thought to be o bj ective in a mathematical way, and thus beyond refute. 60 )
Obviou sly, in s uch a situation the s ignificance of the individual's heart in the
process of salvation becomes downplayed.61 )
It is no accident that r ecent movements in Cath olicism, particularly those )
stemming from the Second Vatican Council,62 are calling for 'social justice,' 63 a
)
an imperative global conversation also undermine cultural capabil ities to have an adequate )
conversation. Ethics must help humanity imagine and construct new forms of
responsibilities, or, in the failure to do so, face the portents ofcollapse," 3. Jenkins believes
that "for Catholic communities," the "care of the shared commons [isJ a sacramental act, a
creative medium by which humans can receive the presence of God," 179. Non-Catholics
"need not accept a Catholic account, but they must acknowledge the relevance of moral
anthropology to concrete problems" facing our shared commons, 180. Therefore, Jenkins
believes that "sacramental ontology means something for non-Catholic citizens ... as well," )
179, given that the Catholic anthropology requires that we protect "human dignity" that
would preserve " the social conditions for learning from one another as participants in the )
creation of God, and from creation itself. Economic livelihoods, human rights, and
distributive justice are goods in themselves as well as epistemic conditions for learning how
to sustain the goods of creation," 180. While "Catholic sacramental theology anticipates" )
environmental care, the truth remains that "a people can learn the good from its habitat only
insofar as its social conditions and cultural aptitudes allow it. While available to all persons,
there are ethical conditions for learning the common good," for which only "Catholic beliefs
about human personhood offer an explanation," 179-180.
60
This is certainly the approach advocated by mathematical-platonist atheists like Sam
Harris (n. 25), and others, like Joseph F letcher, Humanhood: Essays in Biomedical Ethics
(Prometheus Books, 1979). While there is a vigorous debate amongst Catholics on matters
of how to implement some of their programs, as noted above, the more universal the
problems appear to become, as in climate change, the more j ustification top-down )
authoritative policy implementations receive. See the work of David L. Schindler, in
particular, inn. 65, and also seen. 59.
61
Ellen White addressed the issue of social j ustice and salvation directly: "The
government under which Jesus lived was corrupt and oppressive; on every hand were crying
abuses-extortion, intolerance, and grinding cruelty. Yet the Saviour attempted no civil
reforms. He attacked no national abuses, nor condemned the national enemies. He did not
interfere with the authority or administration of those in power. He who was our example J
kept aloof from earthly governments. Not because He was indifferent to the woes of men,
but because the remedy did not lie in merely human and external measures. To be efficient,
the cure must reach men individually, and must regenerate the heart," Ellen White, Counsels
for the Church, 314.
62
Many"Catholics, accustomed to an approach to sacraments that required little, ifany,
participation, were comfortable with passivity, and sometimes, sad to say, a 'magical'
understanding of the sacraments. The liturgical renewal proposed at the Second Vatican )
Council, on the other hand, invited active participation, personal involvement, and )
commitment," Doris Donnelly, "Introduction," in Sacraments and Justice, ed. Doris K.
Donnelly (Collegeville, MN: Order ofSaint Benedict, 2014), vii. Donnelly continues, as the
f j
{J
) -r
)
)
) 222 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
) phrase invented by Catholics,64 to be reintroduced as central to the purpose of the
sacraments.65 In other words, the Catholic vision of sacramental metaphysics is to
) nature of"mathematics" (timeless and objective) that played a key role in inspiring
) "sacraments were renewed, each of the seven-baptism, confirmation, Eucharist, penance,
marriage, orders, and the anointing ofthe sick-uncovered a link to social justice, understood
) in these pages as a call for harmony and well-being of all in society where there exists
equality ofchances in education and employment, appropriate living conditions, and access
) to health care," viii.
63 Compare with n. 46. In many ways, then, politicians and scientists, the leaders of
) society, become a type of priesthood, to which the common person is obligated to submit.
) What is significant about the situation today is that sacramental theology is being invoked
as a justification for the church to become more involved in the state for the sake of social
) justice. "The link between Eucharist and social justice, implicit in the term 'Mass,' has
become more explicit in the teachings of the church. Beginning especially with John Paul
) II, continuing throughout the papacy of Benedict, and still dear to the thought of Pope
Francis, the implicit connection between Eucharist and ethics has been made more explicit.
) The Eucharist empowers the choices and the ethical and moral behavior of believers,
affecting philosophy, art, literature, and even civil and legal institutions, contributing to
) justice," Matthew John Paul Tan, Justice, Unity, and the Hidden Christ: The Theopolitical
fashioning the features of an entire civilization, in personal and family life as well as in
) cultural, political, and social life. The Eucharist moves Christians to a commitment to justice
in today's world. In the words ofPope Francis, 'There is always the risk that some moments
) of prayer can become an excuse for not offering one's life in mission; a privatized lifestyle
can lead Christians to take refuge in some false forms of spirituality,'" Michael S. Discoll,
) "Eucharist and Justice," in Sacraments and Justice, 38. While it may sound good, the
problem here is, what if separate individuals' efforts to advance social justice conflict with
) [merely] becoming a chaplain within the state/society/market complex. This is because the .
each other? What is the method of resolution?
) 64
The phrase "social justice" is thoroughly Catholic in origin, being finally embraced
by Pope Pius XI in 1931. Prior to his use of it, the specific term "social justice" is typically
) attributed to earlier Jesuit Catholic thinkers from the 1840's.
65 David L. Schindler shares that the "Trinitarian communio, present in the sacramental
) 67
communio that is the essence of the Church, reveals the meaning of all of being in its full
integrity, and thereby reveals the inner logic and dynamic of the Christian presence in the
)
world," David L. Schindler, Heart of the World, Center of the Church: Communio
) Ecclesiology, Liberalism, and Liberation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), xvi.
Schindler believes that "the burden of a communio ecclesiology is that the Church can be
) itself only (also) by penetrating the world-and hence the world's social-economic-cultural
orders-with itself. But this in tum also implies that the integrity of the world itself can be
) Theology (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1998), 119. Again, for the history behind neo-
realized only by being so penetrated by the Church. The Church, in its proper reality as
) communio, itself contains the deepest meaning of all worldly orders," 10. Thus, "a
communio ecclesiology requires that the Church as Church inform the world, as the soul
.J informs the body. This applies not only to the social-economic order, but to all worldly
orders-all aspects of reality in all areas of the universe- precisely as the condition for the
) realization ofthese in their legitimate worldly autonomy. Only by participating in communio
can the economic aspects ofreality, as well as all other aspects ofreality, be liberated to give
) it is both an actualizing sign of God's salvation in Jesus Christ, and a sacramental instrument
glory to God, which is the deepest reason for their existence," 10- 11. Schindler thus sees
) the sacramental communio ecclesiology as the key ''which enables us to stand simultaneously
at the heart of the world and in the center of the Church" whereby "our ecclesial presence
J
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 223
become a part of an ethical social justice agenda to be implemented for society at
large.66
Recall now, as has been uncovered and repeatedly emphasized, it was the
Catholic sacramentalism. In turn, today, whether conceived secularly or religiously,
it is mathematics that plays a key role in determining how social justice should be
implemented for the common good, that is, the expansion of a delimited set of
67
freedoms. This expansion means the Catholic church now mediates from the
timeless divine realm through the sacraments, which have now been expanded to
the social sphere, the power of God and salvation68 to everyone. Thus, the Church
in the world [may] become something deeper and more basic than morality and social
justice, even while including them," 8.
66
Matthew Tan suggests "how sacramental practice could become the foundation for
a properly ecc!esial political action ... [where] the Eucharist [becomes] the exemplary_
sacramental act in which the Church could reposition itselfvis-a-vis the dominant order and
provide the proper basis for an ecumenical vision as enacted by cooperative works of social
Complex ofthe Social Justice Approach to Ecumenism in Vatican II (Eugene, OR: Pickwick
Publications, 2014), 63-64. Tan believes that the Church ought not to cede itself into
modernity. It must not allow the theopolitical complex to "render any acts of social justice
acts of Christianity." This would be to submit that the act itself has power apart from "the
Body of Christ." "The works of the Church in social justice and in ecumenism are affected
[negatively] when the Church accepts the secular imperative to limit its embodiment to
prioritization ofone social configuration over another would lead to the prioritization ofone
anthropology over another. The Church as chaplain, subordinated to the capitalist order,
would make the church extend the atomized, mercenary self of the state/society/market
complex, rather than the Trinitarian self of Christianity," 62.
Anna Rowlands, "The Language ofthe Common Good," in Togetherfor the Common
Good: Towards a National Conversation, ed. Nicholas Sagovsky and Peter McGrail
(London, UK: SCM Press, 2015), IO; Paul A. Schweitzer, "Mathematics, Reality, and God,"
in Teaching the Tradition: Catholic Themes in Academic Disciplines, ed. John J. Piderit and
Melanie M. Morey (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012), 229-252; Hugh Duffy,
Queen of the Sciences: The Special Relationship Between Catholic Theology and Liberal
Education (Cork Hill Press, 2004); and Richard Lennan, ed., An Introduction to Catholic
platonism in Christianity, see Colin Joseph Dudley, Canterbury Cathedral: Aspects ofIts
Sacramental Geometry (Xlibris, 2010), 23-24.
68
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: Vol. 4 Part IIL Section 1., Q.61 (New
York, NY: Cosimo, 2007), 2346. "Divine wisdom, therefore, fittingly provides man with
means of salvation, in the shape of corporeal and sensible signs that are called sacraments,"
Ibid. "The Church is simultaneously the fruit of salvation and the means of salvation; for
for passing on this eschatological salvation to all human beings," Walter Kasper, Theology
and Church (New York, NY: Crossroad, 1992), 121.

224 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
is the "sacrament of salvation" for the world69 in an objective and penetrating sense.
There are important im plications from such a socio-politically attuned m etaphysical
vision when connected with sacramentality and the mathematics driving social
justice.
The call has been m ade by contemporary philosophers for the Church to
"embody itself as a public in its own right," and "renounce its place as chaplain as
well as renounce her tacit service to the dominant order" of the secular
state/society/market complex.70 This is possible because the Church is "like a
sacrament," "visible but endowed with invisible realities. " 71 Matthew Tan explains
that "sacramental practice is an important link to the act of social justice because
it defines a public context for the act."72 Therefore, successfully " demarcating an
act of social justice as a properly ecclesial act necessitates the Church to battle
against its domestication via its ceding of space to the state/society/market
complex." 73 Indeed, Tan believes that "precisely b ecause sacramental liturgy is 'the
public work par excellence of the Church,' shearing the Church's social work from
its worship of[God] whilst still m aintaining an element of'Christian value' runs the
risk of making the act anything but particularly ecclesial or even generally
Christian. " 74 The Church must maintain exclusivity from the world by safeguarding
itself as the lone conduit through which the "divine life . . . pulses through her" 75
into the world.76 In summary, the world and its people are to be healed
69
Francis Aloysius Sullivan, The Church We Believe In: One, Holy, Catholic, and
Apostolic (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1988), 109.
70
Tan, Justice, Unity, and the Hidden Christ, 63.
71
Shonbom, Living the Catechism of the Catholic Church: The Sacraments, 5.
72
Tan, Justice, Unity, and the Hidden Christ, 65.
73
Tan, Justice, Unity, and the Hidden Christ, 66.
" Tan, Justice, Unity, and the Hidden Christ, 65.
75
Shonbom, Living the Catechism ofthe Catholic Church: The Sacraments. 5.
76
Some bemoan that the sacraments remain primarily viewed as private or individual
matters, particularly in the case of the confession. "In other words, the lion's share of the
awareness of sin and the practice of sacramental confession remains squarely focused on the
level of the individual or interpersonal acts but rarely on the level of larger-scale
involvements in social institutions such as corporations."
"Nor is this situation likely to change anytime soon. It will be a constant challenge to
future popes, bishops, clergy, and laypersons to find ways to talk to their neighbors about
the need for a much sharper awareness of social responsibility." "Ofcourse, the easiest path
for most people is to keep their faith private and to ignore the urgent need for Christians, as
a necessary requirement oftheir faith in Jesus Christ, to increase their involvement in public
affairs. In the face of these challenges, it is important to nurture the hope that all members
of the Church will continue to use Catholic social teaching as a vehicle for expressing the
call to both individual and social holiness. To ignore either dimension is to cut the faith in
half. Future social teaching documents will continue to be a privileged place where church
teachings might bridge the local and the global and express the need to examine ever more
closely unjust features of the structures and institutions so often taken for granted," Thomas
)
FROM M ETAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS )
225
)
sacramentally, 77 that is, metaphysically, through the inspirational ongm of
metaphysics, which is the mystery of timeless mathematical-science and
technology,78 which continues to dominate the world today. 79
This union, of timeless m athematics, the socio-political sphere, and the
"objective" natural sciences, together with the neo~platonic divine presence through ' )
sacramentality, portend a powerful concoction for a new social order which can
bring together the insights of the secular priests (scientists) and religious priests )
(thus agnostics and theists alike80), philosophers and politicians, into one )
ecumenically harmonious whole. No one has yet done a better job of synthesizing
the mathematical natural sciences into metaphysics than the wholistic sacramental )
vision of contemporary Catholicism. Catholics are now sacramentally saving the )
world, not only through the Mass (bread and wine), but by enacting enviro nmental
Massaro, Living Justice: Catholic Social Teaching in Action (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2012), 158. )
77
"All that Jesus did during his earthly ministry he continues to do today through the
sacraments- sacramental/y-' by means of signs perceptible to the senses,"' Randy Stice,
Understanding the Sacraments ofHealing: A Rite-Based Approach (Chicago, IL: Liturgy )
Training Publications, 201 5), 10.
78
It is seemingly impossible to extract mathematics from natural science in today's )
world. That said, Louis Berger has "pointed toward the problematic issues to which a
technological position leads in the exact [mathematical] sciences only briefly; the topics and
their explorations are vast. What is germane here is that no matter how paradoxical, baffling, .J
or apparently unresolvable these kinds of problems may be, and no matter how important
they may be in their own right, they have not significantly or noticeably impeded progress
and success in the exact sciences-at least not so far. Consequently, most workers in these
disciplines simply can afford either to remain oblivious to them or else set them aside. Up
to now the price the exact sciences have paid for this practice seems to have been
negligible," though Berger believes that a crisis is looming, particularly in the psychological
sciences. Berger shares that "the adoption and application in mainstream psychology of the
exact sciences' approaches, values, methodologies, and criteria raise many issues and
problems ... . [I believe] that in this subject field the cost of maintaining a technological
stance is considerable, even though it may often be difficult to identify, articulate, let alone
quantify," Louis S. Berger, Psychotherapy as Praxis: Abandoning Misapplied Science
(Victoria, BC: Trafford Publishing, 2002), 20, 26.
79
This was a central concern of Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning
Technology, and Other Essays (HarperCollins, 2013). See also, Iain Thomson, Heidegger
on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics ofEducation (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); and Don Ihde, Heidegger's Technologies: Postphenomenological J
Perspectives (Fordham University Press, 2010).
80
While distinct differences exist between secular agnostic scientists and Catholic J
theologians, there are also many points ofcontact-they both embrace theistic evolution, and
the use of science and technology for environmental and social justice. Where it really
matters, in other words, there is ample room for harmonious action.
( )
) T
)
)
) 226 MICHA.ELF. YOUNKER FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 227
) policies,81 and by advancing the implementation of social justice through the magnitude ofthis backdrop from which Canale's contribution shines brightest, as
political process-it is all part of one grand expanding ecumenical metaphysics. 82 his turn toward Scripture unveils a radically different aim for metaphysics which I
) will disclose in section 5.
If something is based upon "science," and the "type" of truth that grounds it,
) mathematics, then it is part of the Catholic agenda. 83 It is against the overwhelming
4. 4. Review and Summary on the State ofPhilosophy and Metaphysics
) Before proceeding to demonstrate the significance ofCanale's contributions,
let me summarize what I have described above. Following upon Canale's seminal
) " Jenkins, The Future of Ethics: Sustainability, Social Justice, and Religious
Creativity. See also, n. 59. insight concerning the root of timelessness behind the traditional Christian
) 82 An important comment must be made-contemporary Catholic philosophers are understanding of Being, and its influence upon all Christian doctrines, I have
neither advocates of pure Platonism nor Aristotelianism, nor a simplistic fusion ofthe two. explored in our contemporary context just what that means philosophically. What
) Some of them might bristle at the impressions given in this essay of Catholic philosophical I have augmented into Canale's analysis is an emphasis upon the fact that the
) thought, viewing it as reductionistic. I maintain the basic origins and interconnections of assumed "tirnelessness"ofBeing upon which his criticism of tradition proceeded is
their ideas are as I have shared, but I acknowledge the issues are quite complicated. also integrally related to several other very importantphilosphical challenges facing
) Importantly, as a reminder, most profess their ideas are a fusion of neo-platonism and
the world today. They are, 1) atheism's conflation of ethics into scientism, 2) the
Aristotle through the lens ofAquinas. The differences are very significant for them, as it is
) mathematical/deterministic roots of contemporary natural science, which
what protects them from atheism and determinism, etc. Following is a selection of what I
consider the most up-to-date serious works by Catholic philosophical theologians reflecting perpetuates 3) the role of mathematics in the social sciences and their influence
) on the issues facing Catholicism. I highly recommend them for those interested in pursuing upon the concept of social justice (the socio-political order).
) the issues further. See Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy (Grand These three concerns dominate the contemporary philosophical world as it vies
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012); David C. Schindler, The Catholicity of Reason (Grand for relevance amidst the many and diverse cultures around the world. Because there
) Rapids, MI: Eerdrnans, 2013); Joseph C. Mudd, Eucharist as Meaning: Critical Metaphysics is an aura of"universal mathematical accessibility" inspiring all three of the above
and Contemporary Sacramental Theology (Collegeville, MN: Order of Saint Benedict, issues, they all, each in their own way, continue to contribute to the ideal of
) 2014); David L. Schindler, Ordering Love: Liberal Societies and the Memory ofGod (Grand unlimited progress and the optimism this brings for the 'salvation ofhumanity,' 84
) Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011); David C. Schindler, The Perfection of Freedom: Schiller,
whether such salvation is understood atheistically or theologically, as with
Schelling, and Hegel between the Ancients and the Moderns (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books,
Catholicism.85
) 2012); Paul Tyson, Returning to Reality: Christian Platonism/or our Times (Cambridge,
UK: Lutterworth Press, 2015); and Conor Sweeney, Sacramental Presence after Heidegger:
) Onto-theology, Sacraments, and the Mother's Smile (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015).
In these works you will find scholarship ofthe highest caliber, addressing a range of issues
on the interrelationship of philosophy and theology, freedom and time, and science and Delusions (New York, NY: The New Press, 2016).
84
sacramentalism, etc. This is the issue defining the significance of the "two cultures"wars between science
) 83 and the humanities, including the place ofreligion within them. The question is, what role
At this point, I must add a caveat- I too support "science," but with some reservations.
Were "science" to suddenly support the various positions I also support, in the areas of earth does science play in our societal salvation? See Dennis Knight Heffner, Unlimited Progress:
)
history, archaeology, etc., I would not consider this a simple "victory" for philosophy, but The Grand Delusion of the Modern World (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2010). Heffuer
) rather philosophy's greatest threat. Too much proof removes the need for faith, and, observes that "Science clearly is seen as the powerful engine for progress." "Since scientific
philosophically, the real problem is the nature offreedom and time, and, thus far, science has progress has undoubtedly influenced the magnified optimism that can be found in the socio-
) shown itself powerless to resolve this dilemma. Were science to "solve" this problem, then politico-economic sphere, the dynamics of scientific progress are relevant to the larger
such science would cease to be "science" as the concept is commonly understood today. At societal world." Science has given rise toward "optimism about unlimited progress," Ibid.,
) 13. Heffuer's comments are shared within a context where scientists like C. P. Snow have
this time I cannot even speculate on what this would mean. For the time being, it appears
that "as an empirical issue, the interplay between contingency and necessity in the history made "salvific" claims, such as that "scientists have the future in their bones" and their
J technology is "the only hope of the poor." Snow believed that "man doesn't live by bread
of life will remain unsettled for some time. What can be said, however, is that it is
) conceptually unhelpful to oppose the two. Contingency and necessity form another one of alone," but also by "scientific revolution," and hence scientists are the only ones who can
those polarities to be found at the very core oflife-like being and not-being, self and other, bring authentic progress to the world. Charles Percy Snow, The Two Cultures (New York,
) freedom and necessity, form and matter," Evan Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998), (emphasis mine) 25, 78. The "theological"
Phenomenology, and the Sciences ofthe Mind (London, UK: Belknap Press, 2007), 217. allusions within Snow's comments are obvious.
) 8
' Both amillennial and postmillennial eschatologies (Revelation 20: 1-7), that is, those
Thus, at present, I am inclined to support the efforts ofthose like Clark Coogan, Escapefrom
) Planet Lame: Finding Wisdom and Happiness in the Age ofInformation (Jacksonville, FL: embraced by many evangelicals and Roman Catholics, require "unlimited progress" to be
Plain Thinking Publishers, 2005); and Andrew Hacker, The Math Myth: And Other STEM made. It goes without saying (see above, n. 25 and n. 84) that atheistic scientists seek
)
)

228 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
With the above in mind, from the Catholic theological perspective, sacramental
metaphysics through its ontological presuppositions has unified the sacred and the
secular, bringing God, freedom, and immortality into one vision for the world- a
technological sacramentalism for society's salvation. Note that the driving principle
behind this metaphysics, in whole or in part, can be abused by Christians and
secularists of every persuasion in particular contexts-conservatives, liberals,
progressives, the Religious Right, the Emergent Left, etc. 86 No one is immune from
abusing mathematical sacramental metaphysics.
So what Canale's penetrating deconstructive criticism of philosophy has
accomplished, therefore, is to incisively expose the seed behind all of today's
problems-"timelessness" in its many and variant guises and disguises. Canale has
provided the key to unlock the door concealing the all-encompassing totalitarian
scope of metaphysics as classically conceived and its efforts to "save the world."
It is not only imbedded within sacramental metaphysics, but also (hidden) within
atheistic scientism. Indeed, on this very point, it is with no small degree of irony
that we observe the Catholic complaints about scientism only point towards a
reinvigorated revival of the Platonist-Christian synthesis for a solution.87
unlimited progress according to the dictates of scientific discovery and its application to the
socio-political spheres. Seventh-day Adventism officially embraces a pre-millennial
perspective, rescuing us from the delusions of continual societal progress in this world,
though our desire to help the world causes us to be caught in a paradox of seeking progress
while predicting failure, which bas been noted by Richard G. Kyle, Apocalyptic Fever:
End-Time Prophecies in Modern America (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 317.
86
Younker, "The American Socio-Political Spider Web and the Rise of Global
Christianity," 152 n. 62; and Canale, "Is There Room for Systematics in Adventist
Theology?," 11 7.
87
See also, n. 82. "With the emergence of modern mathematics, [the] verbal basis for
Western life and thought- this trusted covenant between word and world- began to crumble
'The most decisive change in the tenor of Western intellectual life since the seventeenth
century,' writes Steiner, 'is the submission of successively larger areas of knowledge to the
modes and proceedings of mathematics' . . . . In cardinal respects, reality itself was
redefined. It now began outside verbal language, in the untranslatable world of a pure
mathematics that no longer required a real relation between symbol and word. Truth became
quantitative rather than qualitative, impersonal rather than personal, empirical rather than
intuitive, mathematical rather than metaphysical. It was perceived, increasingly, as an
abstract relation between numbers, rather than as a reality arrived at through referential
signs," Nathan D. Mitchell, Real Presence: The Work of Eucharist (Chicago, IL: Litergy
Training Publications, 1998, 2001 ), 86. What Mitchell's analysis misses, however, is that
his solution is part ofthe problem. As Hans Boersma shares, "the dilemma we now face [the
collapse of atheistic modernism into postrnodemism], while serious, is by no means without
resolution. If it is true that the spurious certainty of modernity resulted from the late
medieval undoing of the Platonist-Christian synthesis, then we may expect that the Great
Tradition offers resources that allow for the recovery of a solid grounding of human truth
claims, a grounding that avoids both the Scylla of modem presumption and the Charybdis
)
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 229
Moreover, although there are plenty of skeptics about metaphysics in
postmodern circles, ofwhom Martin Heidegger and his followers reign paramount,
they often remain "dualists," accepting natural science for what it has appeared to )
be (mechanistic and deterministic), while still somehow insisting it not impinge
upon the philosophical or ethical worlds88 (indeed, Heideggerians remains agnostic
about the existence of any "god"). However, such a stance by Heideggerians only
)
delays the slow but inevitable march of science, as Heidegger himself appeared to
realize late in his career. 89 Thus, as I have shared above, in both cases, of scientism
and sacramentalism, as well as any blissful Heideggerian naivete (Heidegger
)
himself did not suffer from naivete on this issue9°), there are vast societal
)
of postmodern abdication," Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a
Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids, MT: Eerdmans, 201 1), 157. Wbat they both miss is .J
that the platonic origins of the Christianity they long for a return to was grounded upon the
very insights afforded by timeless mathematics that lead to Christianity's collapse!
•• Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), tr. Parvis Emad
and Kenneth Mally (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 108. "Philosophy
is neither against nor for science but leaves it to its own mania for its own usefulness-for
securing, always more easily and quickly, increasingly more useful results, and thus for
making using and needing always more inextricably dependent upon the particular results," )
Ibid. In making this assertion, Heidegger in some ways moves very little beyond the efforts
of Isaac Newton and Rene Descartes, the authors of contemporary dualism. )
89
Martin Heidegger, Four Seminars (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
2003), 55. Heidegger was recounted to share, "modem experimental physics constantly
searches for the laws of motion, just as Aristotle had. This would be the meaning of the
fundamental universal formula, insofar as all the possibilities of movement in their infinite
variety could be deduced. Heidegger now asks what the discovery of this formula would
mean for physics. The answer runs: the end ofphysics. Such an end would entirely alterthe
human situation," Ibid. Later Heidegger observed, "here, more disturbing than the conquest
of space, there appears the transformation of biology into biophysics. This means that the
human can be produced according to a definite plan just like any other technological object.
In this context, nothing is more natural than to ask whether science will be able to stop in
time. Such a stop is nevertheless fundamentally impossible," Ibid.
90
As Fred Dallmayr explains Heidegger's position, "as is well known, one of
Heidegger's chief complaints about Western modernity was the sway of abstract )
'metaphysical' constructions that repressed or prevented any genuine 'care for Being."'
"Instead of pondering the meaning of Being and of cultivating human being-in-the-world,
modem metaphysics-cum-technology has unleashed the project of a total domination or
subjugation oftbe world under geopolitical global auspices. As Heidegger wrote in 1946,"
"'humanity is posed to pounce upon the entirety of the earth and its atmosphere, that is, to
conquer the hidden pathways of nature in the form of natural forces and also to subjugate
the paths of history to the plans and dictates of a global government.' This strategy of
conquest is a losing strategy in terms of human freedom and solicitude, for a humankind in
the grip ofglobal 'security' and surveillance is no longer capable ofunderstanding 'what is,
what the meaning of being and even ofa thing is.' When the totality ofbeings are an object
ofconquest and control, 'the simplicity ofBeing is buried in utter oblivion,"' Fred Dallmayr,
( J
)
)
)
230 MICHAELF. YOUNKER FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 231
)
) implications ifthese philosophies are granted ethical (metaphysical) authority in the Because of the evident connection between Being in general and the highest
social sphere. i being, from Aristotle down through Heidegger, the aim of metaphysics became
)
I
onto-theo-logical. Restated, the flow proceeds from Being in general, to the highest
) 5. The "Problems" of Philosophy-Rescued by Scripture? being ("God"), to how we have knowledge of various beings and how they relate
In this section we will explain what it is Canale has achieved philosophically, with one another (logic, epistemology, and the regional ontologies). Together, the
) in a broad, positive, constructive sense, regarding the issues pertaining to the ontos, theos, and logos constitute a "system" of reality or, as Canale labels it,
traditional aims of metaphysics, as well as point toward what might be unresolved Reason, the ultimate Logos.92
)
)
)
problems that result from exploring his work that warrant further attention. My own
endeavor here, then, aims to offer both a descriptive review as well as a constructive
critique.
I consider Canale' sown deconstructive work on the onto/theo theo/onto-logical
',
t
Of course, within the traditional Heideggerian context over the past few
decades, the phrase 'ontotheology' has assumed a very negative connotation.93 As

) constitution of Reason to be a seminal moment in the history of philosophical 92

For a more detailed exposition of Canale's understanding of Reason, see Oliver
theology, inviting a "tum toward Scripture" in a more profound and radical way Glanz, "Investigating the Presuppositional Realm ofBiblical-Theological Methodology, Part
)
than our Protestant Christian forbears have yet conceived, let alone II: Canale on Reason," in Andrews University Seminary Studies 47#2 (2009), 217-240.
93
) accomplished- Canale is telling us the Reformation' s goal of returning back to Within the Heideggerian context, Merald Westphal explains ontotheology as follows:
Scripture is not yet complete. But the constructive application that follows after his "[Heidegger] derives the term from Aristotle and applies it to Hegel. Aristotle had sought
) deconstruction is where the real philosophical significance of his work rests, and to develop a science of being as such, not this dimension of being or that region, but being
qua being. But to carry out his project, subsequently known as ontology, Aristotle
) opens up an opportunity for philosophers to join an epochal-changing moment in
discovered that he needed to posit God, not the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, to be
the history of Christian philosophy.
) sure, but the impersonal, oblivious Unmoved Mover. With this, ontology becomes theology,
or, as Heidegger puts it, onto-theology. The key idea is that there is a highest being who is
) 5.1. The Aims ofMetaphysics Reconsidered the key to the meaning of the whole of being. Surely every Christian theology makes this
Recall that traditional metaphysics has had two primary aims. First, that of affirmation in relation to the triune God, just as Spinoza makes it in relation to the all-
J serving as an aid to a general ontology, that is, explaining the principles of how encompassing energy/process he calls Nature, and Hegel makes it in relation to the all-
reality "coheres" itself together (the one and the many), which includes both encompassing energy/process he calls Spirit. So, it is assumed, every Christian theism falls
) prey, along with the·s e modem pantheisms, to Heidegger's critique of onto-theology,"
exploring the nature of Being in general (existence) and all other beings, of which
) God is the highest. Apparent musings over the nature ofmathematics, a mysterious Merald Westphal, "Onto-theology, Metanarrative, Perspectivism, and the Gospel," in Myron
class of meta-physical beings (a regional ontology), by Pythagoras and his later Penner, ed., Christianity and the Postmodern Turn: Six Views (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos
) Press, 2005), 144. Heidegger moreover asserts that generally speaking theologians who
disciples, including Parmenides,91 greatly influenced what today has become an inherited this Greek philosophical heritage didn't stop there, but rather frequently "in the
.J intuitive and "timeless" problem- just what are those numbers? In any case, what course ofthe history of ontotheological inquiry the task has arisen not only of showing what
the result has been is that "timelessness" became the foremost insight of the early the highest being is but of proving that this most supreme of beings is, that God exists,"
) Greeks' ontological -musings, and this timelessness inserted itself into Western Martin Heidegger, "Kant's Thesis about Being," tr. Ted E. Klein, Jr. and William E. Pohl,
) metaphysics as a whole at the heart of Being itself (foundational or general Pathmarks, 341.
ontology), and thus became the presumed nature of the "highest" being, God. With both these insights in mind, then, Westphal would describe himself as
) "philosophically closer to my postmodern friends who do not share my faith than to the
Christian philosophers who do," Westphal, "Onto-theology," 141, if they truly do embrace
) the onto-theological attitude Heidegger references. However, Westphal does not fully
) Freedom and Solidarity: Toward New Beginnings (Lexington, KT: The University Press of concur with Heidegger that Christian history posits such a clear place for total human
conceptual understanding. He believes that many "Christian thinkers [are] eager to preserve
)
)
Kentucky, 2016), 62.
91
I add here "apparent," because the historical details are ambiguous. For more, see
Christoph Riedweg, Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching, and Influence, tr. Steven Rendall and
Andreas Schatzrnann (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 115. See also, David
l the mystery of God and the limits of human understanding," an attitude he believes is
"fundamental to the theologies of Augustine and Aquinas, of Luther and Calvin, and, not to
be too Western, of every orthodox theology I have ever encountered. Each of these
Furley, The Greek Cosmologists: Volume 1, The Formation of the Atomic Theory and Its traditions, to mention only some, refuses in its own distinctive way to make total
J Earliest Critics (NewYorkNY: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 50; andLeonidZhmud, transparency to human understanding the condition for God's entry into human discourse.
) Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans, tr. Kevin Windle, and Rosh Ireland (Oxford, UK: They affirm that to posit God is to affirm mystery, not to make everything clear. Christian
Oxford University Press, 2012), 19-24. theology, taken as a (very complex) whole, is more a sustained critique ofonto-theology than
)
)

232 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
D. Stephen Long explains, "ontotheology ... is when theology becomes so defined
by a specific metaphysics that our speech about God fails b ecause we make God an
item in the world. When we say 'God' we primarily speak in terms of being and
causality such that God becomes nothing more than a necessary concept that traces
a cause back to its origin."94 This, to Heidegger, does an injustice to the reality of
the concept of God-God becomes little more than something we create through
speculative postulations. Such a God is not one before whom we can truly feel
obliged to worship, it is not a god who has revealed himself. As Heidegger opines
in one of his more famous passages, "man can n either pray nor sacrifice to this god.
an instance of it. On this point Christianity has been ' postmodern' from the start, not a
precursor of the Enlightenment project," 146.
This is in contrast to how Heidegger obviously viewed Christian history in general, as
well as how some traditionalists view the same history. Additionally, Westphal also further
explains the difficulty surrounding the entire discussion by stating that "Even when our
systematic theologies subordinate philosophical analysis to biblical exegesis, they can and
sometimes do become systems in an onto-theological sense. I am reminded here ofCamus's
definition of the world ofmyth as a world of all answers and no questions. Just to the degree
that our theologies become mythical in this sense, perhaps w ith the aid of a high view of
scripture, they become onto-theological. In them, no doubt against our conscious intentions,
God becomes the One Who Makes Our System Work, who sees to it that we are never at a
loss conceptually, that we always have THE ANSWERS," 147.
In this context, Westphal also· considers what he sees as the appearance of onto-
theology in the work ofclassic theologians, such as Aquinas: "Although Thomistic theology
has deep anti-onto-theological substance, the format ofthe Summa Theo/ogiae pictures what
I have in mind here. Questions have no function other than to introduce our answers," thus
fulfilling part of what inspired H eidegger's onto-theo-logical complaint in the first place,
147. Westphal also alerts users of the divisive and controversial nature that the term can
evoke, "The term [onto-theology] is often used by assistant professors who have appointed
themselves campus terrorists and, alas, by senior scholars who should be more careful, as
a kind ofsci-fi conceptual zapper. You aim it at any theology archaic enough to affirm a
transcendent, personal creator and vaporize it by intoning the magic word," 144. Westphal
thinks we should be more reflective about the issues, realizing that, in some ways,
ontotheology (or theoontology?) is unavoidable.
94
D. Stephen Long, Speaking ofGod: Theology, Language, and Truth (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans Publishing, 2009), 50. Iain Thomson similarly describes the pragmatic result,
"ontotheology" effectively shields "a particular sense of what is and what matters from the
corrosive sands of time," Iain Thomson, " Ontotheology," in Daniel 0. Dahlstrom, ed.,
Interpreting Heidegger: Critical Essays (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 108.
Accordingly, Thomson explains that for Heidegger, "All Western metaphysical systems
make foundational claims best understood as ' ontotheological,' [whereby) metaphysics
establishes the conceptual parameters of intelligibility by ontologically grounding and
theologically legitimating our changing historical sense of what is," Iain Thomson,
"Ontotheology? Understanding H eidegger's Destruktion of Metaphysics," in Heidegger
Reexamined Vol. 4, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Mark Wrathall (New York, NY: Routledge,
2002), 107.
)
)
FROM M ETAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 233 )
Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe n or can he play music
and dance before this god."95 Heidegger then, provocatively, asserts, "the god-less
thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus
perhaps closer to the divine God. Here this means only: god-less thinking is more
open to Him than onto-theo-logic would like to admit."96 Here I must add, the very )
pathway toward which onto-theo-logy arrived at this causa sui who is unworthy of
prayers, or music, or dance, is important. The structural flow has indeed proceeded )
from man's self-reflections about reality toward God, and then toward the )
relationship ofother beings. (In fact, as I have explained, it actually appears to have
proceeded fro m a specific regional ontology, mathematics, toward a general )
ontology, and then concluded with God). This directional error is one Canale
reverses, as I explain below.
It is the system forming concept of onto-theo-logy that leads us to the second
aim of metaphysics, which was also of interest to the Greeks, but was articulated )
most succinctly by Kant. The second aim views the quest of metaphysics to be the
attainment of an understanding of God, freedom, and immortality. It is important
to note that although the "god" seen here in the second aim of metaphysics may
seem to be a reduplication of the "god" sought after in the first aim ofmetaphysics,
in reality it should not be so. In the first aim, "god" appeared through the )
conceptualization scheme of the highest being subsumed under the determinations
of a fundamental onto-logic, but here "god" should be properly understood as the
effort to seek after a theo-logic in itself. In other words, we should be free to look )
for God prior to, and ap art from, any presuppositions in the ontological realm
arising from human reasoning. This "god" is related to, first and foremost, freedom
and immortality (time).
The distinction I wish to highlight here plays upon the fact that the other two
"objects" to be studied through the second aim, freedom and immortality, are )
obviously no ordinary "obj ects." I trust it remains intuitively clear enough why
speculating about freedom and immortality, in themselves, is far less likely to tempt
one toward seeing them as merely "objects" or " beings," as we are sometimes
temp ted to do with the "highest being," God. Recognizing the poverty of freedom
)
and immortality in the arena of object-ness is essential for understanding the
complex and determinative role they can play in reorienting the meaning of )
metaphysics through the second aim as "god" is brought into the picture. The "god"
that accompanies freedom and immortality should be freed from the shackles of
object-ness; this "god" should be allowed to reveal itself alongside freedom and
immortality.
Even for Kant, these latter two objects, freedom and immortality, had a two-
fold application or role to p lay in philosophy and metaphysics. And that is because
freedom has had, at least, two fundamentally different ways of being understood
95
Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 72.
•• Heidegger, Identity and Diffe rence, 72.
/

~r ;~
) H,

234 MICHAEL F. YOUNKER FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 235

) throughout history. The first concerns what we would call existential freedom, that The significance of the issues which concern man "as man" highlight the
is, the freedom to choose between alternative options. But secondly, it concerns the radicality of the uniqueness of mankind. It opens up the concept of the "heart" in
) ethical constraints upon our human being, that is, what sorts of things are we free a more profound way, pointing toward a more wholistic view of the human.
) to choose that we ought to choose. Ethics here enters the scene. 97 If immortality Heidegger may utilize the complex language and apparatus surrounding Dasein to
(and, therefore, the human's relationship to time) is conditional upon our ethical describe the temporality and care undergirding the uniqueness of the mental and
) choices, then the freedom being discussed here is of a special nature presupposing intellectual faculties ofman, 103 but commentators have realized that, in many ways,
a certain concept ofGod.98 Heidegger was creating a "secular spirituality" that had much more substance to it
_) than what traditional philosophy had granted humanity. 104 As Eva Cadwallader
Our point ofdeparture is through the window of this second aim ofmetaphysics
) as articulated by Kant. Through Canale, it will become clear that this latter quest, comments, "considering himself conversant enough in mathematics and physics to
in particular, takes on an entirely different hue when it is Scripture that is examined, discuss the nature oftime with [Albert] Einstein, Heidegger believed that what was
) missing from the scientific account was the human dimension. He thought that
foremost and solely, as the path to an understanding ofthe "objects" offreedom and
) immortality, instead of relying merely on our minds to reason about them. God, because of this absent 'spiritual' perspective, most people today feel 'lost' in their
freedom, and immortality must be revealed through divine revelation to be truly world. " 105 I see such a wholistic perspective reflected in Canale' s and Ellen White's
) use of the concept of the "heart." The heart is a fuller concept than what we often
meaningful.
Prior to proceeding further, however, it is worthwhile to note that it is none mean when we refer to the mind or intellect. 106 The heart is more than our
other than the aforementioned Heidegger, the foremost expositor ofthe significance m athematical reasoning powers. 107 I will return to the significance of this below
) of the concept of time,99 that should initiate our constructive journey into fully
) appreciating Canale's contribution. 100 Indeed, Heidegger is well aware that "for
Kant," "genuine metaphysics remains an ontic science of supersensible beings ...
) namely: freedom, God, and immortality." 101 Heidegger remarks upon this with no 103
Magda King, A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time, ed. John Llewelyn (Albany,
) small degree of interest-"these are no ordinary objects of inquiry with which NY: State University of New York Press, 2001), 217.
metaphysics is concerned. These objects concern the 'interest of man' as man." 102 10
' See, for example, Gananath Obeyesekere, The Awakened Ones: Phenomenology of
) Visionary Experience (Chichester, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012), 155.
Obeyesekere sees a "version ofsecular spirituality in Heidegger's notion ofBeing," "a kind
) of secular spirituality for our own times," Ibid. Cf., Michael Anthony, "Introduction," in
) 97
Joanna Hodge, Heidegger and Ethics, (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 197. Perspectives on Children 's Spiritual Formation, ed. Michael J. Anthony (Nashville, TN:
98
I cannot enter here into the nuances of the Kantian discussion on practical versus Broadman & Holman, 2006), 10; and Frank Schalow, Heidegger and the Quest for the
) speculative reason. May it suffice for the moment to assume that "moral agents require Sacred: From Thought to the Sanctuary of Faith (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer,
knowledge of the non-impossibility of the existence of God, freedom, and immortality, in 2001), 12.
) 105
Eva Hauel Cadwallader, "Guest Preface," in William Henry Werkmeister, Martin
order to understand how their right acts can be related to their experience as a whole,"
_,,\ Frederick Rauscher, Naturalism and Realism in Kant's Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Heidegger on the Way, ed. Richard T. Hull (Atlanta, GA: Rodopi, 1996), xviii.
106
University Press, 2015); 85. For more, see John Silber, Kant's Ethics: The Good, Freedom, To put it concisely, it is the "heart" that "loves." For a biblical exposition on the
) and the Will (Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter, 2012), 176; Sarni Pihlstriim, Pragmatic love of God, see John C. Peckham, The Concept ofDivine Love in the Context ofthe God-
Pluralism and the Problem ofGod (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2013), 26; World Relationship, (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2015), 519.
107
and Sarni Pihlstriim, Transcendental Guilt: Reflections on Ethical Finitude (Lanham, MD: Canale, "The Eclipse of Scripture and the Protestantization of the Adventist Mind:
Lexington Books, 2011), 52 n. 6; cf. n. 47 in this article. Part 2- From the Evangelical Gospel to Culture," 103; Canale, "On Being the Remnant,"
) 99 150, 162; and Fernando Canale, "Principles of Worship and Liturgy," in The Journal ofthe
See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. Joan Stambaugh with Dennis J. Schmidt
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2010). Adventist Theological Society 20#1-2 (Spring/Fall, 2009), 99, 109; 89-111. Ellen White
) describes it this way: "Were the men for whom Christ has died devoid of moral nature, or
10
° Canale frequently points toward Heidegger as the key originator of the concept of
) temporality and time upon which he relies. E.g., Fernando Canale, "Philosophical were the gospel to be submitted to the understanding, to be decided by the intellect alone,
Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," in Andrews University Seminary Studies 36#2 men might approach it as they approach a mathematical problem. But this is not the case.
) (1998), 187. The great truths of salvation are to be planted in the heart. The science ofredemption is as
101
Martin Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure high as heaven, and its value is infinite. This truth is so broad, so deep, so high, that beside
) it all the wisdom of earth's wisest men sinks into insignificance. In comparison with the
Reason, tr. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
) 1997), I 1. knowledge of God, all human knowledge is as chaff. And the way of salvation can be made
102
Heidegger, Phenomenological Interpretation ofKant's Critique ofPure Reason, 41. known only by God," Ellen White, "Ms69-1897" (June 17, 1897), par. 56.
)
)

236 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
after introducing Canale's efforts to let Scripture inform us about philosophical issues.
5.2. Can Scripture Solve Ontological Problems?
Canale's most succinct introduction to his philosophical program occurs in his
article entitled "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary." 108 Here
Canale explains that Heidegger's reflections about existence began from a
phenomenological analysis of human existence (roughly analogous to Dasein) as
it appears to us. Through his analysis of Dasein, Heidegger proceeded to interpret
the ground of Being, and from this, he expected to be able to make an analysis of
"God." 109 Of course, Heidegger, given his self-imposed constraints on how God
could appear, could not complete the development of an understanding of "god,"
thus he removed the "thees" from the onto-thee-logical character of metaphysics.
Heidegger left himself with only an onto-logic, albeit one that now conceived of
Dasein, and therefore Being by implication, temporally, or historically. 110 This was
in sharp contrast from the traditional interpretation given to Being by Parmenides
and Pythagoras.
It should be stated that Canale does not simply assume Heidegger's temporal
understanding ofBeing and insert it into Scripture. The innovation of Canale is to
reverse the sequence of Heidegger's analysis, sharing that "the movement of
biblical intelligibility" should make "the starting point ... not the appearance of
Dasein but the appearance of God." 111 As Canale explains, "we have thereby
replaced the onto-theo-logical order of classical theology with a new thee-onto-
logical order that is faithful to Scripture," 112 and theoretically open to whatever it
is Scripture might say about God and Being. Although Heidegger may have been
open to such an approach as Canale's, he had during his life dismissed Scripture as
a possible appearance of God, or revelatory description of God's past appearances
that had meaning for us today.
In contrast to Heidegger, Canale proceeds upon the assumption that Scripture,
while not a direct manifestation of the Being of God in itself (theophanically), does
nevertheless, as the Word of God, provide the possibility ofa description of such
,oa Fernando Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," in
Andrews University Seminary Studies 36#2 (1998), 183-206.
'
09
Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 203 n. 70.
11 0
Scholars of Heidegger will be aware that Heidegger underwent some complicated
shifts or evolutions in his thinking concerning Dasein and Being. I cannot enter tbis debate
here. For more, see Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of
Education, 117-1 18; Jeremy Wisnewski, Heidegger: An Introduction (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 201 3), esp. 147-162; and the essays in James Risser, ed., Heidegger
Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work ofthe 1930's (Albany, NY: State University ofNew
York Press, 1999).
111
Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 203 n. 70.
112
Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?," 126. See also, Canale, A
Criticism ofTheological Reason, 285-297.
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 237 )
an appearance. Canale shares that Exodus 3:14-15 has been recognized "as the
)
locus c/assicus where the being of God is brought into language." 113 .)
Canale suggests that "ifwe recognize that the text is disclosing in words the
)
presence of God, we have found the necessary starting point for a philosophical
reconstruction of the God principle." He explains, this starting point, "in the realm
of theology," is "analogous to Dasein as a philosophical starting point in
Heidegger's philosophy." 114 Canale has thus argued for a very important point-a .)
purely philosophical issue can be explored from within the text of Scripture itself.
Of course, one might note that the inspiration of Canale's endeavor to discuss the
issue of Being in this particular way was inspired by the philosophers, such as )
Heidegger, but this does not detract from Canale's point that Scripture addresses the )
concerns that philosophers speculate about, whether or not they are aware of
Scripture (as with the Greeks). )
Canale additionally utilizes some methodological tools from Edmund Husserl
and others (particularly the phenomenological bracketing method of epoche to
suspend our scientific judgements about the God principle when we read Scripture
to let the text be itselfl 15) to emphasize the significance of not prioritizing being
over appearance, an old Platonic error, as he examines the text ofExodus 3:14-15. )
In other words, Husserl, and particularly Heidegger, had arrived at the conclusion )
that appearances should not be considered "unreal" in contradistinction to the
"real. " 116 The "temporal" natural world, and our psycho-phenomenological
113
Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 202.
11
Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 203.
•
115
Canale, "Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," 203 n. 71,204 n.
72.
116
This has, although Canale has never discussed it that I am aware of, direct
' )
connections to the Pythagorean/Platonic fixation on the "timeless" nature of mathematics
and its relationship to other regional ontologies, which is one reason I have emphasized it
so frequently above (one must always wonder why it is certain philosophical errors have
been made and remained so persistently difficult to overcome). Of course, in sharing this,
it must be said that the nature of mathematics, for both Heidegger and evidently Canale,
remains a mystery for another time. See, for example, William J. Richardson, "Heidegger's
Critique of Science," H eidegger on Science, ed. Trish Glazebrook (Albany, NY: State
University of New York, 2012), 43. "One would have to explain much better [than
Heidegger] how mathematics is related to the objects of scientific investigation: How is its
formalism to be interpreted? What do the variables represent? What do the numbers
represent? To what extent is mathematics merely a language for expressing the essence of
relations? In another direction what exactly is observed in an experiment: a scientific object
or merely a numerical symbol ofan object? Furthermore, what role does a scientific system
as a whole play in the experimental enterprise?" "Is Being known only when abstract
conceptual knowledge is suppressed? Or is it known through a higher awareness that )
preserves abstract conceptual structures intact and simply enriches them? If so, what is this ,)
'higher awareness?"'
"To none of these questions has Heidegger addressed himself in his published work,"
)
/

)
}
)
238 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
)
experience of it, is as "real" as is any abstract realm like mathematics. 117 In fact, it
is "more" real, Heidegger believed, revealing how it is we encounter and experience
) the abstract. Regional ontologies and the ontical or positive sciences are therefore
) dependent upon Being, and not the other way around. 118
Additionally, along these lines, it is relevant to mention that Canale also
) insightfully distinguishes between epistemology and hermeneutics, that is, our
theories ofhow we obtain knowledge about the world versus the processes by which
) of differences and divisions, on matters both practical and theological. 123 Thus,
we, as humans, produce and interpret each other's language. Canale correctly
) realizes that distinguishing between the two is important as we discuss appropriate
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 239
overstated, given the weight of history favoring the alternate view of timelessness.
If God, and Being, are fundamentally temporal and historical, then a host of other
problems are both solved and created at the same time. For this reason, Canale has
always modestly maintained that he was only initiating the beginning of the
development of a new biblically grounded systematic theology. 122 He may insist
upon the necessity of it, but for good reasons. Without a systematic approach to
theology through Scripture, the continuing results will be manifest-a multiplicity
although many Adventists have, for good reasons, kept at arms length from any

) methods to approach Scripture. 119 Scripture cannot be seen as merely another "fact"
of nature, like we would approach mathematics, or botany, or astronomy. It has
) come to us in the mode of language, encumbered with historical contexts and
certain inherent ambiguities. Rather than viewing this as a negative, however, it
) points us closer to the nature of authentic humanity and divinity-God is a God of
language, and mankind resembles Him in this regard. Therefore, Canale can assert
that postmodern and modem/liberal approaches to hermeneutics are in many ways
) more accurate concerning the nature of man and his reasoning functions than the
) classical view in the past. 120 Importantly, this also elevates the mystery of God, of
language, and of humanity, above that of the modem mechanistic worldview of
j. nature and the correspondent positive sciences and regional ontologies that study
) them.121
Overall, the conclusion of Canale is that Exodus 3: 14-15 comes as close as
,) possible to sharing a clear temporal understanding of Being as manifested through
God's self-naming and theophanic appearance. The significance of this cannot be
) Christianity," and Canale, "Is There Room for Systematics in Adventist Theology?," 117.
) Fernando Canale, "The Quest for the Biblical Ontological Ground of Christian
) Ibid. For more, seen. 40.
formal embracement ofmetaphysics, the reality is, in bits, pieces and parts, we have
been unconsciously participating in the ontotheological program of classical
metaphysics. Without a conscious effort to pull our theology toward Scripture in
a deep philosophical way, being conscious ofthe need for a biblical ontology, 124 our
educational programs, as they branch out into the world, will become subsumed
within the presuppositions of the various secularized and technologized regional
ontologies and positive sciences, which all too often are dependent upon the (often
hidden) ontotheological metaphysics implicit in the classical tradition. 125
122
Canale, "Is There Room for Systematics in Adventist Theology?," 125-131. See
also, Canale, "The Eclipse of Scripture and the Protestantization ofthe Adventist Mind: Part
2," 129.
123
Again, I point toward my own efforts surveying Christianity and Adventism in
America. Younker, "The American Socio-Political Spider Web and the Rise of Global
124
Theology," in The Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 16#1-2 (2005), 1-20.
12
' Perhaps the best, and most significant, example ofthis is in the fields of psychology

117
This is the conclusion of the Heideggerian psychologist Louis S. Berger, Issues in and psychiatry. For example, see Berger, Psychotherapy as Praxis: Abandoning Misapplied
) Science. It also applies, however, to all of the social sciences, such as economics and
Psychoanalysis and Psychology: Annotated Collected Papers (Victoria, Canada: Trafford,
political science, which are fighting their own battles over how much of a role mathematical
~ 2002), 84.
science should play in these respective disciplines. I predict that the Heideggerians will,
118
How this is so, precisely, remains a mystery. Seen. 115, and Thomson, H eidegger
) on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics ofEducation, 117-118; and Steven Hodge, fundamentally, lose these battles. For evidence of the conflict, as William Tabb observes,
Martin Heidegger: Challenge to Education (London, UK: Springer, 2015), 3 5. "the contrasting cultures [ofthe sciences and Heideggerian humanities] that C. P. Snow saw
11 9
Fernando Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Historical-Cognitive Model," in ... have I think a parallel in a division between two cultures within economics that has
Andrews University Seminary Studies 33#1-2 (1995), 19 n. 35.
always been present since economics was first understood as a separate intellectual
) undertaking. It is not surprising that economics, which has roots in moral philosophy and
12
° Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Historical-Cognitive Model," 5-38; 17 n.
its aspirations in being a 'real' science (for example likes physics), should be caught in this
) 31.
two-cultures tension.... Snow's discussion ... paints a picture not unfamiliar to those who
121 One of the best explanations of the uniquely baffling nature oflanguage comes from

) Louis S. Berger, Language and the Ineffable: A Developmental Perspective and Its
Applications (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 201 !). Note also, Ellen White, "there are
) men who proudly boast that they believe only what they can understand. But the folly of
their vaunted wisdom is apparent to every thoughtful mind. There are mysteries in human
) little effect. Nowhere is this more evident than in the discipline of economics," Richard
life and in the manifestations of God's power in the works ofnature---mysteries which the
) deepest philosophy, the most extensive research, is powerless to explain," Review and
Herald, (Sept 14, 1886).
have watched theorists and institutionalists, orthodox and heterodox, and other categories
among economists talk about the way they do economics," William K. Tabb, Reconstructing
Political Economy: The Great Divide in Economic Thought (New York, NY: Routledge,
I 999), 5. "Snow's plea for renewed efforts to bridge the chasm ... has so far had relatively
Bronk, The Romantic Economist: Imagination in Economics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 48.

)
 I
240 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
I )
On this point, lastly, it is not simply the various differences that Adventists may
have on lesser matters throughout the various regional ontologies (areas of study)
'I
and specific positive sciences that is ofimportance. In themselves, differences here
are often inconsequential. The real issue is which metaphysics, of the second
I
Kantian aim, is it that our various cross/multi/trans-disciplinary efforts are
ultimately supporting? Whether we like it or not, the rise of a new metaphysics is
inevitable. It is the drive of forces undergirding society; it is becoming ever more
apparent that society wants and heeds metaphysics. 126 Whether we like it or not,
every discipline will be integrated into either the sacramental metaphysics of the
c lassical tradition, or be cast off into irrelevance. Knowledge that has no use, that
doesn't lead to power, wealth, and health (the popular secular triumvirate of god,
freedom, and immortality), gains little traction in our world today. 127 We have
Similarly, in the socio-political world, the eventual "separation ofpolitical theory from
scientific research on human nature is doubtless related to what C. P. Snow called the
divorce between the 'Two Cultures.' In our universities, the natural sciences are divided
from the humanities and social sciences. . . . As a result, despite excellent popularizations
of the latest scientific findings, most academic studies of human behavior do not integrate
an understanding of biology and evolution with the analysis of politics, economics, or
sociology," Roger D. Masters, The Nature ofPolitics (Yale University Press, 1989). As
Sarah Giest, Michael Howlett and Ishani Mukherjee, further explain within a broader
pragmatic context, "policy-making shared many similar knowledge utilization characteristics
as the situation which existed between scientific researchers and those involved in the
humanities within university settings. This was a relationship which C. P. Snow had referred
to as involving 'two cultures' which spoke to each other but rarely if ever understood what
each other said. By analogy policy-makers and analysts were also considered to be divided
into 'two communities' of knowledge producers and consumers whose relationship was
fraught with the potential for misunderstandings," Sarah Giest, Michael Howlett, and Ishani
Mukherjee, "The Relevance of the Academic Study of Public Policy," 121-135, in The
Relevance ofPolitical Science, ed. Gerry Stoker, B. Guy Peters, and John Pierre (London,
UK: Palgrave, 2015), 126.
12
• S0ren Brier observes that "we have discovered that science, philosophy, and religion
cannot eliminate metaphysics and that neither can Protestant Christianity. Today we must
work with metaphysics in a reflective way," S0ren Brier, Cybersemiotics: Why Information
Is Not Enough (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press, 2008), 142.
12 7
On this point, I offer a personal anecdote. As I have purveyed various fields of
academic study from a philosophical perspective, I have found that despite occasionally
brilliant contributions to various philosophical sub-disciplines, in a world obsessed with
power, wealth, and health, (and pleasure), they often go completely ignored. It does appear
philosophy as an academic enterprise is dead. It is for this reason that, despite the
recognized contributions of someone like Martin Heidegger, and his fellow postmodern
followers, in reality, as noted above, (n. 17) many scientists remain confident that
modernistic "western science will likely outlive postmodemism. It may already have,"
Howard V. Hendrix, "Fighting Out of Context: Culture Wars Within and Without Science
Fiction, from Snow to Sokal," 46. Thus, no matter how carefully one argues for the
"correctness" of some element of Heidegger's contribution, in the end, it seems to matter
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 241
become a metaphysically technological society, whether or not we realize it is in
fact a metaphysically technological sacramentalism as well, as we attain our
knowledge of God through our technologies, as well as attain our "freedoms" and
our health (immortality) through them.
)
5.3. Summary
Historically, mathematics inspired the form that Reason, through onto-theo- J
logy, took. For Canale, it is language and Scripture that sh ould guide us toward a )
theo-onto-logy. The differences could not be more stark, and explain the complex
problem that Canale has faced in explaining what it is he has done. )
Through his prioritization oflanguage over a priori reason, Canale has entered
into the world of hermeneutics, claiming it nevertheless h as priority, despite its
ambiguities, over apparent naturally universal reason. Although I did not here enter
into the details of this issue, many philosophers may object to this switch.
Furthermore, by suggesting that Scripture inherently ought to be sought
continuously, by itself, for fresh insights, rather than relying on tradition, Canale
dismisses somewhat the contributors of the past that so many philosophers and
)
theologians rely upon. For example, despite all that the Reformer Martin Luther has
done for Christianity, he is not really necessary for us today would be Canale's
claim. Of course, this is not his intent in itself to slight such giants, but it is a
~ )
consequence of what he has done. Not only this, of course, but Canale, following
Heidegger, would also implicitly criticize every form of progress that the world
measures, such as in technology, as actual progress in the spiritual sense. For
Canale, such contributions do not and cannot represent actual "spiritual progress" )
toward any "Christian" goal. This puts him at odds with the world's view of
progress in a very profound way.
6. From Metaphysics to Templephysics
The foundation ofCanale's contribution is his reordering of the structure or
system of Reason, from 'onto-theo-logy' into 'theo-onto-logy,' through his
prioritization of the Word of God over human reason, as well as the appearance of
)
very little.
In other words, ifsomeone finds a way to make a faster and smaller computer chip, they J
will rake in billions of dollars. Conversely, if someone, using history and reasoning,
discovers a new paradox or problem or solution in a theological system, or develops a new
philosophical system, they make nothing. Note that, in ages past, prior to the rise ofmodern
technological science, when the Church and hereditary monarchies had control over society,
the situation was different. Technological innovations that would lead to direct wealth and
power were few and far between. My point, however, is that both situations, that of Church
)
and monarchial power, as well as simply technological power, are problems, or competitors,
to philosophy in its simplest meaning, that is, the search for and love of wisdom (to be )
contrasted with mere knowledge). Both the Church and rnonarchial system as well as
modern technology are forms of ontotheology.
)
)
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 243
) 242 MICHAELF. YOUNKER

) God over man's existential self-reflection. Through his efforts in this area, he But the question we 're left with at present, however, concerns the intricate
believes he has uncovered biblical support for re-envisioning the nature of Being, nature of the relationship of metaphysics to the question of God, freedom, and
) the foundation of all metaphysics. 128 As I have been implying, but will now make immortality. How should we conceive these three subjects from within a biblical
) explicit, his reordering ofReason's system, from onto-theo-logy to theo-onto-logy, framework, or point of view? What is it that human reason, and the Bible, are
conceals a depth of significance that may take the biblical scholar, Christian concerned about when they address these three aims in themselves?
) historian, or even theologian without philosophical training, considerable effort to
appreciate. What I am suggesting is that it is not Canale's contribution to our 6.1. One Last Time: The Relationship ofMetaphysics and 'Philosophy'
) Graham Harman recently shared that "everyone wants to discover whether
understanding of the systematic nature of Reason or the nature and meaning of
) Being that ultimately matters, in itself. What matters is what his reordering of human freedom really exists, and we can no longer be satisfied with philosophical
Reason means for the second aim, the Kantian aim, of metaphysics which I have strategies that place this question forever beyond our reach." 129 His comments
) reflect a scholarly world that is seriously questioning whether humans are, in fact,
described above, concerning god, freedom, and immortality.
) Ironically enough, when one thinks of god, freedom, and immortality, one is meaningfully free in any comprehensible way. 130 Why is this the case? It may be
more naturally inclined to think along temporal lines. This is not to dismiss the
.) necessary groundwork Canale has done in dealing with the "temporal" nature of
Being and the structure of Reason, as it is only from these that we can intelligently m Graham Harman, Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of
bring the regional ontologies into a biblical line of thinking, but merely to affirm Things (Peru, IL: Open Court Publishing, 2005), 255.
) that postmodern philosophical reflections have actually made some progress on the
130
We have mentioned the work of Sam Harris above (n. 25). But his views are not the
exclusive domain of a few. Whether human freedom exists at all in a meaningful way is
) complexities of the human predicament and experience of"life." One might say,
today a matter of significant dispute. Recent work indicates that there is a strong perception
intriguingly, it appears Scripture "anticipated" these developments in secular by some scholars that, by and large, "academic philosophers, psychologists, and
) reason. neuroscientists teach their students to believe that their actions may be determined and
) beyond their control, that free will is an illusion," Bob Doyle, Free Will: The Scandal in
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: I-Phi Press, 2011), iii. Doyle suggests that all to often it
) 128 seems as though "humans are seen as cogs in a vast biological machine," but he insists that
This also suggests that all the regional ontologies, and the positive sciences, and all
epistemologies and hermeneutics should also be reinterpreted through Scripture and divine "physical and biological science can produce no such evidence," ibid. As an advocate of
) free will, part of Doyle's proposed theory is that "free will is [part of] ... a temporal
revelation. Ellen White concurs, for example, concerning the positive sciences in
) Fundamentals ofChristian Education (I 923), 328-330. "The general method of educating sequence," directly linking freedom with a certain conception of time, Ibid., 196.
the youth does not meet the standard of true education. Infidel sentiments are interwoven in Furthermore, Doyle believes that all too often those who do believe in freedom "accept the
) the matter placed in schoolbooks, and the oracles ofGod are placed in a questionable or even faulty reasoning that freedom exists only on some metaphysical plane" that makes freedom
an objectionable light. Thus the minds of the youth become familiar with Satan's "a mystery beyond explanation" or "a gift of God beyond understanding by our finite
) minds," leaving philosophers and theologians pragmatically helpless in the face of scholars,
suggestions, and the doubts once entertained become to those who entertain them, assured
facts, and scientific research is made misleading on account of the way its discoveries are especially scientists, who deny human freedom. Ibid., iii.
) Overall, the subject offreedom has received considerable attention lately. For example,
interpreted and perverted.· Men take it upon themselves to rein up the word of God before
a finite tribunal, and sentence is pronounced upon the inspiration of God according to finite see Nicholas Rescher, Free Will: An Extensive Bibliography (Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers
measurement, and the truth of God is made to appear as a thing uncertain before the records University Press, 2010). Rescher observes that in spite of its longstanding interest to
) of science. These false educators exalt nature above nature's God, and above the Author of philosophers, "four-fifths of the writing ever done on the topic" of free-will has been done
all true science," Ibid., 328-329; and Ellen White, "The Revelation of God," in The Review through "the work ofthe past single generation," indicative ofits continuing and increasing
) and Herald (November 8, 1898). She adds, "Christ converted all nature into an index to relevance, Ibid., i. Much of its increasing relevance is explained byThomas Nadelhoffer and
) illustrate His greatness, His goodness, His love. Water, air, light, life-these Christ used to Daniela Tocchetto, who observe, "while the free will debate has traditionally been the fairly
illustrate His work and His character," "Letter 232, 1903," Ellen White, 3MR, 344.1. "God cloistered haunt of philosophers and theologians, a growing number of scientists have
) has illuminated human intellects, and poured a flood of light on the world through recently become increasingly vocal about their skepticism concerning free will. With articles
discoveries in art and science. But those who view these from a merely human standpoint appearing in The New York Times, The Economist, Forbes Magazine, WIRED, and USA
) will most assuredly come to wrong conclusions. The thorns of error, skepticism, and Today, the debate about free will has finally hit the mainstream. One common theme in the
infidelity are disguised by being covered with the garments ofphilosophy and science. Satan way free will has been discussed in the popular press is that recent scientific advances
) (especially in neuroscience) threaten or undermine our traditional picture of agency and
has devised this ingenious manner of winning souls away from the living God, away from
) the truth and religion. He exalts nature above nature's Creator," Ellen White, The Upward responsibility," Thomas Nadelhoffer and Daniela Goya Tocchetto, "The Potential Dark Side
Look, 156. of Believing in Free Will (and Related Concepts)," 121-140, in Exploring the Illusion of
)
)
244 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
informative to explore, once more, the history ofphilosophy and its relationship to
metaphysics.
It was none o ther than Heidegger who sought to separate philosophy from the
sciences originated when he began to observe that " the spectacular advances in the
exact sciences" would "act ... as the 'liquidator' of the humanities in general and
more specifically of philosophy" itself. 131 Accordingly, Heidegger "offered his
'ontological' (philosophical) account of 'Being' as opposed to the 'ontic' or
'factical' one posed b y science and the unthinking ordinary m en tality stemming
from it in a technological era. He saw the 'ontological' viewpoint as necessary for
the possibility of living a genuinely human life as opposed to the mere biological
and physical existence of a sapient humanoid among a world of things. " 132
Why did Heidegger think this way? Heidegger claimed that the fundamental
trait of the metaphysics ofhis time (and ours) was that it is "determined by the fact
that the entirety of the trad itional problematic comes under the aspect of a new
science, which is represented by math ematical natural science." This he connected
explicitly with classical theology as he continued, "ifmetaphysics asks concerning
the first causes, concerning the most general and highest meaning ofbeings, in short
concerning what is highest, ultimate, and supreme, then this kind of knowing mus t
be commensurate with what is asked about. Yet that means: it must itself b e
absolutely certain." 133 Heidegger explains, " thus, via the guiding thread of the
mathematical idea of knowledge, the entire problematic of traditional m etaphysics
assumes the task of carrying out this d em and in the strict sense and thus also of
raising metaphysics, understood in terms of its content, to the formal level ofan
absolute science. The problem of absolute certainty is above all the fundamental
problem of modem philosophy, not in the sense of an epistemology, but sustained
and guided by the problem of the content of metaphysics itself." For, "the
development of modem m etaphysics is sustained by this priority of the problem of
certainty w ith a view to m etaphys ical knowledge. From there the modification of
the body ofproblem s and disciplines occurs." 134 Heidegger's remarks did not cease
Free Will and Moral Responsibility, ed. Gregg D. Caruso (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2013), 12 1- 122.
131 Stefano Franchi and Gi\ven Giizeldere, "Machinations of the Mind: Cybernetics and
Artificial Intelligence from Automata to Cyborgs," in Mechanical Bodies, Computational
Minds: Artificial Intelligence from Automata to Cyborgs, eds. Franchi and Giizeldere
(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2005), I 19.
132
Cadwallader, "Guest Preface," Martin Heidegger on the Way, xviii.
m Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude,
Solitude, tr. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker (Indiana University Press, 1995), 54.
"
4
Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts ofMetaphysics: World, F initude, Solitude,
54-55. Heidegger blames, amongst others, Descartes for this trend. "Did not Descartes, who
determined the fundamental orientation of modern philosophy, want nothing other than to
furnish philosophical truth with the character ofmathematical truth and wrest mankind from
doubt and unclarity? From Leibniz the saying has been handed down: "Sans !es
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 245
)
with his searing criticisms ofm athematical natural science in itself. Heidegger also
repeatedly reflected upon them in his lectures on the place and spirit of technology )
in society and its relationship to philosophy, wherein he claimed that technology
"rages about .. . like an unshackled beast." 135
But if m athem atical natural science and technology are, respectively, the
essence and manifestation ofmetaphysics as determinism and control, then what is
philosophy, that is, the study of Being and Dasein? How should they be
distinguished from m etaphysics? It so happens that Heid egger did offer an
explanation concerning the implications ofhis views about the role ofmathematical
,l
natural science and technology to metaphysics. Furthermore, he explains what role
mathematiques on nepenetrepoint aufond de la Metaphysique": "Without mathematics one
cannot penetrate into the ground of metaphysics. This is surely the most profound and
sweeping confirmation ofwhat is proposed straightaway and for everyone as absolute truth
in philosophy."
"Yet if it is as clear as day that philosophical truth is absolutely certain truth, why does
precisely this endeavor on the part of philosophy never succeed? Regarding this endeavor )
concerning absolute truth and certainty, do we not instead throughout the history of )
philosophy constantly see one catastrophe after another? Thinkers such as Aristotle,
Descartes, Leibniz, and Hegel have to put up with being refuted by a doctoral candidate. )
These catastrophes are so catastrophic that those concerned do not even notice them," Ibid.,
16. )
m Heidegger claimed that "technology . .. rages about in the 'world' today like an
)
unshackled beast," in Martin Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, tr.
Michael Heim (Indiana University Press, 1984), 2 15. See also, Heidegger, Identity and
Difference, 72. If the call toward a genuine reflection on ontology is not heeded, "the rule
of metaphysics [as ontotheology] may rather entrench itself, in the shape of modem
technology with its developments rushing along boundlessly." Similarly, "Although two
seemingly different conceptions of science are now seemingly struggling against each .)
other- science as technical and practical professional knowledge and science as a cultural
value in itself- nevertheless both are moving along the same decadent path of a
misinterpretation and disempowering ofthe spirit. ... The regions ofscience lie far asunder.
Their ways of handling their subject matters are fundamentally different. This disintegrated
multiplicity of disciplines is meaningfully maintained ... [and] the rootedness of the
sciences in their essential ground has atrophied. In all its areas, science today is a technical,
practical matter of gaining information and communicating it. No awakening of the spirit )
at all can proceed from it as science. Science itself needs such an awakening," Martin )
Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (Yale University
Press, 2000), 50-51. Heidegger defines his use of"spirit" here by sharing, "we determine )
the essence of the spirit briefly in this way: Spirit is neither empty acuity, nor the
noncommittal play of wit, nor the understanding's boundless pursuit of analysis, nor even
world reason, but rather spirit is originally attuned, knowing resolution to the essence of
Being. Spirit is the empowering of the powers of beings as such and as a whole. Where
spirit rules, beings as such always and in each case come more into being <wird ...
seiender>. Asking about beings as such and as a whole, asking the question of Being, is
then one of the essential fundamental conditions for awakening the spirit," 52.
)
) ~
)
)
) 246 MICHAEL F. YOUNKER FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 247

) metaphysics plays in a society, by placing it within the framework of the concept reflection about Being and the nature and purpose of theology, and, therefore,
of a worldview. Heidegger shared that "philosophy is completely different from metaphysics in its entirety.
) In summary, within the context ofthis essay, the above comments by Heidegger
'world-view' and is fundamentally distinct from all 'science.' Philosophy cannot
) by itself replace either world-view or science; nor can it ever be appreciated by and their explanation may prove especially enlightening when one grasps a young
them. Philosophy cannot at all be measured by anything else but only by its own Heidegger's own understanding of the Christian life before he evidently abandoned
) now shining, now hidden, essence." 136 This hidden essence is where freedom is his personal faith. Heidegger believed that "Factical life experience is historical,
) contained, within temporality itself. 137 Thus Bret Davis is correct to suggest that it [therefore] Christian religiosity lives temporality as such." 140 Heidegger similarly
is "a possible and fruitful endeavor 'to read the philosophy ofHeidegger as a whole commented during the same period that "historical fullness- more precisely [known
) as a philosophy of freedom, "' 138 an escape from the bondage of determinism and as one of] the few great uniquenesses ofliving religion-is to be evaluated with the
control that dominates the mathematical sciences and technology and the elements of meaning and experience of religious consciousness, and not according
)
metaphysics they implicitly contain. to extra-religious and especially not 'scientific' standards. Only thus will religious
) Carl Rasbke explains Heidegger's perspectives above as follows: "The 'end' life be maintained in its vivacity, and not be endangered by so-called scientific
of metaphysics in the modem world is visible in the pre-emption of philosophy by world-views. Religion, just as any world of experience can gain its form only in
) historical consciousness." Thus, "no real religion allows itself to be captured
science. Philosophy, which once subsisted in a unity with metaphysics and
) scientific thinking, now passes over into science in its modem technological form." philosophically," because "one of the most meaningful, founding elements of
Therefore, "modem science and technology are not so much Greek in origin as they meaning in religious experience is the historical." 141 Therefore, Heidegger
) decisively broke religion away from metaphysics as he understood it, which was the
are Christian. The end of metaphysics coincides with the end of theology; for the
) fates of both philosophy and theology are entwined with the larger realization of absolutization, in an objective scientific form, of knowledge as such. Rather,-the
metaphysical-representational thinking in our technological world culture." 139 In individual seeking after a religious experience will find it more through examining
) other words, the overwhelming "success" of science through technology, from their his own and other's histories and through the exploration of their freedom, rather
) essence in the mathematical-timeless Platonic realm, have overwhelmed ontological than through an accumulation of absolute knowledge. There will be continual
emptying of self, as well as a filling, as the temporal life is lived and new things are
) encountered.

J 136
Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions ofPhilosophy: Selected 'Problems' of 'Logic', 6.2. The Meta-narrative Inside the Temple
) tr. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, I suspect Canale may be mildly surprised to see just how much his thinking
1994), 4. Note also, "the efforts of the great philosophers are directed toward what is in actually does have in common with some ofHeidegger' score insights. Importantly,
every sense ultimate, universal, and ofuniversal validity. The inner struggle with the puzzles some of them are quite accidental, as there is no doubt that Heidegger misused his
) of life and the world seeks to come to rest by establishing the ultimate nature of these. understandings throughout his life, focusing as he did on existential lived life as
Objectively stated: every great philosophy realizes itself in a worldview-every philosophy such, that is, the temporality and freedom of the Dasein as an end in itself. This is
) is, where its innermost tendency comes to umestricted expression, metaphysics," in Martin ultimately an abandonment of Scripture. Heidegger became captive to his onto-
Heidegger, Towards the Definition ofPhilosophy, tr. Ted Sadler (Continuum Press, 2002),
) logy, with the theos simply left out. Nevertheless, it is one last parallel thought that
7. Heidegger considers this unfortunate, indeed a "paradox," whereupon the methodological
justifications inherent in any metaphysical paradigm impose upon philosophy a world view, they share which will now prove penetratingly insightful concerning Canale's own
) contribution and goals.
8-10. Heidegger thus is preparing a critique of foundationalism insofar as it appears
) ontotheologically. Heidegger knew well that "'a civilized people without metaphysics' is like an
137
As Heideggerian J. Woody explains, "freedom is not temporal because it is 'in' time 'otherwise copiously decorated temple without the Holy of Holies, "' 142 and as such
) or because it is in a world that happens to be temporal, so that it participates in time by the
same token that, as body, it is determined by the world. Quite the contrary, freedom is
) necessarily temporal precisely because it must determine itself independently of the world. 140
Freedom is not in time and therefore temporal; it is temporally. Its being is such as to Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life, tr. Matthias Fritsch and
) Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 55.
require temporality of itself," Woody, Freedom's Embrace, 146. See also, n. 4 7. 141
138 Bret W. Davis, Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Northwestern Heidegger, The Phenomenology ofReligious Life, 244.
) 142
University Press, 2007), 71. Davis approvingly cites the opinion of Gunter Figal, Martin Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, tr. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Indiana
) Heidegger: Phanomenologie der Freiheit, 3'd ed. (Weinheim: Beltz Atheniium, 2000), 2 3. University Press, 1998), I 00. Heidegger cites the 1812 edition of Hegel's The Science of
139
Raschke, The Alchemy ofthe Word, 71. Logic. A recent translation can be found in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science
)
)

248 MICHAEL F. YOUNKER
the temptation for people to build their own 'metaphysical temples' was often
irresistible. A very young Heidegger made this clear when he asserted that
"hermeneutics [his earlier term for philosophy] is not philosophy [here meaning
metaphysics or world-view] at all, but in fact something preliminary which runs in
advance of it and has its own reason for being." "What is at issue in it," he
continues, "is not to become finished with it as quickly as poss ible, but rather to
hold out in it as long as possible." 143 One must live with an attitude ofpatience and
p erseverance concerning life's mysteries.
Heidegger claimed, however, that unfortunately we today have "become so
I
pithless and weak-kneed that we are no longer able to hold out in the asking of a
question." Rather, when "the one philosophical medicine-man cannot answer" a
question, one then "runs to the next" 144 medicine-man that can answer the question.
l
The resultant conclusion for Heidegger was that in his day "the great industry of
philosophy" was "geared merely to ensuring that one will not come too late for the
'resurrection of metaphysics' which . .. knows only the single care of helping
oneself and others to a friendship with the loving God which is as cheap as possible,
as convenient as possible, and as profitably direct as possible." 145 This is a lesson
that might apply to many Christians: Perhaps we, too, often lack the patience to
enter into authentic dialogue and questioning with the weightier issues of
philosophy, instead rnshing blindly into the Holy ofHolies, carrying on our backs
what we think is the 'medicine of metaphysics' to the doctor, or Metaphysician,
thereof.
Canale would suggest, with Heidegger, that it is not any self-made medicinal
metaphysics that needs a resurrection. What Canale would assert alone is that the
reason for this is because the Metaphysician has already been resurrected and
ministers in the Holy of Holies according to the plan of His own design which has
been revealed to humanity.
In appropriating the temporal-historical character of Heidegger's insights on
genuine religiosity, Canale has moved away from the terminology of metaphysics,
for perhaps obvious reasons when compared with how Heidegger viewed the term
above. In place ofand preference to 'metaphysics,' Canale has offered the concept
ofLogic, tr. George Di Giovanni (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 8. The above holds
owing to the fact that "The Greeks, to whom we owe the essence and name of 'philosophy'
and of the 'philosopher,' already !mew quite well that thinkers are not 'close to life.' But
only the Greeks concluded from this lack of closeness to life that the thinkers are then the
most necessary-precisely in view of the essential misery of man," Parmenides, I 00.
143
Martin Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity, tr. John van Buren
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999), 15-16.
144
Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics ofFact/city, 16.
145
Heidegger, Ontology: The Hermeneutics ofFact/city, 16.
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 249
)
of 'metanarrative' as the broad descriptor of his vision of a biblical philosophy. 146
I concur with his choice, broadly speaking, but will penetrate yet further, I trust, into
the meaning of it. Canale, like Heidegger and many others influenced by )
postmodemism, shares the view that "science" has been over zealous in its claims
for itself. Canale believes that "the scientific method does not produce [the] )
absolute discovery of truth, but helps us to wrestle with the constant task of
)
interpreting reality." 147 Precisely put, it is this prolonged engagement with
interpretation which constitutes the essence and meaning ofreality itself. That is,
it is not that we don't acquire knowledge at all, but that it is not knowledge alone,
)
as science understands it, that is what we need. We need to be continuously
interpreting reality within its meaningfulness, as the interpreting of it is what
constitutes the heart of reality, and is what reveals the heart of man. 148
What aspects ofreality in particular do we need to be interpreting? For both
Heidegger and Canale, the meaning of the Kantian aim, that is, God, freedom, and _)
immortality, is central. 149 Yet it is here that one ofthe greatest divergences between
Canale and Heidegger occurs. For Heidegger, left without any God, and only the
death oftemporality dying temporally, even to death, there is no immortality. There
is no defined ethics. All Heidegger is left to explore is the existential meaning of
freedom, which becomes time. A circular reality, though interestingly he placed
the priority of the problem on the origin of freedom. 150 What Heidegger did get
)
146
Canale, "From Vision to System: Part III," 57. Canale states that "the traditional
issue of the 'one and the many' (the whole and the parts) that Greek philosophy explained
by way of ' metaphysics,' biblical thinking addressed by way of 'metanarrative.'
Metaphysics and metanarrative are different ways to solve the same philosophical problem
of the one and the many, the whole and the parts," Ibid.
147
Canale, "Evolution, Theology, and Method Part I," 98-99. )
1 9
• White wrote, "Nicodemus had come to the Lord thinking to enter into a discussion
with Him, but Jesus laid bare the foundation principles of truth. He said to Nicodemus, It is
not theoretical knowledge you need so much as spiritual regeneration. You need not to have
your curiosity satisfied, but to have a new heart," Ellen White, The Desire ofAges, 171.
1
° Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground for a New Approach," 103-104;
and Canale, "From Vision to System: Part I," 11.
150
Although Heidegger famously associated "Being" or existence with "time" in his
work, Being and Time, making time a co-primordial element of the foundational question
ofphilosophy, existence, and maintained this overall emphasis throughout his career, he was
also very interested in the issue of human freedom. In fact, at one time he wrote "the
question concerning the essence of human freedom is the fundamental question of
philosophy, in which is rooted even the question ofBeing," thus "the question concerning
the essence of freedom is the fundamental problem of philosophy, even if the leading
question thereof consists in the question ofBeing." In the same work, Heidegger explained
that " the essence offreedom only comes into view if we seek it as the ground of the
possibility ofDasein, as something prior even to being and time," Martin Heidegger, The )
Essence ofHuman Freedom, tr. Ted Sadler (New York, NY: Continuum, 2002), 203,205,
93 (italics original).
)
)
)
)
)
) 250 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
) correct, however, is to think of them within the horizons oftemporality, even God,
ifthere is one, 151 rather than within the confines ofthe predominantlymathematical-
) metanarrative in itself as the new biblical substitute for classical metaphysics. He
timeless natural sciences of today as they struggle to discover freedom in
) contradistinction to necessity or determinism amid nature. 152 Kant, himself, was
still trapped within the sciences for his explanation of God, freedom, and
) immortality, and, indeed, even tried to connect the study ofmathematics with them.
) I trust it is still intuitively obvious why such an endeavor may prove exceedingly
difficult. 153 This is a point I wish to emphasize. Most philosophers today are more
) interested, with pressures of the positive sciences encroaching upon them, to
establish existential freedom, even utilitarian freedoms, more than ethical freedom,
)
yet whatever they do, a ll these freedoms must appear within the confines of
) acceptable scientific evidence. This contemporary and historical focus by many
philosophers conceals tremendous ramifications for the methodological task of
_)
metaphysics and theology.
) For Canale, naturally, the meaningfulness of God, freedom, and immortality
can only be understood within his previously established framework grounded in
) the primacy of the biblical text. Of course, like Heidegger, he does not seek to
) understand freedom within the confines of the sciences. The question of freedom
within nature, in itself, is irrelevant to him as a determinative factor, until that time
) when the positive sciences and regional ontologies have been filtered through a
biblically conceived temporal ontology. 154
)
) Adventists long been saying the same thing?
)
) to the overall biblical metanarrative that is the replacement for classical
)
) 155
) 151
Heidegger, Being and Time, 406 n.13.
152
"As an empirical issue, the interplay between contingency and necessity in the
history of life will remain unsettled for some time. What can be said, however, is that it is
conceptually unhelpful to oppose the two. Contingency and necessity form another one of
) those polarities to be found at the very core oflife-like being and not-being, self and other,
freedom and necessity, form and matter," Thompson, Mind in Life: Biology,
) template of classical metaphysics, they can harmonize it to Christianity without changing its
Phenomenology, and the Sciences of the Mind, 217.
) m Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences (Harvard University Press, 1992),
19-21. See also, Steven M. Bayne, "Marks, Images, and Rules: Concepts and Transcendental
) Idealism," 127-142, in Kant's Idealism: New Interpretations ofa Controversial Doctrine,
ed. Dennis Schulting, Jacco Verburgt (New York, NY: Springer, 2011), 137-138; Jerrold
) J. Katz, Realistic Rationalism (Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology, 1998), 179-180; and
Emily Carson, "Pure Intuition and Kant's Synthetic A Priori, 307-318, in Debates in
) day Adventists. For more, see Ellen White, The Great Controversy (1911 ), 409-431.
Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses, ed. Stewart Duncan,
) AntoniaLolordo (Routledge, 2013), 309-310.
154
Canale, "From Vision to System: Part III," 69.
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 251
Initially, through his use of the Great Controversy metanarrative 155 described
by Ellen White, 156 Canale seems to identify, as noted above, the concept of
explains, "From the perspective of the biblical metanarrative template," "the Great
Controversy metanarrative ... includes the six twenty-four hour consecutive days
of divine creation of life on our planet, the inner historicist logic centered in the
sanctuary, and the eschatological prophecies of Daniel and Revelation." 157 This is
all well and very good in itself, and I strongly affirm all these truths alongside
him. 158 Indeed, in this light, one might even suggest that understanding the
timelessness-temporal interface, in connection with all the issues it leads one into,
is in fact a part of the Great Controversy itself. This may appear more obvious
when one recalls the role that timelessness and mathematics have played in
encouraging recent denials of free-will in the scientific community. The question
of whether we are truly free outside of God takes on a new layer of significance.
Yet, what emerges through Canale's use of the metanarrative concept is what
is critical. Despite all the above elements being a part of the Great Controversy
metanarrative, he believes it still requires an interpretive key, a ground. He
identifies this ground as the Sanctuary doctrine, which is explained throughout
Scripture. Canale states, "the doctrine ofthe Sanctuary is the backbone ofthe Great
Controversy between Christ and Satan that takes place as an ongoing historical
battle for the destiny of the universe." 159 The question is, why is this so, and what
does this really mean, in regards to the issue of metaphysics? Have not many
I ask the question in this way because it appears at times that Canale seems to
"limit" the Sanctuary doctrine to the place of the interpretive or hermeneutical key
Fernando Canale, "Adventist Theology and Deep Time/Evolutionary Theory: Are
They Compatible?," in The Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 15#1 (Autumn
2004), 100. "The main difference between the classical metaphysical template and the
biblical metanarrative template is that the former places God and his acts in a spiritual,
timeless, non-historical realm of reality, while the latter places God and his acts in the
historical continuum of created reality. This methodological template helps us understand
why Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians correctly argue that since evolution fits the
theological structure and inner logic," Ibid.
156
Canale, "From Vision to System: Part III," 58. Note also, Ellen White, The Great
Controversy.
157
Canale, "Adventist Theology and Deep Time/Evolutionary Theory: Are They
Compatible?," 100.
158
I will not here outline the details ofthe sanctuary doctrine as understood by Seventh-
159
Canale, "Adventist Theology and Deep Time/Evolutionary Theory: Are They
Compatible?," 100 n. 24.

252 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
metaphysics.160 This may appear an odd statement, as Canale has done all he can
to uplift and advance an ever increasing awareness of the doctrine of the
Sanctuary, 161 and placin g it within the position of the "hermeneutical key" to
Scripture seems hardly an unimportant one to him. 162 Indeed, Canale articulates the
controversial position, with which I also agree, that the Sanctuary should be the
hermeneutical key to biblical theology above and beyond the Gospel itself (because
the Sanctuary reveals and explains the Gospel), 163 contra the impressions of some
Adventists.
Nevertheless, I phrased my inquiry in the way I did to pene trate into the issues
that the Sanctuary is actually interested in resolving. It is about more than just the
Investigative or Pre-Advent Judgement, as Canale himself has observed, but
includes the entire scope ofA dventist doctrines. 164 Such a topic is b eyond what can
be pursued here. Rather, I wish to ask plainly, what is it that this heavenly Temple
is explaining that relates to traditional metaphysics proper? Can we really replace
metaphysics with a metanarrative, a simple switch? What is it that metaphysics
resolved that a metanarrative resolves differently, beyond the employment of
h istoricality?
At this point, I would like to suggest that the metanarrative of the Great
Controversy, which is indeed centered upon the Sanctuary Temple in heaven, where
Christ presently resides, does indeed mean more than we h ave supposed. This study
is not the time for further biblical exegesis, though it is surely invited by this study.
What I am suggesting is that the Temple also addresses the more classical problems
of metaphysics, that is, the nature or existence of meta-physical realities, such as
God, freedom, and immortality, as well as other possible meta-physical realities (my
hyphenated use of 'meta-physics' is to be distinguished from the metaphysics
Heidegger criticized- I'm literally interested in that which is "not physical" or
beyond physics, not a system p er se). In other words, we sh ould want to know what
it is that the narrative of the Temple is about? What is the story presented? In what
way are the "philosophical" issues of God, freedom, and immortality presented?
What are they presented in connection with? What other meta-physical issues are
This is in part due to Ellen White's language, see Ellen White, The Great
160
Controversy (1911), 423. She says the sanctuary"opened to view" a "systemoftruth,"Ibid.
Canale, "From Vision to System: Part I," 10.
161
Canale, "On Being the Remnant," 141-142; and Fernando Canale, "Evolution,
Theology, and Method, Part 3," in Andrews University Seminary Studies 42# 1 (2004), 37.
162
Canale, "The Eclipse of Scripture and the Protestantization of the Adventist Mind:
Part 2: From the Evangelical Gospel to Culture," in The Journal ofthe Adventist Theological
Society 22#1 (Spring, 2011), 112.
163 Fernando Canale, "The Eclipse of Scripture and the Protestantization of the
Adventist Mind: Part 1: The Assumed Compatibility of Adventism with Evangelical
Theology and Ministerial Practices," in The Journal of the Adventist Theological Society
21# 1-2 (20 I 0), 158; and Canale, "From Vision to System: Part III," 58.
16
• Canale, "From Vision to System: Part Ill," 58.
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 253
)
presented? And lastly, in what way would the presentation of meta-physical issues
in the Temple have an effect upon our understanding ofphysics or nature? I cannot
answer all these questions here, but let me make a few suggestions for a way
forward in exploring these issues.
All too often, as Canale noted, we have seen the Sanctuary as merely another
"doctrine," and considered only the Pre-Advent judgement component ofit, that is,
the existential side ofit (how it affects me). 165 But there is much more to it than
that, I wouW suggest, as some scholars have already begun to point out in some
detail, related to issues oftheodicy, etc. 166 Yet, the point I'm making here is that the
temple itself is telling a narrative, indeed. But within the narrative that it is telling, )
there are still meta-physical questions. Therefore, behind the narrative ofthe temple
there is revealed a physics in the temple. Or, one might say, the physics of the
temple provide the data that the temple is then narrating.
:! By way of concluding this section, I will add that Adventists have long focused
on the 2300 day prophecy of Daniel 8: 14, and the two stage ministry of Christ
Ii within the Holy Place, and the Most Holy Place. We have connected the daily
sacrifices and the Day of Atonement to the sacrifice of Christ himself on earth and
his ministrations in the heavenly Temple. This is the general salvation narrative,
centered within the activities taking p lace in the Temple, within the context of the j
Great Controversy. 167 Below I will briefly explain how the narrative in the Temple
actually points us toward some more traditional metaphysical problems and their
solutions, as well as reframing the types of meta-physical issues that need resolving _)
that human reason hasn't uncovered.
6.3. The Physics Behind the Narrative: Templephysics
What concerns this section is the exploration of the idea that the
Sanctuary/femple at the center of Adventist theology contains more than a
"metanarrative" describing the Great Controversy and God's historical actions in )
dealing with that controversy, which are centered within the Sanctuary. I am
suggesting there are still implicit, and even explicit, meta-physical issues being
described. Because it is through the services of the Sanctuary through which these
other issues are uncovered, explained, or gain significance, I have chosen to label
these issues templephysics. By this label, of course, I am not referring to the
physical nature ofGod's temple in itself. I am actually referring to what should b e
called meta-templephysics, but for the sake of ease-of-use, and for the purpose of
displaying my conviction in the physical reality ofthe heavenly Temple, I am opting
for simply templephysics. Stated differently, the doctrine of the Sanctuary is not
J
165
Marvin Moore, The Case for the Investigative Judgment: Its Biblical Foundation )
(Pacific Press Publishing Association, 20 I 0).
166
Roy Gane, Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day of Atonement, and
Theodicy (Winona Lake, ID: Eisenbrauns, 2005).
167
White, The Great Controversy ( 191 1), 428-431.
)
)
 )
)
)
) 254 MICHAELF. YOUNKER
) just another doctrine, even a pillar one, nor even the hermeneutic key to the
temporal metanarrative of salvation (although it is also this as Canale asserts). It
) is here that the significance of blood is raised anew in a meta-physical way. The
is also the explanatory contextual center ofGod's revelation ofactual meta-physical
) realities-it reveals a templephysics. In what follows I can barely even begin to
elaborate on what this might mean, but I hope to open up fruitful topics for further
) research and reflection.
First, I wish to suggest that the Kantian concerns of God, freedom, and
immortality are in fact addressed in the Sanctuary narrative, and indeed in a way
) completely distinct from how both philosophy and traditional theology have previously
) dealt with the issues, even beyond their different use of the concept of time. Such
differences are manifested in a distinct way for each issue. Furthermore, I would
) also like to posit that the Garden of Eden should also be equated with "temple"
like characteristics, as several commentators have observed. 168 This will allow
)
me to share some additional details to further flesh out the significance of the
) concept of templephysics within its broader contextual use in inspired writings,
including Ellen White.
) together in a way that defies the traditional views that Christianity has struggled
Concerning God, for example, Canale claims that God's theophanic and
) historical actions are primary and constitute the basic nexus within which any God-
world relationship can be discussed. Speculating upon the absent God, or God of
) silence as available to natural reason, is not particularly helpful. The historical God
) manifests Himself in a variety of ways in the Sanctuary, where His actual presence
is manifested. The Sanctuary appears to serve a key role in determining God's
)
)
interactions with the cosmos; it is the place where God "dwells" or lives, and from
which He shares His will concerning what is happening throughout His creation,
including responding to its prayers to Him. 169 Significantly, it is also the "command
) center" of God's actions concerning fallen or sinful humanity. It is the place where
) solutions or remedies are applied, it is where the medicine of sin is described and
displayed. The Holy of Holies, within the temple, is the medical laboratory of the
) great Metaphysician, and of which the earthly one operated as a "makeshift"
) God, that mind will reveal the miracle-working power of God; the power of the mind in
) Collection, 240.
Donald W. Parry, "Garden ofEden: Prototype Sanctuary," in Temples ofthe Ancient
168
) World: Ritual and Symbolism, ed. Donald W. Parry (Salt Lake City, UT: Desert Books,
1994); Mark H. Greene III, The Scriptural Temple (Springville, UT: Horizon Publishers,
) Changing his appearance, assuming the disguise of a serpent, in the most subtle,
2004), 34; Peter Thacher Lanfer, Remembering Eden: The Reception History ofGenesis 3:
) 22-24 (Oxford University Press, 2012); Allen P. Ross, Biblical Worship from the Garden
to the New Creation: Recalling the Hope ofGlory (Kregel Academic, 2006); 89; Gordon J.
) Wenham, 'Sanctuary Symbolism in the Garden ofEden Story,' in I Studied Inscriptionsfrom
Before the Flood: Ancient Near Easter, Literary, and Linguistic Approaches to Genesis 1-
) 11, ed., Richard S. Hess and David Toshio Tsumura (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1994),
399-404; Margeret Barker, The Gate ofHeaven: The History and Symbolism ofthe Temple
) good and evil, thou shalt not eat ofit; for in the day thatthou eatest thereof thou shalt surely
in Jerusalem (London: SPCK, 1991 ), 63-103; and Richard M. Davidson, Flame ofYahweh:
) Sexuality in the Old Testament (Hendrickson Publishers, 2007), 47-48, n. 133, 57.
169
Ps 11:4; 18:6; Is 6:1-4; Ex 25:9; and Heb 8:5.
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 255
wartime hospital. 170 It reveals, today, a God with human nature occupying it. The
greatest medicine ever conceived was concocted behind the veil of this chamber-it
nature of sin, indeed, is a great matter that is communicated in a distinct way within
the Sanctuary and all its furniture, including the stone tables. This is the heart of
templephysics. The concepts oftheodicy, atonement, love, mercy, and justice are
communicated in complex and penetrating ways that natural reason could never
reveal, and classical theology has missed. 171
The sanctuary also contains the Law of God, which then becomes the key for
interpreting the meaning offreedom within Canale 's Scriptural paradigm. Freedom
is related intricately to ethics. It is our violation of God's law that denies us our true
existential freedom, changing our natures, granting us propensities and tendencies
toward sin. The nature of this type of freedom, and its interrelationship with ethics,
natural philosophy has never uncovered; indeed, what human nature is, particularly
its freedom, remains a great mystery. 172 The Sanctuary reveals its own distinct
understanding of the nature of existential freedom and ethical freedom, tying them
with, for example, between Calvinism and Arrninianism on the role of God,
foreknowledge, and human freedom. 173 Their classic debate is therefore
fundamentally misguided. On this point, for example, how it is that Eve could
l "cognitively" err prior to sinning remains something that eludes any
Platonic/timeless conception of an original unfallen timeless soul. 174 A similar
i question is raised about why it is that not only was the one tree forbidden to the holy
170
This was especially true of the earthly tabernacle and temple.
171
See Gane, Cult and Character.
172
Note 2 Cor 3: 17. "When a human mind is allowed to come under the control of
action is like the miracle-working power of God." Ellen White, Spalding and Magan
173
Fernando Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing
Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Litho tech, 2005).
174
"It was when he was in conflict with man that Satan gained his first victory.
artful-manner he assailed Eve, saying, 'Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of
the garden? And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees ofthe
garden; but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye
shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.' The woman erred when she entered
into controversy with the serpent. The Lord had not said, "Ye shall not touch it." He had
said, 'Of every tree in the garden thou mayest freely eat; but of the tree of the knowledge of
die."' Ellen White, "TheTestofLoyalty," in The Signs ofthe Times (February 13, 1896 par.
5).

256 MICHAEL F. YOUNKER
pair in Eden, but that it was only there that they could be tempted .175 L astly, why
it is that Adam and Eve were placed on "probatio n" in the first place raises several
interesting questions about human nature vs. angelic n ature, etc., and the temporal
and probationary nature of the test itself. 176
Ofcourse, as one might s uspect, indeed all three ofKant' s metaphysical objects
relate intimately in Canale's project. The third object, immortality, is for Canale
conditional, in specific, biblically delimited ways. Our adherence to the Law, or
maintaining an ethical life, is the condition for immortality. Eternal torment for the
wicked is also not in God's plans. But there are also some specific things about the
T emple context, including the Garden of Eden, that both reveal and raise me ta-
physical questions. For example, although Adventism rejects any sacramen tal view
of God's power, nevertheless, there is some sort ofdis tinctness ofvirtue to be found
in the tree oflife in the Garden. Somehow it did contain the virtue of divine power,
making immortality not simply a matter ofethics, 177 but something that was still, for
unfallen humanity, to be seen as a "gift." 178 Indeed, even the fallen angels
apparently believed that they could secure strength and power by eatin g from the
tree. 179 Also, m eta-physical issues were an issue prior to the fall in ways we may
not have yet fully appreciated. For example, although the tree of life had
supernatural power in itself, the tree of knowledge of good and evil did not. 180
Importantly, however, Eve evidently thought sin w as in fact concealed within the
:1
175
Ellen White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 53.
176
White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 4 8-49. See also, Ellen White, Confrontation, 18.
177 "Here is truth that will unfold the subject to your mind if you do not close it to the
rays of light. Eternal life is an infinite gift. This places it outside the possibility of our
earning it, because it is infinite. It must necessarily be a gift. As a gift it must be received by
faith, and gratitude and praise be offered to God," Ellen White, Faith and Works, 27.
178
"The fruit ofthe tree oflife in the Garden ofEden possessed supernatural virtue. To
eat of it was to live forever. Its fruit was the antidote of death. Its leaves were for the
sustaining oflife and immortality." Ellen White, Testimonies Volume 8, 288. "The angels
who had been appointed to guard Adam in his Eden home before his transgression and
expulsion from paradise were now appointed to guard the gates ofparadise and the way of
the tree of life, lest he should return and gain access to the tree of life and sin be
immortalized." Ellen White, "Redemption Part I," Review and Herald (February 24, 1874
par. 16).
179
"His followers were seeking him; and he aroused himself and, assuming a look of
defiance, informed them of his plans to wrest from God the noble Adam and his companion
Eve.... Their transgression would place them also, in a state of rebellion; and they could
unite with Adam and Eve, take possession of Eden, and hold it as their home. And if they
could gain access to the tree of life in the midst of the garden, their strength would, they
thought, be equal to that of the holy angels, and even God himself could not expel them."
Ellen White, Spirit ofProphecy Vol. 1 (1870), 30-31.
180
Ellen White, Education, 25.
)
)
FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 257 )
)
fruit. 181 So Eve was apparently "thinking scientifically" before the Fall, and it
contributed to her problems, setting up her overstatement in her dialogue with
Satan. 182 All manner ofinteresting "meta-physical" or templephysical questions are
)
raised by context ofthe Garden, most ofthem encouraging yet ever more intriguing
insights into the radicality of freedom. Many questions on human nature could be )
pursued through an exploration of these narratives.
To conclude this section, I'd like to offer one last suggestion for how a
)
templephysics deals with meta-physical issues in a distinct, yet comparable way, to . _)
what traditional metaphysics, and onto-theo-logy in particular, has attempted to do.
For example, note that in Heidegger 's conception of traditional ontotheology, there
are the questions of Being, God, and beings/Dasein. Canale is convinced that
Scripture reveals its own perspective on these issues, with which I concur. Yet, not
only does Scripture, and even the Temple, reveal its own temporal-historical version
of these philosophical ideas, but, could it also reveal the inverse in a distinctive )
way? Could, therefore, a s tudy of the Sanctuary reveal that God is solving the
inverse ofthe classical trio of concepts by resolving the problems of Sin, Satan, and
sins/sinners (the concept of Sin, the highest/first cause of Sin, and actual sins and
sinners)? In other words, God, in His temple, is solving the problem of Sin, the
Sinner, and sins, as the counterpoint to the reality of Being, God, and beings. This
comparison may yet prove very fruitful as it is studied in more detail, addressing the
philosophical realities behind the nature of the atonement and many other issues. 183
j
181
"Eve had wandered near the forbidden tree, and her curiosity was aroused to know
how death could be concealed in the fruit ofthis fair tree." White, " Redemption Part I," par. )
12.
182
Eve seemed to think that "sin" was a "thing" in the fruit, and thus, "touching it" or
examining it more closely, externally, from the outside, like a scientist, would reveal the
nature of sin. Eve was mistaken in her belief about this. "Eve had overstated the words of )
God's command. He had said to Adam and Eve, 'But of the tree of the knowledge of good
and evil thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die.' In
J
Eve's controversy with the serpent, she added the clause, 'Neither shall ye touch it, lest ye
die.' Here the subtlety of the serpent was seen. This statement of Eve gave him advantage,
and he plucked the frui t, and placed it in her hand, and used her own words, 'He hath said,
Ifye touch it, ye shall die.' You see no harm comes to you from touching the fruit, neither
will you receive any harm by eating it." White, "Redemption Part l ," par. 14.
m Why the reality of substitutionary atonement is philosophically viable only through
a temporal theo-ontological system, for example (E.g., Ellen White, Spirit ofProphecy Vol.
2, 59-60). Note also, why is it that Satan becomes the scapegoat? What does this mean?
White, The Great Controversy, 485-486. Additionally, concerning Satan and sins, that Satan
and sinner will suffer for their individual sins becomes an issue revealed through
templephysics. "For the sins of those who are redeemed by the blood of Christ will at last
be rolled back upon the originator of sin, and he must bear their punishment, while those J
who do not accept salvation through Jesus will suffer the penalty oftheir own sins." "Satan )
and his angels suffered long. Satan bore not only the weight and punishment ofhis own sins,
but also of the sins of the redeemed host, which had been placed upon him; and he must also
)
)
) (
) r1
)
) 258 MICHAELF. YOUNKER ·l FROM METAPHYSICS TO TEMPLEPHYSICS 259
) Sin, also, is a temporal reality and problem that God is resolving in a very specific metaphysics that the world is still producing and applying. His call to return to
way throughout the Great Controversy narrative as it continues to unfold. Scripture, to focus on the historical metanarrative revealed there, demonstrates
) clearly that God has revealed an alternative plan for the salvation of mankind,
) 6.4 Mysteries that Remain Unresolved illustrated and enacted through His activities in the Temple of God. Through this,
In this short section, I just want to clarify what issues are not yet resolved. Not I have invited yet further reflection on how it is that the Temple and its context may
) just for Canale, but for all honest Christian philosophers. First, it remains a mystery reveal the true meta-physical issues worthy of contemplation, what I have labeled
) just what sinless freedom is really like. Revelation may reveal that it exists, but we templephysics. Such templephysical issues open to view the infinite depths of
do not and cannot experientially know what this means before glorification. The God's wisdom and love. As I am sure Canale would concur, with God there is
) noetic effects of sin fundamentally limit our ability to philosophize at this time. always more to learn.
) Though, on this point, I also note that Eve too had much to learn about the reality
ofmeta-physics that a study oftemplephysics might have revealed-she too assumed Michael F. Younker (Ph.D. candidate at Andrews University) is currently serving as the
) mistaken beliefs about the ultimate nature of reality that contributed to her sin . campus chaplain for Middle East University near Beirut, Lebanon. He is also the
manging editor for the Journal of the Adventist Theological Society, and a senior editor
Second, the nature ofmathematics, and its relationship to the other various regional
) for The Compass Magazine. Email: myounker@andrews.edu
ontologies and positive sciences, remains unclear. This uncertainty is only
) compounded when mathematics is compared with language, or considered the
paradigm of language. Lastly, the nature of language itself remains ambiguous.
) Different proposals have been offered, but none ofthem conclusively resolve all the
) issues. 184 1~
Beyond and behind these above mysteries, the complete development of a
) templephysics in a comparable way to what it is that sacramental metaphysics is
) doing in the world today remains a pathway virtually uncharted. The various social,
political, and personal-spiritual applications have not yet been studied in any detail.
) This is the quest before us, and it is an ever more urgent one in our world today,
insofar as it provides the best rationale for why it is that God's ways are best, and
only He is loving, just, and true.
)
) 7. Conclusion
The contributions of Fernando Canale stand alone in bringing to light the
) breadth and depth of the technical underpinnings of the history of philosophy as it
has contributed to theological thought. His desire to return all theological thinking
)
to Scripture, and examine it anew, by cutting through the presuppositions that have
) hindered previous generations, is a turning point on the level of technical reflection
that is possible for philosophers seeking to adhere to the true source of wisdom,
) taking seriously the claim that "man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word
) that proceeds from the mouth of God" (Matt 4:4). Canale has redefined what it
means to be a sola Scriptura Christian intellectual.
) In this article, I have charted Canale's thinking alongside a number of issues
) in contemporary philosophy. I have shown how his seminal insights on the role
of timelessness in theology have a broad application in explaining the developing
)
)
suffer for the ruin of souls which he had caused." Ellen White, Early Writings, 178,
) 294-295.
184
See, for example, Iriann Marie Hausted's chapter on language in this volume.
)
)
 )
)

)
Reading as a Disclosure o f the
Th ough ts of t h e Heart

)
Kenneth Bergland
)

)
Introduction
All too often the reader of the biblical text attempts to erase him- or herself,
especially in academic theology which strives for objectivity. Alternatively we read )
for the sake of entertainment, amusing ourselves through leisurely reading. Further,
it might be a danger that we impose too much of ourselves upon the text, under the
J
cloak of pretentious spiritual edification. There might be multiple psychological )

Part II: reasons behind these readings. Still, the focus in the following is not to excavate
possible motives of the psyche. Rather, in this essay I will argue for the primary and
dominant need to read the Bible in ethical responsibility. 1 It is meant as a reminder
)

On the Horizons of the ' Let me make clear that I do realize that the word 'ethics' for many is understood as
a system of principles giving detailed dictation of every action. The detailed regulation of
)
both positive and negative acts becomes primary. This view leaves little room for freedom.
Vision Others retain this view of ethics, but argue that there are minor or major areas that are
ethically neutral, leaving room for human freedom. Ethics is also traditionally understood
)
as one discipline besides others (ontology, epistemology, and logic). Philosophers have left
many such ethical principles, but alas, the inability ofsuch principles to truly make a person
good is only too well documented in their own lives, Paul Johnson, Intellectuals (Phoenix:
Phoenix House, 1996).
In the following I will use 'ethics' in a different sense. ' Ethics' is here rather
understood as primarily a relational commitment to God and one's fellow, on the basis of
normative statements in the biblical text, where the commandment itself often leaves room
for a certain degree of spontaneity and freedom on the part of the reader in precisely how
to act upon it. Ethics is further encompassing all of life and human existence. It is more
about being accountable and responsible in our concrete relations with our surroundings,
than the development ofa grand abstract system ofprinciples that are not lived. Even ifwe
did not choose to be, our ethical choices determine our future life or death. It is in this sense
I will also use the term 'existential.'
This la tter understanding of ethics might be seen as aligning itself to a more classical
understanding of ethics, Karl Wilcox, " Postmodemism and the Re-Birth of Christian
Literacy," in Revisiting Postmodernism: An Old Debate on a New Era (vol. 13 ofAndrews
University Mission Studies; Berrien Springs, MI: Department ofWorld Mission Seventh-day
Adventist Theological Seminary Andrews University, 2013), 176-77. It might also be seen
in light of the late Martin Heidegger's return to Heraclitus' understanding of ethos as the )
open room whereDasein lives (oikos), in the sense ofwhat shows itself for Dasein. The late
Heidegger's critique of the occidental emphasis, as seen for example in Descartes and Kant,
upon the role of the subject in contrast to his own increased focus upon Being as it shows )
itself is here implied. Emmanuel Levinas built off of the late Heidegger, but emphasized a
break between ethos and oikos, where the other receives priority over the ego so as not to
... I be reduced to the ego's oikos. I have discussed the relation between Heidegger and Levinas
more extensively in Kenneth Bergland, "Den andre i det samrne" (M.A. thesis, University )

j J
)
)
)
KENNETH BERGLAND READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 263
) 262
of a reminder. The voice calling us to choose and act permeates the biblical text, of It is, however, a response the text also provides guidance to, both through more
which the prophets remind us with particularly clarity. As a member of a fallen race or less clear pointers in the text itself and through the inner-biblical reception of
) given passages. I will use Isa 58 as a case-study to illustrate how the contemporary
we are addressed to choose and act, and the ethical character of our response
) determines our destiny. Nothing less is at stake in the self-erasure, self- readers were held responsible for not having seen the indications of social justice
entertainment, and self-imposition-all consisting of existential and ethical in the passages relating to Yorn Kippur (Lev 16; 23; 25). Isa 58 is not an
) forgetfulness.
explanation or exegesis of Lev 16; 23; 25, but presupposes a close ethical reading
The following is not so much a linear series of arguments, as attempts to see of them and is itself a prophetic homily of this reading.
the same core issue from various angles. My point of departure will be Fernando
) L. Canale's epistemological analysis of the subject-object relation, where both the Description, Response, and Explanation
subject and object contribute to the constitution of meaning. A form of this can be In order to create meaning, from the biblical text or in general, both a subject
seen in how the Hebrew Bible (HB) may be syntactically underdetermined, thus and an object are required according to Fernando Canale. Following Nicolai
requiring that the reader establish relations that are not explicitly stated in the text. Hartmann he writes that "in every knowledge a 'knower' and a 'known,' a subject
)
and an object, meet face to face. The relationship that exists between them is in
I will argue that we here can find an analogy to how the text needs to be read in an
) ethical response. As readers who do not belong to the original readership, it is often itselfknowledge."2 Further, he elaborates on the roles of the subject and object:
) not clear how we are addressed by the text. Still Paul writes: "All scripture is
inspired by God and is useful for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for The object's role is basically the communication of the properties of the
) training in righteousness, so that everyone who belongs to God may be proficient, object into the subject.... On the other hand, the cognitive subject, which
equipped for every good work" (2 Tim 3:16--17). It implies that God addresses all when considered from the object's viewpoint appears to be essentially
) receptive, is also, when seen from the subject's perspective, called to play
who belong to Him by means of the biblical text in order to facilitate the good life.
Through close reading and rereading we find depth, lacunas, ambivalence, a creative function in the relational structure of knowledge. The creative
)
tensions, indications, confusion as to who the textual participants are (with our own activity of the cognitive subject thus affects the relation of knowledge
) participation possibly being the most obscure), and what may initially strike us as itself(as does the object); that is to say, it reaches forth and constitutes the

I
odd reuse of biblical texts in later biblical material-all easily overlooked by the image of the object, not the object itself.3
,)
casual reader. The careful reader, on the other hand, might find him- or herself
) entangled and paralyzed by these textual enigmas. I suggest that these phenomena As an example of the role of the reader in the constitution of meaning in the
are not simply an accident, but a characteristic style of biblical literature inviting biblical text, Oliver Glanz has pointed out the incongruence between person-
) number-gender (PNG) shifts in biblical Hebrew (BH).4 This could be illustrated by
the serious reader to get engaged in and involved with the text. The biblical text is
a look at Isa 58: 1-4:
) written perforated and open, arresting the reader in an inescapable position having
to determine how he or she will respond to it. It is not the style itself that is sacred,
_) but the intent determines a certain style. In this process the reader is first and
) foremost called upon-not to provide an explanation, but-to respond in ethical
choices and actions to the One addressing us through the text. Thus the reader also
) reveals the thoughts of his or her heart, the heart not only being an emotional 2
Fernando Luis Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason: Time and Timelessness as
sensation, but the core of one's entire person. · Primordial Presuppositions (Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series;
) Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987), 28.
3
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 30---31. Canale seems to adopt the terms
)
'subject' and 'object' from Hartmann. As it is difficult to see how this set of terms really
of Oslo, 2003) 40-60. In the following I sympathize with Levinas in giving the other, or
) avoids the Cartesian separation between the two, much criticized in recent philosophy, I will
Other, the priority. Concretely this is seen in emphasizing response over explanation.
instead use 'reader' and 'text' in the following.
Contrary to the late Heidegger there is a difference between the ethos and oikos. On the 4
Oliver Glanz, Understanding Participant-Reference Shifts in the Book ofJeremiah:
other hand I also sympathize with Heidegger's emphasis on the disclosure, so the other, or
A Study ofExegetical Method and Its Consequences for the Interpretation of Referential
) Other, actually come to light or through sound for the ego. Concretely this is seen in
Incoherence (Leiden: Brill, 20 I 3), 12-3 1. It should not be overlooked that there is a
receiving Scripture as God's self-disclosure in human language. Contrary to Levinas there
difference between the meaning that is constituted between a reader and text prior to a
) is not an absolute break between the ethos and oikos, forcing him to deny any disclosure of
movement in the reader, taking the form ofreceived meaning, and the active constitution of
the other in a negative theology. The following is therefore a reading of Scripture as God's
) meaning in for example PNG-shifts in the text, taking the form of meaning created by the
word disclosed within the oikos, and simultaneously as an opening ofthe oikos to the beyond
reader.
of the ethos.
)
)
 )
)

READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 265 )

264 KENNETH BERGLAND
)
Cl.# PNG Cl. type Isa 58:1-4 (1riy own tiatfslation) ', . </ ~·~:. ·::,,, " j.' In the following I will argue that something analogous takes place on the
1 2ms Imov Crv with a throat ethical level ofreading, as what takes place on the syntactic level ofreading. On the
2 2U\S ·XYQt do not hold back syntactical level the reader stands responsible for identifying who addresses whom.
)
3 " lmpv
2ms raise your voice like a shofar On the ethical level of reading the reader stands responsible for giving a response
4 "
·2:ms , 'f- Impv -r'~ and make known to my people their rebellion to the message in the text. In the following I will reflect on the implications of an )
·,5 ,;t· ' ' ' _:,:~.' ·' Ello .
' ,
and to the house ofJacob their sin. ethical reading responding in choice and action. 6
6 3mol WxYa- · And thev seek me dailv Reading can be said to consist of three elements, description, response, and )
7, 3mol .' WxYa and desire the lmowledge of mv wavs as a oeoole explanation,7 while reading cannot be said to have taken place if any one of these
x()tl' ,,.. )
8 3ins that does righteousness is lacking. We never relate to the text pure and simple as it is through description.
9 3ms WxOt. and do not despise the justice of its i;1;od(s). In the initial reading we already have at least a minimal explanation, for example
: 10 •' 3uitil . 0Yat'? . · They ask me for the iustice of righteousness. in the identification of the signs and words in the text, the form of the basic rules
11 , '>._,; 3mol :XYat .. they desire the nearness of God. )
of grammar and a perceived horizon of words like ' man,' 'God,' 'world' and their
·,12' ,. ~JcoP . \ xOt,J ..~,.,, "Whv have we fasted
interrelationships. From here explanations can develop to grand ideological
' '2ros _ . WxQf/
13 /"" 1 but you did not see
lcnl'• 0Otl . systems. We should nevertheless not forget the tentative and hypothetical character
14 we afflicted our soul )
,
2 ms :wxYq:. of all explanations, and constantly expose them to be evaluated and revised on the ·
' 15• '11, but you did not notice?"
16 . ' 2rool xYat . "Behold. on the day ofvour fast vou seek business basis of better understandings of the text. Explanation can elevate the need for a
. 17 ,, '2moJ WxYo . and oooress all your labourers! response, but all too often the text is 'explained away' so the need to respond is
,;}8'(;'ilii ~: ·2m.p1-4 { \t<-1t ft:" Behold, you fast for the purpose of strife and blurred. An explanation that is not ethically tuned, that marginalizes or even )
-': .· :t contention suppresses the need to respond, is at best worthless, but likely deceptive.
-~ "' '
-"~. )
19 '•
, .. InfC ''"·'", and in order to strike with a wicked fist! Explanation is not wrong, but an adequate explanation needs to account for all
!•
20 .t
2mp1 , xYqt •· You do not fast at this moment identical phenomena. It is therefore characterized by being comprehensive. As we )
21 ' -- Intc to make vour voice heard on the high place. encounter the text, however, our ego needs humbly to admit its own limitations as
J
we of necessity only see dimly and know partially (1 Cor 13: 12). The problem is
In clauses 1-4 we find 2ms used. On the basis of the content we understand therefore when explanation takes precedence, tending to impose reductionistic
that the commands contained herein are directed by God to the prophet. In clauses readings upon the text that suit our ego and distort the text's call to respond
6- 11 we then get a shift in person and number, from 2rns to 3mpl/3ms. Again the ethically. This is of course also an ethical response the text is vulnerable enough to J
reader needs to ask: Who addresses whom? B y reading the content we understand suffer. But even a hermeneutics of suspicion, favored in critical approaches,
that God is still the speaker, but now He speaks about the p eople. In clauses 12-15 basically silencing the need to respond ethically to the text, has responded ethically
we find a lcpl speaker. It is not clear whether this is God's summarizing the to the text through its lack of trust. In the freedom ofreading we are consequently )
people's attitude, or whether this is a statement by the people themselves to the caught in the imperative to respond.
)
message, but anyway the prophet here seems to allow room for the people's We should probably be less inclined to explain the text, and more focused on
accusation ofGod's neglect. This illustrates how the reader needs to explain the text describing what is actually there and differentiating it from what is not there. What
in order to make it meaningful. The shifts do not come together with an is not there we can with benefit often pass over in silence, while responding to what
identification of the new speaker and the new addressee. This is a typical is there. The text left us . from description is often more uncomfortable, more
phenomenon in BH, and can at times create considerable confusion when the
identity of the speaker and addressee are not as clear as in this case. 5

5
We can also ask about all the times the Bible does not address the reader in 2 pers. and
speaks about God in 3 pers., where we seem to be situated as spectators to the dialogue or
monologue? How should we understand all those cases which do not contain a direct
speech? Is it simply because the biblical authors wanted to address their audience more
directly that they do not address readers in general? And could the prophetic talk about God
in the 3 pers. be explained along the lines of the prophet being the mediator speaking on
behalf of God, and therefore about God in the 3 pers. without removing the immediacy of
the address?
• Glanz speaks of an "ethical responsibility" in the sense of doing justice to the text
(Glanz, Participant-Reference Shifts in the Book ofJeremiah, 3. See also pp. 29 and 93). I
rather speak of 'ethical responsibility' as an ethical response to the biblical text.
7
Instead of 'explanation' I could also use the word 'interpretation.' But as the latter )
may be understood more passive, as a spontaneous interpretation without a conscious
movement in the reader, I rather prefer to use 'explanation' as it may communicate more the )
active role of the reader in deciphering the text. The choice of the terms 'description' and
'explanation' is influenced by Ludwig Wittgenstein's discussion of the two. )
J
I)
 ) ~
)
)
) 266 KENNETH BERGLAND READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 267

) challenging, than the one left us from explanation. 8 What is given in the text seems sufficient and often most favorable for an ethical response. Some might object: "But
how can we presume to read the text ifwe have not first objectively, systematically,
) and analytically understood it?" However, if this is to be a criteria for reading, we
8
) The early Wittgenstein wrote something in the same vein, even if I also see a will never come even to begin reading. 9 As already said, reading is of necessity an
difference: "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak act done as we see dimly and know partially. Our response does therefore not have
) thereof one must be silent" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (trans. to wait for further explanation, as we can and must respond meaningfully to what
C. K. Ogden; London: Routledge, 1922), 27) and he ends TLP by stating "whereof one is already seen and heard. What is there in the text receives precedence over what
) cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
might be behind the text. What is indicated in the text takes precedence over what
189 (7)). Karl Popper formulated his theory oftestability offalsifiability in explicit contrast
) to the early Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) and the Vienna Circle for is implied by the text. 10 We therefore need to "look and see"-as Ludwig
whom "verifiability, meaningfulness, and scientific character all coincide" (Karl R. Popper,
Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge,
2002), 52). For the early Wittgenstein all meaningful propositions were truth functions of 'conventionalist twist' or a 'conventionalist stratagem.')" (Popper, Conjectures and
) Refutations, 47-8).
atomistic propositions that could be verified by empirical observations. He distinguished
) these from meaningless philosophical or metaphysical propositions that could not be verified And he sums up as follows: "One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion ofthe
by empirical observations (Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, l 03 (5); 187-89 scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refatability, or testability" (Popper,
) (6.53-54)). It is a danger, as Popper himself pointed out, that the explanatory power of the Conjectures and Refutations, 48).
9
theories like those of Marx, Freud, and Adler make the one initiated in them see "the world How much of the biblical text needs to be explained before we can respond to it?
' [as] full of verifications of the theory, Whatever happen[s] always confirm[s] it" (Popper, Andrew Teeter describes the rise of"exegesis as a way oflife," where exegesis constitutes
Conjectures and Refutations, 45). Having discussed a case with Adler in 19 19, an autonomous religious habit, as already beginning to develop within the Hebrew Bible
) who- without considering the case closer-immediately had an explanation ofit and saw itself but flowering in later Second Temple Literature (David Andrew Teeter, "Exegesf!i in
it as a confirmation of his theory, Popper reflected: "What, I asked myself, did it confirm? the Transmission ofBiblical Law in the Second Temple Period: Preliminary Studies" (Ph":D.
) diss., Notre Dame, 2008) 146). Put otherwise, exegesis as elaborate explanation of the text
No more than that a case could be interpreted in the light of the theory.... It was precisely
j this fact- that they always fitted, that they were always confirmed- which in the eyes of came to be understood as prerequisite for lived life, and it was done by expert persons who
their admirers constituted the strongest argument in favour of these theories. It began to had this as their vocation in life. It is not clear to me that 'exegesis as a way of life' is
j dawn on me that this apparent strength was in fact their weakness" (Popper, Conjectures and already a phenomenon within biblical literature (Cf. Kenneth Bergland, "Interpretation of
Refutations, 46-47). As such, I believe biblical theology in its attempt to understand the the Written: The Change ofthe Semantic Field ofillll and Appearance of r.r:r:,\l' ," (Hebrew
biblical text ever clrearer should focus more on falsification of explanations than University, 2010)), even ifwe clearly have attested the practice oflegal exegesis (e.g. Neh
accumulating evidence that apparently verify a theory. Some of the following principles 8:7-8).
l 10
Any concept and theoretical system will remain contingent and vulnerable, ready to
could therefore be reworked to fit studies of textual material. Popper writes:
"(l) It is easy to obtain confirmations, or verifications, for nearly every theory-if we be toppled if the text will no longer prove to support it. This robs any philosophical idea or
) method, any idea and method as such, its timeless and primordial status. Even the
look for confirmations.
) (2) Confirmations should count only if they are the result of risky predictions; that is distinctions between time and timelessness, Being and being, subject and object can be
to say, if, unenlightened by the theory in question, we should have expected an event which retained only to the extent and as long as we find explicit support in the text. If these are
j was incompatible with the theory-an event which would have refuted the theory. only convenient ways to speak and communicate about the text, this is also all the status they
(3) Every 'good' scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen. should obtain. All becomes hypothetical, even our terminology and concepts in light of the
) biblical text. We can no longer relate naively to philosophical and theological concepts,
The more a theory forbids, the better it is.
(4) A theory which is not refutable by any conceivable event is non-scientific. assuming that they are adequate in describing precisely the biblical text simply because they
)
Irrefutability is not a virtue of a theory (as people often think) but a vice. have attained a certain convention within the respective disciplines, ignoring the historicity
) (5) Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it; or to refute it. Testability of the very terminology we use.
is falsifiability; but there are degrees of testability: some theories are more testable, more Further, as we converse and write about the biblical text, it should not be the words
) exposed to refutation, than others; they take, as it were, greater risks. themselves we use that constitute the primary challenge for effective communication. All
(6) Confirming evidence should not count except when it is the result ofa genuine test the technical vocabulary often seems to be part of a program to place ourselves out oftouch
) ofthe theory; and this means that it can be presented as a serious but unsuccessful attempt with the text. Our words should allow an entrance into the subject. Instead ofusing difficult
to falsify the theory. (I now speak in such cases of'corroborating evidence.') words with a shallow meaning, words that do not allow for an entrance, like Jesus we should
) strive to use everyday words with profound meaning. We might find that when our
(7) Some genuinely testable theories, when found to be false, are still upheld by their
) admirers-for example by introducing ad hoc some auxiliary assumption, or by terminology reflects the biblical as far as possible, many ofthe theological and philosophical
reinterpreting the theory ad hoc in such a way that it escapes refutation. Such a procedure concepts and dilemmas dissolve and our own heart is touched the more. "Simple in means,
) is always possible, but it rescues the theory from refutation only at the price of destroying, rich in ends." Should the theologian and philosopher therefore strive toward common
or at least lowering, its scientific status. (I later described such a rescuing operation as a language to avoid self-forgetfulness, distance, blindness and deafness to the text?
)
)

268 KENNETH BERGLAND
Wittgenstein said 11-for what is in the text, restraining our eagerness to overcome
all challenges, while responding in love with all our heart, person, and strength
(Deut 6:5).
As Ellen White says: "One sentence of Scripture is of more value than ten
thousand of man's ideas or arguments." 12 Yes, our early SDA ancestors did speak
of a "complete system of truth" with the sanctuary as the unlocking key/ 3 but this
was a low-level system where they acknowledged the interconnectedness between
discoveries they made in Scripture. It was a system in its entirety contingent upon
Scripture, ready to "exchange a thousand errors for one truth." 14 Do we attempt to
11
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe;
Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), 3 l e (66). And. "God grant the philosopher [and theologian]
insight into what lies in front ofeveryone's eyes" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value:
Revised Edition (trans. Peter Winch; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 72e). He also wrote: "How
hard it is for me to see what is right in front ofmy eyes" (Wittgenstein, Culture and Valu e,
44e). And again: ""The difficulty-I might say- is not that offinding the solution but rather
of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it were only a preliminary to it ..
.. This is connected, I believe, with our wrongly expecting an explanation, whereas the
solution of the difficulty is a description, ifwe give it the right place in our considerations.
Ifwe dwell upon it, and do not try to get beyond it. The difficulty here is: to stop" (Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Zettel (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe; Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1970), 314). And finally: "Our disease is one of wanting to explain" (Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (trans. G. E. M. Anscombe;
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 333). Explanation nevertheless has a role in Wittgenstein's
philosophy, as Labron explains, the point here is that we need to accept that there is an end,
a limit, to explanation where we simply need to accept 'That's how it is' (Tim Labron,
Wittgenstein's Relig ious Point of View (London: Continuum, 2006), 50). The treatment of
the illness ofphilosophical confusion for Wittgenstein was not further rationalizations, but
description (Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View, 36). Of course, biblically
speaking the disease of sin is a more serious illness than the need to explain and needs far
more serious treatment than Wittgenstein's therapy can offer. The point here is that
explanation often serve sin, and treatment is needed for both.
11
Ellen G. White, Testimonies for the Church (vol. 7; Mountain View, CA: Pacific
Press, 1948), 71. Commenting on Jesus' response to Nicodemus in Joh 3 she makes the
distinction between theoretical knowledge and curiosity and spiritual regeneration:
"Nicodemus had come to the Lord thinking to enter into a discussion with Him, but Jesus
laid bare the foundation principles of truth. He said to Nicodemus, It is not theoretical
knowledge you need so much as spiritual regeneration. You need not to have your curiosity
satisfied, but to have a new heart. You must receive a new life from above before you can
appreciate heavenly things. Until this change takes place, making all things new, it will
result in no saving good for you to discuss with Me My authority or My mission" (Ellen G.
White, The Desire of Ages: The Conflict of the Ages Illustrated in the Life of Christ
(Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1940), 171 ).
13
Ellen G. White, The Great Controversy between Christ and Satan: The Conflict of
the Ages in the Christian Dispensation (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1888), 423.
14
J. N. Andrews as quoted in George R. Knight, A Search for Identity: The
Development ofSeventh-day Adventist Beliefs (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000),
21.
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 269 )
)
build an intellectual Babylon to our own glory (Dan 4:27), or are we content to
dwell in the lowlands together with our nomadic forefathers of faith?
In the following I will therefore emphasize the importance of the relation
)
between two of the elements in the above triangle of reading, namely description
and response. Even ifexplanation and system have their place, the manner in which )
they tend to take the central dominant position in our thinking calls for a reminder
of the "weightier matters of the law" (Matt 23 :23), setting them aside for a moment )
to point out their subservient role. I want to bracket the theoretical layers, to clarify )
the primary relation between word and life as it seems intended by the biblical
authors. )
Systems and Response
)
Is it perhaps a reason why it has proven such a challenge in biblical theology
to reduce the biblical text to any one idea? Or a neat system? We see some patterns,
but then it eludes us again as we discover more. It is always this 'more' we have not )
grasped which challenges our systematization. If the biblical authors did not
develop an ideological system or theory, might they have good reasons not to do
so? Is it because their concern lies somewhere else? A question here also arises as
to what promise there is in investigations into formal issues within philosophy and
j
theology? Are the real issues to be found otherwise? And even if God has put His
thoughts into human language, does our putting them into our systems and theories )
a lways require a certain blindness and deafness to the text? What possibilities are
there for a system ifit needs to be seen in the text, not thought out by reason? Just )
as with life itself, the text cannot simply and easily be reduced to one main theme
)
or idea, or reconstructed as an Eucledian system. It defies idealizations,
disembodiment, and a timeless realm. Over the years it has proven wonderfully
resistant to reductionisms and systematizations. The text is grounded in life, and it
might be at the cost of life itself that we try to build our neat systems. We must
therefore always begin at the beginning, with the text as it is given to us. 15 )
Many have s uggested different concepts or unifying principles for the HB. The
covenant (Walther Eichrodt), holiness of God (E. Sellin), God as Lord (Ludwig )
Kohler), e lection of Israel (Hans Wildberger), rulership of God (Horst Seebass),
kingdom of God (Gunther Klein), YHWH as the God of Israel and Israel as the
people of YHWH (Rudolf Smend), the dual concept of the rule of God and
communion between God and man (Georg Fohrer), righteousness and justice (Rolf
Knierim), righteousness (Walter Dietrich), the first commandment (W. H. Schmidt
and Walther Zimmerli), Deuteronomy (S. Herrmann), and simply God (Th. C.
Vriezen, the late Gerhard von Rad, and Gerhard Basel). 16 And these are not all.
Richard Davidson has identified at least 50 different suggestions as to a possible
" Wittgenstein wrote: "It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult
to begin at the beginning. And not try to go further back" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, On
Certainty (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 62e). )
16
Cf. Gerhard F. Hase), Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991), 139- 71. )
I )
')
) ~
)
)
) 270 KENNETH BERGLAND
) center of the Bible. 17 Having summarized the various claims to what a center in the
HB might be, Gerhard Hasel writes:
) Those to whom we have referred so far primarily agree on the matter that
a single Scriptural concept, theme, motif, or idea can be made into a center
) which can serve as an organizing principle for a sort of systematic
structure of an OT theology. This is done on the basis of an unspoken
)
presupposition which has its roots in philosophical premises going back
) to scholastic theology of medieval times. It appears that the doing of OT
theology is at this point in the grip of a philosophical-speculative
presupposition which claims that the multiform and multiplex OT
j materials in all their rich manifoldness will fit into and can be
systematically ordered and arranged by means of a center. . . . It is evident
) that even the most carefully worked out single center or formula will
prove itself finally to be one-sided, inadequate, and insufficient, if not
) regarded as subordinate in significance. It is treated as different from
outrightly erroneous, and therefore will lead to misconceptions. 18
Hasel rightly claimed that the event-centered and word-centered HB-and I
) would add with its focus on choice, action, and life-cannot be reduced to a single
) concept. 19 There is an overflow in the text which is not grasped by concepts or a
system. Hasel might touch upon a central nerve when he says that the only one that
_) unites the HB is YHWH himself.20 And let us here spare ourselves from using the
dull words 'theological' or 'theocentric,' even for the sake of"convenience," as
) say what prayer is, what worship is, and what obedience in daily life is. A
they leave the impression that we are again dealing with a systematism. In the text
) we are invited to simply encounter YHWH speaking to us, without hiding behind
any fig leaves or trees. We are called to, we must, respond with our life. Biblical
) and systematic theology, apologetics and orthodoxy, are not flawed in themselves,
) but if any become the dominant reading of the text, it becomes faithless to the
primary intent of the text.
) Atlanta, GA: John Knox, 1982), 10. Cf. p. 9. On p. 11 he also describes the OT as "a story
) who experience these events." He writes that "wisdom has no place within this basic
17
Richard M. Davidson, "Back to the Beginning: Genesis 1- 3 and The Theological
) Center of Scripture," in Christ, Salvation, and the Eschaton: Essays in Honor ofHans K.
LaRondelle (eds. Daniel Heinz, et al.; Berrien Springs, MI: Old Testament Department,
)
Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University, 2009), 5-9. Here he also
) suggests a seven-faceted center of Scripture.
18
Hase!, Old Testament Theology, 154-55. Cf. also pp. 139-71. For other
) problematizations ofreducing the OT to a central concept see Komelis H. Miskotte, When
the Gods are Silent (trans. John W. Doberstein; New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 119;
) Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology(vol. 2; London: SCM Press Ltd, 1965), 362--63;
James Barr, The Concept of Biblical Theology: An Old Testament Perspective (London:
) word is a process in time between two or more persons. It is inherent in the nature of the
SCM Press, 1999), 605-7.
) 19
Hase!, Old Testament Theology, 158.
20
Hase!, Old Testament Theology, 168-71. Ofcourse, a question is ifwe could say that
) YHWH is even the center in a book like Esther where He is nowhere mentioned. Is it
satisfying to say that his activity is implied in the book?
)
)
T
~1 READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF TIIE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 271
f This corresponds somewhat to the dialectic between God's address and human
response, which Claus Westermann argued was the central structure within the Old
•
I
Testament, arguing that the Old Testament primarily tells a story, "based on event
rather than concepts": "the structure of the Old Testament in its three parts [the
Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings] indicates that the narrative in the Old
Testament is determined by the word of God occurring in it and by the response of
those for whom and with whom this story unfolds."21 Having claimed that human
response is "one of the three integral parts of the Old Testament," beside narrative
and the word of God, and that "all of God's acts and speaking is directed towards
eliciting a response," he continues:
This has trans-historical consequences. In the tradition of Western
theology there has from the very beginning been a tendency to separate
the human response in speaking and action from theology in the real
sense, from dogmatics. Thus the basic response is often unconsciously
theology. Human response as action, to the extent it affects behavior in
daily life, is treated in 'ethics.' To the extent it affects behavior in .
worship, it is considered under the heading of 'liturgy.' Human response ,
as speaking (prayer) is generally treated in either ethics or liturgy. This
separation into distinctive, individual divisions ofstudy necessarily results
in a kind of arbitrariness. It misleads us from seeing that human response
belongs to the nucleus of theology, that only the Bible in its entirety can
change can occur here from the perspective of the Old Testament if the
human response is seen as one of the three main parts of the Old
Testament.22
2
i Claus Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology (trans. Douglas W. Stott;
entrusted to us which includes the occurrence of God speaking and the response of those
framework of an Old Testament theology, since it originally and in reality does not have as
its object an occurrence between God and man" (Westermann, Elements of Old Testament
Theology, 11 ), but to me it is not clear why we cannot see the Wisdom literature as a human
response to this same dialectical relation (cf. Hasel, Old Testament Theology, 92). Maybe
particularly the Wisdom literature is enlightening in this context as it can be described as an
inbreathed human response to God's Word, the Wisdom literature not responding to a direct
address by God, but God speaking through sacred writings.
22
Westermann, Elements ofOld Testament Theology, 27-28. He continues: "What does
the word ofGod mean in the Old Testament? It is here not primarily understood on the basis
of its content, but as an action which takes place between a speaker and a listener. ... The
word that it reaches the listener and causes a response....
The word of God does not exist for modem historical understanding because it cannot
be historically documented. The modem historian must place the prophet's subjective
consciousness, the consciousness which believes it has heard the word of God, in the place

272 KENNETH BERGLAND
Westermann here of course thinks ofresponse from the biblical characters, not
the response of the reader. But ifwe see the Bible as God's word will this not also
mean that our response as reader is an integral part of the reading?23
Reader receptability is also a question of what we read and how much. Spending
time with all the human theories, systems, and scholarly discussions might simply
eclipse God's words. Ellen White sounds a warning to reading:
The gathering together of many books for study too often interposes
between God and man a mass of knowledge that weakens the mind and
makes it incapable of assimilating that which it has already received. The
mind becomes dyspeptic. Wisdom is needed, that man may choose aright
of the word coming to the prophet from God. But with that the historian changes the
meaning of 'word' in the Old Testament. He is able to adapt the phenomenon of the word
of God encountered in the Old Testament to his own historical understanding only by
j
understanding it differently than the text intends.
However, modern theology also understand the 'word of God' to a large extent
differently than the Old Testament intends, namely, on the basis of its content. According
to that understanding, the word of God is what God has said. As such it can be found as
given and becomes accessible to objective reflection. This separates the word of God from
the process of its occurrence and puts it at one's disposal" (Westermann, Elements of Old
Testament Theology, 16). And again: ""The Old Testament knows nothing of an abstracted,
objectified word of God, and that is why the word of God in the Old Testament cannot
become a doctrine. It is also the reason none ofthese functions can be absolutized apart from
the others. This absolutizing takes place not only when in the Jewish understanding the Law
becomes the dominant word of God. It is also the case in Christian theology when the Old
Testament as a whole is understood from the perspective of the concept of Law and in
contrast to the New Testament" (Westermann, Elements of Old Testament Theology, 24).
Westermann sees the three functions of the word of God ((1) the prophetic word (future),
(2) the commandment and law (imperative), and (3) a perfective-present character expressed
in the cult- neither which can take precedence over the other, but express in unity the
understanding of God's word) as embedded in narrative (Westermann, Elements of Old
Testament Theology, 22~23).
23
Jacques Doukhan writes: "Hebrew thought as expressed in the Bible is not a thought.
The Bible does not provide any treatise on the concept ofthe world, or of time, etc. Hebrew
thought does not construct the truth as a philosophical system; rather it is essentially the
response to an event. Thus, in Hebrew, it is the thought that follows the event and not the
reverse. . . . Indeed the mechanism of Hebrew thinking stands at the opposite to the
Cartesian cogito, the latter being the basic presupposition in Western methodology. Instead
of stating "I think, therefore I am," Hebrew thought proclaims "I am, therefore I think." Here
the thought is not initiated and controlled by the thought, but is generated and governed by
the adventures of history" (Jacques B. Doukhan, Hebrew for Theologians: A Textbook/or
the Study ofBiblical Hebrew in Relation to Hebrew Thinking (New York: University Press
of America, 1993), 192- 93. We cou.ld possibly take it one step further, following the
Norwegian philosopher Egil Wyller formulating the Christian view as amor ergo sum, "I am
loved, therefore I am," in contrast to Descartes' cogito ergo sum ("I think, therefore I am").
On the basis ofGod creating, sustaining, and redeeming life in his love, as a historical event,
we can therefore say "I am loved, therefore I am, therefore I think."
)
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 273 )
)
between these many authors and the word oflife, that he may eat the flesh
and drink the blood of the Son of God. )
My brethren, discard the streams of the lowlands and come to the pure
)
waters of Lebanon. Never can you walk in the light of God while you
crowd the mind with a mass of matter which it cannot digest. It is time we )
resolved to have heaven's help and allow the mind to be impressed with
the word of God. Let u s close the door to so much reading. Let us pray )
more and eat the words oflife. Unless there is a deeper work of grace in )
mind and heart, we can never see the face ofGod. 24
And again:
In order to obtain an education, many think it essential to study the
writings ofinfidel authors, because these works contain many bright gems )
of thought. But who was the originator of these gems of thought? It was )
God, and God only. He is the source of all light. Why then should we
wade through the mass of error contained in the works of infidels for the
sake of a few intellectual truths, when all truth is at our command... . As
I see libraries filled with ponderous volumes of historical and theological
lore, I think, Why spend money for that which is not bread? ... Very little
of the research which is so wearying to the mind furnishes that which will
help one to be a successful laborer for souls.25
As readers we need to beware that we do not get lost in the literary Amazon
jungle. We need to make sure we do not suffer from severe verbal indigestion so
we lose our sensibilities, attentiveness, and responsiveness to the Words ofYHWH.
How much secondary literature is simply the enticing fruit of the tree ofknowledge,
intended to prevent us from spending time with the one and only primary source? )
This also has implications for academic and scholarly life, often seen as having
)
publication as it's raison d'etre and justification. Contrary to the constant pressure
and encouragement to publish- and is this often not simply self-publication and
propping up our own career?- the scholar and academic needs to practice a certain
self-censure: Are my thoughts really worth the words? And in the quest for a better
way, I readily admit that neither in this essay have I been able to show the proper
modesty.
)
2
• Ellen G. White, Testimonies for the Church (vol. 7; Mountain View, CA: Pacific
Press, 1948), 205.
25
White, The Ministry of Healing, 441-43. It should here be pointed out that Ellen
White writes in the same context: 'There is a study of history that is not to be condemned.
Sacred history was one of the studies in the schools of the prophets. In the record of His )
dealings with the nations were traced the footsteps of Jehovah. So today we are to consider
the dealings of God with the nations of the earth" (White, The Ministry ofHealing, 441 ). )
The question of what type of literature to spend time with is, however, a topic for another
essay. )
)
)
 )
)
"\
)

KENNETH BERGLAND READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 275

) 274

) Close Ethical Reading
Wolterstorffwrote: "It's the details of texts that resist imposed interpretations.
) Only by attending to the details does it become likely that one is oneself interpreted
by the text--or by that One who is the author of the text."26 Matt 5:18-19 can be
)
read as an affirmation of the need of close reading of the Torah, paying attention
) even to the minor details. Below I will argue how it is the details of the instructions
in the Torah regarding Yorn Kippur that constitute the ethical shibboleth oflsa 58.27
Through close reading of different genres of biblical literature it becomes clear
) that it is not only at the text-syntactical level we find gaps in the biblical text
demanding an ethically responsible reading. Before turning to Isa 58 I will briefly
include some reflections on biblical narrative. Erich Auerbach's has pointed out
how gaps constitute a core feature in how the biblical narratives aim at their moral
)
and spiritual intent. He compared the Homeric epics to biblical narrative, especially
drowns the call to respond or with our lives in a keen sensitivity to respond to the
One calling us to act in this world.
The biblical narratives are written in this manner because "their aim is not to
bewitch the senses, and ifnevertheless they produce lively sensory effects, it is only
because the moral, religious, and psychological phenomena which are their sole
concern are made concrete in the sensible matter of life."29 He continues that
because of Homer's intent, his historical accounts can be doubted without losing
the effects he sought to produce; but without believing in Abraham's
sacrifice, it is impossible to put the narrative of it to the use for which it
was written. Indeed, we must go even further. The Bible's claim to truth
is not only far more urgent than Homer's, it is tyrannical-it excludes all
other claims. The world of the Scripture stories is not satisfied with

)
) Abraham's sacrifice. He describes the comfort ofreading Homer in contrast to the
discomfort ofreading biblical narratives: 1 claiming to be a historically true reality-it insists that it is the only real
world, is destined for autocracy. . . . The Scripture stories do not, like
Homer's, court our favour, they do not flatter us that they may please us
and enchant us-they seek to subject us, and ifwe refuse to be subjected
j It would be difficult, then, to imagine styles more contrasted than those of
these two equally ancient and equally epic texts. On the one hand
J we are rebels. 30
) [Homer's epics], externalized, uniformly illuminated phenomena, at a
definite time and in a definite place, connected together without lacunae And George Steiner writes:
)
in a perpetual foreground; thoughts and feeling completely expressed;
.) events taking place in leisurely fashion and with very little of suspense. Unlike the reviewer, the literary critic, the academic vivisector and judge,
On the other hand [biblical narrative], the externalization of only so much the executant invests his own being in the process of interpretation. His
) readings, his enactments of chosen meanings and values, are not those of
of the phenomena as is necessary for the purpose of the narrative, all else
) left in obscurity; the decisive points ofthe narrative alone are emphasized, external survey. They are a commitment at risk, a response which is, in the
what lies between is non-existent; time and place are undefined and call root sense, responsible. To what, save pride of intellect or professional
) for interpretation; thoughts and feeling remain unexpressed, are only peerage, is the reviewer, the critic, the academic expert accountable? 31
) suggested by the silence and the fragmentary speeches; the whole,
permeated with the most unrelieved suspense and directed toward a single Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig follow up in a similar note:
) goa,l (and to that extent far more of a unity), remains mysterious and
"fraught with background."28 People today resist Scripture because they cannot abide revelation. To
J abide revelation means to sustain the full decisiveness of the moment, to
) In the gaps ofthe story are left ethical, spiritual, and psychological lacunas we respond to the moment, to be responsible for it. People today resist
as readers fill somehow, say with an overload of explanation and commentary that Scripture because they are no longer responsive or responsible. They
)
29
Auerbach, Mimesis, 14. While Homer for Auerbach can only be analysed, the
j perforated characters of biblical narrative requires interpretation (Auerbach, Mimesis, 15).
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that
26

) God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 202.
27
The emphasis upon the One speaking to us through the details ofthe text should also
) make it clear that what I here argue for is not a Reader Response Theory as it has come to
be known.
.) 28
Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation ofReality in Western Literature (trans.
Willard R. Trask; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013), 11- 12. Auerbach's first
) 30
sentence in this quote implies that he has adopted a late dating of the Abraham account, in
) harmony with historical critical approaches to the text. This can be controverted, while
retaining the value of his comparative analysis.
)
)
This ethical and spiritual thrust of the biblical narratives also results in character
development, something absent from Homer's concept of fate (Auerbach, Mimesis, 17). I
would add that not only do the gaps make biblical narratives more ethically, spiritual, and
psychologically realistic-at least to our modem concept of an individual still so much
influenced by the biblical portraits- but it also forces the reader into an ethical-existential
crisis.
Auerbach, Mimesis, 14-15.
31
George Steiner, Real Presences (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press,
1989), 8.

276 KENNETH BERGLAND
claim to venture much; but the one true venture, the venture of
responsibility, they industriously avoid. 32
In reading the biblical text we run the risk of self-disclosure, a "commitment
at risk." Self-erasure, self-entertainment, and self-imposition do not avoid this risk.
They turn it down. They are already a chosen resp onse to the text. And in the
choices and commitments we make in responding to what we read, our innermost
thoughts are simultaneously revealed.
A leisurely reading is not moved by the text. It is only when we read in a
serious intent to penetrate into the core of the story that we become troubled by the
questions and issues of the text, that we now find to be questions and issues of our
own life. It is as if the sediments of traditional reading have filled in the gaps of the
text, so we are tom out of our accustomed reading of a story like that of Abraham's
sacrifice only when we h ear a more unfamiliar one, the one for example of Olav
TollefsenFiskvik from Rendalen, Norway. Fiskvik had heard the local priest preach
on Gen 22 some years prior, and had turned more introvert lately. In July 1721 he
took his son, Halvor, into the woods presuming to gather some bark. There he killed
his son with an axe and tried unsuccessfully to light a fire in order to make a burnt
offering to God. Because of Fiskvik's unstable psyche, his case is the first in
Norwegian legal history where the accused came to be seen as morally, and
therefore legally, not accow1table. 33 Because of our knowledge of the outcome of
the biblical narratives, or because of accustomed readings, we easily become
insensitive and indifferent to the real issues at stake in the text.
As Auerbach points out Gen 22 begins without a location. Where is Abraham
when he is addressed? From where does God speak to him? "And it came to pass
after these things that God tested Abraham, and he said to him: 'Abraham!' And he
answered: 'Here I am (hinnenf) ."' We are not told what Abraham was doing when
he was addressed. 34 We easily forget that Abraham did not have a winged horse that
took him straight to Moriah. He had a slow donkey giving him three days of
torment (Gen 22:3-4).35 The terseness, factual descriptions, and details of the
narrative--barren of the p sychological elaborations we as modem readers are
accustomed to-leave the reader with the questions: What might Abraham possibly
have thought? What was going on in his mind? What would I have done in his
place? Would I have chosen to act like him? Could I have become among those
who slay children on religious grounds? And it is difficult to see that these are mere
modem questions, and that the ancient readers were not expected to ask the same.
32
Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig, Scripture and Translation (trans. Lawrence
Rosenwald and Everett Fox; Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), 9.
33
Erling Sandmo, Mordernes forventninger-kriminalhistoriske essay (Oslo:
Universitetsforlaget AS, 1998), 48- 58.
34
Auerbach, Mimesis, 8-9.
35
S0ren Kierkegaard, F,ykt og Ba1ven (Samlede Verker vol. 5; Kj0benhavn: Gyldendals
Bogklubber, 1962), 49. Cf. S0ren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling; Repetition (trans.
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 52.
)
)
)
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 277
)
After m ultiple attempts by Abraham to find his own solutions to preserving life and
securing an offspring, John Lawlord has argued that God's purpose in testing )
Abraham was to reveal what was truly in the heart of the patriarch.36 However, as )
the story is written it also becomes a test of the reader. The way in which we read
the text speaks volumes to what is in our own heart. )
Kierkegaard says we need to read Scripture in love. To help us he asks us to
imagine a lover that hast just received a letter from the beloved, and to make the )
metaphor address more the one who "insist upon reading Scripture in the original )
language" he writes: ·
)
I assume, then, that this letter from the beloved is written in a language
that the lover does not understand, and there is no one around who can
translate iffor him, and perhaps he would not even want any such help lest
a stranger be initiated into his secrets. What does he do? He takes a
dictionary, begins to spell his way through the letter, looks up every word )
in order to obtain a translation. Let us assume that, as he sits there busy
with his task, an acquaintance comes in. He knows that this letter has
come, because he sees it on the table, sees it lying there, and says, "Well,
so you are reading a letter from your beloved"-what do you think the )
other will say? He answers, "Have you gone mad? D o you think this is
reading a letter from my beloved! No, my friend, I am sitting here toiling )
and moiling with a dictionary to get it translated. At times I am ready to
)
explode with impatience; the blood rushes to my head and I would just as
soon hurl the dictionary on the floor-and you call that reading- you
must be joking! No, thank God, I am soon finished with the translation
and then, yes, then, I shall read my beloved 's letter; that is something
altogether different. 37
.J
36
John I. Lawlor, "The Test of Abraham - Genesis 22: 1-19," Grace Theological
Journal l (1980): 28.
37
S0ren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination; Judge for Yourself! (Kierkegaard's
Writings; trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University J
Press, 1990), 26-27. Cf. S0ren Kierkegaard, En oppbyggelig tale (Samlede Va::rker vol. 17;
Kj0benhavn: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1962), 70). Reflecting on Jas l :22-25 Kierkegaard
writes: "IfGod 's Word is for you merely doctrine, something impersonal and objective, then
it is no mirror- an objective doctrine cannot be called a mirror; it is just as impossible to
look at yourself in an objective doctrine as to look at yourself in a wall. And ifyou want to
relate impersonally (objectively) to God's Word, there can be no question of looking at
yourself in the mirror, because it takes a personality, an J, to look at oneself in a mirror; a
wall can be seen in a mirror, but a wall cannot see itself or look at itself in a mirror. No, )
while reading God's Word you must incessantly say to yourself: It is I to whom it is
speaking; it is I about whom it is speaking" (Kierkegaard,ForSelf-Examination, 43-44). Cf.
Timothy Houston Polk, The Biblical Kierkegaard: Reading by the Rule ofFaith (Macon,
Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1997), 55- 56.
)
 ) r
)
)
) 278 KENNETH BERGLAND
How much theology does not confuse translation with reading? We are sitting
with HALOT or BDAG trying to understand the meaning of the words, or using
) extra-biblical sources or commentaries to understand what is going on in the textual
) material. But is all this really reading the words of the beloved? Kierkegaard
continues:
) we here find a biblical model for how to read biblical texts. It will also be seen that
Let us assume that this letter from the beloved contained not only an
expression of affection, as such letters ordinarily do, -but that it contained
) a wish, something the beloved wished her lover to do. It was, let us
assume, much that was required ofhim, very much; any third party would
) consider that there was good reason to think better of it, but the lover-he
) is off at once to fulfil his beloved' s wish. Let us assume that after some
time the lovers met and the beloved said, "But, my dear, that was not at all
) what I asked you to do; you must have misunderstood the word or
translated it incorrectly." Do you think that the lover would now regret
) Joshua Berman has recently suggested that we should see common-law as
rushing off straightway that very second to obey the wish instead of first
) entertaining some doubts, and then perhaps getting the help of a few
)
additional dictionaries, and then having some more misgivings, and then
perhaps getting the word translated correctly and consequently being
exempt--do you believe that he regrets the mistake, do you believe that
he pleases his beloved less? 38
)
) How much theological reasoning, philological studies, and cultural
investigations might really be motivated by a desire to avoid responding in
) obedience? A reading in love will not look for the minimum compliance, but
spontaneously follow every hint of a request.
..,.' I do foresee that some will here object by asking: should we kill our child ifwe
) thought we heard a heavenly voice commanding us to do so? First, let us remember
that the uncomfortable truth is that our father in faith answered 'yes' to this.
) competing laws among critical scholars unsatisfactory, Berman suggest that the key is to
Second, the previous experiential horizon with the beloved seems to give a certain
prognosis of what the beloved might reasonably be expected to ask. For Abraham
J it was clearly a possibility. After Sinai it seems not (Lev 18:21; 20:2-5). Still, it
) appears no less likely that God today might-and does-ask for all. It is faith that
is at stake in Gen 22, more than murder. As Kierkegaard says, " it is only by faith
)
that one achieves any resemblance to Abraham, not by murder."39
) It might be objected that what I write here about approaching the text will not
convince the unbelieving reader. And indeed, I would be surprised if it did. But
then my claim is also that without love and faith the text cannot be read as it was
) intended. A skeptical or critical reading might very well provide insights into the
text-and many of the critics read the text far more detailed and with keener
) argues that the major early critical works on the Pentateuch almost exclusively focused on
) discrepancies in the narrative material, not the legal (Cf. Joshua A Berman, "Histories
38
Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, 27-28. Cf. Kierkegaard, En Oppbyggelig Tale,
) 71.
39
Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 31. Cf. Kierkegaard, Frykt og Bceven, 30.
)
:1
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGIITS OF THE HEART 279
attention than many professed believers in their sloppiness- but they will be
incapable ofreading it correctly.
But now, Isa 58. I have talked long enough about close reading, now is the time
to get into the text. Let me also state, as a point of clarification, that I discuss Isa 58
as a demonstration-by way ofboth description and explanation. I will suggest that
Isa 58 cannot be considered simply an exegesis, or explanation, of Lev 16; 23; 25.
But we see that it presupposes a close ethical reading of these passages. Maybe of
this very reason, we neither find the classic exegetical distinction between 'what it
meant' and 'what it means' in Isaiah's type ofhomily.40
Isa 58 as a Case-Study
Both Jacob Milgrom and Roy Gane have underlined that Leviticus contains
"gaps" and "lacunae," and does not exhaust its topics under consideration.41 We
might need to think differently of biblical law than what we have tended to do.
dominating in the ANE and Bible as opposed to statutory law, where the former is
;~ seen as a resource in contrast to the latter viewing law as a finite, complete
systern.42 Raymond Westbrook on his side saw the ANE understanding oflaw as
4
°For the distinction between 'what it meant' and 'what it means' see Krister Stendahl,
"Biblical Theology, Contemporary," in IDB (ed. George Arthur Buttrick; Nashville, TN:
Abingdon, 1962), 419- 20).
41
Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 1- 16: A New Translation with Introduction and
Commentary (AB Anchor Yale Bile; New York: Doubleday, 1991), 983; Roy E. Gane,
Leviticus, Numbers (NIVAC; ed. Terry Muck; Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2004), 35;
Roy E. Gane, Cult and Character: Purification Offerings, Day ofAtonement, and Theodicy
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 22-24.
42
Finding both the explanations through harmonizations among many biblicists and
understand that the Torah stands in the ANE common law tradition, not the modem statutory
law tradition. He describes the statutory approach to law as a view where "the law itsel f is
contained in a codified text," that emanates from a sovereign lawmaker, is seen as a finite,
complete system, is superior to all other sources oflaw, is the source ofjudges, and may be
quoted in sentences passed (Joshua A. Berman, "The History ofLegal Theory and the Study
of Biblical Law," The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 76 (2014): 21, 23-24). In contrast, in a
common law system "the law is not found in a written code that serves as the judges' point
ofreference and delimits what they may decide" (Berman,- "The History of Legal Theory,"
21). He writes: "No particular formulation of the law is final. As a system oflegal thought,
the common law is consciously and inherently incomplete, fluid, and vague" (Berman, "The
History of Legal Theory," 21 ). Rather than a codified source, the law is here used as a
resource for "justice and righteousness" (Berman, "The History of Legal Theory," 27). He
Twice Told: Deuteronomy 1-3 and the Hittite Treaty Prologue Tradition," JBL 132(2013):
229-30). Not before the establishment of a statutory concept of law among modem
European nations did German scholars suggest a similar understanding of biblical law. The
280 KENNETH BERGLAND
"customary law" or "folk law," different from both common law and civil law (or
'statutory law' as Berman calls it).43 It is not the purpose here to enter this
discussion, but simply prepare us for a different understanding of Torah among our
biblical authors than what we tend to associate with 'law.'
On this basis it is interesting to note that even if it is not exp licitly stated, the
general tenor of Isa 58 is that the p eople should have understood the social
implications of the fast on the Day of Purgation in Lev 16; 23; 25. The question is
how they could have known this? On the surface it is not clear how a message of
social justice could have been drawn from the descrip tion of the Day of Purgation
in Leviticus. In the search for an answer to this question I will first provide
evidence that it really is a reuse between Isa 58 and Lev 16; 23; 25.
Second, I will discuss textual markers that indicate that it is Isa 58 that reused
the passages in Leviticus, and not vice versa. To the general reader this
investigation might appear odd, as the direction of dependence seems self-evident
on the basis of the chronological dating of the two books. Given present critical
scholarship, however, the relative chronology between the Torah and the Prophets
is controversial. Scholars discuss who really reused whom. 44 I will argue that Isa 5 8
does lean on the authority oflaws in Leviticus, while at the same time reading them
in a surprisingly n ew way.
Thirdly, having established that Isa 58 reuses and depends on Lev 16; 23; 25,
I will in the fin al section, "Torah Investigations," discuss what implications this has
centralization of modem states gave rise to the statutory concept of law, just as the
centralization of Greek city-states for the first time in history gave the rise of statutory Jaw
(Berman, "The History ofLegal Theory," 19, 23). For a related understanding see Michael
Lef ebvre, Collections, Codes, and Torah: The Re-Characterization ofIsrael 's Written Law
(Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament studies vol. 451 ; New York: T&T Clark, 2006).
" Westbrook writes: ""By modem Jaw I mean law based upon the Common Law or
Civil Law traditions, as mediated by the Enlightenment of the e ighteenth century and
consequently characterized by restless innovation. Toe two traditions have been carried, in
part by imperialism and in part by their own intellectua l force, to virtually every comer of
the globe. Today they are the basis, directly or indirectly, ofthe legal systems of most of the
member states of the United Nations and of international Jaw. The only other widely
prevalent legal traditions are conservative systems: local customary law and religious law"
(Raymond Westbrook, "The Character of Ancient Near Eastern Law," in A History of
Ancient Near Eastern Law, eds. Raymond Westbrook and Gary M. Beckman; Leiden:
Koninklijke Brill NV, 2003, In). And again: "Much of the law applied by the courts was
probably customary law, derived not from known cases but from timeless tradition"
(Westbrook, "The Character of ANE Law," 14). Cf. also the only time he refers to
'customary law' in Raymond Westbrook, Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law (Paris: J.
Gabalda, 1988), 124n.
44
Julius Wellhausen' s influential statement from 1885 has here set the stage for debate
ever since: "The prophets have notoriously no father ( I Sam. I 0: 12) .... They do not preach
on set texts; they speak out of the spirit which judges all things and itself is judged ofno
man. Where do they ever lean on any other authority than the truth of what they say; where
do they rest on any other foundation than their own certainty?" (Julius Wellhausen,
Prolegomena to the History ofIsrael (Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1885), 397-99).
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 281
for an ethical reading of the biblical texts. I will argue that Isa 58 does not
undertake the transformation of the fast on the Day of Purgation without textual J
support, but that indications in Leviticus give the basis for this new reading of the
)
passages- a reading that is only possible in ethical responsibility. This would also
be in harmony with the principle of Scriptura Scripturam interpretatur, where )
Scripture is seen as its own interpreter, in a way often overlooked in biblical and
systematic theology. The Bible is here not only seen as divinely inspired, but also )
as consisting of passages that give inspired interpretations of other passages in )
Scripture and a model for how to read biblical texts.
Reuse
I will here focus on three arguments that indicate reuse in Isa 58 of Lev 16; 23;
25. A key concept for establishing a case ofreuse between Isa 58 and Lev 16; 23
is in the phrase 'nh in piel ('denial ') + nepes ('person, self'). 45 We only find these
lexemes used together in Lev 16:29, 31; Lev23:27, 32; Num 29:7; 30:14; Ps 35:13; J
Isa 58:3, 5, 10. All these passages refer to the Day of Purgation, except in the cases
ofNum 30:14 and Ps 35:13 . Outside the Torah only Ps 35: 13 and Isa 58 use this
expression. In Num 30:14 the legislation concerns self-imposed vows and sworn
obligations of self-denial of a woman dependent upon her father or husband. Here
)
the phrase does not seem to be limited only to fasting, and might refer to other
forms of self-denial as sexual abstinence. Ps 35: 13 appears to be more limited to )
mere fasting, as it also includes the word 6m ('fast'). The psalmist prays by
afflicting himself through fasting, as for a friend or a brother (v. 14), for those )
maligning him and repaying his goodness with evil (vv. 11, 12). The phrase'nh +
nepes seems in itself to refer to a general sense of self-denial as "an outward
expression accompanying supplication to God at a time of inner distress."46
Ps 35:13 seems too far removed from Isa 58 to argue that there is reuse
between the two. Still, Ps 35: 13 uses both the phrase'nh + nepes and om as in Isa
58:3, 5, 6. On the other side, om is absent from the Torah, including Lev 16; 23
specifically. The following question therefore arises: Is Isa 58's more narrow
understanding of self-denial ('nh + nepes) as fasting ( om) simply using a common .J
understanding ofself-denial as fasting from the time ofits composition, or can it be
argued that Isa 58 nevertheless is reusing the concept o f 'nh + nepes from the Day
of Purgation in Lev 16; 23? The phrase 'nh + nepes could be said to be distinctive
to the Day of Purgation, but it is not unique to it. Based on the above evidence I
would therefore argue that the phrase 'nh + nepes in itself is not conclusive to say
there is a reuse between Lev 16; 23 and Isa 58, even ifit establishes a strong link.
We need corroborating evidence to make this claim.
The opening phrase in Isa 58:1 is: q ra b giir6n 'al-ta/lsi5k kass6piir hiirem J
q6lekii. ("Cry with a throat, do not hold back, raise your voice like a shofar''). The
imperative q ra stands as the central syntactical discursive opening verb for the rest
)
•• See Shalom M. Paul, Isaiah 40-66: Translation and Commentary (ECC Eerdmans )
Critical Commentary; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2012), 480-81.
46
Gane, Leviticus, Numbers, 405. )
' )
)
)
)
282 KENNETH BERGLAND
)
) of the chapter. The imperative directed toward the prophet might very well come
as the divine response to the apostasy of the people described in Isa 57. In
) comparison we read in Lev 25:9: b yom hakkippurfm ta' bfn1 sopiir b kol-'ar.s kem
("On the Day of Purgation you shall cause the shofar to pass throughout the land").
)
Even if q ra is a very common word in the HB, it is worth noting that it is used in
) Lev 23:2, 4, 21, 37 for proclaiming the festivals. Apparently, it seems to have been
a practice to make a public proclamation to assemble for the sacred festivals, which
) 16; 23 speaking of the Day of Purgation is valid, this would only heighten the
were called miqrae qodes. The shofar (sopar) was thus sounded for the beginning
of the Jubilee year, on the Day of Purgation at the end of the seventh cycle of
Sabbatical years, at the beginning of the fiftieth year. But the sopar was also used
./ at other occasions. It was even blown for religious festivals like the new moon (Ps
81:4) and a general fast (Joel 2:15). The use ofsoparin Isa 58:1 might be meant as
)
a pointer to the announcement of the Jubilee year on the Day of Purgation, but
) again, just as Ps 35:13, Joel 2:15 holds open the alternative reading that Isa 58 is
concerned with a general fast, rather than pointing to the Day of Purgation or
) the strongest argument for reuse. As the same arguments demonstrate the direction
Jubilee year. The use of sopar is therefore neither in itself a conclusive argument
) for reuse between Isa 58 and Lev 25:9.
A third point in regard to reuse is the acknowledgment ofsin.47 In Lev 16:21
) we read: "and he [Aaron] shall confess over it [the live goat] all the wickedness of
)
) 47
It is nothing in the words used for sin in the Hebrew that gives us an indication that
there is a reuse between Isa 58 and Lev 16; 23. Isa 58 uses three words for sin: (I) pe.fo'
) ("inexpiable defiant sin"; Isa 58:1. lQisa' , LXX, Targum Jonathan and Vulgate all have
plural here instead ofthe MT singular), (2) !w,(tat ("expiable nondefiant sin"; Isa 58: 1), and
) (3) re.fa' ("wickedness"; Isa 58:4, 6). Lev 16 and 23 uses four words for sin or impurity: (1)
} .t um'iih ("physical ritual impurity"; Lev 16: 16, 19), (2) 'awon ("culpability"; Lev 16:21, 22),
(3) pe.fo' ("inexpiable defiant sin"; Lev 16: 16, 21 ), and (4) !zq(tat ("expiable non defiant
sin"; Lev 16:3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 16, 21, 25, 27, 30, 34; 23:19) (cf. Gane, Cult and Character,
)
298-300). We see that Isa 58 uses re.fa', only once attested in the Torah, not in the legal
) material, but in a prayer (Deut 9:27). On the other side, Lev 16:21, 22 uses 'iiwon, not used
in Isa 58, and t um'iih, not used by Isaiah at all. It is not a substantial argument to say that
j since Isa 58 LXX repeats the three words for sin in Lev 16 LXX (anomia, adikia, and
hamartia), while Isa 58 MT has only two of them (pe.fo' and !zqttat, leaving out 'iiwon), that
) LXX draws Isa 58 and Lev 16 closer together. LXX does not seem to operate consistently
) with several of the words for sin, as the following analysis shows: LXX in Lev 16 and 23
renders (l).tum'iih with akatharsia in Lev 16:16, 19, a word not attested at all in the LXX
oflsaiah, (2) 'awon with anomia in Lev 16:21, also found in Isa 58: 1 to render !za,(tat, and
j Day of Purgation. It is a call to satisfy the need of a person being in a more
with adikia in Lev 16:22, not used at all by Isaiah, (3) pe.fo' with adikema in Lev 16: 16, not
) used in Isa 58, and with adikia in Lev 16:21, renderingre.fo' in Isa 58:6, and (4) !za,(tat with
hamartia in Lev 16:3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 15, 16, 21, 25, 27, 30, 34; 23: 19, a word not used in Isa
) 58. adikia is therefore used in Isa 58:6 LXX to render re.fa', something that is done only one
other time according to Muraoka (Takamitsu Muraoka, A Greek "' Hebrew/Aramaic Two-
) Way Index to the Septuagint (Leuven: Peeters, 2010), 4). re.fa' is also rendered as the
adjective tapeinos in Isa 58:4. Further, Isa 58:1 would be the only time !zq(tat is rendered
) ignorant about its true state.
with anomia (Muraoka, A Greek"' Hebrew/Aramaic Two-Way Index to the Septuagint, 11).
) Could it be that Isa 58 chooses the words for inexpiable (pesa') and expiable (!zq(tat) sins
as it is concerned more with moral sins than ritual?
)
)
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 283
the sons oflsrael, and all their rebellion and all their sins." In comparison Isa 58: 1
says: "and make known to my people their rebellion and to the house of Jacob their
sin." The situation is different. In Lev 16 the people have confessed their sin, but
in Isa 58 they are called to a solemn assembly to be told their sin. In vv. 2-3 the
people seem to be ignorant about their true spiritual situation.48 This ignorance has
in Isa 58 apparently also led to a lack of previous confession of sin, so their sin
needs to be made known and spelled out to them. Ifthe claim that Isa 5 8 reuses Lev
intensity of the opening words of Isa 58. · Coming to the Day of Purgation
unrepentant with unconfessed sins would be detrimental for the people. The
exposure of this critical situation seems intended to catch the attention oflsaiah's
audience.
We have seen that neither of the three above arguments are conclusive in
regard to a reuse of Lev 16; 23; 25 in Isa 58. As far as I can see it is the manner in
which certain key concepts from Leviticus are taken up and reworked that become
of dependence, I refer this discussion to the next section.
Direction of Dependence
In order to determine the direction of dependence between Isa 5 8 and Lev 16;
23; 25, I will begin by pointing out the play in Isa 58 on the key-phrase from fasting
on the Day of Purgation, 'nh + nepes. The root 'nh is used in Isa 58:3, 5, 9, 10,
nepes in Isa 58: 3, 5, 10, 11, and 'nh + nepes appear in Isa 58:3, 5, 10. In Isa 58:3,
5, 'nh + nepes seems to be used largely as we find it in Lev 16; 23, namely for
affliction in the form offasting. As we come to vv. 9-11 their meanings are altered.
The form 'nh in Hebrew has namely two different roots, I 'nh meaning 'to answer'
and II 'nh meaning 'to afflict'. In vv. 3, 5 II 'nh is used. Inv. 9 'nh is no longer II 'nh
('to afflict'), but Isaiah has changed it to I 'nh ('to answer'). Now it is used in a
promise that God will respond (I 'nh) if the people will take care of the afflicted (II
'nh) and hungry. Inv. 3 the people complained over the silence of God, that He did
not respond to their religious practice. In v. 9 God promises that He will again
answer His people if they correct their social practice.
Further, in v. 10 'nh + nepes no longer signifies self-affliction. It is now used
for the person being afflicted, indicated by the use of the niphal. The noun (nepes)
+ participle ( of 'nh) construction "is the representation of an action as ongoing at
a reference time". 49 This is not simply a temporary situation, as in the case of the
permanent state of desperation. Inv. 11 nepes is again used in the clause "and He
will satisfy your person in desert land," now again as part of a promise. God
promises to satisfy the person who has taken care of the afflicted and hungry. The
48
A NT parallel could here be the Laodicean church which in Rev 3: 15-17 also seems
49
Jan Joosten, The Verbal System ofBiblical Hebrew: A New Synthesis Elaborated on
the Basis of Classical Prose (Jerusalem: Simor, 2012), 239.

284 KENNETH BERGLAND
alteration of'nh + nepes in the second ha lf oflsa 58 therefore seems to be strategic
when compared to Lev 16; 23, and supports the claim that Isa 58 reuses and is
dependent upon Lev 16; 23; 25.
Further, we have the puzzling formulation in v. 10, "and you offer your person
(nepes) to the hungry." This clause has challenged ancient as well as modem
readers. It has been rendered as (1) "the desired attitude towards the hungry," (2)
"your bread," and (3) "providing food generously or with a good attitude."50 To me
it seems as if Isaiah intended to say something more than simply "to break your
bread (lehem) for the hungry (lara'eb)" as in v . 7. By replacing /ehem ('bread') with
nepes in "and you offer your person (nepes) to the hungry (lara'eb)" in v. I 0, he is
able to integrate the message of the Day ofPurgation with the people's relation "to
the hungry." The affliction ('nh) of one's self (nepes) entails for him to place
oneself at disposal for the hungry. Again this shows how Isa 58 reworks the
instruction concerning the Day of Purgation so as to expose an inherent message of
social justice in it. This would also confirm that Isa 58 is dependent upon Leviticus,
and not vice versa.
The third point is the cessation oflabour. In Lev 16:29 we read "and you shall
not do any work (kol-melakah) ." The same is restated in 23 :28, 30, 31. Isaiah never
uses the word melakah. Instead ofmelakfih + 'sh ('to do work') as in Lev 16; 23,
we do however find epe + 'sh ('to do business, delight') in Isa 58:13. Isa 58:3
seems to give a basis for saying that epe in Isa 58 is not simply used as 'desire,
delight,' but more specifically for ' business, occupation,' and therefore within the
same semantic field as melakfih. Inv. 3 the clause "Behold, on the day of your fast
you seek business ( epe )" is followed by "and oppress all your labourers!" It is
possible that Isa 58 plays on both the meanings of epe as 'desire, delight' and as
'business, occupation.' In v. 2 the m eaning 'desire, delight' seems to be in the
foreground: "They seek me daily and desire ( epe ) the knowledge of my ways ..
.. They ask me for justice of righteousness, they desire ( epe ) the nearness of
God." Inv. 13 it is possible that Isaiah intended both meanings: "If you hold back
your foot on the Sabbath, from doing your delight/business ( epe ) on my holy day
. . . . and you honour it rather than doing your ways, rather than seeking your
delight/business ( epe )."
Iflsaiah wanted this play on meanings, it can explain why he chose to replace
melakfih in Lev 16; 23 with epe. This would allow him to expose that the real
desire ( epe ) of the people was not to seek God, but to do their own business ( epe
), even on the D ay of Purgation, and during the weekly Sabbath and year ofJubilee.
This also illustrates how Isaiah as a secondary author can take liberties in altering
an evoked text to more richly convey the message he felt called to give. As God is
the main speaker in Isa 5 8 we could even say that God Himself here shows literary
creativity in His confrontation of His hypocrite people. This wordplay would also
support the claim that Isa 58 reuses and is dependent upon Lev 16; 23.
so Victor Avigdor Hurowitz, "A Forgotten Meaning of Nepes in Isaiah 58,10," Vetus
Testamentum 47 (1997): 4 3-46.
)
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 285 )
)
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that there is a reuse and dependence
in Isa 58 on the passages describing the Day of Purgation in Lev 16; 23 and the
announcement of the year of Jubilee in Lev 25:9, 10.
)
Is Isa 58 a Legitimate R e ading of Lev 16; 23; 25? )
The question now is how Isa 58 could see the theme of social justice as a
legitimate reading of Lev 16; 23; 25, or how Yorn Kippur of Lev 16; 23 could be J
read in light of the Jubilee in Lev 25? The most explicit link between the two j
festivals is found in Lev 25:9. Literally it reads: "Then you (2ms) shall cause the
signal shophar to pass throughout; in the seventh month, on the tenth day of the
month---0n Yorn Kippur-you (2mpl) shall cause a shophar to pass throughout all
your land." This signal initiating the year of Jubilee was thus announced on Yorn )
Kippur. As we have seen above, Isa 58 opens with a reuse of this verse, pointing
to the central biblical key to read Yorn Kippur in light of the year of Jubilee.
Gane points out a second link between the two festivals:
The Day of Atonement was the day on which the sins of the Israelites
(Lev 16:1 6- pesha >im, "rebellious sins," and chatta'ot, "missing-the-
mark sins"), many of which involved social unkindness, were purged out
of the sanctuary by blood which represented the blood of Christ (cp. Jn
1 :29), provided by the loving kindness of God (Jn 3: 16; Titus 3:4). How
inappropriate it was for the people oflsaiah' s day to commit more sins of
social unkindness (pesha >im and chatta'ot, Isa 58: 1-a verbal link to Lev
16:16!) at the very time when atonement was being made for them! 5 1 )
The importance ofrepenting from social injustice prior to the liberation of the
oppressed, as seen in Yorn Kippur preceding the announcement of the year of
52
Jubilee, is illustrated by Jer 36. Because the people had not truly repented from
their social injustice, they rather repented from their liberation of their slaves and
seized them again when external pressure ceased . Ellen White wrote:
)
No one can practice real benevolence without self-denial. Only by a life
of simplicity, self-denial, and close economy is it possible for us to
accomplish the work appointed us as Christ's representatives. Pride and
worldly ambition must b e put out of our hearts. In all our work the
principle of unselfishness revealed in Christ's life is to be carried out.
51
Roy E. Gane, "Covenant of Love: Syllabus for OTST620 Study of Covenant, Law,
and Sabbath in the Bible," (Berrien Springs, MI: Seventh-day Adventist Theological ' )
Seminary Andrews University, 2007), 208- 9. For some extra-biblical parallels that might
strengthen the link between Yorn Kippur and Jubilee see Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus 23-27:
A N ew Translation with Introduction and Commentary(AB; New York: Doubleday, 2001), )
2164--oS.
52
Milgrom points out that the year of Jubilee was announced at the evening ofNisan .>
16, after the ritual of the Day of Atonement was completed (Milgrom, Levitic us 23- 27,
2164). .)
)
)
)
i
)
•I
) i
286 KENNETH BERGLAND READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 287
')
) Upon the walls of our homes, the pictures, the furnishings, we are to read, close reading of Lev 16; 23; 25 that Isa 58 reflects seem to testify to the same. As
'Bring the poor that are cast out to thy house: On our wardrobes we are Jean Zurcher reminds us, it is only as the text becomes life that we really
comprehend it: "Bible truth only makes sense to the extent in which it is lived...
to see written, as with the finger of God, 'Clothe the naked.' In the dining
room, on the table laden with abundant food, we should see traced, 'Is it
1 . Truth is really known only when it becomes inner life."56 Oswald Chambers put
) it even more succinctly. He writes that spiritual sight is not so much about thinking
not to deal thy bread to the hungry?' Isaiah 58:7. 53
) right, as obeying right:

) Even if words or phrases in themselves do not establish a basis claiming that

Isa 58 reuses Lev 16; 23; 25, the manner in which Isa 58 uses these words and Simplicity is the secret of seeing things clearly. A saint does not think
) phrases seem clearly to speak of a reuse by Isa 58 of Lev 16; 23; 25. 54 This being clearly for a long while, but a saint ought to see clearly without any
established, it is then noteworthy that Isa 58: 1 seems to open by speaking ofthe two difficulty. You cannot think a spiritual muddle clear, you have to obey it
textual details legitimating reading Yorn Kippur in light of the Jubilee, the clear. In intellectual matters you can think things out, but in spiritual
announcement ofthe year of Jubilee on Yorn Kippur and the repentance from social matters you will think yourself into cotton wool. If there is something
)
injustice on Yorn Kippur. upon which God has put His pressure, obey in that matter, bring your
_) imagination into captivity to the obedience of Christ with regard to it and
Torah Investigations as Embodiment of Torah everything will become as clear as daylight. The reasoning capacity comes
) afterwards, but we never see along that line, we see like children; when we
Wittgenstein pointed out that even ifthe everyday meaning of 'reading' is clear
to us, it is not clear what really constitutes the act of reading when we analyse it. try to be wise we see nothing (Matthew 11 :25). 57
Is reading passing the eyes along the text? But how often have our eyes followed
) the text, while our thoughts have wandered off? Is reading saying out aloud the And Ellen White phrased it in the following sober tone: "One reason why many
words in the text? But what if a person simply pretends to be reading and recounts theologians have no clearer understanding of God's word is, they close their eyes
the words from memory? Is reading taking place when one has not seen a text to truths which they do not wish to practice. As understanding of Bible truth
) previously, and is able to say words corresponding to the characters in the text? But depends not so much on the power of intellect brought to the search as on the
how does this differ from a child, not yet having learned the alphabet, that singleness of purpose, the earnest longing after righteousness."58
) Agreeing with Wittgenstein's emphasis upon usage, Kierkegaard wrote in his
pronounce one or more correct words-even sentences-when sitting with an open
) book, believing he or she is actually reading when using words previously learned? reflection on 1 Cor 13: 1-3:
Or what do we mean if we say that a text causes, influences, or guides certain
) words to occur in our mind?55 Above I claimed that any reading consists of at least There is no word in the human language, not a single one, not the
description, response, and explanation. In the end it seems that only our lived most sacred, about which we are able to say: "If a man uses this word it
) unconditionally proves that he has love." On the contrary, it is always true
life--in the response--demonstrate what we did in the act we call reading. The
) that a word used by one man can assure us that he has love, and an
absolutely contrary word used by another can assure us that he loves just
) Ellen G. White, The Ministry ofHealing (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1905), 206.
53
as much; it is true that a word can assure us that love dwells in the heart
..
.J
54
Wittgenstein: "The meaning of a word is its use in the language" (Wittgenstein, of the one who uttered it, and not in another who nevertheless used the
Philosophical Investigations, 20e (43). This harmonizes with tendencies in Semitic same word.
) philology to emphasize actual use of words and phrases in a given passage, rather than
speculatively importing meanings either form etymology or other Semitic languages (James 56
Barr, The Semantics ofBiblical Language (London: SCM Press, 1991 ); Chaim Cohen, "New Jean Zurcher, "Existentialism: A Survey and Assessment," n.p. [Cited 14 July 2014].
) Online: https://adventistbiblicalresearch.org/sites/default/files/pdfi'existentialism_ 0.pdf. Cf.
Directions in Modern Biblical Hebrew Lexicogtaphy," in Birkat Shalom: Studies in the
) Bible, Ancient Near Eastern Literature, and Postbiblical Judaism Presented to Shalom M. Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious Point ofView, 111-12; Paul Morris, "The Embodied Text:
Paul on the Occasion ofHis Seventieth Birthday (eds. Chaim Cohen, et al.; Winona Lake, Covenant and Torah," Religion 20 (1990): 84. Hans-Georg Gadamer wrote regarding the
J IN: Eisenbrauns, 2008); Chaim Cohen, "The 'Held Method' for Comparative Semitic reader: "he must not try to disregard himself and his particular hermeneutical situation. He
Philology," JANES 19 (1989)). In the study of inner-biblical reuse more emphasis should must relate the text to this situation ifhe wants to understand at all" (Hans-Georg Gadamer,
) Truth and Method (trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall; London: Continuum,
probably be placed on how the passage under study reuses a word or phrase from another
text, than stressing the uniqueness or distinctiveness of a word or phrase used in the two 1998), 324).
) 57
Oswald Chambers, "My Utmost for His Highest," in The Complete Works ofOswald
passages. As this study oflsa 58 shows, it might also be difficult to separate the question of
) reuse from the question of direction of dependence. Chambers (Grand Rapids, MI: Discovery House Publishers, 2000), 823 (September 14).
58
55
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 6 le-70e ( 156-71 ), 116e-17e (375-76). White, The Great Controversy, 599.

)

288 KENNETII BERGLAND
There is no act, not a single one, not the best, about which we
unconditionally dare to say: "He who does this proves unconditionally that
he loves." It depends on how he shows_his love. There are, we know,
deeds which in a special sense are called acts of charity. But truly, because
one gives alms, because one visits the widow and clothes the naked, one's
love is not thereby proved or even recognizable .... And yet it is certain
that love must be known by its fruits. 59
No word, no act proves in itself that there is love in it. The problem in Isa 58
could be summed up with Isa 29:13: "Because this people approached with its
mouth and with its lips honoured me, but its heart is far from me." They had come
to believe that uttering certain words or performing certain actions fulfilled their
religious obligations. We find a similar scathing critique in Amos 5:21-24 and Isa
I: 11- 15. Reflecting on biblical prose prayer, Moshe Greenberg sums up this
prophetic thrust as follows: "No wording of an appeal can persuade, when the one
to be persuaded mistrusts the appellant."60 And:
This vehement, unconditional repudiation of the whole of Israel's
established worship has several premises: first, that in all its forms,
worship is, like prayer, a social transaction between p ersons, with no
magical virtue or intrinsic efficacy. It is rather a gesture of submission and
like all gestures a formality whose meaning depends ultimately on the
total moral evaluation the recipient makes ofthe one who gestures; for the
recipient to esteem the gesturer there must be some moral identification
between them.. . . For worship to find favour in God's eyes, the worshiper
must identify himself with ('know' in the biblical idiom; e.g., Jer. 22: l 5f.)
God in the one way possible for man- by imitating his moral conduct
(compare also Hos. 4:lf. and Jer. 9:23). 61
'
9
S0ren Kierkegaard, Works of Love (trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin
Swenson; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946), 11-12. Cf. S0ren Kierkegaard,
Kjerlighedens Gjerninger (Samlede V rerker vol. 11; K0benhavn: Gyldendals Bogklubber,
1962), 18-20.
60
Moshe Greenberg, Biblical Prose Prayer: As a Window to the Popular Religion of
Ancient Israel (Berkley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), 50.
61
Greenberg, Biblical Prose Prayer, 55- 56. B. Gemseruncovers the same tendency by
investigating the rib-pattern in the HB, the idea of the prophet calling the people to God's
legal procedure against them. But there is also amazing grace in this rfb-pattem as it "reveals
the undogmatic, unsystematic way of thinking, in religious matters, of the Old Testament.
All is ultimately left to, lies in the hands of, the Supreme Judge and Ruler, whose judgment
is righteous, but unpredictable, and inscrutable for human understanding, whose ways are
not ours. He is a person, not a system or an order. But this implies that there is an appeal to
Him, even an irrational, undeserved, unjustifiable appeal to his heart, his compassion, his
grace" (B. Gemser, "The Rib- or Controversy-Pattern in Hebrew Mentality," in Wisdom in
Israel and in the Ancient Near East {eds. Martin Noth and D. Winton Thomas; Leiden: Brill,
1960), 137).
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGIITS OF THE HEART 289 )
)
So while seeing our reading as disclosed in our life, it nevertheless needs to be
stressed that no word or act, not even a form oflife, carries a guarantee or certainty )
in and of itself. So we seem to be caught in a circle. The most precise way to see
)
this seems to be in saying that while it is correct that we can have "outward
correctness of deportment without the renewing power of Christ," it is likewise true )
that there can be no "genuine repentance unless it works reformation."62 No form
of word, act, or life disclose unequivocally what really is in the heart, and still God .J
cannot dwell in the heart without it manifesting itself in word, act, and one's form )
of life. Opposite, one cannot reject God in one's heart without disclosing it
somehow in word, act, and form oflife. I do not claim that it is an original insight
I am presenting here,63 it is a rather old one, but alas, all too often forgotten! We see
)
it in rabbinic thought,64 in medieval thought,65 and among the reformers. 66 Even if
the biblical text and more recent philosophy is the prime focus in this essay, it can
be worth noting briefly that this close ethical reading might be something alive in
former times but largely forgotten in modern theology at large. The reformers .J
expressed it as man being the "living image," in contrast to the dead images made
62
Ellen G. White, Steps to Christ (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1892), 58-59.
63
And maybe this constant desire for originality, for development, is part of the curse
in our worship of the genius and hero. Jacques Derrida described Levinas' thinking as a
constant return and repetition of the same wave on the same beach, nevertheless each time
it repeats itself, is renewed and enriched indefinitely (Jacques Derrida, Writing and
Difference (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 84n). Maybe this is a metaphor
also appropriate for reading the Bible and doing philosophy? In 1931 Wittgenstein also
seems to have abandoned this quest for originality: "Anyway when I was in Norway during
the year 1913- 14 I had some thoughts ofmy own, or so at least it seems to me now. I mean
that I have the impression of having given birth to new lines of thinking at that time (But
perhaps I am mistaken). Whereas now I seem just to apply old ones" (Wittgenstein, Culture
and Value, 17e). And in 1930: '"'This book is written for such men as are in sympathy with J
its spirit. This spirit is different from the one which informs the vast stream of European and
American civilization in which all ofus stand. That spirit expresses itself in an onwards
movement, in building ever larger and more complicated structures; the other in striving
after clarity and perspicuity in no matter what structure. The first tries to grasp the world by
way of its periphery-in its variety; the second at its center- in its essence. And so the first
adds one construction to another, moving on an up, as it were, from one stage to the next,
while the other remains where it is and what it tries to grasp is always the same" {Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks (trans. Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White;
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), Foreword). Cf. Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious Point of )
View, 107- 8.
64
Morris, "The Embodied Text: Covenant and Torah." J
65
Mary J. Carruthers, The Book ofMemory: A Study ofMemory in Medieval Culture )
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres, 1990), 156-88.
66
Marilyn Jean Wilcox, "The Living Art: The Sixteenth-Century English Reformers'
Search for Truth in Crafted Words and Changed Lives" (Ph.D. diss., University of
California, Riverside, 1996).
)
)
)
290 KENNETH BERGLAND
)
) by man. 67 The only legitimate image of God in this world they saw was man, even
if all worship belonged exclusively to God (Gen 1 :26-28; Exod 20:4-6). William
) Perkins wrote: "[M]an is a living image ofGod, made by the very hand of God; and
) in this respect a thousand fold more excellent than all Images made by the hand of
man. " 68 Fitting the perspective in Isa 58, Joseph Hall had God speak in verse to how
) the false images of the church had replaced God's true image, here identified as
"the halt, the lame, and blynd":
) taken up .i n the message and ministry of Jesus, so they can only be understood in
) All false Idols that I abhorred
To honour thou wylt not eschue:
But to my lyely Image true,
The poore, the halt, the lame and blynd,
)
To offer thou wylt not insue,
) But rather art to them vnkynd.69
) is no value-and if there were, it would be of no value. . . . Ethics is
There are biblical passages that might be taken to support the understanding of
) embodied Torah, living image, and the need for reading to include response (Deut
6:5-9; Ps 35:10; Matt 7:24-26; Luke 6:47-49;70 Rom 12:1; 1 Pet 2:4, 5; Jam
) Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion,
67
Marilyn Wilcox writes: "For the Protestant reformer, the highest art was a living art,
)
the image of God printed, engraved in man-an ongoing, lively art which could stretch the
) limits of temporality toward heaven itself' (Wilcox, 'The Living Art," 263-64). She
explains that the reformers' 'living image' "was an attempt to mirror with language the
) human experience oftranscendence while one is"still temporal," where the modifier 'living'
was added "as a metaphor of grace" (Wilcox, "The Living Art," 224, 242 ). Further, the
) concept of the 'living image of God' is nowhere used in the Bible, but by combining the
concept of the 'image of God' in Gen 1 :26-28 and the prohibition in Exod 20:4-6 against
) commandments, its sense is broader than code or custom, denoting instruction and
idols, together with the prophetic polemic against the dead idols, they seem to have found
the concept to be justified (Wilcox, 'The Living Art," 246-47). "The reformers, attempting
.)
to explain how fallen man can remain God's image, add the modifier living as a metaphor
) of grace" (Wilcox, "The Living Art," 242). And again: "When knowing is not only in the
mind but also in the heart, men's actions will change" (Wilcox, "The Living Art," 228).
) 68
Quoted in Wilcox, "The Living Art," 241 from William Perkins, Warning Against
the Idolatrie ofthe Last Times, and an Instruction Touching Religious or Divine Worship
) (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 1601), 93.
69
John Hall, The Court of Virtue (1565) (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
j 76
Press, 1961), 239. Cf. Wilcox, "The Living Art," 244-45. When James Calfhill speaks of
"the lively image and perfect counterfeit of Himself' (James Calfhill, An Answer to John
j Wittgenstein's understanding of language and God-talk. It was held sometime between
Martia/l's Treatise ofthe Cross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1846), 364) he
) is speaking of the Word of God, while seeing a similarity between the fate of the Word and
the martyrs (Wilcox, ''The Living Art," 250). Wilcox explains that the word 'counterfeit'
) in sixteenth-century meaning could mean" 'the perfect picture of God,' free of any negative
connotation" (Wilcox, "The Living Art," 252-53).
) 7
° Commenting on Matthew's Sermon on the Mount and Luke's Sermon on the Plain,
Hans Dieter Betz comments: "Indeed, since the SM and the SP are concerned with the
) Philosophical Remarks, 7). As he was writing on the latter part of the Philosophical
fulfillment of the Torah, the 'doing' is a highly important goal of the texts" (Hans Dieter
) Betz, The Sermon on the Mount: A Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount, Including the
Sermon on the Plain (Matthew 5:3- 7:27 and Luke 6:20-49) (Hermeneia; ed. Adela Yarbro
)
)
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF TIIE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 291
I :22-25). It is also necessary to point out that the only true embodied Torah and
living image is Christ.7 1 In Craig S. Keener's discussion of the logos in John's
prologue he argues that logos, Christ, should be understood as Torah: "Playing on
the link between Torah and Wisdom, the Fourth Gospel presents the Logos of its
prologue as Torah."72 It might, however, be too simple merely to say as Keener that
the logos of the prologue is simply presented "as Torah." Buth is right in that Joh
I : I 7 contains the idea of an elaboration.73 Still, it is as if the Torah and Wisdom are
their fullest sense through his revelation. Keener is probably more to the point when
writing: "Jesus himself embodies the Torah and is its fullest revelation, and the
apostolic witnesses thus deliver a revelation of greater authority than that of Moses
(1: 14-18; 2 Cor. 3). It is rejecting Jesus, rather than obeying him, that constitutes
rejection ofTorah (cf. 1:11-13)."74
The early Wittgenstein wrote: "The sense of the world must lie outside the
World. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there
transcendental."75 At this point in his thinking the idea of God speaking in human
language seemed impossible. He therefore wrote: "if a man could write a book _on
destroy all the other books in the world."76 According to the Bible YHWH,has
Collins; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1995), 84).
71
William R. G. Loader, Jesus• Attitude towards the Law: A Study of the Gospels
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 142-43.
72
Craig S. Keener, The Gospel ofJohn: A Commentary (vol. l; Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Academic, 2003), 360. Keener writes: "Although Torah could be said to consist of
rev elation" (Keener, John, 355- 56).
73
Randall Buth, "John's Targumic Allusions," Jerusalem Perspective 41 (1993): 7-8.
Cf. how Keener reads John 1 :17 in the contrastive (Keener, John, 361).
74
Keener, John, 360. Keener gives the following references where Law, Moses, and
the Scriptures appear in the Gospel ofJohn: I :17, 45; 2:22; 5:39, 45-47; 6:32; 7: 19, 22-28;
8:17; 9:28-29; 10:34-35; 12:34; 13: 18; 15:25; 17:12; 19:24, 28, 36-37; 20:9; cf. 3:14; 7:38,
42, 51; 12:14; and perhaps 8:5.
75
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 182-83 (6.41).
Ludwig Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," The Philosophical Review 74 (1965):
7. Wittgenstein's "A Lecture on Ethics" seems to belong to a transitional phase in
September 1929 and December 1930 (Wittgenstein, "A Lecture on Ethics," 3). In November
1930 he wrote the following in the foreword to Philosophical Remarks: "I would like to say
'This book is written to the glory of God', but nowadays that would be chicanery, that is, it
would not be rightly understood. It means the book is written in good will, and in so far as
it is not so written, but out of vanity, etc., the author would wish to see it condemned. He
cannot free it of these impurities further than he himself is free of them" (Wittgenstein,
Investigations he told his friend M. O'C. Drury: "I am not a religious man but I cannot help
seeing every problem from a religious point of view" (M. O'C. Drury, "Some Notes on

292 KENNETH BERGLAND
spoken- in contrast to all the other silent gods. The book on Ethics is written, and
it has exploded a ll the other books in the world. Or, should we rather avoid this
obj ectification and say the E thical book par excellence is written. Or does not the
word 'ethical' in itselfring a bell ofrem oteness, as an ethical system we can remain
outside? Does not the text rather speak of good and evil? Should we rather
revitalize the term ' the good Book,' or ' the Book of good and evil'? Instead of
sp eaking of ethics, sh ould we more frequently u se the biblical ' righteous ness and
justice' as these words call more immediately for choice and action? Instead of
'existential,' is it not less d isguised, more naked and honest simply to speak of the
biblical ' life and death' among u s mortals? It is an irony in that discourse on the
existential and ethical often become non-existential and non-ethical by the very
terms we u se to speak about them . While the 'existential' and 'ethical ' are
impersonal, non-local, and more prone to objectification- and as such even non-
existential and non-ethical in themselves- the Torah is the words ofYHWH calling
to choice and action determining life or death, good or evil, righteousness and
justice or their opposites.77 Greenberg wrote:
Conversations with Wittgenstein," in Recollections ofWittgenstein (ed. Rush Rhees; Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984), 79). In a conversation with the same Drury, and responding
to this other's reference to Origen's idea that even the fallen angels will be restored to their
former glory their conversation developed as follows:
"Wittgenstein: If what we do now is to make no difference in the end,
then all the seriousness of life is done away with. Your religious ideas
have always seemed to me more Greek than biblical. Whereas my
thoughts are one hundred per cent Hebraic.
Drury: Yes I do feel that, when, say, Plato talks about the gods, it lacks
that sense of awe which you feel throughout the Bible- from Genesis to
Revelation. 'But who may abide the day of his coming, and who shall
stand when he appeareth?'
Wittgenstein: [standing still and looking at me [i.e. Drury] very intently]
I think you have just said something very important. Much more
important than you realize" (Drury, "Conversations with Wittgenstein,"
I 61).
It is not a question of baptizing Wittgenstein as some have tried to do. It is probably
best simply to acknowledge an analogy between the Bible and the late Wittgenstein, as Tim
Labron has pointed out: "What connects Wittgenstein's later philosophy with a 'religious
point of view', and as will be shown Hebraic thought in particular, is their similar
divergence from an exclusively scientific world-view, theorizing and excessive
explanations" (Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View, 38-39). Isaac Nevo has
written that between the early and late Wittgenstein there was a "transition from mystic,
nondiscursive silence towards an unrevealed deity to faith in the revealed deity of the
historical narrative" (Isaac N evo, "Religious Belief and Jewish Identity in Wittgenstein's
Philosophy," Philosophy Research Archives 13 (1987-88): 234). Cf. also Labron,
Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View, 87-93.
77 As an example of the significance of terminology, Jonathan Kiawans has made a
strong textual justification for distinguishing between ritual and moral laws. He has outlined
three criteria to identify ritual impurity laws: (1) "The sources of ritual impurity are
generally natural and more or less unavoidable," (2) " It is not a sin to contract these
)
)
READING AS A DISCLOSURE OF THE THOUGHTS OF THE HEART 293
)
The reader of the Scriptures soon finds himself diverted from ephemeral
concerns to a consideration of fundamental, lasting issues, and these are
dealt with in a plain and simp le way that someh ow bypasses our subtle ties,
)
complexities, and sophistication. By reducing issues to essentials, and thus
making it impossible for the reader to escape them, the Scriptures wor k an )
effect like that of a child's blunt question or uninhibited comment on
grown-up conduct. As a child's remark is capable ofexposing a disturbing )
truth hidden under rationalization and self-deception, so the ancient )
writings invite us constantly to consider that beneath the glorious
achievements ofcivilization stands the human being, a frail needy creature
whose happiness still depends on discovering what it is, and
)
why-without having had any say in the m atter-it has been called into
being.78
And as we grapple around to understand the biblical text, and reality and
ourselves in light ofit, the autocratic words of the text confront us with the task to
take "every thought captive to obey Christ" (2 Cor 10:5 NRSV). In the depths,
lacunas, ambivalences, tensions, indications, confusions of the biblical text and in
the inner-biblical reuses of earlier texts-more than simply a matter of literary or
cultural style- we find the text p erforated by a thrust toward the good life.
impurities," and (3) they only convey impermanent contagion to persons. By contrast, he
outlines five characteristics ofmoral impurities: (1) they are a "direct consequence of sin,"
(2) "there is no contact-contagion with moral impurity," (3) "moral impurity leads to a long-
lasting, if not permanent, degradation of the sinner and, eventually, of the land oflsrael,"
(4) moral impurity cannot be treated by rites of purification, and (5) while ' impure' (iime)
is used for both ritual and moral impurity, ' abomination' (to'ebah) and 'pollute' (!ziin ep) are
used exclusively for moral impurity (Jonathan K.lawans, Impurity and Sin in Ancient
Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 22-3 1). Even though K.lawans' work
forms a point of departure in distinguishing textually between moral and ritual laws, )
refinement is still needed. Terminological overlap between laws relating to ritual and moral
impurity on the one hand and the dietary laws on the other hand, for example, point to an
interrelationship between the laws. Klawans himself admits he has not been able to
conceptualize this overlap between them. A question is if speaking of the distinction
between a holy life with a holy God in contrast to death, which could be unpacked as
containing the three concepts of the distinction between (I) life and death, (2) holiness, and
(3) life with God, do not better help us see the interrelation ofbiblical laws. For a discussion
making the concepts of life and death central to an understanding of the so-called cultic
laws, see Hyam Maccoby, Ritual and Morality: The Ritual Purity System and its Place in )
Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Instead of making the terms
'cul tic' and 'ethical' foundational in our description ofbiblical law, beginning with concepts
that initially help us see the interrelation between the various laws might be more helpful.
Secondarily we might differentiate the legal corpus into laws dealing more with issues of
purity versus justice and righteousness. Using the terminology of the biblical text itself
might thus help us see both forest and trees more clearly.
78
Greenberg, Biblical Prose Prayer, 2.
)
)
)
)
) 294 KENNETH BERGLAND The Influence of Macro-Hermeneutical
Assumptions Upon Biblical Interpretation:
)
)
But be doers ofthe word, and not merely hearers who deceive themselves.
For if any are hearers of the word and not doers, they are like those who
look at themselves in a mirror; for they look at themselves and, on going
I A Brief Evaluation of the Historical

l
) away, immediately forget what they were like. But those who look into the Grammatical Method
perfect law, the law ofliberty, and persevere, being not hearers who forget
) but doers who act- they will be blessed in their doing (James 1:22-25
NRSV). Tiago Arrais
)
) So "l'chaim!"-up, let us be on our way, from words to life, to the glory of God!

Kenneth Bergland did his MA in the history of ideas at the University of Oslo, with special Introduction
focus upon philosophical ethics in the 20'h century. He is now working on his Ph.D. in Old The contents of this volume were written and organized with the intent to
) Testament studies at the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University. celebrate the legacy of Fernando L. Canale. 1 In this celebration the writers
The topic of his thesis is the reuse oflaws and norms between the Torah and the prophets attempted to situate, critique, and expand Canale thinking within the lines of their
as a model for applied biblical ethics. His wife Marianne and daughter Asne help him to
particular field of study.2 Also, whether explicitly or implicitly, most papers were
.) remember where life needs to be lived. Email: kenneth@boehmer.no.
written within the backdrop of contemporary theological issues that have arisen in
) the Seventh-day Adventist3 denomination. This contemporary and confessional
context might further highlight the importance of the present chapter and proviq,_e
) the background to the problem it addresses. It is my desire that this essay might fuid
) resonance not only with those who are associated to the SDA denomination, but
with those who also take Scripture seriously and recognize the same hermeneutical
) challenges to be pointed out in this study in their own particular denominational
contexts.
)

)
1
) The first class I took in the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary at Andrews
University was "Revelation, Inspiration, and Hermeneutics" with Dr. Fernando Canale.
) Little did I know that this class would take away my sleep for a couple of weeks, not only
because it was demanding (it was!), but because Canale's insights and vision shook me to
) the core. During that class I knew that whatever I had to do as an academic had to contribute
to the biblical vision he set forth for biblical and theological/philosophical studies. Since
) then, I have been privileged to attend the majority of his classes, and to have him in my
) doctoral dissertation committee as I am attempting to expand the biblical vision he set forth
through my own work. But most importantly, it has been a joy to have developed a
) friendship with Canale during these years. I do not see Canale only as a teacher and adviser,
but as a friend and mentor. My life and ministry have been deeply impacted by his influence.
) This short study is only a token of appreciation in gratitude for his ministry and influence.
2
Canale himself values this unified and interdisciplinary method toward theological
) thinking as he writes: "it seems advisable that a criticism of the whole of Christian theology
) should be approached as a team effort involving all its related areas of concern and
specialties" (Fernando Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason: Time and Timelessness
) as Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987), 408).
3
Henceforth referred to as SDA.
)
)
296 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Although the topic ofthis particular study was requested by Canale years ago,4
there are at least two reasons that enhance its need. The first, relates to the
importance of addressing the henneneutical issues the work ofFemando Canale has
raised; the second, relates to the timely relevance of such a study to the cunent
interpretative environment of the SDA church. The following paragraphs will
expand these two points in order for the reader to understand the background and
purpose of this study.
In regard s to the first point, the question is: what hermeneutical questions has
the work of Canale raised? At the end of Canale's dissertation one of these
questions can be identified. He writes: "within the exegetical realm both the
grammatical-historical and historical-critical methods stand in need of being
overcome through the developing ofa new exegetical method which should replace
them in the search for Biblical m eanings."5 Before considering the possibility of a
new methodology as Canale proposes, it is important to assess the need to
"overcome" the historical grammatical method itself. This study attempts to
introduce such an assessment.
In regards to the second point, the question is: how does the hermeneutical
environment of the SDA church enhance the need of this study? The use of the
historical grammatical m ethod in Adventism can be traced back as far as William
Miller (1782- 1849), the founder ofthe Millerite movement from which Seventh-day
Adventism emerged. 6 Since then, the SDA church officially met in the years of
1919, 1952, 1974, and 1986 to discuss hermeneutical issues,7 and voted (at the 1986
annual council in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) that Adventist interpreters were to void
relying on the use of the presuppositions and the resultant deductions associated
with the Historical-critical Method. 8 Such reaction toward the historical critical
• Canale asked me to work on this particular topic of study years ago. This volume as
a whole created the opportunity for me to finally deliver on my promise to uncover the
philosophical underpinnings ofthe historical grammatical method in order to better evaluate
its function and usefulness to biblical interpretation.
5
Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason, 408.
6
Alberto R. Timm, "Historical Background of Adventist Biblical Interpretation," in
George W. Reid, ed., Understanding Scripture: An Adventist Approach, Biblical Research
Studies, Vol. l (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2006), 5. The use of the historical
grammatical method in the context of the SDA church is significantly different from the one
which will be analyzed in this study. As I will attempt to argue in this essay, the historical
grammatical method went through significant changes throughout time. At this stage, the
term historical grammatical method must be suspended of any previous notions ( especially
those that relate to how the method is applied today) in order for it to be analyzed as it was
intended to function in its most significant stage, at the tum of the eighteenth century. To
which degree the methodology of Miller could be considered historical-grammatical is also
a question that could be raised at this stage, but to delineate a possible answer falls outside
the scope of this chapter.
7
Ibid., 8-10.
8
See Anonymous, "Methods of Bible Study," Adventist Review, Jan. 22, 1987, 18-20;
Ministry, April 1987, 22-24.
TIAGOARRAIS 297
)
method was materialized by a widespread reliance upon the historical grammatical
method. 9 This reliance on the historical grammatical method can be frequently seen )
in publications within the SDA church.
)
Although the issue of authority and the role of women in ministry in the
context of ordination has been in the background of SDA discussion for years, )
throughout the years of 2013-2014, thinkers of the SDA church turned their
attention again to the issue. To address the issue properly church leadership created )
a committee that would meet regularly to evaluate through research and the )
presentation of papers the biblical, historical, and theological foundations of these
issues. 10 The papers that d ealt with exegetical issues prepared for these meetings j
attemp ted to apply the historical grammatical method of interpretation, yet
surprisingly, several of them reached conflicting results. 11
)
Knowing that there is no study that critically evaluates the origin and
effectiveness of the historical grammatical method within the SDA church, the
seemingly uncritical use of the historical grammatical method might be a possible )
cause for the evident inconsistency in its implementation and results. And aside
from inconsistency, the uncritical use of the historical grammatical method seems,
in practice, to empty the method of any fixed procedures or principles, turning it
into a method that merely serves the purpose of carrying a particular set of
assumptions (whether conservative, progressive, etc.) into interpretation.
Apart from the personal request from Canale to write on this topic, and his call
for a critical assessment of the method (and an "overcoming" of the method itself),
this brief survey of the current hermeneutical divide within SDA circles enhances
the need for serious attention to the historical grammatical method. Therefore, this .)
)
9
This is attested by the fact that the official Handbook ofAdventist Theology aligns the
Adventist hermeneutic with that of the Protestant Reformers, that is, under a methodology
that is called historical-grammatical exegesis. Perhaps around this period the expression
historical-grammatical method began to be used formally within Adventist scholarship. See
Richard M. Davidson, "Biblical Interpretation," in Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist )
Theology, Commentary Series, Vol. 12 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 94.
0
' All papers presented in this committee (Theology of Ordination Study
Committee/TOSC) can be found on the following website:
http://www.adventistarchives.org/gc-tosc.
11
An example ofthis would be Clinton Wahlen's paper"Is ' Husband of One Wife' in
Timothy 3:2 Gender Specific?" which does not endorse the ordination of women, and Jii'i
Moskala 's "Back to Creation: Toward a Consistent Adventist Creation- Fall- Re-Creation
Hermeneutic (Biblical-Theological Reflections on Basic Principles ofBiblical Hermeneutics
Applied to the Ordination ofWomen)," which does endorse the ordination of women. Both
use the historical grammatical method yet arrive at different results. It is not my intention
to support the idea that the use of the method should always bring harmonious results,
instead, my goal is to evaluate how the method sets out to find meaning in the biblical text, )
and its effectiveness in the context of how it has been utilized in history. This paper will not
focus, nor present an opinion on the issue of the ordination ofwomen. What this paper will )
do is evaluate the usefulness of the historical grammatical method as it relates to biblical
interpretation.
)
)
)
)
) 298 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASS1.Th1PTIONS
) essay attempts to address the question of the origin and original intent of the
historical grammatical method as it emerged as a method proper at the turn of the
) centuries, as well as how in this context, the method seeks to arrive at the meaning
eighteenth century. This evaluation will be presented in the context of the macro-
) hermeneutical premises that shape its structure: historical, and ontological
premises. 12
_) Yet before I begin to address the issue at hand, it is important to note that any
interpretative tradition carries a particular set of premises that directly affects not
) acomplex task. 16 The grammatical approach to Scripture can be traced as far back
only how a method will be applied but also its possible results. By probing the
) historical and ontological premises of a particular method, 13 one is able to uncover
its hermeneutical structure, potential, and limitations. Only then can a method be
evaluated in light of its validity to biblical interpretation today.
) It is my hope that this evaluation of the macro-hermeneutical assumptions of
the historical grammatical method might not be an end in itself, but that it might
) highlight some important hermeneutical issues that could prove to be helpful for a
) new generation ofbiblical interpreters seeking to, in Canale's words, "overcome,"
the preeminence of the historical grammatical and critical methods.
) critical approach to the text introduced the idea of"retrojection" into interpretation, that is,
Historical Premises
) the biblical text along with its history a vessel in which to carry an earlier message. Milla,i:
As I begin to address the basic assumptions that form what is today known as
) the historical grammatical method, it is imperative to briefly highlight the
historical 14 background ofits re-appearance at the turn of the eighteenth century. 15
)
) 12
For a proper introduction into the way Canale uses the term "macro-hermeneutics"
see Fernando L. Canale, "Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical
) Understanding of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology?" JATS, 12/2 (2001).
This study will follow the same conceptions. In sum, macro-hermeneutics refers to
l
philosophical issues, meso-hermeneutics to doctrinal/theological issues, and micro-
) hermeneutic to exegetical issues.
13
This twofold structure of assumptions is organized in this way to show that any
) interpretative method carries an inherent view ofhow God (ontology) relates (history) to the
world (cosmology) and consequently to humanity (epistemology). The question to be
) pursued in further studies is: how close to the biblical view ofthe God-world/history-human
relationship are these interpretative traditions? It is also important to note that I will only
) the time ofthe Reformation ofthe sixteenth century as he writes that the "biblical principles
focus on the first two issues, that ofhistory and ontology, since both are foundational for the
understanding of the historical grammatical method.
j 14
The term "history" will be frequently used throughout this section, creating the need
j for some clarification of its meaning. I will follow the general definition given by the Dutch
historian Johan Huizinga since it encompasses both the contemplative and literary forms it
j can take: "History is the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to itself of
the past," (Johan Huizinga, "A Definition of the Concept ofHistory," in R. Klibansky and
) H. J. Paton, Eds., Philosophy and History: Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer (Oxford,
England: Oxford University Press, 1936), 9); quoted in J. J. Finkelstein, "Mesopotamian
) affirming as it did that the literal or, as he preferred to call it, the grammatical or historical
Historiography," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 107, No. 6,
Cuneiform Studies and the History of Civilization (December 20, 1963): 462. In the
)
following pages the term will also be nuanced in the following manner: history as
) historiography, that is, the written record of the past; and history as historical process, that
is, what people actually did and suffered. See David Bebbington, Patterns in History: A
)
)
TIAGO ARRAIS 299
This way, this section will analyze the ongm and intention of the historical
grammatical method in the historical context of the seventeenth and eighteenth
of a biblical text.
From Text to History
To pinpoint the precise origin of the historical grammatical method is
Christian Perspective on Historical Thought (Vancouver, Canada: Regent College
Publishing, 2000), 1. In regards to historiography, the reader will notice that biblical
interpretation, in the transition from pre-critical to critical times, was confronted with two
alternatives: the possibility that the biblical depictions of the historical processes of its
characters, that is, a biblical historiography, was accurate and true; and with the possibility
that modernistic historiography, which critically evaluated the biblical text (along with its
depictions ofthe historical process ofthe biblical characters), was the only rational approach
to interpretation and the true sense of the biblical text. The latter, seen in the historical
"anachronistically attributing present ideas, attitudes, or practices to earlier times," making
Burrows, "Ancient Israel," in Robert C. Dentan, and Roland H. Bainton, Eds., The Idea of
History in the Ancient Near East (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1955), 107. ·
15
At this stage only a brief historical overview will be presented giving priority to the
main issues and transitions of the period (seventeenth to eighteenth century). It is not the
intention nor purpose of this study to provide an exhaustive historical background to the
appearance of the historical grammatical method. For more on the history and rise of the
historical approach to the text see: Scott Hahn, and Benjamin Wiker, Politicizing the Bible:
The Roots of Historical Criticism and the Secularization of Scripture, 1300-1700 (New
York, NY: Crossroad Publishing Company, 2013); Louis Reichenthal Gottschalk,
Understanding History: A Primer ofHistorical Method (New York, NY: Knopf, 1950); Alan
J. Hauser, and Duane Frederick Watson, A History ofBiblical Interpretation: The Medieval
Through the Reformation Periods, Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2008); Henning
GrafReventlow, History ofBiblical Interpretation: Renaissance, Reformation, Humanism,
Vol. 3 (Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010).
16
Scholars, like Richard M. Davidson, normally see the origins of the method during
of interpretation recovered by the Reformers, coupled with the advances in textual and
historical-grammatical analysis of the Renaissance (Erasmus and others), led to a robust
Protestant hermeneutic that has carried until now and has become known as the historical-
grammatical-literary-theological approach or (for short) the grammatico-historical method
or historical-biblical method." Richard Davidson, "Biblica!Interpretation," 90. Hans W. Frei
also sees the roots of the emphasis on grammar and the literal historicity of the text around
the same time frame as he writes about Luther's rejection of the multiplex approach to the
text set forth by his predecessors. Frei writes: "Luther's simplification meant drastic relief,
sense is the truest sense." See Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative: A Study in
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
1974), 19; cf. Martin Luther, "Auf das iiberchristlich, iibergeistlich ind iiberkiinstlich Buch
Bock Emsers zu Leipzig Antwort," Werke, 650-652. For a similar dating of the origins see:

300 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL A SSUMPTIONS
as the school ofAntioch 17 and R abbinic interpretation. 18 Yet the roots of the interest
in the historical back grounds of the biblical text in the context of the interpretation
ofScripture- an interest that still influences interpretation today 19-developed during
the seven teenth and eighteenth centuries. The findings in the fi eld of arch aeology
a long with the effects of Rationalism a nd the Enlightenment project led biblical
interpretation, in the late seventeenth century, to b e heavily influenced by modem
historical approach es to the point that "revelation became for m any a predicate to
history."20 This fissure in the pre-critical approach to Scripture le d the world
d epicted in the Bible "to look increasingly less like the world one actua lly sees in
the Bible and increasingly more like the world of the modem historian."21 By the
Louis Berkkhof, Principles ofBiblical Interpretation: Sacred Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids,
MI: Baker, 1950), 27.
17 Form more seeAnthonyC. Thi selton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 109-114; D. S. Wa llace-Hadrill, Christian Antioch: A Study ofEarly
Christian Thought in the East (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982);
Vahan S. Hovhanessian, ed., Exegesis and Hermeneutics in the Churches ofthe East: Select
Papers from the SBL Meeting in San Diego, 2007 (New York, NY: P eter Lang, 2009).
18
Especially Karaite interpretation in Medieval times. See Meira Polliack, "Medieval
Karaism," in Martin Goodman, Jeremy Cohan, and David Sorkin, Eds., The Oxfo rd
Handbook of Jewish Studies (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), 305-3 12.
Polliack affirms that the only precursor to the grammatical or linguistic-contextual approach
ofKaraite hermeneutics is found in the "vaguely attested" rabbinic interpretative orientation
known as peshat. See Polliack, "Medieval Karaism," 306.
1
• See Richard E. Burnett "Historical Criticism," in Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Gen . Ed.,
Dictionaryfor Theological Interpretation ofthe Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
2005), 290.
20
Ibid., 291. For more on the background of the historical primacy over the text see:
Peter Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation of Scripture
(Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1977); R . K. Harrison, et al, Biblical Criticism: Historical,
Literary, and Textual (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1978); and more importantly H ans W.
Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century
Hermeneutics (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1974).
21
John H. Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch: Revelation, Composition and
Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 93. Although the change in
mindset attempted to arrive at a modem sense ofw hat really happened in history, that is, the
historical facts behind the biblical text, such a change led in an opposite direction. By
understanding the historical processes within a modem framework much of the earlier
understandings of the same historical processes were left behind. Even apart from biblical
hermeneutics, a neglect of the inherent understanding ofhistory in biblical or Ancient Near
Eastern thought proved to be problematic in other areas. Ephraim A. Speiser writes that a
failure "to incorporate the up-to-date findings on the Near East has thrown out of ba lance
the existing philosophies ofhistory and invalidated some oftheir principal results." Ephraim
A. Speiser, "The Ancient Near East and Modem Philosophies ofH istory," Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 95, No. 6 (December 21, 1951): 584. This only
testifies to the importance of being critical about the critical approach to the biblical text and
to its implicit understanding of the concept of history itself. J. J. Finkelstein is correct in
warning the interpreter that in "our approach towards any aspect ofnon Western civilization
)
)
TrAGO ARRA!S 301
)
eighteenth century the " question of th e use of history for religion was still one of
the most pressing problems."22 Yet the modernistic historical a pproach to the text )
introduced in this p eriod implied more than on ly a focus on the rela tion to the text
)
and modern history w ith its consequent effects upon biblical interpretation. 23 At the
foundation of the modernistic historical approach to the text is a monumental )
change in the way reality, truth, and consequ ently the meaning of the biblical text
is perceived. Was the meaning of a biblical tex t to be found by a critical or a non- J
critical assessment of the text and the history it portrays? 24 )
we commonly expose ourselves to the hazard ofapplying Western categories to phenomena )
completely alien to us." J. J. Fi nkelstein, "Mesopotamian Historiography," Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 107, No. 6, Cuneiform Studies and the H istory of
Civilization (December 20, 1963): 46 1.
22
Peter Hanns Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise ofHistorical Criticism
(Berkeley, CA: University ofCalifomia Press, 1975), 43. While many today believe that the
historical approach to the text was almost an organized attack on re ligion (like for French
intellectuals of the time), Reill observes that the Gennan approach attempted to defend or
at least re-interpret religious worship "in the light of a revised religious consciousness."
Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise ofHistorical Criticism, 43.
23
It is important to keep in mind that these transitions in hermeneutical thinking were
not exempt from radical changes at a theological and philosophical level, in fact, these
radical changes were the facilitators of a change in hermeneutics. Timothy J. Furry writes
"philosophical and theological issues matter in the writing of history, since they are part of
its inevitable representational structure." Timothy J. Furry, Allegorizing History: The
Venerable Bede, Figural Exegesis, and Historical Theory (Eugene, OR: Pickwick
Publications, 20 I 3), 2.
24
By "meaning" here I imply the sense intended by th e author as communicated
through the text. For those who favor a non critical approach, the sense of the text begins
with a serious consideration ofthe text itself along with its historical presentation. For those
who favor a more critical approach, the sense of the text is largely influenced by extra
biblical material, since the biblical material is considered as an unreliable source for
historical accuracy. In other words, for the critical mindset the words and literary devices
do not carry a full perspective of the sense of the text, it is only through historical
reconstructions of the background of the text/author that the meaning, or sense, can be
clearly seen. On the relation of truth and meaning, it is important to note that this period was J
marked by an outburst ofpossibilities. While for Ernesti truth could be understood without
a critical appraisal of the text, this study will attempt to show that for others it could only be
understood through a critical approach to the text in order to understand the mind of the J
original author, or the mind ofthe original reader. The question that must be answered at the
outset is: are truth and meaning identical in Scripture? Through the work of Spinoza and
others the gap between both notions was not only created, but increasingly widened. While
the meaning of the text included a moral/ethical dimension, for Spinoza, it did not mean it )
should be considered truth (since only philosophy and reason were able to discuss matters
of truth). He felt that the text is as important as this ethical sense, and may be discarded once
the sense is discovered. This distinction in the work of Spinoza can be easily seen as he )
writes that " (t)he sphere of reason is, as we have said, truth and wisdom; the sphere of
theology is piety and obedience." Benedict Spinoza, A Theological-Political Treatise and
a Political Treatise, trans. R.H. M. Elwes (New York, NY: Dover, 1951 ), 194. This same
distinction will later be picked up by Kant via his distinction between form and content, J
_)
, )
)
)
)
302 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS TIAGOARRAIS 303
)
) Once the modernistic, historical critical approach became synonymous with Understanding the appearance of the historical grammatical method in this
biblical interpretation,25 the meaning of the words of Scripture began to be context will allow the reader to see, to some extent, how only later the method was
) "understood in terms of the world of external events"26 and not the other way taken to be an alternative to the historical critical methodology.32
around. The reality which Scripture spoke of (with supernatural events and actions)
was tied to the reality which modem history approved of (with no supernatural From History to Text
) events and actions). Consequently, the key to uncovering the true meaning and As mentioned earlier, to pin-point the precise appearance of the historical-
significance of the text could only be found through historical criticism. With the grammatical method is almost an impossible task since its development runs
) through several centuries. Even so, John H._ Sailhamer33 points to Johann August
assumption that only modem historical reconstructions provide a window into
) reality, 27 the verification of what was to be considered truthful in the biblical text Ernesti as the one who best articulated what is today known as the historical
came not from a serious consideration of the historical point of view of the text as grammatical method. 34 For Sailhamer, "Ernesti's view remains the definitive
in pre-critical times, but in the critical reconstructions of the modem historian. statement of the grammatical-historical approach."35 Yet surprisingly, the manner
) Probing this departure from pre-critical to critical interpretation and its in which the historical-grammatical approach was understood and applied by
foundational changes to hermeneutics, Hans W. Frei observes that although the biblical interpreters changed within time, looking less and less like that which
) biblical narratives were written as realistic stories, "the meaning of the stories was Emesti envisioned.36 Before I address these changes, it is necessary to focus on
finally something different from the stories or depictions themselves."28 The Ernesti's vision for, and articulation of, the historical grammatical method.
)
departure from this pre-critical stage where "history demonstrated the veracity of
) the Christian message,"29 to a modernistic approach where the veracity of the
Christian message was attested with the aid of historical analysis can be seen as a
) "definite change" by 1760.30 And it is in this context that the historical grammatical
) approach re-appears.31 32
Interestingly, during the time of the Reformers the method "was developed in
) reaction to the allegorical method which had more or less dominated the history of the
Church of Latin Christianity for over a thousand years." Raymond F. Surburg,
) "Presuppositions of the Historical-Grammatical Method as Employed by Historic
Lutheranism," Spring/ielder, 38, No. 4 (March 1975): 278. In other words, since its first
_) inception, the method was reactionary. During the time of the Reformers it became a
)
)
things as they are and things as they appear.
25
Most if not all allusions to the historical critical method in this study do not attempt
to describe how the critical method is used in contemporary times, but only in the period in
l reaction against the long reign of the allegorical method, and after the eighteenth century,
it was used against the historical mindset within which, ironically, it originated.
33
I am greatly indebted to the work of John H. Sailhamer in this section. His thorough
analysis of the work ofJohann August Ernesti and its historical developments are of utmost
) which the historical grammatical method appeared. The challenge here is to be able to see f importance to biblical interpretation. It is my intention to summarize some of his findings
the issues in the formative period of both approaches (grammatical and historical critical) here and outline .some implications within the lines of what this chapter proposes to
J while keeping an eye at their current state. accomplish. Since Emesti wrote in Latin I rely on Sailhamer's evaluation of Emesti's
26
Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, 93. material and on my own readings of Moses Stuart's translation ofEmesti's work: J. A.
) 27 Emesti and Moses Stuart, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, Fourth Edition (New
Augustine distinction of "words" (verba) and "things" (res) informs much of the
hermeneutical discussions around the biblical text. For him, the words (verba) ofthe biblical York, NY: Dayton and Saxton, 1842). From my own reading ofEmesti's work, I believe
) Sailhamer has done a magnificent job in articulating Emesti 's main ideas and the issues that
text "are the means by which one enters into the spiritual realities of the world of things
(res)." Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch, 76. Although this distinction between have risen because of mistranslations from the Latin.
) 34
text/words and reality/things is still foundational for historical approaches to Scripture, Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch, 105. Other scholars also see Ernesti as
) Sailhamer understands that "Augustine's view, to be sure, is not that of the Protestant the one who established the hermeneutical parameters for what is currently known as the
Reformers (Sola Scriptura) and at the same time, is not "the view of biblical authors." historical grammatical method. Roberto Jumonville also writes that Emesti is "r egarded as
) Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, 77. founder of the grammatical-historical school ofhermeneutics." Robert Moore-Jumonville,
28
Frei, The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative, 11. Hermeneuti'cs ofHistorical Distance: Mapping the Terrain ofAmerican Biblical Criticism,
) 29 1880-1914 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002), I 04.
Reill, The German Enlightenment and the Rise ofHistorical Criticism, 43. 35
30
Ibid., 43. Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, 105.
) 31
36
Among these changes is the development ofEmesti's approach into the historical
Re-appears in the sense that some of the principles in which it functions, as
) mentioned earlier, can be traced to other hermeneutical movements in history such as the critical method itse1£ See Sailhamer, "Johann August Emesti: The Role of History in
Antiochene school, Rabbinic interpretation, and the work of the Reformers. Biblical Interpretation," JETS 44/2 (June, 2011 ): 194.
)
)

304 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Johann Em esti (1707-1781), "one of the dominating figures of his time,"37
studied at Wittenberg and Leipzig and began teaching theology in Leipzig in 1759.
Sailhamer and others see Emesti as the father of a conservative and even
evangelical approach to the text, yet along with Johann Salomo Semler,38 E mesti
is also considered one of the founders of the historical critical method due to two
main premises in his work on biblical hermeneutics:
Firstly, Emesti made clear the necessity of studying the Old and New
Testaments not as a homogeneous whole but as distinct bodies of
literature. Secondly, he applied to the New Testament the philological-
historical method that had been developed in the interpretation ofclassical
texts. 39
The difficulty some scholars have in pinpointing the actual role and thinking
of Emesti is due to the fact that although Emesti held to some of the rising
historical critical premises of his time, 40 he failed "to follow these insights to their
logical conclusion and, affirming the doctrine of inerrancy continued to hold a
conservative view ofScripture." 41 Thus, Emesti is influential in a paradoxical way.
On the one hand he popularized the historical critical mindset of his time in his
grammatical approach to the text, 42 but on the other hand, he upheld a conservative,
inerrant, posture.
37
M. A. Knoll, "Emesti, Johann August," in Donald K. McKim, Historical H andbook
of Major Biblical Interpreters (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998), 316.
38
Both Semler and Emesti are also listed as the influences behind the thinking of
Johann Philipp Gabler. See Magne Sreb0, On the Way to the Canon: Creative Tradition
History in the Old Testament (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 31 1-31 2. .
39
David R. Law, The Historical-Critical Method: A Guide for the Perplexed (New
York, NY: Continuum, 2012), 42. In Emesti's words: "the Scriptures are to be investigated
by the same rules as other books." In Emesti, Elementary Principles of Interpretation, 27.
◄o The roots of his premises are also numerous, yet some recognize that the philosophy
of Christian Wolff played a significant role in his moderate rationalistic approach to the text.
Knoll writes that Emesti inherited "from Wolff a rational view of the universe in which
revelation as a distinct source of knowledge apart from reason had a well-defined place."
Knoll, "Emesti, Johann August," 316. Others see the influence ofSchleiermacher in Emesti
thinking, see Cornelia Richter, "Friedrich Schleiermacher: Symbol Theory, Hermeneutics,
and Forms of Religious Communication," in Brent W. Sockness and Wilhelm Gr, Eds.,
Schleiermacher, the Study of Religion, and the Future of Theology: A Transatlantic
Dialogue (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 20 I 0), 384. Moses Stuart sees the heavy influence of
Samuel F. N. Morus' Hermeneutica in the work ofEmesti on this see the preface written by
Stuart in Emesti's, Elementary Principles ofInterpretation, iii-iv.
41
Law, The Historical-Critical Method: A Guide for the P erplexed, 42.
42
Emesti's rationalistic approach to interpretation can be seen when he discusses the
need for methodological steps in interpretation so that interpreters might not "be left to
depend on chance rather than reason." See Emesti, Elementary Principles ofInterpretation,
16.
)
)
TIAGO ARRAIS 305
)
Even so, because Emesti is considered the main articulator of what is today
known as the historical grammatical method, it is important to briefly highlight )
some important aspects of his approach as well as trace some of the roots of his
)
ideas. The question here is: in which way did Emesti understand and articulate the
historical grammatical approach? )
In Emesti's writings, the meaning of the 'historical' and the 'grammatical' in
the method were tied to the parameters set forth by the text, that is, the grammatical
and th~ historical are not two different steps in interpretation, but one and the
same.43 This he called the "usus loquendi."44 In regards to the ' historical' element
in the 'grammatical historical' approach, Em esti "meant simp ly the ' grammatical' )
meaning of the words of Scripture," that is, to understand the meaning of history
)
"meant ' reading' the historical narratives.'"'5
The historical implied that the narratives found in the biblical text were
trustworthy depictions of real historical events, and to have access to those events
one must read what is in the text. As for the 'grammatical' element in the method,
in short, it simply implied careful attention to the grammatical, syntactical, and
literary components of the Hebrew, Greek and Aramaic texts of the B ible. To
understand history one needs to understand grammar.
It did not take long before scholars misunderstood the way in which Emesti
articulated these concepts since "the phrase 'grammatical-historical method' went
from being a description of the primarily textual procedure of studying written
narratives to an almost exclusive search for the meaning of the h istorical events
(rea/ia) lying behind those narratives."46 This movement indicates the essential
difference between what Ernesti envisioned for the historical grammatical method
)
43
For Emesti, "the act of interpretation implies two things; viz., (1) A right perception
ofthe meaning of the words. (2) A proper explanation ofthat meaning." Emesti, Elementary )
Principles ofInterpretation, 14.
•• Daniel O'Leary, "Environmentalism, Hermeneutics, and Canadian Imperialism in
Agnes Deans Cameron's The New North," in Melody Hessing, Rebecca Raglon, and
Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands, Th e Elusive Land: Women and the Canadian Environment
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005), 19.
45
Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, I 07. )
46
Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, l 05. Emesti is categorical in assigning
the meaning of the text to the boundaries set forth by the words and not from outside
notions. He writes: "The meaning, which according to grammatical principles should be
assigned to any word of Scripture, is not to be rejected then on account ofreasons derived
from things or previously conceived opinions; for in this way interpretation would become
uncertain." Emesti, Elementary Principles ofInterpretation, 30. This is a positive feature
ofEmesti's approach to the text, and in some way, it goes against the critical approach to
the text in the sense that it is the text which determines the validity of the previously )
conceived notions of the interpreter. On this Emesti writes: "In the Scriptures, if any
sentiment does not agree with our opinions, we must call to mind the imbecility ofhuman
reason and human faculties; we must seek for conciliation, and not attempt a correction of
the passage without good authority." Ernesti, Elementary Principles ofInterpretation, 30.
j
)
)
)
) 306 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS TIAGO ARRAIS 307

) and historical critical methodologies, namely, the acceptance or rejection of
criticism upon the historical depictions of the Bible as an access to meaning.
) What triggered this misunderstanding, according to Sailhamer, was the English
translation ofEmesti's lnstitutio interpretis Novi Testamenti41 by Moses Stuart.48
While for Emesti the meaning of the text was primarily within the text itself
) independently from critical external historical verifications (apart from the
philological historicity of the words themselves), Stuart "advocated the use of
) While Emesti believed that "the meaning of things ought to be derived solely
history to uncover the meaning of biblical events"49 not realizing that this "was not
) the intent in Emesti's work."50 In other words, Stuart missed the authorial intent
ofEmesti's grammatical method in his translation ofEmesti's work, especially in
regards to how Emesti understood the interrelation between history and text in the
) search for its meaning.
Following this translation ofEmesti 's work, other biblical scholars maintained
the distance between the grammatical and the historical initiated by Stuart. While
Emesti understood the historical and the grammatical to be one,51 scholars utilized
) reconstruct the text. This reconstruction was done in the context of a suspicion
the method as a two-step process, the first "historical," using the historical tools to
) uncover the historical background ofthe text where true historical facts resided, and
the second, "grammatical," the intended spiritual/religious meaning of the text.
) Among these scholars is Karl August Keil who, according to Sailhamer,
meaning of a text the interpreter had to look at both history (through modem
historical critical tools) and text (through critical grammatical tools). 54
What is interesting in this brief historical development is that since its formal
conception the historical grammatical method was utilized as a method through
which scholars could advocate different sets of assumptions. It comes as no surprise
that still today the method is shaped and modified to suit the macro-hermeneutical
commitments of the interpreter using it.
from the words,"55 Keil understood that the meaning "is not in the words of the
author, but in his mind" and it is for this reason that Keil "understands the
investigation of the sense of words to be a historical task."56 The interpreter was to
critically reconstruct the historical setting of the time the text was written in order
to arrive at the true, factual meaning of the text because this was as close as one
could get to the mind of the author. In other words, to arrive at the 'authorial
intention' (what was in the mind of the author) the interpreter had to critically
toward the historical setting depicted by the biblical writer. What the biblical author
actually wrote in relation to history would take on a secondary role under tl:_J.is
critical assessment. 57 "

) originated the hyphenated 'grammatical-historical' form in his German translation As noted so far, Ernesti's intention with the historical grammatical method w~s
ofEmesti's Latin original.52 With this simple change the method began to imply to find the reality and meaning of the text within a somewhat uncritical approach
) "a historical, along with a grammatical, interpretation,"53 that is, a softened version to the text itself. 58 Hans Frei draws out three implications of this literal, realistic,
) of what later came to be known as the historical-critical method, where meaning
was not only restricted to the text itself, but was derived to a large extent from the
) historical-critical evaluations and re-constructions of the interpreter.
While the historical critical approach to the text uncovered the veracity and
) consequently the meaning of the text from critical reconstructions, the historical
) grammatical method as modified by Ernesti's translators, placed a partial yet
significant importance on these historical-critical backgrounds. To arrive at the final
) " Again, this reliance on the history behind the text and the text itself was already
envisioned by Spinoza. Spinoza writes: "the interpretation of nature consists in the
) 47
Johann August Emesti, Institutio interpretis Novi Testamenti (Leipzig, 1761 ). examination of the history of nature, and from there deducing definitions of natural
48
Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, I 06. phenomena on certain fixed axioms, so Scriptural interpretation proceeds by the examination
) 49 of Scripture, and inferring the intention of its authors as a legitimate conclusion from its
Ibid., l 06.
0
Ibid., 106. fundamental principles." Spinoza,A Theological-Political Treatise, 99. This established the
) '

" In addition, for Emesti, even the tropical or figurative sense of a possible word has foundation for the positivistic approach to the text since the difference between the approach
) a "grammatical" meaning. See Ernesti, Elementary Principles ofInterpretation, 37. of the scientist and that of the theologian were quite similar.
2
' Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, 108. Sailhamer also notes that the change
"Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, 119.
56
) from one to two hermeneutical procedures in the historical grammatical method is already Ibid., 119.
indicated by the translations ofErnesti 's work. Sailhamer writes: "[i]n earlier hermeneutical "Maybe it is important to once again point out that the problem here is not with the
) works, the two terms 'grammatical' and 'historical' were commonly connected by the Latin extra-biblical insights themselves, but with the critical assumptions that undermine the
conjunction sive, meaning something like our word 'n amely.' It was 'the grammatical, account of the text.
) 8
' Ernesti understands that an interpreter must have the capability ofdiscerning between
namely, the historical' sense ofScripture that was sought after. When later biblical scholars
such as Karl August Keil connected the two terms with a dash or an et, it suggested the two words and things, and to arrive at the sense of the task or the thing to which it refers one
) must have "an accurate knowledge of languages," and "an acquaintance with the principles
terms no longer meant the same thing. It was now 'the grammatical and historical' method."
) Sailhamer, "Johann August Emesti," 195. of interpretation," in other words, the sense of the text is found within the text, not outside
53
Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, 108. of it. See Emesti, Elementary Principles ofInterpretation, 16.
)
)
308 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS
and semi pre-critical59 interpretation of the text: first, if a story was to be read
literally (as Emesti envisioned), the story "referred to and described actual
historical occurrences;',60 second, "if the real historical world described by the
several biblical stories is a single world of one temporal sequence, there must in
principle be one cumulative story to depict it,"61 that is, "[w]ithout loss to its own
literal meaning or specific temporal reference, an earlier story (or occurrence) was
a figure of a later one; " 62 and third, because the world of the text is unified as one
single story, "it must in principle embrace the experience of any present age and
reader."63
Now that the general tenets ofEmesti's vision for the method in its historical
context are laid out, the question is: according to Emesti's historical grammatical
method, how does the interpreter arrive at the meaning of the text?
Historical Grammatical Structure of Meaning
At the outset, it is important to establish the basic dimensions of meaning
present in interpretation in order to analyze Emesti approach to the text. Kevin J.
Vanhoozer correctly notes that the production ofa text involves at least three tenets:
"interpreters testify to what acts an author performed in inscribing just these words
( content) in just this way (form) on just this occasion ( context)"64 and concludes
that the "meaning of a text pertains to all the things the author was doing in
59
Semi pre-critical in the sense that while Ernesti understood the value of critical
grammatical tools to uncover the meaning ofthe text within the text itself, his assumptions
regarding the textual depictions are quite conservative. In some sense, the historiography
provided by the biblical authors had preeminence over modern historiography because
Ernesti believed that the historical process recorded in Scripture was true.
6
°Frei, The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative, 2.
61
Ibid., 2.
62
Ibid., 2.
63
Ibid., 3.
64
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text?: The Bible, The Reader, and
The Morality ofLiterary Knowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1998), 5. The historical
developments in biblical hermeneutics are marked by changes in emphasis in relation to
these three areas, and more specifically in this study, on the interpretation ofwhat "context"
entails. I chose Vanhoozer at this stage since I am analyzing in broad strokes tl1e basic
elements present in the interpretation of a text. For a more detailed analysis of text and
meaning see: Oliver Glanz, Understanding Participant-Reference Shifts in the Book of
Jeremiah: A Study of Exegetical Method and Its Consequences for the Interpretation of
Referential Incoherence (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 57-76.
TIAGOARRAIS 309
attending to his or her words."65 With this in mind, how does the historical
grammatical methodology relate to the three dimensions: content, form, context?
So far, I have attempted to demonstrate how Emesti understood that to arrive
at the meaning of the text one must not necessarily subjugate it in favor of extra-
)
biblical critical categories. Emesti 's emphasis on the importance ofthe text to arrive )
at meaning derives from his understanding that the exegetical approach to Scripture
needed to be "identical to the newly developed philological approach taken in the J
study of other ancient literature." 66 Emesti's approach is not established on any
inner reasoning within the text, but on the philological approaches ofhis time. What
informs his understanding that "the text can have no other meaning than its )
grammatical, or historical, sense"67 found in the individual words is his reliance
upon this philological background. This is why some see both the grammatical and
the historical approaches to the text as foundational for the critical method, since
both understand that any method for biblical interpretation should follow the same
parameters found in the interpretation of any other book.68
Yet Emesti's emphasis on two of the three tenets of meaning, namely, content
and form, raises the question of how Ernesti viewed the function of language. In
order to establish some parameters to analyze one's philosophy of language,
especially in the context of Scripture, I resort to the philosophy of language found
in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein.69 Wittgenstein's work can be divided in two
main periods, his early work,70 based on foundational theories of language that
viewed the sense oflanguage attached to ideal Forms and explained by foundational
65
Vanhoozer,/s There a Meaning in This Text?, 5. Ifone was to add another dimension )
to Vanhoozer basic scheme it would be that of the reader, that is, the possibility of the
reader being involved in the generation of meaning in the text. Even so, because this
particular study is aimed at the historical grammatical method, I will keep this fourth
dimension out ofthe evaluation ofthe method, especially because the historical grammatical
method gives no role to the reader in the generation of meaning apart from the
meiliodological steps to find the meaning within the text itself. This way, I will limit myself
to the definition of meaning set forth by Vanhoozer as centered on everything "the author
was doing to his or her words," even though I believe such definition Jacks the crucial
dimension of the reader.
66
Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, 117.
67
Ibid., 117.
68
See Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics; Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher,
Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 38.
69
For an introductory perspective on the writings of Wittgenstein see: Hans D. Sluga, )
and David G. Stern, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1996); and probably the best analysis of Wittgenstein's work J
in the context of Scripture and theology is found in Tim Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious )
Point of View (London, UK: Continuum, 2006), and Wittgenstein and Theology (London,
UK: T&T Clark, 2009).
70
Seen in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London, UK:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
j
)
)
)
310 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS
TIAGOARRAIS 311
)
) categories; and his later work, 71 based on a more pragmatic and functional approach methodological steps to reach a proper understanding of what was written, what
that viewed the sense oflanguage attached to its use and practice. \Vhile the former Ernesti calls the subtilitas explicandi.15
) The implications of a semi pre-critical understanding of the text present in
tends to be more Platonic in nature, words pointing to pre-established realities, the
Emesti's intention for the historical grammatical method, along with how the
) latter tends to be more Hebraic in the sense that to understand language one does
approach uncovers the meaning of the text, prepares the ground for the evaluation
not need to learn the reality to which it points, but to understand how language
) functions within its context.72 of the second macro-hermeneutical premise, namely, that of ontology.
Emesti on his part understood that "the reason for a word meaning is not So far, in the analysis of the premises that relate to the issues surrounding the
) term 'hi~tory' in the historical grammatical method I have pointed out that the usage
anived at logically," and in this he implies that to arrive at the meaning of words
) one needs to see "how it functions in that language."73 In this sense, Ernesti's of the method is divided between two camps:76 on one side those those who follow
understanding oflanguage comes close to Wittgenstein's functional understanding Emesti and his original vision (the grammatical and historical are one interpretative
) oflanguage, 74 an understanding that is closer to the Hebrew way ofwriting than the action); and, on the other side, those who follow the translations of his work (the
grammatical and historical are two different interpretative actions). This dual
) Greek.
understanding of the method in the historical sphere will be repeated in the
Emesti's historical grammatical approach, then, arrives at the meaning of the
text by giving emphasis to the first two elements ofthe scheme ofmeaning, content ontological sphere.
and form, and attends to context only to better understand the nature and history of It is also important to note that both those that follow the translations ofEmesti
) work (two step) as well as Emesti (one step) are looking for the true historical
the text/language. As mentioned earlier, in the historical grammatical methodology
) envisioned by Ernesti there is no role given to the reader apart from the meaning of the text. In this they are unified. The difference is seen in whether this
meaning is found in the critical reconstructions of the events surrounding the
) formation of the text, or in what the text itself says about the historical process it
describes. While the historical critics of the time understood that the bridge t◊
)
meaning requires a careful historical critical reconstruction of the life setting (sitz
) 71
See in Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York, NY: in Leben) of the author along with a close attention to the sources that shaped the
Macmillan, 1953). formation of the text, Emesti understood that philology alone was the bridge to
) 72
On the Hebraic sense of Wittgenstein's later work, Wittgenstein himself in a
conversation with M. 0. Drury asserted: "[y]our religious ideas have always seemed to me
) more Greek than biblical. Whereas my thoughts are one hundred percent Hebraic." In M.
) O' C. Drury, "Conversations With Wittgenstein," in Rush Rhees, Ed., Recollections of
Wittgenstein (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 1984), 79. The Hebraic sense is
) found in Wittgenstein's later work and asserted as such because his later work, following
the general tendencies of biblical writings, seems to "attach meaning to the historical and
) contemporary applications oflanguage- the forms oflife- in contrast to positing additional
elements or foundational theories beyond normative practices." Labron, Wittgenstein's
) Religious Point of View, 5.
73
) Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch, 117. Emesti when speaking about the
meaning of words writes: "How can the meaning in each case be found? From the general
) manner of speaking, i. e. from the common usage." In Emesti, Elementary Principles of
Interpretation, 21.
) 74
The main difference is that while Wittgenstein does not believe scientific positivism
of any sort can influence the understanding of what language is, Ernesti will follow a
) rigorous philological approach to uncover the meaning of the words, that is, a scientific
approach. Also, while Wittgenstein focuses on modem languages Ernesti is working in
) biblical interpretation, and this way, there is no way to understand the usage of words
75
Ibid., 17.
76
without a basic grasp of the ancient languages. Even so, the closeness between Emesti and For a sample of those who understand the grammatical-historical method differently
) than Emesti (emphasizing the two step application) are: Hank Voss, "From 'Grammatical-
Wittgenstein can be attested when Ernesti speaks of the sense of words in the following
terms: "The sense of words depends on the usus loquendi. This must be the case, because Historical Exegesis' to 'Theological Exegesis': Five Essential Practices," Evangelical
) Review of Theology, 37, No. 2, (April, 2013): 145; Milton Spenser Terry, Biblical
the sense of words is conventional and regulated wholly by usage. Usage then being
) understood, the sense of words is of course understood." Ernesti, Elementary Principles of Hermeneutics: A Treatise on the Interpretation of the Old and New Testaments (Grand
Interpretation, 25.
Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1974), 203-204.
)
)

312 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS
meaning,77 that is, the historical meaning of the text w as found within the tex t
itself. 78
Ontological Premises
Now that the presuppositions that relate to history hav e been laid out, this
section turns to two ontological issues that emerge d from the evaluation of the
historical premises of the historical grammatical method. The issues that remain to
be addressed are, namely, the issue of time in pre-critical figuration and typology,
and the issue of the dichotom y between words (verba) a nd things (res) in order to
find the meaning (sensus) of the text.
Figuration, Typology, and Time
As noted above, one of the primary features of pre-critical interpretation, a
feature that forms the background of the historical grammatical method,79 is the
77
Sailhamer also argues that the reason why Emesti relies in his philological enterprise
is because of his Lutheran background that relied on the verbal inspiration of the text (see
Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch, 112-114), a presupposition that the SDA
denomination does not share. Canale himself departs from a strict model of verbal
inspiration in his work as he writes: "b]oth verbal and thought inspiration depends on those
ofclassical philosophy, presuppositions we have dismissed and replaced with biblical ones."
In Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology: A Hermeneutical Study of the
Revelation and Inspiration ofthe Bible (Benien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithotec,
2005), 404. Even so, it is also important to keep in mind that some argue that a full blown
notion of verbal inspiration and consequently the notion ofinerrancy only appeared later in
the Lutheran tradition, as for example, for Peter Leithart only by the seventeenth century
" the Reformation doctrine of Scripture had been refined into a strong doctrine ofinerrancy."
Peter J. Leithart, Deep Exegesis: The Mystery of Reading Scripture (Waco, TX: Baylor
University Press, 2009), 7.
78
To summarize this difference in another light, w hile the historical critical method
focuses on the world of the author, historical grammarians focus on the world of the text.
See Manfred Oeming, Contemporary Biblical Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Aldershot,
England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006).What one must realize at this stage is that to ask
the question that is commonly asked "what is the intention of the author within his own
world?" is to ask a question that historical critics have been trying to answer for over two
hundred years. This certainly is not an endorsement for the use of the historical critical
methodology in all its current ramifications. But this is a reminder that an emphasis on
time/history at the ontological level creates several questions that must be dealt with at a
hermeneutical level (questions which Canale and SDAs in general have yet to formally
explore). The temptation here is to avoid and neglect these questions by hiding them ''under
the rug" of the more conservative historical grammatical method without a basic knowledge
of what the method sets forth to do.
79
Figural or typological interpretation that stemmed from a literal or grammatical
approach to the Bible was also central to the hermeneutic of the Reformation. Frei writes:
"[t]he affirmation that the literal or grammatical sense is the Bible's true sense became
programmatic for the traditions ofLutheran and Calvinistic interpretation." See Frei, The
Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative, 37. This is yet another reason why some tie the premises of
the historical grammatical method to the hermeneutic of the Reformation and rightly so.
:i
I'
I
1
)
)
TIAGO ARRAIS 313
)
element of :figura tion or typology. Since the grammatical historical method
originally assumed a realistic reading of the text, that is, narratives that literally
pointed to real p ast historical events and processes, one of the primary
consequences of such reading was the e mphasis on the unity of the whole of
Scripture.80 Scripture told one single story with older events serving as types/figures )
for newer e vents.
At the same time, it is because of figuration and typology that the reader could )
be immersed in the reality of the world of the text. Hans Fre i writes that :figuration )
" was at once a literary and historical procedure, an interpretation ofstories and their
m eanings by weaving them together into a common narrative referring to a single )
history and its p atterns ofmeaning."81 Y e t at the background of the possibility of
this weaving of stories into one single narrative is the element of time. J
Frei points out the importance of not only the unity of the text for a figural )
understanding of the text, but also the importance of time. H e writes: " if figural or
typological inte rpretation was to be successful, it required a de licate balance
b etween the temporally separated occasions, a firm connection with literal or
realistic procedure, and a c lear rooting in the order of temporal sequence."82
Yet while Frei emphasizes the importance of the sequence of past h istory for
figural interpretation, Erich Auerbach, noticing the development of the
interpreta tion ofScripture in the Middle Ages, clarifies that in that particular period,
time was secondary to the eternal/timeless Divine plan.83 Concerning the )
development of figural interpretation h e writes that figural interpretation "is not
regarded as primarily a chronological or causal development but as a oneness
)
within the Divine plan, of which all occurrences are parts and reflections."84 In this
sense, because God was unders tood to b e omnitemporal85 or timeless, the element
)
of time, the " horizontal, that is the temporal and causal, connection of occurrences
is dissolve d. " 86
From this one notices the two possib ilities in understanding the figural or
typological interpretation in pre-critical times: one that follows a temporal historical .J
dynamic where events are incomplete since they point to future events highlighting
Both the Reformers and Frei resort to a literal realistic reading of the text that lead to a
unified narrative that opens itself to the reader. )
0
' This is why the critical approach to the text with its dissection of the text and its unity
virtually destroyed any possible realistic reading of Scripture. By appealing to several )
traditions and dividing the text along with its narrative, the unity of the story was
compromised and the text no longer earned a unified narrative.
81
Frei, The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative, 2.
82
Ibid., 29.
83
Since Frei quotes Auerbach in his study, it even seems that Frei did not see the
difference of emphasis in what Auerbach writes and its implications to understanding the
j
pre-critical mindset. )
•• Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 555.
" Ibid., 73.
86
Ibid., 74.
 )
)
)
314 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS TIAGOARRAIS 315
)
) the importance of the "historical now"; and a second, that follows a timeless notice the presence of several other notions introduced earlier since "[a]ll of
dynamic where current events are already fulfilled in their timeless connection to Augustine endeavors in metaphysics, epistemology, and exegesis coincide with a
) future events highlighting the importance ofthe eternal Divine plan over the present relentless effort to define the functions and limits of human language. " 90 This brief
"historical now." Again, one is caught between two camps with different evaluation might help clarify the dual approach to meaning (from history to text,
)
assumptions. or text to history) found in historical critical and historical grammatical approaches
) Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the ontological direction of pre- to the text, especially the changes made to the historical grammatical approach.
critical figural interpretation, by the late eighteenth century the canonical unity For Augustine "all doctrine concerns either things or signs."91 The word
) "thing" means "that which is part of the real (res) world referred to in the Bible but
supported by the approach was overcome by historical criticism and its divisive
) nature. While in pre-critical times the literal explicative nature of the text was lying outside the Bible itself' that is, "a piece of the outside world identified
identical with historical reference, in the hermeneutical developments of the specifically by a specific word (verbum)."92 The words of Scripture had the role of
) eighteenth century, they were broken apart. 87 a sign pointing to a different reality.93 The question that arises is: what is the nature
) Even so, Ernesti's original intention for the historical grammatical method of a "thing" which signs point to?
implicitly emphasized the role of time and history for the unity of the text and of Some argue that this dichotomy between words and things stem from
God's action in the world according to the reality depicted by the biblical authors Augustine's conception of God and time. Among them is Eugene Vance, who
and frequently seen in the work of Fernando Canale. 88 Auerbach's evaluation of correctly depicts Augustine's view that "even though God created the temporal
) world, God remains eternally present to himself as pure Being beyond time. " 94 So
realism in Scripture provides insight into the context of the Classical ontology of
) Medieval times, a philosophical outlook that often blurs what seems to be the to some extent, for Augustine, the final purpose of the words of Scripture are to
ontological perspective implicit in the work of the biblical authors, that is, ohime, connect the reader with that reality or thing (res) "outside" the world.95 In other
) words, "[t]he words (verba) of Scripture are what takes us into the world of~gs
history, and of Divinity acting and working within it.
) In sum, one ofthe key characteristics ofa pre-critical understanding ofthe text, (res), the real world... where we comprehend (and contemplate) eternal spiritual
a characteristic also seen in the vision for the historical grammatical method in the realities."96 In the end, the words are only a means, a husk,97 pointing forward to,
) work of Ernesti, is that of figuration and typology. Yet in order for the story of or wrapping, the eternal content found in the text.
Scripture to be considered a whole, it must be unified by the element oftime and Historical critics at the turn of the eighteenth century questioned the
) plausibility of the premise of eternal truth existing within the text, the "thing" (res)
progression. As seen above, even in this question scholars are divided between
) those who understand figuration and typology in a temporal chronological sense, or reality which the text pointed to ceased to be this eternal revealed truth in the text
and those who understand it more as a Divine timeless plan. (in pre-critical times), and passed on to be the historical process behind the
) formation of the text. Revelation took place in an event in the past, the text only
) Verba, Res, Sensus: The Text and Truth
Besides the concepts offiguration, typology, and time, a second point that must
i ) help the reader grasp how the historical critical and grammatical methodologies understand
receive attention at this stage is the significance of the interrelation of words the flow of meaning in the text.
) (verba), things (res), and sense (sensus) in hermeneutics, a notion that can be traced 90
Eugene Vance, Mervelous Signals: Poetics and Sign Theory in the Middle Ages
as far back as Augustine De Doctrina Cristiana. 89 In this issue it is possible to (Lincoln, NE: University ofNebraska Press, 1986), 34.
) 91
"Omnis doctrina vel rerum est vel signorum in Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana,
87
Frei, The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative, 28. 1.2.
) 88 92
Sailhamer, The Meaning ofthe Pentateuch, 74.
Much if not all ofthe work of Fernando L. Canale flows from this basic assumption: 93
that the ontological premises ofthe biblical authors are radically different from the premises This basic idea influences his own understanding ofthe "real meaning" ofa particular
that shaped Christian theology. For more on his basic understanding on these issues see: text. See Van Fleteren, Augustine: Biblical Exegete, 10. Fleteren pinpoints at least four
,) Canale, A Criticism ofTheological Reason. spheres in which Augustine articulates these meanings: historical, aetiological, analogical,
, •I
'
9
For a thorough analysis of Augustine's hermeneutic and its relation to critical and allegorical, all carrying a perspective that the text is a sign, pointing to different things.
) methodology see: Augustine A. Gilmore, "Augustine and the Critical Method," Harvard
94
Vance, Mervelous Signals, 35.
95
Theological Review 39, No. 2 (April, 1946): 141-163. This section does not intend to In relation to Augustine's hermeneutic, Vance writes: "Augustine believed that the
) meaning of Scripture is strictly autonomous- independent ofthe temporal, verbal signs by
provide a thorough investigation ofAugustine hermeneutic for several reasons, among them
is the fact that because his material on hermeneutics is so extensive "study of his techniques which it is expressed, and such temporal meaning must be grasped by the reader in a direct
) process of illumination from within." See Vance, Mervelous Signals, 41.
can lead us into intellectual quagmire." In Frederick Van Fleteren, and Joseph C. 96
_) Schnaubelt, Augustine: Biblical Exegete ~ew York, NY: Peter Lang, 2001 ), 2. At this stage Sailhamer, The Meaning of the Pentateuch, 76.
91
I will focus primarily on Augustine's dichotomy between words and things since they might For the analogy of the text as a husk see Leithart, Deep Exegesis, 1-34.
)
.)

316 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS
testifies to this event but does not contain revelation.98 The text continued to be a
vessel in which truth was communicated, but the truth was behind the text, not in
it, in the subjective experience of the author and in its effect upon the reader who
fits himselfi'herselfwithin the same reconstructed story line.
As for historical grammarians, they attempted to maintain the eternal content
of the text (via Augustine), while at the same time sustaining the fact that the text
was only a wrapping in which the eternal content was to be uncovered. The reality
(res) of which the words were signs was found within the text, making the words,
mere signs to be disposed of once the meaning was reached. 99
Interestingly, regarding both approaches to the text, the Platonic dichotomy
between words and things seen in Augustine's work (an understanding that can be
traced through Spinoza to Kant) remains intact at an ontological level. Both
historical critics and historical grammarians exercise their differences under this
A ugustinian, and consequently Platonic, umbrella. The risk of an uncritical use of
the historical grammatical method is just this: that the interpreter ends up
unconsciously resorting to a bermeneutical framework that flows from Platonic
ontology. 100
In sum, the distinction between words and things that have shaped
hermeneutical discussions for centuries, prevalent in the historical critical and
historical grammatical approaches, are fundamentally tied to ontological
commitments. Although both approaches to the text differ in practical priorities, the
macro-hermeneutical structure remains the same.
Summary and Thoughts on the Way Ahead
This essay attempted to summarize in broad strokes the origin and intention of
the historical grammatical method in the historical context of the seventeenth and
98
Canale traces this subjective reality to the influence of Schleiermacher upon the
formulation of the historical critical methodology affirming that the "historical-critical
methodology of exegesis necessarily implies the encounter theory of revelation, and the
artistic view of inspiration." See Canale, The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology,
169.
99
This way, in both the historical and the ontological levels, the importance ofthe text
for historical critics is partial since at the historical level the biblical authors used the text
and its historiographical import to convey an earlier message, and at the ontological level
the text is only a vessel carrying an ethical religious message relevant only at the time of its
composition.
100
This evaluation might vary if the interpreter does not resort to classical ontology
when using the historical grammatical methodology. Even so, because ofthe volatile nature
of the method, it seems that its use might tum out to be problematic. Angel M. Rodriguez
has pointed out the problematic implications of a modified version of the historical critical
method. See Angel M. Rodriguez, "The Use of the Modified Version of the Historical-
Critical Approach by Adventist Scholars," in George W. Reid, Ed. Understanding Scripture:
An Adventist Approach, Biblical Research Institute Studies, Vol. 1 (Hagerstown, MD:
Review and Herald Publishing Association, 2006), 339-351. Perhaps the same should be said
of the historical grammatical method and any of its modified versions.
)
)
TIAGO AR.RAIS 317
)
eighteenth century, along with some of the macro-hermeneutical premises it
inherently carries. In this analysis, some important issues that relate to biblical )
interpretation emerged and the purpose of this summary is to lay them out for the
reader. It is also important to recognize that because the analysis of the historical
grammatical method in this study was limited to a particular period, the summary
here is partial and is not intended to cover or even resolve all issues that the method
)
brings forth. Through this study I attempted to look into one ofthe windows in the
edifice that is the historical grammatical metl?-od, so the points below represent a )
partial yet important evaluation of the method, organized with the intent to
stimulate reflection and debate: )
( 1) The Historical Grammatical Method and SDA Interpretation - One of the )
basic conclusions one arrives at after this analysis is that the historical grammatical
method has undergone so much development and debate that it is theoretically and
practically different from what it was originally intended by Emesti. Since the first
translation ofErnesti's work the method has and is still used as a vessel to carry the
assumptions of the interpreter under the banner ofconservati ve exegesis. To use the
method overlooking the issues pointed out in this paper creates a series ofrisks. In
SDA interpretation, the uncritical use of the historical grammatical method can
prove to be problematic since the method can assume an ontological framework that
the SDA church implicitly denies. Perhaps the volatile use of the method is one of
the reasons why the outcome of its implementation is varied and unclear. This J
requires a radical reassessment of the assumptions guiding the usage of such a
method in order for it to be utilized in a clear manner.
)
To face the next century of biblical interpretation the SDA church should
engage these foundational issues present within any methodology, or seek other
interpretative alternatives instead of a reliance on, or superficial use of, the
historical grammatical method. Interpreters should strive to wrestle with the issues )
raised in this study in order to approach a deeper and clearer understanding ofhow
to interpret the biblical text in light of the hermeneutical developments that have
risen since the eighteenth century.
(2) The Concept of History - This study also pointed to the frequent
interpretation and use of the concept of history in interpretative traditions. The )
concept of history is a crucial issue. Both historical critical and historical
grammatical approaches to the text understand history in a modernistic sense that )
must be overcome by close attention to the biblical understanding of history. The )
challenge here is to develop a thorough biblical understanding of history that goes
beyond the level of prophetic interpretation, since it is mainly at this level that the
SDA church places some emphasis on history due to the historicist approach to
prophetic interpretation.
(3) The Significance o fLanguage - Another issue that appeared throughout this
study is that of language. The SDA church places the biblical text at the center of
its hermeneutical efforts to uncover its meaning, and because of this, the issue of )
language cannot be ignored. How are interpreters to understand how language
functions in the text? Is it possible to trace, within the biblical text, an implicit
philosophy of language? Since Scripture begins with the creative power and
.)
' )
,-
)
)
)
318 INFLUENCE OF MACRO-HERMENEUTICAL ASSUMPTIONS TIAGOARRA!S 319
)
) potentiality of the Word, it seems that there is a rich landscape that is still hermeneutical movement as an approach toward the text rather than a method
unexplored. proper would be best.
) (4) The Locus ofMeaning - part ofthis study highlighted how both critical and When the pages of Scripture are opened, the interpreter is confronted with a
) grammatical approaches vary on the direction of meaning in the text (from text to canonical corpus that contains revelation, wisdom, and truth. A right methodology
history or from history to text) yet remain under the influence of Augustinian alone is good and useful, but without this particular mindset and posture, it will
) ontology. How can interpreters articulate a conception of the textual meaning only prove to be unfruitful in the different spheres of life. Faith cannot "tum into
102
outside of Augustinian ontology and the dichotomy between words and things? method." Wisdom and truth reside beyond the boundaries ofpositivism. The fear
j
Much has been written about SDA biblical hermeneutics yet these issues have of the Lord precedes and creates the condition for the striving toward a new
) rarely been explicitly dealt with. The challenge here is to establish a view of approach. Yet to settle for the historical grammatical method, or even a new
biblical meaning that gives priority to the text, but that does not ignore the methodology proper, is to methodologically isolate the individual from what is done
) implications ofa temporal ontology (articulated in the work of Fernando Canale) to the text (the method can be applied with results without the spiritual/moral
) upon the writing of the text, the formulation of the canon, etc. Also, one must keep condition of the interpreter), and it is this temptation that a new generation of
in mind that the historical grammatical method places little or no focus on the interpreters must industriously resist.
) reader. Other papers in this volume explore the significance of the reader in the
uncovering of the meaning of a biblical text. 101 Again, to settle for the historical Tiago Arrais (PhD) teaches Hebrew Bible and Philosophy at the Adventist University of
) Sao Paulo, Brazil (UNASP-EC). He is married to Paula and the father of Benjamin and
grammatical method implies a neglect toward these important interpretative
Joana.
) dimensions.
(5) The Necessity of a New Method - As I conclude this essay I must write a
) few words on the necessity of a new method. Is a new method of interpretation
) necessary? What I believe should be proposed at this stage, and I write this with the
intent to seek a more balanced interpretative framework for the church, instead of
t·) a new method, what is needed foremost is a new mindset, an interpretative posture
before the text. It is important to consider the issues mentioned above (and others
I)' that might appear) with the intent to critique and revise them through that which is
I •.
portrayed by the biblical text, as in a hermeneutical spiral. But at the same time, a
1:J posture is required before the text. A posture that cannot be outlined
j methodologically. One that is not neglectful of the importance offaith and its threat
) to scientific positivism, that does not bypass the life and morality of the interpreter,
and that is dependent upon the aid and supervision of the Spirit in the process of an
) interpretation that leads to action. Biblical interpretation must be, and truly begins
·' as, a posture before the text before any methodology proper can emerge.
I
' As the SDA church faces the future, serious reflection must be given to these
,) questions. Scripture is not a compendium of books to be perused through a
positivistic approach that intends to uncover all its truths through the rigorous
l. , j . application of a "right" methodology. If this were so, the issue of authority and the
'
. ) ordination of women mentioned in the beginning of this study would have been
~) settled with some consensus. To strive for the development of a methodology that
gives priority to the textual depictions of reality is important. But perhaps the

t)t- significance of this hermeneutical effort is found more in the movement toward it
rather than in the arrival at it. There is life in movement. Perhaps expressing this
I )
I)
101 102
) See, for instance, Kenneth Bergland, "Reading as a Disclosure of the Thoughts of Gerhard Hase!, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, Fourth
the Heart." Edition (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdrnans, 1995), 201.
;>
V
l?·

Scripture Authorizing Doctrine:
A Case Study from the
Epistle to the Hebrews
Kessia Reyne Bennett
Introduction
Fernando Canale's life work has been one of continual exhortation to recover
Scripture as the definitively authoritative resource in theology. For him, the sola
Scriptura principle has radical implications for Christian thinking and doing, from
primordial presuppositions to liturgical expression. So too should the doctrine of
Scripture be formulated from evidence provided in and by Scripture itself. This
1 .J
essay examines how the New Testament epistle ofHebrews uses the Old Testament
to authorize its doctrine of Christ's high priestly ministry in the order of
Melchizedek. Through study of this biblical example we may see an inspired use
of Scripture and gain insight into the theological reasoning operative in Scripture
itself, as well as a practical lesson in how to read and use the texts of Scripture. It
is my hope that this present essay, modest as it is, may emich our understanding
and appreciation of sola Scriptura as a principle of theology and thereby advance
the efforts of my esteemed professor, Fernando Canale, the one who imparted to me
a compelling vision of Adventist theology. This paper is presented with my
appreciation in his honor.
The Research Question
The use of the OT in the NT is not a new field of inquiry. It has long held the
interest of biblical scholars, particularly those concerned with issues of
hermeneutics, and dozens of books and articles have been produced on the topic.
Since the use of the Old Testament is essential to the book of Hebrews (George
Guthrie calls it "the book's bone and marrow" ),2 it has occupied a place of special
attention in the scholarly world. These studies of the OT in Hebrews, and in the
Melchizedek passages in particular, have focused almost exclusively on the
1 Canale maintains that for a proper understanding of Scripture we must account for
both the Bible's view of itself as well as the phenomena of Scripture, which he defines as
"the characteristics of Scripture as a written work and . . . its entire content." "The
Revelation and Inspiration of Scripture in Adventist Theology, Part l ," Andrews University
Seminary Studies 45, no. 2 (Autumn 2007): 201. Scripture's use of Scripture stands at the
intersection ofthese two lines of evidence: the Bible as a text and the Bible's self-testimony.
2 George H. Guthrie, "Hebrews' Use of the Old Testament: Recent Trends in
Research," CBR 1 (2003): 271-294.
)
321 )
SCRIPTURE AUTHORIZING DOCTRINE
)
exegesis employed therein, often with an aim to compare them with contemporary
3 j
standards.
The present study is of a different sort. My primary question is not How did the )
author exegete the Old Testament? but How does the author use the Old Testament
to authorize his claims? Questions of OT exegesis are not here my central concern. )
Instead, I am most interested in how the author of Hebrews used the conclusions
)
he drew about the OT texts in order to support his argument about Jesus as a high
priest in the order ofMelchizedek.4 My focus is on the use of the exegetical fruit, )
not the exegesis itself.
This type ofinvestigation into how Hebrews uses the OT Scripture to authorize )
its claims is relevant to theological concerns regarding the authority of Scripture. J
As we better understand how the inspired NT author of Hebrews understood and
used Scripture we gain helpful insight into how we can or should understand and J
use Scripture as an authority in matters of doctrine.
The Method )
Those who ask questions about use and authorization are committing
themselves to the analysis of reasoning and are undertaking a study in )
argumentation. In arguments such as those found in the epistle ofHebrews practical
reasoning is used, not formal demonstrations oflogic. The arguments in Hebrews,
even those that are distinctly cognitive, are far from mathematical proofs. They )
remain pastoral efforts to convince an audience, efforts embedded in an occasional
)
' E.g., George B. Caird, "The Exegetical Method of the Epistle to the Hebrews,"
Canadian Journal ofTheology, 5 no. 1 (Jan 1959): 44-51; Dale F. Leschert, Hermeneutical
Foundations ofHebrews: A Study in the Validity ofthe Epistle's Interpretation ofSome Core
Citations from the Psalms (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1994); Simon K.istemaker, The _)
Psalm Citations in the Epistle to the Hebrews (Amsterdam: Wed. G. Van Soest, 1961);
Graham Hughes, Hebrews and Hermeneutics: The Epistle to the Hebrews as a New .)
Testament Example of Biblical Interpretation, SNTSMS 36 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1979).
4 By focusing on the Old Testament as used by Hebrews this approach to the text is able
to go some distance in sorting out the exegesis of the author and the rhetoric of the author.
Reliant as they are on the text of Hebrews as the only source of information on how the .)
author exegeted Scripture, far too many scholars conflate to the point of confusion the
interpretive method and the argumentative method. It makes sense that they would largely J
overlap, of course, but they are not necessarily one and the same. Writers and orators often
use some strategy in presenting their arguments that was not a part of corning to their own
discovery process. Dale Leschert remarks that "sometimes the writer ofHebrews so closely
intertwines exegesis and application in his exposition that it is difficult to distinguish them
from each other (e.g., Heb. 2:5-9). At times he only gives the application ofhis text, and the
unwritten exegesis remains in his head (e.g., Heb. 1:8, 9)" (Leschert, 255). The writer of
Hebrews holds this in common with most other hornileticians. To be sure, the presenter is )
rightly believed actually to hold those conclusions that he or she uses in presentation, but
the fact remains that the presentation cannot take us all the way back to the presenter's own J
hermeneutical principles or process of discovery. So in Hebrews: as readers we see the fruit
of the author's exegesis but not always the reasoning behind it.
j
)
)
)
)
322 KESSIA REYNE BENNETT SCRIPTURE AUTHORIZING DOCTRINE 323
)
) presentation. They must, therefore, be examined according to their nature as model distinguishes between several elements in an argument in order to
arguments. 5 demonstrate their relations. 1°First, there is "the claim or conclusion whose merits
) This concern with argumentation and persuasion begets attention to the study we are seeking to establish (C) and the facts we appeal to as a foundation for the
ofrhetoric. More than verbal flourish, rhetoric is argumentation.6 Biblical scholars claim-what I shall refer to as our data (D)." 11 As an example, (C): Sheila is a
)
have embraced rhetorical criticism, most often by using information on classical citizen of the United States of America, and (D): Sheila was born in the United
) ideas and methods of rhetoric to illuminate the strategies and historical situations States of America. The claim about Sheila's citizenship is backed up by data from
of the New Testament letters, sermons, and gospels. This study is of a different her history.
) To help make the connection between the claim and the data more visible,
kind, however; it uses a twentieth-century model to understand a first-century text.
) Is this nai:ve anachronism? It would certainly seem safer to remain in the ancient consider Mike. (C): Mike's nationality is Dutch. The claim is straightforward, but
context. 7 not self-evident. We need something to go on in order to be convinced. We are
) Just as all arguments share in common the use of speech and the goal to affect offered (D): Mike was born in Aruba. For many listeners the question is
an audience, so all arguments share a basic structure, not "ironclad rules of immediately raised: What makes D evidence for C? That bridge between data and
)
universal logic,"8 but a deep structure of making claims and offering evidence. claim is the warrant, r,N): People born in Aruba are citizens ofthe Kingdom of the
Anything that can be rightly called an argwnent contains claims, evidence, and Netherlands and their nationality is Dutch. The warrant, you could say, legitimizes
some relationship between claims and evidence. Therefore we can expect that a the data to be used in support of the claim. If the presenter thinks that the warrant
) itselfrequires additional support, she may provide backing, (B): "other assurances,
look at claims, evidence, and the connections between them will be relevant in the
) study of any argument, no matter the century. Aware ofthe danger of anachronism, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor
I attempt to be cautious in the application of this method, even as I find that the currency." 12 Pertinent laws and statutes would provide backing for such a warrant.
) features common to all arguments provide justification for using a modem method Toulmin pictorializes the relation between these four elements thus:
) of analysis on an ancient text.
For such an analysis I am using, with some modification, the method set forth D-----So,C
) by Stephen Toulmin in his landmark work The Uses of Argument. 9 Toulrnin's I
I
5
Since
Chaim Perelman's The Realm of Rhetoric is a convincing effort to make just these w
) claims about informal argumentation and other insights into the task concerning the concept
ofreasonableness and the influential role of audiences. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University I
j ofNotre Dame, 1982). On account of
6
Burton L. Mack, Rhetoric and the New Testament (Minneapolis: Fortress, I 990), 15- B
)
20. Mack sees the modern understanding ofrhetoric as argumentation and the subsequent
) interest in the rhetoric of"every human exchange involving speech" as originating in Chaim However, to economize space and to emphasize the role of the warrant as the link
\
Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation between the claim and the dattim, I will be listing the elements as follows:
j (Notre Dame: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1969); originally published in 1958 as La
Nouvelle Rhetorique: Traite de L 'argumentation.
) 7
Ben Witherington III states plainly his focus on the ancient context: "[W)hen I use the
) term 'rhetoric' I am referring to the ancient art of persuasion used from the time of Aristotle
onwards through and beyond the NT era in the Greek-speaking world to convince an
) audience or another about something." New Testament Rhetoric: An Introductory Guide to theologian David Kelsey to analyze the uses of Scripture in modem theology for the
the Art ofPersuasion in and of the New Testament (Eugene, Ore.: Cascade Books, 2009), authorization of doctrine. Thus it has been put to use in both areas of our present
) ix. He is interested only in "the sort ofrhetoric that existed and could have been used by the consideration. See: Lauri Thuren, Argument and Theology in 1 Peter: The Origins of
writers ofthe New Testament-early Jewish rhetoric and Greco-Roman rhetoric. The reason Christian Paraenesis, Journal for the Study of the New Testament Supplement Series 114
) for this limitation is simple--it avoids most of the dangers of anachronism." Letters and (Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic, 1995), and The Rhetorical Strategy of 1 Peter
Homilies to Jewish Christians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on Hebrews, James, and (Abo, Finland: Abo Academy Press, 1990); David Kelsey, Proving Doctrine: The Uses of
) Scripture in Modern Theology (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1999).
Jude (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2007), 12.
) ' Witherington, New Testament Rhetoric, 17.
1
°For simplicity's sake I will be using four (C, D, W, and B) of his six elements (the
9
Stephen Edelston Toulmin, The Uses ofArgument (Cambridge: Cambridge University others are Q, qualification; and R, rebuttal). Toulmin, 97.
11
) Press, 2003). Originally published in 1958. Toulmin's scheme for diagramming arguments Ibid., 90.
12
has been used by, among others, biblical scholar Lauri Thuren to analyze I Peter and Ibid., 96.
)
)

324 KESSIA REYNE BENNETT
C: Mike's nationality is Dutch.
W : People born in Aruba are citizens of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands and their nationality is Dutch.
B: The laws governing citizenship and nationality of those born
in Aruba say ...
D: Mike was born in Aruba.
In applying this method to Hebrews and to the Melchizedek passages in
particular, let it be noted that I am not aiming to validate the author ofHebrews's
moves or to critique his argumentation, but to understand them. Because the
concept of authorization is the one under consideration, it is imperative that we see
the structure of the argument so that we might perceive how Hebrews is using OT
texts to authorize claims. The interrelatedness of the parts is of paramount
importance in this investigation and analyzing the anatomy of Hebrews'
argumentation is key for seeing those relations in action.
The concept of authorization is key here, of course. In an argument,
authorization is for the purpose ofpersuasion; that is, the speaker seeks to authorize
the argument to the audience. Any part of the anatomy of an argument that is
offered to support a claim is an authorization strategy of the presenter to the
audience. Using our truncated version ofToulmin's diagraming, then, any datum,
warrant, or backing is functioning in an authorizing role. So above, the location of
Mike's birth and the rules about nationality are serving to authorize the claim about
Mike's nationality. In contrast, the claim that "Mike's nationality is Dutch" would
not be functioning in an authorizing capacity, unless that claim itself was used as
a datum, warrant, or backing to support some other claim. In reading Hebrews on
Jesus and Melchizedek, the guiding question of this research is How does the
author use the Old Testament to authorize his claims? Therefore the analysis of
argumentation proposed below is particularly interested in seeing where Scripture
is being used as data, warrants, and backing; these instances are indicated by the
use of bold typeface in the tables below.
I approached the argument regarding Jesus and Melchizedek in the order in
which it is presented in Hebrews and I analyze the sub-arguments within four
smaller units: 5:1-10, 6:19-7:10, 7:11-19, 7:20-28. These divisions are somewhat
artificial, especially in Hebrews 7, reflecting as they do my own analysis of the
author's unbroken argument. Each table below indicates from which unit the
argument under analysis was taken, although input from other units is sometimes
included to reflect the larger argument being made. I strove to include every idea
that the writer of Hebrews explicitly uses; statements in italicized type indicate
those that I have provided as my educated supposition ofhow the writer is building
his argument.
)
)
SCRIPTURE AUTHORIZING DOCTRINE 325
Examining the Argument
Hebrews 5:1-10
Although mention of Melchizedek is not made until chapter 5, Jesus' high
)
priestly ministry is alluded to in 1:3 ("having made purification for sins"), and
spoken of in 2: 17 ("a merciful and faithful high priest") and also 4: 14-16 (a sinless )
and sympathetic high priest). These qualities of Jesus as a high priest minister are
the first to be developed in chapter 5, flowing seamlessly from 4: 14-16. )
In 5: 1-3, the author ofHebrews moves his gaze from Jesus temporarily in order )
to establish two qualities of the earthly, Levitical high priests: they are sympathetic,
able to deal gently with the ignorant and straying, and they are beset by weakness )
and sin (tables 1 and 2). After explaining that the high priest is able to be gentle
because he too is weak (v. 2), the author of Hebrews explicitly uses that weakness
as an explanation for the need of the high priest to sacrifice for his own sins (kai
di 'auten [astheneian] opheilei . .. peri autou prosphereinperi hamartion). Here the
author of Hebrews uses Scripture as data, supporting his claim regarding the
weakness of the high priests. The reference is not a citation, but a general and
indirect reference to the cultic instructions preserved in the Scriptures. The OT law
is both a record of God's instruction and also a revelation of the spiritual reality of
the high priestly obligation to sacrifice for sins, including their own sins.
Of course the contrast is with Jesus who is sympathetic because he too was
made weak "just as we are-but without sin" (4:15). The verses of Hebrews 5:1-3
looks back to the Son who was "made a little lower than the angels" (2:9), "made
)
like his brothers in every way" (2: 17), and "able to help those who are tempted"
precisely because he himself suffered under temptation (2: 18). They also look
ahead to 5:7-10 where Jesus' perfection through suffering and eventual, high
priestly exaltation are effected, and they point far ahead to 7:27-28 where he will
make explicit this contrast between earthly high priests and our heavenly high
priest.
TABLE 1
C: The high priest is able to deal gently with the ignorant and
straying.
W: Similarity in experience creates sympathy.
D: The high priest is subject to weakness just as the people are
subject to weakness.
TABLE2
C : The high priest is subject to weakness just as the people are
subject to weakness. )
W: The need for offering sacrifices for one's sin indicates ,)
weakness.
_)
.J
.J
 J "'1f°"•c .
)
)
) 326 KESSIA REYNE B ENNETT
)
D: The high priest has to offer sacrifice for his own sins as
) well as for the sins of the people.
) In 5:4-6, the glory of the priesthood is bestowed on Christ as God speaks to
him and proclaims his sonship and priesthood. Here, too, Scripture is referenced
indirectly, but this time as a warrant for the claim that Jesus is a valid high priest
j (table 3). In this instance Scripture preserves the historical account and provides for
the author (and, he presumes, his readers) the "common sense" concept that true
high priests do not choose themselves, but they are called by God.
) TABLE3
) C : Jesus is a valid high priest.
) W: Valid high priests are those called by God. No on e takes
this honor upon himself. He must be called by God.
) D: Jesus did not take this honor upon himself. God designated
) Jesus as high priest.
) After a digression, Hebrews resumes the discussion of Jesus' high priestly
Table 4 shows how the writer defends the designation by God of Jesus as a
) high priest; at one level ofthe argument it is a claim, on another level it is evidence.
He provides some support for the idea that "God designated J esus as high priest"
) by citing Scripture directly, this time as revelation of divine history. 13 The warrant
) could be that God's pronouncements effect the reality they pronounce, thus sealing
Jesus' sonship and priesthood at the time of the pronouncement and not before.
) Alternatively, it could be that the warrant is b etter stated to say that God's
) pronouncements recognize the realities and reveal them at the time ofhis speaking.
The inclusion of "today I have become your father" strongly favors the former.
) What we do not see is the author of Hebrews taking Ps 2:7 or 110:4 as claims
that require evidence in order to show that they are referencing Jesus. There are no
\
I
data given to convince the audience that these are messianic psalms or that God is
the speaker.
I from different fields of reasoning- lexical logic, blood logic, cultic logic-the
)
,,
>
TABLE4
C: God designated Jesus as high priest.
W : God's pronouncements effect the reality they pronounce.
) "forever" argument is indicated by the frequency with which this characteristic
D : God said to Jesus, "You are my Son ... " and "You are a
) priest forever in the order of Melchizedek."
) conviction that has clearly come from a reading of Ps 110. He does believe that
Hebrews 5 :7-10 is the pivot point. Here the argument turns from the emphasis
on Jesus as the suffering, sympathetic high priest to the powerful, exalted, and great
high priest. He does this by bringing both aspects of the true high priesthood
) together: Jesus struggled and suffered and learned (table 5) and was then perfected
13
) By "divine history" I mean those happenings which occur within the Trinity.
SCRIPTURE AUTHORlZING D OCTRINE 327
and made high priest in the order ofMelchizedek. So for these two reasons Jesus
is a valid high priest (tables 3 and 6): he is human, sympathetic, and called by God.
TABLES
C : Jesus is sympathetic with people.
W: Similarity in experience creates sympathy.
D: Jesus had a similar experience as people have: Jesus struggled
and suffered and learned.
TABLE6
C: Jesus is qualified to be high priest.
W: Sympathy is a qualification for high priesthood.
D: Jesus is sympathetic with people.
Hebrews 6:19-7:10
ministry at the end of chapter 6 to capstone a soaring section on the certainty oftlie
Christian hope, a hope anchored in the Most Holy Place in the person ofJesus, our
"high priest forever in the order of Melchizedek." The phraseology of Ps 110:4
rings out through these chapters as a refrain; the author returns to these words in
part or in whole multiple times as he makes his argument about the quality ofJesus'
high priesthood. As Attridge describes it, "[T]he homilist must ground his claim
that Christ is indeed a 'high priest"' and " Ps. 110:4 is the linchpin to the
argument." This psalm provides "leverage for the conceptual claims that undergird
the text's Christology." 14
These repeated references to Ps 110 are accompanied by references to the brief
history ofMelchizedek recorded in Gen 14:18-20. In a series of moves generated
author of Hebrews strives to explain what "the order ofMelchizedek" is all about.
The arguments of6:19-7:3 are examined in tables 7 and 8. In these few verses
the author appears to be supporting two claims, one major claim and another
implicit claim that he does not see to completion. The first and major claim is that
Melchizedek remains a priest forever (table 7). The primacy in this section of the
receives mention: 6:19; 7:3, 16, 17, 21, 23-24, 28. This is the eminent quality ofthe
priesthood of the Melchizedek order in the mind of the author to the Hebrews, a
Melchizedek is "declared to be living" (7:8), which is certainly something more
than he can extract from Gen 14. However, he is not content to rely on the insight
14
Harold W. Attridge, "The Psalms in Hebrews," in The Psalms in the New Testam ent,
ed. Steve Moyise and Maarten J. J. Menken (London: T&T Clark, 2004): 198, 199.
 )
)
)
328 KESSIA REYNE B ENNETT SCRIPTURE A UTHORIZING D OCTRINE 329

and wording of the psalmist but uses the original Genesis account ofMelchizedek
to make the same point.
As indicated in table 7, the author of Hebrews is using Scripture to authorize
his claim about Melchizedek's forever priesthood, but just how he does it-his
warrant and especially his understanding ofhow Scripture communicates-remains
opaque. Is he perhaps convinced by the psalm but using the silence of Scripture for
the purposes of persuasive effect? Or does he hold a more mystical view of his
Bible, reading positive statements in the negative space? 15
TABLE 7
C: Melchizedek remains a priest forever.
W: Priests continue in their office until death.
D: Melchizedek has no recorded parentage, genealogy, birth,
or death.
W: The meaning of one 's name reflects the reality of their
existence/being.
D: Melchizedek's name means "King of Righteousness" and he
is "King of Peace."
)
)
In Heb 7 :4-10, the second half of this section on the quality of the order of
Melchizedek, the homilist returns yet again to the brief history in Gen 14, this time
)
to show the greatness ofMelchizedek in relation to Abraham and thus to show the
superiority ofthe Melchizedek order above the Levitical order in preparation for the )
following pericope. Three times in these four sub-arguments, the writer relies on
Scripture to provide the data authorizing the claims, and all three times he is relying
on it as a record of history (tables 9-12). He construes the narrative of Genesis as
a reliable record of past events and sees within that history itself a spiritual
significance, perhaps even God arranging history as a spiritual lesson. )

TABLE9
Compounding the mystery is v. 2, the literal translation ofMelchizedek's name
and title. The author does not use this data later so we are left to wonder what his C: Melchizedek is great, greater than Abraham. )
intentions were. The double mention of Melchizedek 's kingship does resonate W: The lesser pays a tithe to the greater. )
loudly with the entirety of Ps 110, however. Perhaps the author saw some D: Abraham paid a tithe to Melchizedek.
connection between that king figure spoken of in a Davidic psalm that the early )
church had already accepted as messianic, and the mysterious priest figure TABLE 10 )
Melchizedek who carried the name and title of king. This then could have been
C: Melchizedek is greater than Abraham.
what he meant in v. 3: "being made like the Son of God." Ifso, then kingship is part
ofwhat it means to be made a high priest in the order ofMelchizedek. And indeed, W: Without doubt the lesser person is blessed by the greater.
ii
a priestly and kingly Jesus would fit right at home in the epistle ofHebrews. 16 Table D: Melchizedek blessed Abraham.
8 draws out one such reading.
The blood and body logic that the author of Hebrews employs in this section
TABLE 8. has confounded commentators who wonder at his claim about Levi paying a tithe )
C: Melchizedek is a messianic king figure. through Abraham to Melchizedek, a claim which is set forth to show the greatness
of the Melchizedek order over the Levitical order (tables 11 and 12). What bears
noticing is that this argument comes just before the pericope on the question of
" Research into the conventions and influences active at the time of the epistle's
composition is a very fiuitful undertaking to better understand the exegetical practices, logic,
Levitical lineage. Whereas in that argument the focus is descent ("from the body
and rhetoric of the author, and helps to illuminate such questions as listed above. of," so to speak), in this section the focus is origin ("in the body of," so to speak).
Commentators vary in their ideas about those influences (Platonism? Second Temple pesher While this does not solve the puzzle of what (or to what extent) the author of
exegesis?) and their extent of influence on this work. Hebrews means what he says about Levi paying tithes through Abraham, it does
16
Other commentators see this connection as well. E.g., George Wesley Buchanan says, show that this section nicely sets up the next section to develop the argument.
'The author of Hebrews was happy to be able to interpret 'Melchizedek, king of Salem' as )
'king of righteousness' and 'king of peace,' since the Messiah was expected to rule justly TABLE 11
and to establish peace (Isa 9:5-6; 32:17; Jer 23:5-6; 33:15; Dan 9:24; Zech 9: 1-10; Mal
C: Melchizedek is greater than Levi.
4:2)." To the Hebrews: Translation, Comment and Conclusions, (AB 36; New York:
Doubleday, 1972), 118-1 19. Steven Nordgaard Svendsen also notes the messianic overtones W: The lesser pays a title to the greater.
of this kingly association, and notes that Hebrews has a lready (in l :8b-9a) tied "Jesus' D: Levi paid a tithe to Melchizedek through Abraham.
kingship (through the quotation of Psalm 45[44):7b-8a) with his love for righteousness."
Allegory Transformed: The Appropriation of Philonic Hermeneutics in the Letter to the
Hebrews, (WUNT 2/269; Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 146, 146n64.

)
 )

)
330 KESSIA REYNE BENNETT SCRIPTURE AUTHORIZING DOCTRINE 331
)
TABLE 14
) TABLE 12
C: Levi paid a tithe to Melchizedek through Abraham. C: After the establishment ofthe Levitical priesthood and law,
) there was still need for another priest to come, one in another
W: Ancestors can perform actions on behalf of their
) descendants. order.
D: Abraham paid a tithe to Melchizedek when Levi was still W: Later revelation controls previous revelation.
) D: After the establishment of the Levitical priesthood and
in the body of Abraham.
) law, God said, "You are a priest forever according to the
Hebrews 7:11-19 order ofMelchizedek."
)
Chapter 7, verse 11 begins the section on the incompleteness of the Levitical
) law and the better ministry in Christ, an idea the author carries past chapter 7 TABLE 15
regarding Melchizedek and into chapters 8-10 regarding the superior covenant and C: The Levitical law and Levitical priesthood are inseparable.
)
superior sacrifice. In just this one verse he exposes the inadequacy of the Levitical W: Every kind ofpriesthood requires its own kind of law.
,) priesthood and law (table 13) and establishes that God has been planning to replace D: The Levitical law was given to the people on the basis of
it (table 14). Not to be overlooked is the claim that the Levitical law and Levitical the Levitical priesthood.
) priesthood are inseparable such that to replace one is to replace the other (table 15).
) This claim will play crucially in the next section, backing a warrant.
With the expectation ofanother, non-Aaronic priesthood established, the author
Scripture is used in two places and in two ways in this verse. First, in saying
) steers the argument back to Jesus and resolves any worries about a Judahite high
that the law was given to the people on the basis of the Levitical priesthood,
priest (tables 16-19). Jesus has appeared as a high priest in the order of
j Scripture is brought to bear indirectly, through the author's inference. 17 Again,
Melchizedek and that high priestly order does not rely on ancestry but on the power
notice how he turns to history recorded in Scripture for spiritual insight (table 15).
of life indestructible. Since, as was established in 7: 11, the laws that regulated the
) The second way that Scripture is used in this verse is shown in table 14. Verse 11
Levitical priesthood are inseparably bound up together with the Levitical
does not contain another citation of Ps 110:4, but the Hebrews' use of the key
J) priesthood, the appearance of a new high priest entails the appearance of a new
phrase "in the order ofMelchizedek" points to it. The context also makes it clear
basis of priesthood. Appointment to the Levitical order was based on lineage, but
') that his argument here is dependent on the Scripture citation. In this case, he is
appointment to the order of Melchizedek is "on the basis of the power of an
construing Scripture as a revelation of divine history (letting us in on the divine
) indestructible life" (v. 16). In this line ofreasoning, Scripture is used as warrant
operations we would otherwise not perceive), but importantly, he is also construing
(table 19) and as backing (tables 17 and 18) to provide facts about history (even a
) Scripture as an interpreter of earlier Scripture and premising his argument on the
supernatural and revealed history) and about the law.
warrant that later revelation authoritatively interprets previous revelation. Again,
}, we see the power of chronology and history at work in his argument.
TABLE 16
I) C: The former regulation (the Levitical law) has been set
TABLE 13
) C: Perfection could not have been attained through the aside; there has been a change of law.
Levitical priesthood and law. W 1 : Every kind ofpriesthood requires its own law.
) W 2 : When there is a change in the priesthood there must also
W: What is perfect does not need to be replaced (see Heb
,) 8:7). be a change in the law.
D: After the establishment ofthe Levitical priesthood and law, B 2 : The Levitical law and Levitical priesthood are
I ) inseparable.
there was still need for another priest to come, one in another
) order. D: A priest of a different order has appeared.
)
TABLE 17
) "ho laos gar ep 'autes [tes Leuitkes hieri5sunes] nenomothetetai." The prepositional
17

phrase could be translated with a number of English phrases: on the basis of, under, on, at C: Jesus has appeared as high priest in the order of
j the time of. The force ofthe idea, however, remains: the law came tied up together with the Melchizedek.
priesthood.
)
)

332 KESSIA REYNE BENNETT
W: Priests in the order ofM elchizedek are established on the
basis of the power ofan indestructible life.
B : M elchizedek is declared to be living and a priest forever
without end of life.
D: Jesus has become a priest on the basis ofthe power ofan
indestructible life.
TABLE 18
C: Jesus has appeared as a high priest in the order of
Melchizedek.
W: Priests in the order ofMelchizedek are established not on
the basis ofancestry.
B: Melchizedek has no ancestry in the line of Abraham,
Aaron, or Levi.
D: Jesus has become high priest not on the basis ofancestry.
TABLE 19
C: Jesus has become priest not on the basis ofancestry.
W : No Judahite priesthood is mentioned by M oses.
D : Jesus descended from Judah.
Hebrews 7:20-28
The argument in 7:20-22 is that the covenant of Jesus' priesthood is better
because it was accompanied with an oath (table 20), an oath revealed in words of
God to the Son and recorded in Ps 110:4 (table 2 1), that linchpin verse. The oath
in Ps 110 by which Jesus became a high priest seems, again, to be functioning as
an authorizing force by virtue of its nature as revelation of divine history, a window
into the operations of God when God said to Jesus, "You are a priest forever"
(tables 20 and 2 1). Scripture provides not only a record ofhistorical events to which
humans at one point had phenomenal access (as in the exchange between
Melchizedek and Abraham), but also reveals history to which no human would
otherwise have access. This is not to say that the author ofHebrews meant to make
such a distinction; it seems that for him both belong in the realm of real, past action.
The theology of Hebrews is concerned with God's saving acts in history and
Scripture has a vital role in giving us access to that history and spiritual insight
about it.
TABLE20
C: Jesus has become the guarantee of a better covenant.
W: An arrangement ratified with an oath is superior to one
without an oath.
)
)
SCRIPTURE AUTHORIZING D OCTRINE 333
)
D: Jesus became a high priest with an oath while others
became priests without any oath. )
T ABLE21
C : Jesus became a priest with an oath.
W: God's pronouncements effect the reality that they J
pronounce.
D : God said to J esus, " The Lord has sworn and will not
change his mind: 'You are a priest fo rever."' )
As the homilist gives the final movement in his argument regarding Jesus as
a high priest in the order ofMelchizedek, his claims come close to doxology. With
all of the argumentative pieces in place, he draws them all together to reach his
stirring conclusions. Jesus is a superior priest- holy, blameless, pure, separate from
sinners, exalted above the heavens. Jesus is a priest in a superior order with a better
covenant who provides eternal and complete salvation to those who come to God
through him. The Levitical priesthood and its regulating codes are obsolete and
ashen in comparison.
Because Jesus lives forever, his -priesthood is permanent (table 22) and his
salvation is complete (table 23). The law appoints weak high priests, men who must
engage in repeated sacrifices for sin, including for their own sins. In contrast, the
oath procures a superior priest: it "appointed the Son who has been made perfect
forever" (7:28). Therefore, not only is the origin of this covenant superior in that
it was made with an oath, but the result of this covenant is superior in that the oath
has appointed a superior priest.
T ABLE22
C : Jesus has a permanent priesthood. )
W: Priests continue in their office until death. ,)
D: Jesus lives forever.
TABLE23
C: Jesus is able to save completely those who come to God
through him.
W : Salvation is dependent on intercession before God.
D : Jesus lives forever to intercede for those who come to God
through him.
TABLE24
C : Jesus meets our need as a high priest.
)
)
)
)
334 KESSIA REYNE BENNETT SCRIPTURE AUTHORIZING DOCTRINE 335
)
) W: We need a high priest who is holy, blameless, pure, set grounding in the OT to be convincing. Based on the argument that he makes
apart from sinners, exalted above the heavens. regarding the Levitical priesthood, it is fair to suppose that the default setting of
) these Christians was continuity with the Hebrew Scriptures and that any
D: Jesus is holy, blameless, set apart from sinners, exalted
discontinuity needed to be proven from the Scriptures; this is assumed in Hebrews
) above the heavens. as the way that theological reasoning should work. Thus the view of Scripture is
) that it is authoritative, that it is the controlling document for testing doctrines.
TABLE25 Second, where we see the OT being used in the argument, it is sometimes used
) C: The high priesthood ofthe Son is better founded than the as data, sometimes as warrant, sometimes as backing. All three roles can be said to
Levitical priesthood. have authorizing functions in the argument, but their diversity indicates that subtly
)
W: Later revelation controls previous revelation. different conceptions of authority are in play and that the author of Hebrews
) believes Scripture can exercise them all.
D: The oath appointing the Son as high priest came after
Third and similar, even where the OT is being used in different sub-arguments
) the Levitical law appointing Levitical priests. but in the same role (as data, for instance), the author ofHebrews uses it in different
) ways, expecting Scripture to do different things in the argument. 18 It preserves a
TABLE26 record of history so that those of us who were not present with Abraham and
) C: The high priesthood of the Son is superior to the Levitical Melchizedek may have knowledge about it; it reveals something ofthe inner history
) high priesthood. of God, his pronouncements to Jesus, for instance; it interprets earlier revelation,
making sense of and putting in the right light the Scripture that chronologically
W: A once-for-all action is more efficacious than an action
) came before it. It seems clear that the author of Hebrews uses the OT to authorize
that must be endlessly repeated.
his claims in various and diverse ways, and his inspired use shows us that Scripture
) D 1 : The Son made a once-for-all sacrifice. is capable of serving various and diverse functions in doctrinal formulation. 19 In
) D 2 : Levitical high priests need to offer sacrifices day after fact, even these claims about how Scripture functions in these passages of Hebrews
day and also for their own sins. ought to be taken as an "at least" proposal; additional study ofthe NT use ofthe OT
) will reveal even greater richness, variety, and nuance.
We do see Scripture being indirectly used as authorizing data (tables 25 and "Yet in these last days he has spoken in a Son." As mentioned above, the writer
)
26), again as revelation ofdivine history and spiritual realities. What we do not see, ofHebrews assumes a certain Christology and in his argumentation he takes a great
) however, is argumentative work being done to authorize some of the highest many wonderful things for granted, including Jesus' everlasting life and exaltation
Christological claims that the author has synthesized into the Melchizedek beside God in heaven. It is almost an understatement to say that the author, and
) very likely the congregation to whom he was writing, read the Hebrew Bible
priesthood. The claims that Jesus lives forever (7:24), that he is "holy, blameless,
) separate from sinners, exalted above the heavens" (7:26), and that he "has been Christologically. Neglecting to defend some of his grandest Christological claims
made perfect forever" (7:28) are used as data to support other claims but are not suggests that the author of Hebrews is not as interested in demonstrating his
) themselves supported with evidence. Clearly, prior Christological doctrines are hermeneutics as we are to see them demonstrated. He assumes that Ps 110 is
) playing a major role in the construal and use of Scripture as presuppositions about messianic and does nothing to ground, warrant, or back up that idea. Apparently he
reality and how Jesus relates to it. Hebrews makes no apology--or argument-for did not need to. The great Fact of Christ conditioned their understanding of all that
) this. had come before and had been called revelation. What, then, to make of the
) Conclusion 18
In employing Scripture as an authorizing datum or warrant or backing, any hornilist
) The stated research question of this project was How does the author of or scholar is doing so with a certain pre-understanding ofwhat that text is and therefore how
Hebrews use the Old Testament to authorize his claims? To answer that question, it is allowed tofunction. Kelsey was speaking ofmodern theologians, but he could also have
) a modified version of Toulmin's argument analysis was employed to examine been speaking of New Testament writers when he said that "they do not appeal to some
objective text-in-itself but rather to a text construed as a certain kind of whole having a
) Hebrews' argument regarding Jesus as a priest in the order ofMelchizedek. A few certain kind oflogical force." (Proving Doctrine, 14)
conclusions can be made. 19
Obviously, to analyze the text rhetorically and with a focus on doctrinal formulation,
) First, it is evident that Scripture was crucial to the author for making his case. as I have done here, is only one way to read the text. A broader examination would
Whether because of convictions that were his own, which he perceived in his demonstrate that Bible writers, including the writer ofHebrews, did not use earlier Scripture
)
audience, or which they shared, the high priestly ministry ofJesus had to have some solely for the purpose of authorizing arguments.
)
J
L

336 KESSIA REYNE BENNETT
argument regarding the priesthood order ofMelchizedek? Why did he include it?
It appears that the purpose of Hebrews' arguments examined here was not to
innovate a high Christology, but to support one that already existed in the church,
to illuminate it, to make it more credible, and to use it for ethical exhortation.
Likely the established messianic reading ofPs 110: 1 led naturally to the conclusion
of a messianic reading of Ps 110:4 and also to a question: What does it mean that
Messiah is a priest forever in the order ofMelchizedek?
The implication for those thinking about a doctrine of Scripture and what it
means to think and theologize "biblically" is that, should we desire to follow the
example of the author of Hebrews as seen in these passages, we will give up the
search for one universal formula for proper interpretation. We will acknowledge
that Scripture, with its various settings and genres, is and does various things in the
economy of revelation. We will read all of Scripture-the history, the law,
prophets, and the writings- Christologically, committed to the doctrines ofhis full
humanity, his sinlessness, his resurrection, his exaltation, and his kindness.
Kessia Reyne Bennett is a graduate of Southern Adventist University and Andrews
University and is a student of systematic theology at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School in
Illinois. She is married to Joshua Bennett and they live in Chicago. E-mail:
kessiareyne@gmail.com.
)
)
)
Biblical Hermeneutics at the Onset of
)
Christianity: A Comparison between the
)
Alexandrian and Antiochene Schools of
Interpretation
)
C. Adelina Alexe )
)
Introduction )
Dr. Fernando Canale has been one of the most influential professors in my
academic development during the doctoral studies at Andrews. Even though I
was introduced to his research and theological proposals only indirectly by my )
colleagues, over time I have grown increasingly interested in Canale's views
through personal exposure to his work and the perspectives he advanced. His
dedicated research and astute observations have persuaded me of the need to
explore the intersection of philosophy and theology more in-depth and to )
consider with more care the presuppositions behind our hermeneutics. I have
been challenged and changed through contact with his keen insights, and I
progress as a scholar with a greater sense ofresponsibility and a deeper desire to
continue the kind of research he has exemplified. The article below is but a
humble step in that direction.
In this paper I offer a descriptive overview of the hermeneutical method in
the two most influential schools of theology of the first centuries AD: the school
of Alexandria and the school of Antioch. In order highlight each method I will
compare the views of the most prominent figures in both schools: Clement of
Alexandria and Origen (in Alexandria), and Theodore of Mopsuestia and
Theodoret of Cyrus (in Antioch). My engagement with their views remains J
minimal throughout the paper, allowing the reader to focus on how the two
theological centers related to each other.
I chose to research these schools of interpretation because their location in
the formative stages of Christianity ensured a far-reaching impact on the
development of the Christian thought and practice- hermeneutics in particular.
As Canale has passionately advocated throughout his career, proper _)
interpretation is foundational for a good understanding of the Bible. Considering
our strong emphasis on Scripture as the basis of our theology, the Seventh-day
Adventist church in particular needs to make hermeneutics a research priority.
The monumental historical tum from modernism to postrnodemism and the
subsequent challenges we are left to grapple with as the two worldviews (in
some respects fundamentally opposed) seek to coexist urge us to responsibly
)
think and re-think the complex process of hermeneutics. I hope that this article
will illustrate to some extent the influence of the surrounding cultures on both
schools and leave the reader with a better grasp of the complexity of biblical
interpretation, and a greater openness to consider how our own surrounding
)
)
)
)
)
338 C. ADELINA ALEXE BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AT THE ONSET OF CHRISTIANITY 339
)
) culture impacts our hermeneutics. It is a privilege to contribute to this volume, allegorical language called for an allegorical method of interpretation. Philo
and I do so with gratitude to Dr. Fernando Canale for using his talents in believed that the translators and interpreters of the Scripture were inspired in a
) ministry and for cuing us in to some vital questions. similar way as the writers. Thus, the interpreter's ability to decipher the deeper,
spiritual meaning of the text depended greatly on his sensitivity to divine
) inspiration.6
) During the first centuries AD Christianity flourished and expanded rapidly A few examples give us insight into what this method of interpretation
into the Mediterranean basin. Among the centers of Christianity established in entails. Philo suggests that the trees in Genesis 3 represent "terrestrial virtues in
) the human race... an imitation and representation of the heavenly virtue," and
that geographical area, two emerged in significance: Alexandria (in Egypt), and
) Antioch (in Syria). 1 The most influential theologians of the time were educated that "the tree oflife is that most general virtue which some people call goodness,
in these renowned centers of theology and became the major shapers of the from which the particular virtues are derived, and of which they are composed."7
) development of Christian thought and practice. While the two schools held many Thus, God's invitation to eat of every tree in Eden is an urging for us to nourish
views in common, they differed greatly on the interpretation of Scripture. This our soul by practicing not just one, but all virtues.8 The journey of Abraham
)
often led to controversies over the proper reading of the Bible, as well as the from Ur to Canaan symbolizes the human soul's growth joumey. 9 The death in
) divergent doctrinal beliefs resulting from using different methods of Genesis 3 refers to the degeneration of the soul that succumbed to vice. Being
interpretation. The school of Alexandria emphasized an allegorical interpretation heavily influenced by the Greek dichotomy between body and soul, Philo
) distinguished two types of death: the natural death-the separation of the soul
of the Bible, while the theologians in Antioch stressed a literal (historical)
) interpretation of Scripture. from the body, and the spiritual death-the deterioration of the soul that neglects
practicing the virtues. He believed Genesis 3 referred to the latter.10 -
) The School of Alexandria and the Allegorical Interpretation of Scripture Also under the influence of Greek philosophy, Philo saw God as ah
James Hernando defines allegory as "a metaphor extended into a story" unchangeable deity and interpreted the divine repentance in Genesis 6:6 to mean
) that God "mediate[s] and deliberate[s]" on the misery of humans who struggle
where "the elements of the story take on meanings that are quite different from
) the ordinary literal sense of the words."2 The allegorizing ofScripture involves a due to the conflict between the corruptible body and the soul. 11 He interprets the
search for the symbolic meaning of every text, regardless of its geme. In this divine anger in Genesis 6:7, to be simply an "extravagant form of expression,
) that the iniquities of man had grown to such a height, that they stirred up and
hermeneutical method, "the interpreter looks beyond the historical (literal, plain)
) sense of the words to a hidden meaning,"3 often invoked as the "deeper, spiritual provoked to anger even that very Being who by his nature was incapable of
meaning" of the text.4 anger." 12 Again, he aligns his interpretation of the Bible with the Greek
) philosophy and thus fashions God as unable to feel anger, being "exempt from,
Philo ofAlexandria and superior to all such perturbations of spirit." 13
The Alexandrian inclination toward an allegorical reading of the Bible is Philo's affinity to Greek philosophy is also illustrated in his interpretation of
) partially due to the influence of a local Jewish philosopher named Philo. He the creation of mankind. Building upon the Platonic understanding of the soul
regarded the Scriptures as God's revelation written by men under divine being comprised of a rational part and an irrational part, he suggests that Adam
) represents the mind, the rational part, superior, dominant, and older since it was
inspiration. Given the limited nature of human language, however, Philo held
) that these biblical writers, although possessing an accurate understanding of the created first, while Eve represents the senses and passions-the inferior,
divine, could only express universal truth in allegory.5 Naturally, truth written in irrational, and younger part of the soul, created last, "second in rank and
)
6
1
The school of Antioch was not an organized institution of education as Alexandria; Yarchin, History ofBiblical Interpretation, 19.
) 7
it functioned informally as a group of scholars who congregated around a common ideology Philo,Allegorical Interpretation L (29-31) in The Works ofPhilo, (trans. C.D. Yonge;
) and hermeneutical method, yet it exercised vast influence in the domain of theology. See Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1997), 28.
8
Donald McKim, ed., Historical Handbook ofMajor Biblical Interpreters (Downers Grove, Yarchin, History ofBiblical Interpretation, 21.
9
) IL: Intervarsity Press, 1998), 70. Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans
2
James D. Hernando, Dictionary ofHermeneutics (Springfield, MO: Gospel Publishing Publishing Company, 2009), 69. See also Philo's On Abraham, in The Works ofPhilo, 417-
) 425.
House, 2008), 13. 10
'Hernando, Dictionary ofHermeneutics, 43. Yarchin, History ofBiblical Interpretation, 21-22.
) 11
Philo, Questions and Answers in Genesis I, (93-95), in The Works ofPhilo, 81 I.
• Hernando, Dictionary ofHermeneutics, 13. 12
) ' William Yarchin, History of Biblical Interpretation (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Philo, Questions and Answers in Genesis L (95), in The Works ofPhilo, 81 I.
13
Publishers, 2004), 18. Philo, Questions and Answers in Genesis L (95), in The Works ofPhilo, 811.
)
)

340 C. ADELINA ALEXE
power" 14 to the mind. 15 Philo 's reading of Genesis 2 with a Platonic filter implies
that Adam and Eve were not created equal, but rather Adam held a privileged
position of superiority. This is also evident in his symbolic explanation of the
man cleaving to his wife (Gen. 2:22):
Here you must observe that it is not the woman who cleaves to the man,
but on the contrary, the man who cleaves to the woman; that is to say,
the mind cleaves to the external sensations. For when that which is the
~t
better, namely, the mind, is united to that which is the rose, namely, the
external sensation, it is then dissolved into the nature of flesh, which is
worse, and into outward sensation, which is the cause of the passions.
But when that which is the inferior, namely, the outward sensation,
follows the better part, that is the mind, then there will no longer be
flesh, but both will become one, namely, mind." 16
The struggle between the soul and the body is also borrowed from the
Platonic worldview in which the material is bad and the immaterial is good.
Philo 's understanding of humans as engaged in this inner struggle as early as in
Genesis 2 implies that imperfection is inherent in humans since creation, and the
way to overcome it is through complete submission of the irrational to the
rational. As evident from these examples, Greek philosophy provided Philo with
a framework through which be worked out the interpretation of various Bible
passages. Thus, his aim at interpreting the Scriptures guided by divine
inspiration is overshadowed by the philosophical presuppositions to which he
adhered.
Clement ofA lexandria
The first prominent Christian theologian who used the allegorical
interpretation practiced by Philo was Clement of Alexandria. In addition to
Philo' s influence, several aspects of the contemporary Hellenistic culture
enhanced his readiness to embrace the allegorical interpretation.
The symbolic language was in general appreciated as the choice medium for
the expression of truth during the time. "All who have spoken of divine things,
both Barbarians and Greeks, have veiled the first principles of things, and
delivered the truth in enigmas, and symbols, and allegories, and metaphors," 17
writes Clement. He specifically enumerates Plato, Aristotle, the Pythagoreans,
14
Philo, Allegorical Interpretation II, VIII (24), in The Works ofPhilo, 40.
15
See Philo, Allegorical Interpretation II, in The Works ofPhilo, 38-49.
16
Philo, Allegorical Interpretation II, XIV (49), in The Works of Philo, 43.
17
Clement ofAlexandria, Stromata, book V, ch.4, (trans. William Wilson; fromAnte-
Nicene Fathers, Vol. 2, edited by Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland
Coxe; Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885.) Revised and edited for New
Advent by Kevin Knight. Online: http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/0210.htm.
)
BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AT THE ONSET OF CHRISTIANITY 341
Epicureans, and Stoics, who all wrote in symbols. 18 The reason why
philosophers had "buried their doctrines in myths," was "so as not to be obvious
to all," and the proof of someone being a true philosopher was his ability to
decipher the meaning of such mysteries. 19 The importance given to symbolism
was so high that apparently refusing to speak enigmatically was met with
shunning and dismissal, so much so that "Hipparchus the Pythagorean, being
guilty of writing the tenets of Pythagoras in plain language, was expelled from
the school, and a pillar raised for him as if he had been dead."20 In a context
)
where the world of ideas was seen as the highest realm, a literal meaning of truth
was dismissed as belonging to the ignorant and unlearned. )
Clement was also influenced by the Egyptian linguistic system in which the )
worthiest things, such as praises to kings, were written in the enigmatic style of
hieroglyphs. Like the Greeks, "the Egyptians did not entrust the mysteries they
possessed to all and sundry, and did not divulge the knowledge of divine things
to the profane; but only to those destined to ascend the throne, and those of
the priests that were judged the worthiest, from their nurture, culture, and
birth."21
Accordingly, Clement suggests that the divine truth in the Scriptures,
similar to the chief philosophical works in his and other cultures of the time, was
written in symbolic language.22 Like Philo, he argued that "the God of
the universe, who is above all speech, all conception, all thought, can never be
committed to writing,"23 and saw the entire Bible "as if spoken in a parable."24
To support this with Scripture, he references texts that carry the idea of mystery: )
the wisdom of God is hidden in mystery {l Corinthians 2:6-8), the Spirit gives
the treasures, hidden, dark (Isaiah 45 :3), the deep things of God are revealed to
us by the Spirit (1 Corinthians 2:9-10). This symbolic "mode of interpretation,"
Clement believed, is helpful "to the right theology, and to piety, and to the
display of intelligence, and the practice of brevity, and the exhibition of
wisdom.'m .)
The foundation of Clement's method of interpretation was the Platonic
dualism between body (the material, inferior part of the human being) and soul
(the spiritual, superior part). Based on this, he saw a twofold sense of Scripture:
one literal, corresponding to the body, and one spiritual, corresponding .to the
soul. Since the body occupied the lower part in the hierarchical structure of the .)
human being, the literal meaning was second-rate to the symbolical.
)
18
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (9).
19
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (9).
2
° Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (9).
21
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (7). )
22
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (7).
23
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (4). )
24
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (4).
25
Clement ofAlexandria, Stromata, book V (9).
j
)
)
)
)
342 C. ADELINA ALEXE
)
) Clearly, for Clement the line of demarcation between a philosopher and a
Christian interpreter of Scriptures is very faint and in theology, as in philosophy,
) only those who have been purified in soul can understand that which is
) expressed in veiled form. 26 The natural man, points out Clement, does not
receive the things of the Spirit (1 Corinthians 2:14) and the carnal man can only
) be fed milk (1 Corinthians 3:1-3).27 Clement did not deny the usefulness of a
literal understanding of the text for ordinary believers, but saw it only as the first
) external and inter:nal evidence.33 Externally, the fulfillment of prophecy
step in uncovering the deep truth of Scripture. The spiritually mature Christian
) would look beyond the literal to the deeper meaning of the text and, through
"illumination," using an allegorical method of interpretation, would be able to
discern it.28
} Employing the allegorical method, Clement suggests that the command to
eat only animals who have hooves and ruminate means that "we ought to cleave
to those who fear the Lord... who ruminate on the word of the Lord," and that
the parted hoof signifies "that the righteous walks in this world, and expects the
) meaning are the very hidden treasures of wisdom,"36 which required divine help
holy eternity to come." The command to not eat the eagle, hawk, kite and crow
) is an injunction to not cleave to men who live lawlessly, "for the eagle indicates
robbery, the hawk injustice, and the raven greed."29 Abraham's three days
) journey to Moriah (Genesis 22:3-4) symbolizes a gradual understanding of the
) divine: "the first day is that which is constituted by the sight of good things; and
the second is the soul's best desire; on the third, the mind perceives spiritual
) things, the eyes of the understanding being opened by the Teacher who rose on
the third day."30
) for the spiritual maturity of the Christian.
Clements's interpretation of the tabernacle submits that the covering and the
) veil, made from blue, purple, scarlet, and linen represented "the elements
contained the revelation of God. For purple is from water, linen from the earth;
) blue, being dark, is like the air, as scarlet is like fire."31 The altar of incense was
) "the symbol of the earth placed in the middle of this universe," and the external
court. . . was "the middlemost point of heaven and earth," or "the symbol of
) the intellectual world and that of sense," while the covering was "the barrier of
popular unbelief." The lamp shows "the motions of the seven planets that
)
perform their revolutions towards the south," and also represents Christ who
) casts light on the believers. The "things recorded of the sacred ark signify the
properties of the world of thought, which is hidden and closed to the many." The
) golden cherubim represent the two hemispheres, ''the ark "signifies the repose
) which dwells with the adoring spirits," and "the high priest's robe is the symbol
of the world of senses," with the breast being "the seat of the heart and soul."
) The three hundred and sixty bells, represent a year, "the twelve stones. . .
) 34
26
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (9).
) 36
27
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (4).
) 28
Hernando, Dictionary ofHermeneutics, 68.
29
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (8).
) 3
° Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (11 ).
31
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (6).
)
)
BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AT THE ONSET OF CHRISTIANITY 343
describe for us the circle of the zodiac, in the four changes of the year," or "the
various phases of salvation."32 The influence of Greek philosophy upon
Clements's reading of the Bible is evident and indisputable.
Origen
Clements's student, Origen, embraced the allegorical approach to Scripture
and popularized it. He recognized the divine origins of the Bible based on
(particularly about Christ) testifies to its origin;34 internally, the divine style is
self-evident to the devout reader who, "touched by a divine breath... from his
own emotions. . . will feel that these books were the composition of
no human skill, nor of any mortal eloquence."35
Origen believed that the parable of the hidden treasure in Matthew 13:44
pointed to layered meanings of the Bible. The soil and surface of Scripture
represented the literal meaning, while the "deeper and profounder spiritual
for understanding. Additionally, based on the injunction in Proverbs 22:20-21 to
"write down those things threefold in your counsel and wisdom that you may
reply with words of truth," his view of the human being as consisting of body,
soul, and spirit, as well as God's triune nature, Origen concludes that Scripture
has a three-layered meaning. 37 The body represents the literal meaning, the soul
represents the moral or ethical meaning, and the spirit represents the doctrinal
meaning. The last two are only accessible through an allegorical method and call
Error in biblical interpretation, held Origen, arises because many are not
familiar with the procedure to follow,38 and chief among mistakes is the fact
"that holy Scripture is not understood ... according to its spiritual, but according
to its literal meaning."39 To exemplify, Origen points to the Jewish literal
understanding of the messianic prophecies, which led them to reject Jesus when
these were not fulfilled accordingly: the literal (political and military)
deliverance from captivity and destruction of their enemies, the building of a
literal city of God, a literal, peaceful co-existence of the wild and domestic
animals alongside humans (Isaiah 11 :6).40
32
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book V (6).
33
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV, ch. I, (trans. Frederick Crombie; fromAnte-
Nicene Fathers, Vol. 4. Edited by Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland
Coxe; Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885.) Revised and edited for New
Advent by Kevin Knight. http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/04124.htm.
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (1-4).
35
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (6).
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (23).
37
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (11).
38
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (8).
39
40
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (9).
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (8).

344 C. ADELINA ALEXE
As Clement, 0rigen does see merit in seeking the literal meaning of certain
texts, but limits the validity of such attempts to logical to human reason. Thus,
the intercourse between Lot and his daughters, as well as Abraham's and Jacob's
polygamy- which contradicted God's law, cannot be seen as historically true, but
are "mysteries, and forms of spiritual things."41 For him, "all the narrative
portion relating either to the marriages, or to the begetting of the children, or to
battles of different kinds, or to any other histories whatever," cannot be anything
but "forms and figures of hidden and sacred things."42
Intentional interruptions of the narrative flow by what appears to be an
impossibility or incongruity serve the purpose of deterring the readers from the
ordinary meaning, that their attention "might be recalled .. . to an examination of
the inner meaning."43 According to 0rigen, where God found historical events
that "can be adapted to a spiritual meaning," He composed a text with double
meaning (literal and spiritual); but where God could not find a historical
narrative "appropriate to the spiritual coherence," He inserted things that could
take place but did not, or things that could not possibly take place. 44 The key to
know which narratives are historical and which are not, argues 0rigen, is human
logic.
Appealing to human reasoning, 0rigen concludes that the legislative portion
of the Bible which does not seem to have utility or appears outright impossible
has no historical foundation. 45 For example, the command to destroy
uncircumcised male babies is incongruous with other laws prohibiting murder. 46
The narrative of creation must be intended as allegory since the first three days
could not exist without the sun, or the first day without the sky.47 The trees of
Paradise cannot b e visible and palpable entities, because it is absurd to believe
that eating their fruit brings either life or knowledge of good and evil. Adam
could not hide from God, just as Cain could not depart from the presence of
God, since He is omnipresent. 48 The Gospels present their share of absurdities
which cannot be understood historically: the devil placing Jesus on a mountain,49
the injunction that one should possess neither two coats, nor shoes, or the
command to pluck the right eye that causes you to stumble (which is absurd
since we see with both eyes). 50
On the other hand, 0rigen suggests that "the truth of the history may and
ought to be preserved in the majority of instances," if there is enough external
evidence of the event. Thus, the burial of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob with their
1
• Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (9).
41
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (9).
43
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (16).
•• Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (15).
" Origen, On the First Principles, book IV ( 15).
46
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV ( 17).
47
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (14).
41
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV ( 16).
49
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV ( 16).
50
Origen, On the First Principles, book IV ( 18).
)
)
BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AT THE ONSET OF CHRISTIANITY 345 )
)
wives in the cave at Hebron, being historically uncontested, are real events. It is
likewise historically true that Shechem was given as a portion to Joseph and that )
Jerusalem is the metropolis of Judea, where Solomon built the temple of God.
)
Some parts of the Bible that human reasoning can endorse as good and
necessary (particularly moral teachings) do not require an allegorical )
interpretation, as there is no higher or spiritual meaning to seek aside from their
plain teaching. For example, the commands against adultery, stealing, bearing )
false witness, swearing, and looking lustfully at a woman, as well as the positive
commands to honor your parents, comfort the week, and be patient with others
are "sufficient of [themselves] without any spiritual meaning, and necessary for
those who observe it." 51
As can be seen from this cursory survey of Philo, Clement, and 0rigen's
hermeneutics, the influence of Greek philosophy upon the Alexandrian school of
interpretation played a major role in the shaping of the allegorical method. The
dualism characteristic of Platonism and Neoplatonism formed the thinking J
framework of the Alexandrians and resulted in a syncretism between religion )
and philosophy that endured for centuries, due to the role Alexandria came to
play in the development of the Church.52
It is important to mention that while the allegorical method was
foundational to the Alexandrian school of interpretation, there was diversity
within the school. Theologians exhibited more or less preference for the spiritual
meaning, and gave a varied degree of attention to the literal aspect. However, as
a system of thought and as a hermeneutical method, the Alexandrian school
differed significantly from the Antiochene method. To this we tum next for a
brief overview.
The School of Antioch and the Literal Interpretation of Scripture
In Antioch, prominent theologians such as Diodore of Tarsus, Theodore
Mopsuestia, and Theodoret of Cyrus, rej ected Alexandria's allegorical method
of interpretation, arguing that the so-called spiritual meaning is highly subj ective
and prone to mirror the interpreter's concerns rather than the intention of the
author. 53 In the surviving fragments of Treatise Against the Allegorists,
Theodore accused 0rigen of great wickedness for twisting the narratives,54 and
pointed out the arbitrary aspect of0rigen's allegorization and denial of the text's
historicity, which "has made what is stated in the account to agree with his
views."55
" Origen, On the First Principles, book IV (19).
52
See John Philip Jenkins, Jesus Wars: How Four Patriarchs, Three Queens, and Two
Emperors Decided What Christians Would Believe/or the Next 1,500 Years (Sacramento,
CA: Harper One, 2011).
H Tbiselton, Hermeneutics, 109.
J
54
Frederick G. McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009),
75.
55
Theodore ofMopsuestia quoted in McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, 75. .J
)
 )
)
)
) 346 C. ADELINA ALEXE BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AT THE ONSET OF CHRISTIANITY 347

) The major difference between the two schools, one could argue, arises from ·1 the allegorical interpretation as being fashioned after pagan philosophies, and
their differing view of language in relation to history. Alexandrians believed that condemned Philo's approach, which they thought led to "dangerously... altering
) the Scriptures by suppressing the historical elements within the text."61 While
the Bible was written in allegorical language that did not (at least not always)
) reflect historical accounts. In this model, the words in themselves carried the Antiochenes' logic may have been, to some extent, due to Aristotle's
theological significance, not the events, which often were dismissed as not influence (as might have been the case of Theodore of Mopsuestia who was
) historical. The Antiochenes, on the other hand, viewed God as "the Lord of trained in Libanius's rhetorical academy), the Antiochenes were not influenced
history," and therefore "what he has revealed must be historically trne."56 by philosophy as heavily as the Alexandrians, which is evident from their
Accordingly, the locus of theological meaning resides in the historical events the "emphasis on the practical versus the contemplative nature and approach to
) words described. 57 biblical interpretation. " 62
If Origen saw the literal aspect of the text merely as a veil covering the Thus, the school of Antioch rejected Alexandria's method, and took a more
deeper meanings, whose role was to discourage the superficial reading, literal approach to interpreting Scripture, defending the historical veracity of the
) Theodore believed that the only meaning of the text is that transmitted by the biblical text and emphasizing the author's intended meaning that the interpreter
literal sense. Given such different views of the writing process, language and was to discover. It is important to note, however, that the school of Antioch did
) meaning, the interpreter's role was considerably different in the two schools. In not reject allegory altogether, but limited allegorical interpretation to passages
Alexandria the primary concern was deciphering a meaning relevant for the written in figurative language. The context would orient the reader whether an
) allegorical interpretation is called for or not.63
reader, while in Antioch the focus was on uncovering the authors' intended
) meaning. A typical Antiochene approach to interpreting a Bible passage or book
In its focus on the reader, Alexandria was open for multiple meanings of the included careful consideration of its genre, the circumstances and occasion of its
) writing, its date and authorship, as well as unity and grammatical structure. 64 For
text, while the Antiochenes held to one single meaning of the text. "He," wrote
) Theodore about Origen, "would never have willingly shown an interest in any example, Diodore's style consisted of an introduction in which he discussed the
interpretation filled with the insane blasphemy of the pagans, once he studied the historical context of the text and the author, followed by a verse-by-verse
) true intent of the Scriptures and inquired into what is the meaning of every word. analysis. In his interpretation, he consistently and carefully paraphrased the text
.. He would then have been able to know that there is but one sense in all the so as to not depart from the meaning of the author, and where he encountered
j figurative language, he pointed out the realities and immediate experiences to
words of divine Scripture and to have found in them, as it should be, the
) invincible truth of the Church's teaching."58 which they referred.65
The differences in interpretation, which was rooted in the differing views of
) language, meaning, and history, can ultimately be traced back to the two Theodore ofMopsuestia
schools' overall approaches to interpreting literature in general. The Theodore of Mopsuestia was considered by some "the most typical
)
Alexandrians were educated in the philosophical approach to literature and representative of the Antiochene school of exegesis," and "the foremost
) sought the abstract, metaphysical and ethical teaching, which could only be exponent of Antiochene exegesis."66 He fought against the allegorical
pursued through allegory. The Antiochenes, on the other hand, were trained in interpretation with vehemence and made his case with acute logical insights.
) One of his most clearly stated oppositions to the allegorical method is found in
rhetorical schools of literature where grammatical exegesis was fundamental to
) understanding the text, and the purpose of interpretation was to identify concrete his commentary on Paul's use of the term by an allegory (or allegorically;
situations that provided lessons and applications for the reader. 59 figuratively in some versions) in Galatians 4:24a. Here he takes the opportunity
j to discuss the difference between Paul's interpretation and the Alexandrian's
The school of Antioch did not bold philosophy in high regard, considering it
) of pagan origins and seeing philosophers as "defenders of paganism."60 methodology, which is worth quoting at length:
Accordingly, the Antiochenes expressed clear disapproval of the philosophical 61
) McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, 77-78.
elements in Origen's theology, such as his denial of bodily resurrection and his 62
McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, 23.
) views of the soul entering the body from outside. Likewise, the Antiochenes saw 63
Charles Kannengiesser, Handbook of Patristic Exegesis: The Bible in Ancient
Christianity vol. 2 (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2004), 813.
) 56
64
See Y archin, History ofBiblicallnterpretation, 77 and Thiselton, Hermeneutics, 110.
McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, 20. 65
57
Yarchin, History ofBiblical Interpretation, 76. Kannengiesser, Handbook ofPatristic Exegesis, vol. 2, 781.
) 58
66
Robert C. Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, by Theodore of
Theodore ofMopsuestia quoted in McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, 79.
59 Mopsuestia (trans. Robert C. Hill; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University ofAmerica
. ) 60
McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, 76-77.
Press, 2004), 9.
McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, 23.
)
)

348 C. ADELINA ALEXE
There are people who have great zeal for overturning the meaning of
the divine scriptures, and by breaking up everything placed there they
fabricate from themselves certain foolish fictions and give their folly
the name of allegory. They use this term of the apostle's so as to take
from it the right to dismiss the entire meaning of divine scripture by
depending on the apostle's expression by an allegory. But they fail to
understand how great the difference is between their view and what the
apostle says in this passage. For the apostle does not do away with the
narrative, nor does he get rid of what happened long ago. Instead, he
put it down as what had actually taken place at that time, but in such a
way that he also used the narrative of what had actually happened for
his own interpretation, as when he says she corresponds to the present
Jerusalem (4:23), or when h e says just as at that time the child who was
born according to the flesh persecuted the child who was born
according to the Spirit (4:29). In this way he acknowledged the
narrative in all these matters. 67
Rowan Greer notes that a key word in Theodore's discourse here is intercipiere
- which he translates as "breaking up," and suggests that Theodore's primary
issue with the Alexandrians is that they "break up the narrative and... interpret
its component parts without reference to the narrative as a whole."68 This
interpretation of words in isolation reflected the allegorists' tendency to deny the
historicity of the narratives. Theodore, on the other hand, advocates for the
historicity of the narratives, and shows on logical grounds how its denial
prevents valid interpretations, since the narratives fail to give meaning if broken
apart. If Paul did not see the narrative of Isaac and Ishmael as historical, argued
Theodore, then:
. .. he could not have said that what concerned Hagar corresponds to
the present Jerusalem, which he acknowledges exists at the present
time. Nor would he have put downjust as to refer to someone he did
not think existed. For when he said just as he was doubtless making a
comparison, and no comparison can be made unless the terms of the
comparison continue to exist. Furthermore, when he said at that time,
though he supposes it to be unspecified, he meant to indicate a definite
time. And the distinction of times would be meaningless if what
happened had nevertheless taken place.... [B]ut those people invert
67
Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodore of Mopsuestia: Commentary on the Minor
Pauline Epistles (trans. Rowan A. Greer; Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature), 113-
115.
68
Rowan A. Greer, introduction to Theodore ofMopsuestia: Commentary on the Minor
Pauline Epistles, XIV.
)
)
BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AT TI:IE ONSET OF CHRlSTlANITY 349 )
)
the meaning of everything since they wish the whole narrative of divine
scripture to differ in no way from the dreams of the night. 69
)
The idea of " breaking-up" the narrative reoccurs in the same context, as
Theodore offers more examples where the Alexandrians deny the historicity of )
events: "they say that n ot even Adam actually existed as Adam, since it strikes
them they should interpret scripture as much as possible 'spiritually'-they want )
their folly to be called spiritual interpretation. ... I would like to say to them that )
by breaking up the narrative they no longer have a narrative.';70 Referring back
to Galatians 4, Theodore insists that "in this passage it is on the basis of events )
that actually took place and of those traditions acknowledged by the Jews as true
that he [Paul] strives to prove his own claims."71
Following his line of reasoning, he questions the grounds on which the
Alexandrians derive meaning: "if their view is true and what is written does not
preserve an account o f what really happened but points to something else )
profound and that must be understood intellectually-something spiritual, as they
want to say, which they can discern since they are themselves spiritual people
-where have they acquired this knowledge?"72
Theodore' s own concern with the historicity of the text, however, seems to
be somewhat inconsistent. While he shared with his Antiochene peers "the
conviction that precision in the biblical text requires a like precision in the
commentator and the reader,"73 Theodore was less concerned about historical
precision at times. For example, in regards to the location of Tarsbish (Jonah
I :3) Theodore writes: "I consider this entire chase after detail to be irrelevant to
the subject in hand in so far as the account by the prophet is just as equally
beyond question, no matter which city you think it to be." 74 Yet even as he
demonstrates either an inability or an indisposition for thorough historical
investigation of some texts' background, Theodore "desperately tr[ies] to root
the prophets in historical situations."75
Regarding prophecy, the task of the interpreter, according to Theodore, is to
shed clarity upon "the historical sense of prophetic discourse and to establish the
69
Theodore of Mopsuestia, Theodore of Mopsuestia: Commentary on the Minor
Pauline Epistles, 11 3-115.
70
Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Minor Pauline Epistles, 115-1 17.
71
Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Minor Pauline Epistles, 117.
72
Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Minor Pauline Epistles, 115-117. .J
73
Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets by Theodore ofMopsuestia
(trans. Robert C. Hill; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004),
12.
74
Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, by Theodore of
Mopsuestia. 12.
" Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, by Theodore of
Mopsuestia, 12. .)
)
)
 )
)
)
) 350 C. ADELINA ALEXE
)
facts."76 While he admits that the Scripture has a spiritual meaning that goes
) "beyond the narrative meaning,"77 and "is sensitive to the imagery and figurative
language of the prophets and to literary genres employed by them, provided
) these are consistent with prophecy as history,"78 Theodore is largely
) unconcerned with this dimension of interpretation. Such is the case with the
prophetic material too. Thus, he neglects the symbolism of Hosea's marriage to
) a prostitute, and instead focuses on the historicity of the text: "The prophet
) obeys this command, and marries a prostitute, whose father's name he also
mentions lest what was said should seem some trifling fiction and not a true
) record of events."79
In his largely literalist approach to the prophetic material, Theodore took the
)
texts at face value and assigned them a "proximate fulfillment," neglecting an
apocalyptic fulfillment, and thus slipping into what Hill calls "literalist
historicism."8° For example, he interprets the king in Zechariah 9:9- 10 to be
) Zerubbabel, and rejects a double interpretation: "While, then, it is clear that here
) this refers to Zerubbabel, I am amazed at those adopting farfetched ideas,
applying part to Zerubbabel and part to Christ the Lord, which results in nothing
) else than their dividing the prophecy between Zerubbabel and Christ the Lord.
Now, this is the height offolly."8 1
) He does concede that a "fuller realization comes in the person of Christ,"82
) but sees the fulfillment of it in the Gospels.83 Theodore contends that the Bible
uses hyperbolic language to express the tasks of a chosen person or people,
J which does not do ''.justice to the precise reality of the meaning."84 These
expressions contain a reference to Christ as well, who is the fuller reality of
J these, but which is outlined in the broader biblical narrative of redemption. 85
_) This example is a good illustration of the Antiochenes' principle of theoria- "the
discernment of a fuller sense in events and texts."86
j
) dioceses and molded his writing into largely pastoral and apologetic work. In his
76
) Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, by Theodore of
Mopsuestia, 22.
J 77
Greer, introduction to Theodore ofMopsuestia: Commentary on the Minor Pauline
Epistles, XV.
) 78
Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, by Theodore of
Mopsuestia, 17.
) 79
Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, 42.
80
Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, by Theodore of
.,_)
Mopsuestia, 22.
81
) Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, 366-367.
82
Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, by Theodore of
) events are a type of the things of the New Testament, so as the body has
Mopsuestia, 26.
83
Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, 368.
) 84
Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, 368.
85
) Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, 367-368.
86
Hill, introduction to Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, by Theodore of
) Mopsuestia, 24.
)
BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AT THE ONSET OF CHRISTIANTIY 351
In regards to typology, Theodore insisted that the type "must not merely
point to the existence of its archetype, but also be similar to it, in a truly inferior,
imperfect sort ofway."87 Both the type and the future event need to be historical
realities. Again, this is rooted in the Antiochene view of God as Lord of history:
"The God of both the Old and the New covenant is one, the Lord and maker of
all things, who with one end in view made dispositions for both the former and
the latter. . .. [F)or the purpose of making it clear and to prevent it being thought
novel that he had at a later stage made plans and decisions in our regard, he
conveyed to human beings. . . through the promises he made to Abraham and
David... the reality of the events... to take effect in the Incarnation of Christ
the Lord." 88
Evidently, Theodore of Mopsuestia was largely focused on the historical
aspect of the Scripture and, strongly opposed to allegory, rejected it even when
accepted by the Christian body at large. Thus, "because he concluded that the
Song of Songs was composed for performance at Solomon's wedding to an
Egyptian princess, Theodore denied it was an allegory of God's love for his
people, contrary to the ubiquitous Jewish and Christian interpretive traditions."89
In this aspect Theodore does not exclusively represent the Antiochene
methodology, although he remains one of Antioch's most well-known
representatives. Theodoret of Cyrus, on the other hand, while exhibiting more
typical Antiochene exegesis, was freer in drawing spiritual meaning from the
text in addition to the historical one.
Theodoret of Cyrus
A native of Antioch, Theodoret pursued a rich educational career that
included secular training in rhetoric, as well as exposure to the works ofDiodore
of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, and John Chrysostom. He became the
bishop of Cyrus-a role that implied the oversight of about eight hundred
own words, his task "has been to contend on behalf of the apostolic decrees, to
bring this pasture of instruction to the Lord's flock, and to this end [he] ha[s]
written thirty-five books interpreting the divine Scriptures and proving the
falsehood of the heresies. " 90
The format of his writing varied between questions and answers and verse-
by-verse analysis. His exegetical method, while in many aspects aligned with the
Antiochene school, exhibited features typical of the Alexandrian school as well.
He preserved the historical aspect, but was more at ease with a layered meaning
of the text. This is evident in his greater focus on typology than Theodore. In his
commentary on Psalms 28: 1, Theodoret writes: "Because in truth the ancient
87
McLeod, Theodore ofMopsuestia, 21.
88
Theodore ofMopsuestia, Commentary on the Twelve Prophets, 185.
89
Yarchin, History ofBiblical Interpretation, 77.
90
McK.im, Historical Handbook ofMajor Biblical Interpreters, 70.

352 C. ADELINA ALEXE
alongside of it the shadow, we must set forth this affinity. There the pious King
Hezekiah, and here Christ, is the h elmsman ofpiety."91
His comfort with a layered meaning is also demonstrated in the opening
lines to his commentary on Psalm 30 (sang at the re-consecration of the temple),
which Theodoret suggests refers both to Hezekiah (as a type of all humans), who
"after the destruction of the Assyrians and cure of his illness. . . celebrated a
great feast. . . giving thanks to God for both granting them salvation and
liberating his holy Temple from the fire of the enemy," 92 as well as to "the
restoration of the human nature which Christ the Lord accomplished by
accepting death on behalf of us, destroying death and giving us hope of
resurrection. " 93
Still along the same lines and in contrast with the other Antiochenes,
Theodoret claimed an abundance of prophetic texts pointing to the person and
work of Christ and the beginnings of the Christian church.94 Concerning this, he
explicitly addresses the issue of prophetic interpretation in his preface to his
commentary to Psalms:
I have . .. encountered various. . . commentaries: some I found taking
refuge in allegory with considerable relish, while others make the
inspired composition resemble historical narratives of a certain type
with the result that the commentary represents a case rather for the Jews
than the household of the faith. In my opinion, it is for a wise man to
shun the extreme tendencies of both the former and the latter: the things
that are relevant to the stories of the past should be applied to them
even today, whereas the prophecies about Christ the Lord, about the
Church from the nations, the evangelical lifestyle, and the apostolic
preaching should not be applied to anything else.95
Despite his broader view of prophecy (manifested in his openness to offer a
layered interpretation), Theodoret seemed largely as oblivious to the apocalyptic
(eschatological) aspect present in the prophetic material as Theodore. In his
commentary on Daniel, he gives considerable space to the historical aspect of
the text as he seeks in "other biblical works and secular historians like Flavius
Josephus"96 validation of its prophetic nature, yet remains in the realm of
"prospective prophecy," failing to see apocalyptic meaning in Daniel. Likewise,
91
McKim, Historical Handbook ofMajor Biblical Interpreters, 71.
92
Theodoret of Cyrus, Commentary to Psalms, 1-72, (trans. Robert C. Hill;
Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 187.
93
Theodoret of Cyrus, Commentary to Psalms, 1-72, 187.
94
McKim, Historical Handbook ofMajor Biblical Interpreters, 71-72.
95
Theodoret of Cyrus, Commentary to Psalms, 1-72, 40-41.
96
Robert C. Hill, introduction to Commentary on Daniel, by Theodoret ofCyrus (trans.
Robert C. Hill; Atlanta, GA: Society of Biblical Literature, 2006), XXIl.
)
)
BIBLICAL HERMENEUTICS AT THE ONSET OF CHRISTIANITY 353 )
he appears oblivious to the apocalyptic connotations of various texts in Joel and )
Zechariah and to the eschatological significance of the Day of the Lord. 97
He also exhibits difficulty with the numerical feature of the apocalyptic
genre, being unable to "get the 'seventy years' and 'seventy weeks' and 'a time, )
and times, and half a time,' to add up. " 98 Since coherence and historical
)
correspondence are foundational principles for the Antiochenes, when unable to
reconcile contradictory details or provide a coherent interpretation, Theodoret )
remains in the realm of the historically demonstrable, which confines his
exegesis to a limited future (relative to the biblical material). Theodoret reads )
New Testament references to Daniel in the context of th.is confined future, and
thus locates the fulfillment of all Old Testament prophecy in the New Testament
99
period. Accordingly, the abomination of the desolation refers to Pilate, who
"introduce[ed] into the divine temple by night the imperial images in violation of
the divine law" (a story recorded in Josephus Flavius). 100
As the Alexandrians, the Antiochenes were not unified in all aspects )
regarding biblical hermeneutics. While they fought together against the
allegorical approach, their practice was somewhat dissimilar from each other's
and sometimes theologians exhibited inconsistencies in their own practice of
interpretation. This only testifies further of the ongoing struggle for the
interpreter of Scripture to not only theoretically grasp the correct method, but to
apply that with consistency and double-check the conclusions against the overall
gist of Scripture. )
j
Summary and Conclusions
As evident from this research, even though the Alexandrian and Antiochene
hermeneutical methodologies overlapped in some aspects of interpretation, they
indubitably were vastly dissimilar. The major differences owed largely to the
cultural influences in each geographical area, including the local view of
language and the popular contemporary philosophy. While the fact that the
surrounding culture impacts the biblical interpretation is not completely
unexpected, this aspect of hermeneutic is not always readily acknowledged and
taken into consideration. At the very least, this paper can orient the theologians
and Bible scholars of the need to put intentional effort into understanding the
influences at work in contemporary biblical interpretation. Moreover, this
complex aspect of biblical hermeneutics needs to be brought to the attention of
the church community at large, given the accessibility of Scripture to lay )
members. This responsibility is both important and urgent, given that biblical
interpretation is of eternal consequence.
97
Hill, introduction to Commentary on Daniel, by Theodoret of Cyrus, XXIII. )
98
Hill, introduction to Commentary on Daniel, by Theodoret of Cyrus, XXIV.
99
Hill, introduction to Commentary on Daniel, by Theodoret of Cyrus, XXV. )
100
Theodoret of Cyrus, Commentary on Daniel, 257.
J
J
J
 )
)
) C. ADELINA ALEXE Luther in the Eucharistic Debates:
354
) --- Sola Scriptura or Divinization of Man?
c. Adelina Alexe is a Ph.D. student in religion at Andrews University. Prior to
beginning her doctoral studies, she taught in Palau and China, after which she completed
) an M.Div. at Andrews University and a hospital chaplaincy residency in Delaware.
) Adelina has presented several papers at professional meetings and has published a book Silvia Canale Bacchiocchi
chapter in Beyond Blessings (Ed. Nikolaus Satelmajer) and in Servants and Friends: A
) Biblical Theology of Leadership (Ed. Skip Bell). She enjoys nature and arts, pursues
holistic health, and has a special research interest in narrative theology and hermeneutics.
Email: ade!ina.alexe@gmail.com. Introduction
) In his Basic Elements of Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing Tradition,
Fernando Canale 1 establishes that Scripture alone, or sofa Scriptura, must be the
departure point for any theological construction that seeks an authentic
) understanding of God.2 And while voicing his appreciation for Martin Luther' s
endorsement of the sofa Scriptura principle, Canale states that Luther is "neither
) always biblical nor coherent with the whole testimony of Old and New
Testaments."3 He also notes that "Evangelical theology, even Luther's and
) Calvin's, neglects the sofa, tota, and prima Scriptura principle and builds on the
) multiple sources of theology principle. This principle originates with the Roman
Catholic conviction that God reveals Himself through reason (philosophy and
) science), tradition, spiritual/mystical experiences, and Scripture."4 Specifically,
) Canale says Luther built his central doctrine of justification by faith ("the article
on which the Church stands or falls")5 on Augustine's teaching of God's
)
) 1
I have had the pleasure of knowing Dr. Canale from the moment I entered this world.
) As a father, he has been warm, wise, humorous and engaging. During my elementary years,
I remember my friends getting excited when my dad was preaching because he was so
) passionate in his presentation of Scripture. In particular, I recall him regularly putting his
work aside to chat with me when I came home from school during my teen years.
, )
Throughout my father' s life, the testimony of his self-sacrificing love, as seen in his
) commitment to the church in general and our family in particular, has given weight to his
life's work: to bring the church back to the Bible as the foundation of all Christian thought
) and action. And it is in this spirit that I am especially honored to contribute to this
' •· celebratory volume some thoughts on Martin Luther's application of the sola Scriptura
) principle and its ramifications in the Adventist church today.
2
Fernando Canale, Basic Elements of Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing
) Tradition (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews UniversityLithotec, 2005).
3
Secular Adventism? Exploring the Link between Lifestyle and Salvation (Lima, Peru:
)
Peruvian Union University, Application Center Union Editorial Press, 2013), 37. Canale
) also notes that "although in theory, some conservative Protestant theologians claim to build
their beliefs only from the contents and authority of Scripture, in practice, neither
) Protestantism nor Catholicism has ever produced a systematic understanding of Christian
doctrines from Scripture alone" Basic Elements, 236.
) 4
Secular Adventism?, 33.
5
"The Eclipse ofScripture and the Protestantization ofthe Adventist Mind: Part 1: The
) Assumed Compatibility ofAdventism with Evangelical Theology and Ministerial Practice,"
) Journal of Adventist Theological Society 21, 1-2 (2010): 141. Here Canale echoes the
general sentiment of Reformed Protestantism.
)
)

356 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
timeless reality and will,6 a teaching which is diametrically opposed to a
historical interpretation of Scripture. Because Protestantism in general and
Adventism in particular7 tends to uphold Luther as a stalwart crusader for sola
Scriptura, the following study seeks to evaluate Canale's statements in light of
the Eucharistic debates that took place at the outset of the Reformation. Do
Luther's views support a sola Scriptura approach to understanding the Lord 's
Supper, or do they uphold a mystical view that has as its aim the divinization of
man?
Historical Setting
It was a crisp fall day in Germany when various leaders of the new
Protestant faith gathered in Philip Hesse's Marburg castle. The year was 1529,
just twelve years from the time Luther had inadvertently ignited a reformation by
nailing his ninety-five theses to the doors at Wittenburg. As Rome refused to
budge on any but the most glaring liturgical excesses, the gulf between the
Catholic Church and the Reformers began to widen, pamphlet after fiery
pamphlet. And yet, as the Reformers studied and clarified the doctrines of the
new Protestant faith, differences in their own interpretations began to surface,
the most glaring of which was the Eucharist. Between 1525 and 1528 the
pamphlet war became internalized within the Protestant ranks as Luther and
Zwingli asserted their positions on the Lord's Supper. 8 These differences
threatened to shake the foundations of the new faith. For how could they stand
united against Rome if not agreed on the basics of their faith?
To this end the youthful prince Philip of Hesse called forth the Marburg
Colloquy. Luther and Melanchthon headed the German constituents, Zwingli
6
Basic Elements, 137.
7
George Knight points out that many readers have often drawn wrong conclusions
regarding Ellen White's statements on Luther, particularly that "angels of heaven were by
his [Martin Luther's] side, and rays oflight from the throne of God revealed the treasures
of truth to his understanding" (GC, 122). These readers often assume that Luther's ideas
were as inspired as those of a prophet. Yet Knight clarifies that ''while Ellen White certainly
was arguing that God used Luther and the angels guided him in bis general work, it would
be an error to infer that she agreed with all his theology." Reading Ellen White: How to
Understand and Apply Her Writings (Washington, DC: Review and Herald Pub.
Assn., I 997), 121.
8
Luther called Zwingli and anyone in bis camp '"bis absaloms, sacrament-conjurors,
in comparison with whose madness the papists are mild opponents-the Satanic instruments
of my temptation.' From about the close of the year 1524 till the year 1529, Luther had
written so violently against the Swiss, and so little against the papists, that it was
sarcastically said by Erasmus, 'the Lutherans are eagerly returning to the bosom of the
church"' (Andrew Miller, Short Papers on Church History, Vol. III (London: G. Morrish 20,
Paternoster Square, 1879), 3 1). John Phillips, Exploring the Epistle ofJames: An Expository
Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2004), 200.
}
)
LUTIIBR IN 1HE EUCHARISTIC D EBATES 357
)
and Oecolampadius, the Swiss. 9 Whatever their differences, Philip was certain
they could amicably be ironed out if the Reformers could find themselves, quite
literally, eye-to-eye. It seems clear that H esse had not read the fierce missives
)
where the terms of endearment, particularly from Luther, were questionable at
best- with Luther regularly referring to Zwingli as "the devil." 10 Likewise, )
though Zwingli was eager to attend the conference and hoped for reconciliation,
Luther tried, more than once, to avoid going. Ultimately he agreed to go, but )
requested that "some honest papists should be present as witnesses against those )
future Thrasosll and vain-glorious saints."12 Phillip ignored Luther's request and
Luther begrudgingly attended. At their first meeting, Luther took some chalk and )
scratched out, hoc est corpus m eum (this is my body) on the wooden table before
them. He defied anyone to move him from this statement. For the next three
days, whenever pressed by an argument from Zwingli's camp Luther would
stubbornly signal the words on the table, much to the chagrin of all present.
Not surprisingly, the colloquy did not achieve the desired union. For
although the disputants a ll agreed on fourteen articles concerning the Trinity, the
personal death and res urrection of Christ, justification by faith, original sin, the
Holy Spirit, and the number of sacraments, they could not agree on the 15'h and )
final point regarding the Lord's Supper:
)
9
Olson, 394-95. For a more extensive and extremely readable account ofthe Marburg
Colloquy see chapter seven of J. H. Merle D'aubigne, History of the Reformation of the
Sixteenth Century, vol. 4. Trans. Henry Beveridge (William Collins: 1862), 524-535.
0
' While in each pamphlet Zwingli would regularly address Luther as "my dear Luth~r,"
the latter had no such niceties for his opponent. He opens his "Confession Concernmg
Christ's Supper" with the following diatribe, "Whoever will take warning, let him beware
of Zwingli and shun his books as the prince of hell's poison. For the man is completely
perverted and has entirely lost Christ. Other sacrarnentarians settle on one error, but this
man never publishes a book without spewing out new errors, more and more all the time."
Throughout this and other writings on the Eucharistic debates, "Zwingli" and "the devil" a~e
interchangeable for Luther. Martin Luther, "Confession Concerning Christ's Supper" m
Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings, ed. Timothy F. Lull (Minneapolis, MN:
Augsburg Fortress, 1989), 375-376.
'' In Greek mythology Thrasos was the Daimon (spirit) of excessively bold or rash
action and insolence. He was associated with Ate, the malevolent spirit of delusion.
http://www.theoi.com/Daimon!Thrasos.html.
12
Miller comments that here we note a backward movement from the principles of the
.Reformation, "Luther is no longer standing of the sure Word of God as his testimony, but
on the false ground of superstition. In place of trusting in tile living God and setting at
nought popes and emperors, he pitifully turns to his old enemies to be his friends and refuge
in the approaching discussion." Andrew Miller, Short Papers on Church History, Vol. III J
(London: G. Morrish 20, Paternoster Square, 1879), 33. It is important to note that Luther,
as well as Zwingli, had no desire to break with Rome. Their desire was to bring the Catholic )
Church back to the early faith. Luther had to be excommunicated, for ofhis own he refused
to leave the mother church, his goal was always reformation, never schism.
)
)
)
)
)
358 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
)
And although at present we are not agreed on the question whether
the real body and blood of Christ are corporally present in the bread
) Clearly Luther was not content to "agree to disagree." What was it about the
and wine, yet both parties shall cherish Christian charity for one
) another, so far as the conscience of each will permit; and both parties
will earnestly implore Almighty God to strengthen us by his Spirit in
) the true understanding. Amen. 13
)
As amicable as this sounded, Luther, the author of the Confession, had
) allowed for charity "so far as the conscience of each will permit." For he well
knew his own conscience would permit little if any charity towards "the
fanatics," as he termed them. Amidst tears, Zwingli begged for Luther's hand in
) fellowship, but Luther turned away stating that no brotherhood could ever exist
between them, for they did not have the same spirit. This one point of
) divergence was so central to Luther's theology that in rejecting it Luther
believed that Zwingli and his whole crew had entirely forfeited their salvation.
)
In saying that the emblems of the Lord's Supper were not the actual body and
) blood of Christ, they had become, in Luther's mind, guilty of "blasphemies and
deceitful heresy," "loathsome fanatics," "murderers of souls," who "possess a
) my blood" (Matt. 26:26, 27)? Did He mean that the bread and wine became His
bedeviled, thoroughly bedeviled, hyper-bedeviled heart and lying tongue," and
) who "have incurred their penalty and are committing 'sin which is mortal,"' they
are "blasphemers and enemies of Christ," and "God's and our condemned
enemies." 14 Clearly, Luther's conscience could permit no brotherhood.
And so, Marburg would see the first official splintering of the Protestant
)
faith into Lutheran and Swiss Reformed. Although agreed on so many Reformed
) doctrines, and even on many relating to the Lord's Supper, 15 the one issue of the
bodily presence of Christ in the Eucharist was so vitally crucial that here
) literal-mystical interpretation. Aristotle's categories had made a distinction
Luther's allegiance went back to Rome: he would rather "drink blood with the
) papists than wine with the fanatics." 16
How could the very teaching intended to establish the unity of Christ's
followers be the one to divide them? Luther scholar Reiko Oberman states "The
'scriptural principle'-believed with great certainty by all involved to be the
)
common basis of the Reformation--was mortgaged from the very beginning to
) the all-encompassing dispute over the Lord's Supper." 17 How could the two
leading Protestant Reformers, while unanimously upholding the supremacy of
) Scripture (the formal principle of the Reformation) hold such disparate views on
) the nature and purpose of the Lord's Supper? If, at the very outset of the
) 13
Philip Schaff, History ofthe Christian Church, Vol. VII, 872. Emphasis mine.
14
See Brie/Confession Concerning the Holy Sacrament, LW, 18:287-288, 290-291,
) Mystagogicae 4, 3-6 PG33, pp. 1098-1106 and Ambrose, De mysteriis 9,54,58, ed. Otto
296, 302-303, 316.
" Both rejected Catholic transubstantiation (the sacerdotal "making of God"), that the
) 19
Eucharist conveys grace ex opere operato, and that it is a re-sacrificing of Christ.
) 1
• Luther's Works, American edition [hereafter, LW] (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1955; St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1955), 37:317.
) 17
Reiko A. Oberman, The Reformation: Roots & Ramifications (Edinburg, Scotland:
T&T Clark Ltd, 1994), 198.
)
)
LUTHER IN THE EUCHARISTIC DEBATES 359
Reformation, the issue of Christ's presence could cause such vitriolic animosity
and splintering of the Protestant faith, we know we have touched a nerve point.
bodily presence of Christ that created such an intense impasse?
To answer these questions I will begin by tracing the history of the doctrine
of the Lord's Supper previous to the 16th century. After this we will spend some
time with the major Marburg expositors, Luther and Zwingli, to understand what
informed their viewpoints. The heart of this study will then delve into Luther's
view of the Real Presence to see if it tends to uphold the so/a Scriptura principle
or if it leans towards a mystical union with the divine effecting the divinization
of man. And in conclusion we will look at some of the ramifications of Luther's
view of the Eucharist (as the supreme manifestation of justification by faith) for
our church today. Although both Reformers will be treated in their backgrounds
and educations, I will focus primarily on Luther's views on the Eucharist and the
method in which he believed the sacramental union was effected.
History of the Eucharist: Bodily Presence and Sacramental Efficacy
What indeed did Christ mean when He said, "this is my body" and "this is
body and blood literally or figuratively? A literal interpretation would make
Christ mystically and corporally present in the bread and wine, a figurative
interpretation would make Him present through His Spirit. Because the intent of
the early Church Fathers was to inculcate within the uneducated an attitude of
awe towards the sacrament of the Mass, the consistent trend favored a literal-
mystical interpretation. 18 In the late eleventh century Lan.franc's erudite
application of Aristotle's Categories provided philosophical support for the
between a "substance" (the essential nature of a thing) and its "accident" (the
outer shape, color, smell, etc.). 19 For example, John will remain John (essential
nature) regardless of how old, wrinkled, or humped over (external "accidents")
he eventually becomes. In the case of the Eucharist, when the words of
institution, hoc est corpus meum (this is my body), are pronounced, the external
"accidents" of the bread remain unchanged, but the substance is said to have
changed-it is now the literal, physical body of Christ in substance. Hence a
trans-substantio or ''transubstantiation" has occurred.
18
G. R. Evans, The Roots of the Reformation: Tradition, Emergence and Rupture
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2012), 90. See also Cyril ofJerusalem, Catechesus
Faller, CSEL, 73 (1955), 92, 111, 114.
Aristotle's "Categories." In Jonathan Barnes' The Complete Works ofAristotle, 2
vols. Transl.':J. L. Ackrill. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), see 3-24. Aristotle
lists ten categories, the first ofwhich is substance (or essence) and is independent; the other
nine categories (quantity, quality, relation, place, time, positions, state, action and affection)
are "accidental" existing only in relationship with an "essence."
360 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
By the thirteenth century, the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) had made the
teaching of transubstantiation official Church dogma. 20 This created a strong
power of the priesthood (sacerdotalism) as the priests could literally "make
God." Pope Urban II makes this unsettlingly clear in stating that "The hands of
the priest are raised to an eminence granted to none of the angels, of creating
God, the Creator of all things, and of offering Him up for the salvation of the
whole world."21
As noted in Pope Urban's statement, another parallel power of the Catholic
priesthood was that of mediating saving grace to the penitents. In other words,
participating in the sacraments was seen as something the penitent could do to
elicit God's saving grace. The word sacrament comes from the Latin
sacramentum, meaning "mystery" and is derived from the Latin sacer connoting
"holiness." It contains two parts, the sacramentum, which is the external sign
(such as water in baptism, or bread in the Eucharist), and the res sacramenti,
which is what is signified, that is, the sacramental grace. Medieval philosopher
and mystic monk, Hugh of St. Victor (d.1141) distinguished three types of
sacrament. The first and most important involves baptism and the Eucharist "in
which salvation is chiefly to be found." 22 These rituals served as " conduits to
the divine ... and were guarantors of divine favour ex opera operato, that is,
they worked automatically and independently of earthly conditions. " 23 So in the
Mass the believer could witness both the creation of God and, in eating His
body, receive absolution for his sins. The way for making this official church
doctrine in the 13 th century had already been paved in the 1st century AD by
Ignatius of Antioch who termed the Eucharistic Mass "the medicine of
immortality."24 Ignatius taught that this "medicine" grants the penitent
participation in divine immortality, thus overcoming the curse of death
introduced by sin.25 Ignatius' description of the Eucharist as "medicine of
immortality'' was later used by Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholics to justify
the belief in salvation as a sacramental process of theosis, that is, "divinization"
or "deification,"26-a theme we will revisit in more detail further in our study.
20
Olson, 358.
21
Andrew Miller, Short Papers on Church History, Vol. III, (London: 1879), 26.
Emphasis mine.
22
·The second type of sacrament is not 'necessary to salvation' but is useful for
promoting holiness, such as scattering water and ashes; and the third type is instituted to
make possible the administration of the sacraments, such as the ordination of ministers."
Evans, The Roots ofthe Reformation, 95-96. For a detailed analysis see Hugh of St Victor,
On the sacraments ofthe Christian faith: (De sacramentis), translated by Roy J Deferrari,
(Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1951 ).
21
C. Scott Dixon, The Reformation in Germany (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002),
41.
24
Ignatius, To the Ephesians, 20.
" Roger Olson, 48.
26
Ibid.
LUTHER IN THE EUCHARISTIC DEBATES 361 J
)
As a result it is no wonder that the twelfth century saw a rise in the
popularity of the Mass. The new philosophical rationale and papal dictum )
regarding transubstantiation heralded an even greater role for the Eucharist in
popular life. The Feast of Corpus Christi was instituted in 1264 and the Easter )
season soon became a time for the performance of mystery plays and emotional )
processions as countless penitents crowded around the uplifted "Christ" as "he"
was paraded through the streets.27 It is impossible to overestimate the impact of )
the Eucharist in medieval life.28
Protestant historian, James Wylie, states that the power of the Eucharistic
Christ "operated mysteriously upon the soul. It was no longer an ordinance, it .)
was now a spell, a charm."29 Not only was the Mass the center of medieval
soteriology, ecclesiology, and Christology, it was also deeply fixed in the )
popular affections. It would be one thing to dethrone the Pope of the church, but
it would be quite another to dethrone the Christ of the Mass.30 As I shall note,
this is precisely what Zwingli set out to do. Luther, on the other hand, merely )
dressed the mystical Christ of the Eucharist in Protestant garb. Why and how he
did this is the focus of this study.
)
Luther and Zwingli: A Biographical Introduction
Although Luther's view of the Eucharist is the main focus of this study, a .J
general biographical overview of both Reformers is necessary to understand why )
they were so diametrically opposed in their perspectives. Luther and Zwingli
were true contemporaries, having been born only seven weeks apart. They were J
both born to affluent families of peasant stock. Both were musically gifted and
27
The worship of the host was not uncommon and people often snuck contraband
pieces home to plant in their fields in hopes of better crops. See Miri Rubin, Corpus Christi:
The Eucharist
28
in Late Medieval Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
"The idea of the corporal presence of Christ in the holy supper threw a halo ofsacred
importance around it, excited the imagination of the people and fixed it deeply in their
affections. It was the origin of many ceremonies and superstitions, of great wealth and .)
dominion to the priesthood, and the most stupendous miracles were said to be wrought by
the consecrated bread, both among the living and the dead. It thus became the corner stone
ofthe papal edifice." Andrew Miller, Short Papers on Church History, Vol. III, (London:
1879), 25. Emphasis mine.
29
James A. Wylie, The History ofProtestantism, Vol. 2, 53.3. Interestingly, many
believe that the etymology of the word "hocus pocus" (the generic term for magic) is derived
from "hoc est corpus meum" the Latin words for the institution of the Eucharist
(http://v.ww.etymonline.com/index.php?terrn=hocus-pocus).
10
By 1533 Luther had made a distinction between "Mass" and "sacrament," where the
first implied a meritorious work and the other a reception of a saving grace offered by the
priest. From his Letter Concerning His Book on the Private Mass Luther speaks of this
distinction, "For me mass and sacrament at the altar were one and the same thing, as they
were at that time for all ofus. Yet they are not one and the same thing. It is the mass when
I sacrifice the sacrament to God for my sins and the sins ofothers as a work performed by )
human beings (whether they be evil or godly) . . . it is the sacrament when I receive from the
priest the body and blood of our Lord Jesus Christ under the bread and wine," LW 38:227.
J
)
 )
)
)
) 362 Sn,VIA CANALE B ACCHIOCCHI
) both spoke German-the difference being that Luther spoke with a Saxon dialect
) and Zwingli a Swiss German. 31 Together they were the co-originators of the
Protestant Reformation; for while Luther is known as the originator of the
doctrine of justification by faith, Zwingli came upon this truth by himself and
) began to teach it independently of Luther's discovery.32 One became the Father
of Lutheranism, the other the Father of Reformed Protestantism.33
For all their similarities, their differences were pronounced. Zwingli grew
up a free spirit among the Alpine meadows of his native Switzerland. He was a •
)
young p arish priest, gregarious and even tempered, and cared passionately for
the unity and Christian growth of his congregation. 34 Luther, in contrast,
complained of an overly severe upbringing. His self-isolation as a monk and
) p ersonal sensitivities demanded an external source of assurance to assuage his
) tormented soul. 35 His early privations h ad left their mark in a constant nervous
tension that made him easily irritable. However, the greatest difference between
) these two giants of Protestantism (and most pivotal in terms of the current study)
centers on their education. For while Luther and Zwingli shared an ardent
)
passion for scholarship, their keen academic appetites were fed at universities
) that presented diametrically opposed approaches to knowledge in general and
biblical hermeneutics in particular.
) 1h
) Differences in Education
Ulrich Zwingli studied in Vienna and B asle. He was educated in the
) medieval scholastic theology of the via antiqua.36 At Basle, Zwingli worked
) his theology. Also, it is interesting that, unlike Luther, Zwingli did not receive a doctorate
31
John B. Payne "Zwingli and Luther: The Giant vs. Hercules" Christianity Today
) Online http://www.christianitytoday.com/ch/1984/issue4/408.htrnl?start=3. It is interesting
to note that his alone posed a threat to unity as the Germans loathed the Swiss and the Swiss
resented the Germans.
32
) David Gideon Hagstotz and Hilda Boettcher Hagstotz. Heroes ofthe Reformation.
(Rapidan: Hartland Publications, 1996), 278.
) 33
As significant as John Calvin was in systematizing Reformed theology, Olson argues
that "it would be difficult to find any doctrinal insights or contributions in Calvin's work that
) were not already discovered and articulated by Luther and Zwingli." As such Olson grants
the title of "Father of Reformed theology'' to Zwingli. Roger E. Olson, The Story of
) Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition and Reform, (Downers Grove, IL: IVP
Academic, 1999), 399.
) 34
G. R. Potter, Zwingli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 22-25.
" Jean Rillet does a thorough job of analysing these two Reformers from a
psychological perspective in exploring their personal histories and personalities and then
) connecting them to their disparate roles in the Marburg debates: "The Eucharistic
controversy between the reformers plunges its roots deep into the very hearts of the two
) believers ... [where] the Christian with all his subjectivity seeks to find his way as he explores
the pages of Holy Scripture." Jean Rillet, Zwingli: Third Man of the Reformation, trans.
) Harold Knight (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1959), 215.
)
36
Zwingli was a student ofThomas Wyttenbach, a representative ofthe via antiqua at
Basel University. The via antiqua taught that there was a continuity between human and
divine reason- this school also went by the designations of Thomism, Scotisrn, and
I)
I)
L UTIIER IN TIIE EUCHARISTIC DEBATES 363
especially on Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) through whom he felt the
importance of a solid theology constructed on the basis of reason. 37 A more
contemporary influence on Zwingli was that of humanism, particularly that of
D esiderius Erasmus. Erasmus advocated a return to the Bible and the simplicity
of the early Church, criticizing the Catholic Church for its excesses (though he
never broke with it). His Praise of Folly and Enchiridion hastened the
Reformation, but his publication of the Greek New Testament was the final
catalyst. Eramsus had the heart of a Reformer, but none of the mettle. 38 He was
made of softer stuff than could weather the stake or even excommunication. But
he offered the materials (mainly the Greek New Testament) which would
provide the ground and anchor for the coming Reformation. 39 Zwingli promptly
purchased Erasmus' New Testament, copied and memorized it in its entirety.
H e referred to Erasmus as a "paragon of learning and the sum of all the
40
virtues." Erasmus didn't condemn the Catholic Mass but he called it irrelevant.
"Reason settled everything with him... he was a distinct rationalist."41 Erasmus'
views on peace, reliance on common sense reasoning, and the antiritualistic
tendency ofhis thought would make a deep impression on Zwingli.42
Luther, on the other hand, studied at Erfurt and was given a thoroughly
43
nominalist education. Nominalism, also known as the via moderna, developed
in the 14 century as a reaction against the rational theology of the via antiqua·.
Augustinianism. While Zwingli knew about the via moderna (which advocated a
discontinuity between divine and human reason), he nonetheless upheld the via antiqua in
in theology. This upset some who believed "Master" Huldrych should leave certain matters
alone to the better jurisdiction of bishops and learned doctors. Timothy George, Theology
ofthe Refonners, (Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishing Group, 2013), 124.
37
Rillet, 27.
38
Though Erasmus did not consider himselfa theologian, he is nonetheless viewed by
many as one of the greatest theologians (and certainly Reformer) of the Renaissance, Olson,
361-2.
39
''The influence ofthis work on the Reformation was incalculable. It became the basis
for Luther's German translation and provided all scholars throughout Christendom with a
touchstone for interpretation as well as translation work. Before Erasmus's Greek New
Testament ... the only Bible ...was the Latin Vulgate, which was the authoritative text of the
Roman Catholic Church. ·Erasmus's text showed it to be a relatively poor translation, and
that stimulated and equipped the growing movement towards translating the Bible into the
vernacular
40
languages of the peoples of Europe." Ibid., 363-4.
Hagstotz, 267.
41
Ibid, 266.
42
Jean Rillet, Zwingli: Third Man of the Reformation, trans. Harold Knight
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), 2 15.
" McGrath observes that in 1511, when Luther returned to Wittenberg, he "found an
Augustinian priory and a university in which three particularly significant elements oflater
medieval thought were established," viz, the studia humanitatis, the via moderna, and the
schola Augustiniana m oderna. Alister McGrath, Luther's Theology of the Cross,
(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990), 27.

364 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
Where the via antiqua (Zwingli) emphasized the role of reason in spiritual
revelation, the via moderna (Luther) underscored direct experience (i.e. faith)
over abstract reason. It was Luther's nominalist/via moderna training that
prompted him to make his most unflattering comparison of reason to "that great
whore" that seduces away from faith in Christ.44 In more genteel terms, Luther
notes:
Indeed I believe that I owe to the Lord this duty of crying out
against philosophy and turning men to Holy Scripture .... I have been in
the grind of these studies for lo, these many years and am worn out by
it, and, on the basis of long experience, I have come to be persuaded
that it is a vain study doomed to perdition. For this reason, I admonish
you all as earnestly as I can: Be quickly done with these studies and let
it be your only concern not to establish and to defend them but rather to
deal with them as with bad skills that we learn only in order to get rid
of them or with errors that we take up in order to refute them .... It is
high time that we turn away from irrelevant studies and learn from
Christ 'and him crucified.' 45
However, while Luther may have repudiated reason and philosophy in
theory, he continued to use them in practice. Raul Kerbs notes that Luther
appeals to Plato and Aristotle in building support for the notion of one God. 46 In
effect, Kerbs points out, it was not reason Luther rejected, but human reason.
Theological reason, on the other hand, was permissible for theological matters:47
•• "Reason is the Devil's greatest whore; by nature and manner of being she is a
noxious whore; she is a prostitute, the Devil's appointed whore; whore eaten by scab and
leprosy who ought to be trodden underfoot and destroyed, she and her wisdom... Throw
dung in her face to make her ugly. She is and she ought to be drowned in baptism." Martin
Luther, Works, Erlangen Edition XVI, 142-148.
4
s Martin Luther, Lectures on Romans, XV, 236.
46
Raul Kerbs, El Problema de la Identidad Biblica de! Cristianismo (Entre Rios,
Argentina: Adventus Editorial, 2014), 574. Kerbs, an Adventist philosopher, was a student
of Canale's and greatly influenced by his teachings in general and particularly his
dissertation, A Cristicism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions. As such, Kerbs has written a volume that examines philosophical and
theological thought, from the Presocratics to the Reformation, from the perspective oftheir
basic presuppositions. His analysis ofLuther's presuppositions are found on pages 567-594.
Kerbs' first volume has been published in Spanish and is currently being translated into
English. He is presently working on a second volume spanning the period of the
Reformation to the present.
47
Luther's distinction between human reason and theological reason is the result of his
Neoplatonic two-tier cosmology, which I will explore later. In this construct, human reason
would belong to the physical realm of the body and civil government, whereas theological
reason would be applicable for the timeless realm of God and the human spirit, which, for
Luther, is the main emphasis of theology.
)
LUTHER IN THE EUCHARISTIC DEBATES 365 )
"If we4 8 want to use philosophical terms [Luther notes] we must give them a )
bath."
)
Another source Luther uses for biblical interpretation is tradition. It must be
remembered that Luther was an Augustinian monk and upheld the teachings of )
St. Augustine as tantamount to Scripture.49 In fact, "Luther uses a pedagogical
)
order that goes from the Church Fathers to the Scriptures instead of a critical
order that begins in Scripture and proceeds to the Fathers. Luther is unaware )
that, through the Church Fathers, he is adopting the philosophic interpretation of
the basic presuppositions."50
Luther's reliance of philosophy can primarily be traced in his application of
the methods of nominalist philosopher and Franciscan friar, William of Ockham
51
(1287-1347). Ockham taught that "only faith gives us access to theological )
truths. The ways of God are not open to reason, for God has freely chosen to
create a world and establish a way of salvation within it apart from any
necessary laws that human logic or rationality can uncover." 52 While Aquinas )
had perfected the great "medieval synthesis" of faith and reason, Ockham
destroyed it. Much has been debated about Ockham's influence upon Luther, 53
but that he was a nominalist and an avid student of the works of Ockham )
54
remains undisputed. Luther himself proudly associated himself with the man
48
Unfortunately, Luther never explains how this ablation transpires, but through this
baptism, theological reason becomes a useful tool, as does philosophy. LW, I, 45, 91.
49
See A.G. Dickens, Martin Luther and the Reformation (New York, 1967), 22-3 1;
Heiko Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation (New York, 1966) 127; Daniel Day
Williams, "The Significance of St. Augustine Today," in A Companion to the Study ofSt.
Augustine, ed. Roy W. Battenhause (Grand Rapids: I 979), 3-5; and Patricia Wilson-Kastner, J
"On Partaking of the Divine Nature: Luther's Dependence on Augustine," Andrews
University Seminary Studies 22: I (Spring 1984).
so Kerbs, 575. Translation mine. It should be noted that nearly all of of the Reformers
(with the most notable exception ofthe Anabaptists) did not hold a critical view ofthe early
Church Fathers but assumed they were to be trusted as thoroughly biblical expositors of the
truth. As such, they would freely and even blindly use them to aid and support their own
interpretations of Scripture.
st
Raul Kerbs does a stellar job of developing Ockham's philosophy, theology and
particularly his influence upon Luther. He states that, "following the guidelines ofOckham's
nominalism, Luther rejects human reason in theology as a matter of their belonging to
different areas." Reason functions and rules within the worldly sphere, but faith is what
rules in the spiritual sphere. Furthermore for Luther faith is greater when reason is less. Raul
Kerbs, El Prob/ema de la Identidad Biblica de/ Cristianismo (Entre Rios, Argentina:
Adventus Editorial, 2014), 568,571.
" Dale T. Irvin & Scott W. Sunquist. His tory ofthe World Christian Movement Volume
.J
I: Earliest Christianity to 1453, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2001) 434.
s, For more on this seeHeiko A. Oberman's Luther: Man Between God and the Devil,
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006).
s• Alister McGrath points out that not only did Luther study Ockham (through his
successors, Pierre d 'Ailly and Gabriel Biel) he thoroughly absorbed their teachings (italics
mine). Reformation Thought. An Introduction, (London: Blackwell, 1993), 80.
 ) 366 SILVIA C ANALE B ACCHJOCCHJ
55
referring to him as: "My master Occam was the greatest dialectician." Reiko
) Oberman notes that it was Luther's nominalist education at Erfurt that had
armed him with the weapons he would use to establish the Reformation: First
was the nominalist subordination of reason to experience (faith), and second the
) distinction between God's Word and human reason.56
)
The Marburg Debate
) Having traced the outlines of Zwingli's and Luther' s approach to knowledge
in general and the Bible in particular, let us take up the Marburg discussion of
the Eucharist and see how each Reformer defended his views. With the help of
)
D 'Aubigne's pen we now jump into the discussion mid argument to get a feel
for the tension of the debate on both sides:
) exist in a place. If it is in a place, it is in heaven, whence it follows that
"I oppose you," said (Zwingli], "with this article of our faith: Ascendit
) in caelum- he ascended into heaven. If Christ is in heaven, as regards
his body, how can h e be in the bread? The Word of God teaches us that
he was like his brethren in all things (Heb. ii. 17). He therefore cannot
) be in several places at once."
)
Luther.-"Were I desirous of reasoning thus, I would undertake to
) prove that Jesus Christ had a wife; that he had black eyes, and lived in
our good country of Germany. I care little ab out mathematics."
)
) "There is no question of mathematics here," said Zwingli, "but of St.
Paul, who writes to the Philippians (2:7], [Zwingli, now speaking in
j Greek]: "taking the form of a bondservant."
Luther, interrupting him.-"Read it to us in Latin or German, not in
) Greek."
) so that "to employ a number of principles (to explain phenomena) when it is
Zwingli (in Latin).- ''Pardon me: for twelve years past I have made use
) of the Greek Testament only." Then continuing to read the passage, he
concluded from it that Christ's humanity is of a finite nature like our
) own.
.J
J.
" Oberman, 120. Oberman further notes that the nominalist philosophers on faculty at
) Erfurt had armed Luther with the conceptual dialogical weapons that would become
essential to the Reformation. First was the nominalist subordination ofreason to experience.
)
Secondly was the distinction between God's Word and human reason. See also T. Bruce
) Birth, The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham (Burlington, IA: The Lutheran
Literary Board, 1930), 187.
) '
6
Oberman, 120. See also T. Bruce Birth, The De Sacramento Altaris of William of
Ockham (Burlington, IA: The Lutheran Literary Board, 1930), 187.
) 1946), 103.
t)
L UTHER IN THE E UCHARISTIC DEBATES 367
Luther, pointing to the words written before him-"Most dear sirs,
since my Lord Jesus Christ says, Hoc est corpus meum, I believe that
his body is really there."
Here the scene grew animated. Zwingli started from his chair, sprung
towards Luther, and said, striking the table before him:
"You maintain then, doctor, that Christ's body is _locally in the
Eucharist; for you say Christ's body is really there- there- there,"
repeated Zwingli.
"There is an adverb of place. Christ's body is then of such a nature as to
it is not in the bread."
Luther.- "! repeat that I have nothing to do with mathematical proofs.
As soon as the words of consecration are pronounced over the bread,
the body is there, however wicked be the priest who pronounces them."
Zwingli.- "You are thus re-establishing Popery."57
Here we see the workings of Ockham's influence on Luther. First of all
while Zwingli's
58
method was to compare Scripture with Scripture to find rational
agreement, Luther was content to allow for biblical inconsistencies. 59 For
Luther, reason cannot penetrate invisible things,60 nor understand God, nor His
works, nor the incarnation of Christ, nor His Word.61
Secondly, in Luther' s insistence upon the exclusive authority of hoc est
corpus meum, we detect the influence of Ockham's lex parsimoniae (later in
history referred to as "Ockham's razor") which argues for economy of argument,
possible to use a few is a waste of time. " 62 In other words, if a particular event in
nature can be explained by reference to a single causal antecedent, it is
superfluous to posit more than one. For example, if someone sees a rock fall, it
" J. H. Merle D'Aubigne and H. White, History ofthe Reformation ofthe 16'" Century,
reprint (Prestonsburg, KY: Reformation Publishers, 2008), 530-531.
'" See fn. 64 below.
9
' Roger Olson notes that Luther "was a dialectical thinker, meaning he reveled in the
paradoxical nature of truth. He believed that God's Word reveals a message beyond human
reason or comprehension and that its truth is often couched in apparent contradictions,"
Olson, 379.
60
MLW, I, 18, 729.
61
62 MLW, I, 6,291; MLW, I, 40; MLW, I, 37, 43 : MLW, 23, 127, MLW, 26, 439.
Meyrick H. Carre, Realists and Nominalists (London: Oxford University Press,

368 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
63
is useless to try to explain a demon did it. Similarly, if one argument or text
adequately proves a point (based on faith/experience), then no other text need be
consulted. And so we see that, against numerous biblical arguments by
Zwingli,64 Luther holds to faith in the four words of institution over reasoned
arguments from Scripture.
A third and final influence of Ockham, one that directly affects Luther's
understanding of the Real Presence, is detected in The Babylonian Captivity of
the Church (1520). Here Luther states that Pierre d'Ailly (a pupil of Ockham)
influenced him greatly towards his reinterpretation of the Catholic position on
the Real Presence: "He [d 'Ailly] argues with great acumen that to hold that real
bread and real wine, and not merely their accidents, are present on the altar,
would be much more probable and require fewer superfluous miracles."65
Similarly, Ockham had previously stated: "There is no contradiction involved in
the statement that through divine power the substance of the bread may be able
to remain with the body of Christ. And [this] seems to me more probable and
more in accord with theology, because it rather exalts the omnipotence of God
by detracting nothing from it, nor does it plainly and expressly imply a
contradiction."66 So we see that Luther, like d 'Ailly and Ockham before him, is
essentially upholding the mystical Catholic view of the Eucharist as the Real
63
Olson, 35 1.
64
In reference to Luther's relentless repetition of"this is my body." Zwingli countered
with "It is the Spirit who gives life; the flesh profits nothing. The words that I speak to you
are spirit, and they are life" John 6:63. Zwingli explains further, "When Christ, in John 6,
had done his best to show that salvation depended upon our trust in him as having died for
us, employing figurative language as to his body and blood, the Jews were just as much
dumbfounded as ourselves at that language, and fancied that he was giving his flesh to be
chewed by the teeth. Then Christ came to their aid while there was yet time, though a large
part of his disciples had abandoned him, and warned them that the flesh profits nothing."
Likewise Zwingli made use of similar tropes or figures of speech, such as John 15:5, "I am
the vine"; and Matthew 13 in the parable of the sower, where "the one who sows the good
seed is the Son of Man, and the field is the world. In both cases "it" should be understood
as "represents" or "signifies." Most significant was the case of the Passover lamb in Exodus
12:11 where the lamb "is the Lord's Passover"; clearly the lamb merely represented the
Lord's Passover. Huldrych Zwingli, "Subsidiary Essay on the Eucharist, August 1525," in
H. Wayne Pipkin (trans.), Huldrych Zwingli: Writings Volume Two, (Allison Park, PA:
Pickwick Publications, 1984), 219.
6
' Martin Luther, "The Babylonian Captivity of the Church," in Martin Luther's Basic
Theological Writings, ed. Timothy F. Lull (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1989),
285. Luther states that his intent is that "no violence is to be done to the words of God,
whether by man or angel. They are to be retained in their simplest meaning as far as
possible." Martin Luther, Three Treatises (Fortress Press, 1970), 146.
66
T. Bruce Birch, The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham (Burlington, IA:
The Lutheran Literary Board, 1930), 187.
,,
)
LUTHER IN THE EUCHARISTIC DEBATES )
369
Presence of the physical Christ, while rejecting the philosophically derived )
doctrine of transubstantiation.67
)
Communicatio ldiomatum )
From the rather heated dialogue between Luther and Zwingli we note that
)
the dealbreaker at Marburg had to do with the interpretation of two biblical
phrases, "this is my body" and "seated at the right hand of God." Zwingli )
maintained that they were mutually exclusive, either Christ was in heaven or in
the Eucharist, He could not be in both. Essentially, the argument centered on the )
relationship between Christ's human and divine natures and how they were
manifested. In other words, was Christ 's physical human nature (body) limited
to a certain geographical space or could it be omnipresent? The way the
Reformers interpreted the communication between the divine and human natures
of Christ, communicatio idiomatum, 68 made all the difference. )
No, said Zwingli, Christ could not be physically present in the Eucharist, for )
after His ascension His body resides in heaven. Christ could no longer be
corporally present on earth in His humanity- although through His divine nature
He would be present everywhere.69 This is where Zwingli affirms "it was
[Christ's] humanity that went away. . . it is his human nature which is taken
)
67
Though later historians have labelled Luther's Eucharistic view as consubstantiation,
it is important to emphasize that Luther never used this phrase. Instead, he regularly referred )
to the "Sacramental Union" where the real presence of Christ is "in, with and under" the
elements ofthe bread and wine (Olson, 394,395). Here we see that, instead ofmoving away
from a mystical view of the Eucharist to a biblical one, Luther, though rejecting the
philosophical rationalizations of the Catholic Church (and Aristotle) yet retains its general
mystical view ofthe Eucharist-with the rationale that we must accept the Sacramental Union
by faith.
68
Richard Cross notes Zwingli's position to be in three parts: (1) the person ofChrist
can be designated by the predicates of both natures; (2) the whole God-man can be named
)
even though only one of the natures is meant; and (3) one of the natures can be meant even
though the other is named. "Alloiosis in the Christology of Zwingli" The Journal of
Theological Studies, April 1, 1996: 105-122.
69
Zwingli held that Scripture may attribute the elements ofChrist's divine nature to His
human nature, he calls this a figure of speech, or alloiosis. In this view, the statement "the
Son of Man forgives sins" or "the Son of God suffered" means that "He who is the Son of
God and of man in one person suffered, according to the peculiar quality of His human
nature; and He who is the Son of God and of man in one person forgives sins, according to
the peculiar quality of the divine nature." S. M. Jackson, trans., The Latin Works of
Huldreich Zwingli, vol. 2, ed. W. J. Hinke (Philadelphia: Heidelberg, 1922), 37. In this,
Zwingli splits Christ's reconciling work into parts that relate to his two natures. Later
Reformed Christology rejected Zwingli's division of Christ's natures maintaining the unity
of Christ's human-divine nature, so that "in this assumed human nature, indeed by and with
the same, the Son of God carried out the entire work of redeeming the human race."
Reformed Confessions: Theology from Zurich to Barmen (Westminster: John Knox Press, )
1998), 109.
)
J
J
 .i
)
)
) SILVIA CANALE BACCIDOCCHI
370
) 70
away by these words, since his divine nature cannot help being everywhere."
-. So for Zwingli, the Lord's Supper is not a meal where we eat the body of Christ
physically, but spiritually: "To eat the body of Christ spiritually is nothing else
) than to trust in spirit and heart upon the mercy and goodness of God through
Christ, that is, to be sure with unshaken faith that God is going to give us pardon
for our sins and the joy of everlasting blessedness on account of His Son, who
was made wholly ours, was offered for us, and reconciled the divine
righteousness to us.
71
72
Luther's Christ-Centered Panentheism
Against Zwingli, Luther asserted that after His ascension, Christ could be
) physically present both at the right hand of the Father (in heaven) and in the
) Eucharist. As support Luther used Ephesians 4:22: "He who descended is also
the One who ascended far above all the heavens, that He might fill all things."
) He then argues that "[n]ot only according to his divine nature, but also
) according to his human nature, he is lord of all things, has all things in his hand,
13
and is present everywhere. ... Christ is all around us and in us in all places."
Bernard Lohse explains that for Luther, "God confronts us exclusively in Christ.
. . . Nowhere is Christ only spiritually present. If he is present, he must be
) present bodily, otherwise his presence would have no saving effect. Christ's
) risen and exalted body is always his crucified body, and it is his crucified body
which is exalted."74 Luther's view of the communication of Christ's divine-
) human properties is so firmly fused that Christ's humanity shares in divine
omnipresence to the point that Christ is not just corporally present in the
J supernatural realm of God where He is "simultaneously present in all places
) 10 Huldrych Zwingli: Writings Volume Two, (Allison Park, PA: Pickwick Publications,
1984), 331.
). 71 Ulrich Zwingli, "An Account of the Faith of Zwingli," On Providence and Other
) Essays, eds. Samuel Jackson and William John Hinke (Durham, NC: Labyrinth, 1983), 252.
72 Cooper points out that the term "panentheism" was coined by Karl Krause (1781-
j 1832), a contemporary of Schleiermacher and Hegel, but was not commonly used until
Charles Hartshorne popularized it in the mid-twentieth century. As such, while it is
y anachronistic to refer to anyone previous to that time as a panentheist, Cooper believes the
term "implicit panentheism" can apply to anyone whose ideology fits its description. As
j such, our identification of Luther's thought with panentheism would be an implicit one.
Also, up until the 20'" century, most panentheistic ideologies were labeled as a species of
) pantheism. The difference between these terms is that the former believes "all is in God''
): .
(God is interpenetrates humanity immanently, yet transcends timelessly beyond it), whereas
the latter states that "all is God'' (God as imminent, non-personal, nor anthropomorphic).
) : John W. Cooper, Panentheism: The Other God ofthe Philosophers (Grand Rapids: Baker
Academic, 2006), 26-27. As such, had this current study been written a hundred years ago,
) I would have labeled Luther's Christology as "implicit pantheism."
n Martin Luther, "A Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ-Against the
) Fanatics" in Martin Luther's Basic Theological Writings, ed. TimothyF. Lull, (Minneapolis,
) MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1989), 321. Emphasis mine.
14 A Short History ofChristian Doctrine, trans. Ernest Stoeftler (Fortress Press, 1985),
aj 173.
I:
LUTHER IN THE EUCHARISTIC DEBATES 371
Eucharist, but he physically permeates all things. 75 Here it appears that Luther's
thought is nearly indistinguishable from panentheism. Panentheism, literally
"all-in-God-ism," is where the divine interpenetrates every part of nature yet
extends timelessly beyond it.76 And yet Luther goes beyond panentheism, for it
is not just the spirit of the divine that is present in nature, but, as we have noted,
the actual corporal body of Christ: "Heaven and earth are his sack; as wheat fills
the sack, so he fills all things. As seed bears a stalk, an ear, and many kernels ...
much more is Christ able to distribute himselfwhole and undivided into so many
particles."77
Two years later, in 1528, pressed by Zwingli's persistent rebuttals in the
Eucharistic pamphlet debates, Luther elaborated on this panentheistic view of
Christ. In his "Confession Concerning Christ's Supper" he explains that "[t]here
are three modes of being present in a given place : locally or circumscriptively,
definitively, [and] repletively." He proceeds to describe the presences: (1)
Circumscribed Presence. This is when an object fills a space with its exact
measurements, such as water in a pitcher or a person walking, "space and object
correspond exactly, item by item."
(2) Uncircumscribed Presence. This is indicated where an object or body is
not palpably in one place and not measurable. An example would be the demons
who entered the swine or the whole legion of devils in one man (Matt. 8). Luther
writes: "This was the mode in which the body of Christ was present when he
came out of the closed grave, and came to the disciples through a closed door, as
the gospels show78 • • • Just so, Christ can be and is in the bread, even though he
can also show himself in circumscribed and visible form wherever he wills."79
(3) Replete Presence: This third and last mode of Christ's presence is the
whole and entire, and fills all places, yet without being measured or
circumscribed by any place in terms of the space which it occupies." 80 While this
75
Ibid., 174.
76
See fu. 72.
77
Luther, Against the Fanatics, 322. Emphasis mine.
78
Although Luther makes much of Christ walking through his gravestone and through
the door (when he appeared to the disciples), the Bible does not say that Christ went through
the gravestone, but that "an angel of the Lord descended from heaven and came and rolled
back the stone from the door, and sat on it." Matt. 28:2. Likewise the account of Jesus
appearing in the upper room does not say he went through the door, but that in a moment "he
stood in the midst of them" and then continued to assert that he was not a spirit, but "flesh
and bones" Luke 24:36-39.
79
Luther, "Confession Concerning Christ's Supper," in Martin Luther's Basic
Theological Writings, ed. Timothy F. Lull, (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Fortress, 1989),
385.
80
Ibid. Emphasis mine. This unqualified statement of God's omnipresence as
automatically filling all places with His presence yet extending beyond them, is a perfect
definition ofpanentheism and the basis for Luther's Christocentric panentheism. In biblical
tenns, being filled with God's fullness is not described in terms ofa physical indwelling, but

372 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
is the realm of God alone, "since [Christ] is a man who is supernaturally one
person with God. .. it must follow that according to the third supernatural mode,
he is and can be wherever God is and that everything is full of Christ through
and through, even according to his humanity."81
Because Christ's divine nature is omnipresent, Luther extends that quality to
Christ's human nature also, so that it too is ubiquitous:
Take notice and listen to us. Christ's body is at the right hand of God;
that is granted. The right hand of God, however, is everywhere ....
Therefore it surely is present also in the bread and wine at the table.
Now where the right hand of God is, there Christ's body and blood
must be, for the right hand of God is not divisible into many parts but a
single, simple entity.82
Luther might as well have chiseled hoc est corpus meum on the table at
Marburg, for from these he would not budge a millimeter:
I protest that I differ from my adversaries with regard to the doctrine of
the Lord's Supper, and that I shall always differ from them. Christ said,
'This is My body.' Let them show me that a body is not a body. I reject
reason, common sense, carnal arguments, and mathematical proofs.
God is above mathematics. We have the Word of God; we must adore
and perform it. .. No consideration shall ever induce me to depart from
the literal meaning of these words, and I shall not listen either to sense
or reason, with the words of God before me.83
From this context it would strongly appear that the "W ord" or "words of
God" for Luther are not all the words in Scripture, for Zwingli had spent the p ast
four years presenting numerous biblical arguments to show the futility of
Luther's stance. It would seem that the "Word of God" that Luther is here
one that begins with a cognitive understanding. Ephesians explains that it is when we
"comprehend" (3:18) and "know" (v. 19) the love of God revealed in the redemptive history
that we can be filled with God's fullness. Similarly, Christ's final prayer for His disciples
in John 17 explains that He has given them God's words, which they have received and kept
(v. 6, 8), because of this indwelling word they are in the process of sanctification or
indwelling of Christ (v. 17). On the basis of Christ's cognitive indwelling through His
revealed words in Scripture, the unity of believers with Christ and God is effected (v. 23),
with the ultimate goal of a physical nearness to Christ: "That they may be with me where
I am, that they may behold My glory which You have given Me" (v. 24).
81
Ibid., 387. Emphasis mine.
82
LW 37:63,64.
83
This violent exclamation was pronounced by Luther at Marburg even before the
deliberations were so much as opened, or a single argument was advanced. Gustav
Ferdinand Leopold Konig, Heirich Gelzer, Jean Henri Merle d' Aubigne, The Luther
Memorial, (Philadelphia: Memorial Publishing, 1883), 456.
()
)
L UTHER IN THE EUCHARISTIC D EBATES 373 )
)
referring to is limited to the literal interpretation of the four words he had written
on the table before rum: hoc est corpus meum. And yet, while Luther held that )
Christ is present corporally in all of nature, we must be careful not to look for
Christ just anywhere we please, )
)
Although he [Christ] is present in all creatures, and I might find him in
stone, in fire, in water, or even in a rope, for he certainly is there, yet he
does not wish that I seek him there apart from the Word, and cast
)
myself into the fire or the water, or hang myself on the rope. He is
present everywhere, but he does not wish that you grope for rum
everywhere. Grope rather where the Word is, and there you will lay
hold ofhim in the right way.84
Though Scripture teaches to value all doctrine (2 Tim. 3: 16), and Christ
taught us to live by "every word that comes from the mouth of God" (Matt. 4:4), )
Luther held supreme the four words that made God physically present in the
Eucharist. Why?
Union with Christ as Deification
Hans-Martin Barth explains that for Luther, everytrung depended on the .)
word is in "trus is my body. To switch it to "signifies. .. opens a soteriological )
distance between Christ and the communicant that contradicts the promise of the
words of institution.... [The gift of the Lord 's Supper] is the saving function of
the sacrament together with the word of God." 85
And it is through the faithful eating of Christ's body (while exercising faith
in the promise/word) that salvation is effected:
The heart cannot eat it physically nor can the mouth eat it spiritually.
So God arranges that the mouth eats physically for the heart and the
heart eats spiritually for the mouth, and thus both are satisfied and
saved by one and the same food. . . . Perishable food is transformed into
the body wruch eats it; this food, however transforms the person who
eats it into what it is itself and makes him like itself, spiritual, alive, and
eternal. ... So, when we eat Christ's flesh physically and spiritually,
84
Luther, Against the Fanatics, 321-322.
85
Hans-Martin Barth, The Theology of Martin Luther: A Critical Assessment,
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2013), 238. Emphasis mine. Similarly, Kenneth
Craycraft affirms that the sacrament is meaningless unless "God's Word and commandment
[' take eat, this is my body' Matt. 26:26] are added to it." [Quoting Luther] "'The Word must
make the element a sacrament; otherwise it remains a mere element.' ... This Word is the
Word of promise which, as the content of the sacrament, brings the forgiveness of sins." )
Kenneth R. Craycraft, Jr., "Sign and Word: Martin Luther's Theology of the Sacraments"
Restoration Quarterly, (1990), vol. 32, 146.
J
)
 )
) 374 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
) --- -
the food is so power.fit! that it transforms us into itself and out of fleshy
) sinful, mortal men makes spiritual, holy, living men. 86
) that a correct reading of L uther reveals that he identifies justification by faith as
Though Luther identified two sacraments that carried saving grace: baptism
and the Eucharist, 87 it was the latter that had come under attack by "the fanatics"
and Luther would have none of it. They needed to understand that the Eucharist
}
was more than an effective means of salvation, it was the only effective means
) of deification.88 So Luther explains that the Eucharistic Christ "exceeds any
grasp, and you will not catch him by groping about, even though he is in your
bread, unless ... he himself gives meaning to the bread for you, by his Word,
) bidding you to eat him."89 Because, "when we eat the sacrament we absorb
Christ into ourselves ... he does the same."90 And it is this oneness with God
) that elevates and deifies us into the heavenly realms: "For it is true that man
helped by grace is more than a man; indeed, the grace of God gives him the form
) of God and deifies him, so that even the Scriptures call him 'God' and God's
son. Thus a man must be extended beyond flesh and blood and become more
than man, ifhe is to become good."91
) While Lutheran scholars have traditionally interpreted Luther's view of
) justification by faith (salvation) as a forensic (alien) imputation ofrighteousness,
recent Luther scholars have felt this to be a significant error in our understanding
> Luther's teaching. 92 In particular, the Finnish interpretation of Luther, led by
Tuomo Mannermaa, argues that Luther's view of salvation has been
) sacraments or the Eucharist in particular.
) 86
LW 37, 93; 37, 87.
87
Though Luther numbered the sacraments at two, baptism and the Eucharist, at times
j he spoke of three, but the third (repentance) he effectively included as a part of baptism. So
he could say, "Hence it follows that there are, strictly speaking, only two Sacraments in the
Church of God: Baptism and the Bread.... For the sacrament of penance ... is ... nothing
but a way and a return to Baptism." Martin Luther, "The Babylonian Captivity of the
Church," Three Treatises, 2nd revised edition, trans, A. T. W. Steinhaeuser (Philadelphia:
Fortress, I 970), p. 258.
88
In fact the·term "deification" in its various forms (deifico/vergotten/durchgotten)
appears 30 times in Luther's works. Simo Peura, "Vergottlichungsgedanke in Luther's
Theologie 1518-1519," in Thesaurus Lutheri, 171-172.
89
LW 37, 69.
90
WA 30/1, 27, 6-7. Emphasis mine.
9
' LW 51, 58. Emphasis mine.
92
Patricia Wilson-Kastner has noted that the activity ofdivine grace as partaking ofthe
divine nature is "unquestionably present throughout Luther's theology." She suggests two
reasons why Luther never dealt explicitly with deification, which she terms the "ontological
dimensions of grace." One being that "his norninalist theological training did not provide
him the proper theological systematic framework to integrate Augustine's notion of a
participation in God by nature." Secondly, Luther simply cared little for developing
philosophical foundations of deification, his main concern being the pastoral role of
preaching unmerited grace. Patricia Wilson-Kastner, "On Partaking of the Divine Nature:
Luther's Dependence on Augustine," Andrews University Seminary Studies 22:1 (Spring
1984), 123.
L UTHER IN THE EUCHARISTIC DEBATES 375
misunderstood, having been heavily modified by and read through the
interpretation of Melanchthon and later scholars. These Finnish scholars argue
participation in God or inhabitation Dei:
Central in Luther's theology is that in faith the human being really
participates by faith in the person of Christ and in the divine life and the
victory ,that is in it. Or, to say it the other way around: Christ gives his
person to the human being through the faith by which we grasp it. ...
According to the Reformer, justifying faith does not merely signify a
reception of the forgiveness imputed to a human being for the sake of
the merit of Christ, which is the aspect emphasized by the Formula of
Concord. Being a real sharing (participation) in Christ, "faith" stands
also for the participation in the institution of "blessing, righteousness
and life" that has taken place in Christ. ... Therefore, justifying faith
means participation in God in Christ's person.93
As such, the Finnish interpretation believes that Luther views God, through
Christ, as physically present in the believer in an ontological or "real-ontic"94
way that makes the believer share in the divine essence. However, because part
of the aim of this school is to facilitate ecumenical dialogue,95 they place more
emphasis on Christ being present in faith in general96 versus faith in the
Luther's Scriptural Reduction
As we have noted, the "Word of God" for Luther was not a rational
revelation of God in Scripture (for Luther had repudiated the rational
methodology of the via antiqua, adopting in its place the faith-based,
93
Quoted in Michael J. Christensen, Jeffery A. Wittung, Partakers of the Divine
Nature: The History and Development ofDeification in the Christian Traditions (Grand
Rapids,
94
MI: Baker Academic, 2008), 190. Emphasis mine.
Veli-Matti Karkkainen, One with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification
(Collegeville, MN: Lit Zwingli and Lurgical Press, 2004), 46. See also Carl E. Braaten,
Union with Christ: The New Finnish Interpretation ofLuther (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Co.: 1998); Bengt R. Hoffinann and Pearl Willernssen Hoffinan, Theology ofthe Heart: The
Role of Mysticism in the Theology of Martin Luther (Kirk House, 2003): Bengt R.
Hoffinann's
95
Luther & the Mystics (Augsburg Publishing House: 1976).
Karkkainen, 7-9.
96
Karkkainen states that, "for the Mannermaa School, the leading idea in Luther's
theology of salvation and justification is Luther's insistence on "Christ present in faith (in
ipsa fide Christus adest). In other words, Christ in both his person and his work is present
in faith and is through this presence identical with the righteousness offaith. The Lutheran
tradition holds to the idea of God living in the believer (inhabitation De1). This for
Mannermaa is analogous with the doctrine oftheosis. According to Luther, Christ and thus
his person and work is present in faith itself," 46, emphasis mine.
 i
)
376 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI LUTHER IN THE EUCHARJSTIC DEBATES 377 )

experiential via moderna of nominalism). Instead, the "Word of God" for Luther
boiled down to the commands of Christ mystically tied to our union with Him. ;
... )

J , .. )
Faithfully acting upon these commands (i.e., participating in baptism and the
Eucharist) would involve us in the justification by faith that encapsulated both r
f.,., '-'°9fl1?f11,.i
fl«l.-.."11.:>r- i ·1 l h:;;, •; !Jl;;.,I )
salvation and deification. This is why Luther believed that the doctrine of t j. -~ R,ilucr.~r,
justification by faith was the doctrine on which the church stands or falls.
"~ ....l·. ·, )
People have spoken of Luther 's "canon within a canon," wherein certain
books (most of the OT, Revelation and James) are ignored and· others
highlighted. 97 Similarly, Frank Hase! has expressed that Luther endorses a
·f ~;,
Ct~s
"

)
Christ-centered hermeneutics through a hierarchical "ranking" that goes from the ... 1 .-..r

top-tier status of the gospel of justification by faith through the personal Word
-IU~t1i'.:o,b11n 1-~· hilll ] ,.Cl.th/!
(Christ), to the lesser, 2nd ranking, of the sp oken Word (gospel) and finally, at
the 3rd and lowest ranking, the Written Word (Scripture).98 This is why Luther Ch11Si
.;
l~c )
can claim that whatever doesn't promote Christ is not apostolic, even if taught 81.)j ~
by Paul or Peter, while anything that preaches Christ should be considered )
apostolic, even if taught by Judas, Annas, Pilate or Herod.99 In fact, everything ZL._..!I
is reduced to Christ to such a degre e that Luther states, "In Christ all words
~--.IW•M:w&W1.~,y,e,.,....,...._Mtcn
1
I
l,,,.. ·-'"--'\,.. .,,.........,.,,.,,J
Y.M'J'(l i!d!)~
flMl l;•
become one word."100
Similarly, Raul Kerbs has analyzed Luther's nominalist reduction to the In following we will explore some of the ramifications of Luther's reduction
simplest truth, as illustrated in the diagram below. From lesser to greater degree, of Scripture to justification by faith, and explore a few of the consequences it has )
for our church today.
Luther's cognitive r eduction transitions from: (4) the Bible to (3) Christ to (2)
)
Justification by faith to (1) the book of Romans. Likewise, Kerbs analyzes
Luther's ontological reduction as going from (4) God to (3) Christ to (2) the Implications for Seventh-day Adventism
Cross and, I would add, (1) the Eucharist, as the greatest manifestation of Christ In bis book, Secular Adventism? Exploring the Link between Lifestyle and
" for us."10 1 Salvation, Canale identifies five causes 102 behind the secularization of Adventist
beliefs and lifestyle, with " the single most important factor. . . [being] the
teaching of Luther's doctrine of justification by faith from Adventist pulpits." 103
Luther's reduction of salvation to justification by faith is problematic on many
grounds: first, and most devastatingly, because it is based on the timeless God of
104
predestination. For while Luther correctly rej ected the Catholic system of )
meritorious works, he also rejected any type of biblical synergism in which the
penitent is transformed by a cognitive r enewing of his mind (Rom. 12:2). 105
97
For example, in reference to the Eucharistic debates, Roger Olson notes that the main
102
difference between Luther and Zwingli Jay in their "implicit doctrines of Scripture [where] These are (1) theological illiteracy, (2) theological divisions, (3) tradition and culture
Luther felt free to recognize a 'canon within a canon' and to relegate portions of the Bible replacing Scripture as sources of theological and spiritual guidance, (4) Luther's reduction
to secondary status, when they did not 'promote Christ' in the right way. Zwingli, on the ofsalvation to justification by faith, and (5) the protestantization ofAdventist theology and
other hand, virtually identified the entire Bible with God's Word." The Story of Christian ministerial paradigm, 135.
103
Theology, 401. Ibid., 58.
98 10
Frank Hase! "Christ-Centered hermeneutics: Prospects and challenges for Adventist • In his Lectures on Romans Luther states "[God) saves us not by our own merits, but
biblical interpretation." Ministry Magazine, Dec 2012, 9. purely by His own election and immutable will. . .He gives approval not to our will but to
99
LW, 35, 396. His own unchanging andfirm will ofpredestination." LW, 25:371. Emphasis mine.
10
100
MLW I, 4, 439. ' After Luther, Arminius (1560-1609) and Wesley (1703-1791) attempted to ground _)
10 1
Kerbs, 586. As noted above, Kerbs terminates Luther's ontological reduction at the the notion of a synergistic free will on God's love and the order of divine decrees, yet their
cross. Yet, as covered in this study, Luther believed that Christ physically present in the interpretation of being remained timeless. It was not until the early Advent movement and
Eucharist is what makes the cross ontologically efficacious to the penitent. As such, I believe the Disappointment of 1844 that the historical dimension of God's being was open to the

l
a final ontological reduction to the Eucharist (or the sacraments of baptism and the pioneers. The ramifications of this included a holistic view of man (spirit and body) that
Eucharist) can be argued. resulted in great advances in health reform, education, and the beginnings ofa new historical
 )
)
)
) 378 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
Instead, Luther adopted a vehement monergism, insisting that God timelessly
) predestines 106 mankind to salvation or damnation, irrespective of their choices. 107
Furthermore, from this flawed foundation numerous other problems arise. For in
the timeless system of predestination, God cannot interact personally,
) cognitively, or historically with His creation. In effect, the predestination God
creates automatons who have no choice but to do His bidding. This rejects the
) foundational premise of God's nature as encompassing a love initiative (1 John
) 4:8) that grants us the ultimate choice in our salvation (Joshua 24:14-15) made
through a loving response to His tender acts and entreaties.
A second problem that arises from Luther's reduction of salvation to
justification by faith is that it destroys biblical Christology. Since all that matters
)
in Luther's system is God's sovereign will108 (to the utter denial of human
) freedom), Christ's humanity accomplished nothing on the cross, it was His
divinity that alone effected our salvation. 109 The implications of this for our
) Christian life are devastating. If Christ's life of selfless abnegation, by clinging
) to "every Word" that proceeds from the mouth of God (Mat. 4:4), did not set an
example for us, then Hebrews is incorrect in stating "though He was a Son, yet
He learned obedience by the things which He suffered. And having been
perfected, he became the author of eternal salvation to all who obey Him (Heb.
5:8-9). It was Christ's overcoming in His humanity that made Him the author of
salvation for those who obey.
A third problem in the Adventist acceptance of Luther's timeless system of
justification by faith is that it is based on the Platonic two-world cosmology and
theology based on the correct understanding of God's being as historical and analogically
temporal.
106
It is interesting to note that though Calvin is credited with expounding on the
doctrine of predestination, his treatise "Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God" was
not written until 1552, twenty-seven years after Luther wrote "Bondage of the Will" (in
1525 to counter Erasmus' "On Free Will"). So, somewhat ironically, it would seem that
Luther preceded Calvin in outlining the Calvinist doctrine of predestination.
107
For Luther, "salvation and condemnation depend exclusively on a free and sovereign
divine decision. And just as it is not for humans to know why God allowed evil, neither do
we have the right to know why God chooses some for salvation and others for
condemnation. This is God's most venerable secret. In line with his affirmation of God's
inscrutability and inaccessibility to human reason, Luther maintains that it is logical and
necessary that His justice also be incomprehensible. If human reason could understand the
divine will and establish it as just, it would then no longer be divine, but human." Kerbs,
583; translation mine.
108
"Mit Gott ist eitel wil wil wil," quoted in Kerbs, 585.
109
Regarding Christ's humiliation and sacrifice Luther says: "The kingly authority of
the divinity is given to Christ the man, not because of His humanity but because of His
divinity.... Nor did the humanity conquer sin and death ... the humanity would not have
accomplished anything by itself; but the divinity,joined with the humanity, did it alone, and
the humanity did it on account of the divinity. So here faith alone justifies and does
everything." Quoted in Secular Adventism?, 45.
LUTIIER IN THE EUCHARISTIC DEBATES 379
companion dualistic ontology. 110 Luther explains, "We set forth two worlds, as
it were, one of them heavenly and the other earthly. Into these we place these
two kinds of righteousness ... which are distinct and separated from each
111
other." Our heavenly righteousness (experienced in the soul) is passive on our
part, since God is the only one who acts. This is grace. Our earthly
righteousness (experienced in the body) is active because we must abide by
ethical norms to maintain civil function. This is law.
Now we can understand why Luther affirms, "whatever is not
grace, is Law." Law and grace are separated, even opposed to each
other because they belong to two different worlds (heaven and earth).
Grace and salvation are spiritual "heavenly events," separated from the
everyday life of "historical" events to which the law, sins and works
refer. As justification transposes us by faith to the real world of
heaven- where there is no more time or history-law, sins and works
no longer apply. To speak of them would be sheer nonsense. 112
Because God saves (or damns) timelessly, by the sovereign fiat of His will,
our salvation is effected timelessly in our souls. The lesser physical realm of our
historical lives, in which sin and law prevail, is of little consequence. In
justification by faith, Christians "transcend the Law and enter into grace, where
there is neither Law nor Sin." 113 Perhaps this is why Luther said, ''Be a sinner
and sin boldly, but believe and rejoice in Christ even more boldly... No sin will
separate us from the Lamb, even though we commit fornication and murder a
114
thousand times a day." This statement is coherent in Luther's system of
predestination, for if we have no free will and all our acts are predestined by
God, then our historical actions are really not under our jurisdiction_ll 5
11 0
Ibid., 40, 41.
Il l LW, 26:8.
112
Secular Adventism?, 44.
m "Therefore when you see a man terrified and saddened by a consciousness of sin,
say: 'Brother, you are not distinguishing properly. Into your conscience you are putting the
Law, which belongs in the flesh. Wake up, get up, and remember that you believe in Christ,
the Victor over the Law and sin. With this faith you will transcend the Law and enter into
grace, where there is neither Law nor sin. And although the Law and sins still exist, they
have 11nothing to do with you; for you are dead to the Law and to sins." LW 26: 158.
' LW, 48:282.
115
Luther still gives some consideration to obedience as fruits, or symbols ofsalvations.
However, ''Luther's limited understanding of 'good works' does not call Christians to
emulate Christ's lifestyle by basing their entire life's goals on the guiding principles of
God's wisdom revealed in Old and New Testaments. Obedience to the law is not essential,
.neither to our experience of salvation nor to our Christian lifestyle. Instead, Luther's view
_of justification makes room for an overall secular lifestyle within which believers should
include some good works. Works such as attending church, helping neighbors, and doing
our civic duties become the symbolic tokens of our salvation." Secular Adventism?, 56.

380 SILVIA CANALE BACCHIOCCHI
So while Luther's discovery of justification by faith was a necessary
emphasis, particularly during a time of gross ecclesiastical abuses, his
interpretation of what this entailed was colored by the numerous presuppositions
that were, mostly unconsciously, at play in his mind. As a result, Luther
obliterated the scriptural revelation of a God- and Christ-who interacts with us
in the minutiae of our daily lives (Matt. 6:25-33), who reveals Himself to us
cognitively (Is. 1:18; Luke 24:25-27; Rom. 12:2), demands and assists us in
obedience (Lev. 20:26; Matt. 11:29, 116 Phil. 2:12, Col. 1:29), and through that
joint work of obedience progressively saves us (sanctification) 117 in a loving
relationship that is distinct and personal. It would seem, in retrospect, that the
Christ of Luther is not really the Christ revealed in Scripture as much as He is
the Christ of the Eucharist-a timeless, non-cognitive, and ultimately impersonal
Christ.
Conclusion
There is no question that Luther and Zwingli were both giants of the
Reformation who, among other groundbreaking work, helped to develop the
solas of Protestantism. In this study I have analyzed how while in theory they
both held to the doctrine of sofa Scriptura, in practice Luther strayed far from it
in his foundational doctrine of the Real Presence. This doctrine was so central to
Luther 's theology that anyone who accepted the Reformed teachings but rejected
Christ's literal body in the Eucharist was instantly and hop elessly damned.
When pressed by Zwingli to defend how, on the basis of Scripture, he could
claim the literal corporeal presence of Christ in the Eucharist, Luther eventually,
and in significant detail, described his Christ-centered panentheism, teaching
that Christ permeates all of creation in physical substance and essence, but that
he only bids us look for Him in the two sacraments: Baptism and the
116
Ellen White notes that the yoke that binds us to Christ in service "is the law of God.
The great law of love revealed in Eden, proclaimed upon Sinai and in the new covenant
written in the heart, is that which binds the human worker to the will of God" (DA, 329.3).
117
In biblical terms, being filled with God's fullness is described not in terms of a
mystical indwelling where Christ's essence fills the believer in a "real-ontic" way. Instead,
the Scriptures reveal an indwelling that begins with a cognitive understanding. Ephesians
explains that when we "comprehend" (3: 18) and "know" (v. 19) the love of God revealed
in redemptive history, we can be filled with God's fullness. Similarly, Christ's final prayer
for His disciples in John 17 explains that He had given them God's words, which they had
received and kept (v. 6, 8); because their minds received His indwelling word they then
entered the process of sanctification or indwelling ofChrist (v. 17). On the basis ofChrist's
cognitive indwelling through His revealed words in Scripture, the unity of believers with
Christ and God is effected (v. 23), having as its ultimate goal the eventual joy of being in
proximity to Christ physically: "That they may be with me where I am, that they may behold
My glory which You have given Me" (v. 24). Ellen White states that sanctification is the
work ofa lifetime in which the believer who walks with Christ will be "seeking for truth as
for hidden treasures and will press from light to a greater light, ever increasing in
knowledge" (SM, Book I, p. 317).
, }
)
LUTHER IN THE EUCHARISTIC D EBATES )
381
)
Eucharist. lls So while traditional panentheism teaches that the divine is in
everything and everyone, for Luther divinization is open only to those who, after )
baptism, partake in the Eucharist through faith in the literal words of Christ: hoc
)
est corpus meum. Because for Luther the Word is the gospel, and the gospel is
Christ, and Christ offers Himself to us in the Eucharist as a Sacramental Union J
wherein we are both saved and divinized. And so it would appear that, in the
case of the Eucharist, Luther's canon within a canon was reduced to four words.
In conclusion, while many readers may be shocked at Luther's reduction of
"God's Word" to justification (salvation) by faith in the words of Christ (that
make Him present in the Eucharist) and the resulting divinization of mankind
(theosis), we must realize that his conclusions are thoroughly compatible,
coherent and even necessary for the system within which he worked. This
system includes the timelessness of God's being, cosmological and ontological
dualism, predestination, and the mystical and norninalist rejection ofreason. As
such, while it is commendable to read Luther and cite his many praiseworthy )
statements, we should be cognizant that some are, at root, contradicting and
antagonistic to the Christ of Scripture and the true biblical sanctification that is
effected through our temporal mind, heart, and soul union with God. For it is
only in this progressive and daily interaction with the Christ of all Scripture
(Luke 24:27; John 5:39) that we can experience the joy of sanctification now and
glorification in the life to come. )
Silvia Canale Bacchiocchi, a native of Argentina, earned her BA in English and J
Religion from Andrews University, an MA in English Literature from New York
University, and is presently studying systematic theology at Andrews University.
She and her husband, Gianluca, are currently immersed in the joys and
challenges of raising their (occasionally) cherubic children: Isabella, Gianna and
Enzo. God is good. Email: silvia@bacchiocchi.com.
)
j
118
Martin Luther, "The Babylonian Captivity of the Church," Three Treatises, second
revised edition, trans. A. T. W. Steinhil (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), 258.
J
 J
)
)
) What Makes Humans Human?
) Personal Ontology in the
) Creation Narrative of Day Six
(Gen. 1:24-31)
)
Marla A. Samaan Nedelcu
) this issue in relation to human ontology. This is the work of my dissertation-to
) to compare them with a model that is borne out of Genesis 1-3.
Introduction
) At sixteen years of age, as I prayed for God to guide my life and its course, I
received an unusual calling-not to a specific career or ministry, but to one day
study for a Ph.D. in Theology. Soon after, I heard Dr. Canale give a series of
) presentations at some pastors' meetings. I regret to say that I do not remember the
content ofhis presentations, but what I do remember is listening with rapt attention,
.) trying to catch every word and decipher the significance. I know I have prolific
notes from that weekend stowed away in some box, along with other mementos
from a teenage girl's life. I remember being excited at the content Dr. Canale was
). presenting, but I also remember being excited about his way of thinking, for it
) resonated with whatever analytical nature I had at that age. Nonetheless, the only
specific words I remember from that weekend long ago were the words I told
) myself: "I wish that someday I could be a student of Dr. Canale's."
That dream came true after college as I studied for my M.A. at the Seminary
) at Andrews University, and later for my Ph.D. there. I took every class I could
) from Dr. Canale, concentrating hard to be able to understand vocabulary and
"notions" that were new to me. I think I actually felt my brain stretching, and I
) loved it. How exciting it was to see the big picture, to become aware of the various
) overarching systems of thought through history that underlie every belief and
theory. How fascinating it was to realize that even though we may assume that our
) philosophical presuppositions arise from Scripture, that does not mean that they
necessarily do.
Dr. Canale challenged us students to study the Bible so that our philosophical
presuppositions would truly be drawn from it, so that our professed biblical
worldview would truly be biblical. This, he said, presented an enormous task for
our church, since we often shied away from the topic of philosophical
presuppositions or philosophy in general. But each ofus has a philosophy, whether
we realize it or not. Ifwe realize and acknowledge it, we have the chance to bring
it to God's Word to deconstruct it, so that we then can construct one that is
thoroughly biblical. I remember how I felt when he talked about how our biblical
Adventist doctrines need to be more rooted in biblical philosophical
presuppositions-instead ofpresuppositions that are borrowed from others who we
assume are biblical but, upon investigation, might be more influenced by tradition,
science, or experience. I felt that I wanted to be a small part of this project.
WHAT MAK.Es HUMANS HUMAN? 383
In Dr. Canale's doctoral work, he wrote about the nature of God and whether
it is timeless or temporal. The temporal view is the view of Adventist theology,
supported by the Bible and Ellen White. But in Christian theology, the timeless
view, corning from at least as far back as Greek philosophy, is the accepted view.
In Dr. Canale's classes, we learned that ontology was divided into the study of God
(theology proper), ofhuman beings (anthropology), and of the world ( cosmology).
Dr. Canale had worked on the philosophical underpinnings of divine ontology; and
he, as my professor and dissertation chair, inspired and encouraged me to look at
evaluate the current models of personal ontology in Christian theology today and
This chapter is just a sma11 part ofthat larger project. Here I will focus on what
Gen. I :24-31 , day six of the creation narrative, might have to say in regards to
personal ontology. The three sections that make up the body of this chapter serve
three ends: section one deals with macro-hermeneutics, section two with rnicro-
hermeneutics, and section three with meso-hermeneutics. In other words: first, the
overarching philosophical parameters are laid out; second, a specific biblical
pericope is analyzed; and third, implications for doctrinal issues are explored. 1 ·
What is Personal Ontology? .
The ontological question is one of the earliest questions in philosophy. In
Western philosophy, it arose as early as the Milesian School; in Eastern philosophy,
it can be found in the teachings of Zoroaster and, a few hundred years earlier, in
ancient Hinduism.2 Furthermore, the opening lines of the Bible also address the
1
I was first introduced to these divisions in Dr. Canale's classes, and he borrows this
categorization from Thomas Kung. See Canale, "The Revelation and Inspiration of
Scripture in Adventist Theology, Part I," Andrews University Seminary Studies 45/2
(Autumn 2007), 203; and Kung, Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View,
trans. Peter Heinegg (New York: Doubleday, 1988), 134.
2
Thales (ca. 580 B.C.) is said to have called water the "first principle" and "basic
nature" of "all things" (Philip Wheelwright, ed., The Presocratics [New York: Odyssey
Press, 1966], 44). His analytical thinking and rejection of mythological explanations have
earned him the titles of the "Father of Science" and "Father of Western Philosophy''
(Bertrand Russell, History ofWestern Philosophy [Bodmin, U.K.: MPG Books Ltd, 1996]),
,15. Others from the Milesian School identified basic nature as the "Boundless"
'_(Anaximander) and as air (Anaximenes).
Zoroaster described reality as a radical dualism between truth/order (asha) and
.falsehood/disorder (druj) (Daniel E. Haycock,Beingand Perceiving [U.K.: Manupod Press,
201 I], 473). In Vedism (ancient Hinduism), the foundation of all things is order (rita),
although later Hindu ontological formulations are dualistic (See Raimundo Panikkar, Vedic
Experience: An Anthology ofHinduism's Sacred and Revealed Scriptures [Delhi: Motilal
I3anarsidass, 2001] and Swami Krishnananda, A Short History of Religious and
Philosophical Thought in India [Rishikesh, India: The Divine Life Society, 1994]).

384 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU
basic questions ofbeing.3 Initially, Western ontological questions dealt more with
the existence and nature of deity (theology) and with the origin and nature of the
world (cosmogony and cosmology). But by Plato, questions about the nature,
origin, and destiny of human beings were being addressed as well.4
From Plato onward in Western philosophy, the most prominent views on the
nature of human beings have included an element of dualism.5 Dualism accepts
that there are two fundamental ontological principles that constitute the reality of
humans and of this world, as contrasted with the one principle of monism.
Philosophy of mind, a branch of study within philosophy, identifies the two
dualistic principles as the mind and the body. 6 From the standpoint of theological
anthropology, these two are generally known as the soul and the body.
Traditionally, the soul is considered timeless and the body temporal.7
So what is the relationship between mind/soul and body? This is the main
issue in what is called the mind-body problem, a major field of study under the
domain of philosophy ofmind.8 The underlying questions involve what and who
3
In theology: God is established as Creator in the first three Hebrew words ofScripture
(Gen. I: 1). In cosmogony/cosmology: Gen. 1: 1 reveals that "the heavens and the earth"
came into existence; and the creation week account identifies some things of which the
heavens and earth consist. In anthropology: Gen. 1 and 2 describe the origin, composition,
functions, and significance of human beings (1 :26-31; 2:7, 15-25).
The writing of Genesis may have been contemporaneous with Zoroaster's writings
and/or Vedic writings; however, establishing the date for some of these ancient writings is
problematic.
4
Plato was first to deal specifically with anthropology in such a significant way. His
tripartite division of the human person (rational, spirited, and appetitive) is still influential.
Anaxagoras, with his concept of Nous, is an earlier philosopher who touched on the subject
of anthropology but did not delve as deeply into it.
' See Carsten Johnsen, Man- the Indivisible: Totality Versus Disruption in the His tory
of Western Thoug ht (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1971 ).
In Eastern philosophy, dualism goes back at least to the Yoga school in Hindu
philosophy (7'• century B.C.), which divided the world (including the person) into the
(timeless) mind/spirit (purusha) and the (temporal) material (prakriti).
6
The two principles are also known as idealism and materialism. Philosophy of mind
is the philosophical branch that handles "the nature ofmental phenomena in general and the
role of consciousness, sensation, perception, concepts, action, reasoning, intention, belief,
memory" ("Definition Of: philosophy of mind," http://www.philosophy-dictionary.org
/Dictionary-of-Philosophy-of-Mind/philosophy_ of_mind (accessed Nov. 3, 2011 ]). It deals
with the relationship between mental and bodily processes. The discipline of philosophical
anthropology is broader, tackling human metaphysics and phenomenology, and humans'
relation to each other and their environment. Theological anthropology is the Christian
doctrine of the Nature of Man, or Human Nature and Destiny.
7
"Soul" is at times referred to as "spirit" or "mind," and "body" as the more pejorative
"flesh."
' Paul S. MacDonald, History ofthe Concept ofMind: Speculations about Soul, Mind
and Spirit from Homer to Hume (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2003).
,..}
)
WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? )
385
,)
we are- what we are made of, and who we are in distinction from other living
beings. These are questions ofconstitution and nature, respectively, which make up )
the classification of personal ontology.9
Personal ontology and the mind-body problem has been a central philosophical )
10
issue through the ages. Yet historically it has not been an area ofmajor contention )
within Christian theology since ontological dualism has generally been assumed,
bolstered by the common belief that the timeless soul transcends the temporal
materiality ofthe body. 11 Nevertheless, some theologians have explored views that
)
deviated from that normative tradition, notably during the Reformation and
especially in the last century. 12
Presently, a conflict has arisen primarily because that traditional dualistic view
(which is also the old view of science) is no longer compatible with current
13
science. Science and tradition no longer agree. 14 Indeed, current science holds
.)
• Personal ontology, defined as "the ontology of human persons," has as its question,
"What am I?" This can be divided into two areas, constitution and nature, with their
respective questions, "What am I composed of'?" and "What does 'I' refer to?" (Eric T.
Olson, What Are We?: A Study in Personal Ontology, Philosophy of Mind Series [New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007]). Over two thousand years ago, Aristotle probed these
philosophical questions ofpersonal ontology. He used the terms substance (what a thing is
materially) and essence (what a thing is by definition) to describe similar notions to what
)
this chapter will term constitution and nature (S. Marc Cohen, "Aristotle's Metaphysics," )
The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy [Summer 2012 Edition], Edward N . Zalta, ed.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ sum2012/entries/Aristotle-metaphysics [accessed October
22, 2012]).
10
Jaegwon Kim, "Problems in the Philosophy of Mind," Oxford Companion to
Philosophy, ed. Ted Honderich (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 574-79.
11
John P. Wright and Paul Potter, eds., Psyche and Soma: Physicians and ')
Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment (Oxford: )
Clarendon, 2000). As early as the second or third century A.D., we read this statement in
the Christian apology The Epistle to Diognetus: 'The soul dwells in the body, yet is not of )
the body'' (L.B. Radford [Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 2007], 1.27. Contemporary
theologians who are ontological dualists include John W. Cooper (Body, Soul, and Life
Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate, 2d. ed. [Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 2000]) and Stewart Goetz ("Substance Dualism," in In Search ofthe Soul: Four
Views ofthe Mind-Body Problem, Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer, eds. [Downers Grove,
IL: InterVarsity Academic, 2005]).
12
Historically, views that deviated from the norm have fallen under the umbrella of
"Christian mortalism" and include, for example, segments of the radical Reformation,
Wycliffe, Tyndale, Luther (who was open to the idea of"soul sleep"), Milton, Bultmann,
Cullman, Wright, the Seventh-day Adventist Church and various organizations of the
Church of God.
13
Current discussion on personal ontology has been instigated by recent discoveries in
scientific research, especially in the field of cognitive neuroscience, which studies the
)
biolog ical substrates ofmental phenomena (Patricia Smith Churchland,Brain-Wise: Studies )
in Neurophilosophy [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002]). But many other fields touch on
this issue from different angles ( e.g., Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig. Arti.ficiallntelligence:
')
'J
 386 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU
to a fully materialistic monism in which human identity is sufficiently explained by
brain and genes alone. 15 This is in part because advances in brain-mapping and
genetics have been utilized to help p inpoint the location in the brain or genes of
what can seem to be uniquely human qualities, qualities previously considered to
be "attributes of the soul." 16 Evidence like this certainly seem s favor a monistic
understanding of the human person, which has no place for an ontologically
substantial soul that is housed within the body.
Those who side with Christian tradition in this discussion, however, consider
a strictly material or physical explanation to be unsatisfactory or even scandalous.
They believe that there must be more to human id entity than simply what science
can study. 17 Others who take a middle road b etween dualism and materialism insist
A Modern Approach [Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995)). The theories of
biological evolutionism and philosophical naturalism also do not support the dualistic model.
Christian theology has grappled with these theories by choosing to defend the biblical
account of origins, reject it, or accommodate it to those theories. Frederick Buechner is an
example of a theologian who holds to the evolutionary theory and accordingly finds the
resurrection model of the afterlife to be more tenable than beliefin an immortal soul. As he
puts it, "We go to our graves as dead as a doornail and are given our lives back again by
God" (Beyond Words: Daily Readings in the ABC's of Faith [New York: HarperCollins,
2004], 168).
14
Throughout history, the view of the dichotomous nature of soul and body prevailed
in philosophy, religion, and science. The first scientists were also the first philosophers, and
sought natural rather than supernatural answers for the questions of life. Indeed they were
the ones who originally supplied that dualistic model.
"As Francis H. Crick, who with James Watson discovered DNA structure, proclaimed:
"You are nothing but a pack ofneurons" (The AstonishingHypothesis: The Scientific Search
,, for a Soul [London: Simon and Schuster, 1994], 3 ); Sandra Blakeselee, "Humanity? Maybe
It's All in the Wiring," New York Times [Dec 9, 2003]: Fl).
16
This increasing understanding ofbrain science and genetics has generated discussion
in science-religion studies (Whatever Happened lo the Soul? viii-xiv). For example:
Francisco J. Ayala, "The Biological Roots of Morality," Biology and Philosophy 2 (1987):
235-52; Jorge Moll, et al, "The Neural Correlates of Moral Sensitivity: A Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Investigation of Basic and Moral Emotions" (Journal of
Neuroscience 22/7 [2002]), 2730-36; John C. Loehlin, Genes and Environment in
Personality Development (Newbury Park, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 1992); Richard
Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Robert B. Cairns,
"Aggression from a Developmental Perspective: Genes, Environments and Interactions," in
Genetics of Criminal and Antisocial Behavior, CIBA Foundation Symposium 194
(Chichester, U.K. : Wiley, 1995), 45-60; Malcolm Jeeves, ed., From Cells to Souls-And
Beyond: Changing Portraits ofHuman Nature (Grand Rapids: Eerdrnans, 2004); Justin L.
Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology: From Human Minds to Divine Minds,
Templeton Science and Religion Series (Conshohocken, PA: Templeton, 201 I).
17
Stewart Goetz, for example, argues that p ersons have the right to believe certain
things about their own nature. He says that he falls in the long tradition of Christians and
philosophers who hold that the most natural thing to believe about themselves is that they
are divided into body and soul (/n Search of the Soul, 33). He quotes the philosopher
WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? 387
that the mental and physical are one substance, the same substance that composes
18
the universe itself Still others who attempt to reconcile tradition and today's
science are reticent to use the term "sou l," but may take the entity of "mind" or
"psyche" (referring to the mental) to be a more suitable explanation for human
identity than that of the "brain" (a strictly physical entity). 19 There are also some
non-standard theories, of w hich the new theory ofhylomorphism is one. 20
In the last couple decades, scores of books and articles have probed this
complex and intriguing area of study, and many new theories have joined the
existing ones offering various solutions to this problem.21 Yet the recent flurry of
William Lyons: "That humans are bodies inhabited and governed in some intimate if
mysterious way by minds (souls), seemed and still seems to be nothing more than good
common sense" (Matters ofthe Mind [New York: Routledge, 2001], 9).
In James Porter Moreland and Scott B. Rae's Body and Soul: Human Nature and the
Crisis in Ethics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), science is engaged although
the model of substance dualism is retained. There is an attempt to reconcile the two, but in
such a way that most scientists could not accept. For example: "the substantial soul is a
whole that is ontologically prior to the body and its various inseparable parts. The various
physical and chemical parts and processes (including DNA) are tools- instrumental causes
employed by higher-order biological activities in order to sustain the various functions
grounded in the soul" (205).
" These monists are panentheists, and panentheism as it relates to personal ontology
is the area of process anthropology. Some of the views subsumed in this area are
panpsychism, neutral monism, dual-aspect monism, and reflexive monism.
19
These can still be considered monists, though they avoid the naturalistic theory that
humans are nothing more than highly developed animals. They can be grouped together as
non-reductive physicalists, as opposed to reductive physicalists/materialists who apply
evolutionary theory directly to their understanding ofpersonal ontology. Emergentists have
similarities to non-reductive physicalists but lean more towards dualism and have a strong
sense of ontological telos.
20
William Jaworski devotes two chapters of his book, Philosophy of Mind: A
Comprehensive Introduction (Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011) to hylomorphism.
Hylomorphism is a theory developed by Aristotle and adapted by Aquinas. The "new"
1heory of hylomorphism, while still indebted to Aristotle, differs from the old theory in
several respects, especially in its attempt to answer all the new questions that are currently
at the forefront of the mind-body problem. Jaworski identifies two other "non-standard
mind-body theories": mind-body pessimism and instrumentalism. He charts the standard
mind-body theories as branching down from dualism and monism (6).
21
The following is a sampling of works: Paul M. Churchland (The Engine ofReason,
the Seat ofthe Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain [Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1995)), David J. Chalmers (The Conscious Mind: In Search ofa Fundamental Theory [New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996]), Richard Swinburne (The Evolution ofthe Soul, rev.
ed. [Oxford: Clarendon, 1997]), William Hasker (The Emergent Seif[Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
,University Press, 1999]), Lynne Rudder Baker ("What Aie We? A Study in Personal
Ontology," Mind 117/468 [October2008]: 1120-22), John W. Cooper(Body, Soul, and Life
Everlasting), Max Velmans (Understanding Consciousness [London: Routledge, 2000]),
Todd E. Feinberg (Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the SeifTOxford: Oxford University

388 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU
study h as largely drawn more from philosophy and science than from biblical
studies and theology. 22 Perhaps a fresh and careful consideration of Scripture could
offer a valuable contribution, for it remains the one source of Christian revelation
that is undisputed.23 D oes Scripture, seen without the lens of a priori
presuppositions, offer or assume a model ofpersonal ontology that might integrate
the strengths of other interpretations yet b e unencumbered by their weaknesses?
This study evaluates a portion o f the biblical creation narrative to see whether it
might offer insight into answering some of the questions of p erson al ontology.
Press, 2001]), Joseph LeDoux (The Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are
[New York: Viking Penguin, 2002]), Owen Flanagan (The Problem ofSoul: Two Visions of
Mind and How to Reconcile Them [New York: Basic Books, 2002)), Anthony O'Hear
(Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits ofEvolutionary Explanation [Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997]), Joel B. Green (Body, Soul, and Human Life: The Nature
of Humanity in the Bible [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008)), Kevin J. Corcoran
(Rethinking Human Nature: A Christian Materialist Alternative to the Soul [Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 2006]), Nancey Murphy (Bodies and Souls,or Spirited Bodies? [New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006]), Daniel C. Dennett (Consciousness Explained
[Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1991 ]), John Searle (Mind: A BriefIntroduction [New
York: Oxford University Press, 2004]), Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker (Philosophical
Foundations ofNeuroscience [Oxford: Blackwell, 2003]), Mark Graves (Mind, Brain and
the Elusive Soul: Human Systems of Cognitive Science and Religion, Ashgate Science and
Religion Series [Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2008]), and Wesley J. Wildman (Science and
Religious Anthropology: A Spiritually Evocative Naturalist Interpretation ofHuman Life,
Ashgate Science and Religion Series [Surrey, U.K.: Ashgate, 2009]).
The following are some suggested theories, old and new: Parallelism, Occasionalism,
Substance Dualism, Hylomorphism, Hylomorphic Dualism, Emergent Dualism, Naturalistic
Dualism, Dualistic Interactionism, Token Physicalism, Predicate Dualism, Reductive
Physicalism, Biological Naturalism, Functionalism, Type Physicalism, Philosophical
Behaviorism, Eliminative Materialism, Neutral Monism, Panpsychism, Dual-Aspect
Monism, Reflexive Monism, Constitutional Materialism, Nonreductive Physicalism,
Emergent Materialism, Anomalous Monism, Phenomenalism, Epiphenomenalism.
22
An online bibliography on the science of consciousness in philosophy of mind
contains 28,490 entries, evidencing this flurry ofstudy. Cf. David Chalmers, "MindPapers:
A Bibliography of the Philosophy of Mind and the Science of Consciousness"
(http://consc.net/mindpapers (accessed March 5, 2015)).
Biblical theological research generally has seemed to center around Pauline
anthropology and the concept ofthe resurrection. See, for example, studies by the following
authors: RudolfBultrnann, Oscar Cullmann, Charles Davis, L. Cerfeaux, Robert Jewett, F.F.
Bruce, H.C.C. Cavalin, Robert H . Gundry, Peter Muller, Murray J. Harris, Richard N.
Longenecker, Joel B. Green, Ray S. Anderson, and N .T. Wright. A recent comprehensive
and extensive contribution to biblical anthropology, however, is David H . Kelsey's 2-
volume, 1500-page tome: Eccentric Existence: A Theological Anthropology (Louisville:
Westminster John Knox, 2009).
23
Wayne Grudem' s claim is still one that is widely held: Christian "theology should
be explicitly based on the claims of Scripture" (Systematic Theology: An Introduction to
Biblical Doctrine [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994], 15).
_
)
WHAT MAK.Es HUMANS HUMAN? )
389
)
An Exegetical Look at the Creation Narrative of Day Six (Gen 1:24-31)
To ascertain a biblical view of what and who humans are, it is vital to
understand how they are first introduced in the Bible. This introduction comes in
the creation n arrative of Genesis 1, on the sixth day (Gen 1:24-3 1). This section )
will now take an exegetical look at that p ericope, and will seek to understand what
it might have to say about human constitution and nature (the main issues of
personal ontology). .)
Genesis 1 ' s sixth-qay narrative is formulaic and highly structured; thus, it was
.)
felt that
24
a structural study of this passage would be a promising exegetical route to
take. According to David A. D orsey:
To study a composition's structure is simply to identify and explain the
composition's internal organization (i.e., its layout or arrangement). This
involves three steps: (I) identifying the composition's constituent parts
("units"), (2) analyzing the arrangement ofthose p arts, and (3) considering
.J
24
While Gen 1 may seem to be poetic because of its stylized and formulaic structuring
(Walter Bruggeman, Genesis: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching [Atlanta:
John Knox, 1982], 26-28; Bill T. Arnold, Encountering the Book ofGenesis [Grand Rapids:
Baker Academic, 1998], 23), it is not written in typical Hebrew poetic form (Gordon J.
Wenham, Genesis I-I 5, Word Biblical Commentary [Waco, Tex.: Word, 1987], I 0) and as
a whole is not considered a poetic text (Terry Mortenson and Thane H. Ury, eds., Coming
to Grips with Genesis: Biblical Authority and the Age of the Earth [Green Forest, Ark.:
Master Books, 2008], 216). In fact, grammatical indicators point to it being narrative prose,
even though its more stylistic wording may lead some to call such narrative prose "exalted
prose narrative" (C. John Collins, Genesis 1-4: A Linguistic, Literary, and Theological
Commentary [Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&RPublishing, 2006], 44) or "elevated prose" (Wenham,
I 0). Notably, its multitudinous usage of the waw consecutive (50 times in Gen. 1) "sets it
apart as an unambiguous · narrative account" (Mortenson and Ury, 2 I6, also
ch.5-"Contemporary Hermeneutical Approaches to Genesis 1- 11 "; see also Gerhard F.
Hasel, "The 'Days' ofCreation in Genesis I: Literal ' Days' or Figurative 'Periods/Epochs'
ofTime," Origins 21 /1 [1994], 19-2 1).
On the related topic of the historicity of the Genesis creation account, see Jacques
Doukhan's forthcoming commentary on Genesis (Nampa, Idaho: Pacific Press Publishing
Association, 2016): "Genesis grounds the creation as the historical event that introduces and
generates every other event in Scripture. It is the first event, the first genealogy without
which all other events and genealogies could not have taken place. The fact that creation is
:the preamble of the history of Israel-and of the world- not only gives it a cosmic
perspective, but also affirms and emphasizes its historical quality, which becomes the
groundwork and foundation ofall subsequent events. As such, to question the historicity of
.the creation story would be akin to doubting the historicity of all other accounts reported in
the book of Genesis" (35; see also 39, 40, and 49).
 )
)
) 390 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU
) the relationship of the composition's structure to its meaning (i.e.,
) identifying the structure's role in conveying the composition's message).25
) This section will include those methodological steps, along with some lexical
analysis.
)
The narrative of the days of creation lends itself quite naturally to a structural
) study. It is noticeably and clearly divided into seven sections, the seven days (Gen
l:l-2:4a).26 The seventh-day narrative is the capstone of this narrative unit, and
does not adhere to the literary formula that is present in the narrative of the six
) days. However, within the narrative ofthe six working days of creation itself, there
is found a literary hierarchy that gives prominence to the narrative of the sixth day,
) evidenced through the length and structuring of that day's narrative.27
Interestingly, the narrative of the sixth day is significantly longer than any of
)
the other days' narratives, providing a clue as to its high importance. Days 1 and
) 2 are three verses each (31 and 38 words, respectively); days 3 and 4 are five verses
each (69 words each); day 5 is four verses (57 words); day 6 is eight verses long
(149 words).28 Even just the part of the sixth-day narrative that references the
) creation of haiidiim is longer than the narratives of any of the other days of
creation.
Additionally, each of the six working days of creation loosely follows a five-
part formula in regards to its literary structure.29 Day 6 includes more formulaic
25
) David A. Dorsey, The Literary Structure ofthe Old Testament: A Commentary on
Genesis- Malachi (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1999), 16. Douglas Stuart (Old
.) Testament Exegesis: A Handbookfor Students and Pastors, 4•• ed. [Louisville: Westminster
John Knox, 2009]) suggests this work by Dorsey as a helpful example of the method of
structural studies.
26
This first creation narrative forms an inclusio, where 1: 1 ("in the beginning God
created the heavens and the earth") and 2:4a ("these are the generations [ or, ' this is the
history'] of the heavens and the earth when they were created") mirror each other.
_J 27
Significantly, the sixth and seventh days of creation week are the only two days that
_) receive a definite article-yam hassissfandyom hass'bt f.Theyreceive this special emphasis
because, of all the days of creation, the narrative of the sixth and seventh days are
highlighted the most prominently in the Gen 1: l-2:4a account.
28
Dorsey also notes that "this structuring technique [in which the words count ofdays
1 and 2 is roughly doubled in days 3-5, then roughly doubled again in day 6] conveys the
impression of ever-increasing variety and profusion" (Dorsey, The Literary Structure ofthe
Old Testament, 49).
29
Commentators offer variations on what the formula is, since the narrative does not
follow it with exactitude. Here, for the most part, I will simply repeat the formulaic markers
that the text uses most consistently throughout the narrative: ( 1) "and God said, 'Let ... "';
(2) "and it was so" (missing in days 5 and 6, in which "and God created [or "made"]" takes.
that place); (3) "and God saw ... that it was good" (missing in day 2); (4) all days place a
formula here (except for day 4), but it is not one that is consistent throughout the days (e.g.,
"and God called" in days 1 and 2, divine blessing in day 5, a repeat of the three previous
markers in days 3 and 6, with the addition of divine blessing and other material in day 6);
WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? 391
markers than any of the other days, highlighting the weighty importance of its
content. Also, not only is the creation week linearly organized by the numbering
of days, it is organized by a secondary parallel structuring. 30 Here the luminaries
(day 4) correspond with the light (day 1), the water animals and winged animals
(day 5) fill the waters and the expanse (day 2), and the land animals and humans
(day 6) populate the dry and vegetated land (day 3). Days 3 and 6 receive the most
weight, for only they include two divine pronouncements of creation each ("and
God said, 'Let ... "'). 31 Moreover, day 6 includes some formulaic elements that day
3 does not- namely, the phrase "and God created" and a divine blessing.
Additionally, day 6 includes God's description of his food provision for his
creatures, which adds to the sense that day 6 is the culmination and climax of the
working days of creation week. 32
Within the pericope of the sixth-day narrative itself, the structuring-both
·Jinear and chiastic-brings emphasis to certain points in these verses. T he linear
structuring is shown through the text's use of formulaic language, which has been
fairly consistently ordered in the narrative ofthe six days of creation. In day 6, only
one new formulaic element is introduced, and that involves God's provision of food
for his human and animal creation.33 This is significant because it highlights God's
role as Provider and not merely Creator. It is also significant because it reveals
God's design in his crafting of an ecosystem that is conducive to life and living.
God's provision of food for his creatures in verses 29 and 30, along with his
blessing and commission for humans to "rule" creation in verse 28, connects the
parts of creation together into an ecosystem that thrives by his design.34
(5) "and there was evening and there was morning, the [ordinal] day."
30
Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Genesis, vol. 1: From Adam to
Noah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961), 1-17.
31
On day 3, the divine pronouncement is for the distinction between the waters and dry
ground and for vegetation on the earth; on day 6, it is for land animals and for humans.
32
It must be stated again that even though the account ofthe sixth day of creation is the
culmination and climax of the working days of creation, the account of the seventh day is
the culmination and climax of the entire creation week narrative. Dorsey, The Literary
Structure ofthe Old Testament, 49: "In both the linear and parallel structures, the Sabbath
pay stands in the position of emphasis: it culminates the linear arrangement; and it stands
as unique and unmatched (and thus highlighted) in the parallel scheme."
31
The formulaic elements of day 6 of the creation narrative, in order: "and God said,
,'Let ... "'; "and it was so"; "and God made"; "and God saw that it was good"; "and God
said, 'Let .. .' ' and let ... "'; "and God created"; "and God blessed" (this is a similar
blessing as was made to the animals on day 5, but with the addition of the mandate to rule);
~and God said, 'Behold, I have given . .. "' (the new formula used in day 6); "and it was so";
~and God saw all that he made and behold! Very good" (wherever else this formula is used
f this creation narrative, it is rendered "and God saw that it was good"); "and there was
cevening and there was morning, the sixth day."
"Verse 28 connects and describes the relationship between God's human and animal
'eation. Verse 29 (where God "gives" plants to be food for his human and animal creation)
Jnors verses 11 and 12 (where God creates the plants on day 3) in its strikingly similar
 )
)

392 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? 393 )

In addition to the linear structuring of the sixth-day narrative that draws 27 And God created [biira ] haiidiim in his image, in the image of God )
attention to th e harmonio us operation of God's entire earthly c reation, certain he created him, male and female h e created them.
)
chiastic features in this same narrative draw attention to the sp ecial and unique
p lace humans hold in G od 's creation. To glimpse these features, this structural 28 And God blessed them and said to them: "Be fruitful and become )
study will turn to verses 26-28, the account of the creation of ha iidiim and the heart many and fill the earth and subdue and rule over the fish of the sea and
of this p ericope's assertions relate d to p ersonal ontology.35 over the birds of the heavens and o ver every living thing that creeps upon
)
the earth."
26 And God said : " Let u s make [na' 0 seh] 'iidiim i n our image, according
to our liken ess, and let the m rule over the fish ofthe sea a nd over the birds In this, the B ible's first account of human creation, it is evident that verse 26 )
of the heavens and over the b'hemiih and over all the earth and over every contains similar content to verse 28. Verse 26 recounts God' s decision to make
creeper that creeps upon the earth." 36
J
haiidiim and give them the function ofrulership. Verse 28 com es after God has
created haiidiim and recounts his blessing and commission to them to "be fruitful )
37
. . . and rule." Sandwiched in between is the apex of this passage. Here the
narrative breaks into poetry, as ifprose is insufficient to exp ress the grandeur of the J
wording, clearly connecting God's creation of the p lant kingdom with its usefulness for the
event: 38
animal/human kingdom. As was mentioned before, the creatures of day 5 are connected J
with day 2, since their respective habitats were formed on that day. And it is understood that 27 And God created haiidiim in his image, wayyibra' 'lohfm 'et-ha iidiim b'palmoa
the light and luminaries of days I and 4 are essential for the surviving and thriving of the
in the image of God he created him, b 'pelem ' ' lohfm biira ' oto
entire ecosystem.
35
According to Kenneth A. Matthews, this passage is the "seedbed for understanding
male and female he created them. ziikar im'qebiih biira ' otiim:
the promissory blessing of God for Israel's fathers and its realization in the life of the nation J
(see his Introduction). We cannot look at I :26-28 without viewing it through the prism of
human sin, both in its beginning in the garden and its consequences for human life and In this sole poem o f chap ter 1, the verb biira is used three times, once in each _)
humanity's relationship to creation. Theologically, it is essential for interpreting the colon. This repeated usage is intended to make a poetic impact, as neither this verb
Christian faith with its proclamation regarding human life, the universal sinfulness of nor 'iisiih was used more than once p er creation day in the narrative that precedes )
39
mankind, and the sole resolution of sin through the incarnation, death, and resurrection of day six. Furthermo re, the repeated u sage of biira ("created ") h ere as opposed to
Christ" ( Genesis 1- 11:2 6, The New American Commentary IA (Nashville, TN: Broadrnan
and Holman, 1996], 163, 164). Theodorus C. Vriezen even sees Gen I :26, 27 as the "best
synthesis of the whole Old Testament message" (according to Richard M. Davidson,
"Biblical Anthropology and the Old Testament," paper presented at the Third International of Humanity's Responsibility in the Face of the Biodiversity Crisis," in Keeping God's
Bible Conference, Israel [June 16, 2012], 15; see Vriezen's An Outline of Old Testament Earth: The Global Environment in Biblical Perspective, eds. Noah J. Toly and Daniel I.
Theology [Oxford: Blackwell, 1970], 145). Block (Do=ers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2010), ch. 5.
36 37
Translations of biblical texts are my own throughout. Some options for the It is likely that the blessing and the mandate to "be fruitful ... and rule" applies not )
translation of haiidiim are: humankind, humanity, humans, a human, man, mankind, Adam. only to haiidiim but also to some land animals. Day five includes a blessing and a mandate
I favor a translation that can refer both to the singular ("him") and the plural ("them"), as to "be fruitful and become many and fill"; therefore, it seems reasonable that land animals
this word does in verse 27. The only option that seems to do this is "man," which can refer would also receive some sort of divine blessing and mandate. Based on this and the
to Adam, to the collective Adam and Eve, and to humanity in general. However, difference between the listing of animals in verses 26 and 28, I am led to believe that verse
inescapably "man" denotes "maleness," which is not the intended meaning of haiidiim in 26 applies specifically to haiidiim and verse 28 applies to haiidiim and some land animals.
the Gen 1 narrative (although that is the intent of this word in Gen 2). Therefore, due to the For a discussion of this, see A. Rahel Schafer's dissertation ('"You, YHWH, Save Humans
lack of suitable alternatives, haiidiim will be referred to as haiidiim. If my usage of the and Animals': God's Response to the Vocalized Needs of Non-Human Animals as
personal pronoun "them" in conjunction with haiidiim feels awkward linguistically, it is the Portrayed
31
in the Old Testament," Wheaton College, 20 I 6).
same grammatical usage that is found in the original text. Matthews, 172 ('The construction ofv. 27 is an embedded poem consisting of three )
The Hebrew word b'hemiih is translated and interpreted in many ways: cattle, lines").
39
livestock, domesticated animals, beasts of burden, animals in relationship with humans, After I: I (b're s ft biira ' ' /ohfm 'et hassiimayim w'' et ha iire.s), biira is only used
higher-order animals, intelligent animals, animals capable of relationship w ith God, four- one other time before day six, and this is in day five (it is also used in 2:3 and 2:4a- the last
footed animals, high-carriage animals, wild animals. My study of biblical zoological !:Wo verses of this creation narrative---to refer to the totality and completion of God's )
taxonomy has not yet led me to be confident with one specific translation or interpretation, creative activity). It is interesting how usage of biira is reserved for the creation of the
therefore here I use the original term, b' hemiih . For some ofthese usages, see the following: heavens and the earth (I: I; 2:3 [totality of creation]; 2:4a), water animals and winged
)
Collins, ch. 4; Daniel I. Block, 'To Serve and To Keep: Toward a Biblical Understanding animals (verse 2 1), and humans (verse 27), when the less personal 'iisiih is the verb used for

' )
 )
)
)
) 394 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU
)
'asiih ("made") can connote a more personal, '"absolute' ex nihilo" creation by
) God.40 In regard to the syntax of this poem, the first two lines are in chiastic
structure, and the third line adds more detail to their meaning.41 Some see the first
) two lines merely in synonymous parallelism.42 However, their inverted repetition
) shows that indeed they are in chiastic structure: 43
) A And God created ha adii.m A wayyibra' 'lohfm 'et-ha ii.dam
) B in his image B b'.salmoa
B ' in the image of God B' b~selem ''lohim
A' h e created him A' bara' 6t6
) fruitful ... and rule"). These two divine declarations sandwich verse 27, the central
This structure of verse 27a-b is a tool the author uses to highlight the utmost
) importance given to the imago Dei, the element found at the heart ofthis structure.
Verse 27c follows in synthetic parallelism to this structure, and explains how
) beginning of the pericope, verse 24. Verses 24 and 25 form a unit on the creation
) of!and animals ("living creatures" ofthe earth), where verse 24 pronounces God's
the rest of creation. It is possible that bara is used in I :21 specifically because of the
) inclusion of the "great sea creatures/monsters" (hattanninim haggedolim) listed first in this
verse, in order to indicate their subordinate and creaturely position in relation to God, as
) opposed to their position as divine monsters in certain ancient Near Eastern myths [see, for
) example, Doukhan, Genesis, 68; Mary K. Wakeman, God's Battle with the Monster: A Study
in Biblical Imagery [Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973], 79). God also highlights the special
) significance ofhis animal and human creation by specifically blessing only his fifth-day and
sixth-day creatures: "Be fruitful and become many'' (verses 22 and 28). Certainly between
) the longer narratives in days five and six, the usage of bara in them, and the specific
blessing given to animals and humans, it seems that the intensity of the creation narrative
) increases as it continues. Each aspect of creation is important, and God's planning is
manifest as he creates each element in the necessary order, and builds up the whole
)
ecosystem. But the literary elements of this narrative seem to suggest that creation week
climaxes with the creation of haadam.
0
• Doukhan, The Literary Structure ofthe Genesis Creation Story, Andrews University
) Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 5 (Berrien Springs, Mich.: Andrews University Press,
1978), 62.
j 41
For the chiastic arrangement, see Matthews, 175. For the relationship between verse
27b and 27c, see Phyllis A. Bird, "Male and Female He Created Them: Gen. 1:27b in the
) Context of the Priestly Account of Creation," Harvard Theological Review 74/2 (April I,
) 1981 ), 149-50.
42
See Paul K. Jewett, Man as Male and Female: A Study ofSexual Relationships from
) a Theological Point of View (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 45; Willem A.M. Beuken,
"The Human Person in the Vision of Genesis 1- 3: A Synthesis of Contemporary Insights,"
Louvain Studies 24 ( 1999), 6-9.
" The firsthalfofverse 27a uses proper nouns ("God" and "haadam"), and the second
) half of27a uses a personal (possessive) pronoun to refer to a proper noun ("his" refers to
"God" found in the clauses after and before it); the first half of 27b uses a proper noun
("God"), and the second half of 27b uses personal pronouns to refer to proper nouns (both
referents are in the first half of 27a, where "he" refers to "God" and "him" refers to
"haadam"). Matthews, 175; Peter Mercer, An Initiatory Catechism ofHebrew Grammar
(Melbourne: Walker, May & Co., 1876), 28.
WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? 395
haa.dam can be both "him" of verse 27b and "them" of verse 27c.44 How
significant it is that in this first biblical reference to the creation of humans, and in
this grand imago Dei text, the author makes a point to emphasize how God created
in his image not just "him" but "male and female." 45
But not only is the imago Dei the theme of the first biblical poem, and as such,
the apex of verses 26-28, it is also the zenith of this narrative of the sixth day of
creation. In this narrative, God speaks four times. T wo of these times are found
in the pericope ofver;,es 26-28, of which verse 27 is the apex. In verse 26, God
speaks his intention to create humans ("Let us make 'adam in our image ... and let
them rule"), and in verse 28, God speaks his blessing and commission to them ("Be
imago Dei text. Yet two more times God speaks on the sixth day, once before
verses 26-28 and once after.
The first time God speaks in the sixth-day creation narrative is at the very
intention in regards to the creation of land animals, and verse 25 recounts his
making of them. This pattern is a convention that is used throughout this creation
narrative. Here whenever something new comes into existence, it is introduced by
God's declaration of the "impersonal jussive" "Let . ..." Its narrative is then
wrapped up by a pronouncement that such a thing indeed was made. 46
44
Because ofsemantic correspondence, some see a formal parallelism between "in the
image of God" in verse 27b and "male and female" in 27c, which can lead to viewing God
as bisexual. See Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric ofSexuality (Philadelphia: Fortress,
1978), 200. Karl Barth emphasizes the bisexuality of the imago Dei but does not go so far
as to say God is bisexual (The Doctrine ofCreation, trans. J.W. Edwards et al.; 4 bks.; vol.
3 of Church Dogmatics, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance [Edinburgh: T & T Clark,
1958], bk. 2: 236). Others see the correspondence between verse 27c and what precedes it
as indicating an original androgynous haadam before the differentiation between male and
female is introduced. See Judy Klitsner, Subversive Sequels in the Bible: How Biblical
Stories Mine and Undermine Each Other(New Milford, CT: Maggid Books, 2011 ), 112-14.
In seeing verse 27c in synthetic parallelism to what precedes it, I agree more with Bird:
"The parallelism ofthe two cola is progressive, not synonymous. The second statement adds
to the first; it does not explicate it'' (149, 50). See also Davidson, 12.
., Gerhard von Rad states that this shows that the author's "idea ofman .. . finds its full
meaning not in the male alone but in man and woman" (Genesis, rev. ed. [Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1973], 60). He continues by quoting Emil Brunner: "That is the immense
double statement, ofa lapidary simplicity, so simple indeed that we hardly realize that with
it a vast world of myth and Gnostic speculation, of cynicism and asceticism, of the
deification of sexuality and the fear of sex completely disappears" (Man in Revolt: A
Christian
46
Anthropology [Cambridge: The Lutterwortb Press, 2002], 346).
Days 1-3 state either "And God said: Let there be ... and God made ("and there was"
.in day 1)" or "And God said: Let there be .. . and God saw . .. that it was good." Days 4-6
include all three of the verbs above: "And God said: Let there be ... and God made
("created" in day 5; "made" and "created" in day 6) .. . and God saw .. . that it was good

396 MARLA A. SAMAAN N EDELCU
So in the narrative of the sixth day of creation, God speaks first at the
beginning of the unit that describes the creation of land animals (verse 24). His
speaking is recorded a second time at the beginning of the unit that describes the
creation of ha iidiim (verse 26). His third declaration is at the end of that unit (verse
28). And his final proclamation comes after this unit, in the final section of this
pericope that has to do with God's alimentary provision for humans, land animals,
and birds. This final section (verses 29, 30) flows out of the previous one, since
God has just described humankind's relationship with the animal world (verse 28)
and now describes their relationship with the plant world (verse 29) and also the
relationship b etween the animal and plant worlds (verse 30). Yet because of
similarity of content between verses 29 and 30, they are also a self-contained unit.
By looking atthe author's placement of God's four declarations in the narrative
of the sixth day, it is seen that verse 27 is sandwiched on either side by two divine
declarations in this concentric arrangement:47
24 And God said: "Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their
kind . . 26 And God said: "Let u s make 'iidiim in our image, according to our
likeness, and let them rule ..." 27 "And God created ha iidiim in his image .. ."
28 And God blessed them and said to them: "Be fruitful and become many and fill
the earth and subdue and rule ..." 29 And God said: "Behold I have given to you
every plant ...".
So not only does the chiastic structure ofverses 26-28 highlight verse 27 as its
apex, but the concentric structure of verses 24-30 draws attention to verse 27 as its
(''very good" in day 6). All of the days except for days I and 5 also include "and it was so."
The following is the distribution of these literary elements, day by day. Day 1: "And God
said: Let there be light and there was light. ... And God saw . .. that [it was] good'' (verses
3, 4). Day 2: "And God said: Let there be space/expanse ... and let it separate .. . And God
made ... and it was so'-' (6, 7). Day 3: "And God said: Let the waters be collected ... and
let dry ground appear and it was so. ... And God saw . .. that [it was] good. And God said:
Let the earth sprout grass ... and it was so ... and God saw that [it was] good'' (9-12). Day
4: "And God said: Let there be luminaries ... and let them be for signs ... and let them be
for luminaries .. . and it was so . . .. And God made ... and God saw that [it was] good''
(14-16, 18). Day 5: "And God said: Let the waters swarm ... And God created [bara] ..
. and God saw . .. that [it was] good'' (20, 21). Day 6: "And God said: Let the earth bring
forth living creatures ... and it was so. And God made .. . and God saw . .. that [it was]
good. And God said: Let us make 'adiim ["cohortative ofresolve" here, not "impersonal
jussive"] . . . and let them rule . .. And God created [biira] ... and it was so. And God saw
all ... and behold! Very good (24-27, 30, 31). All italicization in biblical texts is mine,
throughout.
47
Hajime Murai, "Literary structure (chiasm, chiasmus) of Book of Genesis,"
http://www. valdes .ti tech .ac.jp/-h_murai/bible/0 I_Genesis_pericope_e.html# I (accessed
Sept. 26, 2014). See also his paper presented at the Society of Biblical Literature, "The
Parallel Concentric Structure within Exodus," Atlanta, GA (Nov. 21, 20 I 0).
)
)
WHAT MAKES H UMANS H UMAN? )
397
48 )
rnidpoint. Furthermore, the chiastic structure of the poem in verse 27 makes it
obvious that the imago D ei is a central idea the author seeks to convey. Thus, by )
extension, the imago Dei can be seen as a central theme to which verses 24-30
point. )
But the pericope of the sixth day ofcreation extends from verse 24 to verse 31, )
so what purpose might this last verse serve?
)
31 And God saw all that he made and- behold!-[it was] very good. )
And there was evening and there was morning, the sixth day.
)
This verse culminates the account of the sixth day of creation. But it is also the
concluding statement of God 's creative work on all six days ofcreation-"and God
saw all [kol] that he made."49 Six times previously in this chapter, the following
phrase is repeated: "and God saw that (it was] good"-wayyar' ''Iohfm kf-tob .50
But here "God saw all that he made and-behold!-[itwas] very good"- wayyar' )
''lohfm 'et-kol-' 0 .ser 'a.sah w'hinne-tob m" od.
What in God's creation elicited this response of "behold!-very good"
(w'hinne-tob m"od) as opposed to "that [it was] good" (kf-tob)? Certainly it was
the "all," the completed ecosystem-"and God saw all that he made"-wayyar'
0
' ' lohim 'et-kol-' ser 'asiih. However, it is interesting to note that only after the J
narrative records the creation of humans is God's created work complete and )
worthy of his highest commendation ("behold! Very good"). Already earlier on
the sixth day, immediately after the creation ofland animals, "God saw that [it was] j
good" (verse 25). But even in land animals' miraculous composition and similarity
to humans, and even though all life except for human life had already been created,
.J
creation did not receive God's highest exclamation of approbation. That did not
come until the creation of haiidiim, which marked the completion of God's creation
of the heavens, the earth, and all their vast array (2: 1). Even 2:5 conveys this idea
that the earth was not complete or filled until the creation of haiidiim (which is
described in more detail in 2:7 and on). There was a sense ofnegation, and creation
was "not yet" until its culmination with the creation of haiidiim. 51
48
P.A. Smith, Rhetoric and Redaction ill Trito-Isaiah: The Structure, Growth and
Authorship of Isaiah 56-66 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 19, 20. Luis Alonso Schokel, A
Manual ofHebrew Poetics (Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2000), 192.
49
God's creation of all this ('et-ko/-' "ser 'asiih) serves as the antidote to the earth's
being "chaotic and void" (tohu wiibohu) in verse 2. Gen 2: I extends this idea offullness and
completion: "So the heavens and the earth were completed, and all their vast array" (wk
o/-s'ba am). J
so Only in the first occurrence of this phrase (verse 4) is wording slightly different.
Here the object of creation mentioned in the phrase: "And God saw the light that [it was]
J
good"-wa;ry,ar'' ' lohim 'et-ha or ki-tob.
st
In Gen 2:5, "we find expressions of 'not yet' (terem), of non-action (lo) and non-
existence ('ayin)" (Doukhan, Literary Structure, 52).
J
_)
)
)
)
) 398 MARLA A. SAMMNNEDELCU
) To review, day six can be seen as the highpoint of days one to six, the days in
which God accomplished the ''work (m' la' kto) which he had made/done" (2:2),
) day narrative of Gen. 1. Included in this will also be an attempt to ascertain which
while the resting, blessing, and sanctifying of the seventh-day Sabbath (2:2, 3) is
) truly the culmination and climax of the entire creation week narrative ( 1:1-2:4a).
Furthermore, the creation of haii.dam is a highlight of day six, and the imago Dei
) is the main thrust of that narrative ofhaii.dam's creation. At the same time, a closer
) look at the formulaic structuring of the sixth-day narrative can call attention to the
interrelationship between haii.dam and the rest ofthe created ecosystem. Therefore,
) it is evident that the unique creation of haii.diim, the imago Dei theme, and the
relationship of haiidii.m with the rest ofcreation is ofcrucial import to the Gen. 1: 1-
) 2 creation narrative: "And the Lord God formed haiidiim of the dust of the ground
2:4a creation narrative. Certainly these concepts are of utmost importance to the
) text's expression of what and who humans are.52
) Day Six's Implications for Personal Ontology
The Bible is not a philosophy textbook in which one can look up a section on
personal ontology and read a clearly laid out treatise. Instead, throughout the Bible,
) the truth presented about personal ontology is entwined with narrative, parable,
theological discourse, and poetry. The first and most foundational occurrence of
) in the Gen 2 creation narrative. 56
content related to personal ontology is found in the creation narrative. Day six of
) creation, in the Gen 1 narrative, is of particular interest not only because it is the
first occurrence of content related to personal ontology, but because it describes the
) creation of both humans and land animals. This is of great importance since one
of the major questions of personal ontology, and even of theological anthropology,
)
relates to the similarities and differences between humans and animals. 53
) The purpose ofthis section is to discover what Gen 1 :24-31 might have to say
about personal ontology, based on the exegetical analysis in the previous section.
Accordingly, this section will b e divided into the two main categories of personal
) ontology: constitution and nature.54 It will explore if and how the pericope
)
) 52
Vriezen even sees this imago Dei pronouncement as "the outstanding feature of the
conception ofman in the Old Testament" (144) and Gen 1:26, 27 as the best summary of the
) end, where God gives "every green plant for food" to every creature that has nepes !zayyiih
entire Old Testament message (128).
) 3
' Cosmas Rubencamp, "The AnthropologyofJeanZurcher: A Catholic Appreciation,"
Andrews University Seminary Studies XII (Jan. 1972), 79. See Jean Zurcher, Nature and
) Destiny of Man (New York: Philosophical Library, 1968). In scientific and philosophical
fields, animals can generally be referred to as "non-human animals." In Gen 1, however,
) a clear distinction is made between the animals and haiidiim (humans). Even so, all life
created on days five and six also falls under the category of"living creatures/beings" (nepes
J !zayyiih).
•• To review, the questions of constitution and nature delineate the topic of personal
) contradistinction to the physical life" (Anthropology of the Old Testament [Philadelphia:
ontology. Personal ontology asks the question "What am I"? And this question is made up
) of two others: the question ofconstitution-"What am I composed of?"-and the question
ofnature-"What does 'I' refer to? To give the Aristotelian explanation, constitution would
) be concerned with what humans are materially, and nature would be concerned with what
humans are by definition.
j
)
WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? 399
addresses these questions ofpersonal ontology, and will summarize the findings in
such a way as to present what view ofpersonal ontology may be found in this sixth-
views of the imago Dei may be best supported by the pericope.
Constitution
Does this pericope have anything to contribute to the question ofwhat humans
are made of, the question of constitution? It certainly does, first by referring to
animals as nepes !zayyiih ("living creatures," "living beings").55 This is of utmost
significance, especially when considering this term's usage in verse 7 of the Gen
(min-ha "diimiih) and breathed into his nostrils the breath oflife (nismat !zayyfm)
and nismat !zayyfm became a living being (nepes !zayyiih)." Here the constitution
of haii.diim is given as a formula ("dust of the ground" + "breath of life"). It can
seem surprising that after God's one-of-a-kind creation of haii.diim, haii.dii.m is
given the same designation as all animals (nepes !zayyiih). Certainly it suggests that
there is not a constitutional difference between animals and humans, by virtue of
nepes !zayyiih being used ofanimals in the Gen 1 creation narrative, and ofhaiidiim
_
Additionally, both humans and animals are created male and female. In
regards to haii.diim, they are createdzii.kiiri1n'qebiih (precisely a physical "male and
female," not the perhaps more psychological "man and woman"). And while these
terms are not used of animals in the creation narrative, the blessing and commission
to "be fruitful and become many" assumes such. 57 Furthermore, in the account of
Adam naming the animals, the implication is that he saw that the animals were male
and female, yet also saw that a suitable partner was not found for him (2: 18-25).
Still another aspect ofhumans' and animals' physicality is similar, according
to this narrative. Both are given plants-' eseb -by which to receive their
" Day six of the Creation narrative mentions nepes !zayyiih twice. In its first
verse-"Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their kind" (1 :24), and at the
(1 :30). The next place nepes !zayyiih is found regards the creation ofAdam: "And the Lord
God formed haiidiim of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of
life and haiidiim became a living being'' (or living creature; Gen2:7). There are three other
occurrences of nepes !zayyiih in the creation narrative: Day five's "swarms of living
creatures" in the waters (Gen 1 :20, 21), and Adam's naming of every living creature (Gen
2:19).
6
' According to Hans Walter Wolff, in all 754 occurrences ofnepes !zayyiih in the Old
Testament, it "is never given the meaning of an indestructible core of being, in
Fortress, 1974], 20).
" In verse 22, "be fruitful and become many'' speaks of the water animals and winged
animals; in verse 28, it is directed towards haiidiim, but likely includes land animals as well.
See footnote 27.

400 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU
sustenance {l :29, 30). This narrative shows that the drives to survive and to
reproduce, two basic urges, are not only shared by animals and humans, but that
their fulfillment is provided for by God. Additionally, the land animals and humans
are created on the same day. In spite ofhumans' unique honor in creation (ofbeing
created in God's image, according to his likeness), this still does not warrant a
separate creation day for hatidtim. The land animals and hatidtim together share
the same birth date.
Analysis of this text thus far has shown similarities between humans and
animals, in regards to constitution. They both are nourished by plant food, are
blessed and commissioned by God to reproduce, and are called "living creatures"
(nepes fiayytih). 58 Thus, this nanative seems to suggest that humans and animals
are constituted of the same physical stuff, or at least gives no indication that they
are composed of different physical stuff. Why is this significant? Because it is
agreed that animals' constitution is thoroughly physical. So if a biblical text uses
the same constitutional term (nepes f,ayytih) for humans and animals, it suggests
that humans, like animals, are also thoroughly physical in their constitution.
Nature
If humans, like animals, are thoroughly physical in their constitution, what
about their nature? Is it unique in any way? What makes humans human?59
Categories of ontology, such as constitution and nature, serve to describe and
differentiate things from each other. If there is no difference in ontological
categories between two things, then there is no justification to call them two things
and not just one thing. So if humans are truly unique, but are constitutionally
physical like the animals, then there must be some difference in nature between
58
Perhaps haiidiim and some land animals (at least the b'hemiih) are both also blessed
and commissioned by God to rule. Sorting out the zoological taxonomy in Gen 1 can be a
daunting task, but at present this is the conclusion to which my cursory exegesis has led me.
59
DNA is the answer Kelsey gives in his theological anthropology. Humans and
chimpanzees (and also bonobos) do not share 1-2% oftheir DNA with each other. It would
be fascinating to know what these genetic differences are. But "scientists do not yet know
how most of the DNA that is uniquely ours affects gene function" (Kate Wong, "Tiny
Genetic Differences between Humans and Other Primates Pervade the Genome," Scientific
American 311/3 [Aug. 19, 2014),http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/tiny-genetic-
differences-between-humans-and-other-primates-pervade-the-genome/ [accessed Nov. 16,
2014]). While study of this field has only recently begun (because the human genome
needed first to be mapped out), HARs (human accelerated regions) have been identified as
regions in the human DNA sequence that seem to be uniquely human, and some of these
seem to be Jinked with the development of larger brains in humans (K.S. Pollard, S.R.
Salama, N. Lambert, et al, "An RNA Gene Expressed During Cortical Development Evolved
Rapidly in Humans," Nature 443 (2006): 167-72). Perhaps in time such study of DNA will
help to answer the question of what makes humans unique. Even so, the answers that we
can find from the biblical creation narrative are of great value, for they are inspired by the
Creator of all things, who created humans' unique DNA.
)
I WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? 401
humans and animals. Examining what these differences might be is one way that
I can help to illuminate what humans are by nature, and what makes them who they
are.
)
)
I Does Gen 1:24-31 suggest that there are differences between humans and
animals? In a previous section, it was shown that while the interrelationships )
within God's created ecosystem is a major theme here, the creation of humans is
I still the chiastic apex of day six of the creation week. This is evidenced by the
amount of space the narrative devotes to hatidtim, by the literary intensity that j
builds as the narrative continues through the days of creation and· into day six, by
I the poetry that breaks out of prose in verse 27, and by how God proclaims the
completion ofhis creation "behold!-very good" once hatidtim, the capstone ofhis
I creation, comes into being. 60 It was suggested that the concept of the imago Dei is
the thematic climax of Gen 1 's sixth-day narrative, and that it points to why humans )
I hold such a unique and special place in creation, in spite ofsuch great constitutional
similarities to animals.61
Another feature that differentiates the creation of humans and animals is how
the telling oftheir creation is expressed. Ofland animals, God's intention to create
is stated thus: "Let the earth bring forth living creatures according to their kind"
(verse 24). Ofhaiidtim, God's intention is stated this way: "Let us make 'iidiim in
our image, according to our likeness" (verse 26).62 This is creation's "boldest
affirmation of the remarkably unique relationship between humans and
God- humans resemble God."63
Moving from the above statements of divine intent to create, to the actual )
reports of the creation of animals and humans, it is found that these reports are in
parallel form with each other. This parallelism highlights the difference between
the creation of animals and humans-and that the imago Dei is the differentiating
factor.64 "And God made [wayya'as''lohim] ... [all the categories ofland animals]
according to their kind" (verse 25); "And God created [wayyibra' 'lohfm] hatidiim
in his image" (verse 27). 65 Doukhan comments on this distinction between land _)
0
• It is interesting to note that the only other instance of poetry that is used in either
creation account is found in Gen 2:23 and is an exclamation ofMan'sjoy at the creation of
Woman. In Gen 1 and 2, the device ofpoetry is reserved exclusively for the glory that was
a part of the creation of human beings, both man and woman. J
61
A reference to Ps 8:5 reinforces the fact ofhumans' special place in creation: "You
have made him ['iidiim] a little lower me ' lohim ("than God"; or, less likely- "than the
angels") and have crowned him with glory and honor."
62
It is interesting to note that the text specifies that the plants and animals are all
created "according to their kind" (verses 11, 12, 21, 24, and 25). Yet of humans, it instead
states that they are created "in his image, according to his likeness" (verse 27).
63
Doukhan, Genesis, 71.
64
Doukhan, Genesis, 76.
65
The difference between the verbs 'iisiih and biira here seems significant for
identifying human ontology (and may be); however, it seems less significant when one
notices that the verb used for God's creation ofthe water animals and winged animals is also
)

) ~
)
)
402 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU
)
) animals and humans found in 1:24-27: "Animals are defined within the natural
domain, according their 'kinds' and are described as derived from the earth (1 :24),
) while humans are defined in terms of a special and direct reference to God."66
) Yet even though God made or created both animals and humans, the text
makes a point to indicate that the earth brought forth animals and God personally
) created haii.dam. This does not indicate a constitutional difference between animals
and humans, for haii.dam is made min-ha O dii.mii.h, from the same ground or earth
) which of the views might be best supported by the sixth-day creation narrative.
as the animals (2:7; 3:19). It does not indicate a difference in origin between
) animals and humans, for both originate from the creative power of God (Ps 104:30:
"You send forth Your breath/spirit [ruh kii.], they [the animals] are created
0 1:24-31, although some of them do not appear as obvious from the text. What
) [yibbii.re]"). What the sixth-day narrative conveys, however, is that God invested
a special care in creating haii.dam.
)
The use of the "cohortative of resolve" (verse 26: "Let us make 'ii.dam) as
j opposed to the "impersonal jussive" (verse 24: "Let the earth bring forth living
creatures") also makes manifest God's special attention to the creation of haii.dam,
) not truly unique to humans, would it be warranted to consider an individual one of
and possibly even reveals the creative activity of the godhead by its use of the
) plural pronoun.67 It may present a more intimate involvement of God in the
creation of haii.dam than in the rest of creation. Certainly this, too, is tied up with
) haii.dam being created in God's very own image.
The ways in which humans differ from animals in this creation narrative relate
)
to humans being created in God's image. 68 But what is this image of God, and what
) does it have to say about personal ontology? As a Genesis commentator states:
) "Although it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of the 'image,' it is closely
associated with the uniqueness and distinctiveness ofhumans."69 There are scores
'
.)
) 71
biira. While the usage of both 'iisiih and biira could be stylistic, it is true that biira does
convey a much more personal element in creation by God than does 'iisiih. What perhaps
)
is the most significant here is that in verse 27, the verb biira is repeated three times (as
) discussed above), when this occurs nowhere else in the narrative, for any other verb.
66
Doukhan, Genesis, 70.
) 67
See Gerhard Hase!, where he surveys the various interpretations of this plural and
settles on the "plural of fullness" interpretation. "The Meaning of 'Let Us' in Gen. 1:26,"
) affection for those who have charge of them, far superior to the affection shown by some of
Andrews University Seminary Studies 13 ( 1975): 58-66. "Let us" in reference to God is only
used twice in the Old Testament-here and in Gen. 11 :7 ("Come, let us go down and there
_,,l
confuse their language, that they may not understand one another's speech"); both usages
) are for divine actions that are monumental for humans.
For a discussion of the "cohortative of resolve" and "impersonal jussive" used in this
) text, see Nahum M. Sarna, Understanding Genesis (New York: Schocken, 1970), 11.
" To review, the "cohortative of resolve," showing God's intimate involvement in
) humans' creation, introduces the first occurrence of imago Dei in the Bible. The theme of
the imago Dei is the climax of this sixth-day creation narrative. It receives special attention,
) 72
space, and its own literary genre. The imago Dei here is of course unique to humans, and
) is a major part of the reason God saw his creation and exclaimed: ''behold!- very good"
(verse 31).
) 69
James McKeown, Genesis, The Two Horizons Old Testament Commentary (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdrnans, 2008), 27.
)
.
. '
WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? 403
of answers to the question of what the imago Dei is: physical likeness, the
possession ofmental and rational abilities, free will, emotional life, personhood and
individuality, moral nature or a desire for holiness, spiritual nature or an openness
to God, the social and sexual natures which include marriage and family, the call
to rule or care for creation, adoption and sonship, self-consciousness and identity,
the innate sense of eternity, or a combination ofthese.70 The goal of this chapter
is not to choose the best interpretation of imago Dei overall. It is simply to see
Really none ofthe points in the paragraph above would be contradicted by Gen
would engender more controversy would be to claim that these attributes are so
exclusive to humans that they are sufficient to differentiate humans from animals.
Evidence from Scripture and science ( even from lay observation) demonstrates that
while humans possess these qualities to a higher degree than animals, most are
shared in some degree by animals.71 Considering that most of these qualities are
them the imago Dei? This does not seem to be the best answer.
Nevertheless, there is one attribute on the list above that undoubtedly applies
fully to humans and not animals, and that is sonship. 72 It is haii.dam that is a son .
of God (Luke 3:38). Furthermore, the notion of sonship could be a helpful ·
7
°For a good survey of numerous answers, see Gunnlaugur A. Jonnson, The Image of
God: Genesis 1 :26-28 in a Century ofOld Testament Research, Coniectanea Biblica, Old
Testament Series 26, trans. Lorraine Svendsen (Lund, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell
International, 1988).
Some texts that may indicate higher-order cognitive processing (for good or evil) in
animals: Gen 9:5; Exod 21 :28; Num 22:28-30; Job 38:41 ; Ps 103:22; 147:9; 150:6; Prov
6:6-8; 30:30; Jon 4:11; 2 Pet 2:16; Rev. 5:13. Consider passages from Ellen White, such as
this one: "The intelligence displayed by many dumb animals approaches so closely to human
intelligence that it is a mystery. The animals see and hear and love and fear and suffer. They
use their organs far more faithfully than many human beings use theirs. They manifest
sympathy and tenderness toward their companions in suffering. Many animals show an
the human race. They form attachments for man which are not broken without great
suffering to them" (Ministry ofHealing [Nampa, ID: Pacific Press Publishing Association,
1999), 315-316). Every year, increasingly more is discovered and published on animal
behavior that reveals great similarities between humans and animals. As a result, the term
"humaniqueness" was recently coined (by an evolutionary biologist) to focus in on the study
of "factors that make human cognition special" (Amy Lavoie, "Hauser Presents Theory of
'Humaniqueness,"'Harvard Gazette [Feb. 14, 2008], http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story
/2008/02/hauser-presents-theory-of-humaniqueness/ [accessed Nov. 13, 2014]).
Adoption and how it relates to sonship is a theme brought up in the New Testament,
so it will not receive focus here. But certainly adoption is a theological topic that has seeds
in the creation and sonship of haiidiim in Gen 1.
I use "sonship" because I was not able to find a gender-inclusive alternative. But in
using it, I mean both son and daughter, and do not wish to prefer or exclude one gender.

404 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU
interpretation of the imago Dei because it is more all-encompassing than the
alternatives, avoiding the compartmentalization of "inward" and "outward"
characteristics, for example. This fits with a wholistic view ofhumans, a view that
is faithful to this narrative that identifies humans as "living creatures" (or "living
beings") not "souls" in bodies.73 Unfortunately, "most commentators have
anatomized the individual person into material and spiritual properties, thus
identifying the imago Dei as either physical or spiritual. This dichotomy, however,
is at odds with Hebrew· anthropology [whereJ ... a person is viewed as a unified
whole."74
Furthermore, this view of imago Dei matches up nicely with the very next
occurrence of "image" (se/em) after Gen 1:26 and 27. This is found in Gen 5 :3:
"And Adam lived a hundred and thirty years and begat a son in his own likeness,
according to his image, and called his name Seth." This text connects image and
73
This wholistic view ofimago Dei also harmonizes with White's understanding ofthe
image of God as both an outward and an inward resemblance to God. Patriarchs and
Prophets, 45: "Man was to bear God's image, both in outward resemblance and in
character. Christ alone is the 'express image' (Hebrews 1:3) of the Father; but man was
formed in the likeness of God. His nature was in harmony with the will of God. His mind
was capable of comprehending divine things. His affections were pure; his appetites and
passions were under the control of reason. He was holy and happy in bearing the image of
God and in perfect obedience to His will" (Nampa, Idaho: Pacific Press Publishing
Association, 2005). Notice how she includes the aspects of the whole person in her
explanation of the image of God.
74
Matthews, 167. Matthews is one who puts forth "sonship" as an answer to the
question of what the imago Dei is (170, 71).
There is semantic evidence that points to "image" and "likeness" (Gen. 1:26: b',salmenu
kidmutenua) indicating the physical and mental aspects of human ontology, respectively.
See Doukhan, Genesis, 73. This corresponds with White's above distinction of"outward
and inward resemblance to God," although she did not make the specific connection between
image/outward resemblance and likeness/inward resemblance. It should be remembered that
even if "image" and "likeness" are used to describe the physical and mental aspects of
human ontology, it does not mean that these aspects were intended to be in opposition to
each other. Instead, they form one unified human nature, with the aspects of that nature
together created to resemble God. The Bible's first usage of these terms seems to indicate
that no great technical distinction is meant between these terms. For even though Gen. I :26
uses both the terms when describing God's intention to make haiidiim, Gen I :27 uses only
"image" in its account ofGod's creation ofhaiidiim. These shows that while using "image"
and "likeness" together may add more explanatory detail, what it means to be haiidiim is
equally conveyed through the usage of"image" alone.
Based on semantic evidence, some commentators see "image" as referring to humans'
"outward resemblance" to God ("physical/material domain"), and "likeness" as referring to
an "inward resemblance" to God ("spiritual/functional domain"). See Doukhan, Genesis,
73. Yet this differentiation does not choose one domain over the other, it reinforces human
unity by recognizing that the aspects ofhuman nature are together meant to resemble God.
)
)
)
WHAT MAK.Es HUMANS HUMAN? 405
)
likeness with sonship, as is implied in the Gen 1 creation narrative.75 For Adam
was created "in the image of God, according to his likeness" (1 :26), and now he )
fathers a son "in his own likeness, according to his image" (5:3). 76
)
What might this image, this sonship, entail, and how might it make humans
unique? On a most basic level, it is self-evident that the use of the word "image" )
in the imago Dei shows that God originally created humans with the capacity to be
similar to him in some way. The same is the case with "sonship." Not only does
it point to a special bond between father and child, but also to a certain similarity
between them. According to the New Testament, as God's children behold him,
they are transformed into his image, and when he returns, they will be like him, for
they will see him as he is (2 Cor 3:12-18; 1 John 3:1-3). Because humans are
created in God's image and endowed with God's sonship, they have a higher
capacity to be similar to God than do animals, especially those persons who choose J
to live for God. 77
In what ways can humans be similar to God? In every dimension of who they )
are as humans. This is faithful to a wholistic view of personal ontology and to the
depiction of human creation in the day-six creation narrative. But what are these
dimensions or aspects that humans have? Through the Bible, humans are described )
with many different anthropological terms. As a whole, the biblical usage of
anthropological terms is more explanatory of the various expressions of what it
means to be human than it is a partitioning of specific anthropological parts over )
and against each other. This first chapter of the Bible reinforces that view by
_)
simply referring to man, man and woman, and humankind as haiidiim, a wholistic
term that includes every aspect ofwho and what humans are. Everything that God
gives humans to do here is a function of haiidiim as a whole. Describing these
aspects can be useful for the sake of analysis, to better understand the whole. But
if the example given in Gen 1 is to be taken seriously, such analysis should not to )
separate the aspects from each other or assign varying ontological properties to each
of them. )
The image of God and the sonship he gives humans also demonstrates itselfin
every other dimension of who they are. While humans are constitutionally similar
" Certainly "image" and "likeness" are used in connection with each other, both in Gen
1:26 and 5:3. The connection between these terms and "sonship" is obvious in 5:3, and is
implied in God's fashioning of haiidiim in chapter one's narrative. However, the solid
confirmation of this "sonship" link to the Gen 1 creation narrative is found in Luke 3:38.
74
In commenting on the birth of Seth described in 5:3, Ellen G. White writes that "Seth
was ofmore noble stature than Cain or Abel, and resembled Adam more closely than did his
other sons" (Patriarchs and Prophets, 80). She goes on to state that his character was
worthy and he had a "natural goodness," in line with Abel and not Cain.
77
This is not to downplay the intelligence or relationship to God that animals can
possess (see, for example, Num 22 or Ps 148). Some animals may sometimes surpass some
humans in these ways. However, because humans are created in the image of God, )
according to his likeness, they have more potential to be more like God than the rest of
creation, provided they walk in his ways.
)
'J
)
)
)
406 MARLA A. SAMAAN NEDELCU WHAT MAKES HUMANS HUMAN? 407
)
") to the animals and not to God, there may be some physical resemblance between physicalist views: How can humans be merely physical yet manifest a nature that
God and humans-not a sameness, but certainly more resemblance than there seems to not be reducible to mere physical components? The sixth-day creation
) would be qetween God and animals. While this is not a popular theological view, narrative offers the answer to this question and so many others of personal
there is much evidence for it when studying the biblical usage of"image," _selern. 78 ontology: humans are created in the image ofGod! Humans are temporal creatures
)
Since humans are created in the image of God and are given sonship, more is created by him, physical in constitution as the animals; but they are God's children,
expected of humans in fulfilling God's mandates than is expected of animals. Not his image-bearers on earth, called to represent his nature and character while living
only are humans to be fruitful, but they are to bring up their children in the "training in his created world, called to be transformed into who he created them to be.
)
and instruction of the Lord" (Eph 6:4). Not only are humans to rule over the fish
and the birds and the creeping things (1 :28), but over the b'hernah and over "all the Marla Samaan Nedelcu is a Ph.D. Candidate at Andrews University, and is writing her
dissertation on a biblical model of human ontology, under the direction ofDr. Canale. She
earth" as well (1 :26). In this rulership, they are to reflect God's compassionate and
) currently resides in Georgia, where she enjoys being a mom to her preschooler son Simon,
salvific rulership (Jon 4:11; Matt 10:29; Rom 8:18-25). This requires the a wife to her husband Adrian, an adjunct professor, and a free-lance writer. Previously,
harmonious development of every dimension of human nature-physical, mental, Marla has also served as an associate pastor and church planter. She received her MA in
spiritual (and more: social, sexual, emotional, moral, etc.). Every human faculty Religion (theology, New Testament) from Andrews University and her B.S. in Religious
) is to reflect the image and glory of God to the world. This is what makes human Studies and Archaeology (minors: Music, English, Biblical Languages) from Southern
unique--the capability to be more like God than any other creature, for haadarn Adventist University. Email: adrianandmarla@gmail.com.
)
alone is created in his image.
)
Conclusion
) Day six ofthe creation narrative presents a view ofpersonal ontology in which
) humans are wholistic living beings, connected to the rest of creation. They have a
physical constitution, with the creation narrative showing no apparent differences
between their constitution and that of the animals. Yet, by virtue of the imago Dei
j and God's extraordinary care in creating them, the text shows that humans, God's
children, have a likeness to him in their nature-a wholistic nature that includes
) every dimension of who they are.79
This opposes the traditional classical view, in which humans are similar to God
) in constitution and nature, by virtue of a timeless, immortal soul. It opposes the
) modern materialist view, in which humans are merely animals (though highly
developed ones) who share the same constitution and nature as they do. It corrects
) the panentheist view by upholding a clear and eternal distinction between created
) humans and the creator God. It answers a question ofemergentist and non-reductive

)
1
_) • See especially the next occurrence of_selem in Gen 5 :3, where White states that Seth
physically resembled Adam more closely than his brothers did (Patriarchs and Prophets,
) 80). For a brieflisting of the major holders of this view, see Davidson, 5. I agree with him
that this view did not gain popularity because it did not fit into the framework of
) traditionally held dualistic and timeless presuppositions.
79
Of course, this similarity to God is much more of a struggle to obtain after the Fall.
j In White's words: "In the beginning God created man in His own likeness. He endowed him
) with noble qualities. His mind was well balanced, and all the powers of his being were
harmonious. But the Fall and its effects have perverted these gifts. Sin has marred and well-
) nigh obliterated the image of God in man. It was to restore this that the plan of salvation was
devised, and a life of probation was granted to man. To bring him back to the perfection in
) which he was first created is the great object of life- the object that underlies every other"
(595).
)
)

Philosophy, Theology, and Language:
Ludwig Wittgenstein and
Fernando L. Canale
Moises Estrada
1. Introduction
h
The 'linguistic-tum' in analytic philosophy of the 20' century owes its
preoccupation with language to several philosophers, among them is Ludwig
Wittgenstein. 1 "Philosophy," he said, "is a struggle against the bewitchment of our
2
understanding by the resources of our language." In the later Heidegger and
4
Gadamer, phenomenology3 also turned to the investigation oflanguage as such.
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations has contributed to the relationship
between philosophy of language5 and constructive theology. Livingstone and
Fiorenza thus state: "In another century, historians of Christian thought may well
judge that the later writings of the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein ... were the
most decisive influence on the way Christian theologians in the latter half of the
twentieth century reconceived their task. Without question, a great deal ofChristian
6 (1964), "we find him struggling with the phenomenalism that assigns primacy to
theology after Wittgenstein is pursued in new ways." Fernando Canale's Toward
a Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial
Presuppositions and Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive
Foundation of Christian Theology also bear the marks ofWittgenstein's influence.
Therefore, in this essay Wittgenstein's later work will be exposited, examining
Fernando Canale's phenomenological use of Wittgenstein, and briefly describing
the theological applications of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Then a
'philosophical investigation' of"God" is presented, with further applications and
contributions from the concepts of "description," "language-games," "forms of
life," and "world-pictures" for constructive theology's task of faith seeking
See, Richard Rorty, The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method (The
1
University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1967). The idea of the "linguistic-turn"
names the phenomena of philosophy's focus on language.
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (UK: Blackwell, 2009), 52e .
3 Phenomenology in the continental tradition is the discipline that pursues philosophical
description of "consciousness and experience in abstraction from consideration of its
intentional content." Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary ofPhilosophy (UK: Oxford
University Press, 2008), 203.
4 The analytic/continental division evidentially is blurred in Wittgenstein, Heidegger,
and Gadamer, as suggested by Richard Rorty.
5 Philosophy of language in the analytic tradition has developed into "the general
attempt to analyze working language, the relationship the understanding person has to its
parts, and the relationships they bear to the world." The Oxford Dictionary ofPhilosophy,
274.
6 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 511- 512.
)
)
)
PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 409
)
understanding.
)
2. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Early, Middle, and Later Phase )
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) is perhaps the most important philosopher
oflanguage in the 20'h century. 7 Wittgenstein's philosophy was concerned with the )
logic of our language, the dissolving of philosophical problems, paradoxes, and )
puzzles. Indeed, Wittgenstein was preoccupied with philosophy of language for
.most of his life. Wittgenstein's life and philosophical work may be divided into )
three phases: early, middle, and later.8
In the early phase Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1914-21) )
defined a picture theory oflanguage associated with St. Augustine, which reduced
meaningful language only to statements or propositions that were verifiable. In the
early work, the picture theory oflanguage presupposes that the meaning of words )
constitutes the name of the object or representation, i.e. meaning arises from )
correspondence between words and objects, i.e. verification. Therefore, the early
work, made two particular assertions, (1) what can be said at all can be said
clearly, and (2) what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.9 His early
work quickly became a model for logical positivism and analytic philosophy.
In the middle phase (1920-29), Wittgenstein develops a phenomenology of
language and boasts that he "found a new philosophical method that will allow
systematic progress as in the sciences." 10 In Wittgenstein's Philosophical Remarks )
personal experience and the language of experience(... however,) this thinking is
11
soon left behind and his thinking turns to the critique of these assumptions." )
Wittgenstein would come to explicitly reject the temptation of philosophy
7
According to Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy's article "Ludwig Wittgenstein."
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/wittgenstein/.
8 A rough timeline of some of Wittgenstein's writings is helpful to keep in mind, as I )
develop and describe his philosophy. By the "early phase" I refer to the period dating from
the Wittgenstein's war Notebooks to the publication ofthe Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.
By the "middle phase" I refer to 1920 (when Wittgenstein left philosophy at Cambridge) to )
1929 (when Wittgenstein returned to do philosophy at Cambridge, hence also to the writing
of Philosophical Remarks that year). By the "later phase" I refer to the period of )
development of Philosophical Investigation and Wittgenstein's death.
9 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus(New York: Dover, 1999), 27. )
10 See, Hans Sluga, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996),16. It is additionally, noteworthy that just as the title ofTractatus
Logico-Philosophicus resembles Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politcus, so to the title of
the Philosophical Investigations resembles Husserl's Logical Investigations.
" See Sluga, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, 16--17. Wittgenstein's J
phenomenology of language attempted to, "explain the difference between private
experience and the physical world in terms of existence of two languages, a primary
language of experience and a secondary language of physics." This dual-language view is
still apparent in the Blue Book. The dualism between private and public, as )
phenomenological constituted, would lead to philosophical chimeras. Consequently, j
Wittgenstein rethinks philosophy's task.
)
)
)
)
410 MOISES ESTRADA PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 411
)
·, (phenomenology) to generalization and scientism. "Philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the
In the later phase (1930-51), Wittgenstein's philosophy oflanguage became resources of our language." 17
) a reaction, departure from, and criticism of the picture theory of language, and so
too, of logical positivism, scientism, and analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein's The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms oflanguage
)
posthumous Philosophical Investigations (1953), espouse ordinary-language have the character ofdepth. They are deep disquietudes; they are as deeply
philosophy, 12 hence, this later work is contra logical positivism and analytic rooted in us as the forms ofour language, and their significance is as great
philosophy. 13 The Philosophical Investigations moved away from the picture theory as the importance of our language.- Let's ask ourselves: why do we feel
) a grammatical joke to be deep? (And that is what the depth of philosophy
of meaning to the language-game view. Wittgenstein's later philosophy asserted
is)_ is
) (1 ') that the task ofphilosophy oflanguage is descriptive, and (2') that the meaning
of words and language lies in their everyday usage. Moreover, Wittgenstein's
) philosophy of language is derived from ·his metaphilosophy, i.e. (2') is deduced "Essence is expressed in grammar.
.,I
\
from (1 '). 14 Therefore, the early work constituted a prescriptive philosophy, while
the later work constituted a descriptive philosophy. 15 Grammar tells what kind ofobject anything is. (Theology as grammar)." 19
l\
.J
3. Method in Philosophical Investigations (b) philosophy is before or after science:
)
In remarks 109 to 133 of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein
) discusses the nature of philosophical method, laying out some of philosophy's "The name 'philosophy' might also be given to what is possible before all
presuppositions and rules. Metaphilosophy is reflexive philosophy, i.e. philosophy new discoveries and inventions."20
) of philosophy itself.16 For this reason his metaphilosophy will be schematized
below by a statement about philosophy and then by citing one or more of his (c) philosophy describes rather than prescribes:
)
remarks on the matter. I take Wittgenstein to state,
) "All explanation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.
(a) philosophy is an activity (philosophy as grammar): And this description gets its light-that is to say, its purpose-from the
.,I
' philosophical problems ... The problems are solved, not by coming up
with new discoveries, but by assembling what we have long been familiar
with."21
)
12
"Ordinary" in ordinary-language signifies "logical order" rather than the mere "In philosophy no inferences are drawn. 'But it must be like this!' is not
"popular" or "common." Wittgenstein states, "every sentence in our language 'is in order a philosophical proposition. Philosophy only states what everyone
) as it is,"' a reference to Tractatus 5.5563: "In fact, all the propositions of our everyday concedes to it. " 22
language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order" (Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, 251). (d) philosophy brings language back to ordinary use:
13
"Contemporary Metaphilosophy" in Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(http://www.iep.utm.edu/con-meta/#SH3c). For this reason, Wittgenstein's later work is "What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their
considered post-analytic philosophy. Post-analytic philosophy, "denotes the work of everyday use."23
philosophers who owe much to Analytic philosophy but who think that they have made
) some significant departure from it." See, (John Rajchman and Come! West, Post-Analytic
Philosophy (New York: Cornell University P ress, 1985).
) 14
See Paul Horwich, Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012). 17
15
It should be noted here, that Wittgenstein's philosophical method is descriptive and Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 52e..
not explanatory as scientific method. Wittgenstein is opposed to explanation in philosophy " Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 53e.
19
in favor of description. However, he thinks explanation is proper to science, but improper Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 123e.
20
) to philosophy. See Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books: Preliminary Studies Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 55e.
21
for the 'Philosophical Investigations' (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), 17-18. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 52e.
22
) 16
Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary ofPhilosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 165e.
23
Press, 2008), 231. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 53e.
\
/

)

412 MOISES ESTRADA
"The work of the philosopher consists in marshalling recollections for a
particular purpose."24
"The confusions which occupy us arise when language is, as it were,
idling, not when it is doing work."25
26
"A philosophical problem has the form: ' I don't know my way about. "'
(e) philosophy "earmarks" the "way we look at things" and "puts everything before
us":
"Philosophy must not interfere in any way with the actual use oflanguage,
so it can in the end only describe it.
For it cannot justify it either.
It leaves everything as it is. " 27
"Philosophy just puts everything before us, and neither explains nor
deduces anything.-Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing
to explain. For whatever may be hidden is ofno interest to us." 28
(f) philosophy clarifies presuppositions and conclusions (Weltbild, i.e. world-
picture):
"For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear." 29
"One thinks that one is tracing nature over and over again, and one is
merely tracing round the frame through which we look at it."30
"It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is
this a 'Weltanshauung'?)."31
24
25
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 55e.
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 56e.
26
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 55e.
27
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 55e.
28
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 55e.
29
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 56e.
0
' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 53e.
31
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 55e.
)
PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE )
413
"The idea is like a pair of glasses on our nose through which we see
whatever we look at. It never occurs to us to take them off."32 )
"But what we are destroying are only houses of cards, and we are clearing )
up the ground oflanguage on which they stood."33 )
(g) philosophy does not advance theories:
"And we may not advance any kind oftheory."34
"If someone were to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be
possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them."35
"The dogmatism into which we fall so easily in doing philosophy."36
)
(h) philosophy has many methods:
"There is not a single philosophical method, though there are indeed )
methods, different therapies, as it were." 37
(i) doing philosophy ends:
"The real discovery is the one that enables me to break offphilosophizing
when I want to.-The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no
longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question."38
From the above metaphilosophical scheme, Wittgenstein derived a philosophy of
language that we will look at next. 39 _)
.)
4. Language-games, Forms of Life, World-pictures
As already stated, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations move from the
picture theory of language to a language-game view, emphasizing function and
usage. Wittgenstein's linguistic shift might be termed as a move from
representationalism to functionalism in the later work. In this sense, the early and )
12
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 50e.
11
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 54e.
34
35
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 52e. .J
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 56e.
36
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 56e.
37
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 57e.
18
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 57e.
39
Horwich, Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy. I assume Horwich's thesis on
Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy as the point of departure for his philosophy oflanguage, i.e.
description of language-games.
) w
MOISES ESTRADA
) 414
) later Wittgenstein is analogous to philosophy of language history, which is
40
distinguished between logical positivism and linguistic analysis respectively.
) Wittgenstein's development of the "language-game" concept is a descriptive
tool for philosophy oflanguage. He said: "I will call these games 'language-games'
and will sometimes speak of a primitive language as a language-game .... I shall
) also call the whole, consisting oflanguage and the activities into which it is woven,
a 'language-game. "'41
Wittgenstein had posed some examples oflanguage to describe different uses
) oflanguage. Thus, he asserted that there was a multiplicity of uses for language,
rather than just one use. Each use oflanguage he called a language-game, including
,I the whole network oflanguage. He said: "Think of the tools in a toolbox: there is
) a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screwdriver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and
/ The attempt to define the term 'games,' fails to do this consistently and clearly,
screws.- The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects.
_j (And in both cases there are similarities.)"42 This toolbox concept likens word-use
to tool-use and describes that the function of words and language are different and
)
diverse.
) Wittgenstein claimed that the meaning of words lie in their use. He stated:
"practice in the use of the rule also shews what is a mistake in its employment."
43
) Again: "A meaning of a word is a kind of employment of it. For it is what we learn
when the word is incorporated into our language. " 44 Also: "That is why there exists
) there is anything common to all.-For if you look at them, you won't see
a correspondence between the concepts 'rule' and 'meaning'."45 However, he did
_) not state that all meaning is derived from use, but only for some cases. Wittgenstein
thus equated the meaning of a word in use with rule-following. His chess game
analogy (between words and pieces) states: The meaning of a word is its use
governed by rules. He notes, "Where is the connection effected between the sense
of the words 'Let's play a game of chess' and all the rules of the game?-Well, in
) the list of rules of the game, in the teaching of it, in the everyday practice of
)' playing."46 Moreover, "Let's say that the meaning of a piece is its role in the
game."47 Likewise, the meaning of a word is its role in a language-game.
) Therefore, Wittgenstein thinks oflanguage as 'games' with 'rules' in order to
) show that a word's meaning lies in use. He then queries:
.,,\ But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and
command?-There are countless kinds; countless different kinds ofuse of
) all the things we call "signs", "words", "sentences". And this diversity is
) not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new
40 Robert Ammerman, Classics of Analytic Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hacket
Publishing Company, 1990), 9.
) 41
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Se.
42
) Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 9e.
43 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 6e.
) 44
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, l0e.
45
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, l0e.
) 46 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 86e.
47
\ Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 158e.
)
PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 415
language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become
obsolete and get forgotten. 48
Wittgenstein says, "The word 'language-game' is used here to emphasize the
fact that the speaking oflanguage is part of an activity, or ofa form oflife."49 Three
important points arise here. First, there are many types oflanguage-games. Second,
language-games are active and changing. Third, language-games are part of a form
of life. Again, a form of life is a social practice, hence, an 'activity,' but it also
implies a historical, cultural, religious, or political context.
Further, Wittgenstein is hesitant to define language-games and 'games'. He
wants to stay away from definition or explanation and stick to description.
However, this move is not arbitrary, because 'games' cannot be definitely defined.
such that, a definition could apply to all instances of games. He describes the
difficulty with defining 'games' in the following:
Consider, for example, the activities that we call 'games.' I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is
common to them all?-Don't say: "They must have something in
common, or they would not be called 'games '"- but look and see whether
something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole
series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look! 50
Therefore, Wittgenstein thinks that while 'games' cannot be defined, they can be
described. If the philosopher takes Wittgenstein's suggestion and does not 'think'
but instead 'looks' and 'sees,' she will find that a fixed, all-encompassing definition
for 'games' is not possible. Though she will see there are 'similarities' in the many
and varied games. Wittgenstein's phrase 'look and see' may be taken as a model
of philosophy's task in the descriptive investigation oflanguage. Therefore the task
of philosopher is to look for meaning in the use of language, i.e. language in
practice.
Wittgenstein says about the similarities of games: "I think of no better
expression to characterize these similarities than 'family resemblances'; for the
various resemblances between members of a family-build, features, colour of
eyes, gait, temperament, and so on and so forth-overlap and criss-cross in the
same way.- And I shall say: 'games' form a family." 51 This is a holistic view of
language. For this reason, he takes family resemblances to be something like the
relation of 'games.' Just like, family resemblances criss-cross and overlap, so too
the different uses of language.
48
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 14-1 Se
49
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 14-l Se.
50
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 36e.
51
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 36e.

416
MOISES ESTRADA
Wittgenstein describes the system or background of language. He says, "the
propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology.
And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely
practically, without learning any explicit rules. " 52 A world-picture for Wittgenstein
is something like a worldview, yet, less philosophical and not as well thought-out.
Language-games are part ofa form of life; both describe a world-picture. The logic
(rules) of language-games is learned through a form of life. Moreover, just as a
form oflife constitutes rules of a language-game, so too language-games constitute
the logic of a world-picture. Therefore, Wittgenstein states, "but I did not get my
picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because
I am satisfied ofits correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I
distinguish between truth and false." 53 Notice the world-picture is inherited. That
picture of the world, i.e. background, then determines that which is true and what
is false. This brings us to Canale's phenomenological application ofWittgenstein's
philosophy to the criticism ofreason's structure.
5. Fernando Canale's Phenomenological Wittgenstein
Canale's fundamental theology constitutes a phenomenological investigation
of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason, leading to a criticism of theological
reason. Canale distinguishes the concepts of onto-thee-logos as being, God, and
reflection respectively. Ontos refers to the ontological framework. The ontological
framework, i.e. content leans on the side of the object, i.e. the known. Theos refers
to the system, constituted by the ontos and logos frames. Logos refers to the
epistemological framework. The epistemological framework, i.e.form leans on the
side of the subject or the knower. In the section, "The System: Theos" in Toward
a Criticism of Theological Reason, Canale asserts that "the ontological and
epistemological frameworks ofreason' s structure in their relationship provide the
basis for the unity and coherence of the cognitive enterprise as a whole. That
coherence and unity of meaning is what is known as a 'system' of meanings or
significations."54 Therefore, the phenomenological investigations holds, a holistic
approach (whole and parts), rather than a reductionist approach (a part) to the
structure of reason.
Furthermore, Canale's phenomenological move toward investigation of
reason's struc ture as whole and parts resembles the holism in Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty. In fact, he makes extensive
engage ment and use of Wittgenstein's philosophy. In Toward a Criticism of
Theological Reason, he uses Wittgenstein in pages 4 6 through 133. His
interpretation of Wittgenstein, moreover, is phenomenological. Canale states that
52
Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 53e.
" Wittgenstein, On Certainty, l 5e.
'
4
Fernando L. Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and
Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions, (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University,
1983), 44.
)
I
I
)
P HILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 417 )
I
"it must be remembered that Wittgenstein's analysis, as it has been shown by
I
I
Nicholas F. Gier, is, in the final analysis, also a phenomenological one."55
However, Gier's conclusion is unwarranted, since Wittgenstein explicitly
I abandoned the proposal ofa phenomenology oflanguage in the later work. 56 In fact,
Wittgenstein denied the phenomenological method all together, yet granted
)
)
phenomenological problems. 57 Gier did not explicitly expound or critiq ue
I Wittgenstein's statements abandoning phenomenological method.
Canale's approval of Wittgenstein for a "description of the new temporal
I interpretation ofobjectivity"58 is expressed throughout his theological work. Canale
states, "Wittgenstein's analysis is useful in a more indirect way since it is expressed )
from a linguistic perspective. Additionally, due to the non-systematic style of his
I writings, we find in him a rather germinal thinker who provides insights which
stand in need of further development." 59
As stated previously, Canale adopts a holistic approach to the system of
Reason.60 He states that system provides, " the ground for a coherent network of )
meaning that enable meaning to flow harmoniously among the parts of the whole
and between each part and the whole. "61 Already, his concept of meaning is
obviously holistic. Moreover, he states, "It pertains to reason's systematic nature
that meaning should flow from the whole to the part rather than from the part to
whole."62 To be certain, his concept of meaning signifies the function of meaning
s, Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 60. See Nicholas F. Gier, )
Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparitive Study ofthe Later Wittgenstein, )
Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1981).
6
' Hans Sluga said of Wittgenstein in the middle work, "we find him struggling with
the phenomenalism that assigns primacy to personal experience and the language of )
experience ... this thinking is soon left behind and his thinking turns to the critique of these
assumptions" (Sluga, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, 16).
" Wittgenstein states, "Here the temptation to believe in a phenomenology, something
midway between science and logic, is very great" (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks On Color
(New York: Blackwell, 199 1), 15e). Then he states, 'There is no such thing as )
phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems" (Wittgenstein, Remarks
On Color, 9e). Again, he repeats, "there is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are )
indeed phenomenological problems" (Wittgenstein, Remarks On Color, 49e).
8
' Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 131.
9
' Canale, Toward A Criticism OfTheological Reason, 131-132. Canale's suggestion
that Wittgenstein "stands in need of further development" may well be do to his
phenomenological and systematic and architectonic approach, whereas, the late Wittgenstein
is totally anti-systematic and anti-architectonic. For this reason, the later writings are
fragmented, rather than systematized. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard's influence on
Wittgenstein is clear.
60
The term "Reason" is capitalized to signify the philosophical concept of the onto-
theo-logos system as such, as opposed to ordinary-uses of the term "reason." )
61
Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 44.
62
Canale, Toward a Criticism ofTheological Reason, 47. )
j
)
)
)
)
418 MOISES ESTRADA PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 419
)
) in Reason's structure. Consequently, Canale's holistic use of system is based on 616, 19, where we are told that they are the foundation of our language-
Wittgenstein's On Certainty. Canale asserts that: games, they cannot be tested, they cannot be doubted, and that they cannot
) change. It should be noticed that the analysis of the phenomenon of
Wittgenstein refers to system in its actual concrete significations knowledge and the structure of reason do not render the existence or
) necessity of thinking in terms of only one absolute presuppositions, but
remarking that "when we first begin to believe anything, what we believe
is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions (Light rather speaks of presuppositions in general implying the plurality of
dawns gradually over the whole)" (On Certainty, 141). He deals with them.66
)
systems from a more epistemological perspective, as he says that "it is not
single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which Finally, the presuppositional structure ofReason is distinguished or categorized
)
consequences and premises give one another mutual support (Ibid., 142).63 by a p lurality of presuppositions that are absolute and relative, that underlie the
) logic oflanguage-games constituting a world-picture, i.e. system.
At this point, Wittgenstein's holism as applied by Canale is evident. Canale Canale proposes in the phenomenological analysis of system and theos an
) analogy that is philosophically interesting. Canale states: "The role of
further says about the role of tradition:
) presuppositions within the structure ofreason is, in a way analogous to the theos
the way in which tradition leads the interpretation of the foundational of it, although in the deepest grounding of meaning the search for the ultimate
) presuppositions has to go even beyond theos and ontos. " 67 Thus he claims that there
structure of meaning and reason, see Wittgenstein On Certainty, 95.
) Wittgenstein explains that "I did not get my picture of the world by is an analogy between the concept of God and the role of presuppositions in
satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied Reason's structure. Canale further explains the "role of presuppositions":
) of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I
distinguish between truth and false. 64 They are analogous to the theos, according to Wittgenstein, because the
"systems" of meaning that he analyzes are mostly those of the common
) Thus, the form of life and world-picture is fundamental. He says about life realm, and so they can be expressed, at least in a linguistic context, as
Reason's structure: propositions that are other than or the idea of God. By analogy, then, that
) presupposition plays the role of theos in reason's structure. A deeper
) Wittgenstein (On Certainty, 95) calls it "world-picture" ... Wittgenstein analysis, however asks for the meaning of this presupposition and its
says that "our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this constitution, the thing which is not always pursued by Wittgenstein, but
) system has a particular bit the value we give it" (On Certainty, 410) ... which is obviously hinted as he sees all systems of thought springing from
Wittgenstein describes properly the role ofthe systematic nature ofreason the Lebenswelt. Or, as he expresses in his writings, the bottom line from
) which every absolute presupposition would spring is our action; see On
by saying that "the system is not so much the point of departure, as the
) element in which arguments have their life" (On Certainty, 105).65 Certainty, 204, 46, 136,287, 559, 339.68

) By Lebenswelt, Canale means life-world, a set of terms from the thought of

Therefore, Wittgenstein's philosophy is fundamental to Canale's
) phenomenological criticism of Reason's structure. He argues along with Husserl and Heidegger that is similar to Wittgenstein's Lebensform, i.e. form oflife
Wittgenstein that, "Presuppositions are of two kinds, relative and absolute," and in and the concept ofworld-picture. Moreover, I understand Canale to mean that theos
) the footnotes he states: is analogous to the "foundation oflanguage-games."69 However, the philosophical
investigation oftheos to be developed (while granting Canale's analogy) proposes
)
The relative ones, in their meaning are sub-ordinate to the absolute ones
) ... One of them is called ... "hypothesis"; see On Certainty, 153, 163,
337, 110, where we are told that they can be true or false, be tested be 66
) Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 59.
doubted and that they need ground. The second kind is called 67
Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 60.
) "fundamental presuppositions"; see ibid., 403,119,311, 512, 12, 626, 68
Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 60.
69
The foundation in "foundation of language-games" is what Wittgenstein calls
) 63 "groundless grounds," ''unfounded foundation", or "trust." See, On Certainty, § 411, 559,
Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 47.
) 64
Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 50. 509, 600. See "The Groundlessness of Belief' in Norman Malcolm, Thought and
65
Canale, Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason, 48. Knowledge: Essays (New York: Cornell Unversity Press, 1977).
)
)

420 MOISES ESTRADA
that the concept of God is the foundation or normativity (norm of norms) in Judeo-
Christian language-games and form oflife.
It seems that Canale has agreed with Wittgenstein's descriptions on the logic
of language, their absolute and relative presuppositions, the world-picture, the
grounding of language in life, and his holistic approach. Canale, however, seems
to leave out the concept oflanguage-games and form oflife, they are not described
or used. He also seems to remain unaware about Wittgenstein explicit statements
denying phenomenological method and the history of abandoning the pursuit of a
phenomenology of language. Now that Canale's phenomenological Wittgenstein
has been developed and critiqued partially, we turn to the implications between
philosophy and theology.
6. Theology after Wittgenstein's Philosophy
The possible relationship between Wittgenstein's philosophy and constructive
theology is of interest for many reasons. His philosophy is contra Enlightenment
epistemology and logical positivism. What then are the implications for theology?
In theology, after Wittgenstein's philosophy, how are religious words and sentences
used? How are the words "God," "Jesus Christ," "revelation," and so on used? How
are religious language-games70 played? What are the rules ofa language-game, such
as that ofprayer, prophecy, poetry? What is the religious forms oflife? What is the
religious framework, system of reference, or world-picture? The answers to these
questions constitute philosophical implications for theology.
Wittgenstein, I propose, may be to contemporary theology what Plato was to
Augustine and Aristotle to Aquinas. Moreover, Wittgestein's philosophy may be
considered as ancilla theologiae, i.e. handmaid of theology. I take it, that his
philosophy plays a ministerial role, as opposed to a magisterial role in theology. 71
In this manner, philosophy is rendered in service of theology.
In addition, Wittgenstein's philosophy serves as a counter-philosophy to
logical positivism and Enlightenment epistemology, e.g. foundationalism.
Positivism held that language was meaningful, if and only if, it was verifiable. In
other words, the meaning of a word lay in the object to which it referred. Thus
positivists concluded that the language of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics etc. were
meaningless. However, the later Wittgenstein held that meaning is shown in the use
of words or sentences. This proposition was monumental and ultimately inflicted
a fatal blow to positivism. Thus the language-game of ethics or theology for
70
As described before, the term "game" in "language-game" is meant to stress the
grounding oflanguage in human life and activity. It is not meant to belittle the importance
or seriousness of religious language per se. On the contrary, the term "game" is a
philosophical tool used for logical-grammatical investigations in pursuit of proper
understanding of socio-linguistic usage and meaning.
71
The magisterial role means that philosophy's task functions as a final court of appeal
or authority for theology, whereas the ministerial role means that philosophy's task is in
service of theology via description, clarification, or evaluation of a sort.
)
)
PHil..OSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 421 )
instance, hold meaning in their function or linguistic usage, so that even the rules
)
of their language-games are set forth. )
Therefore, Wittgenste in's philosophy may be understood as
nonfoundationalist. Foundationalism is the epistemological view that claims there _)
are foundations to knowledge that are self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the
senses. The whole ofknowledge then is deduced or induced from these foundations
(e.g. rationalism or empiricism). Nonfoundationalism is the epistemological view
that rejects or denies that all knowledge can be founded only on self-evidence,
incorrigibility, or evidence to the senses. Therefore, nonfoundationalism
acknowledges grounds of belief, but also the groundlessness of belief. 72 Come!
West states the following on the move away from foundationalism, termed the
Myth of the Given:
The Myth of the Given is an attempt to secure solid foundations for
knowledge claims; it is a quest for certainty in epistemology. The Myth of
the Given roughly holds that there is a given element-a self-justifying,
intrinsically credible, theory-neutral, noninferential element-in experience
)
that provides the foundations for other knowledge claims and serves as the )
final termination points for chains ofepistemic justification. Therefore the
attempt ofpostmodern American philosophers to demythologize the Myth
of the Given is a move toward antifoundationalism in epistemology.73
West, describes a trend in philosophy that has reacted against the Myth of the
Given, an anti-movement, he calls antifoundationalism. Antifoundationalists reject
all together that there are foundations ofknowledge. For this reason, Wittgenstein
is not antifoundationalist but nonfoundationalist. N onfoundationalism is the middle
view that rejects the narrow view offoundationalism (which restricts foundations
of belief to the self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses) and the broad
view ofanti-foundationalism (which asserts all knowledge is groundless belief), and
as a result grants that there are some grounds of belief and groundless be!ief.74
72
Nonfoundationalism does not exclude the possibility of S holding or positing the
sola, prima,- or tota Scriptura beliefs in a P theology, let P stand for a Judeo-Christian
We/tbild. Therefore, let S holding or positing the sola, prima, or tota Scriptura beliefs bespt.
S holding or positing spt may be taken to mean, that the P weltbild of S, either (1) has
grounds for spt, or (2) spt are groundless. (1) is the result of S rationally deriving spt,
whereas (2) is the result of S simply presupposing spt, i.e. basic beliefs.
73
74
Corne! West, The Corne/ West Reader(New York: Basic Cevitas Books, 1999), l 98.
By "grounds of belief' I mean that there are indeed some grounds for some beliefs,
whereas "groundless beliefs" are some beliefs held by S, which S does neither bother to
ground, nor justify, it also might be the case that some beliefs held by S are not empirically
possible to ground. Also, Wittgenstein looked at the language-games as grounded in "acting"
or a "way of acting." See, On Certainty,§ 110,204. The "difficulty,"Wittgenstein said, "is )
to realize the groundlessness" that the "foundation" is "not founded." See, On Certainty,§ )
166, 253. See, "The Groundlessness of Belief' in Nonnan Malcolm, Thought and
Knowledge: Essays (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977).
)
,.,.
)
)
) 422 MOISES ESTRADA
) Theology like philosophy looks at the difference words and sentences make,
) i.e. practices give words their meaning. Moreover, there is a comparison between
the philosophical and theological methods, i.e. rules may criss-cross and overlap.
) Wittgenstein asserted: "Grammar tells what kind of obj ect anything is. (Theology
as grammar.)"75 "Theology as grammar" is "an allusion to a remark Wittgenstein
) attributed to Luther, who, he says wrote somewhere that theology is the grammar
) of the word 'God."'76 Luther in fact said:
) tell me what language has there ever been that men have successfully
learned to speak as a result of grammatical rules? Are not rather those
)
languages that adhere most closely to rules, such as Greek and Latin,
) nevertheless learned by using them? Therefore how great a folly it is in the
instance of sacred language, where theological and spiritual matter are
) treated, to disregard the particular character of the subject matter to arrive
) at the sense on the basis of grammatical rules! 77
) Moore comments on Wittgenstein saying, "About ' God' his main point seemed
) to be that this word is used in many grammatically different senses."78 As a result,
grammar may be analogical to method in theology. 79
) However, there is a contrast between philosophy and theology. I take
Wittgenstein's philosophical method to be distinct from theological method.
) Fundamentally, the contrast is drawn between philosophy's description, and
) theology's normativity (norm of norms). In other words, whereas theology as
grammar may determine the rules,80 logic, or usage of the word "God," philosophy
) as grammar may not determine the rules, logic, or usage of religious language-
) games. Therefore philosophy may only describe and indicate the ordinary religious
use of"God." Yet, philosophy may describe the proper use of the word 'God' and
) the improper use, if and only if, the rules or logic of the religious language-game
is not followed as determined/given by theology.
75
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 373.
76
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 256.
77
Luther, Luther's Works, 8:27 quoted in TirnLabron, Wittgenstein and Theology (New
York: T&T Clark, 2009), 96-97.
78
G. E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933" in Classics of Analytic
) Philosophy (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), 276.
79
For the early Wittgenstein logic is hidden in language, just as Christ is hidden in the
( Old Testament. For the late Wittgenstein method, logical or grammatical rules, is not hidden
in the language-game, but shown in the language-game in the same manner as Christ is
revealed in the New Testament. See, Tim Labron, Wittgenstein's Religious Point of View
(New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2006) and idem., Wittgenstein and
Theology.
~) • By rules, I mean, the religious ontological, epistemological, or ethical normativity,
0 Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 50e.
grammar, or conventions of language's function and meaning. In other words, the "rules"
or "logic" oflanguage-garnes. E.g. the proper use or application of ''.justice" in a political
form of life.
PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND L ANGUAGE 423
7. Philosophical Investigation of "God"
Since the relationship of W ittgenstein's philosophy to theology has been
schematized, this section's aim is an application ofWittgenstein's philosophy to the
question of theos, simply put, the concept of God's essence and existence.
Wittgenstein comments on the aim of philosophical theology in what Malcolm81
says is a reference to Anselm's ontological argument: "A proof of God's existence
ought really to be something by means of which one could convince oneself that
God exists. But I think that what believers who have furnished such proofs have
wanted to do is give their 'belief' an intellectual analysis and foundation, although
they themselves would never have come to believe as a result of such proofs. " 82
Some Judeo-Christians attempt to give 'an intellectual analysis and foundation' to
the existence of God. In this manner, a philosophical investigation of the term
"God" is in keeping withfaith seeking understanding. In what follows, the religious
form oflife that will be the locus for the investigation of the concept of God is that
of Judeo-Christianity.
In 1946 Wittgenstein said: "The way you use the word 'God' does not show
whom you mean-but, rather, what you mean."83 For this reason, what is meant by
the word 'God' lies in the use of the Judeo-Christian language-game. To be sure,
Christians ordinarily use the word "God" to encompass what is meant by ''Heavenly
Father," "the Creator of the universe," "the King of kings," "Supreme Being,"
"Jesus Christ," "Holy Spirit," and so on. Each of the previous names or titles for
"God" yields another aspect of the meaning of the concept Since time or space
does not permit the philosophical investigation of each of the names or title for
"God," the use of theos as "Supreme being" (Anselm's name of God) classically
meaning necessary, omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, immanent yet
transcendent etc., will be the loci of the investigation because of Wittgenstein's
direct remarks on the concept.
Not all the attributes of"Supreme being" will be investigated, except for that
of "necessity," which is exemplified in Anselm's name of God that is said to refer
to God's necessary existence. On this Livingstone notes, "In a celebrated article
entitled 'Is It the Religious Belief that 'God Exists'?' Malcolm . . . defends
Anselm's definition of God as a necessary existent by claiming that such a
conception of God has long played a meaningful role in the Judeo-Christian
84
language-game." Malcolm85 quotes the scriptures about the 'necessary existence'
of God:
81
82
See Malcolm, "The Groundlessness of Belief"
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984), 85e.
83
84
Livingstone and Fiorenza, Modern Christian Thought, 5 14-515.
85
Norma n Malcolm was one of Wittgenstein's closest friends and students. See,
Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein's Memoir and Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View.

424 MOISES ESTRADA
In the Ninetieth Psalm it is said: "Before the mountains were brought
forth, or even thou hadst formed earth and the world even from everlasting
to everlasting, thou art God." Here is expressed the idea of the necessary
existence and eternity of God . .. In those [Jewish and Christian] complex
systems of thought, those "language-games," God had the status of a
necessary being. Who can doubt that? Here we must say with
Wittgenstein, "This language-game is played." 86
In other words, on the use of"God's necessity" we may say, "this language-game
is played" along with Malcolm and Wittgenstein.
Before, investigating the objective necessity or essence oftheos, it is insightful
to look at what Wittgenstein said about the role objective necessity and essence
play in language-games. Wittgenstein said: "Essence is expressed in grammar."87
Essence is supposed to be an internal quality or property of a given object.
Grammar, of course, is the set of rules in a language-game. Gier states,
"Wittgenstein does claim that when we strike rock bottom ... we have come down
to conventions" (BB, p. 24) and that "if you talk about essence- you are merely
noting a convention [ and] to the depth that we see in the essence there corresponds
the deep need for convention (RFM, p. 23)."88 In other words, essence is a
foundation, convention, or rule ofa language-game. Wittgenstein gives an example:
"Consider: 'The only correlate in language to an objective necessity is an arbitrary
rule. It is the only thing which one can mil out of this objective necessity into a
proposition."89 However, Wittgenstein is not a conventionalist. Gier claims:
"grammatical rules are arbitrary, but their application is not" (LI, P. 58,
CF. P. 49) ... grammatical rules are arbitrary only because they cannot be
given an extra-linguistic justification. They are not arbitrary in the sense
that they depend on acts of the human will. The grammar contained in
language-games and forms of life is already given: generally we are not
free to change it.90
For this reason, Wittgenstein said, ''what has to be accepted, the given, is-one
might say-forms oflife, " 91 that "it is in language that human beings agree. This is
agreement not in opinions, but rather in form of life," and "astonished perhaps at
the fact that we agreed? Perhaps giving thanks to the Deity for this agreement."92
In 1949 Wittgenstein investigated God's necessity or essence that guarantees
existence, comparing the use of the word "God" to that of color and its essence. G.
86
Livingstone and Fiorenza, Modern Christian Thought, 514-515.
87
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 371.
88
Sluga, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, 201.
89
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 372.
90
Sluga, The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, 201.
91
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 345.
92
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 345, 94, and 93.
)
PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND L ANGUAGE 425 )
)
E. Moore records Wittgenstein as stating in a lecture, "I have always wanted to say
something about the grammar of ethical expressions, or e.g., of the word 'God. "'93
Moore says, "in fact he said very little about the grammar of such words as ' God'
. .. What he did deal with at length was not Ethics [Theology] but Aesthetics,
saying, however, 'Practically everything which I say about 'beautiful' applies in a )
slightly different way to 'good. '"94 For this reason, a close investigation of theos,
i.e. God's essence as understood by Wittgenstein will be compared with color's )
essence.95 Wittgenstein remarked:
)
God's essence is supposed to guarantee his existence-what this really )
means is that what is here at issue is not the existence of something.
Couldn' t one actually say equally well that the essence of colour )
guarantees its existence? As opposed, say, to white elephants. Because all
that really means is: I cannot explain what 'colour' is, what the word
"colour" means, except with the help of a colour sample. So in this case
there is no such thing as explaining 'what it would be like if colours were
to exist. ' 96 )
I take it, that 'God 's essence is supposed to guarantee his existence,' is analogical
to "the essence ofcolour guarantees its existence." Yet, the logic of God's essence
and colour's essence will be slightly different categorically.By categorically I mean
the difference between the theological and aesthetic.
Wittgenstein stated that what is here at issue is not the existence of something, )
by which is meant that the subj ect matter of investigation is not the existence or
reality of God (as an object of scientific inquiry), but that of the language-game.
Therefore, the philosophical issue at stake is not scientific, but linguistic. I take,
Wittgenstein thus to mean that:
(1) Either 'God's essence is supposed to guarantee his existence' means ,j
the existence of something or not.
Wittgenstein in the Investigations continues his description of the propositions
'God's essence is supposed to guarantee his existence' and its analogy 'the essence
of colour guarantees its existence':
I want to restrict the term 'name' to what cannot occur in the combination )
'X exists'.-And so one cannot say 'Red exists', because ifthere were no )
red, it could not be spoken of at all."- More correctly: If "X exists"
93
G. E. Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933" in Classics of Analytic
Philosophy, (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), 276.
94
Moore, "Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933," 276. .)
95
I should note, that Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations critique and move
beyond classical and medieval notions of essences, as will become apparent below. J
96
Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, 82e, emphasis added.
)
 )
)
)
) 426 MOISES ESTRADA PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 427
) amounts to no more than "X" has a meaning-then it is not a sentence [29] to say that just because red exists "in and of itself'. Whereas the only
) which treats ofX, but a sentence about our use oflanguage, that is, about contradiction lies in something like this: the sentence looks as if it were
the use of the word "X."97 about the colour, while it is supposed to be saying something about the use
) of the word "red".-In reality, however, we quite readily say that a
Further, the remarks on "red exists" or "X exists" apply to the statements that particular colour exists, and that is as much as to say that something exists
)
'God's essence is supposed to guarantee his existence,' 'God exists,' or 'name' of that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate than the
) God. Hence, let 'Red exists' be replaced by 'God exists,' such that Wittgenstein second; particularly where 'what has the colour' is not a physical object. 100
might state that:
) So Wittgenstein may be taken as describing the following,
) (2) if "God exists" amounts to no more than "God" has a meaning, then
it is not a sentence which treats of God, but a sentence about our use of (3) The terms "God exists" mean "God has a meaning."
) language.
And the logical contrary is,
)
Wittgenstein continues:
) (4) The terms "God does not exist" mean "God has no meaning."
It looks to us as if we were saying something about the nature of red in
) saying that the words "Red exists" do not make sense. Namely, that red Only we do not want to say that that expression says this, but that this is what it
) exists "in and of itself." The same idea-that this is a metaphysical would have to be saying ifit made sense. Continuing this line of thought,
statement about red-finds expressions again when we say such a thing
) as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word (5) that a particular (being or entity) exists, that is as much as to say that
"indestructible. " 98 something exists that has that (nature or reality).
)
Wittgenstein is describing a "metaphysical" language-game of color, but the In reality, however, in Judea-Christian ordinary-language we say,
purpose of the investigation is still to bring back words to ordinary-language use.
) Wittgenstein thus said: "We are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon (5') the sentence looks as ifit were about the (being or entity), while it is
oflanguage, not about some non-spatial, atemporal non-entity."99 supposed to be saying something about the use of the word "God."
J
Now, if the term and concept of "God exists" is filled in for "red exists,"
Wittgenstein's remarks on aesthetics are analogical to theology. He describes: And the first expression is no less accurate than the second, however, the attempt
) is to get closer to the ordinary-language usage. The distinction is between (5) a
But what we really want is simply to take "Red exists" as the statement: metaphysical use ofwords and (5') a grammatical use of words. Wittgenstein next
) the word "red" has a meaning. Or, perhaps more correctly, ''Red does not states:
exist" as "'Red' has no meaning." Only we do not want to say that that
) expression says this, but that this is what it would have to be saying if it And the same applies ... when we give it a name by uttering the word
) made sense-that the expression actually contradicts itself in the attempt "R"-in so doing we have given that object a role in our language-game;
it is now a means ofrepresentation. And to say "Ifit did not exist, it could
) 97
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 58. have no name" is to say as much and as little as: if this thing did not exist,
98
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 58. we could not use it in our language-game.-What looks as if it had to exist
) 99
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 52e. Wittgenstein's Philosophical is part of the language. It is a paradigm in our game; something with
) Investigations attack speculative metaphysics, particularly when and where language "goes which comparisons are made. And this may be an important observation;
on holiday'' or is not at work in everyday use, e.g. abstracting from the concrete. Here but it is none the less an observation about our language-game---our mode
) Wittgenstein will have nothing to do with the concept oftimelessness, but only the temporal or representation. 101
(this essay presupposes the temporality of God, as opposed to the classical theology's
) timelessness). Although, Wittgenstein attempts to destroy speculative metaphysics, perhaps
there is still a compatible possibility of a descriptive metaphysics, as proposed by P. F.
) Strawson; See his, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphyscis, (London: Methuen,
100
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 58.
101
1959), i.e. not contradictory to Wittgenstein's philosophy oflanguage. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 2 9 .
)
_)
 )
)

428 MOISES ESTRADA PHILOSOPHY, THEOLOGY, AND LANGUAGE 429 )

I take, Wittgenstein to mean,
(6) when we give a name by uttering the word "God"- in so doing we
have given that object a role in our language-game; it is now a paradigm,
i.e. a means of representation.
Further, to say
(7) "If it did not exist, it could have no name."
is to say as much and as little as:
(7 ') if this thing did not exist, we could not use it in our language-game."
In other words, what looks as ifit had to exist is part of the ordinary-language in a
form oflife. Specifically, the language-game, with the use of"God's necessity" or
"existence" is part of the Judeo-Christian form oflife. Therefore, from (6) and (7)
follows,
)
normative discipline were proposed. On the one hand, description as 'philosophical
investigation' of "God" was presented, constituting "God" as the foundation and )
groundless ground of Judeo-Christian forms of life. On the other hand, God is
constituted as normative (norm of norms) within Judeo-Christian language-
games. Therefore, the philosophical investigation of theos describes the concept )
of God as the given of the Judeo-Christian form of life and language-games. The
investigation then moved beyond a mere analogy between theos (i.e., as system )
of ontos and logos) to the given of Judeo-Christianity.
Moises Estrada is from Riverside, CA. When not philosophizing, he enjoys running, con-
versations, and spending time with his wife Silvia, their families, and friends. He received
a B.A. in Religious Studies (philosophy emphasis) from La Sierra University, where he
had also taken up the Master of Theological Studies prior to coming to Andrews Univer-
sity for the M.Div. with concentrations in systematic theology and philosophy which he
completed in 2015. His current academic interests are in Ludwig Wittgenstein, logic, and
philosophy of language. He is currently undertaking the Master of Letters in Philosophy
at The University of Aberdeen, Scotland.

(8) It is a paradigm in our language-games; something with which )

comparisons are made.

Or,

(8') That "God exists" is a paradigm in our language-games.

J
But this is an important observation; but it is a grammatical observation about our
language-game, i.e. our mode ofrepresentation. For this reason, says Wittgenstein,
"what has to be accepted, the given, is-one might say-forms oflife. " 102

8. Conclusion
Philosophy and theology describe the fundamental role of theos in Judeo-
Christian language and life. Wittgenstein and Canale have stressed the interrelation
and interconnectedness of the ontos, theos, and logos. Both Wittgenstein and
Canale make use of the world-picture concept, absolute and relative
presuppositions, and logic of language. However, where Canale moves toward a
phenomenology, Wittgenstein moves away. Canale's theological approach is
systematic and architectonic, while Wittgenstein's philosophical approach is anti-
systematic and anti-architectonic. Wittgenstein in contrast makes extensive use of
the language-game and form of life concepts. After Wittgenstein's philosophy of
language was exposited and Fernando Canale's phenomenological Wittgenstein
examined, theological applications of Wittgenstein's philosophy were explored.
Distinction between philosophy as a descriptive discipline and theology as a
0
' ' Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 345.
 )
)
) Postmodernism and Heidegger's
~) Critique of Modernity
) and impact while dwelling on some connected motifs Martin Heidegger wrestled
) Christian W annenmacher
) 'post-modernity' and (2) the political circumstances of the subsequent inception of
) 'modernity' and 'post-modernity,' which are often juxtaposed against each other
philosophy is a long term and lonesome business. In the early 1990s, I
) lyzed "On the Radical Evil in Human Nature," the first section of Kant's
~:Zigion.1 After_ graduation, I was baptized. Years ~ate:, I w~s struggling with my
) 2
dissertation design and approach. A~er so~e he~itat10n, I mtroduced myself to
) Fernando Canale in Octo?er of2005 via e-mail. This happ~ned because a pastor in
Munich, a native Argentmean and student colleague of his, advised me to do so.
) Although we had never met befo~e, I ha~ encountered Dr. Canale's ideas indirectly
) because I had already read the dissertation of Dr. Frank Hasel, supervised by Dr.
canaleyears before.3 Me~nw~ile, we corresponded electronically before eventually
) fixing a date for a _m~etmg Ill October of 200~- We met only twice, at first in
Berrien Springs, Michiga_n, and ~ve years_ l~t~r, 1:1 Fellbach-Schrniden, Germany.
)
Dr. Canale's initial quest10n dunng my v1s1t ~ his department office was: "What
) do you think about my approac~ to ~e1deg?er? Back then, I had to admit that I had
t yet taken the time to read his dissertation, where he had appropriated some of
) no , . . 4
Heidegger s msights.
) Years later, I paid the debt and read the substantial and pioneering work.
Looking back, I understand that D:..<::anale's question to me could not have been
IJ . uiring about his unmistakable cnt1c1sm ofRudolfBultrnann' sown appropriation
t: :?Heidegger's categories an~ motifs~; rather he was inquiring about his own.
t,,· J) Indeed, Heidegger's a:uvre 1s massive, vast, scattered and to some extent
----;-;;;:;;:;;uel Kant, Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason, trans. by Werner s.
Pluhar, intr. by Stephen Palmquist (Ind!anapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009).
2 Toe thesis eventual!Y w_as subrm~ed as 7:1e_ Proble':1 of ~vii: Vital Changes in the
History ofan Idea (Dr. phi!. di_ss., Ludwig M~XIm1han Umvers1ty of Munich, 2011 ).
, Frank Hase], Scripture in the Theologies of W Pannenberg and D.G. Bloesch: An
Investigation and Assessment ofits Origin, Nature and Use (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang,
, Fernando Luis CanaIe, ACrztzczsm
1996). . . . OJ·•Theologzca
. IReason: Time and Timelessness as
Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien ~prings, MI: Andrews University Press, 1987).
, Canale, Criticism of !heol~gical Reason, 208-284. Here I learned e.g. how
theologians recurrently deal with_ philosophers and moreover ~as _re1:1inded of a principled
caveat I gained from the first article_I read by J?r. Canal~, which mc1dentally corroborates
his BuJtrnanian lesson: "I am conv:inced ~ha_t 1f Advent:ts~ theology opens its doors to a
tematic theology whose operative pnnc1ples are denved from any sort of human
sys · w1·11 .become a subspecies· of Evangelica~ism, losing in the
philosophy, very s?on_Advent1sm
cess not only its identity and umqueness, but also the reason for its existence and
::sion." (Fernando Canale, "Is. There ~oom for Systematics in Adventist Theology?"
Journal of the Adventist Theologzcal Soczety 12, no. 2 (2001): 130).
POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRJTIQUE OF MODERNITY 431
opaque-if not subtly poisonous. Therefore, in the first place the present essay
wants to pave the way for reading it in light of the historical context of its genesis
in his confrontation with modernity. Before going straight into this topic I will
touch on (1) Heidegger's initially somewhat hidden influence on the era termed
post-modernism in France in order to show (3) the ambiguity of the concepts
without explicitly taking into account the distinct religious context ofHeidegger's
own project. These three aspects are mandatory to understand the discussion about
the topic in its initial stage. And because my trajectory does not fit nicely the
intentions of Dr. Canale' s dissertation, nor does one of the different branches of
French postrnodemism really pertain to his project, in this comparatively short
article I will only take a preparatory step to answering his question.
In criticizing the concept of the 'subject' in modem philosophy-especially
because of its overemphasis in German idealism-Heidegger never referred to the
term 'post-modernity' as such. This peculiar term was later coined in order to locate
and distance the heritage ofGerman Idealism even further from the present age. But
the notion ofgoing beyond the 'subject,' and therefore ofmodernity, is nevertheless
present in Heidegger's ceuvre. The ambiguity of the concepts involved is not the
least due to the intricate combination of the historical and the normative in
Heidegger's approach to the history of philosophy understood as an 'overcoming
of metaphysics,' while at the same time blending in the political ambitions of the
parties involved. Heidegger, disillusioned with Roman Catholicism, eagerly
awaited arrival of a new era in the history of being (Seinsgeschichte) supposedly
corning in the 1930s. The 'Heideggerian left,' however, later wanted to understand
the utter failure of the tenets of the Enlightenment at large (the so-called 'dialect of
Enlightenment') in order to come to terms with an event that is shrouded in
mystery, even when we look at it from a biblical perspective. 6
lTitimately Heidegger and his heirs come together and differ about the proper
subject that is to be deconstructed. The same also holds true for Dr. Canale's
contribution which has to be interpreted as another kind of salvaging destruction of
metaphysics.7 To make these ideas more palatable to an Adventist audience, I will
indicate some points of compatibility to issues (alas not yet the main issue) of the
'Great Controversy.'
6
To adumbrate the Shoah as a significant end-time event I trace in The Problem ofEvil
(pp. 194--200) hints to the eschatological eclipse of righteousness in the Scriptures by
analyzing the imagery taken from Joel 2:3 1:'The sun shall be turned to darkness, and the
moon to blood" (cf. Mt 24:29; Acts 2:20; Rev. 6:12; 12:1).
7
In Criticism of Theological Reason Dr. Canale twice refers explicitly to Heidegger's
transformational relation to traditional philosophy (seep. 69 fu 1 and the main body of the
text on p. 123 fu 2 and 3). Concerning his own project he indicates that his meta-critique of
epistemology "follows a constructive systematic approach" (15), whose shape was inspired
by Heidegger's attitude to the origins of Western thinking (seep. 286, fu 2), and eventually
is leading to "an 'overcoming' ofreason's traditional, timeless interpretation" (398).

432 CHRISTIAN W ANNENMACHER
A Complicated International and Academic Debate
The Postmodern Condition, a commissioned work by Jean Fran9ois Lyotard,8
was the entrance gate to a philosophical and socio-political debate, which
commenced in the 1980s when Ji.irgen Habermas opposed the "neoconservative"
dismissal ofModernity on the occasion ofhis Adorno Prize acceptance speech.9 A
fragmented debate about the philosophical distinction between Modernity and Post-
modernity has dominated ever since. 10 Without mentioning him once in his speech,
Habermas takes exception to Lyotard's view of the arts in the times of late
capitalism.'' But his dissent goes even deeper, since Lyotard had thrown down the
gauntlet just in the moment Habermas was about to publish his magnum opus. 12 A
8
La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir ( 1979), was originally written as a
report on the influence of technology in exact sciences, commissioned by the Conseil des
universites du Quebec. The English translation was published in 1984 by Manchester
University Press under the title The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.
Wikipedia notes: "Lyotard later admitted that he had a ' less than limited' knowledge of the
science he was to write about, and to compensate for this knowledge, he 'made stories up'
and referred to a number of books that he hadn't actually read. In retrospect, he called it 'a
parody' and 'simply the worst of all my books"' (Perry Anderson, The Origins of
Postmodernity (London/New York: Verso, 1998), 24-27). Nevertheless he abided to
propagate the notion of a postmodern condition .
9
The speech was de livered in German language on September 11, 1980. It was
translated and published as "Modernity versus Postrnodernity," New German Critique 22
( I 981): 3-14; and later reprinted as "Modernity: An Unfinished Project," Habermasandthe
Unfinished Project of Modernity. Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity (eds. Maurizio Passerin d'Entreves and Seyla Benhabib; Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press, 1997), 38-55 or "Modernity- An Incomplete Proj ect," The Anti-Aesthetic:
Essays on Postmodern Culture (ed. Hal Foster; New York: New Press, 1998), 3- 15 and The
Norton Anthology of Th eory and Criticism (ed. Vincent B. Leitch; New York: W. W.
Norton, 2001), 1748- 59.
10
"Outside the Anglo-American culture circle, social philosophy is dominated by what
European writers often call 'the Habermas-Foucault debate" ' (Richard Rorty, The Journal
of Philosophy 90, no. 7 (1993): 370). Due to the untimely death of Foucault in 1984 the
debate remained unfinished and had to be conducted by proxy, see James Schmidt,
"Foucault, Habermas, and the Debate That Never Was," (2013) n.p. [cited 7 Nov 2014].
Online: https://persistentenlightenment.wordpress.com/2013/07117/debate 1/ (this is the first
in a series of six parts). Furthermore consult the basic anthology Critique and Power:
Recasting the Foucault I Habermas Debate ( ed. Michael Kelly; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1994).
11
P eter James Lowe, "Modern or Postmodern? Habermas or Lyotard? Either\Or, and
\or Both/And?" ( 1999) n.p. (cited 3 Dec 2014). Online: http://www.voiceoftheturtle
.org/show_article.php?aid=84.
12
Jurgen Habermas, Theorie des kommunikativen H andelns (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1981). "The question of how to cope with the new problems which manifest
themselves under conditions of radical plurality stands at the center of the postmodern
debate in philosophy, which Lyotard and Habermas led in the 1980s and which Rorty has
joined" (Wolfgang Welsch and Mike Sandbote, "Postmodemity as a Philosophical Concept"
(eds. H. Bertens and D. Fokkema; Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 1997), 78- 79).
)
POSTMODERNISM AND H EIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 433 )
few years later, Habermas further develops his argument in The Philosophical )
Discourse of Modernity. 13 Here we can see the complicated debate in full scope _)
because the names of the contributing founding fathers are brought to the forefront:
Jean Fran9ois Lyotard engaged and appropriated Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel )
Foucault engaged and appropriated Friedrich Nietzsche, and Jacques Derrida
)
engaged and appropriated Martin Heidegger, whereas Ji.irgen Habermas engaged
and appropriated Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, introducing )
all of them into the very same arena. 14 In the first instance, a good map is required
to unravel the entangled strands. Therefore I recommend Habermas'
analysis--concentrated in his twelve lectures- as a gateway to the debate.
Habermas is an accurate cartographer when it comes to the complex intellectual
terrain and knows what is at stake in the trails the various parties blaze. 15 )
"It must be acknowledged from the outset that Lyotard's major target . .. is Jurgen
Habermas's [at that time still to be published; CW] theory of ' communicative rationality,'
especially the central tenet ofthe theory that the telos or goal of all rational communication ,)
is the achievement ofconsensus, a consensus that rests on implicit validity claims which can
always be called upon to be justified explicitly" (David Schalkwyk, "Why the Social Bond .J
Cannot be a Passing Fashion : Reading Wittgenstein Against Lyotard" Theoria 44, no. 89
(I 997), 116). "So we find French critics ofHabermas ready to abandon liberal politics in
order to avoid universalistic philosophy, and Habermas trying to hang on to universalistic
philosophy, with all its problems, in order to support liberal politics" (Richard Rorty,
"Habermas and Lyotard on Post-Modernity" Praxis International 4, no. I (I 984): 33).
13
Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), see esp. the chapter about Heidegger: "The
Undermining ofWestern Rationalism through the Critique ofMetaphysics" (pp. 131- 160).
Again, Lyotard is scarcely mentioned, only as the propagator of the key term
"postmodemity," in the preface on page xix and Wittgenstein appears merely passim as a
reference to Husserl's and H eidegger's approach to philosophy, mainly when it comes to
questions of language.
1
• To pave the way, Habermas introduced his outlook in the first lecture in three steps
as follows: "Hegel was the first to raise to the level of a philosophical problem the process )
of detaching modernity from the suggestions of norms lying outside of itself in the past .. .
He sees philosophy confronted with the task of grasping its own time-and for him that .J
means the modern age-in thought. ... In the place of a substantialist notion of reason of
the metaphysical tradition, Kant puts the concept of a reason that divides up into its
moments, the unity of which has only a formal character. . . . Because transcendental
reflection- in which the same principle of subjectivity appears without any covering, so to
speak-assumed a judicial competence in relation to those spheres, Hegel sees the essence
ofthe modem world gathered into its focal point in Kantian philosophy'' (Habermas, Twelve
Lectures, 16 and 18-19).
" In Germany and beyond Habennas is greatly admired and feared because of his art
to intervene or provoke a necessary debate in postwar Europe. The Postmodernist
philosopher Peter Sloterdijk was so envious towards this "floor leader" characteristic that
he consciously challenged this dominance in the late l 990s with his notorious speech, )
"Regeln for den M enschenpark: Ein Antwortschreiben zu Heideggers Brief uber den
Humanism us" (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999). See also Norman Schultz, "Thoughts J
on the Sloterdij k-Habermas-Controversy." Online: http://fibonaccie. blogspot.de/2012/01/
_)
~
)
)
CHRlSTlAN W ANNENMACHER
POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 435
)
)
434~----------:----:--:----:----:-:---------
- L tard introduced a new term in addressing his main issue-the nature of
vulnerable to the abiding threat of irrationality: "In France this tradition leads from
Georges Bataille through Foucault to Derrida. Over all these figures hovers, of
yod mism: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity
) ost-mo e · a1so a move agamst · H a b ermas' consensus theory course, the spirit of Nietzsche, newly resurrected in the 197Os."23 Richard Rorty
arratives." 16 This
· is
P etan deems as nothing basically approves of such a sharp diagnosis because their "lack of identification
) towar smotard
. hdL · else than another general and abstract "narrative'
with any social context" led the French contemporaries to disconnect philosophy
wfhic Y_ ation." 17 Habermas admits that "with the 1970s now behind us, we have
) o emancip · the sense o fthe g1on·fication · o f contemporariness or from social reform. 24 This consensus is possible because, due to his ancestry,25
r that modernism [m 18 Rorty shares some of Habermas' theoretical tenets, such as a pragmatist
to coniess
. for trUe presence] finds almost no resonance today." However, in
interpretation of Marxism and an agnostic interpretation of the Bible.26 Habermas
yearning to Max Weber, he holds that "cultural modernity in terms of the
) reference
separation of substantiv~ r:aso~,hodrm] ti ~11ty ethrxpressed mr .
. re i[pgious_ a~d metaphysical later shared the emphasis on democracy and deconstruction with Derrida, although
painted in different colors;27 thus, there is an ongoing debate about the question of
•ews [is to be distinguis e mo ee moments ertammg questions of
_) what deconstruction is all about. 28
world-vidge justice' and taste,] now capable o fb emg · connected only formally with
) knOW1ether' ,,19 A professionalized treatment of the cultural heritage is linked to the
oneano ·
f an increased .
distance between expert cu1tures and the general public 23
Habermas, "Modernity: An Unfinished Project," 53.
fate • fl
uence o fthe arts b u talso com~1·icatn~g · the_ process of' 24
O
deadening not 0 ~y the m "There is no 'we' to be found in Foucault's writings, nor in those of many of his
(;) French contemporaries" (Rorty, "Habermas and Lyotard," 40).
) •cation m democracy altogether. Thus, agreemg with his German 25
cou;,nu:nal antagonist Niklas Luhmann, Habermas admits that there is no other Rorty is the grandson of the noted German-American theologian Walter
,) pro :b8 ~ -ty than to pursue these expert cultures "in accord with their own immanent Rauschenbusch, who was educated as a Lutheran pastor, later in America becoming a

!) possi i1i
logic." 20
Although Habermas fin:her admits . tha~ " even among those philosophers . who
Baptist clergy and fathered the Social Gospel. "Walter Rauschenbusch's daughter Winifred
and her husband James Rorty, moved from churchly circles into the cosmopolitan company
of the old New York Intellectuals and at least for a season loved Trotsky more than Jesus.

~.
',)
)
curren
tly represent something of an Enlightenment rearguard, the project of
modernity appears . cur1ous
""'
· 1y fragrnent e d ," 21 h e noneth eless argues that
nservatism displaces the burdensome and unwelcome consequences of a
... Richard Rorty confesses that as a boy of 12 he knew the point ofbeing human was to
give one's life to fight against social injustice" (Scott Holland, "The Coming Only is Sacred:
Self-Creation and Social Solidarity in Richard Rorty's Secular Eschatology'' Cross Currents
1~eocor less successful capitalist . . mod emization . . o f the economy on to cultural 53, no. 4 (2004)).
26
more o . . . h
modernity."22 And in his suspic!on, e_ co~s a ge1:-erationt . of French philosophers See Richard Rorty, "Failed Prophecies, Glorious Hopes," Philosophy and Social
to the ,yOung Conservatives making e project of modernity even more Hope (New York: Penguin, 1999) and Rorty's afterword "Buds That Never Opened" in
Christianity and the Social Crisis [in the 21st Century] ( ed. Paul Raushenbush; New York:
Harper Collins, 2007), 347-50.
27
hts-on-sloterdijk-habennas.html.
--- -b
t oug16 Ibid, xxiv. "But what men·ts attentwn
· IS
· that _ID?de_rn met~phys1cs
· none the less gave
For the designation of both as "post-Holocaust philosophers" see Philosophy in a
Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida (ed. Giovanna
. h the reconstitution of great narrattves-Chnstiamty, Enlightenment, Romanticism Borradori; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 8-14. Regarding the different
b1rt to speculative Idealism, M arxism-w
· h.1ch are not entirely
· foreign to mythical' emphasis in their respective approach to the legacy of enlightenment in the light of the 9/ 1I
Gennan ,, (Franrois Lyotard, "Time Today'' (1988), The Inhuman: Reflections on Time event (see especially the pages 14--22), Habermas, on one hand, continues the Critical
narratives l) 68)
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, I 9. ~ ,
y .
• Theory with its diagnostic function in favor of a remedy and Derrida on the other hand
17
Lyotard The Postmodern Condztwn, 60. claims a special "responsibility before alterity and difference" (ibid, 15-16). Their
,s Haberm~s, "Modernity: An Unfinished Project" (Cambridge Mass., 1997), 41.
communality resulted moreover in "February I 5, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea
19 Ibid, 45. . An Unfimshed . . ,, 45. See also Poul KJaer,
. for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe" Constellations 10, no. 3
Habennas, "Modernity: ProJect, "Systems (September 2003): 291- 297.
. C 10 t t· On the outcome of the Habennas/Luhmann-debate," Ancilla Iuris (2006) 66 28
" 'Deconstruction' is, at present, a watchword in political science, history and law,
_ _on
in ex · http://www.an~i.ch/_med"a/b
Online: · g/a~c1·11a2O
1 . e1tra ,, 06_66_kjaer_systems.pdf. ' as well as in the study ofliterature. In all these disciplines, it connotes a project ofradical
77 21 Habermas, "Modernity: An Unfimshed ProJe~t,. 46. destabilization.... The term 'deconstruction,' refers in the first instance to the way in which
'' Ibid, 43. "In his book, The Cult~ral Co;1trad1ctions of Capitalism, Daniel Bell has the 'accidental' features of a text can be seen as betraying, subverting, its purportedly
e thesis that the cnses mamfested m advanced Western societies can be traced
deve lopedethbifurcation between culture and society, · 'essential' message" (Richard Rorty, "Deconstruction," in The Cambridge History of
between cultural modernity and the
Literary Criticism, Vol. 8: From Formalism to Poststructuralism (ed. Raman Selden;
backto thof the econoIDIC · and auullll1strat1ve
0 -'- • • system. . . B e11 Iocates the blame for the
deman dtionoftheProtestantethtc
s · (aphenomenonwh.1ch had areadydisturbedMaxWeber)
I Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 167 and 171 ). "Deconstruction is not a
. matter of simply renouncing ideas of reason but of interrogating them, disrupting and
. h 1u 'adversary culture,, that 1s,
d1sso · Wtt· h a cu!ture wh ose modemtsm· encourages hostility to
displacing them, revealing them to be illusions that are so deep-seated as to be irremovable.
WJt an tions and values of everyday 1·~ · 1·1zed under economic and
11e as rat1ona
the conven . ,, ... This kind of wholesale critique ofreason has, of course, to deal with the paradoxes of
administrative imperatwes (42).

CHRISTIAN W ANNENMACHER
436
Postmodernism in France
In La pensee 68, Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut offered a socio-political analysis
ofthe May 1968 student uprising in France, noting that "most of the typical or basic
works of what we regard today as a 'philosophical generation' are in fact nearly
29
contemporaneous with the May crisis." And in the p reface to the English
translation, they introduced their argument concerning the so-called 'postmodern'
philosophical generation as folh>ws:
The logic of this history cannot be grasped if one does not see that it has
been dominated since 1945, more or less surreptitiously, by a critique of
the modem world and of the values of formal democracy, a critique
mainly inspired by Marx and Heidegger, successively, and sometimes
simultaneously. For this reason, it is important to understand clearly how
a Marxian critique of bourgeois idealism and the Heideggerian
deconstruction of the 'technical world' could have gone together in spite
30
of everything that separates them.
Ferry and Renaut subsequently further elaborate on explaining the mix:
The Nietzschean-Heideggerian components of contemporary thought do
date humanism to Descartes rather than to the rise of capitalism. They
intentionally include Marxism itself in the metaphysical project of a
subject that posits itself as 'master and possessor of nature' and that
I
proclaims its pretension to be self-transparent and to make reality
31
transparent, as well.
.
I
,.t'I
Ii
t ,' •'
self-referentiality that inevitably follow in its wake.... One of the explanations Derrida
offers for this inevitability is interestingly reminiscent of Kant's account of the illusionary
potential ofthe ideas ofreason" (Thomas A. McCarthy, "Deconstruction and Reconstruction
in contemporary Critical Theory," in R~constructing Phil~sop~y? New Essays in
Metaphilosophy (eds. J. Couture and K. Nielsen; Calgary: Umvers1ty of Calgary Press
~
1993 ), 252-254 passim). _McCarthy, Catholic _Neo-K~tian in Habermasian tradition:
subsequently names especially the ~otton of a rational subJect, of an objective world, and
of context-transcendent truth as an issue.
29 Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties: An Essay on
Antihumanism (Amherst: University ofMassachusetts Press, 1990), xviii. Jacques Derrida
alone released three important books in 1967.
3°Ferry and Renaut, French Philosophy ofthe Sixties, xi.
31 Ibid, xii.
)
)
POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 437 )
)
But the focal point ofthis 'left Heideggerianism' 32 is to approach the ' dialectic of
Enlightenment' 33 because during the trauma represented by the Second World War, )
it became obvious that the most 'civilized societies' were unable to stop colonialist
imperialism and Nazism. 34 Ferry and Renaut explain: "Far from having effected the )
emancipation of man, the Enlightenment was turned inside out, universalism
)
became Eurocentrism and rationalism became irrational, an irrationality
unavoidable in a world thoroughly dominated by a purely instrumental or technical )
reason." 35
In 1990, Ferry and Renaut stated that the history of Heidegger's influence in
France "remains, for the most part, to be written."36 Heidegger's entrance to France
was his "Letter on Humanism" (1947) to Jean Beaufret37 criticizing Jean-Paul
Sarte' s "L' existentialisme est un humanism" ( 1946) and distinguishing German and
French variants of existentialism. Beaufret took his students to visit Heidegger at
32
For the origin and use of this label see Dominique Janicaud, Heidegger en France ,_)
(Paris: A. Michel, 200 I), 291- 300 and Richard Wolin, "Herbert Marcuse: From Existential
Marxism to Left Heideggerianism," in Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt, Karl Lowith, .)
Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 135-72.
33
Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic ofEnlightenment: Philosophical )
Fragments (Stanford University Press, Stanford 2002), a work of philosophy and social
criticism, was first published in 1944 trying to explain ''why humanity, instead of entering j
a truly human state, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism" (Preface, xiv). Habennas
inherited this question from his Frankfurt School mentors as well (see Borradori, Philosophy
in a Time ofTerror, 69).
34
And please note the gap: "In his work, the theme of the crisis of the West is never a
self-criticism of the violence perpetrated by the West upon colonized people, or upon those
branded by the Nazis as 'undermen"' (Domenico Losurdo, Heidegger and the Ideology of
War: Community, Death, and the West (Amherst: Humanity Books, 2001), 218).
JS Ferry and Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties, xiii. Jean-Franyois Lyotard
makes the catchword 'Auschwitz' the starting point in The Differend: Phrases in Dispute
(tr. George Van Den Abbeele; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) "to save
the honor of thinking" (ibid, xii).
36
Ferry and Renaut, French Philosophy of the Sixties, xv. Meanwhile much is
accomplished, not the least by Dominique Janicaud's Heidegger en France (Paris: A.
Michel, 200 I).
37
Martin Heidegger, P/atons Lehre van der Wahrheit. Mil einem Brief uber den
'Humanismus' (Bern: Francke, 1947). While Heidegger's continued teaching privileges
came into question by the denazification committee, including the threat of confiscation of
his home and personal library by the French occupying troops, he made different attempts
to contact contemporary philosophers in France. After several times failing to get an answer
he eventually made acquaintance with Beaufret in I 946, see e.g. Hugo Ott, "Martin
Heidegger schreibt an Jean-Paul Sartre," in Perspektiven der Philosophie 20 (1994): 413-17.
Heidegger's first public lecture in Germany was 1949 in Bremen, his first teaching
assignment in Freiburg not until 1951, paradoxically just in the moment when his regular C)
retirement became effective. More details about Heidegger's entanglement with Nazism and )
his postwar silence in Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life (New York: Basic
Books, 1993).
 )
)
POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 439
CHRISTIAN WANNENMACHER
438 This statement has to be understood in the context of Heidegger's overriding
) - ear Jean-Fran9ois Lyotard, one of the students selected to
importance for Derrida while interpreting Nietzsche.41
the sameY ·
Todtnau ergb "b his experience thus:
) join the visit, descn es A Common Source: Habermas' Motive to Rescue the Notion of Modernity
) asant in his Hutte, dressed in traditional costume, of
Even Haberrnas, the German sociologist and philosopher, began his public
I reme~ber a s1Y ~e and shifty eye, apparently lacking in shame and
) career as a commentator on politics and current affairs with a much-noticed piece
sententious speedc by his knowledge and flattered by his discipline. This
· ty, protectegh to prevent me from b ecommg · a 'He1"deggenan.· ' I take under the telling title "Thinking with Heidegger against Heidegger."42 This piece,
anx1e
the document of alienation of a still young student, was written in 1953 on the
pictur_e w~s e:u These were fugitive impressions, due no doubt to the
38 occasion of Heidegger's postwar publishing of his Introduction to Metaphysics
no pnde lll s. oung Parisian. I continued to read his work. from 1935.43 At the end of his review essay, Habermas asks why Heidegger
prejudices ofa y
published this address without qualifications. And for the sake of a partial answer,
. F lt in one ofhis last interviews, acknowledged Heidegger's
he bypasses the philosopher in order to push forward his "political personality"
And M1c~el ~u;auhis interpretation of Nietzsche because their combination
(:) knowing that this division is academic. 44 In the 1930s, Heidegger not only served
influence as pivot_a orhi·cal shock' which ignited his reuvre: as Rector of the University ofFreiburg (elected on April 21, 1933) and joined the
'phi1osop
~) generated the NSDAP (May 1, 1933). With his Turning ('Kehre') after his resignation (April 27,
t:) 'I
. has always been the essential philosopher. I began by
For 1?e Heid:rg:en Marx, and I set out to read Heidegger in 1951 or
reading Beg_ ' or 1953-I don't remember any more--I read
1934) his Fundamental ontology went "green" in the sense that he saw the fate of
Western Europe (and his own) as part of the 'oblivion of the difference' 45
~: 1952
1952; then lll . have here the notes that I took when I was reading
Nietzsche. 1, stl11 t tons of them. And they are much more important than
~}) t
Heidegger. 1 goHegel and Marx. My entire philosophical development
my translation).
41
"Heidegger's importance for theDerridean project cannot be overestimated, and that
the ones I to_o ~~y my reading of Heidegger. I nevertheless recognized importance remains even here, where Derrida's reading of Nietzsche is an apparent
was detenrune . d h. 39 opposition to the reading of Heidegger" (Alan D. Schrift, "Reading Derrida Reading
that Nietzsche outweighe im. . Heidegger Reading Nietzsche" in Research in Phenomenology 14 (1984): 88).
42
D rrida who more openly entertained his complex relationship "Mit Heidegger gegen Heidegger denken," in Franlifurter Allgemeine Zeitung (July
25, 1953), see English reprint "Martin Heidegger. On the Publication of Lectures from the
Therefore Jac_ques f Jecon;truction, complained:
to the progenitor o Year 1935," in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 6, no. 2 (1977): 155-180. "Only two
of the major figures in the Frankfurt School tradition, Marcuse at one end and Jurgen
. ote somewhere in Psyche (in 'Desistance') that for a
Habermas at the other, were avowed Heideggerians for a period of their careers: Marcuse
I sugges~d man Heidegger was never named m . any book by those who,
from about 1928, when he joined Heidegger in Freiburg, until the end of 1932, when he left
quarter centurY,fi reed to recognize in private or in public much later that Freiburg shortly before Hitler came to power; Habermas from about 1949, when he began
•f 0
in rancewere • thought (Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze,
' d rnaJ· or role in their his university studies, until 1953, when Heidegger published his 1935 lectures with no
he had playe a explanations and no apologies" (Thomas A. McCarthy, Ideals and Illusions: On
for exarnple).40 Reconstruction andDeconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1991 ), 83).
. L otard "Heidegger and 'the Jews': A Conference in Vienna and 43
Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (tr. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt;
38 Jea~-Fran~o; Ji~ical Writings (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1993), New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). Heidegger recommended the book as a
Freiburg," tn idem, o companion ofBeing and Time (1927) and as summarizing his views at that time (1953) on
J37. [Morality," (interview with Foucault, conducted by Gilles Barbedette ontology.
' 9 "The Return~ !984) in Michel Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture : 44
29 But the very first sentence is lucid because the essay targets the physiognomy ofthe
and Andre ScalaOthe; Writings, 1977-1984 (ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman; New York: address: "We are concerned here with the philosopher Martin Heidegger not as philosopher,
Interviews 0nd but as a political personality, and with his influence not upon the internal discussion of
Routledge, !990)' 250.'d "Politics and Fnen . dsh'1p," ,vegotiatwns:
u . . Lnterventions and
scholars, but upon the development of excitable and easily enthused students" (Habennas,
• 0 Jacques ~:~ (~d. Elizabeth Rottenberg; Stanford: Stanford University Press,
"Lectures from the Year 1935," 155). The problem with the lecture remains still intricate:
Interviews, 19'.I- M hart concludes: "The urbanization of the Black forest not the least
2002), !55. Ohver t; hts in Paris. Therefore it is undeniable that the concept of "68
was due to the s_tree II gJ·ointly coined by Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut with disparaging
"Heidegger questions radically and uncovers the originary. The connection discovered is
fascinating; nevertheless, the conception as a whole is one-sided" (ibid, 161- 62).
45
See more about this key concept on p. 451-455. As introductory guide consult Lee
hilosophy'--ongma h tY 1·c" (Oliver Marchart, o·1e po1·1t1sc
· he D'"'
1uerenz. Zurn Denken des Braver, Heidegger: Thinking ofBeing (London: Polity Press, 2014).
Pintent-aPP\'stoteop-
ie_ Lefort Badiou, Laclau und Agamben (Berlm: . Suhrkamp, 2010), 20,
Politischen be! Nancy, '

CHRJSTIAN W ANNENMACHER
440
(Seinsvergessenheit) that transformed into technology. 46 According to Heidegger,
t chnology-conceived as the necessary, final culmination ofmetaphysics-would
e quire the transcending of the entire Western tradition. 47 Therefore, H abermas'
r~tique does not bother with H eidegger's notorious inaugural address,48 but rather
49
~th certain infamous statements in the lecture and its "eschatological impact" as
whole. However, in order to rescue the notion of modernity, Habermas' most
50
:ubstantive objection with respect to Heidegger's critical analysis of the history of
philosophy reads as follows:
•• In 1962, Martin Heidegger published Die Technik und die Kehre. See the English
translation published with his attention as The Question Concerning Technology and Other
Essays (intr. and trans. ""'.illiam Lovitt; _New York: Garlan~ P1:blishing, 1977). "With!n the
frame of this concept, Heidegger's fascist error takes on a s1gmficance related to the history
fmetaphysics ... . with Nietzsche's theory of power does Heidegger develop the concept
0 and (b) as a mwidane process of enlightenment at large. These notions have also a
f technology in terms of the history of ontology" (Habermas, Twelve Lectures, 159). But
~any reconstruction of the tum must begin with what remains the key text: the passage from
the "Letter on Humanism" in which Heidegger chooses to speak of the Kehre for the first
t' me (or rather in a published form, since the term itself had appeared earlier in his courses)"
(~ean Grondin, "Prolegomena to an Understanding of Heidegger's Tum," in Graduate
Faculty PhilosophyJourn~l 14:, no'. 2- 15, no. I (1991): 87). . of metaphysics has to do with Modernity and Postmodernity. Considered
" Gregory Bruce Smith, Heidegger, Technology and Postrnodem1ty," The Social
Science Jou rnal 28, no. 3 (1991): 378. For a betterunderstanding of this intricate move see
Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics,
nd Art (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
a " Martin Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University," Review of
Metaphysics 38, no. 3 (1985): 467-502. See also Charles E. Scott, "Heidegger's Rector's
Address: A Loss ofthe Question of Ethics" in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14, no.
z- 15, no. l ( 1991): 237- 264.
•9 "This Europe (in its unholy blindness always on the point of cutting its own throat)
lies today in the great pincers between Russia on the one side and America on the other.
Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same: the same hopeless frenzy of
unchained technology and of rootless organization of the average man .... We lie in the
pincers. Our people, as standing in the center, suffers the most intense pressure--ourpeople,
the people richest in neighbors and hence the most endangered people, and for all that, the
metaphysical people." "What is peddled about nowadays as the philosophy of National
Socialism, but which has not the least to do with the inner truth and greatness of this
movement [namely the encounter between global technology and modem humanity], is
fishing in these troubled waters of 'values' and 'totalities"' (Heidegger, Introduction. 40-1
and 213).
so "And without difficulty we perceive that Heidegger, pursuant to his encounter with
Holderlin and Nietzsche and with excessive pathos (ofthe second decade] of the 20'h century
and the immoderate self-consciousness of a personal and national mission, plays the chosen
against the bourgeois, originary thought against common sense, and the exceptional one's
courage before death against the ordinariness of the secure one. He praises the one while
damning the other. Needless to say, such a man has the impact of an ideological whip
[Einpeitscher] and given the conditions of the 20th century, given the exalted conditions of
the 1935, the impact ofa prophet," (Habermas, "Lectures from the Year 1935," 160).
:)
)
POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 441
)
If Christianity, with its consolidation of the two-world view, is integrated
with the degeneration process of the western world as a mere stage, then )
the (even for Hegel so central) idea of equality of all before God and the
freedom of each and everyone can no longer offer an effective )
counterweight to it. Neither can individual egalitarianism counterbalance
)
the natural privileges of the stronger, nor can cosmopolitanism
counterbalance this impulse of the German people as the his torically .)
chosen.51
.)
Targeting Heidegger's anti-modernist stance, H abermas indirectly is also
speaking about the philosophical prerequisites of God's final judgment in salvation
history. Kant's critical court-metaphor ("Gerichtshof der Vernunft" in Critique of )
Pure Reason, B779) emerged not by chance because without his notion of
mo dernity, we would not understand what judgment in human terms is all about,
namely as (a) critical inquiry or propositional evaluation in the light ofmoral claims
certain implication on what Adventists call the pre-advent or investigative judgment
because in addition to believing in court proceedings in a heavenly tribunal, we
have to be aware of a sobering mwidane sifting process during the end-time of
history. Therefore, I would like to indicate in non-Heideggerian terms what the end )
..)
ontologically, Modernity should be widerstood as the crisis ofthe subject (or within
the subject) and Postmodernity as coping with a crises awareness and management
of all systems that surround us. 52 The intricacy of the problem lies in the fact that
the crisis of the subject (especially in confrontation with the question about the
existence of God) doesn' t stop with the awareness of the crises that surround us.
Quite the contrary, these two crises enforce each other: The pressure to make
decisions doesn't decrease but increase because we brought so many systems under
our control. Therefore, the opportunity to make a decision in favor of God's )
existence is obscured because we are confronted with multiple decisions and the
decision making process at large.
Heidegger, as a formerly conservative Catholic Christian intending to become
a Jesuit priest in 1909 but rejected due to health problems, had a keen apprehension
ofthe anti-modernist Catholic worldview and the apocalyptic tendencies ofhis own
age. After Hegel's celebration of modernity as climax of the history of philosophy,
N ietzsche and Marx first indicated its demise because both had had enough of the
art of interpretation and wanted to proceed to power and efficacy.53 Connected to
" Habermas, "Lectures from the Year 1935," 162.
52
Yoshiro Nakamura discerns between inner(viz. vertical) from outer (viz. horizontal)
alienness in Xenosophie. Bausteine einer Theorie der Fremdheit (Darmstadt: Wiss.
Buchgesellschaft, 2000), 151. )
" Karl Marx' famous 11 ,h thesis reads: "The philosophers have only interpreted the ')
world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it" ("Theses on Feuerbach" in The
Marx-Engels Reader (ed. Robert C. Tucker; New York: W.W. Norton, 1972), 109).
..J
 -)
)
) 442 CHRlSTIAN W ANNENMACHER
) this point, is the fact that human arts play such an important role in Postmodemism.
) Nietzsche believed the power of art, making way for the transformation of humans
into the Ubermensch, a transgender super-human of sorts.54 Beside Heidegger
transcending philosophy towards poetry,55 other famous philosophers also knew
something about the task of philosophy after its demise: Ludwig Wittgenstein
recommends philosophy as therapy ofbewitchment through language and Theodor
) W . Adomo's idea of art was to indicate what philosophy could not systematically
articulate any more. 56 These different reactions to modernity as the purported
) climax are side effects of a 'broken dialectic' between philosophy and theology. 57
) tried to reconcile the contemporary empirical worldview of his day with the neo-
Some Basic Facts about Modernity
) The focus of my paper, however, is the more important question of what
Heidegger's overcoming of metaphysics has to do with postmodemism conceived
) Derrida," Philosophy Today 40, no. I (1996): 16-26 and idem, "Critical Theory between
as a criticism of modernity.58 Heidegger subdivided the history of philosophy
54
"Die Gegensiitze sich paarend wie Mann und Weib zur Zeugung von etwas
) Drittem-Genesis der Werke der Genie's! [The opposites yoking like man and woman in
order ofbegetting something third- genesis ofthe works ofgeniuses]" (Friedrich Nietzsche,
Nachgelassene Fragmente, Friihjahr 1884, 25 (202), Siimtliche Werke. Kritische
) Studienausgabe Vol. 11 (Munich /Berlin: dtv/DeGruyter, 1980, 67).
55
William McNeil!, "Heidegger's Holderlin Lectures," in The Bloomsbury Companion
) to Heidegger (ed. F. Raffoul and E. S. Nelson; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013),
223- 235.
J 56
"In Adorno, on the other hand, the emphatic claim to reason bas withdrawn into the
accusatory gesture of the esoteric work of art, morality no longer appears susceptible to
)
justification, and philosophy is left solely with the task ofrevealing, in an indirect fashion,
the critical content sealed up within art" (Habermas, "Modernity: An Unfinished Project,"
46).
_) 57
"I will use Hegel and Barth as two exemplary exponents ofsuch dialectical thinking;
Hegel being the paradigm of a conclusive dialectic, Barth the paradigm ofan inconclusive,
) even a broken dialectic. ... For Hegel the dialectic is that of the Spirit that makes the
difference between God and the human mind irrelevant, for Barth the dialectic deepens the
j the year 130. It was then that the religious philosophy ofGreece began to effect an entrance,
gap between the wholly other and the world of creatures" (Paul Ricceur, "Evil, a Challenge
) to Philosophy and Theology," Journal of the American Academy of Religion 53, no. 4
( 1985): 642).
) 58
The ambivalence of Postrnodernism stems from the fact that their proponents on the
one band try to excel modernity by aggravating the claims on subjectivism and autonomy
) and on the other hand proclaim the overcoming or end of modernity as an era as well, see
Jean Grondin, Von Heidegger zu Gadamer: Unterwegs zur Hermeneutik (Darmstadt: Wiss.
) Buchgesellschaft, 200 I), 136. Thus it is not transparent which part of modernity exactly
) draws their critique. In Foucault's case Nancy Fraser reminded us: "Only with the
introduction of normative notions could he begin to tell us what's wrong with the modem
) power / knowledge regime and why we ought to oppose it" (Nancy Fraser "Foucault on
Modern Power: Empirical Insights and Normative Confusions" Praxis International 1, no.
) 3 ( 1981 ): 283 (quoted again in Habermas, Twelve Lectures, 284)). Foucault's so-called
'cryptonormativism,' i.e. the question of the normativity of one's viewpoint and its
) implication for agency is discussed further, now also critical towards Habermas, in Marie
Fleming, "Working in the Philosophical Discourse ofModernity: Habermas, Foucault, and
)
)
POSTMODERNISM AND H EIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 443
mainly in three stages, namely "the transformation of pre-Socratic into Platonic-
Aristotelian thought; of Greek into Roman-Christian thought; and finally of
medieval into modem thought."59 At any rate, for our present purposes we have to
go back to the point in this development when Platonism, in a quite peculiar way,
merged with Christianity into onto-theology (a word used by Heidegger with
reference to K ant). 60 Adolfvon Harnack called the attempt to fuse the Greek idea
of ontology and the Christian proclamation of redemp tion the "Hellenization of
61
Christianity." This amalgamation62 was later expanded into the basic teachings of
the Roman-Catholic Church by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. When Aquinas
Platonic reshaped biblical world-view handed down from Augustine63 , he chose
Modernity and Postmodemity," Philosophy Today 41, no. I (1997): 31-40.
59
Habermas, "Lectures from the Year 1935," 161.
60
Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason (tr. and ed. by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood;
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 584. "What Heidegger called 'Platonism'
or ' metaphyics ' or 'onto-theology' Derrida calls 'the metaphysics of presence' or
'logocentrism' (or, occasionally, 'phallogocentrism'). Derrida repeats Heidegger's claim that
this metaphysics is utterly pervasive in Western culture" (Rorty, "Deconstruction," 169-70).
According to Paul Ricceur "onto-theology'' was a reaction over against the "gigantomachy
of evil" in Gnosis, challenging the Biblical teachings about what Adventists later in their
terminology usually call the "Great Controversy'' (Ricceur, "Evil, a Challenge," 639).
Curious enough, the creed of the Church was developed in order to fight Gnosticism, and
only indirectly to disprove Platonism, but the latter functioned as interpretament of the creed
later, for this see Eginhard P eter Meijering, "Wie platonisierten Christen? Zur Grenzziehung
zwischen Platonismus, kirchlichem Credo und patristischerTheologie," Vigiliae christianae
28(1974): 17and27.
61
Adolf von Harnack, What is Christianity? Lectures D elivered in the University of
Berlin during the Winter-Term 1899-1900 (2nd ed. Thomas Bailey Saunders; New
York/London: G. P. Putnam's Sons I William and Norgate, 1908), 221 and 225-227. "The
first stage of any real influx ofdefinitely Greek thought and Greek life is to be fixed at about
and it went straight to the centre of the new religion. ... We are here concerned, however,
. .. only with that influx of the Greek spirit which was marked by the absorption of Greek
philosophy and, particularly, of Platonism" (ibid, 215- 16).
62
'The elaboration [Ausspinnung] ofthe Gospel into a vast philosophy ofGod and the
world, in which every conceivable kind of material is handled; the conviction that because
Christianity is the absolute religion it must give information on all questions ofmetaphysics,
cosmology, and history; the view of revelation as a countless multitude of doctrines and
explanations, all equally holy and important- this is Greek intellectualism. According to it,
Knowledge is the highest good, and spirit is spirit only in so far as it knows; everything that
is of an aesthetical, ethical, and religious character must be converted into some form of
knowledge, which human will and life will then with certainty obey'' (von Harnack, What
is Christianity?, 244-45).
63
"Aquinas adapted what was originally a P latonic and Neoplatonic notion of
'participation,' probably from Plotinus and Proclus, to function in an Aristotelian
metaphysical context, to explain that the creature's being is a participation in the being of

444 CHRJSTIAN W ANNENMACHER
Aristotle's framework.64 His theory emulates a God's eye-view. Nicholas ofCusa's
reaction to this impossibility, known as metaphysics, i s laid down in De docta
ignorantia. 65 C usa cla ims to have found the title phrase in one of Augu stine's
letters.66 Aquinas' adaequatio rei et intellectus presupposes an ontological
foundation of truth which was interpreted according to the principle of analogia
entis,61 allowing the assignment of empirical attributes to the Deity. Cusa opposed
this idea holding that "there can be no comparative relation between the infinite and
the finite" because "the infinite, qua infinite, is unknown; for it escapes all
comparative relation."68 Although this line of thought leads directly to Descartes
God" (James F. Ross, "Analogy," Oxford Companion to Christian Thought (eds. A.
Hastings, A. Mason, and H. Pyper; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 15).
•• "The lonians located the order of the cosmos in space; they imagined the structure
of the universe and the positions, distances, dimensions, and movements of the stars
according to geometric patterns.... In thus presenting the cosmos 'for inspection,' they
made of it, in the fullest sense of the term, a theoria, a spectacle. This conception of the
physical universe in geometric terms entailed a general reordering of cosmological
perspectives; it sanctioned the advent ofa form of thought and an explanatory system that
had no analogy in myth" (Jean-Pierre Vernant, Origins of Greek Thought (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1982), 120).
In book 11. of bis Metaphysics we find Aristotle's argument for the existence of God
as 'unmoved mover' fitting exactly in this cosmological tradition. Ackrill writes: "A long
analysis of change and its presuppositions culminates in the conclusion that there must be
a single, eternal, unchanging actuality to explain the eternal circular movement of the heavenly
sphere and the existence of the world of change.... Aristotle next says something more
about the nature of the unmoved mover and about how it operates. (These further remarks
explain his calling it 'God'). It operates as a final cause, an object of thought and desire.
Thus the heavenly bodies move in their eternal circular motion because they seek to be
like the pure actuality of the unmoved mover, and such motion is the nearest they can
approach to it" (John L. Ackrill, Aristotle the Philosopher (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
1981), 128-29).
65
I am aware that Markus Fuhrer, Echoes of Aquinas in Cusanus's Vision of Man
(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014) observes that "Cusanus is not as far from the Angelic
Doctor as some might believe" (p. 3)
66
''There is therefore in us a certain learned ignorance, so to speak-an ignorance
which we learn from that Spirit of God who helps our infirmities" (Augustine's "Letter to
Proba," in idem, Letters, Vol. 2 (83-130), (tr. W. P arsons; Washington: Catholic University
of America Press, 2008), 389). See the respective remark in Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia
Doctae /gnorantiae 13.
67
"Between the Creator and the creature there cannot be a likeness so great that the
unlikeness is not greater." However, by this proposition the idea of a restricted analogy
bet\veen creator and creature was officially recognized since the Fourth Lateran Council in
the years 1215-1217.
•• De Docta /gnorantia II, 2, 102 and I, 1,3 (here cited according to Nicholas ofCusa:
On Learned Ignorance (tr. J. Hopkins; Minneapolis: Arthur J. Banning Press, 1990), 5 and
63).
)
)
P OSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 445 )
and Kant, Cusa remains still faithful to the Platonic and neo-Platonic tradition of )
antiquity.69 )
The Enlightenment, p ushed forward especially by Protestants, followed the l 6'h
century Reformation in its criticism of metaphysics by aiming their criticism at the )
philosophical foundations themselves. 70 T here are several good reasons to view the
)
critical ceuvre of Immanuel Kant as the climax (or consummation) of the whole
movement towards modernity, without surrendering it entirely to Deism or )
71
Atheism. Kant attacked the medieval proofs of God-classifie d by Aquinas as
72
"quinque vire" -arguing that the cosmological and the teleological argument )
ultimately rests on the ontological argument.73 In the early 20'h century Gem1any,
Kant was still considered the philosoph er ofProtestantism, similar to Aquinas who,
for a longer time already, had been considered the great architect of medieval )
Catholicism and beyond. D espite a wide reception of Kantian criticism in the
)
aftermath of German idealism, the onto-theological formation of philosophy was
able to continue asserting itself mainly in the Catholic Church, especially in the
)
69
See Stephan Otto, "Nikolaus von Kues ( 140 I - 1464) ," in Klassiker der Philosophie
I: Von den Vorsokratikern bis David Hume (ed. 0. H offe; Miinchen: C.H. Beck, 1994), 246. )
70
"What began as metaphysics-the description of the basic structures of
reality-ended as epistemology: the attempt to track if not to ground the foundations of our
knowledge" (Susan Neiman, Evil in Modem Thought: An Alternative History ofPhilosophy )
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 6).
71
Compare Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism _J
(ed. D. Pacini; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003) with Jurgen Habermas,
"From Kant to Hegel and Back again: The Move Towards Decentralization," European )
Journal of Philosophy 7, no. 2 (1999), 129-157 and please notice their debate in 1985
concerning the fate of metaphysics after Heidegger in Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschri.ft far
)
europiiisches Denken, echoed in Jurgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking:
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994), 3-53.
72
Based on and beyond the three classical proofs (cosmological, teleological and )
ontological argument) Thomas knows five different ways from experience (a posteriori) to
God. There is no overriding proofto unbelievers as Anselm thought, but believers have the
notion of God as I. unmoved mover (via prima: ex parte motus), 2. causa prima (via
secunda: ex ratione causae effiecientis), 3. ens necessarium (via tertia: ex possibili et
necessario), 4. perfect being ( via quarta: ex gradibus), and 5. principal designer (via quinta:
ex gubernatione rerum). For a first introduction see "Natural and Philosophical Theology"
in Matthew L. Becker, Fundamental Theology: A Protestant Perspective (London:
B loomsbury Publishing, 2015), 185-218 and Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways: Saint
Thomas Aquinas' Proofs of God's Existence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).
73
Robert Andrew Ariel, "Theistic Proofs and Immanuel Kant: A Conflict Revisited,"
Journal ofthe American Academy ofReligion 42, no. 2 (I 974), 299. Eventually Ariel "found
that he [Kant] established this dependence only by means ofa logical error'' (ibid., 306). For
the argument itself see Nick Everitt, "Kant's Discussion of the Ontological Argument,"
Kant-Studien, vol. 86, no. 4 (1996), 395-405.
 )

)
) 446 CHRJSTIAN W ANNENMACHER POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 44 7

) context of the resurgence of Neo-Thomism in the late 19th century and the
) subsequent debate about anti-Modemism.74
To make the succession of the philosophical systems more obvious, Wolfhart
) Pannenberg, the late Lutheran theologian with a strong leaning towards
Catholicism, has suggested a model ofdevelopment that reconstructs the history of
) philosophy in the spirit of Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel. The five types (see
) diagram below) are forms that are played through in sequence, but that also
partially coexist simultaneously.75 Pannenberg distinguishes between (1) Radical
) opposition (e.g. Tertullian attacked philosophy and stressed obedience over
theoretical understanding), (2) Theological outdoing or exceeding (e.g. Augustine
proposes a philosophical theology that is superior to Gnosticism and contests any
) philosophical truth next to his kind of'natural theology'), (3) Coequal Coordination
( e.g. Thomas Aquinas argued that both disciplines form distinct, but even justifiable
enterprises, since empirical knowledge does not exhaust the power of God), (4)
) Principled differentiation (e.g. Immanuel Kant, who by restraining the reasonable
scope of human access to scientific knowledge makes room for religious
) subjectivity), and finally the famous Hegelian Sublation (or "Aufhebung" 76)
through the dialectic operation of his system oflogic. After Kant's critique, it was The theological exceeding is turned upside down in the subsequent stages of
) the history of ideas.
Hegel who again restored Leibniz's idea oftheodicy with new logical devices and
through this maneuver provoked a final "stage of broken dialectic."77 The
separation of the Hegelian school into Left-Hegelians and Right-Hegelians brought The modernist interpretation especially concentrates on two "point
) darkness over Germany and the world. Hegel has entered the history books as the setters"-Augustine (2) and Kant (4 )--because they made ample room for human
j progenitor of the struggle between fascism and communism, because he no longer freedom and subjectivity. 78 But the inroad for both was Paul's message of the
wanted to heed Kant's Socratic attitude towards the ban on images and his gospel because "philosophy for Augustine was centered on what is sometimes
j restricted position regarding the problem oftheodicy. misleadingly referred to as 'the problem of evil. "'79 Nearly the same holds true for
Kant because the major operations in his critical theory were necessary due to his
J °
pessimistic anthropology. 8 For Augustine, Plato was extremely important in the

) 78
) significance that this formulation can be verified in works as diverse as those of Augustine,
74
) For Heidegger's reception of the Motu proprio from Pius X in 1914, see Ott,
Heidegger: A Political Life, 81-82. Even a bit more detailed about Heidegger's inner
) conflict in relation to the oath against Modernism is Hugo Ott, "Der Habilitand Martin
Heideggerund das von Schaezler'sche Stipendium"Freiburger Diozesan-Archiv I 06 (1986):
) 141-160 (see esp. 148- 151 und 154-155).
75
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theologie und Philosophie: Ihr Verhiiltnis im Lichte ihrer
) gerneinsarnen Geschichte (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996), 20-36. From an
) onto-theological (viz. Pannenberg's) point of view in the end only Plato (pp. 37--{;8) and
Hegel (pp. 359-367) have something substantial to say and contribute regarding the intricate
) historical relationship of the two supreme disciplines, philosophy and theology.
76
The Hegelian term Aujhebung covers different, even contradictory meanings like to
) keep or preserve, to cancel or abolish, and eventually to elevate, lift up or to transcend.
77
Therefore see the emended parts in Paul Ricceur, "Evil. A Challenge to Philosophy
) and Theology," in Gottes Zukunft- Zukunft der Welt. F estschrift fii.r Jurgen Moltmann zum
60. Geburtstag (ed. H. Deuser; Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1986), 356-58.
)
)
"Modernity is not, I think, a historical period, but a way of shaping a sequence of
moments in such a way that it accepts a high rate of contingency. It is not without
Kant and Husserl" (Jean-Fram;:ois Lyotard, "Time Today," in The Inhuman, 68, emphasis
added)). And Kant confirms:"... love, as a free assumption ofthe will of another into one's
maxims, is an indispensable complement to the imperfection ofhuman nature .... For what
one does not do with liking he does in a niggardly fashion .... The feeling of freedom in
the choice ofthe final end is what makes the legislation worthy of its love" (Immanuel Kant,
"The end ofall things ( 1794)," Religion and Rational Theology (tr. and ed. Allen W. Wood
and George di Giovanni; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 230).
79
Michael Mendelson, "Saint Augustine," in The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy
(Fall 2009 Edition), ed. by Ed. N. Zalta, URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2009/
entries/augustine/. For more details about the general influence ofPaul see Wannenmacher,
The Problem ofEvil, 65-85 and passim.
80
See Christian Wannenmacher, Zurechnung und Realrepugnanz: Anthropologische
Voraussetzung der bosen Natur des Menschen in Kants Moralphilosophie [Accountability
and Real Tension: Anthropological Supposition of Man's Evil Nature in Kant's Moral
Philosophy] (Master thesis, LMU Munich, 1992).

448 CHRISTIAN W ANNENMACHER
transformation of his life and work as a Christian philosopher. Although he
gradually became aware of the tension between "Athens" (Plato) and "Jerusalem"
(Paul), Augustine basically remained a Platonic thinker. The onto-theological
tradition wanted to have the Christian event ofredemption understood in front of
the horizon of Greek metaphysics, the climax of which happened 500 years before
Calvary. Logically, evil was seen as a privation of the Sein-a solution which, in
its classical form, can be found with Augustine (theoretically) and Boethius
(practically). This "solution" presupposes the assumption ofa Platonic ontology of•
two worlds which despite the protest of Spinoza, Lessing, Hamann, Kierkegaard,
and Nietzsche has dominated the religio-philosophical discourse until the beginning
of the 20th century. Heidegger then transvalued the Roman Catholic tradition by
asserting: "The Good is only the good ofEvil."81
Even though he insisted on the reality of evil in man's will, Kant, on the other
hand, in an anti-Platonic gesture, formerly already did away with the existence of
the devil. He thus responded to Luther's ambivalent representation of God. The
Deus absconditus, according to Luther, was the actual riddle of the absent reason
in the moral subject. By no longer arguing ontologically, Luther had informed
Kant's transcendental philosophy 250 years later. Luther structured his theological
conclusions in such a way that they had as a premise the death and resurrection of
Christ, and only later on addressed their logical and anthropological implications.
Kant translated Luther's metaphysics-critical program into critical philosophical
terms, thereby twisting metaphysics into epistemology. At the same time, he not
only toppled the proofs of God but, by ignoring God's antagonist, established a
quasi-Manichaean anthropology. But even his transcendental idealism was intended
to be a certain kind of realism, although he could not deliver himself from dualism
(Plato's duplication of the world) with all its problematic implications. Kant
thought it a scandal in philosophy that we must accept the existence of things
outside ourselves merely as a belief, with no proof.82 Martin Heidegger commented
on that: "The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but
that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again."83
81
Heidegger wrote this in a letter to Elisabeth Blochmann on Sept 12, 1929, during a
suppressed love affair with her being a former university friend of his spouse Elfride, see
Rudiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 1999), 18 I.
82
"No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of
metaphysics (though in fact it is not so innocent), it always remains a scandal ofphilosophy
and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all
get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for ourinner sense) should have to be assumed
merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer
him with a satisfactory proof." (Kant, Critique ofAire Reason, 121).
u Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson;
Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 249 (italics in the original). And therefore he concludes: "The
Real is essentially accessible only as entities within-the-world" (ibid, 246).
)
POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 449 I
Heidegger's Idea About the Overcoming of Metaphysics )
Heidegger, in his revolutionary phenomenological vindication of common )
sense realism and his consecutive criticism of onto-theology, was influenced by
Schelling, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche. 84 His entire life Schelling fought with the )
riddle of Evil and Platonism (viz. Identity-Philosophy) whereas the latter two
)
became outright anti-Platonic. But initially it was Heidegger's reading of Aristotle
that fueled his philosophical rigor.85 Later he immersed himselfinto Luther's ceuvre )
in order to present his lecture "The Phenomenology ofReligious Life" (in 1921) at
86
Freiburg and "The Problem of Sin According to Luther" in a seminar with Rudolf )
Bultmann in Marburg (1924),87 with far-reaching implications for Bultmann's )
existential interpretation of the New Testament. In 1927, Being and Time made a
huge impact in the recursive treatment of the ontological tradition through Plato,
84
After his annual engagement as president ofthe University ofFreiburg from 1933- 34
Heidegger, from 1936 onwards, delivered lectures on Schelling and on Nietzsche. During
that time Heidegger's development was getting at a crucial turning point (Die Kehre). In a
posthumous published manuscript from 1936-38 Heidegger wrote: "The age of the
'systems' has past" (idem, Contributions to Philosophy [of the EVENT], (trans. Richard
Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu; Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 4). If
Being and Time is perceived as undermining modem Neo-Kantian metaphysics,
Contributions undertakes to reshape the very project ofthinking. Because his professorship
was suspended a lot of material was published with considerable time shift: the lectures on
Nietzsche, the German prophet of nihilism, in two volumes not until 1961; the lectures on
Schelling's Treatise On Human Freedom not until 1971 and his Contributions to Philosophy
)
posthumous not until 1989. Heidegger foresaw the publication meticulously because he
knew about the dark side of his ideas coming to everyone's public attention in 2014 by the
publication of his Black Notebooks that reveal his deep seated anti-Semitism.
., In an allusion to Psalm 23 Heidegger indicated the importance ofFranz Bretano's
dissertation On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle (1862) as a "rod and staff" since
1907, see Martin Heidegger, "My Way to Phenomenology," in On Time and Being (tr. J.
Stambaugh; New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 74. In the winter semester of 1921/22 )
Heidegger held his lecture Phenomenological Interpretations ofAristotle: Initiation into
Phenomenological Research (tr. Richard Rojcewicz; Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
200 I) and in the next year he prepared the manuscript Phenomenological Interpretations )
with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation, the famous Natorp
Bericht from 1922, see Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail ofHis Early Occasional Writings,
1910-192 7 (eds. T. Kisiel and T. Sheehan; Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007),
150-84. For a briefoverview ofHeidegger's life until his first lecture as Husserl's successor,
see Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography,"
Listening 12, no. 3 (1977): 3- 20 (repr. in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker (ed. T.
Sheehan; Chicago: Precedent Press, 1981 ), 3- 19). .J
86
Martin Heidegger, The Phenomenology of Religious Life (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2010). In his lecture "Phenomenology and Theology" (1927/28),
Heidegger concluded: ''The positive science of [Christian] faith does not need philosophy
for the grounding and primary disclosure ofits positivity, Christianness. This grounds itself )
in its own way.... Accordingly, there is no such thing as a Christian philosophy; that is an
absolute 'square circle"' (ibid, 50 and 53, modified according to the original German text). )
87
Kisiel and Sheehan, Becoming Heidegger, 187-195. )
j
)
 ) T
)
)
450 CHRJSTIAN W ANNENMACHER
Aristotle, Au gustine, and Kant. Initially, a second part of Being and Time was
) planned but eventually Kant and the Problem ofMetaphysics was published as a
separate book in 1929.88 In March of the same year, Heidegger discussed the gist
) of that book with Ernst Cassirer, who as the senior representative of the Marburg
sch ool ofNeo-Kantianism was much more famous at that time. 89 But Heidegger
seemed to enjoy his role as an academic outcast with dizzying attributes.
) Even before finishing his first dissertation in 1913 and his second in 1915, he
was considered a promising candidate for a chair in Catholic philosophy, until the
) appointment procedure in 1916 shocked him out ofhis illusions.90 He then manied
a Protestant and decline d to follow the rules of his church,91 and his radical
)
88 "The present publ ication should serve as a fitting supplement to that [book]" (Preface
to Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (tr. Richard Taft; Bloomington: Indiana Univ.
Press, 1997), xix).
) 89 A written transcript of the Heidegger-Cassirer debate in Davos, Switzerland in 1929
regarding the question of Kant and "neo-Kantianism" is to be found in "A Discussion
) Between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger," in The Existential Tradition: Selected
Writings (ed. N. Langiulli; New York: Doubleday, 1971 ), 192-203. At the beginning oftheir
)
discussion Heidegger claimed: "Kant, however, did not wish to provide a theory ofnatural
science, but to show the p roblematic of metaphysics, more specifically of ontology. My
intention is to work this essential content ofthe positive basis ofthe Critique ofPure Reason
) into ontology," while later repeating: "What I want to show is that the Analytic is not an
ontology of nature as object of natural science, but a general ontology, that is a critically
based metaphysics genera/is" (ibid, 193-195 passim).
90
See for this conclusion especially Hugo Ott, in "Martin Heidegger-Mentalitiit der
Zerrissenheit," in Freiburger Diozesan-Archiv 110 ( 1990): 435-437 and 439. Heidegger's
habilitation treatise '"The Doctrine of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus"-positively
evaluated in July 1915 by the theologian Dr. Engelbert Krebs (side by side with the author
J from whom he learned a lot) in place of supervisor Heinrich Rickert-was not finished
meanwhile the very Dr. Krebs appealed to Baden's Ministry of education-vying for the
) same Catholic chair in philosophy that he deputized for three semesters. Apart from that the
dean Heinrich Finke could not establish his mentee against the super-professor and
J kingrnaker Rickert after he as Catholic history professor had spurred Heidegger to treat Duns
Scotus in order to gain the appointment. When Rickert's successor Edmund Husserl arrived
in Freiburg Privy Councilor Finke changed his mind and opted for a 20 years older, more
) solid Catholic candidate fromMi.inster. In case this man would decline the appointment there
was no name mentioned even for an associate professorship instead. Maybe this happened
) also because Heidegger used a too difficult terminology and complicated approach for
beginners in theology. For this line of events see also Bernhard Casper, "Martin Heidegger
) und die Theologische Fakultiit Freiburg 1909-1923," Freiburger Diozesan-Archiv 100
( 1980), 538-539; Safranski, Martin Heidegger, 63-65; Ott, Heidegger: A Political Life,
.J 64-105; "Der Habilitand Martin Heidegger," 141-160; and Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's
Lehrjahre," The Collegium Phaenomenologicum (ed. J. Sallis; Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988),
J 77-137.
) 91
This development happens from 1917 onwards. Martin Heidegger wrote on January
9, 1919 in a farewell letter to the eight years older Catholic priest Dr. Engelbert Krebs:
) "Epistemological insights applied to the theory of historical lmowledge have made the
system of Catholicism problematic and unacceptable for me-but not Christianity per se or
)
I
I POS1MODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CR!TIQUE OF MODERNITY 451
historicism in accompanying "the dying out of Christianity" eventually made him
I a guru ofdark eschatological thoughts contaminated by current events92 which later
let him proclaim the end of philosophy while being at home with the apocalypse. 93
I His multiple conversion story also made him a perfect postmodern role model,
whether it be in the flavor of continental philosophy proposed by Denida or the
ironical surmounting of analytical philosophy by Rorty, who saw philosophy as a
I
kind of making literature-not science. Instead, Kant still held fast to qu estions
about metaphysics that appears as a prolegomena to the scientific enterprise (viz.
epistemology proper).
The concept of the hermeneutical circle-the pristine kind of the recursive
treatment employed in Being and Time-Heidegger drew from Schleiermacher. 94
But the idea of the ontological difference between Being (Sein) and beings
metaphysics, the latter albeit in a new sense" (quoted in Ott, Heidegger: A Political Life,
106). "The proper clarification of this turning (Kehre) is impending" noticed Hugo Ott at
first in "Der junge Martin Heidegger: Gymnasial-Konviktszeit und Studium," Freiburger
Diozesan-Archiv 104 ( 1984), 323 (my translation). Krebs, being in personal friendship and
in job competition with Heidegger at the same time, nevertheless administered the sacrament
for Heidegger's marriage in 1917. The Heideggers immediately depreciate this canonical
ritual through a confirmation by a Protestant pastor in Wiesbaden (see Ott, "Mentalitat der
Zerrissenheit," 440).
92
"For me, the present situation-precisely because much remains dark and unbridled
(unbewiiltigt)-has an unusual gathering power (Kraft) . It heightens the will and the
certainty to act in the service of a great task (Auftrag) and to participate in the building of
a world grounded on the people (volklich gegriindeten Welt) . . .. I experience what is
presently happening completely from the future .... The confrontation with 'Marxism' and
the 'Center' will literally make no headway ifit doesn't mature into a confrontation with the
adversarial spirit of the communist world and no less with the dying spirit of Christianity"
(Heidegger's letter to Elisabeth Blochmann on March 30, 1933 (tr. F.H.W. Edler) in
Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 14, no. 2-15, no. I (1991), 570). "Bolshevism is
originally Western, a European possibility: the rise of the masses, industry, technology, the
dying out of Christianity; insofar, however, as the supremacy ofreason, qua equalization of
everyone, is merely a consequence of Christianity, which is basically ofJewish origin (cf.
Nietzsche's idea of the slave revolt in morals), Bolshevism is in fact Jewish; but then
Christianity is also basically Bolshevist!" (idem, Contributions to Philosophy, 44).
93
"What is significant is that philosophers such as Gehlen, Adorno, and also Heidegger
can agree that the situation, viewed as a whole, is catastrophic. Yet this catastrophe lacks an
alarming aspect. One can live with it" (Safranski, Martin Heidegger, 408). "Everyone now
thinks of doom and downfall. But we Germans cannot go under because we have not yet
arisen and must persevere still through the night" (Letter on July 20, 1945 to Rudolf
Stadelmann; cited ibid, 333)
94
"It is in and of itself evident that the relative contrast between understanding the
individual texts and the understanding of the text as a whole is so reconciled that each part
be allowed the same treatment as the whole" (F. D . E. Schleierrnacher, Hermeneutik und
Kritik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1993), 168; my translation).

452 CHRISTIAN W ANNENMACHER
95
(Seienden) was his own invention. It was introduced together with the idea of a
salvaging destruction of the ontological tradition before him.96 Derrida appropriated
these ideas for the political left and instead made the concept popular under the
term deconstruction, 91 but the very idea is far from being restricted to postmodernist
authors, as not only Habermas aptly showed on the occasion of his acceptance
speech of the Peace prize in 200 1 from the German book trade.98
The most central question about deconstruction has to be the question what
deconstruction is all about, or rather what Heidegger is targeting with his method
ofdiscrimination ofconcepts. In 1919, he turned away from Catholicism conceived
as a teachable philosophical system; in 1942/43 he accused the Papal system in the
Roman Catholic Church of distorting the Greek concept of truth as aletheia; 99
" "For Hegel, the matter of thinking is the idea as the absolute concept. For us,
formulated in a preliminary fashion, the matter of thinking is the difference as difference.
... For us, the character of the conversation with the history of thinking is no longer
Aujhebung (elevation), but the step back.... We speak of the difference between Being and
beings. The step back goes from what is unthought, from the difference as such, into what
gives us thought. That is the oblivion of the difference" (Martin Heidegger, Identity and
Difference (tr. Joan Stambaugh; New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 47, 49 and 50).
96
"We are to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive at those
primordial experiences in which we achieved our first ways of determining the nature of
Being- the ways which have guided us ever since ... But this destruction is just as far from
having the negative sense of shaking offthe ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary,
stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within
its limits" (Heidegger, Being and Time, 44).
97
"In order to distance himself from Heidegger, Derrida proceeds to invent bits of
philosophical terminology designed to mock and displace Heidegger's own terminology.
I ... Derrida is trying for the position for which Heidegger had implicitly nominated himself,
I~ that of the first post-metaphysical thinker, the prophet of an age in which the reality-
appearance distinction has entirely lost its hegemony over our thought'' (Rorty,
"Deconstruction," 170).
98
"Kant refused _to let the categorical 'ought' be absorbed by the whirlpool of
enlightened self-interest. He enlarged subjective freedom [Willkiir] to autonomy (or free
will), thus giving the first great example-after metaphysics-ofa secularizing, but at the
same time salvaging, deconstruction ofreligious truths. With Kant, the authority of divine
commands is unmistakably echoed in the unconditional validity of moral duties. With his
concept of autonomy, to be sure, he destroys the traditional image of men as children of
God. But he preempts the trivial consequences of such a deflation by critical assimilation
ofreligious contents" (Jurgen Habermas, "Faith and Knowledge," The Frankfurt School on
Religion: Key Writings by the Major Thinkers (ed. Eduardo Mendieta; New York:
Routledge, 2005), 333). "Deconstruction is not a new phenomenon. Jesus and Luther used
deconstruction effectively and properly" (Fernando Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical
Theology?," Andrews University Seminary Studies 44, no. 1 (2006), I 05).
99
"The operating force in this accomplishment is no longer the imperium of the state
but the imperium of the Church, the sacerdotium. The 'imperial' here emerges in the form
of the curial of the curia of the Roman pope. His domination is likewise grounded in
command. The character of command here resides in the essence of ecclesiastical dogma"
(Martin Heidegger, Parmenides (tr. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz; Bloomington:
)
)
POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 453
--- j
however, in 1957, Heidegger focused more generally on metaphysics as his main )
object:
)
The difference between beings and Being is the area within which )
metaphysics, Western thinking in its entire nature, can be what it is. The
step back thus moves out of metaphysics into the essential nature of )
metaphysics.... Viewed from the present and drawn from our insight into
)
the present, the step back out of metaphysics into the essential nature of
metaphysics is the step out of technology and technological description )
and interpretation ofthe age, into the essence ofmodern technology which
is still to be thought. 100
Heidegger's second proposition about metaphysics makes the case even more
complicated because he joins the recursive operation (the step back) with a
historical reflection on the fusion of two different discourses:
Metaphysics is theology, a statement about God, because the deity enters
into philosophy. Thus the question about the onto-theological character of
metaphysics is sharpened to the question: How does the deity enter into
philosophy, not just modem philosophy, but philosophy as such? . . . The
question, How does the deity enter into philosophy?, leads back to the
question, What is the origin of the onto-theological essential constitution )
of metaphysics? To accept this kind of question means to accomplish the
step back. 101
With explicit regard to Hegel in the third step, Heidegger proposes when this
j
historical reflection culminated and how the questionable fusion of the ontological
and epistemological perspective in metaphysics became obvious:
Hegel thinks of Being in its most empty emptiness, that is, in its most
general aspect. At the same time, he thinks ofBeing in its fully completed
fullness. Still, he does not call speculative philosophy, that is, philosophy
proper, onto-theo-logy but rather "Science of Logic." ... But how can
"Being" ever come to present itself as "thought"? .. . This means: the
Being of beings reveals itself as the ground that gives itself ground and J
accounts for itself. 102
Therefore, Heidegger concludes: "The fundamental character of metaphysics
is onto-theo-logic. We should now be in a position to explain how the deity enters
Indiana University Press, 1992), 46). The notion resonated again during Heidegger's
interrogation after the war according to Ott, "Mentalitiit der Zerrissenheit," 429-433. )
100
Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 51 and 52.
101
Ibid, 55 and 56.
102
Ibid, 56-7 passim.
)
)
)
)
454 CHRISTIAN W ANNENMACHER
)
) into philosophy." 103 The metaphysical concept of God was imagined to be causa
sui, which in the philosophical tradition was presented as logos, material
) substratum, substance or subject. 104 "What differs shows itself as the Being of
) beings in general, and as the Being of beings in the Highest." Heidegger not only
mentions the two different kinds of discourse included in metaphysics 105 but also
) with all certainty avoids mentioning God according to the Hebrew tradition.
Nevertheless, at a crucial point of his lecture, he explicitly states:
) whether this 'something else' is equivalent to Lyotard's 'Postmodern condition.'
j This ground itself needs to be properly accounted for by that for which it
accounts, that is, by the causation through the supremely original
matter-and that is the cause as causa sui. This is the right name for the
god of philosophy. Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before
)
the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play
) music and dance before this god. The god-less thinking which must
abandon the god of philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus perhaps closer to
) philosophy while at the same time anticipating the end (as final stage or telos) of
the divine God. Here this means only: god-less thinking is more open to
) Him than onto-theo-logic would like to admit. 106
) Here one can sense Heidegger's still existing piety, although his description of the
) difference between ' being' and thinking of 'being' sometimes turns out to be
meandering and faltering. Heidegger comments on that too:
) influence on the generation of Postmodernist thinkers emerging in France and then
Someone who has experienced theology in his own roots, both the
j avoid the Biblical apocalyptic perspective. 111 In any case, the philosophical
theology of the Christian faith and that ofphilosophy, would today rather
) remain silent about God when he is speaking in the realm of thinking. For
the onto-theological character ofmetaphysics has become questionable for
) tenability of promises erected during Enlightenment.
103
Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 59.
) 10
• "Metaphysics must think in the direction of the deity because the matter of thinking
) is Being; but Being is in being as ground in diverse ways: as Logos, as hypokeimenon, as
substance, as subject. ... It is still infinitely more impossible to represent >Being< as the
) general characteristic of-particular beings. There is Being only in this or that particular
historic character: Physis, Logos, Hen, Idea, Energeia, Substantiality, Objectivity,
J Subjectivity, the Will, the Will to Power, the Will to Will.... Being becomes present as
Logos in the sense of ground, of allowing to let lie before us. The same Logos, as the
) 109
gathering ofwhat unifies, is the Hen. This Hen, however, is twofold. For one thing, it is the
) unifying One in the sense of what is everywhere primal and thus most universal; and at the
same time it is the unifying One in the sense of the All-Highest (Zeus). The Logos grounds
) and gathers everything into the universal, and accounts for and gathers everything in terms
of the unique. It may be noted in passing that the same Logos also contains within itself the
) essential origin of the character of all language, and thus determines the way of utterance
as a logical way in the broader sense" (ibid, 60, 66 and 69).
J 105
"When metaphysics thinks of beings with respect to the ground that is common to
all beings as such, then it is logic as onto-logic. When metaphysics thinks ofbeings as such
) 111
as a whole, that is, with respect to the highest being which accounts for everything, then it
) is logic as theo-logic" (Ibid, 70-1 ).
106
Ibid, 72.
)
)
POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRJTIQUE OF MODERNITY 455
thinking, not because of any kind of atheism, but from the experience of
a thinking which has discerned in onto-theo-logy the still unthought unity
of the essential nature of metaphysics. 107
Regarding this, Rudiger Safranski notes, "In Heidegger we still find the whole
wonderful metaphysics, albeit at the moment of its falling silent--or, to put it
differently, at the moment when it opens out into something else." 108 One wonders
Habermas avoids this term and instead prefers to speak about the post-metaphysical
and post-secular times in which we live. 109
Conclusions
1. First of all I want to emphasize that there is nothing like postmodernity as
a fact, but that there are only different kinds of awareness of the continual fate of
modernity after Hegel, who claimed to represent the climax in the history of
history. 110 However, just as Habermas' conscious use of the epithets post-
metaphysical and post-secular indicates, it is not appropriate to describe our times
with all too general and paradoxical judgments about the end of history as
commonly done in discussions of secularization or postmodernity. How
complicated any judgment becomes, we can see when we gauge Heidegger's
spreading throughout the world. Their disciples allude to and, at the same time,
perception of the Modem / Postmodern divide was brought into prominence in a
well-defined post-Marxist cultural setting in Germany and France, debating the
2. Heidegger's longing for a post-metaphysical stage in his thinking stems in
the first place from his critical turn against his upbringing in a Catholic
system-first and foremost stabilized by Thomistic metaphysics-which he
experienced as a lasting dependency in his formative years. The initial nexus of
107
108
Heidegger, Identity and Difference, 54-5.
Safranski, Martin Heidegger, ix.
Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking (1994) and An Awareness ofWhat is Missing:
Faith and Reason in a Post-secular Age (Cambridge: Polity Press, 20 I 0).
110
Highly influential regarding this purpose was Alexandre Kojeve's Introduction a la
lecture des Hegel: Let;ons sur la phenomenologie de /'esprit, professees de 1933 a 1939 a
/'Ecole des Hautes-Etudes (ed. R. Queneau; Paris: Gallimard, 1947). Heidegger observed
that "Kojeve has a rare passion for thinking" and "French thought of the past few decades
is an echo of these lectures" but deplored that "Kojeve only reads Being and Time as an
anthropology." See his letter of Sept 29, 1967 in Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt,
Letters 1925-1975 (tr. A. Shields; Orlando: Harcourt, 2003), 133.
During his visiting professorship in Munich in January 2004, I tried to invite Samuel
Weber, the Avalon Professor of Humanities at Northwestern University, to discuss these
parallels but without further explanation he robbed himself of the opportunity.

CHRISTIAN W ANNENMACHER
456
Heidegger's humiliation by Finke's breach ofpromise in 1916 to the souring ofhis
elation to the Catholic Church was clearly analyzed by Hugo Ott and recurrently
:pproved. 112 Admittedl~ the dys~ctiona~ Catholic network _(i.e. the German
3
Verbandskatholizismus' ) forced him--pnvately and profess10nally-to think
utside the box and, under the protection of Edmund Husserl, he went the
~rotestant extra mile via Marburg. In the aftermath of Luther's concept of sin,
Heidegger eventually found his way through the reuvre of Schelling, Kierkegaard,
and Nietzsche, each of them working at their respective projects to surmount the
Hegelian supremacy withi~ the~ ~entury. With_ Paul Ricreur, I understand this
watershed as a 'broken dialectic between philosophy and theology, leaving
unanswered the question whether anyone will be able to bridge the gap left by the
demise of metaphysics ultimately inspired by Plato and his Christian heirs.
3. Heidegger's rationalization of his involvement with the Nazi regime in
Germany doesn't make it easier to understand what is at stake in his claims about
the 'overcoming of metaphysics.' While he furthermore remained silent about his
personal sense of guilt, Jewish ~ d Christian phi_losophers like Emmanuel Levinas,
Paul Ricreur, and Jacques Demda desperately tned to tease out ofhis philosophical
analysis what wa~ ~uitable to their vie~s. ~ut :"'i~out these high ambitions,
Heidegger was stnvmg and, at the same trme m his view, also suffered for 114 his
specimen would have been only signific~nt fo~ an inn~r-Catholic circle seeing him
as apostate. 11 l Howe_ver, f:o~ an A?vent1st pomt ofv1ew,_ we have to ask what this
philosophical conscious !Ife ~s tellmg us, one that experienced European culture
during the two World Wars,_lived ~e_tween ~e two major Christi~n denominations
in Germany, faced the growmg political tens10n between the Soviet Union and the
United States, and was fully aware of the emerging spiritual polarity of East and
West which later amounted to a more common paradigm ofcriticism regarding the
ratio~al or 'Western' use of technology.
4. In his dissertation, Dr. Canale mentions Heidegger 239 times, approximately
one third of these references occur during his criticism of Bultmann. However, at
the outset, Dr. Canale already indicates that "we cannot, as theologians, include
theology in the contemporary rejection of metaphysics as Heidegger does in his
'overcoming' of both metaphysics and theology,"116 and, later on, re-emphasizes
112Sheehan, "Heidegger's Lehrjahre," 108; Victor Farias, Heidegger and Nazism
(Philadelphia: Te~ple U:?iversi~ __Press, 19~9), 51-:-~~; Ott, "Der_ Habilitand Martin
Heidegger," 160; idem, Men~htat d_er Ze~ssenbett, 435-437; tdern, Heidegger: A
p0 /itical Life, 64-105; Safranski, Martin Heidegger, 66-67.
,u Ott, "Menta/itiit der Zerrissenheit," 435.
'"" two thorns-the confrontation with the faith of tradition and the failure of the
Rectorat_:_:,~lready contain enough of what must actually be overcome," wrote Heidegger
in a Jetter to Karl Jaspers on July 1, 1935, see The Heidegger-Jaspers Correspondence
(]920-1963) (eds. W. Biemel and H. Saner; Amherst: Humanity Books, 2003), 151.
11 i See for example Bernhard Lakebrink, "Schriftgelehrte und Pharisaer heute"
Theologisches: Katho/ische Monatsschrift 19, no. 4 (1989): 174-182; cf. Ott, "Mentalitat
der Zerrissenheit," 440.
116 Canale, Criticism o/Theo/ogical Reason, 23 fn 1.
)
POSTMODERNTSM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 457 )
)
that he "cannot agree . . . with Heidegger's understanding of a groundless
traditional metaphysics."117 This reservation stands in silent but significant tension
to his claim that the whole enterprise eventually is "not contradictory but
complementary" 118 to Heidegger's analysis which in comparison to Kant's analysis
is "a step forward." ' 19 It seems that Dr. Canale does not entirely agree with the )
motif although he partially appropriates the method. In preparation for his third
chapter, Dr. Canale concurs with Heidegger that "the ontological reflection must )
return .. . to the origins of Western thinking" 120 and finally concludes: "What
)
Heidegger's system lacks is the foundation of the Biblical system." 121 Because this
essay makes only a preparatory step to answering Dr. Canale's question about an
appropriate interpretation of Heidegger I will not attempt to trace all the well-
thought observations in his groundbreaking study here. The question remains
whether the renowned Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan is correct in his claim
that "Heidegger' s work has nothing to do with preparing for Christian revelation
and grace." 122 Although it might be acceptable from the Catholic viewpoint of the )
respective author, I disagree with this all too rash and definitive verdict-with
certain qualifications from an Adventist perspective. 123 In fact further inquiry will
have to show whether Heidegger's work is more than merely another symptom of
the already mentioned ' broken dialectic.'
5. Although he cites Stanislas Breton approvingly, indicating that the current
crisis of philosophical reason is essentially connected to the crisis in the )
understanding of the essence of metaphysics, 124 it seems to me that Dr.
Canale-despite of any deconstructivist doubt - is unwilling to let go of Kant's )
"ideal of pure reason" with its implication for systematicity in theology. On the
contrary, he accuses Heidegger of denying this Kantian insight: "In his
'overcoming' of metaphysics he actually rejected both the traditional timeless )
interpretation of the theos and the theos itself as part ofreason's structure," 125 and
therefore was opening the gate for 'another solution' that is less desirable for
theology, namely Postmodemism in its varieties. B ut I am not sure whether it was
Heidegger's intention to blur the reality-appearance distinction in the way as it
became manifest in Postmodernism according to Rorty. 126 In my mind, Heidegger )
'" Ibid, 125.
111
Canale, Criticism of Theological Reason, 49 fn I. J
119
Ibid, 50 fn 2.
120
Ibid, 286 fn 2.
121
Ibid, 384 fu 1. Consequently Heidegger "misunderstands the purpose and place of
the idea of creation in Christian theology" (ibid, 169 fn 1).
122
Thomas Sheehan "Heidegger and Christianity," in Cambridge Dictionary of
Christianity (ed. Daniel Patte; Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010), 503.
123
For now see Christian Wannenrnacher, "Virtues of Prophetic Realism in Times of
a Broken Dialectic: On Reconciling Modem Critique ofKnowledge with Common Failures
in System-Building," Spes Christiana 22-23 (2012): 35-65.
124
Canale, Criticism ofTheological Reason, 23 fn 1.
125
Canale, Criticism of Theological Reason, 395 fn I.
126
See fit 97 above.
)
)
)
)
CHRJSTIAN W ANNENMACHER POSTMODERNISM AND HEIDEGGER'S CRITIQUE OF MODERNITY 459
) 458
) ~futed the exaggerated co;-1structi".e cla~ o~subjective philos_ophy in German the dismissal of man as the basis for existence, thought, and ethics. 133 Well-known
Y. and therefore recognized agam the !tnuts of our theoretical capacity. In Catholic scholars, like Gianni Vattimo and Rene Girard, on their part propose to
) Idea. 1ismtext the 'overconungo . f metaph ys1cs . , moreover means acceptmg . asobenng . embrace an altered theology by dwelling on kenosis, the circle of violence and
this con ' ft 1 fi h fr d d b. . . victimization. 134 Within the complexity of this state of theoretical affairs the
mundanesiftingprocessa er~mp eroom or uman ee oman su ~ect1v1tywas
Adventist contribution has to measure itself according to the Biblical context of its
d b Augustine and Kant m the past.
ma ~- ~here is an iro~r ~ the fact that Hab~rma~, "".ho refers to_ himself as calling. 135 Adventists usually do not focus on the 'oblivion of the difference' during
, . . sly unmusical, 7 1s well aware of the 1mp!tcat10ns concemmg the two the history ofbeing but rather on the oblivion of the apocalyptic perspective during
) re11g1ouhaunting Heidegger.
. 12s A · a young man, puttmg · · finger on the history of Christianity. However, from the vantage point ofboth, the philosophy
s qmte his
thorns
.d oer's devaluation · ofChri stiamty . . m . the wak e o fh"is "Lat·1ure with . the Rectorat, of religion and the history of ideas, it is striking that onto-theology helped to
Hebi eg.,as was very astute although he left the onto-theological "consolidation of domesticate eschatology. 136 Therefore, both foci have to be put into due perspective.
Ha erm-world view" und"1sputed mere1y as given. . B y a d m1ttmg
. . t h at "Heidegger
. I think that Dr. Canale's work plays a significant role in the Adventist project to
the two . ns radically and uncovers the ongmary, · · ,,129 H b
a ermas nevertheless strengthen the suppressed voice of apocalyptic prophecy. However, there is still
)
ques t10 dged the truth ofHe1"degger' s conception · o f th e progressive oblivion of much more to do and thus he untiringly awaits a new generation of pastors and
) acknowle . . theologians who are able to finish the work, including that on the scholarly level. 137
. marked by the three great epochs oftransformat10n. Yet, at the same trme he
b:mg~d him with determined forgetfulness, namely of being too silent about his
) 133
See e.g. Religion after Metaphysics (ed. Mark A. Wrathall; Cambridge: Cambridge
c arg nners and especially about their "theological origins," this time not touching
foreru"degoer's early Cath o1·1c upb nngmg, · · b ut on his yet mature but still transitional University Press, 2003) or Stefanos Geroulanos, An Atheism that Is Not Humanist Emerges
on H e1 Sein o
und Zeit. Independently from the debate thirty .
years later, Habermas in French Thought (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010).
stageo[here indicated
. d d"
the conteste para igm Lyotard later put mto . . bemg
quest10n . 134
Gianni Vattimo and Rene Girard, Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith
1
area dy f · h h · · (Columbia University Press 2010). Interestingly enough, Girard claims against the
" of shaping a sequence o moments m sue a way t at it accepts a high rate Nietzschean-Heideggerian school dismissing onto-theology that "ordinary Christians have
~ :~~tingency." 130 Admittedly, this initial strength of Christianity meanwhile never confused these [rational] systems [elaborated by theologians] with the redemptive
0 ms to be overstretched and nearly exhausted because the sin-problem
power of the cross" (89).
see ulated through the ages and events like the Shoah and the global eco-crisis 135
Hans K. LaRondelle, "The Remnant and the Three Angel's Messages," in Handbook
accumt reversible. Nevertheless, the conception of God's judgment presupposes a of Seventh-Day Adventist Theology (ed. R. F. Dederen, Hagerstown: Review & Herald
are no . 2000), 857-892. The purpose of the apocalyptic perspective is to show the continuity
notion ofa subJect as an accountable agent.
tenabl_ e Does the 'overconnng . o f metaphysics . h e w ake o f Heidegger
. , mt . lead to a between the humble coming of Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah of prophecy to the
7theology or strong theology? Dr. Canale envisioned "a new starting point for consummation of His mission as judge and restorer in the time ofthe end. "Therefore, they
weak . tian rapprochement" 131 m · 1983 and Iater contextua1·1zed h.is approach by [Seventh-day Adventists] are committed to restoring all the neglected Bible truth ofthe new
Chr!S ·ating the postmodem concept o f deconstruct10n . m . relation to American covenant. ... Such an identification with the remnant church of prophecy (Rev. 12: 17;
appropn . 14:6-12) offers no ground for a spirit of exclusivism or triumphalism" (ibid, 887 and 888).
evangelicalism. 132 And meanwhile sev~ral nuanced a~swers came along, some in 136
Ernst Bloch surmised that Plato's doctrine of anamnesis was the most effective
order to bridge the gap left by the denuse of metaphysics, and others to emphasize impediment to the futuristic biblical thought (cf. Ernst Bloch, The Principle ofHope, vol.
I (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1995), 137 and Christian Senk:el, "Utopie auf
Goldgrund: Ernst Blochs apokalyptische Metareligion," Apokalypse und Erinnerung in der
121 Compare Habermas, "Faith and Knowledge," 336 and Jurgen Habermas and Joseph
deutsch-jiidischen Kultur des fruhen 20. Jahrhunderts (ed. J. Brokoff and J. Jacob;
. The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Franscisco: Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 107). "The emergence of a literature which
Ratzmger,
. Press 2006), 50 wit · h the seIf-des1gnat10n
. . of M ax Web er ma. Ietter to Ferdmand
. pretends to interpret the bible but instead supplants it [ ... ] coincides with some 'inner-
Igna!l_us n February 9, 1909: "It is true that I am absolutely unmusical religiously and have religious' event: the de-eschatologizing ofChristianity" (Carl Friedrich Geyer,Religion und
Tonniesd Oor ability to erect any psych.1c ed"fi f 1· · h · ·
1 tees o a re 1g10us c aracter w1thm me. But a
Diskurs. Die Hellenisierung des Christentums aus der Perspektiveder Religionsphilosophie,
no nee h self-examination has told me that I am neither antireligious nor irreligious." Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1990), 78 and 82; my translation). "By the third century A.D. the
thoroug end of the world has receded into distance and the Christian community has finally been
12s See fn I I4 above.
129 Habermas, "Lectures from the Year 1935," 161.
transformed into a church" (Jacob Taubes, Occidental Eschatology (tr. D. Ratmoko,
"" Lyotard, "Time Today," 68. For a more complete quotation of that passage see fu Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 77).
137
Fernando Canale, "Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology and its Impact on the
78 above. • 9 Unity and Mission of the Church" (A paper presented at the Ph.D.- Th.D. Colloquium at the
131 Canale, Criticism of Theo1og1cal Reason, 39 .
1n Fernando Canale, "Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?," Andrews University Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University, Berrien Springs MI,
2006).
. ry Studies 44 no. 1 (2006), 95-130.
Semina '
 •"")

)
CHRISTIAN W ANNENMACHER
Velocity and Technique in the
)
460 Contemporary Era:
Christian Wannenmacher has studied Philosophy, ~olitical .science, and Ancient History )
at Munich University (LMU), Germany'. and earned his Dr. Phil. degree from the Philosophy
Understanding the Mediatic Logic Through
department at the same in~titution. He 1~ currentl_Y working as an independent scholar and Martin Heidegger )
freelance consultant. Email: wannenchrist@gma1l.com. )
)
Tales Tomaz
)
)
In his studies on Adventist theology, Fernando Canale introduced to the
theological community ideas emerging from his discussions about the German
philosopher Martin Heidegger, whose most relevant work, Being and Time, was
1h
published in 1927 and became one of the main philosophical treatises of the 20
century. In this work, Heidegger undertakes a sophisticated analysis of human .J
existence, which he calls Dasein. Humans are the only beings that ask themselves )
what it means for something "to be." At the end ofhis reflective journey, Heidegger
understands that being is time, which means that only the temporal-historical )
perspective itself explains how things appear "to be" to human beings. This )
conception is put against the metaphysical conceptions, which establish a previous
essence to existence. If the nature of reality is temporal and historical, it must be )
considered hermeneutical. Departing from this theoretical basis, Canale was able )
to begin his reflexive movement that questions the traditional notion of divine
timelessness. Such a journey lead to many other subjects, like a review of the
meaning of the role of revelation in Christian faith. 1 Thus Canale not only found
Heidegger's concepts useful, but he perceived the philosophical deconstruction
intended by the German philosopher as a singular opportunity for criticizing the )
whole traditional mode of thinking in Christian theology that often relied on
philosophical statements which Heidegger argued were not valid anymore. The
traditional Christian concept of a timeless God is only one of them.
It is important to notice, however, that Heidegger's thoughts go beyond his
significant insights in Being and Time. The questions that led the philosopher to
write that book went through gradual changes, and today it is clearly seen that his
f~;·; work is divided in two parts: the first is related to the Dasein matter, and the second
I, is interested on the question concerning technique (or technology, as it usually
I"'
" appears in the English translations). This last theme is undoubtedly the most
important one of the late Heidegger.2 At the same time, the Heideggerian thought
·1,: about technique does not vary dramatically from that undertaken in Being and Time.

:I\ '
1 Fernando Canale, 0 Principio Cognitivo da Teologia Crista: um Estudo
Hermeneutico Sobre revela<;ao elnspira9ao (Engenheiro Coelho, Brazil: Unaspress, 2011 ).
As well as this book ofCanale's, many other works were originally written in Portuguese,
German, and Spanish which are cited in this article. For the sake of fluency, I opted for )
presenting them already in free translation into English.
2 Peter Trawny, Martin Heidegger (Frankfurt, Germany; Nova York: Campus 2003).

( )
)
)
VELOCITY AND TECHN1QUE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA 463
) TALESTOMAZ
) ----------------
462
If his insights regarding the hermeneutic comprehension of
1
.
God, in his Providence, was considered to command everything, so that his designs
would be fulfilled. 4 However, the ruin of the medieval church's credibility and the
) tbeologic.l thought, his unde,stsnding of tedmique nright p ;" ,ty &e useful to numerous scientific, political, economic, and social discoveries in the Western
to think about the cootempO<>'Y condition, in wlrich the tr ';~ e some moce keys
World from the 15'h to the 19th centuries opened a gap for the idea that humankind
ofhu-. beings,
. God,
. ,nddifi
nntuce. is questioned by the e :ergence
,nnnalofth
und=Urnding
I
00 could take control of its own existence, making use of reason, science, and
) soc,al medi~ genehc mo ,canon, cybocgs and robots h e nt=et, technology.
infonn,tics, ,nd othec modem technology. ' P enom= b,sed Thus, the road ofmodem technology's progress begins when the human being
Thus.' the purpose
fl · of this
b study 1 present Heidegger, s view
th is to . of t hn. considers itself in the position of dictating the course of the world, what is called
10
,long w,th , ce ccuon a oot e ce evance of this vi ec ,que
) conteropocmY ,vocld. With this reflection, this wock intends ;w
undecstand the
,_tion ott,lartin Jleideggec'• wocks within Chrisforn theo~ contnbut'. to , l&gec
the anthropocentric era. The anthropocentric perspective, therefore, is the one that
transformed the relation between subject and object in a duality in which subject
prevails upon object. According to this view, technological progress is a way of
of ""ing ooly his foundin& wock. Being end Time. Tlri• obj e ~•"" ,tume.s, in.stead reaching a certain purpose, which is always to improve humanity by suppressing
this study does not aim to do. The
th present
f text does not pro pose
c veaalso
cleadefines what
.
negativities. Once technology is understood as a tool to attain human purposes, it
be<w«n a eontempoc,.Y oocy o technology and Chri . 'connectwn is seen as subordinate to the leadership of the subject. In the case of real-time
ConsequcotlY, it docs not suggest implications fut ChristiaO th ,n,n theology. technologies, the negativity to be overcome is the distance to the other. This is
of w,dc,st,nding technology. This i,,k should be ca . ;"ght and its mode
opportuni'Y·' me out at the next considered a problem that can be solved by applying human wisdom and
knowledge in both studying and producing communication machines. Hence, the
anthropological conception of technique views the relation between human and
opological Perspective of Technique technology assuming that the subject prevails over the object.
. . Anbthrt technique and techno1ogy, H e1.degger ' s startmg
. pomt . 1s
.
For Heidegger, the anthropological notion of technique is correct ifconsidered
When th~g a;:: the instrumental view of t~c~que, also called
with superficial analysis, but it hides what is actually at stake in modem technique,
his confrontation u·ve The instrumental conception is a result of the
· 1 perspec · or technology. 5 In order to comprehend what is crucial, one must abandon the
anthropologica d the dichotomy between subject and object and attributed the
anthropological notion in which technology is a medium, a tool. In this sense, the
worldview_that fo~\uman capacity ofdecision, while all other beings ofthe world
humanistic view that granted favor to the subject must be left behind.
role of subject to ~. ts before the human being. As the following paragraphs
would be ~ut as_ 0 1e; view organized the Western thought, especially during
Original Signification of Technique
explain,_ tlus poi: ~UJ11an being found itselfves_ted with the capacity of assuming Aiming to establish a non-instrumental conception of technique, Heidegger
modemity, wh~n e through the calculated domam of nat~e, an objective relation.
begins to rescue the original meaning of the Greek term techne which gave birth to
thi 1Ji
the course 0 st0 historical division suggested by Crro Marcondes Filho, the
what is called today technique and technology. Heidegger defmes it in the
According to e_ sin the so-called theocentric era, when it used to consider
Holzwege as a "mode ofknowing."6 But what did he have in mind to evoke such
West lived for ce~W:~eady given, without significant space for human decisions.
a definition? Plato and Aristotle are the main sources to which the German
history as sometlung philosopher turns to elucidate what exactly was understood as techne. One of the
. t to mention that Heidegger's work finds itself under tremendous most meaningful statements where Plato deals with the techne is in the Sophist.
3 It is also unportan ce of Anti-Semitic passages in the recently published "Black When Socrates ca1ls himself a technites, which meant a person that had the techne,
. the appearan_See Martin Hei~egger, Uberlegungen
pressure s1~~~ - XII-XV: Schwa,:ze Hefle he does it because he knew how to "serve himself with careful proceedings that
Ji
Notebooks, m ear1 2014Gennany: Vittono Klostermann: 2014) and especially the
J939-1941 (Fran rtd,'t of the notebooks, Peter Trawny, Heidegger und der Mythos der
connnentanes · oftheeh 1..or g(Frankfurt, Germany: v ittono
· · Klostermann, 2014). Trawny
Judischen "' ,,e/tversc
. . wonm ·
Jearthat Heidegger's history ofbemg
· 1s
· ma
· very s1gmficant
· · extent 4
Ciro Marcondes Filho, Sociedade Tecnol6gica (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Scipione, 1994).
sug()'ests thatnow1t1sc. tment against the Jews. However, th'is does not mean that his 5
In Heidegger's thought, technique and modern technique must be differentiated,
0
contanunate
. d by his resen
h Id simply be thrown away. They have to be evaluated and more although both cany some common traces. Only modern technique, which emerged from the
theory and concer5i: ~~uld be noticed also that Canale's approach is not dependent on Industrial Revolution, can be called technology. With this theoretical differentiation,
critically analyze · . s_ much more a "thinking along," a discussion emerging from the Heidegger stresses his opposition to the anthropocentric view, that considers the human
Heidegger's theoryb it~s Gennan thinker. In this way, this text and others in this Festschrift being as being "technological" since its appearance. This point will be approached with
challenges offered_/t \•s influence on Canale's thought do not intend to ignore the recent more details below.
that emphasize Hei eg~e mitism but to highlight the points that may be of interest for 6
Martin Heidegger, Holzwege (Frankfurt, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 46.
question of the Anti- e '
theological reflectJOn.

464 TALESTOMAZ
since the beginning have previewed the end to which the interrogated will lead."7
In this sense, techne makes something appear (which is tn,th in the Greek sense),
but it does not refer to the mere production of artifacts and tangible products. For
Plato, techne is a special form of production which is deeply connected with the
dominion of a specific method for reaching a result previously and intentionally
established.
Similarly, Aristotle does not see technique as a mere act of producing, but
considers it as a producing accompanied by a previous knowledge. By
differentiating techne and episteme, Aristotle states that while the latter is more
related to contemplation, the former has much more to do with production.
However, as Plato puts it, it is still not simply an act ofproducing. What effectively
constitutes techne is the knowledge that goes along with it, what Aristotle calls
"true reason." It is not an unreflected producing. One who has techne knows the end
that is intended and uses all sp ecific methods to reach it. It is not possible to assure
absolutely that the result will be attained, but it is possible to visualize the goal and
what is needed in order to arrive at it. Mickle summarizes:
The techne is not merely poiesis [production], as significant as it can be. It
is an intentional fruit of a judgment; a judgment that refers certainly to a
scope where is not present the apoditic certainty that the demonstrative
knowledge can offer, but even so it has certain safety measures in relation
to the truth in the act of doing. 8
From this standpoint Heidegger proposes in his work, The Question Concerning
Technology, that technique is much more than merely a medium or a tool, it is a
form of bringing to light something that was hidden, a form of uncovering,
revealing the real. Technique is a way ofmaking something that was not previously
present (instead it was hidden, covered, protected, like the word Entbergen can
suggest in the original German language) coming into the realm of existence. Thus,
it is a mode of production. The Greeks called production aletheia, which means
truth- truth as uncovering, as bringing to light, as appearance.
However, this is · not the only existing form of uncovering. Nature
itself- physis- is also a form of uncovering reality, a form of truth. It is a way
through which a flower appears in the blooming, the form that "has in itself the
outburst of production."9 But technique is a way of uncovering something that
would not be uncovered without the intervention of another, different from the
flower. Technique is that which makes a piece of silver to become a cup through
the action of a craftsman, in an example used by Heidegger. Also, the very word
technique does not refer only to handwork, but also to art, which is a way to
7 Enrique Munoz Mickle, "Techne y Tecnica, Ousia y Materia," Techne, edited by
Centro de Estudos da Antigiiidade Grega do Departamento de Filosofia da PUC-SP (Sao
Paulo, Brazil: Educ/Palas Athena, 1998, p. 18-27), 20.
• Mickle, "Techne y Tecnica, Ousia y Materia," 21.
9 Martin Heidegger, "A Questao da Tecnica," Scientiae Studia 5, no. 3 (2007): 379.
I· '.
)
V ELOCITY AND TECHNIQUE IN THE CONTE11PORARY ERA 465 )
)
uncover, to produce. "Thus, what is decisive in techne does not lie at all in making
and manipulating nor in the using of means, but rather in the afore-mentioned )
revealing," says Heidegger.10
)
Essence of Modern Technique )
Could modem technique-steam engine, etc.-also be a form of uncovering or
revealing, just as the technique of the craftsman? According to Heidegger, yes. )
Modem technique, h owever, holds some differences when compared to pre-modem
)
technique. Modem technique-technology-is a producing which bases itself in the
notion implicit in modem science that everything can be measured and represented )
as a number. 11 Modem physics has assumed the duty oftransforming nature in a set
ofrelatively calculable and manipulable forces. Numbers would have the capacity
of representing the real in a calculable way and of increasing the possibilities of
manipulating it. For Heidegger, this is exactly the core of modem technique. It
carries the attempt ofmaking everything measurable through science. In this way,
"man puts at risk the unlimited violence of calculations, ofplanning and cultivation
of all things."12 Through this perspective, everything can be represented. This
process corresponds to the virtualization of the world, i.e., the conception of the
world as an image.
The revealing ofthe real as calculation, as something measurable, turns modem )
technique into something that "puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it
supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such." 13 It challenges nature to
provide energy to be stored for later usage. Pre-modem technique remained
immediately connected to nature, as the windmill, that "does not unlock energy
from the air currents in order to store it." 14 Otherwise, through modern technique
a river becomes a source of energy to be stored in a power station and distributed
to do something else. A dry region becomes a mineral reserve of coal ready to
attend another need that ordered it previously. Modern technique is a mode of
revealing that challenges nature to make itself available to provide energy for
another end. Thereupon, that which is uncovered or revealed by modern technique
appears as standing-reserve (Bestand) for a specific end. Modem technique is a
form ofrevealing things as standing-reserve, that is, something that stands for a use.
But not for whatever use. "The [technological] revealing reveals to itself its own
manifoldly interlocking paths, through regulating their course. " 15 Regulating,
directing and controlling "even become the chief characteristics of the challenging
[technological] revealing."16 Thus, the human being puts itself in the position of
10
Heidegger, "A Questao da Tecnica," 381.
11
Mickle, "Techne y Tecnica, Ousia y Materia." .)
12
Heidegger, Holzwege, 94.
13
Heidegger, "A Quest1io da Tecnica," 381.
14
Heidegger, "A Questao da Tecnica," 381. )
15
Heidegger, "A Questiio da Tecnica," 382, italics added.
•• Heidegger, "A Questiio da Tecnica," 382.
) 1
) l
)
) 466 TALESTOMAZ I VELOCITY AND TECHNIQUE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA 467

) ruler of the world, of nature, of history and of the real, and transforms itself in the that the technical knowledge itself routes. The technical directing is a positioning
scheme that places things according to its own arrangement. Heidegger concludes,
"subject." 17
) In the technological era, this form ofproduction is widespread. When observed from this point, that the human being does not have technique in its hands. The
from an anthropocentrical perspective, this factor can give rise to the idea that "enframing" seduces it with the possibility of controlling the real, but in the end the
humanity is finally prepared to conduct the whole reality to fulfill its goals. human is conducted itself by modern technique. What is decisive in modern
) However, to avoid such mistake, it is necessary to analyze more closely the technique, therefore, does not consist in the human use or instrumentalization for
implications of Hiedegger's definition of modern technique. For the German reaching certain ends, but in the technological "enframing" that uses the human to
) enthrone itself as the only option ofrevealing the real.
philosopher, techne is a mode ofknowing. The craftsman held not only the capacity
) of producing, but also producing with knowledge. As Peter Trawny sums up, "the
human being of the mass society lives technically without having produced itself Heidegger and Velocity
all those technical equipments and, the most decisive point, without the possibility Heidegger defined modern technique as a mode ofthinking and acting in which
of having produced them." 18 Unlike the craftsman and the artist who make use of the human being represents the world as something calculable and measurable in
)
pre-modern technique, the human being from the era of technique, excluding few order to obtain direction and control over reality. In the end, however, the human
) exceptions, does not possess technology in its hands. Despite this fact, it is deeply itselfwould be driven by this mode ofthinking, instead of controlling reality. These
involved with technology; as Trawny says, it "lives technically." ideas were developed in the mid-20 th century. Since then, technology has advanced
) on unimaginable paths, although Heidegger himself was able to foresee important
In the same way, Heidegger supports the view that the modern human being is
) not the initiator, or the subject, of modern technique. It is moved to uncover things aspects, such as the possibility opened by modern technique for intervention in
in a technical manner before it notices what is really at stake, so that its human genetic nature. The new technological developments raise important
) participation is not that ofthe master of the process, but that ofthe one that answers questions regarding human beings, God, society, nature, etc. As the relations
to the calling of revealing things as standing-reserve. Rather than becoming the between human beings become even more mediated, as the modern narratives are
) told each day in a more sophisticated technological way, as the religious services
master of technique, the human being is invoked to use it. Hence, this calling leads
) the human being to challenge nature. That is for Heidegger the essence of become more and more available on DVDs, streaming channels and performatic
technique, Gestell, which is often translated as "enframing." 19 The enframing is the expressions, the theological reflection will have to face, sooner or later, the question
.) concerning the meaning of modern technology and of the possibilities that it opens.
call to frame reality as standing-reserve, prepared to another finality that was set by
) the technological positioning scheme, a process which counts on the participation The naive understanding of technology as a neutral instrument, which can be used
to take the believer away from God or to bring it closer to him, is only admitted if
of the human being, but that is not driven by its capacity of decision.
There is a paradox resulting from this thought: In the moment when the human one assumes the same traditional philosophical paradigms of the West, whose
being sees itself as ruler of nature and history, that is precisely when it does not fragility was already demonstrated by Heidegger. Once theological reflection has
J taken the first steps to free itself from this techno-philosophical basis-Canale's
have technique in its hands. As Peter Trawny explains:
) contribution to this is fundamental-it could go a step further to rethink the religious
experience in the technological era.
) The more technically the human understands itself and the world, the more
it raises itself as the ruler of the world, the more it befalls in a dependency To reflect on the contemporary religious experience in the way suggested
) above, i.e., far from the paradigm subject-object that sees technology as an
that practically does not leave space to consider things and human beings
from another perspective than that of the operativeness [Machbarkeit]. 20 instrument, this text suggests reflection on one of the most significant unfoldings
) ofHeidegger's theory of technology, namely the comprehension of the role and the
Technique shows itselfas the only legitimate interpretation ofwhat it means "to meaning of velocity in the contemporary world. Everyone perceives the daily life
) nowadays as a race against time. It seems to be necessary to save time. By the way,
be" in the technological era. It becomes clear, in this sense, that modern technique
.J cannot be seen as a tool which is subordinated to the human being, so that it could technologies seem to have exactly the function of saving time for what is more
accomplish its own aspirations. What is really at stake in modern technique is the important to be done. Nevertheless, although much time is saved, it does not lead
) to a calmer life, but to a more and more accelerated lifestyle, at least for the vast
transformation of the real into standing-reserve for a usage that is geared in the path
majority of the population in major centers and developed cities. Pathological
J consequences are, for instance, stress and depression.
) 17
Heidegger, Holzwege. 95. The most acknowledged thinker of velocity as a social phenomenon is Paul
18
Trawny, Martin Heidegger, 153. Virilio, who proposed that velocity and the acceleration ofcontemporary human life
) 19
Heidegger, "A Questao da Tecnica," 384.
20
are intimately connected to the technoscientific development ofthe 20th century and
Trawny, Martin Heidegger, 154.
)
)

TALESTOMAZ
468
extended through the 21 st century. Inspired by Virilio, Eugenio Trivinho proposes
that this primacy of velocity manifests itself nowadays through the digital
technologies of communication, whose spreading in everyday life has led many
scholars to define this actual p eriod as cyberculture. Thereby, from Trivinho 's point
of view, cyberculture could be defined as the era ofvelocity's supremacy precisely
through the supposedly ludic technologies from our era.
Trivinho's statements, however, go further. In A Dromocracia CiberCultural
(Cybercultural Dromocracy, not yet translated into English), Eugenio Trivinho
argues that:
It could be said-with the proper permission for abusing the
comparison-that velocity operates as a kind of Ge-Stell [enframing], just
as Heidegger foresaw and defined, with the difference that here it
[ enfrarning] appears articulated by totalitarian propensities and, obviously,
21
sinister.
for Trivinho, velocity would not be simply one more process of modem life,
not even a mere consequence ofmodem technology. Trivinho's statement suggests
that the very provocation to the human beings nowadays-what Heidegger classified
as a challenge to reveal the world as a standing-reserve-would be actually done by
velocity itself. In other words, velocity would be a contemporary form of Gestell,
thus, the essence of the technological era.
This statement must be better evaluated and for this it is necessary to turn in
detail to Virilio's explanation about velocity. According to Virilio, the geographic
22
world, the "place," has been suppressed in favor of velocity, the "non-place." It
means that, regarding human experience, there is a sovereignty from the "non-
place" of velocity upon territory. This happens because of a specific reason: the
"narrowing of distances," acquired through the con tinuous development of the
vectors of velocity. These vectors of velocity can be identified precisely in the
contemporary technologies, and among them the communication media sh ould b e
highlighted. "With the telegraph, distances and territoria l b oundaires evaporate;
with real-time technologies, real presence bites the dust."
23
The suppression of distances is an extremely relevant phenomenon, whose
consequences cannot be ignored. Virilio quoted Rene Char stating that:
"Eliminating distances kills," and added:
When you endlessly increase the liberating power of the media, you bring
what was once hidden by distance and secret-which was distant and
naturally foreign to each of us- far too close; you then run the risk of
reinventing, here and now, some kind of barbarism (barbaros = foreigner,
21Eugenio Trivinho, A Dromocracia Cibercultural: L6gica da Vida Humana na
Civiliza9iio Mediatica Avan9ada (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Paulus, 2007), 95.
22 Paul Virilio, Velocidade e Politica (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Esta9ao Liberdade, 1997), 123.
" Paul Virilio, A Arte do Motor (Sao Paulo, Brazil: Esta9ao Liberdade, 1996), 55.
)
)
)
VELOCITY AND TECHNIQUE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA 469
)
one who does not speak the language). In other words, you run the risk of
inventing the enemy. 24 )
)
T herefore, from the point ofview ofperception, the dimension ofthe planet and
even of the universe are hereinafter "in a perpetual shrinking effect" and this is )
happening as the technoscientific development grows in the direction ofproducing
more sophisticated forms oftelepresence.25 )
It is interesting to notice that Heidegger bad already discussed, although en )
passant, the matter of technological elimination of distances and its relation with
the increase of velocity. In the text Das Ding, he suggests that technologies as the )
airplane and the radio perform the annihilation ofdistances. When the movie theater
brings scenes of other cultures, it is also responsible for bringing a notion of
closeness never experienced earlier. But he points out in a special way to "the
television," which he sees as the "summit of the removal of any possibility of
distance." 26
In Being and Time, Heidegger suggests that the era of technique experiences J
a specific acceleration, and the media-he mentions specially the radio-are directly
implicated in this process.27 Heidegger also discusses this point in the text about the
conquering of the world as an image, where he attributed to the airplane and to the
radio decisive participation in the logic ofannihilating long distances, in such a way
that the daily routine of each human being must be familiar from now on with
"exotic and distant worlds."2 8 In this way Heidegger clearly indicates that the
media, such as other technologies, have something to do with overcoming
distances. It must be regarded that Virilio also compares several times the
communication media to the transport media, taking both as vectors of velocity
which are active in eliminating distances.
Heidegger, therefore, had already seen some relevance in velocity with regard
to the technological world of his time. But the relationship between velocity and
modem technique becomes more significant in exploring the very meaning of
Gestell. When the philosopher says that the uncovered reality becomes a standing-
reserve, it can be understood as the ultimate loss of the foundation of the real.
Through the enframing, things have value not by an intrinsic significance anymore,
but by the role they play in the technological arrangement of the world. When the
real is transformed in standing-reserve, it loses any foundation. Without foundation, )
the meaning of reality oscillates, its signification can easily change every instant J
dep ending only on the respective conjuncture, on the need of the moment. When
uncovered as standing-reserve, things become purely no-thing, to refer to a notion
)
24
Virilio, A Arte do Motor, 25.
2
' Virilio, A Arte do Motor, 41.
26
Martin Heidegger, Vortriige und Aufsiitze (Frankfurt, Germany: Vittorio )
Klostermann, 2000), 81.
27
Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Frankfurt, Germany: Vittorio Klostennann, 1977), )
141.
28
Heidegger, Holzwege, 95. .)
 ) '"T
)
)
I
TALESTOMAZ
) 470
) proposed by Casanova.29 This phenomenon, which can be called uprooting, makes
reality much more susceptible to changes.30 The easier it is to change the meaning
) material product, what appears through the production of the medium is an
of things, the bigger is the role of velocity in the uprooted reality. It is not only a
issue of possibility, but of necessity of velocity, since the slowness has a great
potential of revealing the absence of foundation of the real, which is terrible for
) beings who ask all the time the question about the meaning of things-as human
beings do.
However, one cannot ignore the existence ofthe possibility that the relationship
) between velocity and technique is nowadays even more significant, justifying the
arguments for a new technique, a contemporary technique whose essence would be
the provocation for being faster.
)
Velocity as the Contemporary Gestell Contemporary Technology
) As seen in the last paragraphs, Heidegger's concept of modem technique
already includes in its essence a significant role for velocity. Nevertheless, in the
) time of nature establishes a new paradigm for human action. As Virilio suggests,
Heideggerian sense, technique is a way to bring to light, a way of producing. For
t·)) Peter Trawny, the electronic communication media are the producing form par
excellence in the contemporary world. However, he prefers to speak of medium
instead of media-in singular form rather than plural-to emphasize that there is a
"standardized invisible power" that "conducts the media that we see every day."
31
ti) As well as Heidegger, he tries to drive the attention away from the technological
L,) equipments toward the persistent power that operates in them, that is the very
11.. reason for the appearance of the equipments and their various uses.
Trawny defines medium as "the immaterial unit of capital and technology,"
1,ci which means an inextricable connection between technology, economy and
communication media. The medium is the productive force of the contemporary
VELOCITY AND TECHNIQUE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA 471
own intense acceleration, the production of the medium goes towards the
immaterial, "an appearance that disengages itself from the body."33 Instead of a
information that is immaterial.
As well known, matter itself is a great hindrance to the continuous production.
Trawny explains that, once the medium strives for immateriality, the production can
be accelerated in ways never thought of before. To convert all things in information
to be consumed and exchanged, thereby maintaining the permanent functioning of
the economic and technological development, is the great telos of the medium. In
other words, when it gets rid of the nature and materiality of existence, production
can happen ad infinitum. When the contemporary producing is independent of
nature, of the body and of materiality, it reaches its own, mechanic, artificial and
technological rhythm, which lets it be independent of the time ofnature and rush
into velocity.
The autonomization that contemporary technology acquires in relation to the
velocity has always brought competitive advantages. However, if distances and
matter play a significant role in the spatial-temporal organization ofthe world, they
represent clear limits to the advantages ofvelocity. That is why, in the past, velocity
was never uplifted to the condition of social paradigm-or of truth. Once the
distances appear to be overcome, as Virilio proposes, velocity is finally converted
in a mode of being and acting. It is possible to affirm, then, the technological
velocity as a privileged contemporary form of uncovering reality in
contemporaneity.
Velocity only acquires such a significant status in the technological scenario
because of the immediate success of the adherence to it, "the practical efficiency

t~ )
world. Its ultimate goal is the suspension of all borders oftime and space, aiming
to transform the world in an infinite spherical surface where there is "no resistance
to the currency of values, goods and bodies," in order to facilitate the production
of everything.32 However, production brings to mind the idea of tangible products.
demonstrated when you do what it [velocity] wants."34 The popular adherence to
velocity as a paradigm of life occurs, therefore, as far as it grants advantages to the
one who does what it, velocity, requires. In other words, what gives primacy to the
velocity-knowledge in the everyday life is precisely its effectiveness. Individuals
and corporations do not adhere to technology due to well-elaborated discourses that
The medium, nevertheless, does not strive to produce material goods. Through its
legitimize it, but because of its efficacy. Therefore, the whole social sphere is now
measured by the paradigm ofvelocity, by the effectiveness arising out ofthis mode
2• Marco Antonio Casanova, Nada a Caminho: Impessoalidade, Niilismo e Tecnica na of knowing.
Obra de Martin Heidegger. (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil: Forense Universitaria, 2006). Then it is time to note again Heidegger's point: The contemporary
,o For the sake ofthe correctness ofthe argumentation, it is not reality itself that is more
susceptible to changes. It is the meaning of the real, its significance. That can be easily seen
technological velocity cannot be seen merely as a tool at the disposal of human
in the world of fashion. Suddenly a color or a whole look can be "fashion" while a few beings, instead it should be seen as the own modus vivendi of this time. It
,; months ago they were rejected as old-fashioned or inappropriate.
31 Peter Trawny, Medium und Revolution. (Berlin, Germany: Matthes und Seitz, 201 1),
constitutes a real appeal to humankind, an actual provocation to be and act in a
determined way. From this perspective, velocity seems to tum into something much
) 29. It is important to highlight that the so-called "invisible power" does not correspond to more significant in the social and historical sense in such proportion that is
I.
an organized institution or group of persons. It also does not have anything to do with equivalent to a new mode of Gestell. The present technological development has

l
supernatural powers. Trawny's argument, as well as Heidegger's, revolves around the
·._~1.·~.
characteristic that many inanimate things and processes have to become powerful trends
.1/ which overcome human decision capacity. Only in this sense they become an "invisible
33
Trawny, Medium und Revolution, 20.
;• Trivinho, A Dromocracia Cibercultural: L6gica da Vida Humana na Civilizat;iio
,;J power" which is even able to "conduce" something.
32 Trawny, Medium und Revolution, 21.
Mediatica Avant;ada, 98, added remark.
~)
h)

TALESTOMAZ
472
as essence, therefore, not t~e challenge to put reality available to the human being
ore but the provocation to be faster.
anym '
Heidegger saw a clear d anger mt
. he essence of~odern technique. Basically,
•t was the possibility that the human loses the notion of the existence of other
~odes of truth, or the other ways of knowing. All things would be seen by
humanity as standing-re~erve, and other ways of~ncovering the world and bringing
things to light would be ignored. Thus, the technical knowledge would tend to shut
the door to other types of knowledge and even for !mowledge itself as a mode of
truth. And in this point lies the greatest danger, when the human believes it holds
the world in its hands.
Contemporary technology also presents a similar danger. In its efficiency it
drags human beings toward it i_n such a wa!' that the indi~idual begi~s to uncover
the world only by the perspective of velocity. And velocity, due to its efficiency,
tends to shut off all othe: forms of truth beyond itself. More specifically, in
cyberculture the hurr:1an bemg d~es not see anot~er w~y of acting that is not under
the dictates of velocity. Wben history reach~s thJS pomt, the human itself is taken
as standing-reserve to the a~to-repr~ductlon of contemporary technology, to
perpetuate the mode of Jmowmg that 1s related to it, which found in velocity its
most updated manifestation. Tra~y seems to think in this sense when he says that
the human body is "integrated m the way that space and time of the medium is
presented." Through this process, the ~uman body is r~functionalized only and
exclusively in the context of the medium, thus becomrng an "extension of the
35
medium.
In a "similar way Baudrillard
• • •
had already identified that humanity creates
(economical, political, technological, amo~g others) _systems and leads them to
perfection, but then they escap~ from its hands m the p erfection of their
ultradevelopment. They autonorruze themselves, with no external ends, because
their only end is to reprodu_ce themselves. In the case of the technological systems,
its self-referential operation p~ged human goals and instead of producing
something, it began to reproduce itself. Moreover, the need of self-reproduction of
the time demands a constant_ care of t~e human being, this being that now orbits
36
around the created system without seemg other alternatives.
Conclusion
Heidegger had said that the essence of technique is something not technical. If
the essence of contemporary ~echnology is also something not technical, it is
easonable to assume that velocity plays this role. Living in a world with no barriers
}or the continual production and_ :eproduction of everything seems to be what
I, motivates the social, cultural, political and economical realms, and why not even
st
tt the religious experience of the 21 century? Nowadays, human beings rarely see
any alternative to velocity, the constant movement, the constant (re)production, the
l> Trawny, Medium und Revolution, 29.
1• Jean Baudrillard, A Transparencia do Mal: Ensaio sobre os Fenomenos Extremos
(Campinas, Brazil: Papirus, 2003).
)
)
VELOCITY AND T ECHNIQUE IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA 4 73
)
permanent state of being occupied, even when there is no end of it.37 Heidegger
also noticed as well regarding modern technique, that the essence of contemporary
technology is not upon the hands of the human being. It is a provocation to )
humankind. However, what should be emphasized is that, in its most actual
unfolding, this is not a provocation simply to unveil reality as a standing-reserve, )
instead it strives for immateriality.
)
What is at stake now is independence from the materiality of existence. The
overcoming ofdistances through technological velocity is an epiphenomenon ofthe )
process of symbolical dematerialization of existence. This idea implies that every
technological process disputes for the end (primarily in a symbolic way) of the )
materiality of existence as locus of experiential investment. The mediatic velocity
in cyberculture is the central thread of this process.
Hence, cyberculture is an era that turns itself against material life. Velocity )
compels human beings to the unconditional acceleration of existence and installs
the fear of becoming slow, which means not being able to keep up with the velocity _)
of this time spread through all digital technologies, and thus of being part of the J
social and cultural outskirts, or even to be jettisoned completely from citizenship.38
To be fast became an imperative order to be set in the prevailing social and cultural
lifestyle of the 2 1st century. For Heidegger, the temptation was to see everything )
and everyone as a standing-reserve. However, the present temptation is to see
everything and everyone as mere information, with no flesh and body, only sparky
signs in the screens, rapid inhabitants of the velocity-country.
Therefore, there is one more road for theological scholars who want to take part
in the deconstruction of Western philosophy as undertaken by Heidegger. They
should consider the paradigm under which the human being lives challenged by
contemporary technology. In the crucial summit of technological development, the
human life is colonized by a specific mode of thinking, the velocity-thinking. In the
era of velocity, technologies, techniques and velocity are not tools for the human
being. Otherwise, the human being has become hostage of these processes and )
tendencies. Thus, it experiences now the uprooting of its material historical )
condition and is at risk of being each time more at the mercy of conjunctures and
circumstantial conceptions, which lack a clear relation with its history and with
everything else that gave meaning to human existence.
Parting from these initial considerations, the theological reflection could
meditate over the following hypothesis: Is not the Christian religious experience )
giving in each day more to the provocation of contemporary technology when it
adheres to pe,forming-worships, technicized programs and mediated personal
devotion? Many times these "techniques" are considered tools to spread the gospel.
37
Obviously, there are already movements and small initiatives that intend to slow
down the daily life. But they are nothing more than marginal movements, developing _)
themselves in the borders of society. They do not yet enjoy the necessary popular support
to constitute a whole mode of social organization. )
38
Trivinho, A Dromocracia Cibercultura/: L6gica da Vida Humana na Civilizar;iio
Mediatica Avam;ada, 89-100. J
 )
)
)
) 474 TALESTOMAZ The Collateral Effects of the Delay of Jesus'
) A theological reflection that considers the themes exposed in this text should
Parousia on the Message, Mission, and
)
question if the theological worldview is not actually becoming captive to the Worship of the Church
anthropological conception of technique, which thinks that world and reality are
) subdued to human desires. Finally, it can also be considered if, with this increasing
technicizing of religious life to obtain better practical results (keeping in mind that Elmer A. Guzman
) velocity is seductive because of its immediate effects), religion will not end up
losing its autonomy as a mode of truth in favor of technology, fulfilling the most
/
terrifying forecast made by Heidegger about the era of technique.
) Introduction
Tales Tomaz is a Ph.D. candidate in Media and Communications at Universida de Sao
The climactic ascension of Christ and his unfulfilled promise of the parousia
Paulo and was granted a scholarship as a visiting student at the Martin-Heidegger-Institut,
have significantly affected the development ofChristian thinking. 1 This in-between
Germany. Since 2009 he is an assistant professor at Centro Univeristario Adventista de Sao
) Paulo, where he teaches courses in theories ofcommunication, cyber-culture, and scientific experience- his ascension on the one side and his parousia2 on the other-has
production. He has presented several papers on technologies, media philosophy, and launched epistemological and existential anxieties among theologians in all ages
) who sought to justify the delay of the second coming by means of accommodation
communications, his major interests. His personal challenge at this moment of theoretical
) self-development is to integrate his knowledge in media philosophy with Christian faith, a to philosophical concepts.3 This justification through accommodation is what marks
task which will receive most of his concentration in the corning years.
)
)
)
)
J
j
)
J
) ' My studies at Andrews University have been enriched by the teaching, writings, and
ministry ofDr. Fernando L. Canale. It has been a delight to hear his prophetic voice pointing
) the way forward in Seventh-day Adventism--referred by him as the "Adventist project."
While Canale's early work focused on the foundational level of theology (ontology and
') epistemology), his late work applied his findings to the theoretical and practical levels
(issues related to ecclesiology, worship, spirituality, secularism). This chapter is related to
j his current emphasis on the practical level, and it is offered in his honor.
2
I use the Greek term parousia instead of return for its broad conceptuality. It means
)
the state of being present at a place, presence, arrival, coming, or advent. ''parousia," BDAG
) 780--1.
3
I use the term anxiety in the sense of "very eager and concerned to do something or
) for something to happen"; however, this could also be called expectation. Anxiety carries
the sense of a "disorder" in psychological language (Concise Oxford English Dictionary
) [I Ith ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 2004], s.v. "Anxiety"). Epistemological
anxiety is used in the sense of verification of truth-claims of apocalyptic expectations;
) existential anxiety concerns the impracticability of Christian moral ideals without
apocalyptic belief (Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas [Harmondsworth, UK:
Penguin, 1933), 15).
,)
\ \
_J
476 ELMER A. GUZMAN
l COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF THE DELAY OF JESUS' P AROUSIA
the development ofthe Christian doctrine. 4 Meanwhile, the church is called to bring
about the eschatological kingdom through repentance, mission, and proclamation. 5
After the ascension, the church worships an empirically absent but spiritually
and providentially present God, whose scattered theophanies6 and m essengers
provide the basis for its hope. This God is accessed via his Son-Jesus.7 The
language of the church's worship is informed by past actions, words, and relations
between God and his people, and points to the future deliverance and resolution of
the Great Controversy between God (good) and Satan ( evil). Yet the delay of this
resolution not only caused the institutionalization of religion with clear boundary
markers for admission into m embership,8 but also produce d a diverse Christianity
with universal aspirations- in terms of space, time, and validity of claims. 9 This
• Hans Kiing identifies this development in theology using the conceptual framework
ofparadigm change or shift in theology and Christianity. He argues that Christianity had six
major paradigm shifts always maintaining the abiding substance of faith: ( l) Early Christian
apocalyptic; (2) Early church Hellenistic; (3) Mediaeval Roman Catholic; (4) Reformation
Protestant; (5) Enlightenment modem; (6) Contemporary ecumenical or postmodern
(Christianity: Essence, History and Future [New York: Continuum, 1995], 1-9). He uses
Thomas Kuhn's conceptual idea of scientific revolution to explain the accommodation and
development of theology as paradigm shifts (Kiing, et al. Paradigm Change in Theology:
A Symposium for the.future [New York: Crossroad, 1998], 3-31).
5
The condition for the fulfillment ofthe eschaton is synergetic: the passive voice ofthe
verb in ''your kingdom come" (Matt 6: 10) emphasizes that God is the agent of the coming;
on the other hand, the church is called to spread the message as a prerequisite for the
kingdom's coming (Matt 24:14), and in this sense the end shall be speeded (2 Pet 3:11).
6
Mircea Eliade describes it as hierofany: "something sacred shows itselfto us." (The
Sacred and the Profane: The Nature ofReligion, [1st ed.; New York: Harcourt, 1959], 11).
He uses this phenomenological nomenclature of the school of history of religions for
comparing the phenomenon of the sacred in many religious manifestations.
7 ' The expansion of the Christian faith into different lands motivated the translation of
This is not a place to ditinguish between general and special revelation, or the
difference between soteriological and epistemological access to God via Christ. In this paper
I assume an exclusivist interpretation of Salvation via Christ. I support this position by
pointing out that Christ is the mystic ladder of Jacob's dream (Gen 28:12-13; cf. Ellen G.
White, That I May Know Him: The Morning Watch Texts with Appropriate Selections
[Washington: Review and Herald, 1964], Jan 15). He is the access to God (John 14:6) and
the mediator (Heb 8:6, 9: 15). For a inclusivist approach, namely, theocentric instead of
Christocentric, see Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of Christian
Attitudes toward the World Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985), 145-167.
8
The boundary markers were defined by orthodoxy as "whatever is taught in any epoch
by the majority of bishops, and to be Catholic is to concur with this majority." (Mark J.
Edwards, Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church [Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009], 7).
• For a summary of the different meanings of universality, see Avery Dulles, The
Catholicity of the Church (Oxfordshire: Clarendon Press, 1985). The theory of the
Hellenization ofChristanity proposed by von Harnack argues that the Catholic Church is the
last great production of the Hellenic spirit (Adolf von Harnack, History of Dogma 1:39,
quoted in Wendy Heileman, ed., Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response
within the Greco-Roman World (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994], 77).
However, von Harnack's fundamental error is that he assumes Christianity is universal and
477
)
universalization became the excuse for the rendering of the Christian message in
common language, contrasted to the language of the authoritative religious texts.
Hence, the church translated the Hebraic faith into understandable, intelligible,
philosophical-laden doctrines. 10
In this essay, I will argue that because of Jesus' delayed parousia (1) the
church had to explain the intelligibility of its message, (2) the church had to justify
Jesus' absence by controlling his presence through worship, (3) the church had to j
reshape its understanding oflanguage about God and his relation to humanity, and
finally (4) the church had either to justify the absence ofGod through philosophical
accommodation or to re-eschatologize its hope for the return ofJesus. My argument )
will be organized around these four issues.
Because Jesus' Parousia Was Delayed, the Church
Had to Explain the Intelligibility of Its Message
The reception of the message depends on its intelligibility. The ascension of
Jesus to heaven and his delay in returning caused intellectual anxiety: either the
words of Jesus were true, and therefore, had a different meaning than their face
value, or they were false, and the faith was in vain. The church controlled this
anxiety by reinterpreting the eschatolog ical Jewish apocalypticism of Jesus 11
)
through a different view of reality: namely, a variegated form of Platonism. 12 This
early adoption of philosophy by theology opened the door for the adoption of )
subsequent philosophies in ecclesiastical history.
)
Judaism particularistic (p. 72). Choi points out that Second Temple Judaism had
universalistic tendencies as well; see Phuichun Richard Choi, "Abraham Our Father: Paul's
Voice in the Covenantal Debate of the Second Temple Period" (PhD dissertation, Fuller
Theological Seminary, School of Theology, 1997).
0
J
the sacred texts of the church into the common language-Koine, Peshitta and Vulgata
means simply common. The history of the transmission of the NT, for example, attests to )
this rapid spread and survival of the message by a vast collection of manuscript witnesses
in different languages, sometimes with their own implicit assumptions ofreality imbedded.
11
Jesus the Messiah is well established standing in the eschatological Jewish
apocalyptic tradition. See Sigmund 0. P. Mowinckel, He That Cometh (Oxford: Blackwell,
1959), 3; D. S. Russell, The Method &Message ofJewish Apocalyptic, 200 BC-AD I 00, The
Old Testament Library (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964).
12
Jaroslav Pelikan argues that ''when the consummation was postponed, it could no
longer serve as the premise for affirmations of Christian doctrine, which had to be
transposed into another key" (The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of )
Doctrine, 5 vols. [Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1973-1990], l : 123). Although there
were several elements of change between the ascension and the adoption of a kind of
Platonism, these changes were micro and meso paradigm changes. Kung argues that the _)
change from the early Christian apocalyptic paradigm toward the Hellenistic paradigm
constitutes a macro change (Kiing, Christianity: Essence, History and Future, I I 1). This )
macro paradigm shift was catalyzed mainly by Origen and Augustine, and their usage of
philosophical tools for the interpretation of Scripture (Kiing, et al., Paradigm Change, 113).
r,I
)
)
J ELMER A. GUZMAN
478
An understanding of philosophy has always been necessary for an
) understanding of theology. This is so because Biblical thinking has always been in
13
dialogue with the particular culture of its time. This is attested in Augustine's
Neoplatonism, Aquinas's Arist~telianism, Bultman' s existe1:tialism, Pannemberg' s
) Hegelianism, and Boff's Marxism. None of these theologians adopt a particular
system wholesale; they creatively adopt and modify the framework of theology by
dialoguing with the mindset of the time. The issue under consideration is related to
the different methods of validating this appropriation of philosophy by theology. I
)
will describe three methods that attempt such validation: translation, pluralism, and
contemporaneity.
The first method of validation is translation. Andrew F. Walls's appropriation
) of philosophy by theolo_gy is justified a~ a 1;11eans of tran~Jat~o1: of the gospel-the
) transposition of categones for cornmurucatlve purposes. Similarly, Paul Tillich's
method of correlation can be interpreted as a translation ofthe original message into
15
) contemporary expression (existentialism).
The second method of validation is pluralism. Jack A. Bonsor argues that
_)
orthodoxy does not require a specific philosophy. His method seeks to identify
) universal truth in the pluralism of expression as long as the constant meaning is
found in elements of the church. In this sense, this alleged plurality-as a
I;) consequence of the historical consciousness-does not harm Christianity, but has
''.) the potential to bring forth its unity.
16
COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF THE DELAY OF JESUS' PAROUSIA 479
argues that the verbs in the Bible that have God as a subject should not be
interpreted univocally (literal sense), but analogically in partial correspondence to
the referent. In this way, the modem cosmology of evolutionary science emptied
the categories of divine deeds and speech as recorded in the Bible. 19 The challenge,
then, is to explain what the analogical reading points to, if not to achieving
equivocity (a different sense). The bottom line of Gilkey's article is that the
language of the Bible and its meaning (systematic theology) do not coalesce. They
are not univocal; hence, a theologic,al ontology, by adopting a critical ontology, has
to interpret the symbolic text in a different category.
In my evaluation, Walls, Tillich, Bonsor, and Gilkey exemplify the human
necessity of fulfilling the anxiety of rendering Christian faith intelligible.
Nonetheless, they fall short in some aspects. In regard to the translation method,
since communication assumes meaning, the communicator cannot change the
original authorial intentionality. The translator-traitor excuse cannot justify
fundamental changes in meaning. In regard to the plurality method, although
Bonsor's proposal is sensitive to and tolerant of the historical appropriation of
philosophy by theology, he mainly sustains this because it is necessary for his
community of faith based on the creeds and tradition. In his logic, he further
appoints the Catholic Church as a center for this so-called unity. In regard to the
contemporaneity method, although Gilkey's attempt to communicate meaningfully
in a scientific era should be commended, it assumes that the naturalistic cosmology

The third method ofvalidation is contemporaneity, or the adoption ofthe latest

is superior to Judea-Christian cosmologies.20 By claiming the principle ofanalogy,
1.~j system available-the newer the better. Langdon Gilkey explains the
Gilkey presupposes that there is a closed continuum in a causal system that
invalidates any kind of divine intervention. These attempts at intelligibility by way
.'I
meaningfulness of religious language as a result of the secularization of society, of analogy could be compared to putting a Band-Aid on a cancer. Their proposals
/ Kant's metaphysical embargo, and the death of God movement. Hence he
1:t,) articulates Christian faith assuming naturalism embedded in a process view of
17
reality interpreted by human experience.
tl:;'\) Gilkey's classic article "Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical
Language"18 is paradigmatically describing the crisis of biblical theology. Gilkey

13
Diogenes Allen and Eric 0. Springsted,Philosophyfor Understanding Theology (2nd
ed.; Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007). In broad terms, Allen and
Springsted argue that the pre-modem period focused its attention on metaphysics, the
modern period on epistemology, and the postmodern period on language.
1 Andrew F. Walls, The Cross-Cultural Process in Christian History: Studies in the
4
Transmission and Appropriation of Faith (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2002), 80.
" Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951-1963), 1:60; Roger E. Olson, The Journey ofModern Theology: From Reconstruction
19
to Deconstruction (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2013), 381. Ibid., 202.
1• Jack A. Bonsor,Athens andJerusalem: The Role ofPhilosophy in Theology(Eugene, 20
These ideas found their way into OT theology, as exemplified by John H. Walton,
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2003), 168-71. The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate (Downers
"Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal ofGod-Language (New York: Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 16-37. Conversely, for a defense of the Judeo-Christian
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1969); Religion and the Scientific Future: Reflections on cosmology from a scientific viewpoint, see Leonard Brand, Faith, Reason, & Earth History:
Myth, Science and Theology (London: S.C.M. Press, 1970). A Paradigm ofEarth and Biological Origins by Intelligent Design, (2d ed.; Berrien Springs,
18
Langdon Gilkey, "Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Language," MI: Andrews University Press, 2009).
Journal ofReligion 41 (July 1961 ).
 T

r)
)

ELMER A. GUZMAN COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF THE DELAY OF JESUS' PAROUSIA 481 )

480
21
are insufficient to justify the fundamental problem of the de-eschatologization of
Christianity due to J esus' d elayed parousia.
Against tills panorama in Christian theology, Fernando Canale argues that
ontological ideas assumed in Christian theology and worship have distorted its
practice and meaning, making necessary the recovery of a biblical understanding
23
of ontology.22 This hypothesis assumes that the Hebrew texts (OT and N T )
entertain philosophical notions different from their classical, modem or
4
postmodern interpretations.~ Inste~d of a~o!~ing the task by a dopting a critical
25
ontology (Gilkey) or by statmg the 1mposs1b1hty of the task (Barr), Canale, and
21 The term de-eschatologization is used by Mitchell meaning the loss of the dimension
of the kingdom of God when the church became conflated with the empire, which is an
example of over-realized eschatology (Roger Haydon Mitchell, Church, Gospel, and
Empire: How the !'olitics ofSovereignty Impregnated t~e w_est [Eug~ne_, OR: Wipf & Stock,
2011), 55). Martm Werner expands on de-eschatologization and its impact on doctrines
(Martin Werner, The Formation of Christi~n Dogma: An Historical Study of its Problem
[New York: Harper, 1957], 269-296). Forh1m, the concept means the loss of imminence of
the eschaton (p. 269). For a critique of Werner's work, see Jaroslav Pelikan, Historical
Theology: Continuity and Change in Christian Doctrine (New York: Corpus), 73 ff. I use the
term de-eschatologization as the eclipses of the apocalyptic vision registered in Scriptures
concerning the imminent expectation for divine intervention in final salvation, judgment,
vindication, and deliverance. For a warning against this concept targeted to Seventh-day
Adventism, see George R. Knight, The Apocalyptic Vision and the Neutering ofAdventism
(Hagerstown, MD: Re~ew and Herald, 20?8):
22 This attempt 1s not only a reJectton of Greek metaphysics, but also the
acknowledgement for the possibility of metaphysics (contra the early Wittgenstein and
others who argue that metaphysics is impossible). Kevin J. Vanhoozer describes this as an
attempt to "reform metaphysics along biblical lines"; see Remythologizing Theology: Divine
Action, Passion, and Authorship, Cambridge Studies in Christian Doctrine (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 20 I 0), 9.
" J categorize the NT as a Hebrew text even though it is written in Greek. Hence
Hebrew signifies not only the language but the rational framework.
24 Other contemporary examples of scholars who attempt to look for the fundamental
ideas of Scripture: Y oram Hazony, The Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture: An Introduction
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jaco Gericke, The Hebrew Bible and
Philosophy ofReligion, Society ofBiblical Literature Resources for Biblical Study (Atlanta:
Society of Biblical Literature, 2012).
25 James Barr's invalidation of word study for obtaining meaning constitutes another
challenge for this attempt. He argues that meaning resides at the level of sentences. See
James Barr, The Semantics ofBiblical Language (London: Oxford University Press, 1961),
263ff. Also, for an interesting analysis of Barr and Kittel, see Carlos Alfredo Steger, James
Barr and Some Aspects of the Semantics of Biblical Language (Berrien Springs, MI:
SDATS, 1989). Hence, any kind of word study for achieving significance and theology is
/' missing the mark. See James Barr, Biblical Words for Time, Studies in Biblical Theology
t1 (Naperville, IL: A. R. Allenson, 1962). Yet, Hazony argues that if meaning is not found in
the word itself but only in the sentence, then one inevitably will import into the texts his or
her cultural prejudices. Hence the importance of word, literary, structural analyses (Hazony,
Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, 3 34, footnote I).
)
more recently Yoram Hazony,26 argue that philosophical qualities ofthe text can be
extracted from the narrative and other literary qual ities: namely, the assumed
realities which the text claims as a mode ofmetaphysics,27 ethics,28 and aesthetics. 29
)
Because Jesus' Parousia Was Delayed, the Church )
Had to Justify His Absence and Try to Actualize
His Presence Through Worship
At this stage, I will describe how the church reacted to Jesus' absence by
attempting to actualize the divine presence through the doctrines of the E ucharist
J
and divine omnipresence. )
First, the church attempted to actualize Jesus' presence, as noted in the debate
30
on the Eucharistic rituals. Although a majority ofChristian denominations practice
)
1
the rite of the Lord's Supper,3 the meaning of the presence of Christ is disputed
)
regarding the literalness of the words of Christ: ''This is m y body" and ''This is my
32
)
blood." There have been attempts at convergence among denominations, as noted
by the World Council of Churches document Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry, yet
J
26
Hazony argues that the field of biblical studies is saturated with philology,
compositional history, and literary character ofthe text, while "the ideas that find expression )
in the Bible-the metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and political philosophy ofthe biblical
authors- have a ll too often eluded the interest of academic scholars of Bible" (Hazony, J
Philosophy of Hebrew Scripture, 19). For this task, Hazony emphasizes the narrative _)
sequence of nine works- Genesis to the book of Kings (Ibid., 22 and chapter I).
27
Fernando Canale argues that both "biblical and systematic theologies need to
interpret the same issues as philosophy interprets (i.e., God, human nature, reality, reason)."
Yet, partly following Claude Tresmontant's attempt toward a biblical metaphysics, he says )
"the Bible speaks to philosophical issues in a way that radically departs from traditional
philosophical interpretations" (Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching/or the Cognitive
Foundation ofChristian Theology in a Postmodern World (New York: University Press of
America, 2001), 55-56). A lso see Shalom Carrny and David Shatz, "The Bible as a Source
for Philosophical Reflection," in History of Jewish Philosophy, ed. Daniel H. Frank and
Oliver Leaman (New York: Routledge, 1997), 13-37.
28
John Barton, Understanding Old Testament Ethics: Approaches and Explorations
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003); Waldemar Janzen, Old Testament
Ethics:2
A Paradigmatic Approach (Louisville, KY: Westminster, 1994).
• Jo Ann Davidson, Toward a Theology ofBeauty: A Biblical Perspective (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 2008).
30
In early Christian thought, the Christian liturgy was a celebration of the presence of
the living C hrist. See Robert Louis Wilken, The Spirit ofEarly Christian Thought: Seeking
the Face of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 31.
31
Exceptions are Salvation Army and Quakers.
32
Cf. Matt 26:26, 28. For a biblical interpretation ofthe Lord's supper and its symbols
in the canon, see Ronald P. Byars, The Sacraments in Biblical Perspective. Interpretation,
Resources for the Use of Scripture in the Church (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox
Press, 201 I). For a helpful overview of the old debate, see Leonard J. Vander Zee, Christ, )
Baptism, and the Lord's Supper: Recovering the Sacraments for Evangelical Worship
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004).

j
Ir
 )
)
) ELMER A. GUZMAN
482
differences remain.33 Nonetheless, I suspect that the churches that adopted
) sacramentalism emphasized the mandate of the Lord's Supper in order to
mechanically actualize the presence of Jesus. This sacrament gained importance
) and centrality as the Second Coming ofJesus was delayed with the passing of time.·
) Second, the church attempted to actualize divine presence by means of the
predication of omnipresence to the divine essence. Classical theology had to
) miti'gate Jesus' delayed return through the divine attributes of perfection and
simplicity.34 Gerald O'Collins asserts that despite the language of divine absence
)
in Scripture, God is never absent because he is, a priori, omnipresent, due to his
nature.35 This mentality is imported into models of spirituality as seen in Dallas
Willard's Divine Conspiracy. 36 He argues that God is always near us because ofhis
) omnipresence, divine perfection, and simplicity. Willard attempts to re-vision God
) and his world. He argues that God is omnipresent and so the world is "God-bathed
and God-permeated."37 Willard equates the divine presence with heaven, and since
the first heaven is the atmosphere we inhabit, God involves us as air, the
' ) surrounding space.38 Then, he offers a catena of biblical texts emphasizing the
,, divine presence invading human space. He asserts that "God relates to space as we
i\ ) do to our body."39 The difference is that God cannot be localized, for he is
,; ) everywhere.
In my evaluation, both O'Collins and Willard assume the divine perfect God
' '\ of classical theism a priori, neglecting the manifold language of movement
li _)
assumed by the relational God of Scripture. In Aristotelian physics, movement
, j assumes potentiality, and not perfection. Innumerable examples support this
l, locative nature of divine presence.40 At this stage, I will tum to some biblical
~,)
,,.!
l~ "\
1J
World Council ofChurches,Baptism, Eucharist, and Ministry, Faith and Order Paper
,) 33
1,, (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982).
The concepts of perfection, simplicity and omnipresence are related in classical
·~.) 34
theism. If God is simple be does not have parts. Ifhe has parts he can move and change, or
have potentiality to become what he is not. Otherwise, if he is perfect he does not have
1)
,, potentiality, but is pure actuality (Aquinas). So, the concept of omnipresence means that he
) cannot move, or be surprised by knowledge that he does not have, because he is already
everywhere, knowing everything. This is a caricature of the perfect God ofclassical theism
~'.>
I evidently there are nuances.
""The witness of the Sacred Scriptures to God's self-revelation divulges a remarkable'
~,.? ensemble ofreligious experiences, both individual and collective. The leading protagonists
of biblical history experienced many presences, some silences, and no absences of God.
,) They told their story of God out of what they bad lived through, understood, and
interpreted." Gerald O'Collins, Rethinking Fundamental Theology: Toward a New
Fundamental Theology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 35-36.
Dallas Willard, The Divine Conspiracy: Rediscovering Our Hidden Life in God (San
36
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1998), 61-76.
" Ibid., 61.
38 Ibid., 67-68.
39 Ibid., 76 (Italics his).
• 0 See some examples below.
COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF THE DELAY OF JESUS' PAROUSIA 483
examples attesting divine horizontal and vertical movement that can deconstruct the
assumption ofO'Collins and Willard.
Divine horizontal movement is seen in God's walking in the garden. 41 The
principle of movement is meaningful. The LXX text says they (Adam and Eve)
heard the sound or voice (ten phonen) of the Lord God walking in the paradise
(paradeiso). The participle ofperipateo is genitive absolute, which means that the
force of the verb is secondary to the main verb, namely, the fact that they "heard."
The counterpart ofperipateo in the MT refers to a participle in hitpa'el in iterative
sense: "he was moving about" (NET). Both meanings attest one thing: God moved,
and as he moved, "they heard" his sound/voice. Some call the fact that God walks
an anthropomorphism, 42 but one should acknowledge that the Bible uses physical
terms for divine characteristics and actions, and that the interpreter should not assert
a metaphorical or analogical reading too fast. 43 Gordon J. Wenham observes that
the term walking (hitpa'el participle hiilak) is used ofdivine presence in the Israelite
tent sanctuary.44 The divine presence in the garden and in the tent sanctuary is
depicted as a horizontally movable presence in the realm ofgeographical extension.
Also, there is some theological tendenz in the LXX reading of the MT. The
LXX reads "in the paradise,"45 instead of"in the garden." Hence interpreting the
locative dative and explicitly changing the noun. This change might be justified as
an attempt at abstraction of the physicality of the environment assumed by Greek
ontology, as "a transcendent place of blessedness. " 46
Finally, they hide from the presence of the Lord God. Presence, in the text, is
rendered literally as "his face" (apo prosopoulmfpeney). Adam and Eve went into
the midst of the trees, assuming that God was not there.
God moves by walking horizontally in geographical extension, and he does this
movement in a place, called a garden (MT), which was later abstracted as paradise
41
Gen 3:8: "They heard the sound of the Lord God walking in the garden at the time
of the evening breeze, and the man and his wife hid themselves from the presence of the
Lord God among the trees of the garden." Besides God's walking in the Garden, other
biblical texts support this, such as Lev 26: 12 and Deut 23: 14.
42
K. A. Mathews, Genesis 1-11:26, vol. IA, The New American Commentary
(Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1996), 239.
43
Canale points out that the analogical sense (analogia entis) should reject the classical
interpretation of entis as timeless toward a temporal view of entis. He asserts: "the
analogical procedure as such is not to be dismissed but rather to stand in need of being
reinterpreted within the context provided by the temporal primordial presupposition of
Biblical rationality'' (Fernando Canale, A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and
Timelessnessas Primordial Presuppositions [Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press,
1987], 362). Richard M. Davidson, "Biblical Anthropology and the Old Testament" (paper
presented at the Third International Bible Conference, 2012).
44
Cf. Lev 26:12; Deut 23:15 [14]; 2 Sam 7:6-7. Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 1-15,
vol. 1, Word Biblical Commentary (Dallas: Word, Incorporated, 1998), 76.
45
baggiin= en to paradeiso. It should be noted that there is a tendency in Hellenized
Judaism to avoid anthropomorphisms in order to present Hebrew thinking respectfully to its
Hellenized audience.
46
"paradeisos," BDAG 761. Cf. Gen 13:10, Luke 23:43.

ELMER A . GUZMAN
484
(LXX). Man can go away from the presence of God, implying that God is not there
or at least implying that his presence or face functions more as a relational element'
47
instead ofa locative element. ' one denies any lmowledge of divine being, the consequence will be the ad option of
A second group of examples, conceming divine vertical movem ent, is found
in the Tower of B ab el narrative. The Lord came down to see the city and the
tower. 48 A similar movement up and down is found when God evaluates the sins of
Sodom and Gomorrah .49 Also, the directionality of burnt offerings emphasizes
50 this
movement. The word used for a burnt offering simply means "to ascend." God
smells the offering from heaven, by m~~s of ~ e smoke that goes up; the
directionality of the offering points to a d1vme location. Yet, God also makes his
presence or name known on earth. These examples affirm the dynamic of God
corning down for judgment and worship.
The con cept of movement described in the Scriptures challenges divin~
perfection of classical theism .51 God himself, his being and presence is the one who
moves. This language is neither allegorical, nor analogically timeless, but
analogically temporal.52 If God moves, then he changes position. Thus, h e is not
one, total, perfect, as parmenides defined the total!ty ?fbeing. Some have attempted
to reject completely divine nature-essence-ousza m order to emphasize divine
54
identity;53 others argue for divine relationality. Nonetheless, following Canale,ss
Scripture describes divine acts and speech; however, one should not a priori decides
47
what is the nature of such descriptions. Evidently God is not a man that he may walk yet
it says that God walks. To say that it is a metaphorical non-literal walk does not mean'that
is not real. Even if this wa\~ng is_ metap?orical, the_tenor of th~ meta~hor of approaching
and separation reflects relat1onahty, while the vehicle of the image 1s the fact that God
walks. For the concepts of vehicle and te~or o_f a metaphor, see I. A. Richards, The
Philosophy of Rhetoric (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 90-96.
Gen 11 :5: "Come, Jet us go down, and confuse their language there, so that they will
48
not understand one another's speech." Cf. Exod 3:8.
Gen 18:21: " I must go down and see whether they have done altogether according
49
to the outcry that has come to me; and if not, I will know."
so The etymology of burnt-offering is similar to the verb to ascend, and means a tribute
rising (in the fire). "oliih," HALOT, 830.
st
Contrary to the God depicted by O'Collins and Willard, God moves and is not a
priori everywhere omnipresent. God not only walks and goes up and down, but other
instruments of his presence are movable as well: his throne has tires and his tabernacle is
movable (Ezek 1:22-28).Neil B. MacDonald argues that divine spatiality corresponds to the
witnesses of Scripture in contrast to the apophatic conception of infinity (space) and eternal
timelessness (time). He further argues that the testimony ofScripture is more consistent with
a local God than an omnipresent God. See Neil B. MacDonald, Metaphysics and the God
ofIsrael: Systematic Theology ofthe Old and New Testaments (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
2006), 96.
This will be further de~~l_ope~ by Peckham, "Divine Passibility, Analogical,
52
Temporality, and Theo-Ontology, m this volume.
ll Richard Bauckham, God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New
Testament, Didsbury Lectures (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 6-7; Kevin J.
Vanhoozer, "Does the Trinity Belong in a Theology of Religions? On Angling in the
)
)
)
COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF THE DELAY OF JESUS ' PAROUSIA 485
)
access to divine being should be granted via Scriptures, and this is only possible
through the God-man relationship which Gulley describes as covenantal )
relationality. This means, what he is is accessed by means of how he relates. For if
the divine b eing assumed by tradition.
In this section, I described two attempts used to control the actualization of
)
Jesus' presence: the Eucharist and omnipresence. The first attemp t tried to
manipulate God by ritual ( ex opere operato), while the second attempted to mitigate
the d elay of the parousia by essentialism predicating a priori that God is already
here due to his omnipresence. Nonetheless, both attempts are insufficient due to a )
distorted notion of divine being. These attempts failed to interpret the being- )
actions-relations of God from the Scriptures themselves. Instead, they assumed the
contours of divine being from classical theology influenced by critical ontology. )
)
Because Jesus' Parousia Was Delayed, the Church
Had to Reshape Its Understanding of Language )
About God in His Relation to Humanity
The disciples of Jesus related to a real p erson. They addressed, talked, and
listened to him. The Hebrew writers addressed God with the proper name YHWH,
among other vocative descrip tions, such as Father(' Abba'), Master('Adonai '), and
Husband (in Proverbs and Hosea), in covenantal-relational terms. Yet the ascension
of Jesus produced a drastic epistemological and existential anxiety concerning the
)
mode ofrelation to this empirical absent God. Consequently, instead ofrelating to
him, they attempted to obtain lmowledge about his essence.56
Theology is reasoning about God. 57 Norman Gulley argues that th eological
science begins either with the Bible, with God, or with bo th.58 This is a dogmatic
)
Rubicon and the 'Identity' of God," in The Trinity in a Pluralistic Age, ed. Kevin J.
Vanhoozer (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 41-7 1. )
54
Norman Gulley argues that whereas classical theology tends to define God's nature
using apophatic language (timeless, immutable, infinite, etc.), the Scriptures present the
person of God as moving for the sake of his covenant. His major thesis is that God is
relational (Norman R. Gulley, Sytematic Theology [Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews
University Press] 2: 130). He says that ''the love of the biblical God is manifested in all of
His attributes" (Ibid., 2:271) and further describes his own system: "It can be argued that my
system is a qualified Arminian paradigm (issuing from a relational Trinity and not from a
timeless God, as did the view of Arminius" (Ibid., 2:550).
" Canale, Criticism ofTheological Reason, 352-364.
56
The ecumenical councils testify to the disputes concerning the nature of God and the
Trinity. They were more concerned about the nature of Christ than his relation to
humankind. Cf. John H. Leith, Creeds ofthe Churches: A Reader in Christian Doctrinef rom
the Bible to the Present, !st ed. (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963).
57
Olson puts it this way: "A person cannot serve God faithfully without knowing
something about God's nature and will." (Roger E. Olson, The Story ofChristian Theology:
Twenty Centuries of Tradition & Reform [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999),
16).
58
Gulley, Sytematic Theology, I : 145.
 ]
)
)
) ELMER A. GUZMAN
486 -~
task done by particular people in a particular setting. Gunton argues that "it is
) subordinated to an eschatologically oriented attempt to enable language to
correspond to reality, God's reality."59 For Gunton, systematic theology is
) eschatology because only there will God's knowledge be fully realized. John
) Webster also argues that the object matter of systematic theology is "God and all
things in God."60 I would put it this way: God and all things in relation to God.
) Theologians and church members addressed God in many ways: (1) 61some
attempted to talk about God with positive onto-theological language, (2)
) conversely, some used negative language, by means of negation of divine limits
(e.g., timeless, infinite), (3) some considered God above any conceptuality
62
or
beyond being, avoiding any kind ofmetaphysical captivity (e.g., Marion ), and (4)
) others avoided metaphysics by establishing its impossibility, so god-talk became
without any correspondence with reality, similar to a language game (e.g., Kevin
) 64
Hector63 and Jaco Gericke ).
) More recently, one of the fathers of postliberalism, Yale theologian George
Lindbeck, also attempted to articulate the meaningfulness of Christian claims as
) avoiding conservatism (cognitive-propositional theory) and liberalism (experiential-
) expressive theory) by interpreting the Christian faith through a cultural-linguistic
theory. He argued that doctrines are the grammar of faith, and do not make their
) claims necessarily true; their claims are valid intrasystematic, instead of
.) extrasystematic--correspondence to factuality. So, the meaningfulness of truth
claims would make sense only inside the community of faith because they cannot
) be verified (e.g., creation, resurrection, miracles). Lindbeck evaluates that the
linguistic-cultural approach cancels the referent ofthat which is spoken about in the
)
) 59
Colin E. Gunton, "A Rose by Any Other Name? From 'Christian Doctrine' to
'Systematic Theology,"' International Journal ofSystematic Theology 1, no. 1 ( J 999): 21.
) John Webster, "Principles of Systematic Theology," International Journal of
60
) Systematic Theology 11, no. l (2009).
61
Hence, God became the highest being among beings. The problem is the danger of
) idolatry when one projects _itselfupon this highest being, as the famous critique of Ludwig
Feuerbach indicates, where theology becomes anthropology. See Ludwig Feuerbach, The
) Essence ofChristianity (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004).
62
Marion claims that the entire project ofreligion as is now under suspicion of being
) idolatry. By claiming that God does not have a being, Marion attempts to reshape the
metaphysical conceptualization of God in a postmodern age. Marion releases God from the
j ontological category described by Thomas Aquinas as proper to God, and later described as
onto-theology. Marion clarifies that God without a Being doesn't mean that he is not; on the
) contrary, "God is, exists." (Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being: Hors-Texte, Religion and
Postmodemism [_Chi~ago: Univer~ityofChicago ~ress, 1991], xix). ~owever, the priority
;;) of divine revelat10n 1s not found Ill the metaphysical category ofbemg (presence), but in
i)
r'
divine Jove that precedes being (the present, meaning gift, that which is given). Hence the
differentiation between God and humans.
')
" Kevin Hector attempts a therapeutic metaphysics. See Kevin Hector, Theology
~f'
,') without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition, Current Issues in
Theology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
!) 64 Gericke, Hebrew Bible.
li
,?
COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF THE DELAY OF JESUS' PAROUSIA 487
real world. Hence Lindbeck's model goes against epistemological realism by
denying the ontological truth claim of the text. The first-order truth claims are no
longer necessary, but intrasystematic, validated by inner coherence. Consequently,
doctrinal claims are second-order propositions with no necessary correspondence
with reality outside language. 65
In my evaluation, talk about God is inevitable even after Kant's metaphysical
embargo. People continue to speak meaningfully about God because people attend
church. The postmodern turn-into-language is simply not enough to sustain the
claims that Christian faith demands.66 This becomes clear when Jaco Gericke
describes the philosophy and ontology of the Hebrew Bible as '"subconscious'
levels of ancient Yahwism(s)."67
Although these proposals by Lindbeck, Hector, and Gericke are coherent, they
simply are not enough for the claims necessary to sustain the Christian faith and the
life of worship and mission of the church.68 If the claims are only internally valid,
how does one justify the church's. mission to carry the message with its truth-claims
to the world (those outside the community of faith)? How can one teach creationist
sciences in Christian schools? What is the meaningfulness of Christianity in the
public square?
If only a description is attempted, if only an internal coherence is sought,
Christianity's project becomes subjectively sentimental,69 or merely ethical
monotheism as in the social gospel; ultimately Christian belief and claims may not
be warranted as true, because their expansion depends on the truth-claims being
validated on the factual level ofreality.
65
George A. Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal
Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984). For a conservative response to Lindbeck's
proposal see Alister E. McGrath, The Genesis ofDoctrine: A Study in the Foundations of
Doctrinal Criticism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). For the modification ofLindbeck's proposal
from linguistic conditioning toward a canonical conditioning, see Kevin J. Vanhoozer, The
Drama of Doctrine: A Canonical-Linguistic Approach to Christian Theology (Louisville,
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2005).
" Livingston and Fiorenza describe the 1960s as a time when the theological giants
were dead. They say, "They are, at once, more varied, less grandiose in their visions and
claims, more tolerant of religious diversity, but also, and perhaps paradoxically, less
expectant but more hopeful." See James C. Livingston and Francis Schussler Fiorenza,
Modern Christian Thought (rev. ed.; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2006), 527.
Disappointment with the wars of the 20th century made theologians speak in a lower tone.
67
Gericke, Hebrew Bible, 205,227, 256.
68
Namely, the church which is faithful to its biblical message and mission, and not a
caricatured interpretation of the church as shaped by cultural accepted guidelines. If the
claims of the church are only internally valid, the public religious discourse becomes
endangered.
69
Schleierrnacher describes this as a "feeling of absolute dependence" (Friedrich
Schleierrnacher, The Christian Faith [New York: Harper & Row, 1963], Proposition 16).

488 ELMER A. G UZMAN
Because Jesus' Parousia Was Delayed, the Church
Either Accommodates Its Frustration or Hopes
fo r the Future Return of the Son of God
After surveying the many options for the de-eschatologization of Christianity,
starting with the adoption of variegated Platonism70 and followed by the adoption
of a catena of critical ontologies, it is apparent that the basic logic of these
proposals does not solve the delay ofthe parousia, but only functions as a palliative
to diminish anxiety about the unfulfilled promise made by Jesus concerning his
return. More recently, faith and the truth-claims of Scripture have.been considered
valid only in the private or ecclesiastical domain. The logic for this state of
affairs-although coherent with the latest scientific establishment of
knowledge--does not aid in the solution of the basic problem: the actualization of
the eschaton.
The logic goes as follows: (1) the church adopted critical ontology because of
Jesus' delayed parousia, (2) Jesus' delayed parousia can be actualized if, and only
if, the church goes out into all the world with the message, (3) but the critical
ontology makes the church's claim valid only inside the community of faith; (4)
thus, the church does not claim anything meaningful in the world, and does not
accomplish the necessary condition for Jesus' parousia.
Although the adoption of critical ontologies neutralizes religion in the public
square (mission),71 it does not affect the state of affairs inside the walls of the
church and its language (worship)-for the message can be intrasystematic true,
following the description of doctrine as the grammar of faith (Lindbeck). In fact,
70
Since Jesus did not return, Augustine and other apologists had to spiritualize God.
Wilken explains Augustine's move: "In like manner, the early apologists drew on Greek
ideas of God to explain and interpret God's otherness and ineffability. They introduced
nonbiblical terms, for example, immutability and unoriginate, to express the biblical view
that God is without beginning and eternal. When Saint Augustine read the books of the
Neoplatonists, they helped him think his way through to a spiritual understanding of God.
Unable to conceive of God.except in substantive categories, that is, as something like that
which the eye could perceive, he imagined a thin, ethereal substance that was diffused
throughout the world. It was taken as self-evident that if something does not occupy space
it is nonexistent. By studying the writings ofthe Neoplatonists he found the conceptual tools
to think of God as spiritual, always and everywhere at the same time, 'Deus totus ubique
simul,' as the axiom went" (Wilken, Spirit ofEarly Christian Thought, 319). Whitehead uses
a different reasoning and argues that Christianity adopted Platonism due to its enthusiasm
and impracticable moral ideals (Whitehead, Adventure ofIdeas, 15). Christian moral ideals
were possible only within an "interim ethics" of apocalyptic belief (p. 16). The underlying
assumption ofWhitehead's argument is that humanity is progressing from a primitive Jewish
eschatological state toward a developed situation. Whitehead is correct in his evaluation of
Christian ethics as tinctured by apocalyptic beliefs. Once the apocalyptic belief diminished
in intensity, it became necessary to reinterpret Christian ethics for the sake of Christianity's
survival through institutionalization, which became organic to the political Roman
environment.
71
Knight, Apocalyptic Vision .
)
COLLATERALEFFECTSOFTHEDELAYOF JESUS' PAROUSIA 489 )
)
the state of affairs of the church embargoed by scientific critical ontologies limits
the mission, so the church turns its attention to worship.72 )
Nonetheless, the language of worship in history has proved at times to be
deceiving when functioning as a tiebreaker for doctrinal issues. 73 Church history
attests that doctrinal debates were often decided not based on revelation, but on
liturgical practices validated by time and usage. 74
As a result of the de-eschatologization of Christianity, the adoption ofcritical
ontologies became necessary for epistemological and existential anxiety
management in the church, yet this did not solve the problem- Chtist is still not
here. Hence the Seventh-day Adventist apocalyptic message not only calls for a )
return to biblical church teachings, but also calls for a biblical re-eschatologizing
of Christianity. This orientation will avoid the adoption of critical ontologies that
has occurred in the Christian tradition.75 )
Conclusion
I have argued that the Chtistian church adopted critical ontologies- starting
with variegated Neoplatonism-because Jesus' parousia was delayed and they had
to make the truth-claims of the Scriptures intelligible. They attempted to fill the
void left by the delay of the parousia by controlling the actualization the divine
presence through worship/Eucharist and omnipresence. Because the church filled
the absence of Jesus by actualizing his presence, the mission ofthe Church became
secondary, while worship primary.
This primacy of worship became even more emphatic after Kant's )
metaphysical embargo, which caused the language of faith to become meaningless
72
Olson comments that for Lindbeck, "doctrines are not the essence of religion;
narrative and worship are" (Olson, Journey ofModern Theology, 663).
73
E.g., the status of Mary in Theotokos and the changing from Sabbath to Sunday.
74
Protestant theologian Geoffrey Wainwright claims that although liturgy and
devotional practices lead the development of doctrine in Catholicism, Protestantism tries to
bring both worship and dogma closer to Scripture. His book could be called Lex orandi, Lex
credenda- the rule of prayer- for his val idation ofthe influence ofworship into doctrines
(Geoffrey Wainwright, Doxology: The Praise of God in Worship, Doctrine, and Life: A
Systematic Theology [New York: Oxford University Press, 1980], 7). He further says, "The
liturgy is the pre-eminent place in which the Church ponders and applies the scriptures: it
thus contributes creatively to the development of doctrine" (Ibid., 16 1). By this he means
the liturgy serves as the control of the doctrinal development.
Jaroslav Pelikan repeats this principle many times throughout his five-volume work The
Christian Tradition. He says that whenever there is no systematic development on an issue
of faith, the language ofworship precedes the language of faith. He closes his fifth volume j
by pointing out that the ecumenical spirit of Christianity, after Council Vatican II, should
)
reappropriate the centrality ofworship as the "rule ofprayer' in ecumenical times. The "rule
ofprayer" emphasized by Wainwright and Pelikan points out that liturgy is one active force )
forging doctrine (Jaroslav Jan Pelikan, The Christian Tradition, 1:339, 5:294, 5:335.)
" Fernando Canale, "The Message and Mission of the Remnant: A Methodological )
Approach," in Message, Mission and Unity ofthe Church (ed. Angel Manuel Rodriguez;
Silver Spring, MD: BRI, 2013), 261- 86.
' J
.)
 T
)
)
)
) 490 ELMER A. GUZMAN Selected Bibliography of
) outside its community. Again: (1) the church adopted critical ontology because of Fernando Canale's Works
Jesus' delayed parousia, (2) Jesus' delayed parousia can be actualized if, and only
) if, the church goes out into all the world with the message,76 (3) but the critical
) ontology makes the church's claim valid only inside the community of faith, (4)
thus, the church does not claim anything meaningful in the world, and does not BOOKS
) accomplish the necessary condition for Jesus' parousia. This logic primarily
) affected mission (the meaning of faith outside the community) rather than worship
(the meaning of faith inside the community).
Secular Adventism? Exploring the Link Between Lifestyle and
) The meaningfulness of the Seventh-day Adventist orientation is the re- Salvation. (Lima, Peru: Peruvian Union University, 2013).
eschatologization ofChristianity. Recognition ofthe void ofthe parousia makes the
adoption of human conceived ontologies unnecessary. Jesus is not here, but is Adventismo Secular? Como Entender la Relacion Entre Estilo de Vida
coming. He is in his sanctuary. The acknowledgement of this void launches the y Salvacion. (Lima: Universidad Peruana Union, 2012).
\
possibility of a biblical ontology. This re-eschatologization will sustain the mission
j because it is inherent to the actualization of the parousia. It also will sustain Creation, Evolution and Theology; an Introduction to the Scientific
worship as the anticipation of the parousia.77 In fact, this re-eschatologization will
and Theological Method. (Libertador San Martin: Editorial Universidad
turn these anxieties into hope for human life and the future.
) Adventista del Plata, 2009).
Elmer A. Guzman, a native from Brazil, earned degrees in theology and journalism. He is
currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Theological Studies and New Testament at the Seventh-day Creacion, Evolucion y Teologia: Una Introduccion a Los Metodos
) Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University. He is married to Hanny, and the Cientifico y Teologico. Translated by Claudia Blath. (Libertador San
couple has a daughter, Victoria.
Martin: Editorial Universidad Adventista del Plata, 2009).
)
J Criar;ao, Evolur;ao e Teologia: Uma Introdur;ao aos Metodos
) Cientifico e Teologico. (Engenheiro Coelho, SP: Unaspress, 2014).

) Creation, Evolution, and Theology: The Role ofMethod in

) Theological Accommodation (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Lithotech, 2005).
)
) Basic Elements of Christian Theology: Scripture Replacing Tradition
) (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithotech, 2005).

) The Cognitive Principle of Christian Theology: A Hermeneutical

) Study of the Revelation and Inspiration ofScripture (Berrien Springs,
MI: Andrews University Lithotech, 2005).
)
) 0 Principia Cognitivo da Teologia Crista. (Engenheiro Coelho, SP:
Unaspress, 2011).
)
) Back to Revelation, Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive
76
Matt 24:14.
) 77 Thanks to Tiago Arrais, who pointed out that this anticipation is found weekly in the
Foundations of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World, (Lanham,
Sabbath ( cf., Heb 4: 1ff), and for the idea that worship is the anticipation of the parousia. MD: University Press of America, 2001).
)
)

492 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS
A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as
Primordial Presuppositions, (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Press, 1987).
REFEREED JOURNAL ARTICLES
"End Time and Salvation," Perspective Digest 18, no. 3 (2013).
"On Being the Remnant," Journal of the Adventist Theological
Society 24, no. 1 (2013): 127-1 74.
"The Emerging Church-Part 4: Levels of Change," Journal of the
Adventist Theological Society 23, no. 2 (2013): 161-189.
"Principios de Adoraci6n y Liturgia," Evangelia 6 (2013): 21-45.
"De la Vision al Sistema: Terminando la Tarea de la Teologia
Adventista, Parte 1: Resumen Hist6rico." Theologika 28, no. 1 (2013):
48-119.
"Sola Scriptura and Hermeneutics: Toward a Critical Assessment of
the Methodological Ground of the Protestant Reformation." Andrews
University Seminary Studies 50, no. 2 (2012): 179-205.
"Ministerio y Estilo de Vida." Theologika 27, no. 1 (2012): 86-132.
"The Emerging Church." Perspective Digest 17, no. 2 (2012).
"The Emerging Church- Part 3: Evangelical Evaluations." Journal of
the Adventist Theological Society 23, no. 1 (2012): 44-73.
"Principios de Adoraci6n." Revista SAIT (Sociedad Adventista de
Investigaciones Teol6gicas) 1, no. 1 (October 2011): 1-1 9.
"Sola Scriptura y la Herrneneutica: l Son la Teologia Evangelica y la
Adventista Compatibles?" DavarLogos X, no. 1 (October 2011):
107-139.
)
)
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS 493
)
"On Being the Emerging Remnant: The Claim." Adventus 21 (2011):
66-75. )
"Estilo de Vida y Salvaci6n." Theologika 26, no. 2 (2011): 200-249.
)
" lPor Que los Adventistas del Septimo Dia Estan Adoptando los )
Estilos de V ida Seculares?" Theologika 26, no. 1 (201 1): 84-136.
"Principles of Worship and Liturgy." Perspective Digest 16, no. 1
(201 1).
.)
"The Emerging Church Part 2: Epistemology, Theology, and
Ministry." Journal ofthe Adventist Theological Society 22, no. 2 (2011):
67-105.
"The Emerging Church Part 1: Historical Background." Journal ofthe )
Adventist Theological Society, vol. 22, no. 1 (2011): 84-101.
"Epistemologia Biblica para la Investigaci6n Adventista? Una
Propuesta de Trabajo." Apuntes Universitarios 1, no. 1 (2011): 119-141. .J
"The Eclipse of Scripture and the Protestantization of the Adventist
Mind: Part 2: From the Evangelical Gospel to Culture," Journal ofthe
Adventist Theological Society 22, no. 1 (2011): 102-133. j
)
"The Eclipse of Scripture and the Protestantization of the Adventist
Mind: Part 1: The Assumed Compatibility of Adventism with
Evangelical Theology and Ministerial Practices," Journal of the
Adventist Theological Society 21, no. 1-2 (2010): 133-165.
"Principles of Worship and Liturgy." Journal of the Adventist
Theological Society 20, nos. 1 & 2 (2009): 89-112.
"Holiness and Ministry." Ministry (May, 2009), 12-14.
"On the Future of Adventism: Reason or Debate," Andrews University
Seminary Studies 46, no. 2 (2008): 2 15-227.
"The Revelation and Inspiration of Scripture in Adventist Theology
J
..J
 7
~
)
)
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS 495
) 494
------------------
Part l," Andrews University Seminary Studies 45, no. 2 (2007): 195-219. Evolution," Andrews University Seminary Studies 41, no. 2 (2003):
) 65-100.
", "Completando la Teologia Adve~ti,~ta II: El Proyecto Teol6gico
_j
Adventista y su Impacto en la Iglesia. DavarLogos 6, no. 2 (2007): "Evolution, Theology, and Method Part 1: Outline and Limits of
} Scientific Methodology,"Andrews University Seminary Studies 41, no. 1
127-141. (2003): 65-100.
)
"Completando la Teologia Adventista I: La Tarea Teol6gica en la
) Vida de la Iglesia Parte I" DavarLogos 6, no. 1 (2007): 55-68. "Escatologia, Teologia y el Destina del Adventismo," Perspectivas
) Teol6gicas 2, no. 1 (2002), 76-90.
"Absolute Theological Truth in Postmodern Times," Andrews
) University Seminary Studies 45, no.1 (2007): 87-100. "Deconstrucci6n y Teologia: Una Propuesta Metodol6gica,"
) DavarLogos l, no. 1 (2002), 3-26.
"From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology
Part ID Sanctuary and Hermeneutics," Journal of the Adventist "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology? In Search of a
) Theological Society 17, no. 2 (2006): 36-80. Working Proposal." Neue Zeitschriftfiir Systematische Theologie und
) Religionsphilosophie 43, no. 4 (Fall 2001), 366-389.
"Deconstructing Evangelical Theology?" Andrews University
) Seminary Studies, 44, no. 1 (2006): 95-130. "Theological Worldview and its Impact on the Seventh-day Adventist
) Church," Issues in Theology and Spiritual Leadership 3 (2001): 41-65.
"From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist Biblical and
J Systematic Theologies-Part II," Journal of the Adventist Theological "Is There Room for Systematics in Adventist Theology," Journal of
) Society 16, nos. 1-2 (2005): 114-142. the Adventist Theological Society 12, no. 2 (Fall 2001), 110-131.

"The Quest for the Biblical Ontological Ground of Christian "Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical
j Theology," Journal of The Adventist Theological Society 16, nos. 1-2 Understanding of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology,"
j Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 12, no. 2 (Fall 2001),
(2005): 1-20.
16-34.
"Adventist Theology and Deep Time/Evolutionary Theory: Are they
) Compatible? ,"Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 15, no. 2 "Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical
(2005): 93-103. Understanding of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology?"
Enfoques XVI (1): 47-70. Peer reviewed and reprinted by permission of
) "From Vision to System: Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology JATS.
) Part I: Historical Review" Journal of the Adventist Theological Society
15, no. 2 (2005): 5-3 9 - "Interpretando Ideas Expresadas en Textos: El Metodo Filos6fico de
) Investigaci6n en las Ciencias humanas," Enfoques 12, no. 2 (2000):
) "Evolution, Theology and Method, Part 3: Evolution and Adventist 83-114.
) Theology." Andrews University Seminary Studies 42, no. 1 (2004):5-48.
"La Cosmovisi6n Teo16gica y su Influencia Sabre la Iglesia
) "Evolution, Theology, and Method Part 2: Scientific Method and Adventista del Septimo Dia," Enfoques XI, 1-2 (1999): 101-122.
)
 ")

496 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS
"Metodo Filos6fico de Investigaci6n: Descripci6n y Principios,"
Logos 10, April (1999): 18-31.
"Paradigm, System and Theological Pluralism," Evangelical
Quarterly 70, no. 3 (1998): 195-218.
"Philosophical Foundations and the Biblical Sanctuary," Andrews
University Seminary Studies 36, no. 2 (1998): 183-206.
"Revelation and Inspiration: The Historical Cognitive Model."
Andrews University Seminary Studies 33 (Spring 1995): 5-38.
"Revelation and Inspiration: The Liberal Model." Andrews University
Seminary Studies 32 (Autumn 1994): 169-195.
"Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model." Andrews
University Seminary Studies 32 (Spring-Summer 1994): 7-28.
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS 497
se Acerca el Fin?" El Centinela, August 2011, 22-24.
"Die Neue Kumene: Wesen, Wurzeln und Ziele, der Emerging )
Church'-Bewegung." BWgung, January/February 2011, 7-11. )
"The Emerging Church: A Report to the Remnant." Adventist Pastor j
Online, August 2010.
"The Emerging Church: What Does it Mean? And Why Should We
Care?" Adventist Review, June 10, 2010, 16-19. _)
)
"Eschatology and Salvation." Adventist Pastor Online, January 2010.
"Is Adventist Theology Compatible with Evolutionary Theory?"
Adventists Affirm vol. 24, no. 1 (2010): 33-39.
)
"Las Raices de la Violencia." El Centinela, September 2010, 5-6. )

"Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New Approach." Andrews "Salva9ao Por Inteiro." Ministerio, (November-December, 2009),
University Seminary Studies 31 (Autumn 1993): 171-194. 17-20.

"Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground for a New Approach." "Avaricia." El Centinela, (January 2009).
Andrews University Seminary Studies 31 (Summer 1993): 91-104.
"Holiness and Ministry." The Adventist Pastor On Line, (August,
"Secularizaci6n e Historia de la Cristiandad." ("Secularization and 2008). -
)
the History of Christianity.") Enfoques 5 (1993): 11-18.
"Babylon: Yesterday and Today." Signs of the Times, (June 2006), )
22-25. )
I

PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL/ PERIODICAL ARTICLES (not

refereed) "Babilonia: Ayer y Hoy" El Centinela, (Junio 2006), 10-13.

"l,C6mo y Cuando Ocurria el Regreso de Jesus? El Centinela, (Junio "Is Adventist Theology Compatible with Evolutionary Theory: Can
2013): 18-20. Adventism Harmonize Biblical Creation to Deep Time Evolution
without Changing its Essence?" Perspective Digest 10, no. 4, (Fall )
"Una Fede Dinamica." It Messaggero Adventista, (June 2012): 21-23 2005): 4-10. )

"l,Quien era Cristo?" El Centinela, Abril 2012, 22-24. "Thinking Biblically and the Pastoral Ministry" Reflections: A BR!
Newsletter, (October 2005), 2-4.
"Apocalipsis: Terremotos, Maremotos, Guerras, Crisis ... l,Sera que

)
 ~ -
) ,,'

)
)
) 498 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO C ANALE'S WORKS 499

"Good News About the Judgment." Signs of the Times, (August CHAPTERS IN BOOKS
) 2005), 18-20.
"The Message and Mission of the Remnant: A Methodological
' "L,Que Me Espera en el Juicio?" El Centinela (August 2005), 12-14. Approach," in Message, Mission and Unity of the Church, ed. Angel
) Manuel Rodriguez. (Silver Springs, MD: Biblical Research Institute,
"Adventist Theology and Deep Time History: Are They Compatible?" 2013), 261-286.
)
Ministry, (May 2005): 7-11.
) "Seguridad de la Salvacion y Ministerio," in Con Afan de Servir:
) "Entendemos Bien el Don de Lenguas?" El Centinela, (September Rejlexiones de Lideres Para Lideres, ed. by Miguel Angel Nunez.
2002), 8-10. (Lima, Universidad Peruana Union, 2011).
'i

)' "Where is God? If God is All-knowing, All-wise, All-powerful, How "Doctrine of God," in Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology,
Come Bad Things Happen-and for So Long? Adventist Review, (May ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000),
) 105-159.
30, 2002), 20-23.
)
) "Porque Creo en el Creador." El Centinela, (October 2001), 8-10. "La Doctrina de Dios,"'in Teologia: Fundamentos Biblicos De
Nuestra Fe, edited by Raoul Dederen. Translated by Tulio M. Peverini.
"Interview [on the notion of God]," Shabbat Shalom 46, no. 2 ( 1999): Miami, FL: Asociacion Publicadora Interamericana, 2005: 41-144.
) 7-12.
"Doutrina de Deus," in Tratado de Teologia Adventista do Setimo
,.,,j "Usted Tiene un Amigo," El Centinela, (December 1999), 7-9. Dia, edited by Raoul Dederen. (Tatui, SP: Casa Publicadora Brasileira,
) 2011), 41-144.
"Los Sufrimientos de la Cruz." El Centinela, (March 1997), 6, 7.
"Revelation and Inspiration," in Understanding Scripture: An
"Construyamos Sobre el Fundamento de la Palabra," Perspectivas Adventist Approach, edited by George W. Reid (Silver Spring, MD,
t (March, 1996), 1-3. 2005), 47-74.
/

)
,, "Como Nuestra Vision del Mundo Impacta Nuestra Teologia y "Revela9ao e Inspira9ao," in Compreendendo as Escrituras: Uma
) Nuestra Mision," Revista Adventista, (Winter 1996), 8-9. Abordagem Adventista, edited by George W. Reid. (Engenheiro Coelho,
SP: Unaspress, 2007), 47-74.
"The Importance of our W orldview," Ministry, (December 1995),
) 12-14. "Hermeneutica, Teologia y Remanente," in Pensar la Iglesia Hoy:
Hacia una Eclesiologia Adventista. Estudios Teol6gicos Presentados
)
"La Obra del Espiritu Santo en la Salvacion." El Centinela, (July durante el IV Simposio Biiblico-Teol6gico Sudamericano en honor a
~· 1993): 6, 7. Raoul Dederen (ed. Gerald A. Klingbeil, Martin G. Klingbeil and
) Miguel Angel Nuiiez; Libertador San Martin, Argentina: Editorial
"The Path of Scientific Truth Leads to God." Liberty Magazine, Universidad Adventista del Plata, 2002), 167-176.
)
(May/June 1993): 26-30.
) "Hacia el Fundamento Teologico de la Mision Cristiana," in Misi6n
)
./
 ""T.
500 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS
de la Iglesia Adventista, by Werner Vyhmeister (Villa Libertador San
Martin, Argentina: Editorial C.A.P., 1980): 182-210.
PREFACES
"Preface" to Alberto Treiyer's The Apocalyptic Expectations of the
Sanctuary. Benton Harbor, MI: Alberto Treiyer, 2008.
"Preface" to Kwabena Donkor's Tradition, Method, and
Contemporary Protestant Theology: An Analysis of Thomas C. Oden 's
Vincentian Method. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003.
BOOK REVIEWS
Review of The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System, by Avery
Dulles, Andrews University Seminary Studies (Autumn 1994): 266-26.
Review of Systematic Theology, Vol I, by Wolfbart Pannenberg,
Andrews University Seminary Studies (Spring-Summer 1994): 146-147.
Review of Thomas Aquinas: An Evangelical Appraisal, by Norman L.
Geisler, Andrews University Seminary Studies (Summer 1993): 143-145.
Review of The Promise of Trinitarian Theology, by Colin Gunton,
Andrews University Seminary Studies (Autumn 1992): 248-250.
Review of Reason and the Contours ofFaith, by Richard Rice,
Dialogue 3 (1992): 31.
Review of Inspiration: Hard Questions, Honest Answers, by Alden
Thompson, Andrews University Seminary Studies (Autumn 1991):
278-279.
Review of Metaphysics and the Idea of God, by Wolfbart Pannenberg,
Andrews University Seminary Studies (Autumn 1991): 276-278.
Review of Christian Belief in a Postmodern World: the Full Wealth of
)
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS 501
)
Conviction, by Diogenes Allen, Andrews University Seminary Studies
)
(Summer 1991): 165-166.
)
Review of Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith, by )
Ronald H. Nash, Andrews University Seminary Studies (Autumn 1989):
238-240.
SCHOLARSHIP ON FERNANDO CANALE'S WORK
)
Glanz, Oliver. "Investigating the Presuppositional Realm of )
Biblical-Theological Methodology, Part 2: Canale on Reason." Andrews
University Seminary Studies 47, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 217-240.
Wannemacher, Christian, "Fernando Canale: Adventist Theologian
with a Solid Philosophical Background" in History of Philosophy
Course dictated in the Theologische Hochschule Friedensau
(Friedensau, Germany, October 2009).
She, King Long. "The Use of Exodus in the Book of Hebrews." Ph.D.
Dissertation. Dallas Theological Seminary, 2008. (Grounded on
Canale's Dissertation).
Fockner, Steve. "Reason in Theology: A Comparison of Fernando
Canale and W olfhardt Pannenberg" MA Thesis. Berrien Springs, MI:
Andrews University, 2008.
)
Taylor, Ervin. "Review Article: Fernando Canale's Creation,
Evolution, and Theology: The Role on Method in Theological
Accommodation." Andrews University Studies 46, no. 1 (Fall 2008):
83-90.
Glanz, Oliver. "Time, Reason and Religious Belief: A Limited
Comparison between Herman Dooyeweerd's Structural Analysis of
Theoretical Thought and Fernando Canale's Phenomenological Analysis
of the Structure of Reason and Its Biblical Interpretation." MA Thesis,
Free University of Amsterdam, 2006.
)
 )
)
)
) 502 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS 503
-)
PROFESSIONAL PAPERS READ Rios, Argentina, April 23, 2009.
)
"Deconstructing Evangelical Theology." Paper presented at the "Toward an Adventist Model of Christian Spirituality." A paper
Church History Brown Bag Discussion, Thursday, March 3, 2011. presented at the Seminary Faculty Fellowship. Andrews University
) Andrews University, Berrien Springs, ML Campus, February 9, 2009.
)
"Analisis Hist6rico-Hermeneutico de las Divisiones Teol6gicas en el "The Protestantization of the Adventist Mind." A paper presented at
j
Liderazgo Adventista." Paper presented at the Sociedad Unionista de the Ph.D.-Th.D. Colloquium, Seventh-day Adventist Theological
) Honore Investigaci6n Teol6gica (SUHIT), October 28, 2010. Seminary, Andrews University. Berrien Springs, MI, October 2, 2008.
Universidad Peruana Union, Lima, Peru.
)
"Analisis Hist6rico-hermeneutico de las Divisiones Teol6gicas en el
"La Clave Hermeneutica de la Teologia Adventista: Dios en su Liderazgo Adventista" A paper presented at the Sociedad Adventista de
) Santuario." Paper presented at the Sociedad Adventista de Investigaciones Teol6gicas (SAIT), Universidad Adventista del Plata,
Investigaciones Teol6gicas (SAIT), June 14, 2010. Universidad Libertador San Martin, Entre Rios Argentina, April 24, 2008.
) Adventista del Plata, Libertador San Martin, Entre Rios, Argentina.
) "Las Raices Biblicas del Postmodernismo." Seminar presented at the
"Toward an Adventist Theological Model." Paper presented to the Poro Pauli (Barcelona, Spain, March 2-4, 2007).
~)
Faith and Science Council of the General Conference of the Seventh-day
) Adventist Church, October 20, 2010. Andrews University, Berrien "La Identidad Hermeneutica del Adventismo." Presentation made to
,} Springs, ML the faculty and students of Theology at Sagunto Adventist College
(Sagunto, Spain, February 28, 2007).
"Toward an Adventist Theological Model." Paper presented at
) "Tanakh and Tell" Lecture Series, October 19, 2010. Andrews "Las Raices Biblicas del Postmodemismo." Seminar presented at the
University, Berrien Springs, ML University Students AMICUS, of the Portugese Union (Santarem,
)
Portugal, February 23-25, 2007).
"Bibel und Kultur" A paper presented at the Symposium Biblisher
Henneneutiksponsored by the Southern German Union and the Biblical "Completando la Teologia Adventista: El Pensarniento Teol6gico y su
Research Institute of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. Schulzentrum Impacto en la Unidad y Misi6n de la Iglesia." A paper presented at the
Marienhohe, Darmstadt, Germany, July 5, 2009. Sociedad Adventista de Investigaciones Teol6gicas (SAIT), in the
Universidad Adventista del Plata, Libertador San Martin, Entre Rios,
I·
"Offenbarung, Inspiration, und Authoritat der Bibel" A paper Argentina, May, 22, 2006.
) presented at the Symposium Biblisher Hermeneutik sponsored by the
) Southern German Union and the Biblical Research Institute of the "Finishing the Task of Adventist Theology and its Impact on the
) Seventh-day Adventist Church. Schulzentrum Marienhohe, Darmstadt, Unity and Mission of the Church." A paper presented at the Ph.D.-Th.D.
J;
Germany, July 3, 2009. Colloquium, Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews
University, Berrien Springs, MI, March 1, 2006.
"Los Principios Hermeneuticos de la Teologia Cristiana" A paper
presented at theSociedad Adventista de Investigaciones Teol6gicas "The Role of Reason in the Understanding of God." A paper
) (SAIT), Universidad Adventista del Plata, Libertador San Martin, Entre presented at the Third Euro-African Division International Student
:)
.>

j

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS
504
Congress AMICUS, Lido di Jesolo, Venice, Italy, October 29, 2005.
"The Rationality of Adventism." A paper presented at the Third
Euro-African Division International Student Congress AMICUS, Lido di
Jesolo, Venice, Italy, October 30, 2005.
"Theological Divisions in Adventist Theology" Paper presented to the
faculty of theology of Villa Aurora College. Florence, Italy, October 27,
2005.
"Mission and Power: Unleashing the Power of the Word." Paper
presented at the International Seed Conference, Andrews University,
Berrien Springs, Michigan, June 25, 2005.
"Absolute Theological Truth in Postmodern Times." A Paper
presented at the Evangelical Theological Society, San Antonio, Texas,
November 18, 2004.
"Adventist Theology and Deep Time History: Are They Compatible?"
A paper presented at the International Faith and Science Conference
organized by the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists,
Denver, Colorado, August 23, 2004.
"Adventist Theology and Evolutionism," a paper presented at the
Creation Conference organized by the Seminary Doctoral Club,
Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan, February 28, 2004.
"Beyond Open Theism: The Quest for the Biblical Philosophical
Ground of Christian Theology," A paper presented at the Evangelical
Theological Society, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, November 21, 2002.
"Escatologia, Teologia y el Destino del Adventismo." A paper
presented at the Primer Simposio Teol6gico Hispano conjointly
sponsored by the Lake Union of Seventh-day Adventists, the Hispanic
Association of the Seventh-day Adventist Seminary, and the Midwest
Chapter of the Adventist Theological Society, Berrien Springs, MI,
October 21, 2002.
"Creation, Evolution and Theology: A Report on Method." A paper
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS 505
)
presented at the International Faith and Science Conference organized by )
the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, Ogden, Utah, August
25, 2002. )
)
"The Open View of God: An Introduction." A paper presented at the
Seminary Faculty Fellowship, Andrews University Campus, February 4, )
2002. )
"Switching Theological Paradigms in Evangelical Theology?" A
paper presented in response to Clark Pinnock's paper "Reconstructing
Evangelical Theology: A Self-Critical Assessment." Andrews
University, Berrien Springs, September 23, 2001.
)
"Hermeneutics, Theology and Remnant." A paper presented at the IV
Biblical-Theological Symposium of Adventists organized by Adventist
Universities in the South American Division. River Plate Adventist
University, Entre Rios, Argentina, August 31, 2001. j
·)
"Revelation and Inspiration." A paper presented to the Biblical
Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists,
Andrews University, Berrien Springs, April, 21, 2001.
"Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical
Understanding of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology?" A
paper Presented at the Evangelical Theological Society, Nashville, )
Tennessee, November 16, 2000.
"Reason, Revelation and the Search for Truth." A paper presented to
the 24th Faith and Learning International Seminar sponsored by the
Department of Education of the General Conference of S.D.A, Andrews
University, Berrien Springs, Michigan, June 20, 1999. J
"Theology and Education." A paper presented to the 15th Faith and
Learning International Seminar sponsored by the Department of
Education of the General Conference ofS.D.A., Newbold College, )
England, June 22, 1994.
.J
"Systems, Scripture, and Education." A paper presented to the 15th )
Faith and Learning International Seminary sponsored by the Education
'.J
.)
 }
')
) 506 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS 507

) minutes. USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.

Dept. of the General Conference of S.D.A., Newbold College, England,
) June 22, 1994.
"Cultura y Bautismo." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge Jaque, 30
) minutes, USA: 3 Angels BrodcastingNetwork, 2010.
"The Uniqueness of the Adventist Theological System." A paper
) presented to the Midwest Chapter of the Adventist Theological Society,
) Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan, February 19, 1994. "Cultura y Conducta Cristiana." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge
Jaque, 30.minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
)
"Secularizaci6n e Historia de la Cristiandad." (Secularization and the
) History of Christianity). Paper presented to the First Symposium on "Cultura y Creaci6n." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge Jaque, 30
Theology and Secularization sponsored by River Plate University, Entre minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
Rios, Argentina, November 1991.
"Cultura y el Santuario." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge Jaque,
"Towards an Adventist Understanding of Revelation and Inspiration." 30 minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
)
Paper presented to the Adventist Theological Society Scholar's Meeting,
) "Cultura y Misi6n." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge Jaque, 30
Kansas City, Kansas, November 1991.
) minutes. USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
"Current Metaphysical Trends and the Biblical Concept of
) "Cultura y Nucleo Familiar." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge
Predestination." Paper presented at River Plate University, Entre Rios,
) Argentina, October 1991. Jaque, 30 minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
,)
"The Future of Adventist Theology." Paper presented to the Forum of "Culturizaci6n del Cristianismo." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge
University Students at River Plate University, Entre Rios, Argentina, Jaque, 30 minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
) October 1991.
"Culturizaci6n y Adoraci6n Parte l." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by
) Jorge Jaque, 30 minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
"Heidegger's Interpretation of Being as Time and the Possibility of a
) Biblical Metaphysics." Paper presented at River Plate University, Entre
Rios, Argentina, October 1989. "Culturizaci6n y Adoraci6n Parte 2." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by
)
Jorge Jaque, 30 minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
)
) BROADCASTING I DVD PUBLICATION "Iglesia y Cultura." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge Jaque, 30
minutes, USA: 3 Angles Broadcasting Network, 2010.
) "Andrews University Personal Testimony." In Personal Testimony,
) edited by Jim Gilley, 1 hour, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, "Iglesia y Cultura Introducci6n." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge
Jaque, 30 minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
) 2010.
) "Ciencia Geo16gica Biblica." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge "Testimonio Personal." In Testimonio Personal, edited by John
Jaque, 30 minutes, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010. Dinzey, 1 hour, USA: 3 Angels Broadcasting Network, 2010.
)
) "Crecer en Cristo." In Dialogo Abierto, edited by Jorge Jaque, 30
)
)
 ~
I

)
508 BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS BIBLIOGRAPHY OF FERNANDO CANALE'S WORKS 509

CD PUBLICATIONS Principles and Methods of Theology: Students Notes (1997).

)
"Experiencing Christ Seminar" Power Point Presentations in CD Sketches on Contemporary Theology (1995).
(2008). )
Theological Sketches on Fundamental Theology (1994).
"Revelation, Inspiration, Hermeneutics" Power Point Presentations in .)
CD (revised 2008 edition). Theological Sketches on the Doctrine of God (1993). )

)
"How Pastors can Bring Salvation and Life Style Together," in Theological Sketches on the Doctrine of Revelation and Inspiration
Empowering Your Life and Your Church (Audio CD by Amazing Facts, (1992).
2007).

"Revelation, Inspiration and Hermeneutics," Multimedia Presentations

in CD (2003).

"Revelation, Inspiration and Hermeneutics," Power Point

Presentations in CD (2003).

"Doctrine of God," Power Point Presentations in CD (2003).

"Survey of Theology I," Power Point Presentations in CD (2002).

"Contemporary Theology," Power Point Presentations in CD (2002).

"History of Philosophy," Power Point Presentations in CD (2002).

Personal Web Home Page updated (November, 2001).

Understanding Revelation-Inspiration in a Postmodern World (Berrien

Springs, MI: Andrews University Lithotech, 2001).

"Revelation, Inspiration and Hermeneutics," Slide Presentations in

CD (2001).

_)
CLASS NOTES PUBLICATIONS

Doctrine of Revelation and Inspiration: Students Notes (1998).