Page 6

Corro v.
Lising
Facts:
Respondent RTC Judge Esteban Lising, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo
of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued a search warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in committing
the crime of inciting to sedition.
1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;
2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;
3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;
4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,

banners;
5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording

machines, video machines and tapes
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents/personal

properties alleging among others that the properties seized are typewriters, duplicating
machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes
which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as they are, connected with the
offense of inciting to sedition.
Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion. Hence, this petition praying that the
search warrant issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and
void ab initio that the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times be reopened.
Respondents would have this Court dismiss the petition stating that probable cause
exists justifying the issuance of a search warrant, the articles seized were adequately
described in the search warrant, a search was conducted I n an orderly manner and the
padlocking of the searched premises was with the consent of petitioner's wife.
Ruling:
Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:
SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon

probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible
officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized.
and, Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court, states that:
SEC. 3.Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall

not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense
to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and

circumstances, as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his actions, and
the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and proper (Burton vs. St. Paul,
M & M. Ry. Co., 33 Minn. 189, cited in U.S. vs. Addison, 28 Phil. 566)."
FELICANA L.MORGAN
CONSTI LAW II Page 1
An application for search warrant must state with particularly the alleged subversive
materials published or intended to be published by the publisher and editor of the
Philippine Times, Rommel Corro. As We have stated in Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, 133 SCRA 800, "mere generalization will not
suffice."
A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the
things to be seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search
warrant- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they
should seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be
committed, — that abuses may not be committed.
The affidavit of Col. Castillo states that in several issues of the Philippine Times:
... we found that the said publication in fact foments distrust and hatred
against the government of the Philippines and its duly constituted
authorities, defined and penalized by Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1835; (p. 22, Rollo)
and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others—
... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles

tending to incite distrust and hatred for the Government of the Philippines
or any of its duly constituted authorities. (p. 23, Rollo)
The above statements are mere conclusions of law and will not satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. They cannot serve as basis for the issuance of
search warrant, absent of the existence of probable cause.
In the case at bar, the search warrant issued by respondent judge allowed seizure of
printed copies of the Philippine Times, manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication,
newspaper dummies, subversive documents, articles, etc., and even typewriters,
duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines.
Thus, the language used is so all embracing as to include all conceivable records
and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal or illegal. The
search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which
is constitutionally objectionable.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
PICOP v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 253) (1999)
FACTS:
On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the RTC of Quezon City, stating: 1. That the management of Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP compound, is in possession
or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms, ammunitions, explosives, which are the
subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in committing the offense, and
which . . . are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises described; 2. That a Search
Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession and bring
to the described properties. After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge
Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the contested search warrant. On February 4, 1995, the
police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and seized a number of
firearms and explosives. Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search
unreasonable, the petitioners filed a “Motion to Quash” before the trial court.
Subsequently, they also filed a “Supplemental Pleading to the Motion to Quash” and a
“Motion to SuppressEvidence.” On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested
Order which denied petitioners’ motions. On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its
second contested Order denying petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid
HELD:
The requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such
presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the witnesses
he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under oath
or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things
to be seized. In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial
court failed to examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3
Cicero Bacolod, who appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search
warrant, had no personal knowledge that petitioners were not licensed to possess the
subject firearms; and (3) the place to be searched was not described with
particularity.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Constitutional Law: People vs Judge Estrada
PEOPLE VS ESTRADA
FACTS:
A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order
that granted private respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the
denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of the present case
are as follows:
> Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of
BFAD filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza
(private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City for
violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However,
the application ended with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of
another person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village,
Talisay, Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied
for by the same applicant)
>Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the
next day. The present petition stated that, during the search, the team discovered that
said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound containing at least 15
structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent
Lanuza at Lot 41 of said address. Failure to find any drug products prompted the
policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons
of assorted drug products.
> On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search
warrant on the ground that the search warrant is illegal and null and void.
Respondent judge granted Lanyza’s motion to quash the search warrant and denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuza’s motion to quash Search

Warrant 958.
Held:
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she
was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of
the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza had no license to sell drugs.
We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the
issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best
evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such
evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the
negative ingredient of the offense charged — for instance, the absence of a license
required by law, as in the present case — and such evidence is within the knowledge
and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best
evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefore during the examination by the judge. The necessity of
requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to
give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and
personalities.
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that
private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that
effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured
such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed
persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not
FELICANA L.MORGAN
be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent
is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant.
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient
particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at
Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different
person.
This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.
28 In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was
accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private
respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are
residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this
sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of
private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other
buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely
indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does
not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the
description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has
characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of
the constitutional requirement.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
COLUMBIA VS. CA
Facts
: The National Bureau of Investigation has engaged in an anti -film piracy drive by
investigating various video establishments in Metro Manila involving cases violating PD
No. 49, as amended, including Sunshine Home Video Inc. (“Sunshine”), owned and
operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6 Mayfair Center, Magallanes,
Makati, Metro Manila.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search warrant
with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others, of pirated
video tapes of copyrighted films, which the court granted.
In the course of the search of the premises indicated in the search warrant, the NBI
Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion pictures/films
owned or exclusively distributed by Columbia Pictures, Inc. et al (Columbia et al.)
Thereafter, the court has lifted the search warrant which it had therefore issued after a
series of motions, up until the CA.
In the SC, Sunshine challenged Columbia et al’s legal standing in our courts, they being
foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not Columbia et al were “doing business” in the Philippines, thus, needs to
be licensed before having a legal standing in Philippine courts.
Sunshine’s contention:
Columbia et al, being foreign corporations, should have such license to be able to
maintain an action in Philippine courts.
Sunshine point to the fact that Columbia et al are the copyright owners or owners of
exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion pictures or films,
and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their attorney-in- fact, as being
constitutive of “doing business in the Philippines” under Section 1(f) (1) and (2), Rule 1
of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As foreign corporations doing business in the
Philippines, Section 133 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, denies them the right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence
of a license to do business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of
a search warrant.
Columbia et al’s contention:
Columbia et al denied that they are doing business in the Philippines and contend that
Sunshine have not adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing such business
here, as would require them to be licensed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such exclusive
right does not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor establish the
presumption of doing business.
Ruling:
No, foreign film corporations do not transact or do business in the Philippines and,
therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take recourse to our courts.
As acts constitutive of “doing business,” the fact that Columbia et al are admittedly
copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the Philippines of motion
pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an indicium of doing business
which would require them to obtain a license before they can sue upon a cause of
action in local courts.
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of Columbia et

al., with express authority pursuant to a special power of attorney
Held:
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory standards,
Columbia et al are not barred from maintaining the present action. There is no showing
that, under our statutory or case law, Columbia et al are doing, transacting, engaging in
or carrying on business in the Philippines as would require obtention of a license before
they can seek redress from our courts. No evidence has been offered to show that
petitioners have performed any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act
indicative of an intention to conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
Article 125 and Article 133 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, as interpreted,
says that any foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines may maintain an
action in our courts upon any cause of action, provided that the subject matter and the
defendant are within the jurisdiction of the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed
license but “doing business” in the Philippines without such license which debars the
foreign corporation from access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign
corporation is without license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow
that it has no capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not
engaged in business in the Philippines.
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes “doing”
or “engaging in” or “transacting” business. Each case must be judged in the light of its
own peculiar environmental circumstances. The true tests, however, seem to be
whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or substance of the business or
enterprise for which it was organized or whether it has substantially retired from it and
turned it over to another.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Authorities agrees that a foreign corporation is “doing,” “transacting,” “engaging in,” or
“carrying on” business in the State when, and ordinarily only when, it has entered the
State by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and transacting through them
some substantial part of its ordinary or customary business, usually continuous in the
sense that it may be distinguished from merely casual, sporadic, or occasional
transactions and isolated acts.
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute doing or
transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however, held that the term
implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements, and
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of some
of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the purpose and
subject of its organization.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in the
State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the State, where such
contracts are consummated outside the State. In fact, a view is taken that a foreign
corporation is not doing business in the state merely because sales of its product are
made there or other business furthering its interests is transacted there by an alleged
agent, whether a corporation or a natural person, where such activities are not under
the direction and control of the foreign corporation but are engaged in by the alleged
agent as an independent business.
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent dealer
who has purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products sold are not
a doing of business by the corporation. Likewise, a foreign corporation which sells its
products to persons styled “distributing agents” in the State, for distribution by them, is
not doing business in the State so as to render it subject to service of process therein,
where the contract with these purchasers is that they shall buy exclusively from the
foreign corporation such goods as it manufactures and shall sell them at trade prices
established by it.
Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum contact to
warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
PEOPLE v. SALANGUIT
FACTS: Two criminal cases were filed against Salanguit, the first for possession/use of
shabu, and the second, for possession/use of marijuana. Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied in the
RTC of Cavite a warrant to search the premises of Robert Salanguit for shabu and
shabu paraphernalias. He presented as a witness Edmund Badua, an undercover
officer, which transacted with Salanguit for the purchase of shabu.
The application was granted and the team of Aguilar proceeded to the premises of
Salanguit in QC to serve the warrant. The operatives proceeded to knock on Salanguit’s
door but the same was left unanswered. The operatives heard people panicking inside
the house and they began to force their way inside the house. They indicated their
authority to conduct the search and began which yielded to the finding of clear plastic
bags with shabu and 2 bricks of dried marijuana leaves covered in newspaper.
Salanguit refused to sign the receipt for the confiscated drugs. During his arraignment,
he pleaded not guilty and in the trial court, he gave stated that he never got the chance
to review the purported warrant that Aguilar and his team has. He further stated that the
operatives ate their food and took his cash and valuable, as well as canned goods.
The RTC found him guilty for possession/use of shabu and marijuana. Salanguit
appealed the said decision and argues that the shabu allegedly recovered from his
residence is inadmissible as evidence against him on the ground that the warrant used
to obtain it was invalid and that the marijuana seized from him was also inadmissible as
evidence against him pursuant to the plain view doctrine, and that the operatives
employed unnecessary force in executing the warrant.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the warrant used to seize the shabu was valid and the said shabu was
inadmissible in evidence against him.
2. W/N the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence against Salanguit pursuant to
plain view doctrine.
HELD:
1. Yes, all the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant were satisfied.
2. No, the marijuana was not one of the drugs indicated in the warrant and it was not in
plain view when it was seized.
RATIO:
FELICANA L.MORGAN
1. The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Salanguit contends that it should be void as it did not indicate the
existence of drug paraphernalias. The warrant was valid as to the seizure of shabu and
void as to the seizure of drug paraphernalia. It is to be noted that no drug paraphernalia
was seized. Salanguit further contends that the warrant was issued for more than one
specific offense because possession or uses are punished under two different
provisions in the Dangerous Drugs Act. This Court has decided in the case of People v
Dichoso that a warrant that does not specify what provisions of the law were violated, is
valid as to the authority to search and seize marijuana, shabu and drug paraphernalias.
Lastly, Salanguit argues that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity. The rule is that a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place to be searched. The location of Salanguit’s house being indicated
by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt that the warrant described the place
to be searched with sufficient particularity.
2. Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the
police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets and
shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain
view doctrine can no longer provide basis for admitting the other items subsequently
found. The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent
illegality to justify their seizure. Not being in a transparent container, the contents
wrapped in newsprint could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. That being
said, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against Salanguit.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
G.R. No. 165122 Case Digest
G.R. No. 165122, November 23, 2007
Rowland Kim Santos, petitioner,
vs PRYCE Gas Inc., respondents
Ponente: Tinga
Facts:
This is a petition for review on the decision of Court of Appeals to reversed the twin
orders of RTC Iloilo City quashing the warrant it issued and ordering the return of LPG
cylinders seized from petitioner.
Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and distributing industrial

gases and LPG products. In 2002, Pryce noticed the decline of return of LPG cylinders
for refilling. Pryce employees suspected that LPG cylinders had been removed from
market circulation and refilled by their competitors, one of whoom is Sun Gas and
Santos as the manager.
Figueroa, Pryce's sales manger for Panay sought the assistance of CIDG to
recoverLPG cylinders allegedly in posession of Sun Gas. Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) conducted surveillance on the warehouse of Sun Gas then
later requested the Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) to conduct a routine fire inspection
at Sun Gas. CIDG operatives entered the warehouse and were able to take
photographs of LPG cylinders (PO@ Demandara).
Demandara applied before RTC Iloilo for a warrant to search the premises with the
allegation that Pryce LPG cylinders were tampered and replaced with Sun Gas marking,
averred also that Sun Gas is distributing Pryce LPG products without the consent of
Pryce. RTC issued the search warrant with the authority to seize the following items: 1.
Assorted sizes of PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS CYLINDERS in different kilograms.
2. Suspected LPG gas tanks cylinders with printed/mark SUN GAS INC., trademark and
embossed Pryce Gas Trademark scrapped off.
3. Other materials used in tampering the PRYCE LPG GAS TANKS cylinders. The
authorities have seize a number of Pryce LPG tanks.
Santos then filed for motion to quash the search warrant on the grounds of lack of
probable cause as well as deception and fraud in obtaining evidence in support of the
application, violating article 3, section 2 of constitution and Rule 126 of rules of court.
On the same day, CIDG filed a criminal complaint before the office of City Prosecutor of
Iloilo against Santos, charging him with violation of RA No. 632.
After hearing, RTC granted the motion to quash , stating that the probable cause as
found by it at the time of the application for search warrant fell short of the requisite
probable cause necessary to sustain the validity of the search warrant.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Respondent filed a manifestation and motion to hold in abeyance the release of the
seized items. It also filed a motion for reconsideration of the 16 July 2002 Order but was
denied in an Order dated 9 August 2002.
Respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for
certiorari, arguing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in quashing
the search warrant. The petition essentially questioned the quashal of the search
warrant despite a prior finding of probable cause and the failure of petitioner to prove
that he bought the seized items from respondent. It also challenged petitioner’s
personality to file the motion to quash.
On 16 January 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision, which set
aside the two orders of the trial court. The appellate court also ordered the return of the
seized items to respondent. Petitioner sought reconsideration but was denied in an
order dated 16 July 2004.
Issues: (1) whether or not petitioner has authority to seek the quashal of the search
warrant; (2) who has proper custody of the seized items; and (3) whether or not
respondent correctly availed of the special civil action for certiorari to assail the quashal
of the search warrant.
Ruling:
1. The Court of Appeals ruled against petitioner and reversed the trial court’s quashal of
the search warrant solely on the ground that petitioner, being a mere manager of Sun
Gas, Inc., failed to show his authority to act on behalf of the corporation and, therefore,
had no legal personality to question the validity of the search warrant. Thus, it
concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in entertaining and
subsequently granting petitioner’s motion to quash.
Well-settled is the rule that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby, and the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
2. In quashing the search warrant, it would appear that the trial court had raised the
standard of probable cause to whether there was sufficient cause to hold petitioner for
trial. In so doing, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.
Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discrete and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was
FELICANA L.MORGAN
committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.
3. The Court of Appeals, however, erred in ordering the return of the seized items to
respondent. Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Criminal Procedure expressly mandates
the delivery of the seized items to the judge who issued the search warrant to be kept in
custodia legis in anticipation of the criminal proceedings against petitioner. The delivery
of the items seized to the court which issued the warrant together with a true and
accurate inventory thereof, duly verified under oath, is mandatory in order to preclude
the substitution of said items by interested parties. The judge who issued the search
warrant is mandated to ensure compliance with the requirements for (1) the issuance of
a detailed receipt for the property received, (2) delivery of the seized property to the
court, together with (3) a verified true inventory of the items seized. Any violation of the
foregoing constitutes contempt of court.
The seized items should remain in the custody of the trial court which issued the search
warrant pending the institution of criminal action against petitioner.
Petition denied.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Hon Ne Chan v Honda Motors
Nature of the Petition
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
DOCTRINE
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, or on mere
suspicion or belief.
Probable cause, as far as the issuance of a search warrant is concerned, has been
uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
FACTS:
 On 14 November 2003, the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI), through

Special Investigator (SI)Glenn Lacaran, applied for search warrants with the RTC
against petitioners for alleged violation of Section 168in relation to Section 170of
Republic Act No. 8293 or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines
 On the same date, RTC Judge Artemio S. Tipon issuedtwo(for Hon Ne Chan and
Yunji Zeng) search warrants.
 On the strength of these search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of
petitioners’ premises and seized items from the petitioner.
 Motion to Quash Search Warrants and to Return Illegally Seized Items, averring
therein that the search warrants were issued despite the absence of probable
cause and that they were in the nature of general search warrants.
 Trial court ordered the NBI to return to petitioners the articles seized
 CA reversed the RTC
ISSUES
1) Whether probable cause existed in the issuance of thesubject search warrants;
FELICANA L.MORGAN
2) Whether said search warrantswere in the nature of general search warrants
andtherefore null and void; and
3) Whether there existed an offense to which the issuance of the search warrants
wasconnected.
HELD/RATIO:
The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
1) Whether probable cause existed in the issuance of the subject search warrants
NO.
Petitioners Argue:
The statement “[Lacaran] has information and verily believes that (petitioners)
are in possession or has in their control properties”failedto meet the condition
that probable cause must be shown tobe within the personal knowledge of
thecomplainant or the witnesses he may produce and notbased on mere hearsay
Court:
Next paragraph of the above quoted application for search warrant states that
“Lacaran „personally verified the report and found [it] to be a fact.”
Probable cause, as far as the issuance of a search warrant is concerned, has

been uniformly defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man that an offense has been committed, and
that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched to believethat an offense has been committed, and that the
objectssought in connection with the offense are in the placesought to be
searched.
Microsoft Corporation and LotusDevelopment Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc: “The

determination of probable cause does not call for theapplication of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment ofconviction requires after trial on the merits.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
As implied by the words themselves, probable cause is concerned with
probability,not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need
notpresent at this stage reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment
are those of a reasonably prudent man, not the exacting calibrationsof a judge
after a full-blown trial.”
2) Whether said search warrantswere in the nature of general search warrants

andtherefore null and void
NO.
Petitioners Argue:
The search warrants inquestion partook the nature of general search warrants
inthat they included motorcycles bearing the model name “WAVE.”
Court
It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly

describe the place to be searchedand the things to be seized. It is not, however,
required thatthe things to be seized must be described in precise andminute
detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part ofthe searching authorities.
3) Whether there existed an offense to which the issuance of the search warrants
wasconnected.
YES.
Petitioners Argue:
The search warrants were issued in relation to no particular offense.
Court
Application for Search Warrant filed by NBI SI Lacaran, it is clearly stated

thatwhat respondents are complaining about was the allegedviolation of the
goodwill they have established. It is quite obvious thenthat their cause of action
arose out of the intrusion intotheir established goodwill involving the two
motorcyclemodels and not patent infringement
FELICANA L.MORGAN
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA v. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO
GR No. 182926, Jun 22, 2015
PERALTA, J.
Facts:
The case arose from a complaint filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc.
Represented by Atty. Edgar Borje against petitioner Ana Lou Narvaja, alleging that
while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it
appear that she incurred meal expenses for P1,810.00 instead of the actual amount of
P810.00 at Garden Café, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed reimbursement for it. She was
charged with falsification of private document before the MCTC of Jagna Bohol.
Narvaja filed a motion to quash/defer arraignment on the ground that none of the
essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna,
Bohol, hence, MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper
venue. MCTC denied the motion to quash. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
which was also denied.
She then filed a petition for certiorari before RTC for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The court denied it for lack of legal basis or merit and that there
were sufficient evidences
indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna Bohol. If the court were to follow the
logic of the petition, her claim that her request for reimbursement was made in Cebu
City not in Jagna, Bohol would likewise give no showing or indication that the
falsification was done in Cebu. It would result to a “neither here nor there” situation.
Narvaja elevated the case on appeal to the CA and was also dismissed, affirming in toto
the decision of the RTC. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence,
this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol does not have jurisdiction over the criminal
case and WON there was an improper venue
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Ruling:
No. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Under the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court
or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. Based on the allegations of the complaint, the
falsification of private document was actually committed in Jagna, Bohol.
Guided by the settled ruled that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof, the court holds
that Narvaja’s case falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Jagna, Bohol.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, vs.MA. MERCEDITAS
NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015
Facts: The instant case arose from an Affidavit-Complaint dated July 15, 2003 filed by
the PCGG against former officers/directors of DBP, as well as former officers of
National Galleon Shipping Corp., charging them of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA
3019. Then President Ramos issued AO No. 13 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans in order to identify various anomalous behest
loans entered into by the Philippine Government in the past. One of which is the loan
account granted by the DBP to Galleon.
The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon

from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans. Resultantly, the PCGG
filed the instant criminal complaint against individual respondents.
The Ombudsman found no probable cause against private respondents and dismissed
the criminal complaint against them. It found that the pieces of evidence attached to the
case records were not sufficient to establish probable cause against the individual
respondents, considering that the documents presented by the PCGG consisted mostly
of executive summaries and technical reports, which are hearsay, self-serving, and of
little probative value. In this relation, the Ombudsman noted that the PCGG failed to
present the documents which would directly establish the alleged illegal transactions.
Aggrieved, the PCGG moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an
Orderdated April 13, 2009; hence, this petition.
Issue: whether or not the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable
cause to indict respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.chanrobles
Held: The petition is meritorious.
The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not
an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing
the Ombudsman's action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount
to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman's exercise of power must have been done in an
arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all
in contemplation of law.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation
proceedings - whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor - is geared only to
determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial
for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., the Court
defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the
following manner, to wit:
Probable cause, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty
thereof. It does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of
constitutes the offense charged. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. What is determined is whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed,
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary

investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its
proceedings. In the case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, the Court declared that hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights
and obligations of parties.
In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual
respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the criminal complaint against them.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
ENRILE VS SALAZAR
SUMMARY:
Enrile, et. al. were charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders.
They were arrested without bail, thus this petition for habeas corpus. The Supreme
Court held that applying the Hernandez doctrine (one crime of simple rebellion only and
not complex crime under Article 48) the petitioners could be granted bail. OSG’s
contention that the Hernandez doctrine does not apply because it only applies to the
2nd portion of Article 48 (the offense is a necessary means of committing the other) and
the present case falls on the 1st portion (single act constitutes 2 or more crimes) was
not heeded.
DOCTRINES:
Hernandez doctrine: Murder and arson are crimes inherent when rebellion is taking
place. In the RPC, rebellion is just a single crime (Article 134) and there is no reason to
complex it with other crimes inherent in its commission. Thus, Article 48 applies only
when there are two crimes committed and not when there is only one such as in this
case.
Article 48 was enacted to favor the accused, not of sentencing him/her to a penalty
more severe than what is proper when the acts were punished separately.
FACTS:
February 27, 1990 – Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of
Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Judge Salazar of the RTC-Quezon
City.
Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan were
charged with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murders
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed
in the arrest warrant.
The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in
Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the
petition for habeas corpus.
ISSUES:
WON the petitioner has committed a complex crime arising from an offense being a
necessary means to commit another, referred in the Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code? (NO)
RATIO:
NO. Enrile and the Panlilio spouses should only be charged with simple rebellion
following the Hernandez doctrine:
Murder and arson are crimes inherent when rebellion is taking place. In the RPC,
rebellion is just a single crime (Article 134) and there is no reason to complex it with
other crimes inherent in its commission. Thus, Article 48 applies only when there are
two crimes committed and not when there is only one such as in this case.
The OSG contends that this case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because the
information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not
in furtherance, of rebellion.
Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime
(“delito complejo”) arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing
another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48 and is the subject of the
Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime (“delito compuesto”) arising from a single
act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of
the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore,
it should not apply.
The court does not agree. If rebellion will be punished separately, Enrile could be
charged with (1) crime of rebellion, fine not exceeding PhP 20,000 and Prision Mayor,
and depending on the circumstances, up to but not exceeding 12 years of Prision
Mayor; (2) crime of murder, punishable Reclusion Temporal in its maximum period to
death, depending on the circumstances.
In the absence of aggravating circumstances, the maximum penalty cannot be imposed

on Enrile. However, Article 48 states that an accused can be punished the MAXIMUM
FELICANA L.MORGAN
PENALTY even without a single AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES. This is contrary
to the principle that penal statutes should be decided liberally in favor of the accused
and strictly against the state.
Article 48 was enacted to favor the accused, not of sentencing him/her to a penalty
more severe than what is proper when the acts were punished separately.
The spirit of Article 48 is that if there are two or more acts which constitute a single act,
the single act should be the one punished for if the punishments were combined for the
constitutive acts, it impose a graver penalty than what is proper which is unfavorable to
the accused.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and
the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion
only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of
right. The Court’s earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in
character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent
Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court
shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
MAXIMO SOLIVEN v. RAMON MAKASIAR (D)
G.R. No. 82585, November 14, 1988
FACTS:
Soliven broadcasted the statement that President Aquino hid under her bed during a
coup d' etat. The President sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued
because the President was immune from suit.
President Cory Aquino filed a criminal complaint for libel against Beltran
Petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from
suit impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings
ensue by virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently
have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's jurisdiction.
This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying
on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or
perjury.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings against
the petitioners
HELD:
Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to
assure the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that,
aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office
and may be invoked only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the
President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in which the President is
complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case
from proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the
privilege. Thus, if so minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the
privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The choice of whether to exercise the
privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that cannot
be assumed and imposed by any other person.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
SILVA V. PRESIDING JUDGE G.R. No. 81756 October 21, 1991
FACTS:
RTC judge Nickarter Ontal issued a search warrant filed by M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor,
chief of the PC NARCOM Detachment in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, to be
served against Petitioner Nicomedes Silva.
The application was accompanied by “deposition of witness” executed by Arthur Alcoran
and Pat. Leon Quindo.
The search warrant stated that “You are hereby commanded to make an immediate
search at any time of the day (night) of the room of Tama Silva residence of his father
Comedes Silva to open aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith
seize and take possession of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes,
joint and bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.”
During the raid, the officers seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the amount of
P1,231.40.
Petitioners alleged that the enforcement of the search warrant was illegal because it was
issued on the sole basis of mimeographed and the judge failed to personally examine
the complainant and witness by searching questions and answers.
Antoinette Silva also filed a motion the return of the said amount because her name is
not included in the search warrant. Thus, her belongings shouldn’t be subject of the
warrant.
Acting on the said motion to return the money, Judge Ontal issued an order stating that
the court “holds in abeyance the disposition of the said amount pending the filing of
appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant.
RTC’s new judge, replacing judge Ontal, ruled against petitioners.
MR was likewise denied by Judge Cruz (new judge).
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is validly issued by then Judge Ontal
HELD:
NO. In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as
well as the "Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that
Judge Ontal failed to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the
applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers in order to
determine the existence of probable cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed
by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted together with the "Application for
Search Warrant" contained, for the most part, suggestive questions answerable by
merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon.
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad.
The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely
routinary. The deposition was already mimeographed and all that the witnesses had to
do was fill in their answers on the blanks provided.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional
and statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by
personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions
and answers. His failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they
seized the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta
Silva was not even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate
the seizure of money but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the
search warrant was issued for the seizure of personal property (a) subject of the offense
FELICANA L.MORGAN
and (b) used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense and NOT for
personal property stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus,
the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his discretion when he rejected the
motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her seized money.
Petition granted.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Bache & Co Inc vs. Ruiz
GR L-32409, 27 February 1971
Facts:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter

addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant
against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section
46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all other pertinent
provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant
which was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers:
Vera’s letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still
unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition
in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet
subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At
that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed
his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had
already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and
warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could
be charged for perjury.
The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition.
Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later
(a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and
Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal.
The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint
or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless
proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents.
On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or
recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that
the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera, Logronio, de Leon, et. al.,
be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally, damages and
attorney’s fees.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
After hearing and on 29 July 1970, the court issued an order dismissing the petition for
dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total sum of
P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.
The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.
Issue:
Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents
from its office.
Held:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al.
(GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme Court impliedly recognized
the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and seizures; holding
that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the
interest of each of them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may
be; and that the corporate officers therefore may not validly object to the use in
evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and
premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in
evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong,
and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former
case, only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers
and effects were searched and seized were the petitioners; while in the latter, the
corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby
been impaired, is itself a petitioner.
On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations
in Stonehill. Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there
was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and
his witness (Logronio).
The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly
be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache &
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s
readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and
to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a
personal examination.
Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search
warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the
violation of Section 46(a), Section 72 and Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns),
which are interrelated. The second is the violation of Section 53 (withholding of income
taxes at source).
The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and
the fourth is the violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales,
business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even
in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a),
53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and 209 are under
Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to
include all conceivable records of the corporation, which, if seized, could possibly
render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and void.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
NEMESIO PRUDENTE vs Hon Judge ABELARDO M. DAYRIT
G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989
FACTS:
The Chief of the Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Manila, Judge Abelardo Dayrit, for the issuance of Search Warrant for
violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm, etc). In the deposition of
witness (P/Lt. Florencio C. Angeles), it was made mentioned of “result of our continuous
surveillance conducted for several days. We gathered information from verified sources
that the holders of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions aren’t licensed
to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further, the premises is a school and the
holders of these firearms are not student who were not supposed to possess firearms,
explosives and ammunitions.
Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the

Philippines, Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms,
explosives hand grenades and ammunitions which are illegally possesses at the office
of Department of Military Science and Tactics and at the office of the President.
Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:
Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts
The examination of the said witness was not in form of searching questions and
answers
Search warrant was a general warrant
Violation of Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege
under oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday, urgent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?
HELD:
Search Warrant annulled and set aside.
RATIONALE:
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the Judge, after examination under oath and affirmation of the
complainant, and that witnesses he may produce and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons and things to be seized. The probable cause must be in
connection with one specific offense and the Judge must, before issuing Search
Warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, In writing
and under oath, the complainant and any witnesses he may produce, on facts
personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with
any affidavits submitted.
“Probable Cause” for a valid search warrant, has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection which the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.
– This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the

complainant and witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
PARTICULARITY
For violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) while the said decree
punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase
illegal possession of firearms etc. – – Reformed to ammunitions and explosives. In other
words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the Search Warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD1-866 that was violated is not of such gravity as to call for the
invalidation of this case.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
PEOPLE V MAMARIL
GR 147607
January 22, 2004
Facts:
 SPO2 Chito Esmenda applied before the RTC for a search warrant authorizing
the search for marijuana at the family residence of appellant Mamaril. During the
search operation, the searching team confiscated sachets of suspected
marijuana leaves. Police officers took pictures of the confiscated items and
prepared a receipt of the property seized and certified that the house was
properly searched, which was signed by the appellant and the barangay officials
who witnessed the search.
 The PNP Crime Laboratory issued a report finding the seized specimens positive
for the presence of marijuana. Moreover, the examination on the urine sample of
appellant affirmed that it was positive for the same.
 Appellant denied that he was residing at his parent’s house, and that he was at
his parent’s house when the search was conducted only because he visited his
mother. He also said that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time
during the trial, although he admitted that the signature on the certification that
the house was properly search was his.
Issue:
 Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant
Ruling:
 Yes. The issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable
cause.
 Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.
 In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that:
o The judge must examine the complaint and his witnesses personally
o The examination must be under oath
o The examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching
questions and answers
 The prosecution failed to prove that the judge who issued the warrant put into
writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of
searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant.
 When the Branch Clerk of Court was required to testify on the available records
kept in their office, he was only able to present before the court the application
for search warrant and supporting affidavits.Neither transcript of the proceedings
of a searching question and answer nor the sworn statements of the complainant
and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of
searching questions and answers in writing was presented. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are not sufficient.
 Such written examination is necessary in order that the judge may be able to
properly determine the existence and non-existence of probable
cause.Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure of the
judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the examination in writing
and attaching to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
 No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their
seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. Consequently, the evidence seized
pursuant to an illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against
appellant.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
MICROSOFT CORPORATION v. SAMIR FARAJALLAH, GR No. 205800, 2014-09-10
Facts:
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations

organized and existing under the laws of the United States.
Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and Ma.
Geraldine S. Garcia (respondents) are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia
Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation with principal office at Unit 1603, East Tower,
Philippine Stock
Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was
unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support,
Inc. (OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in the verification of this information.
Two OSI Market
Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and Michael A. Moradoz (Moradoz) were

assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect
unauthorized copies of Adobe and Microsoft software.
On 17 March 2010, counsel for petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Chief of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. The case was
assigned to Police Senior Inspector Ernesto V. Padilla (Padilla).[6]
On 26 March 2010, Padilla, Serrano, and Moradoz went to the office of respondents.
Using a legitimate business pretext, they were able to use two computers owned by
New Fields and obtained the following information regarding the installed Microsoft and
Adobe software:
Padilla was trained to distinguish original from counterfeit software,[7] and he saw the
screens of the computers used by the OSI staff, including the product I.D. Nos. of the
installed software.
In their Joint Affidavit, Serrano and Moradoz stated that:
There are at least two (2) computers using common product identification and/or serial
numbers of MICROSOFT and ADOBE software.
This is one indication that the software being used is unlicensed or was illegally
reproduced or copied. Based on the training we attended,... all ADOBE and
MICROSOFT software should only be installed in one computer, unless they avail of an
Open Licese Agreement from the software developer, which is not the case in NEW
FIELDS.
They also observed that New Fields had 90 computers in their office with Microsoft
software, none of which had the Certificate of Authenticity issued by Microsoft.
After being informed of the results of the investigation, petitioners then issued
certifications that they have not authorized New Fields to "copy, print, reproduce and/or
publish unauthorized copies of Microsoft and Adobe software products."[9]
An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010, before Judge
Amor Reyes in her capacity as Executive Judge of the RTC. Search Warrant Nos. 10-
15912 and 10-15913 were issued on the same date.[10]
The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields employees
witnessed the search conducted by the authorities. Several items were seized, including
17 CD installers and 83 computers containing unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or
Adobe software.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
New Fields filed a motion seeking to quash one of the two warrants served
The motion was received by petitioners on 10 June 2010 and was set for hearing on 11
June 2010. During the hearing on the motion,... petitioners were allowed by the RTC to
file their Comment/Opposition on or before 21 June 2010.
In their Comment/Opposition dated 21 June 2010,[13] petitioners alleged that:
The Motion [to Quash] failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day notice rule under the
Rules of Court. Hence it is nothing but a worthless piece of paper.
In this case, the Motion of Respondents was scheduled for hearing on 11 June 2010.
However, Respondents only furnished [petitioners] a copy of the Motion on 10 June
2010, or just 1 day before the scheduled hearing, which was in clear violation of the 3-
day notice... rule.[
On 29 June 2010, the RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing that
"all the items seized from the respondents be returned x x x."
According to the RTC, petitioners should have identified which specific computer had
the pirated... software.[16] The RTC added that no criminal charge has been filed yet,
despite the fact that the seized items have been in petitioners' possession for several
weeks since the warrants were issued. Lastly, the RTC dismissed the petitioners'
contention that... the three-day notice rule was not complied with because petitioners
were already notified of the motion personally.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion for the Issuance of a Status Quo
Order on 8 July 2010 wherein they alleged that: (1) they intend to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order; and (2) the Order was not immediately executory.[19]
Respondents received a copy of the motion the day it was filed.
espondents moved to expunge petitioners' motion for reconsideration, saying that

petitioners failed to comply with the three-day notice rule.[20] The hearing on the motion
was set on 13 July 2010. A copy of the motion was received by... petitioners on 20 July
2010.[21]
On 15 July 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order.[22]

Respondents filed their Comment/Opposition[23] to the motion, which was received by
petitioners on 12 August 2010.
The RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari[26] under Rule 65 on 8 November 2010 before
the Court of Appeals.
The CA denied the petition for certiorari
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Amor Reyes of Branch 21,
Regional Trial Court of Manila did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders dated 29 June 2010 and 27 August
2010,... quashing Search Warrant Nos. 10-[1]5912 and 10-[1]5913 and directing the
immediate release of the items seized pursuant to the said warrants, despite the
pendency of appellate proceedings.[28]
Ruling:
We rule that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in this case.
However, we sustain petitioners' contention that there was probable cause for issuance
of a warrant, and the RTC and CA should have upheld the validity of both warrants.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Compliance with the three-day notice rule
In Anama v. Court of Appeals,[29] we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not
absolute. The purpose of the rule is to safeguard the adverse party's right to due
process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study the...
motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be
dispensed with.
As correctly pointed out by the CA:
In the instant case, when the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their comment on
the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the
[three]-day notice rule was not strictly observed, its purpose was still... satisfied when
respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners x x x the
opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion.[30]
FELICANA L.MORGAN
AGUINALDO vs.VENTUS
FACTS: Claiming to be business partners in financing casino players, private

respondents alleged that sometime in March and April 2002, petitioners connived in
convincing them to part with their (P260,000.00) Pesos in consideration of a pledge of
two motor vehicles which the latter had misrepresented to be owned by Aguinaldo, but
turned out to be owned by one Levita De Castro, manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-
Car. Prespondents Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson filed a Complaint-Affidavit for
estafa against petitioners Aguinaldo and Perez before the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) of Manila.
Perez filed his Counter-Affidavit,4 denying the accusation against him, and claiming that
his only participation in the transaction between private respondents and Aguinaldo was
limited to having initially introduced them to each other.
Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution 7 recommending both petitioners to be

indicted in court for estafa under Article 315, paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). He also noted that Aguinaldo failed to appear and to submit any controverting
evidence despite the subpoena.
Perez was arrested, so he filed an Urgent Motion for Reduction of Bail to be Posted in
Cash, which the public respondent granted in an Order of even date. Public respondent
issued an Order granting the motion for withdrawal of information, and directing the
recall of the arrest warrant only insofar as Aguinaldo was concerned, pending resolution
of her motion for reconsideration with the OCP.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Cancellation of Arraignment, pending resolution of

their motion for reconsideration filed with the OCP of Manila. Upon the prosecution's
motion, the public respondent ordered the proceedings to be deferred until the
resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration. Public respondent ordered the case
archived pending resolution of petitioners' motion for reconsideration with the OCP of
Manila.15
The OCP of Manila filed a Motion to Set Case for Trial, 16considering that petitioners'
motions for reconsideration and for withdrawal of the information have already been
denied for lack of merit.
Public respondent issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest against
Aguinaldo and the setting of the case for arraignment.
Public respondent granted petitioners' urgent motion to cancel arraignment and

suspend proceedings, and motion for reconsideration. 21
Levita De Castro, through the Law Firm of Lapeña and Associates, filed a Motion to
Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest. De Castro alleged that she was the
private complainant in the estafa case that had been ordered archived. Petitioners filed
an Opposition alleging that De Castro is not a party to the said case, which is in active
file, awaiting the resolution of their petition for review before the DOJ.
The public respondent issued an Order granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to
Issue Warrant of Arrest, thus:
Pending with this Court are (1) Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest
against accused Aguinaldo filed by private prosecutor with conformity of the public
prosecutor
Petitioners filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari. CA dismissed the petition for lack of
merit. Petitioners raise the following issues:
FELICANA L.MORGAN
ISSUES: 1. Whether the honorable court of appeals failed to appreciate that the motion
to reinstate the case and issue a warrant of arrest was filed by one levita de castro who
is not a party to criminal case no. 03-21[6]182.
2/ Whether a procedural techinicality that the suspension allowed for arraignment is

already beyond the 60- day period may be relaxed in the interest of an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.
RULING: No. Petition denied.
On the first issue, petitioners are correct in pointing out that the Motion to Reinstate the
Case and Issue a Warrant of Arrest 31 was filed by one Levita De Castro who is not a
party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182. Records show that De Castro is not even a
private complainant, but a mere witness for being the owner of the vehicles allegedly
used by petitioners in defrauding and convincing private respondents to part with their
P260,000.00. Thus, the public respondent should have granted petitioners' motion to
expunge, and treated De Castro's motion as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect,
as it was filed by one who is not a party to that case.
On the second issue, the Court disagrees with petitioners' contention that the provision
of Section 11 (c),33 Rule 116 of the Rules of Court limiting the suspension for
arraignment to only sixty (60) days is merely directory; thus, the estafa case against
them cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves their petition for review with finality.
In Samson v. Judge Daway,34 the Court explained that while the pendency of a petition
for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits
the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the
petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of said
period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer
arraignment.35
In Diño v. Olivarez,36 the Court held that it did not sanction an indefinite suspension of
the proceedings in the trial court. Its reliance on the reviewing authority, the Justice
Secretary, to decide the appeal at the soonest possible time was anchored on the rule
provided under Department Memorandum Order No. 12, dated 3 July 2000, which
mandates that the period for the disposition of appeals or petitions for review shall be
seventy- five (75) days.37
In Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, 38 the Court ruled that in a long line of decisions,
it has repeatedly held that while rules of procedure are liberally construed, the
provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge
of judicial business. After all, rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the
litigants, and they are not to be trifled with lightly or overlooked by the mere expedience
of invoking "substantial justice." Relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the
exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or
when the purpose of justice requires it.39
On the third issue, the Court is likewise unconvinced by petitioners' argument that the
precipitate filing of the Information and the issuance of a warrant of arrest put petitioners
at the risk of incarceration without the preliminary investigation having been completed
because they were not afforded their right to file a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
resolution.
While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a
substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the
Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for
reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature. In support of their
argument, petitioners cite Sales v. Sandiganbayan 41 wherein it was held that since filing
of a motion for reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary investigation proper,
an Information filed without first affording the accused his right to a motion for
FELICANA L.MORGAN
reconsideration, is tantamount to a denial of the right itself to a preliminary
investigation..
With the Information for estafa against petitioners having been filed on July 16, 2003,
the public respondent cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
August 23, 2005 Order denying their motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, pending the final resolution of their petition for review by the DOJ. The
Court believes that the period of almost one (1) year and seven (7) months from the
time petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on February 27, 2004 to
September 14, 200546 when the trial court finally set their arraignment, was more than
ample time to give petitioners the opportunity to obtain a resolution of their petition. In
fact, the public respondent had been very liberal with petitioners in applying Section 11
(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which limits the suspension of arraignment to a 60-
day period from the filing of such petition. Indeed, with more than eleven (11) years
having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be
arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal
case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition for review with
the DOJ had long lapsed.
On whether petitioners were accorded their right to a complete preliminary investigation

as part of their right to due process, the Court rules in the affirmative. Having submitted
his Counter-Affidavit and Rejoinder- Affidavit to the OCP of Manila before the filing of
Information for estafa, Perez cannot be heard to decry that his right to preliminary
investigation was not completed. For her part, while Aguinaldo was not personally
informed of any notice of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the Information,
she was nonetheless given opportunity to be heard during such investigation.
In fine, the Court holds that public respondent erred in issuing the May 16, 2005 Order
granting the Motion to Reinstate Case and to Issue Warrant of Arrest, as it was filed by
one who is not a party to the case, and it was based on the DOJ's dismissal of a petition
for review in a different case. Nevertheless, the Court upholds the CA ruling that the
public respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion when he issued the August
23, 2005 Order denying petitioners' motion to quash warrant of arrest, and setting their
arraignment, despite the pendency of their petition for review with the DOJ. For one, the
public respondent had been very liberal in applying Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court which allows suspension of arraignment for a period of 60 days only. For
another, records show that petitioners were given opportunity to be heard during the
preliminary investigation of their estafa case.
Considering that this case had been held in abeyance long enough without petitioners
having been arraigned, the Court directs the remand of this case to the trial court for
trial on the merits with strict observance of Circular No. 38-98 dated August 11, 1998, or
the "Implementing the Provisions of Republic Act No. 8493, entitled 'An Act to Ensure a
Speedy Trial of All Criminal Cases Before the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.'" In
this regard, suffice it to state that petitioners cannot invoke violation of their right to
speedy trial because Section 9 (3) of Circular No. 38-98 excludes in computing the time
within which trial must commence the delay resulting from extraordinary remedies
against interlocutory orders, such as their petitions before the CA and the Court.
Finally, in order to avoid delay in the proceedings, judges are reminded that the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for
review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest previously issued because
the quashal of a warrant of arrest may only take place upon the finding that no probable
cause exists. Moreover, judges should take note of the following:
1.If there is a pending motion for reconsideration or motion for reinvestigation of the
resolution of the public prosecutor, the court may suspend the proceedings upon motion
by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment of the accused and direct
the public prosecutor to submit the resolution disposing of the motion on or before the
FELICANA L.MORGAN
period fixed by the court, which in no instance could be more than the period fixed by
the court counted from the granting of the motion to suspend arraignment, otherwise the
court will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
2.If there is a pending petition for review before the DOJ, the court may suspend the
proceedings upon motion by the parties. However, the court should set the arraignment
of the accused and direct the DOJ to submit the resolution disposing of the petition on
or before the period fixed by the Rules which, in no instance, could be more than sixty
(60) days from the filing of the Petition for Review before the DOJ, otherwise, the court
will proceed with the arraignment as scheduled and without further delay.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
MAYOR ANWAR BERUA BALINDONG v. CA, GR No. 177600, 2015-10-19
Facts:
The long-drawn controversy now raised in the instant petition was instigated by a
shooting incident that took place in Poblacion, Malabang, Lanao del Sur... that resulted
in the death of Dante Limbona and Ante Maguindanao, and the serious wounding of
Azis Panda and Kiri Hadji Salik. In the course of the preliminary investigation the
investigating prosecutor found probable cause to charge private respondents Lt. Col.
Jalandoni D. Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong, PO1 Kennedy Balindong, Amer Oden
Balindong and Ali Sarip
Balindong with Double Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder. The Information was
thereupon filed before the Regional Trial Court
However, after reinvestigation ordered by the trial court, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor downgraded the charges against private respondents Lt. Col. Jalandoni D.
Cota, Anwar Berua Balindong and Kennedy Balindong and dropped the charges against
Amer Oden Balindong and Ali Balindong. Private complainant Zenaida Limbona, the
widow of the... victim Dante Limbona, filed a petition for review questioning the
Provincial Prosecutor's
Resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ).
then Secretary Serafin Cuevas modified the assailed resolution and directed... the
Provincial Prosecutor to file instead "two (2) informations for frustrated murder with
attempted murder, two (2) informations for frustrated murder and an information for
attempted murder" against private respondents.
Secretary Cuevas denied private respondents' Motion for Reconsideration
The corresponding Amended Informations were accordingly filed before the Regional
Trial Court
Private respondents, in the meantime, filed a second Motion for
Reconsideration, which the succeeding DOJ Secretary Artemio G. Tuquero... denied

"with finality and with warning that no further pleadings will be entertained".
they filed a Third Motion for Reconsideration that was eventually granted by the new
DOJ Secretary Hernando B. Perez
Private complainants sought reconsideration thereof but the same was subsequently
denied... prompting them to bring the matter before the Court of Appeals in a petition for
certiorari... the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed issuances of DOJ Secretary
Perez... in due time denying private respondents' Motion for Reconsideration... pursuant
to the
Decision of the Court... of Appeals, the RTC-Branch 219 issued a resolution finding
probable cause to charge private respondents for Murder with Attempted Murder
Frustrated Murder... and Attempted
Murder
The warrants of arrest were accordingly issued against private respondents, who,
undaunted, went up to the Supreme Court to question the Decision of the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review on certiorari... the Supreme Court promulgated...
its
Decision
FELICANA L.MORGAN
"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals...
which annulled the DOJ Resolution... and reinstated its Resolutions... is AFFIRMED.
The Temporary
Restraining Order issued... by this Court is hereby LIFTED, and the Regional Trial
Court... is ORDERED to implement its Resolution... relative to the issuance of warrants
of arrest against all the accused.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied with
finality
Despite... the categorical pronouncement, however, private respondents adamantly filed

another motion purportedly for clarification of the 16 December 2004 Decision but which
was in fact an attempt to have the High Court order a re-determination by the trial court
of the appropriate... crime with which to charge private respondents.
the Supreme Court ruled thus:
"The Court Resolves to (a) EXPUNGE from the records of this case petitioners' urgent
motion for clarification... and (b) ADMONISH petitioners and their counsel to pay heed
to the directives of this Court and against... misrepresenting the import of its rulings and
to desist from any further unauthorized pleadings UNDER PAIN OF CONTEMPT."
The
Decision of the Supreme Court became final and executory
Subsequently, due to the inhibition of the presiding judge of the RTC... the criminal
cases were raffled to RTC... whose presiding judge was expressly ordered... by the
Supreme Court to enforce the warrants of arrest against private respondents with
utmost dispatch
After issuing the Order relative to the enforcement of the warrants of arrest against
private respondents, however, the... presiding judge of the RTC... inhibited herself as
well from hearing the criminal cases and the same were re-raffled anew to the RTC...
presided by respondent Judge Ralph S. Lee.
Private respondents then filed before RTC-Branch 83 a Motion to Re-Determine the

Existence or Non-Existence of Probable Cause Which May Even Warrant Dismissal -
Even of the Appropriate Charges of Homicide, Frustrated and Attempted Homicides.
Private complainants, on the... other hand, moved for respondent Judge Lee's inhibition
when the latter failed to act upon a motion for the issuance of Alias Warrants of Arrest.
However, prior to voluntarily inhibiting himself from the subject criminal cases,
respondent Judge Lee issued the assailed
Order granting private respondents' motion for redetermination of probable cause and
consequently ordering the downgrading of the crimes charged. The cases were then re-
raffled to RTC... presided by respondent Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, who then issued the
second... assailed
Order denying a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order issued by respondent Judge Lee and setting the arraignment
Private complainants filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition of respondent Judge
Baclig, who later denied said motion and re-set the arraignment
Aggrieved by the orders issued... by Judge Ralph S. Lee and Judge Vivencio S. Baclig,
the State, through the Office of Solicitor General, commenced a special civil action for
certiorari in the CA
(CA-G.R. SP No. 97121)... the Court promulgated its Decision... adjudging Judge Lee
and Balindong, et al. guilty of indirect contempt
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Decision of the Court... clearly sustained the filing of two Informations for Murder with
Attempted Murder, two Informations for Frustrated Murder and an Information for
Attempted Murder against private respondents. The Court even directed... the
implementation of the arrest warrants against them. This, notwithstanding, private
respondents filed a motion for determination of probable cause and/or dismissal of the
case against them. Worse, this was done after being admonished by the Court to pay
heed to its directives... under pain of contempt.
With the finality of this Court's Decision, all issues relative to the determination of the
proper offenses with which to charge private respondents had been laid to rest. In
continuing to file pleadings and motions purportedly seeking for the clarification of the
proper charges... against them, respondents merely rehashed their tired arguments and
unavailing assertions. They did not only succeed in delaying the conduct of the trial of
the aforesaid cases but also willfully and deliberately flouted this Court's directives with
their stubborn refusal to... abide by our pronouncement and their incessant nit-picking of
issues already resolved with finality.
In granting respondents' motions for reconsideration and re-determination of probable

cause, and consequently down-grading the charges against respondents
Judge Lee contravened this Court's directive
He impudently substituted his own judgment for that of this Court. Had he thoroughly
reviewed the records of the case, it would have been impossible for him to misread the
import of said Decisions and Resolutions.
Thereafter, Judge Lee inhibited from the criminal cases, which were re-assigned to
Judge Lita Tolentino-Genilo, who... issued an order: (a) reinstating the charges against
Balindong, et al. for two counts of murder with... attempted murder, two counts of
frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder
(b) issuing alias warrants of arrest against them; and (c) inhibiting herself from further
hearing the... cases.[8] Subsequently, the criminal cases were re-raffled to... respondent
Judge Alexander S. Balut.
Aggrieved by the dispositions of Judge Tolentino-Genilo, Balindong, et al. filed their

Motion for Reconsideration and/or Recall Suspend Order of Arrest.[9] As the new trial
judge, however, Judge Balut opted to defer action to await the Court's... ruling
He further suspended the enforcement of the alias warrants issued for the arrest of
Balindong, et al.
the CA promulgated its ruling... in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121... the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City... are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The CA declared the assailed orders of Judge Lee and Judge Baclig to be in clear
defiance of the Court's decision
It pronounced that Judge Lee erred in opining that the Court had only sustained... the
executive... determination of probable cause by the DOJ, and had not touched on what
appropriate crimes should have been charged against Balindong, et al.;[15] and that
Judge Baclig similarly erred in holding that the Court "did not prohibit the trial judge
from... determining the appropriate crime to be filed against the accused [once] the
cases were brought to his sala."
To reiterate the rule, determination of qualifying circumstances is a matter of evidence.

Thus, as pointed out by petitioner, by arbitrarily downgrading the original charge from
murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder to homicide, frustrated homicide and
FELICANA L.MORGAN
attempted... homicide, respondent Judge Lee effectively denied the prosecution the
opportunity to prove the attendance of qualifying circumstances in a fullblown trial.
Issues:
Limbona raises as the sole ground for her petition to cite in contempt of court Judge
Balut and Balindong
Ruling:
We next deal with the contempt charge of Limbona against Judge Balut who, by his
order of July 16, 2007, deferred action on the Motion for Reconsideration and/or Recall
Suspend Order of Arrest of Balindong, et al., and suspended the enforcement of the
alias... warrants of arrest.
Let us also look at Judge Balut's order... in which he stated as follows:
Without necessarily addressing the merit of the motion, that is, whether or not the alias
warrants of arrest issued against the accused should be recalled or set aside, and to
avert any conflicting determinations on the matter at hand, the Court deems it but
prudent... to defer any action hereto considering that the accused's petition for review...
assailing the Court of Appeals' judgment in CA-G.R. SP No. 97121, which precipitated
the issuance of the order of arrest sought to be reconsidered/recalled by herein
accused, is... still pending before the Honorable Supreme Court for final determination.
In the meantime, while awaiting resolution of the said petition for review... the
enforcement of the alias warrants of arrest... issued against the accused is hereby
suspended.
Judge Balut has justified his actions by invoking judicial courtesy and asserting his
judicial discretion on the matters in question
It is clear that Judge Balut did not thereby disobey the decisions of the Court
To start with, there was no indication in his Order that bad faith had moved him to
suspend the implementation of the warrants of arrest against Balindong,... et al., or that
he had thereby acted with a willful and deliberate intent to disobey or to ignore the
Court's bidding, or to cause injustice to any of the parties. In the absence of the clear
showing of bad faith on his part, his being prudent could only be an error of... judgment,
for which he could not be held to account. Secondly, the history of the criminal cases,
from the transfer of venue... to the successive inhibitions of several RTC Judges; to the
succession of petitions... for certiorari bearing on the handling of the criminal cases
brought to the higher courts, including this Court,[32] must have probably persuaded
Judge Balut to tread the path of prudence and caution. Indeed, he expressed in his
Order... the desire "to avert any conflicting determinations" pending the promulgation of
the Court's Decision... thirdly, his actuations were entirely different from those of Judge
Lee's, who downgraded the offenses from two counts of murder with attempted...
murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and one count of attempted murder to double
homicide with multiple frustrated homicide, and ordered the issuance of the warrants of
arrest for such downgraded offenses.
Principles:
The issuance by the trial court of the warrant of arrest upon filing of the information and
supporting papers implies the determination of probable cause for the offense charged.
It is then superfluous for the accused to seek the judicial determination of... probable
cause on the pretext that the trial court should still act and proceed independently of the
executive determination of probable cause to charge the proper offense.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES – Plaintiff-Appellee JERRY PUNZALAN and
PATRICIA PUNZALAN– Accused-Appellants
FACTS
The prosecution established that on November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in the

morning, Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan (IA1 Sandaan) and her team
implemented a search warrant issued on October 28, 2009 by then Manila RTC
Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to: (i) make an immediate search of the
premises/house of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, Vima
Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon and Felix Razon who are all
residents of 704 Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay City; and
(ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of assorted
dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the
court.
Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be
occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch of the compound describing the
house to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant.
Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to
coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and
Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them a media
representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the operation. From the
barangay hall, they walked toward the target place using as a guide the sketch
they prepared.
When they were already outside the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, which
is a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan knocked on the door. A woman, later
identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When
they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they
have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but was not
successful since the PDEA agents pushed the door open. The team was able to
enter the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were both surprised when
found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant
infront of accused-appellants.
Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the
table. Intelligence Officer 1 Pagaragan (IO1 Pagaragan) was able to seize 9 heat-
sealed plastic sachets, 2 square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a
small round plastic container. All 3 plastic containers contained smaller heat-
sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of suspected shabu. There
were also other paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale.
Accordingly, Special Investigator 2 Esteban (SI2 Esteban) and Intelligence Officer
2 Alvarado(IO2 Alvarado) effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and
Patricia Punzalan after informing them of their constitutional rights. IO1
Pagaragan immediately marked the seized items by placing the marking "ADP".
After searching and marking the evidence found on the first floor, the team,
FELICANA L.MORGAN
together with the barangay officials and accused-appellants, proceeded to, and
conducted the search on the second and third floors but found nothing. They
went downstairs where they conducted the inventory of recovered items. IO1
Pagaragan prepared the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized and a Certification
of Orderly Search which were later signed by the barangay officials.
After their arrest, accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were brought to
the PDEA Office in Quezon City for investigation. IO1 Pagaragan presented the
seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report, Request for Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination.
Laboratory examination of the seized pieces of drug evidence gave positive
results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as
shabu, a dangerous drug.
Thereafter, the accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 11,

Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession of 40.78 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
On March 29, 2010, the trial court convicted accused-appellants for violation of
Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. The trial court held that the issuance of a
search warrant against the premises of different persons named therein is valid
as there is no requirement that only one search warrant for one premise to be
searched is necessary for its validity. Also, the address of the accused-appellants
Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and adequately described. A sketch that
specifically identifies the places to be searched was attached to the records and
such description of the place was unquestionably accurate that the PDEA agents
were led to, and were able to successfully conduct their operation in the premises
described in the search warrant.
In its findings, the trial court observed that there were actually two phases of the
search done in the Punzalan house. The first or initial search was done at the
ground floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents gained entry and
was beyond doubt made in the presence of both accused. This is where the bulk
of illegal drugs were found, confiscated and consequently marked. It is of no
moment that the barangay officials were not able to witness the said initial search
and their failure to arrive on time to witness the first or initial search at the
ground floor of the Punzalan house, or even their total absence thereat, will not
render the subject search invalid and unlawful inasmuch as their presence is not
required.
The second phase of the search was conducted at the upper floors of the house
after the markings on the 293 sachets of confiscated specimens were completed
by 101 Pagaragan. This was witnessed and participated in by the barangay
officials. Finally, after the search of the entire house was concluded, it is not
disputed that an inventory of all the items seized was conducted by IO1
Pagaragan in compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants. The CA held
that there was a valid search and seizure conducted and the seized items are
admissible in evidence. The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of
illegal possession of dangerous drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug.
ISSUE/S
1. Whether or not the search conducted was valid – YES.
2. Whether or not the chain of custody rule has been complied with – YES.
RATIO
I. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two

witnesses. - No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.
As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present
during the initial search, the search was witnessed by accused-appellants
themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality" must be present
applies only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any
member of his family.
To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the

following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is
not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
said drug. In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish with moral
certainty the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. Accused-appellants were caught in actual possession of the
prohibited drugs during a valid search of their house. It bears stressing that aside
from assailing the validity of the search, accused-appellants did not deny
ownership of the illegal drugs seized. They have not proffered any valid defense
in the offense charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002.
II. This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is
what the proponent claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link
in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in
FELICANA L.MORGAN
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to
it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the
chain to have possession of the same.
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or
recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as
exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead
to a finding of guilt. In this case, the chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs
was duly established from the time the heat-sealed plastic sachets were seized
and marked by IO1 Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the
PDEA Office in Quezon City. IO1 Pagaragan was also the one who personally
delivered and submitted the specimens composed of 293 sachets of shabu to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The specimens were kept in
custody until they were presented as evidence before the trial court and
positively identified by IO1 Pagaragan as the very same specimens he marked
during the inventory.
The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty.
Gaspe does not undermine the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs
seized from accused-appellants. The failure to strictly comply with the prescribed
procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the
accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The

Decision dated October 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
04557 is hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 126379 June 26, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.
CHIONG, petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED,
MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM, and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

FACTS:
– A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which
quashed search warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any
purpose the items seized under the warrant.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
– An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar
Hussain who had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety
Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan.
– The following day Search Warrant No. 1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail
Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to Abigail Variety Store resulting in
the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of different explosives
and firearms.
ISSUE:
WON a search warrant was validly issued as regard the apartment in which private
respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, WON that particular
apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.
HELD:
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first four (4)
separate apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be
the subject of their search.
The same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND
WAS NOT WHAT WAS ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT.
As such, any evidence obtained from the place searched which is different from that
indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any
proceeding.
The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of
minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the
Judge issuing the same; and what was done was to substitute for the place that the
Judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that the executing officers had in
their mind. This should not have been done.
It is neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that
stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched — although not that
specified in the warrant — is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the
warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in
determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the
applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the
court issuing the warrant.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in
support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.
It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched,
even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of
the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion
which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and
only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers
conducting the search.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
UY VS. BIR
G.R. No. 129651 – 344 SCRA 36 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Search and
Seizure – Requisites of a Valid Search Warrant
In Sept 1993, Rodrigo Abos, a former employee of UPC reported to the BIR that Uy
Chin Ho aka Frank Uy, manager of UPC, was selling thousands of cartons of canned
cartons without issuing a report. This is a violation of Sec 253 & 263 of the Internal
Revenue Code. In Oct 1993, the BIR requested before RTC Cebu to issue a search
warrant. Judge Gozo-Dadole issued a warrant on the same day. A second warrant was
issued which contains the same substance but has only one page, the same was dated
Oct 1st 2003. These warrants were issued for the alleged violation by Uy of Sec 253. A
third warrant was issued on the same day for the alleged violation of Uy of Sec 238 in
relation to sec 263. On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied
by members of the PNP, on 2 Oct 1993, searched the premises of the UPC. They
seized, among other things, the records and documents of UPC. A return of said search
was duly made by Labaria with the RTC of Cebu. UPC filed a motion to quash the
warrants which was denied by the RTC. They appealed before the CA via certiorari. The
CA dismissed the appeal for a certiorari is not the proper remedy.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search warrant issued.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of UPC and Uy in a way for it ordered the return of the
seized items but sustained the validity of the warrant. The SC ruled that the search
warrant issued has not met some basic requisites of validity. A search warrant must
conform strictly to the requirements of the foregoing constitutional and statutory
provisions. These requirements, in outline form, are:
(1) the warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons
or things to be seized.
The SC noted that there has been inconsistencies in the description of the place to be
searched as indicated in the said warrants. Also the thing to be seized was not clearly
defined by the judge. He used generic itineraries. The warrants were also inconsistent
as to who should be searched. One warrant was directed only against Uy and the other
was against Uy and UPC. The SC however noted that the inconsistencies were cured
by the issuance of the latter warrant as it has revoked the two others.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution guarantees the right of the people against
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Read full text here.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
NOTES
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing
and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally
known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
People vs Francisco
G.R. No. 129035, August 22, 2002
Search and Seizure
See: Rule 126 Section 4 (Requisites for Issuing Search Warrant)
FACTS: Federico Verona and his live-in girlfriend, Annabelle Francisco, were placed
under surveillance after the police confirmed, through a test-buy operation, that they
were engaged in selling shabu. SPO2 Teneros and SPO4 Alberto San Juan applied for
a search warrant before the RTC Manila to authorize them to search the premises at
122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
Attached to the application was the After-Surveillance Report of SPO2 Teneros. It

stated that Dante Baradilla, who claimed to be one of Federico Veronas runners in the
illegal drugs operations, allegedly sought the assistance of SPO2 Teneros for the arrest
of Verona. The search warrant was subsequently issued by Judge Bayhon authorizing
the search of shabu and paraphernalia at No. 122 M. Hizon Street, Caloocan City.
Annabelle Francisco, who was then nine months pregnant, was resting inside the
second floor masters bedroom of their two- storey apartment at No. 120 M. Hizon
Street, Caloocan City, when she heard a loud bang downstairs as if somebody forcibly
opened the front door. Eight policemen suddenly entered her bedroom and conducted a
search for about an hour. Accused-appellant inquired about their identities but they
refused to answer. It was only at the police station where she found out that the team of
searchers was led by SPO2 Teneros. The police team, along with a Barangay
Chairwoman and a Kagawad enforced the warrant and seized the following:
1. One Salad Set wrapped in plastic containing 230 grams shabu

2. Several plastics in different sizes
3. Two rolls of aluminum foil strips
4. Five improvised tooter water pipes and two improvised burners
6. Two cellular phones
7. One monitoring device with cord
8. Several pieces aluminum foil strips
9. Two masking tapes
10. PhP 22, 990
The police team also seized the amount of P180,000.00, a Fiat car, jewelry, set of keys,
an ATM card, bank books and car documents.
Consequently, Francisco was charged with violation R.A. No. 6425 or the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. She then filed a motion to quash the search warrant asserting that
she and her live-in partner Federico Verona had been leasing an apartment unit at No.
120 M. Hizon Street, District 2, Caloocan City, Metro Manila, since 1995 up to the
present as certified by the owner of the apartment unit.
The trial court denied the motion to quash and upheld the validity of the search warrant.
It rendered a decision finding Francisco guilty as charged imposing upon the accused
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Francisco appealed and raised several issues including the assignment of errors
against the trial court when it admitted the evidence against her, notwithstanding that
the search conducted was illegal and violative of her constitutional rights, and that she
must be acquitted after finding that the searach was conducted at a place different from
what was described in the search warrant.
The trial court upheld its decision and stated that despite the fact that the search
warrant in question was served at apartment No. 120 and not at the specific address
stated therein which is 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City will not render the search and
seizure illegal. While it is true that the rationale behind the constitutional and procedural
requirements that the search warrant must particularly describe the place to be
FELICANA L.MORGAN
searched is to the end that no unreasonable search warrant and seizure may not be
made and abuses may not be committed, however, this requirement is not without
exception. It is the prevailing rule in our jurisdiction that even a description of the place
to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort
ascertain and identify the place intended.
Accused maintains that the search was grossly infirm as the subject search warrant
authorized the police authorities to search only No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
However, the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City.
ISSUE: Whether or not the search conducted was valid and reasonable
HELD: No.
The basic guarantee to the protection of the privacy and sanctity of a person, his home
and his possessions against unreasonable intrusions of the State is articulated in
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, which reads:
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES,

PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE, AND
NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER
EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE COMPLAINANT AND THE
WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE PLACE
TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.
For the validity of a search warrant, the Constitution requires that there be a particular
description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The rule
is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it
from other places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality
that leads the officer unerringly to it satisfies the constitutional requirement.
Specifically, the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant are:
(1) probable cause is present;

(2) such presence is determined personally by the judge;
(3) the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined
by the judge, in writing and under oath or affirmation;
(4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them;
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
The absence of any of these requisites will cause the downright nullification of the
search warrants. The proceedings upon search warrants must be absolutely legal, for
there is not a description of process known to the law, the execution of which is more
distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which excites such intense feeling in
consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect. The warrants will always be
construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy.
No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer
undertakes to justify it.
In People v. Veloso, the Court declared that even a description of the place to be
searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can with reasonable effort, ascertain
and identify the place intended.The description of the building in the application for a
search warrant in Veloso as well as in the search warrant itself refer to the building No.
124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands which was considered sufficient
designation of the premises to be searched.
The prevailing circumstances in the case at bar are definitely different from those in
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Veloso. At first glance, the description of the place to be searched in the warrant seems
to be sufficient. However, from the application for a search warrant as well as the
search warrant itself, the police officer serving the warrant cannot, with reasonable
effort, ascertain and identify the place intended precisely because it was wrongly
described as No. 122, although it may have been located on the same street as No.
120. Even the description of the house by police asset Baradilla referred to that house
located at No. 122 M. Hizon St., not at No. 120 M. Hizon St.
The particularity of the place described is essential in the issuance of search warrants to
avoid the exercise by the enforcing officers of discretion. Hence, the trial court erred in
refusing to nullify the actions of the police officers who were perhaps swayed by their
alleged knowledge of the place. The controlling subject of search warrants is the place
indicated in the warrant itself and not the place identified by the police.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by
the officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in
support of their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the
Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to
police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if it not be
delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the door to abuse of the search process,
and grant to officers executing a search warrant that discretion which the Constitution
has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of the place to
be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it
cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.
All told, the exclusionary rule necessarily comes into play, to wit:
Art. III, Sec. 3 (2), 1987 Constitution. -- ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF
THIS OR THE PRECEDING SECTION SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY
PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING.
Consequently, all the items seized during the illegal search are prohibited from being
used in evidence. Absent these items presented by the prosecution, the conviction of
accused-appellant for the crime charged loses its basis.
The exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing
the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Verily, they
are the fruits of the poisonous tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional
right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence.
On another note, the Court found disturbing the variety of the items seized by the
searching team in this case. In the return of search warrant, they admitted the seizure of
cellular phones, money and television/monitoring device items that are not within the
palest ambit of shabu paraphernalia, which were the only items authorized to be seized.
What is more disturbing is the suggestion that some items seized were not reported in
the return of search warrant, like the Fiat car, bankbooks, and money. In an attempt to
justify the presence of the car in the police station, SPO2 Teneros had to concoct a
most incredible story that the accused, whose pregnancy was already in the third
trimester, drove her car to the police station after the intrusion at her house even if the
police officers had with them several cars.
A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a

fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles
relating to a crime.
The decision of the RTC convicting Francisco of violation of R.A. 6425 was REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
Francisco was ACQUITTED.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
RATIO: Rule 126 Search and Seizure. Section 4. Requisites for Issuing search
warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the jusdge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
WILLIAM C. YAO, SR., LUISA C. YAO, RICHARD C. YAO, WILLIAM C. YAO JR.,
and ROGER C. YAO
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETRON CORPORATION and PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM CORP., and its Principal, SHELL INT’L PETROLEUM CO.
LTD.
G.R. No. 168306 June 19, 2007
FACTS
Petitioners are incorporators and officers of MASAGANA GAS CORPORATION

(MASAGANA), an entity engaged in the refilling, sale and distribution of LPG products,
while Private respondents Petron and Pilipinas Shell are two of the largest bulk
suppliers and producers of LPG in the Philippines. Their LPG products are sold under
the marks "GASUL" and "SHELLANE," respectively. They are authorized to allow
refillers and distributors to refill, use, sell and distribute their respective LPG containers
and products. NBI agent Oblanca filed applications for search warrant against
petitioners and other occupants of MASAGANA compound, on the ground that
petitioners are actually producing, selling, offering for sale and/or distributing LPG
products using steel cylinders owned by, and bearing the tradenames, trademarks, and
devices of Petron and Pilipinas Shell, without authority and in violation of the rights of
the said entities. Presiding Judge of RTC Cavite found probable cause, hence,
commanded the immediate search and seizure of the items. Petitioners filed with the
RTC a Motion to quash Search Warrantsalleging that the items are being used in the
conduct of the lawful business of respondents and the same are not being used in
refilling Shellane and Gasul LPGs. RTC denied the said petitioner’s Motion, and was
affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether Petitioners are liable for Trademark Infringement.
DECISION
YES. Section 155 of Republic Act No. 8293 identifies the acts constituting
trademark infringement. As can be gleaned in Section 155.1, mere unauthorized use of
a container bearing a registered trademark in connection with the sale, distribution or
advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause confusion, mistake or deception
among the buyers/consumers can be considered as trademark infringement.
In Oblanca’s sworn affidavits, he stated that before conducting an investigation

on the alleged illegal activities of MASAGANA, he reviewed the certificates of trademark
registrations issued by the Philippine Intellectual Property Office in favor of Petron and
Pilipinas Shell; that he confirmed from Petron and Pilipinas Shell that MASAGANA is
not authorized to sell, use, refill or distribute GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinder
containers; that he and Alajar monitored the activities of MASAGANA in its refilling plant
station located within its compound at Governor’s Drive, Barangay Lapidario,
TreceMartires, Cavite City; that, using different names, they conducted two test-buys
therein where they purchased LPG cylinders bearing the trademarks GASUL and
SHELLANE; that the said GASUL and SHELLANE LPG cylinders were refilled in their
presence by the MASAGANA employees; that while they were inside the MASAGANA
compound, he noticed stock piles of multi-branded cylinders including GASUL and
SHELLANE LPG cylinders; and that they observed delivery trucks loaded with GASUL
and SHELLANE LPG cylinders coming in and out of the MASAGANA compound and
making deliveries to various retail outlets.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 180595, March 05, 2010 ]

ARTHUR DEL ROSARIO AND ALEXANDER DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONERS, VS.
HELLENOR D. DONATO, JR. AND RAFAEL V. GONZAGA, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Philip Morris Products, Inc. (Philip Morris) wrote the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), requesting assistance in curtailing the proliferation of fake Marlboro cigarettes in
Angeles City, Pampanga. After doing surveillance work in that city, respondent
HellenorDonato, Jr., the NBI agent assigned to the case, succeeded in confirming the
storage and sale of such fake cigarettes at the house at 51 New York Street, Villasol
Subdivision, Angeles City, that belonged to petitioner Alexander del Rosario.
On March 5, 2002 respondent Donato applied for a search warrant with Branch 57 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City to search the subject premises. But it
took a week later or on March 12, 2002 for the RTC to hear the application and issue
the search warrant. Although Donato felt that the delayed hearing compromised the
operation, the NBI agents led by respondent Rafael V. Gonzaga proceeded to
implement the warrant. Their search yielded no fake Marlboro cigarettes.
Subsequently, petitioners Alexander and Arthur del Rosario (the Del Rosarios) filed a
complaint for P50 million in damages against respondents NBI agents Donato and
Gonzaga and two others before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 62, in Civil Case
10584. On August 6, 2003 respondents NBI agents answered the complaint with a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of: a) the failure of the complaint to state a cause of
action; b) forum shopping; and c) the NBI agents' immunity from suit, they being sued
as such agents. The RTC denied the motion on March 25, 2003. The NBI agents filed a
motion for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on June 27, 2003.
Dissatisfied, respondents NBI agents filed a special civil action of certiorari before the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 79496. On June 29, 2007 the latter court granted
the petition and annulled the RTC's orders, first, in alleging merely that the NBI agents
unlawfully procured the search warrant without stating the facts that made the
procurement unlawful, the complaint failed to state a cause of action; and second, the
Del Rosarios were guilty of forum shopping in that they should have filed their claim for
damages against the NBI agents through a motion for compensation with the court that
issued the search warrant.
The Del Rosarios sought reconsideration of the decision but the CA denied it on
November 19, 2007, prompting them to file this petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the complaint of the Del Rosariosdid not state
a cause of action.
RULING:
The CA held that the Del Rosarios' complaint before the RTC failed to state a cause of
action against respondents NBI agents. Such complaint said that the NBI agents
unlawfully procured and enforced the search warrant issued against the Del Rosarios
but it failed to state the ultimate facts from which they drew such conclusion.
The test of sufficiency of a complaint is whether or not, assuming the truth of the facts
that plaintiff alleges in it, the court can render judgment granting him the judicial
assistance he seeks. And judgment would be right only if the facts he alleges constitute
a cause of action that consists of three elements: (1) the plaintiff's legal right in the
matter; (2) the defendant's corresponding obligation to honor or respect such right; and
(3) the defendant's subsequent violation of the right. Absent any of these, the complaint
FELICANA L.MORGAN
would have failed to state a cause of action.
According to the Del Rosarios, the following allegations in their complaint state a cause
or causes of action against respondents NBI agents:
2.4 On 12 March 2002, elements of the [NBI] x xx led by Defendant Rafael I.

Gonzaga x xx entered by force the premises belonging to Plaintiff Alexander del
Rosario situated at No. 51 New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City,
pursuant to a Search Warrant unlawfully obtained from the [RTC] of Angeles City,
Branch 57 x xx.
x xxx
2.6 Contrary to the sworn statements given before the court by defendants
Hellenor D. Donato Jr. x xx and contrary to the allegation in Search Warrant No.
02-09A, no `fake Marlboro cigarettes and their packaging' were found at No. 51
New York Street, Villasol Subdivision, Angeles City x xx.
2.7 The inclusion of Plaintiff Arthur del Rosario in Search Warrant No. 02-09 had
no factual basis considering that the premises searched is the property solely of
Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario.
2.8 Worse the enforcement of Searched [sic] Warrant No. 02-09 was just part of
the series of raids and searches that was conducted in Angeles City and
Pampanga, which was done with much publicity in the community and had
tended to include the Plaintiffs in the same category as other persons and entities
who were in fact found to be dealing with fake Marlboro cigarettes.
x xxx
3.2 The baseless sworn allegations that Plaintiffs had under their control and
possession counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes and packaging to obtain a search
warrant, and the malicious service of the such warrant at the residential premises
of Plaintiff Alexander del Rosario in full and plain view of members of the
community, as part of the series of raids and operations conducted within
Angeles City and Pampanga during that period, has tainted irreversibly the good
names which Plaintiffs have painstakingly built and maintained over the years.
x xxx
3.4 Plaintiffs were subjected to so much humiliation and embarrassment by the

raid conducted on the subject residential premises, and subjected them to much
unwarranted speculation of engaging in the sale of fake merchandise.
Essentially, however, all that the Del Rosarios allege is that respondents NBI agents
used an unlawfully obtained search warrant against them, evidenced by the fact that,
contrary to the sworn statements used to get such warrant, the NBI agents found no
fake Marlboro cigarettes in petitioner Alexander del Rosario's premises.
But a judicially ordered search that fails to yield the described illicit article does not of
itself render the court's order "unlawful." The Del Rosarios did not allege that
respondents NBI agents violated their right by fabricating testimonies to convince the
RTC of Angeles City to issue the search warrant. Their allegation that the NBI agents
used an unlawfully obtained search warrant is a mere conclusion of law. While a motion
to dismiss assumes as true the facts alleged in the complaint, such admission does not
extend to conclusions of law. Statements of mere conclusions of law expose the
complaint to a motion to dismiss on ground of failure to state a cause of action.
Further, the allegation that the search warrant in this case was served in a malicious
manner is also not sufficient. Allegations of bad faith, malice, and other related words
without ultimate facts to support the same are mere conclusions of law.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
The Del Rosarios' broad assertion in their complaint that the search was conducted "in
full and plain view of members of the community" does not likewise support their claim
that such search was maliciously enforced. There is nothing inherently wrong with
search warrants being enforced in full view of neighbors. In fact, when the respondent
or his representative is not present during the search, the rules require that it be done in
the presence of two residents of the same locality. These safeguards exist to protect
persons from possible abuses that may occur if searches were done surreptitiously or
clandestinely.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
G.R. No. 185125 January 30, 2012
Ruben Del Castillo
vs.
People of the Philippines
Facts:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner Del Castillo was engaged in

selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after
conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner,
secured a search warrant from the RTC. Upon arrival to the residence of Del
Castillo to implement the search warrant, SPO3 Masnayon claimed that he saw
petitioner run towards a small structure, a nipa hut, in front of his house.
Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because he and his men were not familiar
with the entrances and exits of the place. They all went back to the residence of
Del Castillo and requested his men to get a barangay tanod and a few minutes
thereafter, his men returned with two barangay tanods who searched the house
of petitioner including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover.
His men who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several articles,
including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline substance.
Thus, an information was filed against Del Castillo for violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the RTC and affirmed by the Court
of Appeals. Petitioner filed with the Supreme Court the petition for certiorari
contending among others that CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be
presumed to be in possession of the same just because they were found inside
the nipa hut.
Issue:
Can petitioner Del Castillo be held liable for violation of Section 16, Article III of
R.A. 6425 by mere presumption that the petitioner has dominion and control over
the place where the shabu was found?
Held:
No. While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be
owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be
sufficient showing that the property is under petitioner’s control or possession.
The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in
question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The
RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure
FELICANA L.MORGAN
due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence
and presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drugs. With the prosecution’s failure to prove that the nipa hut
was under petitioner’s control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own
starting perspective on the status of the accused — in all criminal prosecutions,
he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof
sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
People v. Posada
Facts:
Accused-appellants Roger Posada and Emily Posada were convicted by the RTC
Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case No. 3490 for selling 12 pieces of
transparent sealed plastic sachet, containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
or shabu with a total weight of 0.4578 grams, in violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.
Roger was also convicted by the same RTC in Criminal Case No. 3489 for possession
of one piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue of a crystalline substance
(allegedly shabu), a piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small scissors, and 15 pieces
of used lighter all of which are intended to be used for smoking or introducing
dangerous drugs into the body of a person, in violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A.
No. 9165.
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accused-appellants filed an appeal before the
Court of Appeals (CA) which, via a Decision dated June 17, 2010, affirmed the RTC
Decision as to the accused-appellants' conviction in Criminal Case No. 3490 but
acquitted Roger in Criminal Case No. 3489 on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Issue:
I. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellants
notwithstanding the prosecution's failure to establish the chain of custody and integrity
of the alleged seized illegal items.
II. Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appelants
despite the prosecution's failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
On the first factual issue, the Court found that the records of the case and the
testimonies of witnesses belie the accused-appellants' contention.
Based on the records, the buy-bust operation, the arrest of the accused-appellants and
the confiscation of the illegal items happened at around 12 noon of August 3, 2005.
PO1 Area received from Emily one sachet of shabu and after PO1 Area introduced
himself and arrested Emily, 12 more sachets of shabu were found in the possession of
Emily. The said 12 sachets of shabu were inside a coin purse, with a bundle of money.
PO1 Area prepared on the same day an RPS in the presence
of Asuncion, Kagawad Sarmiento and Vargas. On August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested
for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet, containing white crystalline substance marked with initial R; 12 pieces of small
size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with
sub-markings R-1 to R-12; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size
plastic sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005
was received by PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz on the same date.
Nothing in it would show that P/CI Tria submitted the alleged illegal drugs beyond the
24-hour reglementary period. In fact, even the Laboratory Examination Request dated
August 4, 2005 does not indicate violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Clearly, from
the foregoing, the accused-appellants failed to adduce any evidence to prove their
contention. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation
applies in this case. The accused-appellants' failure to show evidence that the police
officers did not comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 gives us no other recourse but
to respect the findings of trial court and of the CA.
CA is correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the police officers as regards the
timely submission of the subject illegal drugs since they are presumed to have regularly
performed their duties, unless there is evidence suggesting ill-motive on the part of the
police officers. In this case, the accused-appellants failed to contradict the presumption.
What goes against the accused-appellants is the fact that they have not offered any
FELICANA L.MORGAN
evidence of ill-motive against the police officers. Emily even admitted that she did not
know PO1 Area, the poseur-buyer. Considering that there was no existing relationship
between the police officers and the accused-appellants, the former could not be
accused of improper motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellants. In People
v. Dumangay, the Court upheld the findings of the lower court on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duties because there was no proof of ill-motive.
Therein, the accused-appellants self-serving and uncorroborated defenses did not
prevail over the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses. The same may be
said in the present case.
On the second factual issue, the Court found the accused-appellants' claim not
supported by evidence.
A review of the defense-quoted testimony of PSI Clemen would show that accused-
appellants received one piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with
marking R, 12 pieces small size heat-sealed marked as R-1 to R-12 and one small size
crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet totaling to 15 items. PSI Clemen's
testimony tallies with the Laboratory Examination Request of P/CI Tria.
Evidence shows no discrepancy as to the number of plastic sachets recovered from the
accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen.
The prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of the seized illegal
items.
After PO1 Area arrested Emily and confiscated the 13 sachets of shabu (one bought by
PO1 Area from Emily and 12 found in Emily's coin purse after she received the same
from her husband Roger), P/CI Tria took pictures of the incident using his cellphone
while the official photographer was also taking pictures. Then PO1 Area prepared an
RPS, which Asuncion, Sarmiento and Vargas witnessed. Meanwhile, SPO1 Aldave,
seizing officer went inside the house of the accused-appellants, prepared and signed an
RPS after the raiding team found a piece of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet containing
residue of white crystalline substance, one small pair of green scissors beside the bed
inside a room, 15 pieces of used lighters, and two pieces of P50.00 bill and one piece
of P100.00 bill. Asuncion, Arcilla and Gonzales witnessed the preparation and signing of
the said RPS. Thereafter, on August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory
examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, containing
white crystalline substance; 12 pieces of small size heat sealed transparent plastic
sachets, containing white crystalline; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and
small size plastic sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated
August 4, 2005 was received by a certain PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz.
Subsequently, witness PSI Clemen, the forensic expert, received personally from PO2
Abanio the above-mentioned marked pieces of evidence. She then immediately
conducted a laboratory examination, yielding a result that the 12 pieces of plastic
sachets, the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking R and the one
aluminum foil strip contained methamphetamine hydrochloride. In open court, the
above-mentioned pieces of evidence were identified and marked.
From the foregoing, the prosecution, without an iota of doubt, has established the chain
of custody and integrity of the seized illegal items. The Supreme Court in People v.
Sanchez, clearly discussed how chain of custody should be proven, to wit:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe
how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it
was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to present, not only the corpus delicti, but
the testimonies of the people involved in each link in the chain of custody.
The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants
sold 12 sachets of shabu, but it has proven the accused-appellants' guilt beyond
reasonable doubt of possession of the same number of shabu in violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
There was a discrepancy in the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490. In the said
information, the accused-appellants were charged for selling 12 pieces of transparent
sealed plastic sachet of shabu. However, based on the evidence which the prosecution
adduced, Emily sold to PO1 Area one sachet of shabu, which was worth P250.00.
Then, after she handed the one sachet of shabu to the poseur-buyer, Emily received
additional 12 sachets of shabu from her husband Roger and when PO1 Area informed
the couple of the buy-bust, Emily had in her possession the 12 sachets of shabu.
Subsequently, the confiscated sachets of shabu were marked. The one sold to PO1
Area was marked with R, while the 12 sachets of shabu Roger handed to Emily before
their arrest were marked as R-1 to R-12.
The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather than separately charging Emily for the
sale of the one sachet of shabu and charging both Emily and Roger for possession of
the 12 sachets of shabu, the public prosecutor lumped the charges together to sale of
12 sachets of shabu. This is wrong. The Information is defective for charging the
accused-appellants of selling 12 sachets of shabu when, in fact, they should have been
charged of selling one sachet of shabu and possessing 12 sachets of shabu. From the
evidence adduced, Emily and Roger never sold the 12 sachets of shabu. They
possessed them. Thus, they should have not been convicted for selling the 12 sachets
of shabu. However, this was exactly what was done both by the trial court and the CA.
Without basis in fact, they convicted the couple for selling the 12 sachets of shabu.
Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective Information. An
Information is fatally defective when it is clear that it does not really charge an offense
or when an essential element of the crime has not been sufficiently alleged. In the
instant case, while the prosecution was able to allege the identity of the buyer and the
seller, it failed to particularly allege or identify in the Information the subject matter of the
sale or the corpus delicti. We must remember that one of the essential elements to
convict a person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify with certainty the corpus delicti.
Here, the prosecution took the liberty to lump together two sets of corpora
delicti when it should have separated the two in two different informations. To allow the
prosecution to do this is to deprive the accused-appellants of their right to be informed,
not only of the nature of the offense being charged, but of the essential element of the
offense charged; and in this case, the very corpus delicti of the crime.
Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or information, the court has no
other recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused. Here, since there
exists ambiguity as to the identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense
charged, it follows that such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused-
appellants. Thus, from the foregoing discussion, we have no other choice but to acquit
the accused-appellants of sale of 12 sachets of shabu.
Truly, both the trial court and the CA were wrong in convicting the couple for selling 12
sachets of shabu because the prosecution failed to show that the husband and wife had
indeed sold the 12 sachets of shabu. Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 provides:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and
Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five
hundred thousand pesos ([P]500,000.00) to Ten million pesos ([P]10,000,000.00) shall
be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or
FELICANA L.MORGAN
transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless
of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
More, jurisprudence holds that the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs can
only be successful when the following elements are established, namely:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore.
To our minds, while there was indeed a transaction between Emily and PO1 Area, the
prosecution failed to show that the subject matter of the sale to PO1 Area was the 12
sachets of shabu. Based on the testimony of PO1 Area, the 12 sachets of shabu were
the sachets of shabu which Roger handed to his wife Emily and were not sold, but
which PO1 Area found in her possession after the latter identified himself as a police
officer.
In People v. Paloma, the Court acquitted the accused for the prosecution's failure to
prove the crime of illegal sale of drugs, and we have set the standard in proving the
same, to wit:
Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria, the prosecution must
clearly and adequately show the details of the purported sale, namely, the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration, and, finally, the accused's delivery of the illegal drug to
the buyer, whether the latter be the informant alone or the police officer. This proof is
essential to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit the
offense.
In the instant case, PO1 Area's testimony showed no evidence that the transaction as to
the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu ever happened. Rather, PO1 Area adequately
testified on the fact that accused-appellant Roger handed the 12 sachets of shabu to
Emily who kept them in a coin purse. And after PO1 Area identified himself as a police
operative, he found the 12 sachets of shabu in Emily's possession. From the foregoing,
while the prosecution was able to prove the sale of one sachet of shabu, it is patently
clear that it never established with moral certainty all the elements of illegal sale of the
12 sachets ofshabu. And failure to show that indeed there was sale means failure to
prove the guilt of the accused for illegal sale of drugs, because what matters in the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is to show proof that the sale actually
happened, coupled with the presentation in court of corpus delicti. Here, the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of the sale of the 12 sachets of shabu and also to prove
that the 12 sachets of shabu presented in court were truly the subject matter of the sale
between the accused-appellants and PO1 Area.
Notwithstanding the above-discussion, we convict both Roger and Emily of illegal

possession of prohibited drugs despite the fact that they were charged for the sale of
illegal drugs, because possession is necessarily included in sale of illegal drugs.
Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved,
and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved,
the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Since sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes possession of the same, the
accused-appellants should be convicted of possession. We have consistently ruled that
possession of prohibited or dangerous drugs is absorbed in the sale thereof. Then
Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban logically and clearly explained the rationale
behind this ruling, to wit:
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the sale thereof,
except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of another quantity of the
FELICANA L.MORGAN
prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and which are probably intended
for some future dealings or use by the seller.
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs.

It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale be identified and
presented in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could not be established without
a showing that the accused possessed, sold and delivered a prohibited drug clearly
indicates that possession is an element of the former. The same rule is applicable in
cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them away to another.
For prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the

following essential elements must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in possession
of an item or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possess the said drug.
Emily and Roger were found in possession of 12 sachets of shabu.
In United States v. Juan, the Court have clarified the meaning of the words having
possession of. The Court said that the said phrase included constructive possession,
that is, the relation between the owner of the drug and the drug itself when the owner is
not in actual physical possession, but when it is still under his control and management
and subject to his disposition. In other words, in that case, we recognized the fact that a
person remains to be in possession of the prohibited drugs although he may not have or
may have lost physical possession of the same.
The ruling in Juan applies to the present case. Admittedly, the 12 sachets

of shabu were found in the possession of Emily. But PO1 Area saw Roger hand the
same 12 sachets of shabu to Emily. While Roger had lost physical possession of the
said 12 sachets of shabu, he had constructive possession of the same because they
remain to be under his control and management. In the Juan case, Lee See gave the
physical possession of the opium to Cabinico while Chan Guy Juan had not yet
received the same opium from Lee See, but both were held guilty of illegal possession
of opium. Thus, we can liken the instant case to that of Juan because while Roger had
lost physical possession of the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily, he maintained
constructive possession of the same.
Convicting both Emily and Roger of possession of illegal drugs deprives their children of
parents. But if the Court have to take care of our children and the family where each of
us belongs, the Court are obligated to put in jail all those, including fathers and mothers,
who peddle illegal drugs.
The Court emphasized the need for the public prosecutor to properly evaluate all the
pieces of evidence and file the proper information to serve the ends of justice. The
public prosecutor must exert all efforts so as not to deny the People a remedy against
those who sell prohibited drugs to the detriment of the community and its children. Many
drug cases are dismissed because of the prosecutor's sloppy work and failure to file
airtight cases. If only the prosecution properly files the Information and prosecutes the
same with precision, guilty drug pushers would be punished to the extent allowed under
the law, as in this case.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 2010 is MODIFIED.
Accused-appellants ROGER POSADA and EMILY POSADA ARE FOUND GUILTY OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWELVE (12) SACHETS OF METHAMPETAMINE
HYDROCHOLORIDE OR SHABU, WITH A NET WEIGHT OF 0.4578 GRAMS AND
ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO THE INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY, AS MINIMUM, TO FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT
(8) MONTHS, AS MAXIMUM AND A FINE OF P300,000.00.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Kho vs Makalintal
G.R. No. 94902-06. April 21, 1999

Facts: Petitioners sought to restrain the respondent NBI from using the
objects seized by virtue of such warrants in any case or cases filed or to be filed
against them and to return immediately the said items, including the firearms,
ammunition and explosives, radio communication equipment, hand sets, transceivers,
two units of vehicles and motorcycle.
Petitioners question the issuance of subject search warrants, theorizing upon the
absence of any probable cause therefor. They contend that the surveillance and
investigation conducted by NBI agents within the premises involved, prior to the
application for the search warrants under controversy, were not sufficient to vest in the
applicants personal knowledge of facts and circumstances showing or indicating the
commission of a crime by them (petitioners).
Issue: Whether petitioners’ contention of the absence of probable cause in the given

situation is tenable.
Held: Petitioners’ contention is untenable. Records show that the NBI agents who
conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocably that they saw guns
being carried to and unloaded at the two houses searched, and motor vehicles and
spare parts were stored therein. In fact, applicant Max B. Salvador declared that he
personally attended the surveillance together with his witnesses (TSN, May 15, 1990,
pp. 2-3), and the said witnesses personally saw the weapons being unloaded from
motor vehicles and carried to the premises referred to. NBI Agent Ali Vargas testified
that he actually saw the firearms being unloaded from a Toyota Lite-Ace van and
brought to the aformentioned house in BF Homes, Paranaque because he was there
inside the compound posing as an appliance agent (TSN, May 15, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is
therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was
based on the personal knowledge of the applicants and their witnesses.
In the case of Central Bank v. Morfe (20 SCRA 507), this Court ruled that the question
of whether or not a probable cause exists is one which must be determined in
light of the conditions obtaining in given situations. In Luna v. Plaza (26 SCRA
310), it held that the existence of a probable cause depends to a large extent upon the
finding or opinion of the judge who conducted the required examination of the applicants
and the witnesses.
After a careful study, the Court discerns no basis for disturbing the findings and
conclusions arrived at by the respondent Judge after examining the applicants and
witnesses. Respondent judge had the singular opportunity to assess their testimonies
and to find out their personal knowledge of facts and circumstances enough to create a
probable cause. The Judge was the one who personally examined the applicants and
witnesses and who asked searching questions vis-a-vis the applications for search
warrants. He was thus able to observe and determine whether subject applicants and
their witnesses gave accurate accounts of the surveillance and investigation they
conducted at the premises to be searched. In the absence of any showing that
respondent judge was recreant of his duties in connection with the personal
examination he so conducted on the affiants before him, there is no basis for doubting
the reliability and correctness of his findings and impressions.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
AL-GOUL VS CA
Facts:
Judge Mangay issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure of
certain items in Apartment No. 2, 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan
City.
The police searched Apartment No. 8, in the same compound and found one (1) .45
caliber pistol. Found in Apartment No. 2 were firearms, ammunitions and explosives.
Petitioners were charged before the RTC of Kalookan City with illegal possession of
firearms, ammunition and explosives, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866.
Thereafter, petitioners were arrested and detained.
When their motion for bail was denied, they appealed to the CA where they also raised
the issue of the validity of the search and seizure orders.
Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the
Bill of Rights as well as Section 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court on Criminal
Procedure because the place searched and articles seized were not described with
particularity. They argue that the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126
was ignored when only one witness signed the receipt for the properties seized during
the search, and said witness was not presented at the trial
Issues:
1. Was the search made at Apartment No. 8 legal?

2. Was the search made at Apartment No. 2 legal?
3. Whether the two-witness requirement under Section 10 of Rule 126 was violated
Held:
1. No. The place to be searched cannot be changed, enlarged nor amplified by the
police. Policemen may not be restrained from pursuing their task with vigor, but in doing
so, care must be taken that constitutional and legal safeguards are not disregarded.
Exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Hence, the
search made at Apartment No. 8 is illegal and the .45 caliber pistol taken thereat is
inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.
2. Yes. The search warrants in question specifically mentioned Apartment No. 2. The
search was done in the presence of its occupants, herein petitioners, in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court. The articles seized during the search of
Apartment No. 2 are of the same kind and nature as those items enumerated in the
search warrant. The items seized from Apartment No. 2 were described with specificity
in the warrants in question.
The nature of the items ordered to be seized did not require a technical description.
Moreover, the law does not require that the things to be seized must be described in
precise and minute details as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching
authorities, otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a
search warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things they are looking for.
Once described, however, the articles subject of the search and seizure need not be so
invariant as to require absolute concordance, in our view, between those seized and
those described in the warrant. Substantial similarity of those articles described as a
class or species would suffice.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
One of the tests to determine the particularity in the description of objects to be seized
under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. A careful examination
of Search Warrant Nos. 54-95 and 55-95 shows that they were worded in such a
manner that the enumerated items to be seized could bear a direct relation to the
offense of violation of Section 1 and 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,
penalizing illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives. What the
warrants authorized was the seizure of articles proscribed by that decree, and no other.
2. Section 10 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 10. Receipt for the property seized. The officer seizing property under the warrant
must give a detailed receipt for the same to the lawful occupant of the premises in
whose presence the search and seizure were made, or in the absence of such
occupant, must, in the presence of at least two witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality, leave a receipt in the place in which he found
the seized property.
Clearly, the two-witness rule applies only in the absence of the lawful occupants of the
premises searched. In the case at bar, petitioners were present when the search and
seizure operation was conducted by the police at Apartment No. 2. More importantly,
petitioner Nasser admitted being an actual occupant/resident of Apartment No. 2.
Hence, there no violation of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. (Al-
Ghoul vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126859, September 4, 2001)
FELICANA L.MORGAN
PEOPLE VS TEE
FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a

resident of Baguio City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP
NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by appellant and at his residence yielded
huge quantities of marijuana.
Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too
general and that the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance
of a valid search warrant. The pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the
filing of the appropriate charges against appellant. In an information dated July
24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged Modesto Tee, alias “Estoy
Tee,” with illegal possession of marijuana.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant's contention that the description on the
serach warrant which says “an undetermined amount of marijuana,” was too
general and hence makes the warrant void for vagueness.
HELD: SC held that the appellant’s contention, has no leg to stand on. The
constitutional requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things
to be seized is primarily meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to:
(1) readily identify the properties to be seized and thus prevent them from seizing
the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion regarding
the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.
What the Constitution seeks to avoid are search warrants of broad or general
characterization or sweeping descriptions, which will authorize police officers to
undertake a fishing expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of
evidence or articles relating to an offense. However, it is not required that
technical precision of description be required, particularly, where by the nature of
the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, since the
requirement of a technical description would mean that no warrant could issue.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Microsoft Corporation vs Maxicorp, Inc. 438 SCRA 224
FACTS:
In 1996, Dominador Samiano, Jr., an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc. He observed that Microsoft Softwares
(Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged within the premises of
Maxicorp. Samiano, together with a civilian witness (John Benedict Sacriz) then bought a
computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-installed with a pirated copy of Windows.
For their purchase, they were issued a receipt, however, the receipt was in the name of a
certain “Joel Diaz”. Subsequently, Samiano applied for a search warrant before the RTC.
He brought with him Sacriz as witness. He also brought the computer unit they bought as
evidence as well as the receipt. He even added an additional witness (Felixberto Pante), a
computer technician, who showed the judge that the software in the computer unit bought
by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated. The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable
cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair competition committed by Maxicorp,
issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp assailed the legality of the warrant before the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Maxicorp and in its decision it
highlighted the fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s or Sacriz’ name hence the
proceeding in the trial court was infirm from the onset.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: No. The testimonies of the two witnesses, coupled with the object and
documentary evidence they presented, are sufficient to establish the existence
of probable cause. From what they have witnessed, there is reason to believe
that Maxicorp engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the
prejudice of Microsoft. Both NBI Agent Samiano and Sacriz were clear and
insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold within
Maxicorp’s premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases,
installed there.
The fact that the receipt issued was not in Samiano’s name nor was it in
Sacriz’ name does not render the issuance of the warrant void. No law or rule
states that probable cause requires a specific kind of evidence. No formula or
fixed rule for its determination exists. Probable cause is determined in the light of
conditions obtaining in a given situation.Thus, it was improper for the Court of
Appeals to reverse the RTC’s findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samiano’s purchase of counterfeit goods is not in his name.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
VALLEJO VS CA
FACTS: A SW was applied for and subsequently issued by respondents to be

served in the Registry of Deeds, provincial capitol of Isabela in which it
enumerated the things to be seized:
1. Undetermined number of Fake Land Titles, Official Receipts in the Cashier's

Office, Judicial Form No. 39 known as Primary Entry Book under No. 496 and
other pertinent documents related therewith;
2. Blank Forms of Land Titles kept inside the drawers of every table of employees
of the Registry (sic) of Deeds;
3. Undetermined number of land Transfer transactions without the corresponding

payment of Capital Gains Tax and payment of documentary Stamps.
A motion to quash the SW was filed by the respondent contending that the things
to be seized were not described with particularity and was in a nature of a general
warrant, therefore, is a violation of the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures but was denied by the RTC and the CA.
Hence, the present petition for certiorari. (The OSG in its comment agreed with
petitioners.)
ISSUE: WON the warrant issued by the RTC was valid.
HELD:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. – A search warrant shall not issue
except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in
the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. – The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in
writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements,
together with the affidavits submitted.
The things to be seized must be described with particularity. Technical precision

of description is not required. It is only necessary that there be reasonable
particularity and certainty as to the identity of the property to be searched for and
seized, so that the warrant shall not be a mere roving commission. Any
description of the place or thing to be searched that will enable the officer making
the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing is sufficient.
Thus, the specific property to be searched for should be so particularly described
as to preclude any possibility of seizing any other property(test of particularity).
As correctly pointed out by the petitioner and the OSG, the terms expressly used
in the warrant were too all-embracing, with the obvious intent of subjecting all the
records pertaining to all the transactions of the petitioner's office at the Register
of Deeds to search and seizure. Such tenor of a seizure warrant contravenes the
FELICANA L.MORGAN
explicit command of the Constitution that there be a particular description of the
things to be seized.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Stonehill v Diokno
Facts:
Forty-two (42) search warrants were issued at different dates against petitioners
and the corporations of which they were officers. Peace officers were directed to
search the persons of the petitioners and/or their premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences. Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets, and profit and
loss statements and Bobbins were to be seized.
Petitioner contends that the issued search warrants were null and void as having
contravened the Constitution and the Rules of Court for, among others, it did not
describe the documents, books and things to be seized PARTICULARLY.
Issue:
Whether or not the search warrant has been validly issued.
Whether or not the seized articles may be admitted in court.
Held:
The authority of the warrants in question may be split in two major groups: (a)
those found and seized in the offices of the corporations; and (b) those found and
seized in the residences of the petitioners.
The petitioners have no cause of action against the contested warrants on the
first major group. This is because corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of their officers,
directors and stockholders. The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired, the objection to an unlawful search and
seizure purely being personal cannot be availed by third parties.
As to the second major group, two important questions need be settled: (1)
whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made
under authority thereof, are valid or not; and (2) if the answer is no, whether said
documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners.
The Constitution protects the rights of the people from unreasonable searches
and seizure. Two points must be stressed in connection to this constitutional
mandate: (1) no warrant shall be issued except if based upon probable cause
determined personally by the judge by the manner set in the provision; and (2)
the warrant shall describe the things to be seized with particularly.
In the present case, no specific offense has been alleged in the warrant’s
application. The averments of the offenses committed were abstract and
therefore, would make it impossible for judges to determine the existence of
probable cause. Such impossibility of such determination naturally hinders the
issuance of a valid search warrant.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
The Constitution also requires the things to be seized described with
particularity. This is to eliminate general warrants.
The Court held that the warrants issued for the search of three residences of
petitioners are null and void.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
TAMBASEN VS. PEOPLE [246 SCRA 184; G.R. NO. 89103; 14 JUL 1995]
Facts: In August 1988, P/Sgt. Natuel applied for issuance of search warrant
alleging that he received information that Petitioner had in his possession at his
house “M-16 Armalite rifles, hand grenades, .45 Cal. pistols, dynamite sticks and
subversive documents”, which were “used or intended to be used” for illegal
purposes. The application was granted.
In September, a police team, searched the house of petitioner and seized “2

envelopes containing P14000, handset with antennae, transceiver with antennae,
regulator supply, academy notebook and assorted papers and handset battery
pack”. In October, petitioner moved that the search and seizure be declared
illegal and that the seized articles be returned to him. In December, MTCC, in its
order, directed Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to petitioner ruling that
any seizure should be limited to the specified items covered thereby. SolGen
petitioned with the RTC for the annulment of the order of MTCC citing that
pending the determination of legality of seizure of the articles, they should remain
in custogia legis. RTC granted the petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the articles which were not mentioned in the
search warrant was legal.
Held: Section 2 Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant
should particularly describe the things to be seized. The police acts beyond the
parameters of their authority if they seize articles not described in the search
warrants. The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things
to be seized, to leave the officers of the law with no discretion; that unreasonable
search and seizure may not be made and that abuses may not be committed.
Petition granted. People of the Philippines is ordered to return the money seized.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
COLUMBIA VS CA
Facts: The National Bureau of Investigation has engaged in an anti -film piracy
drive by investigating various video establishments in Metro Manila involving
cases violating PD No. 49, as amended, including Sunshine Home Video Inc.
(“Sunshine”), owned and operated by Danilo A. Pelindario with address at No. 6
Mayfair Center, Magallanes, Makati, Metro Manila.
On November 14, 1987, NBI Senior Agent Lauro C. Reyes applied for a search
warrant with the court a quo against Sunshine seeking the seizure, among others,
of pirated video tapes of copyrighted films, which the court granted.
In the course of the search of the premises indicated in the search warrant, the
NBI Agents found and seized various video tapes of duly copyrighted motion
pictures/films owned or exclusively distributed by Columbia Pictures, Inc. et al
(Columbia et al.)
Thereafter, the court has lifted the search warrant which it had therefore issued
after a series of motions, up until the CA.
In the SC, Sunshine challenged Columbia et al’s legal standing in our courts, they
being foreign corporations not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not Columbia et al were “doing business” in the Philippines,

thus, needs to be licensed before having a legal standing in Philippine courts.
Sunshine’s contention:
Columbia et al, being foreign corporations, should have such license to be able to
maintain an action in Philippine courts.
Sunshine point to the fact that Columbia et al are the copyright owners or owners
of exclusive rights of distribution in the Philippines of copyrighted motion
pictures or films, and also to the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as their
attorney-in- fact, as being constitutive of “doing business in the Philippines”
under Section 1(f) (1) and (2), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Board of Investments. As
foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines, Section 133 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 68, or the Corporation Code of the Philippines, denies them the
right to maintain a suit in Philippine courts in the absence of a license to do
business. Consequently, they have no right to ask for the issuance of a search
warrant.
Columbia et al’s contention:
FELICANA L.MORGAN
Columbia et al denied that they are doing business in the Philippines and contend
that Sunshine have not adduced evidence to prove that petitioners are doing
such business here, as would require them to be licensed by the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Moreover, an exclusive right to distribute a product or the ownership of such

exclusive right does not conclusively prove the act of doing business nor
establish the presumption of doing business.
Ruling: No, foreign film corporations do not transact or do business in the

Philippines and, therefore, do not need to be licensed in order to take recourse to
our courts.
As acts constitutive of “doing business,” the fact that Columbia et al are

admittedly copyright owners or owners of exclusive distribution rights in the
Philippines of motion pictures or films does not convert such ownership into an
indicium of doing business which would require them to obtain a license before
they can sue upon a cause of action in local courts.
Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of

Columbia et al., with express authority pursuant to a special power of attorney
Held:
Based on Article 133 of the Corporation Code and gauged by such statutory
standards, Columbia et al are not barred from maintaining the present action.
There is no showing that, under our statutory or case law, Columbia et al are
doing, transacting, engaging in or carrying on business in the Philippines as
would require obtention of a license before they can seek redress from our
courts. No evidence has been offered to show that petitioners have performed
any of the enumerated acts or any other specific act indicative of an intention to
conduct or transact business in the Philippines.
Article 125 and Article 133 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines, as
interpreted, says that any foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines may maintain an action in our courts upon any cause of action,
provided that the subject matter and the defendant are within the jurisdiction of
the court. It is not the absence of the prescribed license but “doing business” in
the Philippines without such license which debars the foreign corporation from
access to our courts. In other words, although a foreign corporation is without
license to transact business in the Philippines, it does not follow that it has no
capacity to bring an action. Such license is not necessary if it is not engaged in
business in the Philippines.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
No general rule or governing principles can be laid down as to what constitutes
“doing” or “engaging in” or “transacting” business. Each case must be judged in
the light of its own peculiar environmental circumstances. The true tests,
however, seem to be whether the foreign corporation is continuing the body or
substance of the business or enterprise for which it was organized or whether it
has substantially retired from it and turned it over to another.
Authorities agrees that a foreign corporation is “doing,” “transacting,” “engaging

in,” or “carrying on” business in the State when, and ordinarily only when, it has
entered the State by its agents and is there engaged in carrying on and
transacting through them some substantial part of its ordinary or customary
business, usually continuous in the sense that it may be distinguished from
merely casual, sporadic, or occasional transactions and isolated acts.
The Corporation Code does not itself define or categorize what acts constitute
doing or transacting business in the Philippines. Jurisprudence has, however,
held that the term implies a continuity of commercial dealings and arrangements,
and
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts or works or the exercise of

some of the functions normally incident to or in progressive prosecution of the
purpose and subject of its organization.
As a general rule, a foreign corporation will not be regarded as doing business in

the State simply because it enters into contracts with residents of the State,
where such contracts are consummated outside the State. In fact, a view is taken
that a foreign corporation is not doing business in the state merely because sales
of its product are made there or other business furthering its interests is
transacted there by an alleged agent, whether a corporation or a natural person,
where such activities are not under the direction and control of the foreign
corporation but are engaged in by the alleged agent as an independent business.
It is generally held that sales made to customers in the State by an independent

dealer who has purchased and obtained title from the corporation to the products
sold are not a doing of business by the corporation. Likewise, a foreign
corporation which sells its products to persons styled “distributing agents” in the
State, for distribution by them, is not doing business in the State so as to render
it subject to service of process therein, where the contract with these purchasers
is that they shall buy exclusively from the foreign corporation such goods as it
manufactures and shall sell them at trade prices established by it.
Merely engaging in litigation has been considered as not a sufficient minimum

contact to warrant the exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
FELICANA L.MORGAN
PEOPLE v. DANILO SIMBAHON Y QUIATZON, GR No. 132371, 2003-04-09
Facts:
On April 22, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 23, issued Search
Warrant No. 95-100,[1] commanding the search in the premises of 771 Roxas Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, owned by appellant Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon, for... alleged
violation of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1866, penalizing the illegal possession
of firearms.
Stripped of their immaterialities, the prosecution's evidence tends to establish that about
3:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 23, 1995, police operatives, together with the
chairman of the barangay which had jurisdiction over the place, and a member of...
media, served Search Warrant No. 95-100, Exhibit "F", issued by Hon. Judge William
Bayhon on April 22, 1995, upon Danilo Simbahon, Maricar Morgia, and Charito
Mangulabnan at their residence at No. 771 Roxas Street, Sampaloc, Manila, that
although at first they were met with... slight resistance, the team nevertheless gained
entry into the house and, rounding up all the occupants found therein, herded them to
the sala. Thereafter, they began conducting a search of all the rooms in accordance
with the search warrant; that in the room occupied by live-in... partners Danilo
Simbahon and Charito Mangulabnan, the police officers found under the bed a brick of
dried flowering tops suspected to be marijuana, weighing 856.8 grams, wrapped in a
newspaper and placed inside a plastic (Exhibit "C") and a black bullet pouch containing
six (6)... live ammunitions, while in the room occupied by Maricar Morgia, the operative
recovered a green plastic pencil case containing nine (9) pieces of small transparent
sachets with white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu (Exhibit "B-1") and five
(5) pieces of .38... caliber live ammunitions. When lastly the living room was searched,
the policemen found therein a red and black synthetic case. Inside the case were three
(3) pieces of small transparent plastic sachets containing suspected shabu (Exhibit "B-
2"), some sniffing... paraphernalias such as improvised burner, tooter (Exhibit "B-6"),
scissors (Exhibit "B-8"), eight (8) strips of aluminum foil (Exhibit "B-5), plastic sachets
with residue (Exhibit "B-3"), and empty plastic sachets (Exhibit "B-4"). After the search,
an inventory receipt (Exhibit
"G") of the items seized from the house of the suspects was prepared and, together with
an affidavit of orderly search (Exhibit "H"), was signed by Danilo Simbahon; that the
three accused were then arrested and brought to the precinct for investigation. The
ammunitions recovered... were sent to the Firearms and Explosive Unit, Camp Crame,
Quezon City, to determine their identities and on September 22, 1995 and August 6,
1996, certifications were issued by said office to the effect that accused Maricar Morgia
and Danilo Simbahon were not licensed/registered... firearm/ammunitions holders of
any kind and caliber. The other evidence recovered were brought to the National
Bureau of Investigation for laboratory examination and were found to be positive for
shabu and marijuana as evidenced by Exhibit "E".
The three accused were arraigned on June 2, 1995 and respectively pleaded not guilty.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

PROSECUTION PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT APPELLANT
COMMITTED A VIOLATION OF SECTION 8 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6425 (1972).
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SEARCH

WARRANT NO. 95-100 WAS VALID.
WHETHER OR NOT THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN FAILING TO SUSPEND THE APPELLANT'S ARRAIGNMENT AFTER
GRANTING A REINVESTIGATION.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC ATTORNEY WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN
FAILING TO CHALLENGE THE VALIDITY OF THE SEARCH CONDUCTED PRIOR
TO THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE APPELLANT.
Ruling:
The prosecution's failure to explain why the markings were no longer on the bricks of
marijuana leaves is certainly damaging to its case. The prosecution must ensure that
the item presented in court is the very same item seized from an accused in order to
discourage tampering... with the evidence. Its failure to do so, therefore, raised serious
doubt as to appellant's guilt. Considering that in criminal cases, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary to establish the guilt of an accused, similarly,
unwavering exactitude in the identification of the corpus delicti is necessary. Every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be established... by proof beyond reasonable
doubt.[11]
More importantly, this case should be dismissed on the ground of manifest violations of
the constitutional right of the accused against illegal search and seizure. While appellant
may be deemed to have waived his right to question the legality of the search warrant
and the... admissibility of the evidence seized for failure to raise his objections at the
opportune time,[12] however, the record shows serious defects in the search warrant
itself which render the same null and void.[13]
As a general rule, factual findings of the trial court are entitled to respect absent any
indication that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of weight and influence
which, if considered, would alter the result of the case.[14] In this case, we... find that
the trial court overlooked defects in Search Warrant No. 95-100, to wit:[15]
The caption as well as the body of Search Warrant No. 95-100 show that it was issued
for more than one offense for violation of RA 6425 and for violation of PD 1866. In
Tambasen v. People, et al., it was held:
On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 123 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific
offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special
laws: P.D. No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700,
the Anti-Subversive Law. Search Warrant No. 365 was therefore a "scatter-shot
warrant" and totally null and void.[16]
Finally, the seized marijuana was not mentioned in the search warrant issued for the
search of appellant's house. The seizure by the police officers conducting the search of
articles not described in the search warrant was beyond the parameters of their
authority under the... search warrant. Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution
requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized. The
evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those,
and only those, particularly... described in the search warrant, to leave the officers of the
law with no discretion regarding what articles they should seize, to the end that
unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be
committed.[20] Neither can the... admissibility of such seized items be justified under
the plain view doctrine, for the bricks of marijuana in this case were found not
inadvertently or in plain view. Rather, they were found after a meticulous search under
the bed, wrapped in a newspaper and inside a plastic... bag. In People v. Musa,[21] the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents was declared inadmissible because the said
drugs were contained in a plastic bag which bore no indication of its contents.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant Danilo Simbahon y Quiatzon is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged against him. He is ordered immediately released unless he is being held for
some other... valid or lawful cause.
Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
FELICANA L.MORGAN
FELICANA L.MORGAN
FELICANA L.MORGAN

Page 6

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Page 6

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Corro v.

1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

3. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;

4. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets,

5. Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording

Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents/personal

Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides:

SEC. 3. ...no search warrant or warrant of arrest issue except upon

SEC. 3.Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall

Probable cause may be defined as "such reasons, supported by facts and

and, the affidavit of Lt. Ignacio reads, among others—

... the said periodical published by Rommel Corro, contains articles

ISSUE: WON the search warrant issued was valid

ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuza’s motion to quash Search

Columbia et al’s contention:

Neither is the appointment of Atty. Rico V. Domingo as attorney-in-fact of Columbia et

Pryce is a domestic corporation engaged in manufacturing and distributing industrial

Nature of the Petition

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.

(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;

 On 14 November 2003, the National Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI), through

1) Whether probable cause existed in the issuance of thesubject search warrants;

(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;

Probable cause, as far as the issuance of a search warrant is concerned, has

Microsoft Corporation and LotusDevelopment Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc: “The

2) Whether said search warrantswere in the nature of general search warrants

It is elemental that in order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly

The search warrants were issued in relation to no particular offense.

Application for Search Warrant filed by NBI SI Lacaran, it is clearly stated

GR No. 182926, Jun 22, 2015

G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015

The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations obtained by Galleon

Held: The petition is meritorious.

It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary

In the absence of aggravating circumstances, the maximum penalty cannot be imposed

Yes, the President of the Philippines may initiate criminal proceedings.

WON the search warrant is validly issued by then Judge Ontal

On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter

G.R. No. 82870 December 14, 1989

Person to be searched in Nemesio Prudente at the Polytechnic University of the

Petitioner moved to quash the Search Warrant. He claimed that:

Petitioners, had no personal knowledge of the facts

Search warrant was a general warrant

Whether or not the search and seizure was valid?

Search Warrant annulled and set aside.

– This probable case must be shown to be personal knowledge and of the

January 22, 2004

 Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a search warrant

petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45

Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations

Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.

Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and Michael A. Moradoz (Moradoz) were

In their Joint Affidavit, Serrano and Moradoz stated that:

In their Comment/Opposition dated 21 June 2010,[13] petitioners alleged that:

Respondents received a copy of the motion the day it was filed.

espondents moved to expunge petitioners' motion for reconsideration, saying that

On 15 July 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order.[22]

The RTC denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration

The CA denied the petition for certiorari

Hence, this petition.

As correctly pointed out by the CA: