Case No.

330
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People vs. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169, No. 23051 October 20, 1925

MAINT POINT: The law, constitutional and statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not
issue unless the application "particularly" describe the person to be seized.

FACTS:
Veloso, a congressman and the manager of the Parliamentary Club, alleged to be a gambling house, was
found guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of authority.

Detective Geronimo obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño to search the building located

nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them was Congressman Veloso who
resisted arrest because the warrant indicated a John Doe and that the police had no right to search the
house.

ISSUE: Whether or not the John Doe warrants are valid?

RULING: Yes. Those warrants are valid. John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the
rule. The police should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be
seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible.

The police should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough to perform
under the best of conditions, by superficial adherence to a technicality or far-fetched judicial interference.

Case No. 331

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33, No. 45358 January 29, 1937

MAINT POINT: The affidavit to be presented, which shall serve as the basis for determining
whether probable cause exists and whether the warrant should be issued, must contain a
particular description of the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.

FACTS:
Petitioner Alvarez asks that the warrant issued by Judge Gutierrez

ordering the search and seizure of certain accounting documents at any time of day and night as well as
the order authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized

be declared illegal and set aside and the items be returned to him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure warrant is valid?

RULING: No. It is not valid. Pursuant to Section 2, of Article III of the Constitution, "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." In the case at
bar, the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made. Therefore, the Court held that the search
warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and
do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
Case No. 332
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541, No. L-69899 July 15, 1985

MAINT POINT: Warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized

FACTS:
Rommel Corro filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus to review the order of Judge Esteban Lising of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. XCV. On September 29, 1983,

respondent Regional Trial Court Judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col.
Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No.
Q-00002 authorizing the search and seizure of Philippine Times paraphernalia, under the crime of inciting
to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1835.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said warrant is valid?

RULING: No. The Court found no basis for the issuance of the search warrant, absent of the
existence of probable cause. A search warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the things to be seized. In the case at bar, the search warrant under consideration was in the nature
of a general warrant which is constitutionally objectionable. WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. Q-00002
issued by the respondent judge on September 29, 1983, is declared null and void.

Case No. 333

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Pangandaman vs. Casar, 159 SCRA 599, No. L-71782 April 14, 1988

MAINT POINT: Warrants of arrest should particularly describe the person or persons to be seized

FACTS:
The shooting incident by armed men in Lanao led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners assert
that the respondent Judge issued a warrant of arrest against fifty (50) “John Does” transgressing the
Constitutional provision requiring that such warrants should particularly describe the persons or things to
be seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the John Doe arrest warrant is valid?

RULING: No. The Court ruled that Said warrant is voided to the extent that it is issued against fifty (50)
“John Does.” Insofar as said warrant is issued against fifty (50) John Does not one of whom the witnesses
to the complaint could or would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one of a class of writs long
proscribed as unconstitutional and once anathematized as totally subversive of the liberty of the subject.

Case No. 334

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383, No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

MAINT POINT: Search warrants authorizing the seizure of books of accounts and records
"showing all the business transactions" of certain persons, regardless of whether the transactions
were legal or illegal, contravene the explicit command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be
seized should be particularly described and defeat its major objective of eliminating general
warrants.

FACTS:
Respondents herein secured a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein and or the
corporations of which they were officers, to search books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers), for violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrants, and the searches and seizures made are valid?

RULING: No. The Court ruled that the search warrants, searches and seizures are invalid. The
Constitutional mandates: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the
things to be seized. In the case at bench, none of these requirements has been complied with in the
contested warrants. They violate the Constitution, and hence, are invalid.

Case No. 335

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People vs. Martinez, 235 SCRA 171, G.R. Nos. 105376-77 August 5, 1994

MAINT POINT: Regardless of the alleged defect of the search warrant in erroneously designating
his first name,

the seized articles may still be used as evidence against the accused-appellant, having been
obtained from him and as such, fruits of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest.

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Alexander Martinez, alias Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, was charged with (1)
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and possession of illegal firearms in the Zamboanga City RTC after
a buy bust operation. The accused-appellant argues that he is not the person named in the search
warrant issued in connection with the buy-bust operation, his name being Abelardo Martinez and not
Alexander Martinez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the wrong name in the search warrant in a buy bust operation invalidates the
search?

RULING: No. The Court held that such cannot render the articles seized inadmissible as evidence
in court. As a matter of fact the information filed identify him as “Alexander Martinez alias
Abelardo Martinez y Montesor, accused.” The accused-appellant was arrested as a result of a “buy-
bust” operation and the ensuing search of the premises was made as an incident to a lawful arrest. It is
therefore clear that regardless of the alleged defect of the search warrant in erroneously designating his
first name, the seized articles may still be used as evidence against accused-appellant, having been
obtained from him and as such, fruits of a lawful search incidental to a valid arrest.

Case No. 336

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Microsoft Corp. v. Maxicorp (2004)

MAINT POINT: All evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure are inadmissible
in court due to lack of specificity.

FACTS:
An agent of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted a surveillance against Maxicorp, Inc.
He observed that Microsoft Softwares (Windows Operating Systems) were being produced and packaged
within the premises of Maxicorp. They then bought a computer unit from Maxicorp. The unit was pre-
installed with a pirated copy of Windows. Using it as evidence, a computer technician, who showed the
judge that the software in the computer unit bought by Samiano from Maxicorp was pirated.

The RTC judge, convinced that there is a probable cause for a case of copyright infringement and unfair
competition committed by Maxicorp, issued the corresponding warrant. Maxicorp argues that the warrants
issued against it are too broad in scope and lack the specificity required with respect to the objects to be
seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not THE SEARCH WARRANTS ARE “GENERAL WARRANTS”?

RULING: Yes. The exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of Article III of the Constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence obtained through unreasonable searches and seizure. Thus,
all items seized under paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e
or f, should be returned to Maxicorp.

Case No. 337

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, AFP 133 SCRA 890

MAINT POINT: Typographical error in specifying the address to search is not sufficient to
invalidate a search warrant where the address intended to be searched also appears on the face of
the warrant

FACTS:
The military applied for a search warrant for 2 addresses of the newspaper WE Forum: 728 units C, RMS
Building Quezon Avenue, QC and No 19, Road 3, Project 6, QC

2 warrants nonetheless were made of the RMS Building address. The search of the latter is sought to be
invalidated on the ground that the place was not sufficiently described.

ISSUE: Whether or not the not sufficiently described place is enough to invalidate the search warrant?

RULING: No. The defect pointed out is obviously a typographical error. In determining the sufficiency
of the description of the address, the executing officer’s prior knowledge of the intended in warrant is
relevant. In this case, the executing officer was also the affiant on whose affidavit of the warrant had been
issued. Therefore he knew where the addresses referred to.

Case No. 338

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Frank Uy v. BIR , 344 SCRA 36

MAINT POINT: The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community.

FACTS:
A certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing
Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the
National Internal Revenue Code.

3 search warrants were issued for different violations. The authorities searched the premises.
Petitioners contend that there are several defects in the subject warrants that command their nullification.
They point out inconsistencies in the description of the place to be searched in Search Warrant A-1, as
well as inconsistencies in the names of the persons against whom Search Warrants A-1 and A-2 were
issued. They claim that the things to be seized were not described with particularity. These defects,
according to petitioners, render the objects seized inadmissible in evidence

ISSUE: Whether or not a mistake in the identification of the owner of the place invalidates the warrant?

RULING: There is no mistake in the identification if the place if properly described (Bernas p.47)
The rule is that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the exclusion
of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement. In
this case, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be found in Cebu City. Nor
was it established that the enforcing officers had any difficulty in locating the premises of Petitioner
Corporation. That Search Warrant A-1 therefore, inconsistently identified the city where the premise to be
searched is, is not a defect that would spell the warrant’s invalidation in this case.
Case No. 339
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Yousex Al-Ghoul v. CA GR 126859 Sept. 4 , 2001

MAINT POINT: Items recovered without particularity of description in search warrant cannot
automatically be used as evidence.

FACTS:
Judge Geronimo S. Mangay, presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 125, Kalookan City, issued search warrants 54-953 and 55-954 for the search and seizure of
certain items in Apartment No. 2 at 154 Obiniana Compound, Deparo Road, Kalookan City.

The police found unlicensed firearms and explosives and a caliber in Apartment 8 in the same area.

Petitioners contend that the search and seizure orders violated Sections 2 and 3 of the Bill of Rights
because the place searched and articles seized were not described with particularity. Solicitor General
avers that the search of Apartment 2 was legal, and the items seized therein are admissible in
evidence. However OSG agrees with petitioner since there was no mention of Apartment No. 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not items recovered from Apartment no. 8 cannot be used as evidence?

RULING: Yes. We note that the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners waived their right to raise any
attack on the validity of the search warrants at issue by their failure to file a motion to quash. But, in
conducting the search at Apartment No. 8, not just Apartment No. 2 as ordered specifically in the
search warrants, the police committed a gross violation we cannot condone. Thus, we conclude that
the gun seized in Apartment No. 8 cannot be used in evidence, but those articles including guns,
ammunitions, and explosives seized in Apartment No. 2 are admissible in evidence.

Case No. 340

PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People v. CA – 291 SCRA 400

MAINT POINT: The Constitution requires inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the
place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized.
FACTS:
A petition for certiorari has been filed to invalidate the order of Judge Casanova which quashed search
warrant issued by Judge Bacalla and declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the
warrant. An application for a search warrant was made by S/Insp Brillantes against Mr. Azfar Hussain who
had allegedly in his possession firearms and explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt 1207 Area F. Bagon
Buhay Avenue, Sarang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. The following day a search warrant No.
1068 was issued but was served not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent to
Abigail Variety Store resulting in the arrest of 4 Pakistani nationals and the seizure of a number of
different explosives and firearms.

ISSUE: Whether or not there has been unreasonable search and seizure committed by the police for
having searched a place that is different from that stated in the warrant and that there was only a
typographical error in the address?

RULING: Yes. The case at bar, however, does not merely deal with the correction of an “obvious
typographical error” involving ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, but the search of a
place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant.

TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 341
ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Paper Industries v. Asuncion

FACTS: Police inspector Pascua applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Quezon City. After
having the joint deposition, Judge Asuncion issued the contested warrant against Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP), herein petitioner, by only stating “PICOP COMPOUND”, Thus, an
appeal is made by herein petitioner to quash the warrant made by Judge Asuncion on the ground that it
does state particularity the place where such warrant is to be enforced.

ISSUE: Whether or not the statement “PICOP COMPOUND” complies with the particularity description in
a search warrant as required by the constitution.

RULING: No. The warrant only contains PICOP compound, which has multiple building and
structures. The warrant failed to indicate what building or particular location in that compound
where the search warrant is to be made. In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional
safeguard against unreasonable search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only
to those described in the warrant.

TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 342
ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Malalaon v. CA

*an issue regarding RTC’s territorial jurisdiction to issue a warrant, outside the topic.

FACTS: An application for a search warrant was made by Lt. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Center
before the RTC of Kalookan City. That a violation of PD 1866 or the illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition is perpetrated at Newport, Quezon City.

After the search, herein petitioners argue that the warrant was issued outside their jurisdiction,
that only the RTC located in RTC may issue such warrant because it is the only court that has jurisdiction
over the area where the search warrant was initiated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take cognizance of an application of a search warrant in
connection with an offense allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue
warrant to conduct a search on a place likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction.

RULING: Yes. Petitioners argument that the search warrant is outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
issuing judge is erroneous. It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities
or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should apply for a search
warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the
foregoing rules. It would be doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of
nullification of said warrant should they file their application therefor in and obtain the same.

Note: A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for
personal property and bring it before the court.

1. Before the criminal action is filed with the appropriate court, a court which has no territorial jurisdiction
over the crime may validly entertain an application for and thereafter issue a search warrant in connection
with the commission of such crime; and

2. After the filing of the criminal action, the court with which it was filed has primary jurisdiction to issue
search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said case; however, under extreme and compelling
circumstances, another court may issue a search warrant in connection with said case.

TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 343
ART 3 SEC2: PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
People v. Estrada

FACTS: A search warrant was made and 52 boxes of drugs were confiscated.

In the search warrant, it failed to indicate whether such drugs are fake, misbranded, adulterated or
unregistered.

The accused now asking for the return of such drugs on the ground that there was an unreasonable
search warrant for the warrant failed to particularly indicate the item to be seized.

ISSUE: Whether or not the invalidity of the warrant, for failure to particularly indicate the item to be seized,
is subject to the return of the confiscated drugs.

Ruling: No. Although the search warrant was declared illegal for not complying with the requirement of
particularity of description in a warrant. The confiscated items cannot be returned as the possessor
thereof, the accused, have not acquired a licensed to possess the items, though they are legal.

TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 344
ART 3 SEC2: ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE A WARRANT
Salazar v. Achacoso

FACTS: Then Secretary of Labor and public respondent herein Tomas D. Achacoso issued a warrant to
seize the documents and paraphernalia used by hererin petitioner in running his illegal recruitment
agency. The warrant was made in pursuance of PD 1920 and EO 1022, which was enacted during the
Marcos Era.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Labor may issue a warrant of search and arrest.

RULING: No. The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. The 1987 constitution also made it clear
under Sec 2 of Article 3 that such warrant of search and arrest may only be done by a Judge.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 345
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Republic v. Sandiganbayan

FACTS: The Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) issued separate orders against
private respondents Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation to effect their
sequestration. PCGG also issued a “Search and Seizure Order” against Allied Banking Corporation. On
the basis of the PCGG’s order which read in part, “OREDERING THEM TO you are hereby directed to
submit for search and seizure all bank documents in the above-mentioned premises which our
representative may find necessary and relevant to the investigation being conducted by this Commission,”
Allied contended that this is not one for sequestration but is particularly a general search warrant which
fails to meet the constitutional requisites for its valid issuance.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG may validly issue a search and seizure order.

RULING: No. The PCGG has no authority to issue the order. It is not a judge, as clarified by the Court in
“Baseco,” and the PCGG cannot be considered as “such other responsible officer as may be authorized
by law” because Executive Order No. 1 did not expressly nor impliedly grant the PCGG the power to issue
search warrants/orders. Only a “judge” and “such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law” were empowered by the Freedom Constitution to issue search warrants.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 346
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Esteban Morano, Chan Sau Wah, and Fuh Yan Fun v. Hon. Martiniano Vivo

FACTS: Chan Sau Wah, a Chinese citizen arrived in the Philippines to visit her cousin. She arrived in the
Philippines with Fu Yan Fun, her minor son by the first marriage. She and her minor son were permitted
only into the Philippines under a temporary visitor's visa for two months and after they posted a cash bond
of 4,000 pesos. Months later, she married Esteban Morano, a native-born Filipino citizen. To prolong their
stay in the Philippines, Chan Sau Wah and Fu Yan Fun obtained several extensions.

Upon the expiration of the last extension, a letter from the Commissioner of Immigration ordered Chan
Sau Wah and her son to leave the country upon a certain date with a warning that upon failure to do so,
he will issue a warrant for their arrest and will cause the confiscation of their bond.

ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of the warrant of arrest by the Commissioner is valid.

RULING: Yes. Power to deport aliens is an attribute of sovereignty planted on the accepted maxim
of international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential
to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions. Article III of the
Constitution, does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation
issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates an order of arrest in the
exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceeding for a given
offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a
competent official, such as a legal order of deportation, issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, in
pursuance of a valid legislation. The constitutional guarantee set forth in Article III of the
Constitution requiring that the issue of probable cause be determined by a judge does not extend
to deportation proceedings.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 347
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Sy v. Commissioner of Immigration

FACTS: Chiu Wan Hong, a Chinese citizen, came to the Philippines and was admitted as a non-immigrant
or temporary visitor.

Over five (5) years later, the Commissioner of Immigration caused petitioner who now claims to be Aurora
Villamin Sy, to be arrested for the preparatory to proceedings for her deportation for overstaying.

Petitioner claimed that she is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus because the warrant for her deportation is
allegedly illegal or void. Having been issued in compliance with a decision of the Board of Commissioners
of Immigration, the legality of said warrant depends upon that of said decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant issued by the Commissioner is valid.

RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Bureau of Immigration may issue a warrant of
arrest only for the purpose of carrying out a final decision of deportation or when there is
sufficient proof of the guilt of the alien.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 348
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Lucien Tran Van Nghia v. Liwag

FACTS: Petitioner, Lucien Tran Van Nghia, is a French national with temporary address in Sta. Ana,
Manila. Originally admitted to the Philippines as a temporary visitor, his status was changed to that of an
immigrant based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines.

However, petitioner has not made any investment and has engaged only in French tutoring and practice of
acupressure. Respondent CID Commissioner Ramon J. Liwag received a sworn complaint from
petitioner’s landlord, accusing petitioner of being an undesirable alien for “committing acts inimical to
public safety and progress.” Respondent issued a warrant of arrest against petitioner after the latter twice
refused to go to the CID headquarters for verification of his status.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued and petitioner’s subsequent arrest were valid and
legal.

RULING: No. Petitioner was “invited” by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his
apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a
sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously
absent. It is essential that there should be a specific charge against the alien to be deported and
arrested.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 349
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Board of Commissioners v. Judge dela Rosa
FACTS: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native
born Filipino citizen. William Gatchalian, then a twelve year old minor, arrived in Manila and sought
admission as Filipino citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. The then
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum directing the Board of Commissioners to review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of
respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, admitting
respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of Immigration issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian.

ISSUE: Whether or not the warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of Immigration was valid.

RULING: No. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the
sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner
of Immigration for purposes of investigation only is null and void for being unconstitutional. A
reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration clearly
indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects, respondent
Gatchalian included.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 350
Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant
Harvey v. Santiago

FACTS: Petitioners Harvey, Sherman (both Americans) and Van Elshout (Dutch) were suspected alien
pedophiles after 3 months of close surveillance by the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID)
agents. Respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Warrants of Arrest against
petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Petitioners question the validity of their detention as there is no provision in the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which legally
clothes the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending determination of the
existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest was valid.

RULING: YES. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest
is that it must be based upon probable cause. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure also provide that
an arrest wit a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person
has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when
an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5). The arrest of petitioners was based on probable
cause determined after close surveillance for 3 months, which justified the arrest and the seizure of the
photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. Further, that petitioners were not "caught in
the act" does not make their arrest illegal because they found with young boys in their respective rooms,
and Sherman was even naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable grounds to
believe that petitioners had committed "pedophilia" defined as "psychosexual perversion involving
children".

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 351
Art III Sec 2. Only a Judge May Issue a Warrant
Ho v. People

FACTS: Petitioners were charged in an information with a violation of Section 3 of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act) before the Sandiganbayan. Attached to the information were the resolution of
Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Labrador and the memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) d
jurisprudence.

ISSUE: May a judge issue a warrant of arrest solely on the basis of the report and recommendation
of the investigating prosecutor, without personally determining probable cause by independently
examining sufficient evidence submitted by the parties during the preliminary investigation?

RULING: NO. Art III Sec 2 states that xxx no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce xxx. Following established
doctrine and procedure, the judge shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. In the instant case, the public respondent relied fully
and completely upon the resolution of the graft investigation officer and the memorandum of the reviewing
prosecutor, attached to the information. It had no other documents from which to sustain its own
conclusion that probable cause exists and issued challenged warrant of arrest on the sole basis of the
prosecutors findings and recommendation.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 352
ART. III, SEC. 2, ONLY A JUDGE MAY ISSUE WARRANT
Board of Commissioners v. Judge dela Rosa

FACTS: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native
born Filipino citizen.

William Gatchalian, then a twelve year old minor, arrived in Manila and sought admission as a Filipino
citizen which was eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. The then

Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum directing the Board of Commissioners to review all cases
where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Philippine citizen, including that of
respondents Gatchalian. Petitioner Board reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, admitting
respondents Gatchalian as Filipino citizens. Petitioner Commissioner of Immigration issued a mission
order commanding the arrest of respondent William Gatchalian

ISSUE: Whether the Board of Commissioners can issue a warrant

RULING: YES, The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation may issue warrants to carry out a final
finding of a violation. It is issued after a proceeding has taken place. This is an exception to the rule that
only a judge may issue a warrant.

the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the
Board of Commissioners of the... existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the
alien... to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 353
Art III Sec 2. Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Material Distributions (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Felipe Natividad and Lope Sarreal

FACTS: Lope Sarreal filed a complaint seeking a money judgment against petitioners Material Distributors
(Phil.) Inc. and Harry Lyons, and filed a motion for the production and inspection of the books or papers of
said petitioners, which the respondent Judge granted and consequently required the petitioners to
produce the same. Petitioners argued that Sarreal is not entitled to the production and inspection of the
said documents because his only purpose was to find out if a case of falsification has been made.

Sarreal contended that the inspection of said documents was to enable him to designate with particularity
in the subpoena duces tecum, to be obtained in connection with the trial of the case, the specific books
and papers containing the entry of receipts and payments made by the petitioners, such books and
papers being material to the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the production and inspection of the books and papers would violate the
petitioners’ right against unreasonable searches and seizure of whatever nature and for any purpose.

RULING: NO. The orders in question, issued in virtue of the provisions of Rule 21 of the Rules of Court,
pertain to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or confused with the unreasonable searches
prohibited by the Constitution. But in the erroneous hypothesis that the production and inspection of
books and documents in question is tantamount to a search warrant, the procedure outlined by Rule 21
and followed by respondent Judge placed them outside the realm of the prohibited unreasonable
searches. Sarreal has an interest in the books and documents in question because such contain evidence
material to the matters involving the issues between him and petitioners, that justice will be better served if
all the facts pertinent to the controversy are placed before the trial court. Rule 21 of the Rules of Court:
xxx Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court may (a) order any party to produce
and permit the inspection of any designated documents, papers, books oraccounts which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or
control xxx

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 354
Art III Sec 2. Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling (U.S. Case)

NOTE: Walling was the federal official authorized by law to investigate whether certain businesses were
acting consistently with the Federal Labor Standards Act.

FACTS: The instant case concerns Administrator Walling’s right to judicial enforcement of subpoenas
duces tecum (an order to compel the production of documents). The subpoenas sought the production of
specified records to determine whether petitioners were violating the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Petitioners, newspaper publishing corporations, refused to have their books and records examined,
claiming that the enforcement of the subpoenas would permit the Administrator to conduct general fishing
expeditions into petitioners' books, records and papers, in order to secure evidence that they have
violated the Act, without a prior charge or complaint and simply to secure information upon which to base
one, all allegedly in violation of the search and seizure provisions

ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the subpoenas duces tecum would violate the provisions on
search and seizure.

RULING: NO. The records in the instant case present no question of actual search and seizure, but raise
only the question whether orders of court for the production of specified records have been validly made;
and no sufficient showing appears to justify setting them aside. No officer or other person has sought to
enter petitioners' premises against their will, to search them, or to seize or examine their books, records or
papers without their assent, otherwise than pursuant to orders of court authorized by law. The very
purpose of the subpoena and of the order, as of the authorized investigation, is to discover and procure
evidence, not to prove a pending charge or complaint, but upon which to make one. Further, petitioners
were corporations. The only records or documents sought were corporate ones and were relevant to the
authorized inquiry, the purpose of which was to determine two issues, whether petitioners were subject to
the Act and, if so, whether they were violating it. These were subjects of investigation authorized by
Section 11(a) of the act. It is not to be doubted that Congress could authorize investigation of these
matters.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 355
ART III SEC 2: Of Whatever Nature and for Any Purpose
Camara v. Municipal Court

FACTS: A housing inspector from San Francisco’s health department entered an apartment building for
routine inspection to locate possible code violations. The building manager informed the inspector that
Camara might be using his space contrary to permitted policy. The inspector approached Camara to enter
the area, but the Camara denied entrance for lack of a search warrant. The inspector returned twice more,
again without a search warrant, and was again denied entry. A complaint was subsequently filed against
Camara, and he was arrested for violating a city code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Camara has a constitutional right to refuse an inspection without a warrant.

RULING: YES. Administrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant intrusions upon the
interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that

such searches, when authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure, lack the traditional
safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to an individual. In other words, building
inspection by administrative officers shall comply with the warrant procedure.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 356
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
People v. Aminuddin

FACTS: On the basis of a tip, Aminuddin was arrested and searched upon disembarking from M/V Wilcon
in Iloilo City.

The detention and search yielded marijuana. The officers were not armed with a warrant although the
officers had at least two days to obtain a warrant.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.

RULING: NO. As a general rule, an officer shall first obtain a warrant before conducting a search and
seizure. In this case, the officers had all the time to obtain a warrant.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 357
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
People v. Valdez

FACTS: Abe Valdez was allegedly caught in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted,
cultivated and cultured 7 fully grown marijuana plants.

The prosecution presented its witnesses, all members of the police force, who testified how the
information was received, the commencement of their operation and its details under the specific
instruction of Inspector Parungao. Accordingly, The police officers found appellant alone in his nipa hut.
They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw 7 five-foot high,
flowering marijuana plants in two rows. They uprooted the seven marijuana plants, took photos of
appellant standing beside the cannabis plants and arrested him. ABE VALDEZ

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.

RULING: NO. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves,
it is clear that they had at least 1 day to obtain a warrant to search appellant’s farm. Their informant had
revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the
information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause
to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and
apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to
them.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 358
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
People v. Oliver Edano

FACTS: Oliver arrived on board a space wagon driven by Siochi. The informant approached Oliver and
talked to him inside the vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe. When PO3 Corbe was
approaching the appellant, Oliver went out of the vehicle and ran away.

They chased the appellant; PO3 Corbe was able to grab Oliver, causing the latter to fall on the ground.
PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic bag from the appellant’s right hand, while PO3
Alcancia seized a gun tucked in the appellant’s waist. The other members of the police arrested Siochi.
Thereafter, the police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized items to the police station for
investigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure was valid.

RULING: NO. In this case, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense. Considering that the appellant’s warrantless arrest was unlawful,
the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag
containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible in evidence, having come
from an invalid search and seizure.

Moreover, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, and without more, cannot
be evidence of guilt.

TINGKAHAN
Case No. 359
ART III SEC 2: Warrantless Search and Seizure
Dale Grady v. North Carolina

FACTS: Dale Grady was convicted of two sexual offenses. After being released for the second time, a trial
court civilly committed Grady to take part in North Carolina’s satellite-based monitoring program for the
duration of his life. The program required participants to wear a GPS monitoring bracelet so that
authorities can make sure that participants are complying with prescriptive schedule and location
requirements. Grady challenged the constitutionality of the program and argued that the constant tracking
amounted to an unreasonable search. Both the trial court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals held
that wearing a GPS monitor did not amount to a search.
ISSUE: Whether or not the use of GPS monitoring bracelet constitutes a search.

RULING: YES. The Court held that participation in the North Carolina program amounted to a search
because requiring someone to wear a bracelet that tracks the person’s whereabouts constitutes a
“physical occupation of private property for the purpose of obtaining information.”

TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 360
ART. III SEC 2: WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
WHEN IS A SEARCH A SEARCH?
Valmonte v General De Villa

FACTS: As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the National Capital Region District Command
(NCRDC) installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners herein aver that,
because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints,

considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially
at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of the checkpoints is constitutional.

RULING: Yes. No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine
checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful
search and seizure or other rights. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited.

Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.