Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases

TALAVER
Case No. 1624
In the Matter of the Petition for Writ of Amparo and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Favor if Alicia
Jasper S. Lucena v. Sarah Elago, et. al., G.R. No. 252120, September 15, 2020
MAINT POINT: The writ of amparo shall cover extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. And the Rules of Court envisions the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy
applicable to cases of illegal confinement or detention where a person is deprived of his or
her liberty, or where the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto.
FACTS:
in 2018,
AJ enrolled as a Grade 11 student at the Far Eastern University (FEU). There,
AJ was enticed to join the FEU Chapter of Anakbayan. On August 7, 2019, the Senate Committee
on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs conducted a hearing amidst reports that Anakbayan had
been recruiting students and inducing them to abandon their homes. The petitioners, parents of AJ,
instituted the petition for the issuance of the writs of amparo and habeas corpus to regain custody of
AJ.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners' plea for the issuance of a writ of amparo and writ of habeas
corpus is proper?
RULING: No. The writ of amparo shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. And
the Rules of Court envisions the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy applicable to cases of illegal
confinement or detention where a person is deprived of his or her liberty, or where the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. In this case, AJ was not
missing, just with the Akbayan, which are not agents or organizations acting on behalf of the
State.
As she has already attained the age of majority, AJ — at least in the eyes of the State -has
earned the right to make independent choices with respect to the places where she wants to
stay, as well as to the persons whose company she wants to keep.
Case No. 1625

Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
People v. Sesbreno, G.R. No. 121764, September 9, 1999
MAINT POINT: The ninety-day period applies only after the case is submitted for decision, not from
the start of the trial and the hearing of the civil case ahead of his case happened only once
FACTS:
RTC found Raul H. Sesbreo, guilty of the crime of murder, for the death of one Luciano Amparado.
Atty. Sesbreo claim that due process was violated because his right to speedy trial was violated.
That the trial court ignored various Supreme Court Circulars ordering judges to decide cases within
ninety days from the inception of trial.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases was violatedl?
RULING: No, records revealed that no undue delay could be imputed, much less persuasively
shown, against appellee and the trial court. Further, the ninety-day period applies only after the
case is submitted for decision, not from the start of the trial and the hearing of the civil case ahead of
his case happened only once.
Case No. 1626
Binay v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 120681, October 1, 1999
MAINT POINT: The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.
FACTS:
Jejomar Binay was charged before the Sandiganbayan three separate information one for violation
of Article 220 RPC (improper using of public funds) and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 during his time as Mayor of the Municipality of Makati. He contended that the six-year delay
from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the
information were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right
to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right of the accused to speedy disposition of cases was violated?
RULING: NO, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured,
or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
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the party having his case tried. The court found that the cases were sufficiently complex,
thus justifying the length of time for their resolution..
Case No. 1627

Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan - 199 SCRA 299 (no violation)
MAINT POINT: The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felix Gonzales, former director of BFAR was charged for violating RA 3019 in the illegal
use/utilization of “Otoshi-Ami Net,” also known as “Lambaklad,” for experimental test fishing.
Petitioner avers that there has been considerable delay in terminating the preliminary investigation of
his case which was submitted for resolution as of May 29, 1984, up to the time when the amended
information was admitted by respondent court on May 7, 1990, or a period of more than six (6)
years.
RULING: NO, The SG submits that there was no inordinate delay because from the time of the
filing of Complaint Affidavit in 1983 up to the filing of the information in 1989 numerous
incidents presented themselves for resolution during the preliminary investigation; that the
delay was not caused by inaction on the part of the investigating officials but, instead, the
intervening period was consumed by the investigations and reinvestigations conducted; and
that the preliminary investigation conducted in the consolidated cases did not become ripe
for resolution.
Case No. 1628

Socrates v. Sandiganbayan - 253 SCRA 773 (no violation)
MAINT POINT: A speedy trial is one conducted according to the law of criminal procedure
and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays
FACTS:
Petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assails the orders and resolution issued by respondent
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028. Petitioner avers that the respondent court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case on the ground that an inordinate delay of six (6) years
between the conduct of the preliminary investigation and the subsequent filing of the information
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against petitioner constitutes a violation of his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the
case and due process of law pursuant to the Tatad doctrine.
RULING: No, respondent court found that the six-year delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation was caused by petitioners own acts.
Case No. 1629

Bolalin v. Occiano – 266 SCRA 203 (violation)
MAINT POINT: Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our
people in the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute. Respondent judge
has committed infractions, both administrative and criminal, of such a grave nature as to call
for sanctions of commensurate degrees.
FACTS:
Francisco Bolalin, who was a candidate for the office of Barangay Captain during the 1994 Barangay
Elections, charged respondent Judge Occiano, with gross inefficiency and neglect of duty for his
failure to render his decision in Election Protest No. 1 within the prescribed period. Complainant
alleges that the last and final hearing of the election protest was on February 27, 1995 but, until Jan
14 1997, it does not appear that a decision has been rendered by respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to a speedy disposition of cases was violated by Judge Occiano?
RULING: YES. The Court finds him liable, because of his unauthorized absences, not only the
constitutional and statutory requirements that cases be decided within the period fixed therefor were
flagrantly violated. In the process, he also contravened Section 16, Article III of the Constitution
which provides that “all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
Case No. 1630

Angchangco v. Ombudsman – 268 SCRA 301 (violation)
MAIN POINT: The constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section
16 of the Bill of Right does not justify the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional
rights. A delay of close to three (3) years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of
the circumstance.
Page 3
FACTS:
Ombudsman was to issue a clearance in favor of petitioner Casiano A. Angchangco/petitioner.
Petitioner served as deputy sheriff and later as Sheriff IV in the Regional Trial Court of Agusan del
Norte and Butuan City where a complaint due to graft was filed against him which was unresolved
up to his retirement that led to the denial of his request for clearance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to speedy disposition of cases was violated?
RULING: YES. The Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the Ombudsman in
resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed
right to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him
Case No. 1631

Lambino v. De Vera – 275 SCRA 60
MAINT POINT: A judge who fails to decide cases within the required period and continues to
collect his salaries upon his certification that he has no pending matters to resolve,
transgresses the constitutional right of litigants to a speedy disposition of their cases
FACTS:
Judge Amado de Vera of the Municipal Trial Court, Malasiqui, Pangasinan, is charged with various
corrupt practices prejudicial to the administration of justice. Within the period 1993-1994, there were
twenty-six criminal cases filed before Judge de Veras sala, but none of them was resolved, not even
to determine whether there was indeed probable cause to try the cases on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guiltyof gross inefficiency ?
RULING: YES. A lower court judge is mandated to render decision within three months from
date of submission. Additionally, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires
a judge to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the period
specified.
Case No. 1632

Duterte v. Sandiganbayan – 289 SCRA 721(preliminary investigation, violation)
MAINT POINT: The inordinate delay in the conduct of the “preliminary investigation”
infringed upon their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case.
Page 4
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged before the Sandiganbayan for violating Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft And Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly entering into an
anomalous contract for the purchase of computer hardware and accessories with the Systems Plus,
Incorporated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners’ right to speedy trial was violated by the inordinate delay in
the conduct of the preliminary investigation?
RULING: YES. The preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioners has been
conducted not in the manner laid down in Administrative Order No. 07. The inordinate delay
in the conduct of the “preliminary investigation” infringed upon their constitutionally
guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of their case. The undue delay of close to three (3)
years in the termination of the preliminary investigation in the light of the circumstances
obtaining in that case warranted the dismissal of the case.
Case No. 1633

Marcos v. Sandiganbayan – GR 126995 October 6, 1998 (violation)
MAINT POINT: Section 16, Article III of the Constitution assures all persons shall have the
right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative
bodies.
FACTS:
This case involves a Lease Agreement covering LRTA property located in Pasay City, with the
Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI), a private enterprise, under terms and
conditions manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government. It took 6 yrs for
Sandiganbayan to decide on the case which is now on the ground of appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the violation of the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of trial can be
a ground for acquittal?
RULING: YES. The Court has consistently adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the
denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt
at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would fall within the prohibition against
an accused being twice put in jeopardy.
Page 5
Case No. 1634

Roque v. Ombudsman – GR 129978 May 12, 1999 (violation)
MAINT POINT: The delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as
mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints
before him.
FACTS:
Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS)
assigned in their respective places, were under preliminary investigation ordered by by Deputy Omb.
Gervasio for violation of the RA3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in 1991. In 1997,
Omb. Desierto approved the said recommendation and subsequently, 2 informations was filed
before the Sandiganbayan information for the said violation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases?
RULING: Yes. Although respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman
Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given
why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints.
Case No. 1635

Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan – GR 108595 May 18, 1999 (violation)
MAINT POINT: The delay of almost six years disregarded the ombudsman's duty, as
mandated by the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770, to act promptly on complaints
before him.
FACTS:
Petitioner filed with the office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit statitng that he had nothing to do with a
sworn complaint filed by one Almedras against Alejandro Tapang for violating the RA3019.
6 years after the filling of the complaint, Special Prosecutor filed an information charging Tapang and
the petitioner for the said violation.
Page 6
Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given
why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints.
Case No. 1636

Dansal v. Fernandez, 327 SCRA 145 ( no violation )
MAINT POINT: The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of cases should not
operate as to deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in prosecuting criminal
cases or generally in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be afforded a fair
opportunity to present their side.
FACTS:
Montera filed an Affidavit of Complaint with the OMB charging petitioners with the offense of estafa
through falsification of public documents. On 1993 and after various affidavits, the cases were ripe
for resolution. A year and 4 months later, OMB came out with a resolution stating that only Dansal
was charge for violation of the RA3109. On appeal, petitioner contended that it was a violation on
the grounds that it took a year and 4 months for the OMB to furnish her with its resolution.
RULING: No. The preliminary investigation in subject cases against the petitioners took more than
one year and four months to finish. But such a delay, for that matter should not be cause for the
court to try cases and to finally decide of the controversy after the presentation of evidence.
Case No. 1637

Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, 322 SCRA 655 (no violation)
Page 7
MAINT POINT: The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the
Constitution, but the same shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable
opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It secures rights to an accused, but it does not
preclude the rights of public justice.
FACTS:
PNB filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against former president Marcos and other people.
However, Domingo, President of the PNB at that time, was also involved in the case. On March 9,
1992, Domingo submit his counter-affidavit. On July 9, 1992, Special Prosecutor Office III Diaz-
Baldus issued a resolution recommending that Domingo and another accused to be charged of
violating RA3019. Domingo argued that his right to a speedy disposition of cases was violated
because there was a lapse of time starting from March to July.
ISSUE: Whether or notthere is violation of the right to speedy disposition of cases?
RULING: No. Domingo cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law considering that
one of the principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him the opportunity to submit his
counter-affidavit since the first subpoena was returned unserved. After Domingo filed his counter-
affidavit on 9 March 1992, the corresponding information was in due time filed on 30 July 1992. The
delay, if any, was more beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to petitioner in that it was intended to
afford him the opportunity to refute the charges made against him.
Case No. 1638

Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, GR 109271, March 14, 2000 (no violation)
MAINT POINT: The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is
deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.
FACTS:
Petitioners were charged guilty for violation RA3019. On appeal, they alleged that there was a
violation to speedy disposition of cases as it took 3 years for the ombudsman to file the information
against the petitioners from the date of the resolution recommending the filing thereof.
RULING: No. The delay was not vexatious, capricious, nor oppressive, considering the structural
reorganizations and procedural changes brought about by frequent amendments of procedural laws
in the initial stages of this case. While the case was going on, the Zaldivar case was promulgated
holding that the Tanodbayan lost his authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the
filing of Informations with the Sandiganbayan effective February 2, 1987.
Page 8
TANGGING
Case No. 1639
Article III Section 16 – Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases
Raro vs Sandiganbayan (GR 108341)
FACTS: Raro, a lawyer, was the Corporate Secretary of the PCSO. Also, he was the Acting Manager of
the Special Projects Department that was in charge of the experimental Small Town Lottery.
Abao, as Provincial Manager of the experimental STL alleged discrepancies in the operations made by
Raro. Raro complained that the prejudicial and indecent delay in the preliminary investigation violated his
rights to due process of law and to speedy disposition of the case because while the complaint was filed
on May 20, 1988, the information against him was filed more than four (4) years later.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has merit
RULING: No. The record clearly shows that the Ombudsman exerted utmost effort to determine the
veracity of Abao’s allegations against petitioner. That it took the NBI almost two years to complete its
report on the matter does not mean that petitioner’s right to speedy disposition of the charge was brushed
aside. If delay may be imputed in the proceedings, the same should be reckoned only from October 25,
1991 when petitioner filed his counter-affidavit.
MAIN POINT: In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may be
considered and weighed are the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay
Case No. 1640

Dela Pena vs Sandiganbayan (GR No. 144542)
FACTS: (COA) created a Special Audit Team, which thereafter conducted an audit of the operations of a
fishing vessel under the management of the Davao del Norte School of Fisheries.
The result of the audit was referred to the OMB for Mindanao. Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Tolentino
issued an order requiring herein petitioners to file their respective counter-affidavits. Petitioners and their
co-respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, the last of which was filed on 3 December 1992.
It took petitioners three (3) months to complete the submission of their respective counter-affidavits. Yet, it
took the Office (4) years, (1) month, and (26) days to terminate the preliminary investigation. The case
was transferred to GIO Coresis, who thereafter terminated the investigation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation amounted to a violation of
their constitutional rights to due process of law and to a speedy disposition of the case against them
RULING: No. The case was transferred to GIO Coresis sometime between the last quarter of 1994
and first quarter of 1995 as can be gleaned from the letters on record. He had to go over the
lengthy COA report and counter-affidavits of the five respondents, as well as the numerous
receipts and other evidence forming part of the "voluminous records." It took him more or less
Page 9
two years to evaluate the evidence and come up with a resolution. In any event, the delay could
scarcely be considered as "vexatious, capricious and oppressive."
MAIN POINT: The right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. The concept of speedy disposition is
relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular
regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the doctrinal
rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that may be considered
and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay
Case No. 1641

(Not Lopez) Roque vs OMB (GR No. 129978)
FACTS: Roque was a Schools Division Superintendent of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato. COA conducted an audit on the P9.36 million
allotment released by the DECS Regional Office. Auditors Soriano and Enriquez found some major
deficiencies and violation of RA 3019.
Petitioners instituted the instant petition for mandamus premised on the allegation that after the initial
Orders finding the cases proper for preliminary investigation were issued on June 1991 and the
subsequent submission of their counter-affidavits, until the present or more than (6) years, no resolution
has been issued by the Public Respondent and no case has been filed with the appropriate court against
the herein Petitioner
ISSUE Whether or not there was undue and unjustifiable delay in resolving [the] complaints against
petitioners (respondents therein) which violated their constitutional right to [a] speedy disposition of cases
Desierto to review the recommendation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why
it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. After a careful review of the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the Court finds the inordinate delay of more than six years by the
Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally
guaranteed right to due process and a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
MAIN POINT: It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary investigation
should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a preliminary investigation does not
warrant dismissal of the information. True --- [for] the absence of a preliminary investigation can be
corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary
investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time.
Case No. 1642

Lee vs People (GR No. 137914)
Page 10
FACTS: Lee and Sonny Moreno were charged by Neugene Marketing, Inc. through its designated
trustee, Atty. Roger Z. Reyes, with the crime of estafa with abuse of confidence before the Office of the
City Prosecutor. Petitioners filed several motions from 1991 to1995 (reconsider date, reinvestigation,
review/reinvestigation,quash/dismiss, etc) totaling to 24 motions. Petitioners contend that the long delay
in the resolution of the proceedings at the DOJ and the trial court violated their constitutional right to a
speedy disposition of their cases.
ISSUE Whether or not there is a violation of the right to a speedy trial
RULING/ MAIN POINT: No. Petitioners filed a series of motions, both repetitious and dilatory. The
accused also filed several Motions to Inhibit the Judges who saw through the ploy of the accused,
including City Prosecutors. Behind the backdrop of the nine (9) motions to quash, as well as
reinvestigations involving the same issues concerning probable cause are. It was the petitioners
themselves who principally dragged and hindered the resolution of the criminal investigation and trial for
estafa. They thus have no reason to complain against the delay in the disposition of their cases
Case No. 1643

People vs Monjey (GR No. 146689)
FACTS: Monje, along with other companions, were charged with rape with homicide for the brutal rape
and killing of 15-year old Imee.
After initial cross-examination by defense counsel, witness Cordero failed and refused to return to court
for the continuation of his cross-examination. Despite the insistence of the defense counsel to pursue his
cross-examination and the repeated warnings from the trial court that it would be constrained to strike out
and disregard his testimony should he fail to appear again, the witness stubbornly refused to return to
court for his cross-examination.
Three of the accused were acquitted, except for Monje, who was sentenced to death penalty. Monje
appealed proposing the decision to be remanded on grounds of new evidence for his acquittal as well.
ISSUE Whether the action of remanding this case to the trial court for further proceedings apparently to
enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove is constitutional
RULING/MAIN POINT: No. A proposal has been expressed for the remand of this case to the trial court
for further proceedings, apparently to enable the prosecution to prove again what it failed to prove in the
first instance. We cannot agree because it will set a dangerous precedent. Aside from its being
unprocedural, it would open the floodgates to endless litigations because whenever an accused is on the
brink of acquittal after trial, and realizing its inadequacy, the prosecution would insist to be allowed to
augment its evidence which should have been presented much earlier. This is a criminal prosecution, and
to order the remand of this case to the court a quo to enable the prosecution to present additional
evidence would violate the constitutional right of the accused to due process, and to speedy
determination of his case.
Case No. 1644
Art III Sec 16: Right to speedy disposition of cases
Ty-Dazo vs. Sandiganbayan
374 SCRA 200
FACTS: Petitioner Ty-Dazo is Municipal Mayor of Salcedo, Easter Samar. Two complaints were filed
against him before the SB: Criminal case 22021 for violation of RA 3019 and Criminal Case 23656 for
violation of PD No. 705 or the Forestry Code. The Office of the OMB already received the complaints in
Criminal Cases Nos. 23656 and 22021 some time in 1994.
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However, it was only on April 28, 1997, or three (3) years after the receipt of the complaint, that the
corresponding information in Criminal Case No. 23656 was filed with the SB. On the other hand, while the
information in Criminal Case No. 22021 was filed with the SB on January 18, 1995, it took the Office of
the OMB more than four (4) years to resolve petitioner Ty-Dazo’s motion for reinvestigation. Hence,
contends that the SB committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his motions to dismiss in the said
cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s right to due process and speedy disposition was violated.
RULING: NO.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, would not be sufficient. In the application of the
constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
MAIN POINT: The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable
motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
Case No. 1645

Guiani vs. Sandiganbayan
GR No. 146897, August 6, 2002
FACTS: The COA-ARMM, after an inspection was conducted during October 15, 1992 instituted a
complaint for violation of RA 3019 against the regional officers of DPWH-ARMM for the alleged
anomalous implementation of infrastructure projects.
Preliminary investigation was conducted by the OMB and a recommendation for indictment was approved
by Ombudsman Desierto on October 16, 1998, 6 years after the complaint was made by COA. 21 criminal
cases were filed against the petitioners before the SB immediately thereafter. In a motion to dismiss,
petitioners argued that the delay in the resolution of the complaints against them by the OMB violated
their right to speedy trial. The motion was denied by the SB and motion for reconsideration was denied
likewise.
ISSUE: Whether or not the alleged delay of almost 6 years violated their constitutional right to speedy
trial.
RULING: NO. Most of the respondents, including some of petitioners herein, moved for extensions of
time. All the counter-affidavits were received in August 1995, owing to the number of respondents.
Thereafter, the COA filed reply-affidavits on February 24, 1996 and May 29, 1996. It was only after the
submission of the last pleading, i.e., the reply-affidavits, that the preliminary investigation can be said to
have been concluded. The time to resolve the cases commences from this date.
MAIN POINT: Well-settled is the rule that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a
speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delay. In the determination of whether or not that right has been violated, the factors that may
be considered and balanced are: the length of delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure
to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
Case No. 1646

Avilla vs. Reyes
Page 12
479 SCRA 334
FACTS: In a verified complaint filed before the Court, herein complainants charged the respondent Judge
of CA, Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, for allegedly violating Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct for delaying their petition for writ of preliminary mandatory injuction against the members
of Class 2001 and Class 2002 of the PNPA, resulting from the death of Cadet Dominante Tunac allegedly
caused by the hazing activities for a period of one and a half month despite extreme urgency of the matter
to their prejudice and damage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the delay violated their right to speedy disposition of the case.
RULING: NO.
NO. Period of one and a half month within which to study and prepare a decision does not constitute the
delay stated in the Canons of Judicial Conduct. It must be noted that complainants’ petition for a writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction. Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction which is a preservative
remedy, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction requires the performance of a particular act that tends
to go beyond maintaining the status quo and is thus more cautiously regarded. The period to study its
propriety in the circumstances was, however, interrupted when complainants filed their motion for oral
arguments, and by the succeeding incidents where comments were required and filed.
MAIN POINT: The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
Case No. 1647

Enriquez vs. Office of the OMB
545 SCRA 618
FACTS: Herein petitioners, various officers of Land Registration Authority (LRA), were charged
administratively and criminally in a complaint before the office of the Ombudsman. Six (6) years from the
filing of the complaints-affidavits and more than four (4) years after the parties formally offered their
evidence on January 29, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss all the cases against them as
respondent’s “inordinate delay” constitutes a violation of their constitutional right to a speedy disposition of
their cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inaction of the office of the Ombudsman constitutes a violation of petitioners’
right to speedy disposition of their cases.
RULING: YES. Respondent did not resolve the administrative and criminal cases against petitioners
although the investigation of the said cases had long been terminated when the latter formally offered
their evidence way back on January 29, 2002. Respondent’s belated excusethat the prosecutors
assigned to these cases are still reviewing and evaluating them with extreme care to arrive at a just
determination is not only unreasonable but also an afterthought. Thus, the complaints against petitioners
were dismissed.
Page 13
MAIN POINT: The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with
the established rules of procedure, but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice.
Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the
Constitution and by various legislations inutile.
Case No. 1648

OMB vs. Jurado
561 SCRA 135
FACTS: In an original complaint, various officers of Maglei Enterprises Co., were charged for violations of
the Tariff Code. Also, after a report by the Fact-finding board (FFB) of OMB, a subsequent complaint
and investigation against Atty. Ben Jurado, Chief of the Warehouse Inspection Division of Maglei
Enterprises Co., was recommended. But the Court of Appeals, in absolving Jurado, provided that in the
case at bench, the incident which gave rise to the complaint against the petitioner happened on March 16,
1992. And yet it was only on November 20, 1997 or a lapse of more than five (5) years after the original
complaint that the case relative to the said incident was filed against him. Records also show that it took
the Ombudsman almost six (6) years to decide that a case be filed against the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the aforementioned acts constitute a violation of respondent’s right to speedy
disposition of the case.
RULING: NO. Prior to the report and recommendation by the FFB that respondent be criminally and
administratively charged, respondent was neither investigated nor charged. That respondent was charged
only in 1997 while the subject incident occurred in 1992, is not necessarily a violation of his right to the
speedy disposition of his case. The record is clear that prior to 1997, respondent had no case to speak of
—he was not made the subject of any complaint or made to undergo any investigation.
MAIN POINT: With respect to respondent, there were no vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays
because he was not made to undergo any investigative proceeding prior to the report and findings of the
FFB of OMB.
CASE NO. 1649

ART III SEC 16: Right to a Speedy Disposition of Cases
Perez (not Perea) v. People, 544 SCRA 532
FACTS: Perez is the Municipal Treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In an audit made on his office, it was found
that the public funds that he was entrusted to is short of Php72,784.57. He was found guilty of
Malversation of Funds by the SB. Upon appeal, Peitioner claims that he was violated the right to a speedy
trial and due process, as over 13 years had passed, before the case had been filed against him.
ISSUE: WON Perez ‘ rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case was violated
RULING: No. Petitioner cannot complain that his right to due process has been violated. He was given all
the chances in the world to present his case, and the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after
considering all the pieces of evidence presented before it. Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The
matter could have taken a different dimension if during all those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs
of asserting his right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some overt acts, like filing a
motion for early resolution, to show that he was not waiving that right .
Page 14
CASE NO. 1650

Gaas v. Mitmug, 553 SCRA 335
FACTS: Gaas was the bookkeeper of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Municipality of Bacolod,
Lanao del Norte. Because of a cash shortage in his office, the OMB rendered a Decision finding Gaas
guilty of gross neglect of duty and ordered his dismissal. The Complaint was filed on November 18, 1991
and petitioners received an Order directing them to submit their counter-affidavits only three years after.
The Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the Deputy Ombudsman.
ISSUE: WON Gaas’ rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case was violated
RULING: No. Within the three year period, they failed to raise the issue of speedy disposition of the case.
It was only when they lost and pursued their appeal that they first raised the issue. It cannot therefore be
said that the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. Petitioners
cannot now seek the protection of the law to benefit from the adverse effects of their failure to raise the
issue at the first instance. In effect, they are deemed to have waived their rights when they filed their
counter-affidavits after they received the Order without immediately questioning the alleged violations of
their rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case.
CASE NO. 1651

Roquera v. Chancellor – 614 SCRA 723
FACTS: Petitioner Capt. Roquero., an employee of UP Manila was placed under preventive suspension
for ninety (90) days due to a complaint of Grave Misconduct filed against him. The prosecution agreed to
submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on or before 16 July 1999 but failed. So Roquero filed a Motion
through counsel praying that complainant be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her
exhibits. The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to the
unreasonable delay, Roquero filed another Motion asking for the dismissal of the administrative case
against him but was denied on the ground that “Section 27 of the Uniform Rules states that the failure to
file a formal offer of evidence amounts to a mere waiver thereof, and not a dismissal of the action.” As
such, petitioner cannot claim a vested right to a dismissal of his case below just because a formal offer
was not filed within the agreed period.
ISSUE: WON Roquero’s rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case was violated
RULING: Yes. the delay was prejudicial to petitioner's cause as he was under preventive suspension for
ninety (90) days, and during the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him
remained stagnant at the prosecution stage. While it is true that administrative investigations should not
be bound by strict adherence to the technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings, the same however should not violate the constitutional right of respondents to a speedy
disposition of cases. The constitutional right to a "speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the
accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative
cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the
Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the
administration of justice.
Page 15
CASE NO. 1652
Lumanog v. People – 630 SCRA 42
FACTS: Appellants were the accused perpetrators of the ambush-slay of former Chief of the Metropolitan
Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine Constabulary Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla.
The trial court convicted them and the CA upheld the conviction of the accused-appellants based on the
credible eyewitness testimony of Alejo who vividly recounted before the trial court their respective
positions and participation in the fatal shooting of Abadilla having been able to witness closely how they
committed the crime. This case remained pending with the CA for four years.
ISSUE: WON Accused-appellants’ rights to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case was
violated
RULING: No. It must be stressed that in the determination of whether the right to speedy disposition of
cases has been violated, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each
case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not be sufficient. 158 Under the
circumstances, we hold that the delay of (4) four years during which the case remained pending with the
CA and this Court was not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive. In this case appellants are not entitled
to the “radical relief” in the absence of clear and convincing showing that the delay in the resolution of
their appeal was unreasonable or arbitrary.
CASE NO. 1653

ART. III, SEC. 17 Right against self-incrimination
US v Navarro (Rationale)
FACTS: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro et al are charged with the crime of illegal detention. During
the trial, the prosecution presented 3 witnesses, along with these are one of the defendants. Marcelo De
Leon testified that along his 2 other co-accused, did kidnap Punsalan. Flaviano Punsalan (Felix’s brother)
testified that Navarro stated that he was the leader of the band that kidnapped Felix Punsalan and that his
companions were Marcelo de Leon, Fidel Feliciano, Remigio Delupio, and one Luis; that the said Felix
Punsalan died within a week from the time he was kidnapped. The witness testified that Navarro made
the statement freely and spontaneously, without threats or compulsion. The lower court rendered
judgement condemning each one of the defendants to life imprisonment.
ISSUE: WON the law can compel an accused to testify against himself.
RULING: No. The right against self-incrimination was established on the grounds of public policy and
humanity of policy, because if the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the
strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity, because it would prevent the
extorting of confessions by duress. In other words, the very object of adopting this provision of law was to
wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in the Philippines under the Spanish rule that requires the
accused to submit to judicial examinations, and to get testimony regarding the offense with which they
were charged or if they refuse face stricter punishment. The prosecution has the duty to convict one of a
crime and produce evidence. The accused cannot be called to assist in the production of such evidence
nor his silence be proof against him. MP BOLD
Page 16
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1654.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
United States v. Tan Teng - 23 PHIL.145
FACTS: Tan teng raped Oliva Pacomio, a 7 year old girl. Upon investigation, Olivia identified
the accused, thus was arrested. During trial, the victim through medical examination show that
she was suffering from Gonorrhea disease and that it is acquired through contact. Later, the
defendant testified that he rest his private parts upon hers and that he was found suffering from
gonorrhea based on medical examination. Tan Teng contended, that the result of the scientific
examination made by the Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body was not
admissible in evidence as proof he was suffering from gonorrhea; as that to admit such
evidence was to compel the defendant to testify against himself.
ISSUE: WON the substance found is violate his right against self- incrimination
RULING: No. The prohibition that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own
lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt. The main purpose is to prohibit
compulsory oral examination of prisoners before trial, or upon trial, for the purpose of
extorting unwilling confessions or declarations implicating them in the commission of a
crime. Judge Lobingier said, if Tang Teng was found with a stolen object or a bloody shirt, the
same could constitute evidence of the commission of the crime if used for the same purpose.
So, an inspection of the bodily features by competent authority was not violative because he
was not compelled to make any admission, what was obtained was his body itself.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1655.
United States v. Ong Siu Hong - 36 PHIL. 73 (discharge)
FACTS: Ong Siu Hong was forced to discharge the morphine from his mouth. Ong Siu Hong
appears to have been convicted by the lower court, based on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses, who were members of the Secret Service. Ong Siu Hong's counsel raised the
constitutional question that the accused was compelled to be a witness against himself.
ISSUE: Whether Ong Siu Hong was compelled to be a witness against himself when the
morphine was forced from his mouth.
RULING: Yes. To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is along the
same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before the court; or putting in evidence
papers and other articles taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the
Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the accused to be used in proving
Page 17
his guilt. It would be a forced construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights in
question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken from a person accused of crime could
not be given in evidence. The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit
testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort unwilling confessions from
prisoners implicating them in the commission of a crime.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1656.
Villaflor v. Summers - 41 PHIL. 62 (pregnancy test)
FACTS: Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco were charged with the crime of adultery. On
trial before the Judge of First Instance, the court ordered Villaflor to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if she was pregnant or not. Villaflor
refused to obey the order on the ground that such examination of her person was a violation of
the constitutional provision in contempt of court and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid
Prison until she should permit the medical examination required by the court. Villaflor filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: WON the compelling of a woman to permit her body to be examined by physicians to
determine if she is pregnant, violates her right against self incrimination
RULING: No. Every person has a natural and inherent right to the possession and control of his
own body. To compel any one, and especially a woman, to lay bare the body, or to submit to the
touch of a stranger, without lawful authority, is an indignity, an assault, and a trespass.
However, between a sacrifice of the ascertainment of truth to personal considerations, between
a disregard of the public welfare for refined notions of delicacy, law and justice cannot hesitate.
The rule that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial self incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and under an order of the trial court, an
ocular inspection of the body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture or
force shall be avoided. It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will be taken not to use violence and not to embarrass the
patient any more than is absolutely necessary. And, the accused made no objection to the
physical examination.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1657.
Beltran v. Samson - 53 PHIL. 570 (writing)
Facts: Petitioner Beltran, a municipal treasurer charged with the crime of Falsification, refused
to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. Beltran in this case
Page 18
contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him,
which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He further argued that the same will make
him furnish evidence against himself.
Issue: Whether or not the writing sought in this case for the purpose of determining whether
Beltran wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified constitutes evidence against himself
within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.
Ruling: Yes. In the case at bar writing means that Beltran is to furnish means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. The Court
believes the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's
possession. For the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between
one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish
evidence against himself.Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or
the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention. Considering the circumstance that Beltran is a municipal treasurer, it
should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But
even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means
complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the
constitution.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1658.
Bermudez v. Castillo - 64 PHIL. 483
Facts: An investigation was filed against the respondent in connection with an administrative
case. Respondent filed 6 letters as additional evidence in support of his defense. He claimed
that the said letters were of the complainant but the complainant admitted that only 3 of the
letters were hers. Respondent, in determination to prove that the other 3 letters were of the
complainant, he required her to copy the letters in her own handwriting in the presence of the
investigator; the complainant refused, invoking her right against self-incrimination.
Issue: Whether or not the complainant is entitled to the right against self-incrimination by
refusing to copy the letters in her own handwriting as the respondent was impelling her to do.
Ruling: Yes. Complainant has made a no disclosure and her testimony may be attacked by
means of other evidence in the possession of the respondent, which is not precisely that coming
from the complainant herself.
The purpose of Section 17, Article III is positively to avoid and prohibit the repetition and
recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person, in a criminal or any other
Page 19
case, to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his conviction. If such is its purpose, then
the evidence must be sought elsewhere; and if it is desired to discover evidence in the person
himself, then he must be promised and assured at least absolute immunity by one authorized to
do so legally, or he should be asked once for all, to furnish such evidence voluntarily without
any condition.
Main Point: The privilege against self-crimination is a personal one. But the privilege is an
option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry. Hence, when an ordinary witness is on the stand,
and a self-criminating act relevant to the issue is desired to be shown by him, the question may
be asked, and then it is for the witness to say whether he will answer it or claim its privilege.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO.1659.
Chavez v. CA – L- 29169, Aug.19, 1968
Facts: An information was filed against all the accused for stealing a thunderbird car together
with accessories. During the trial, the prosecution asked herein petitioner Roger Chavez, one of
the accused, to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Prosecution contends
that the accused Chavez will only be an ordinary witness not a state witness. Counsel of
accused answered that it will only incriminate his client. Prosecution averred that he has waived
his constitutional right to remain silent. The Judge ruled in favor of the prosecution. Petitioner
was convicted. Judgment of conviction was rendered for qualified theft of a motor vehicle.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self–incrimination had been
violated so as to warrant a grant of writ of Habeas Corpus.
Ruling: Yes. Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger
Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly
provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach
of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said that he has waived his right. He did
not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1660.
Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. - L-19052
Facts: Petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, was charged with "graft, corrupt
practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". Then President of the
Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The
Page 20
Committee ordered petitioner Cabal to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding
and be sworn to as witness in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth.
Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to,
subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This
notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness
stand. The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila. The City Fiscal filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the
Committee to take the witness stand.
Issue: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand
violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Ruling: Yes. Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge
of unexplained wealth, the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the provisions of
the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary. However, such forfeiture has been
held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of
property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal
case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto. No person
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against
compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-
criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by
reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable
is civil or remedial in nature.
Main Point: The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of
requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the
position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke
the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions. It is not disputed
that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but,
also, to take the witness stand.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO.1661.
Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners - L-25018
Facts: An administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr. for alleged immorality. At the initial
hearing thereof, opposing counsel announced that he would present Pascual as his first
witness. Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right from being a witness against
himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to testify in the
next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent
authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with
Page 21
prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court
ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain
from hearing or further proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial
disposition of the matter. Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the
claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to
act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his consent and
against himself." Hence, the Board appealed.
Issue: Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail
of the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.
Ruling: Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while
administrative in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would
result in the revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he
can refuse to take the witness stand. The right against self-incrimination extends not only to
right to refuse to answer questions put to the accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo
testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the witness stand when called by as a witness by
the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self- incrimination, along with the other
rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime should not go
unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect
accorded to the human personality.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1662.
People v. Gamboa - 194 SCRA 372 (paraffin test)
FACTS: Common-law spouses Soledad and Impas were conversing in their house when
suddenly someone kicked open the door. Herein appellant fired his shotgun to the husband. He
fired a second shot hitting the victim on the abdomen, causing his eventual death. He was
charged of murder, and was found guilty as charged. In his appeal, appellant raises, among
others, the question that the paraffin test was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This
right is afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose
confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent and
to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
ISSUE: W/N the accused’s right against self-incrimination is violated by the taking of the paraffin
test.
HELD: NO. The accused’s right against self-incrimination is not violated by the taking of the
paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to testimonial compulsion
and not when the body of the accused is proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed,
the paraffin test proved positively that he just recently fired a gun.
Page 22
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1663.
People v. Canceran - 229 SCRA 581 (paraffin test)
FACTS: A group, including the accused and the victim, were having a drinking session, called
“tagayan.” Bautista was the person who refilled the glass so the other persons present could
take their turn in drinking. When the victim Doroja was about to take his second drink from the
glass, a bullet struck him on the left side of the head. Bautista alleged that it was Canceran who
shot the victim. Canceran and Bautista voluntarily submitted to a paraffin test to determine who
had fired a gun. Results showed negative for Bautista, but not for Canceran. The accused
alleges that the results of the nitrate tests should be disregarded due to the possibility that the
results of the tests conducted on the accused-appellant and prosecution witness Bautista may
have been interchanged.
ISSUE: W/N the paraffin tests conducted violates the right against self-incrimination, and the
results from the test must be disregarded due to the extreme likelihood that the casts of
accused Canceran and prosecution witness Bautista have been interchanged.
HELD: NO. The paraffin tests conducted without the presence of counsel did not violate
the right against self-incrimination nor the right to counsel. The defense failed to show
even the slight possibility that the paraffin casts were interchanged. The Solicitor General
correctly points out that "there is no possibility of interchange since the casts, when submitted to
the NBI Manila for examination, were embedded or glued to the paper with proper
identification."
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO.1664.
People v. Tranca - 235 SCRA 455 (x-ray, not a violation)
FACTS: Appellant was charge with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. After he was
arrested in a buy-bust operation, he was made to undergo ultraviolet radiation to determine the
presence of fluorescent powder dusted on the money used. The defense contends that the right
of the accused against self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an
ultraviolet ray examination. The defense also argues that the Chief Chemist failed to inform the
accused of his right to counsel before subjecting him to the examination.
ISSUE: W/N the accused was denied his right against self-incrimination when he was made to
undergo the ultra-violet ray examination to determine the presence of fluorescent powder
dusted on the money used in a buy-bust operation.
Page 23
HELD: NO. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination
is the use of physical or moral compulsion to export communication from the witness,
not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is
simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant's own lips, against his
will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of the accused's body to ultraviolet radiation,
in order to determine the presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation
so as to warrant the presence of counsel.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1665
Almonte v. Vasquez
FACTS: Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds yr.
1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued in connection with the investigation of funds representing savings from unfilled positions
in the EIIB which were legally disbursed. Almonte and Perez denied the anomalous activities
that circulate around the EIIB office. They moved to quash the subpoena duces tecum. They
claim privilege of an agency of the Government.
ISSUE: W/N the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioner’s right against
self-incrimination.
HELD: NO. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced in this case are
public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are government
officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Where the subpoena duces
tecum is directed to government officials required to produce official documents/public
records which are in their possession or custody, then there is no violation of the right
against self-incrimination.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1666.
People v. Go – 237 SCRA 73
FACTS: Herein appellants were charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for selling,
delivering, and giving away 2 grams of shabu powder, and for possessing 60 grams of shabu
powder. They were found guilty by the trial court. Upon appeal, appellants insist that they had
not been shown the search warrant before the search on their residence was conducted. In
concluding that a search warrant had been presented to appellants prior to the commencement
of the search, the trial court relied on a document entitled "Certificate of Re-conduct of Search"
which had been prepared by the police authorities but signed by appellants.
Page 24
ISSUE: W/N the Certification of Re-Conduct of Search is entirely admissible as evidence.
HELD: NO. The "Certification" cannot be admitted in its entirety against the appellants. The 2 nd
paragraph of the "Certification" amounts to an implied admission that shabu, the marked money,
and shabu paraphernalia had been found by the police authorities at the residence of the
appellants, and therefore, subject to their control and custody. To this extent, the
"Certification" is a declaration against interest and tacit admission of the crime charged.
The 2nd paragraph is, in other words, a self-incriminatory statement made at a time when
appellants were not assisted by counsel, a violation of their right to self-incrimination.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO. 1667.
Regala v. Sandiganbayan – 262 SCRA 122
Facts: Corporation clients of petitioner (law firm partners) consulted the latter regarding
corporate structure and financial matters upon which legal advice were given by petitioners.
Said corporation is subject to investigation by the PCGG involving ill-gotten wealth. Petitioner
later on trial was demanded by PCGG to disclose identity of its clients but refused to provide
information on fear that it may implicate them in the very activity from which legal advice was
sought from them and it may breach the fiduciary relationship of the petitioner with their client
and .
Issue: Whether PCGG’s demand runs afoul to petitioner’s right against self-incrimination?
Held: YES. PCGG’s demand not only touches upon the question of the identity of their clients
but also on documents related to the suspected transactions, not only in violation of the
attorney-client privilege but also of the constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whichever
way one looks at it, this is a fishing expedition, a free ride at the expense of such rights.
If a client were made to choose between legal representation without effective
communication and disclosure and legal representation with all his secrets revealed then
he might be compelled, in some instances, to either opt to stay away from the judicial
system or to lose the right to counsel. If the price of disclosure is too high, or if it
amounts to self incrimination, then the flow of information would be curtailed thereby
rendering the right practically nugatory.
TINGKAHAN
CASE NO.1668.
People v. Malimit – 264 SCRA 167
Facts: While at night Onofore Malaki, attending his store, was killed and robbed by accused
Jose Malimit. It was found out that his store vault was ransacked and his wallet was missing in
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his packet. As such, he was later on charged by TC with and convicted of special complex crime
of robbery with homicide. In this appeal, appellant asks for acquittal claiming that the TC erred
in admitting as evidence Malaki's wallet together with its contents thus, violative of his right
against self-incrimination. Likewise, appellant sought for their exclusion because during the
custodial investigation, wherein he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he
hid Malaki's wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
Issue: WON right against self-incrimination is applicable in this case?
Held: NO. Appellant asseverates that the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with
its contents violates his right against self-incrimination. The right against self-incrimination
guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put by
Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission
of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
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