Case 1 Tatad v Sandiganbayan

But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device
for setting back time.

A delay of close to three years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar

The absence of a PI can be corrected by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a PI can not be
corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back time

Facts:

 Tatad files a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prelim. Injunction to set aside the resolution of Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan to enjoin them from continuing with trial or the criminal case.
 In 1974, petitioner (Secretary and Head of the Public Information) was charged with graft and corruption. No action was taken
on said report. 5 years later, upon petitioner’s resignation, another complaint was filed against the former for graft and
corruption. Tatad’s resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos.
 The Tanodbayan accuses Tatad of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corruption. On the issue of prescription, Tanodbayan cites -
–rancisco v CA stating that the filing of complaint or denuncia interrupts the period of prescription. Since cases were filed n
1980 and offenses were committed in 1973-1975, the Tanodbayan still has the right to prosecute the same, the 10 year
prescription period has not yet elapsed. Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 195,
extending the period of limitation with respect to criminalprosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been acquired, is
constitutional.
 Hence, the prosecution under these two laws are separate and distinct from each other. Tanodbayan also explained
that delay in the conduct of preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the informations filed and that
neither will it render said informations defective. Finally, Tanodbayan added that P.D.911, the law which governs
preliminary investigations is merely directory insofar as it2xes a period of ten (10) days from its termination to
resolve the preliminary investigation.
 Sandiganbayan denies motion to quash. Hence, this petition. Petitioner questions whether the prosecution's long delay in the
filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his constitutional right to due process and the right to a
speedy disposition of the cases against him.

Issue:

 Whether prosecution's long delay in the filing of these cases with the Sandiganbayan had deprived petitioner of his
constitutional right to due process and the right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him.
 Was petitioner deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to "speedy disposition" of the cases against him
as guaranteed by the Constitution?

Ruling: Delay of three years is violative of speedy disposition of cases and due process

 Petitioner claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional mandate of "due process" and "speedy disposition of
cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding
informations only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the purported offenses, which amounted to
loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the informations.
o Sandiganbayan averred the delay was due to Tanodbayan’s gruelling scrutiny as to whether the evidence presented
during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government official.
 In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from
undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial where it is clear that the has been deprived of due
process of law or other constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the
application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar
to each case.
 The facts of the case can not but leave the impression that political motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling
the prosecutorial process in this case.
 Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation cannot be justi2ed on the basis of the facts on
record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes aten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation
byhim from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period2xed by law is merely "directory," yet, on
the other hand, it can not be disregarded orignored completely, with absolute impunity.
  We 2nd the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative
of the constitutional right of the accused to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing
the conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation prescribed by the law
for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is partof the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by
the fundamental law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the constitutionally
guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the
1987 Constitutions), the inordinate delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights.
 A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by
indulging in the speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and grueling scrutiny by the Tanodbayan
as to whether the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking
government official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of treatment, which must be
emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his
sworn statement of assets and liabilities required by Republic Act No. 3019, which certainlydid not involve complicated legal
and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and grueling scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in
terminating the preliminary investigation.

Case 2 Galman v Sandiganbayan

The petition is granted. Galman’s right to due process was violated due to a partial and biased tribunal which was forced to make its
judgement based on President Marcos’ orders. No double jeopardy since the Constitutional right of due process was violated.

Facts:

 Case regarding the reopening of the case of Ninoy Aquino’s death. Pres. Marcos rejected the findings of the fact finding body
tasked with investigating Ninoy’s death and insisted on the military’s version, that Galman shot and killed the latter.
 Hence, relatives of Galman (who was shot and killed during the tragedy) filed a present action alleging the Tanodbayan and
Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation
of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.
 That the Sandiganbayan was biased and that the Tanodbayan did not represent the interest of the people when he
failed to exert genuine and earnest efforts to present vital and important testimonial and documentary evidence for
the prosecution
 A TRO was field by the SC but was subsequently overruled. The petiitoners field a motion for reconsideration and urge the
case be set for full hearing because if the charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital

evidence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the reliefs demanded: The People are entitled to
due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the
tribunal is not impartial, then the entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan
be restrained from promulgating their decision
 However, Sandiagnabayn promulgated its decision acquitting all the accused and convicted Galman as the assassin despite
contrary findings submitted by the prosecution. Hence, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court granted.
The new Tanodbayan urged the reopening of the case in order that justice could take its course. The Sandiganbayan stated
the Tanodbayan was pressured into suppressing vital evidence.
 Deputy Tanodbayan admitted that the Sandiganbayann Justices and Tanodbayann were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. The President summoned the jUstices of the SB and TB, furnished
scripts and planned that AFTER (not IF) they were acquitted, double jeopardy would inure.

Issue: WON Galman was denied due process and be subsequently acquitted

SC Ruling:

 NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY - It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting
aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign
people in criminal cases is denied due process
o "Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due
process is thereby violated.
o "The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of
their jurisdiction.
  SC adopts findings that former President (code named Olympus) stage-managed in and from Malacañang Palace "a scripted
and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to
offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total
absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability.
 The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty ofjustice to stand unrectiHed. The courts of the
land under its aegis are courts of law andjustice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be
usedas mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth,instead of repositories of judicial
power whose judges are sworn and committed torender impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of
a right orthe prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from thepressures of politics and prejudice.
More so, in the case at bar where the people andthe world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system
is atstake.

Case 3 Alonte v Savellano

right to due process of appellants was violated since they were not given opportunity to present their evidence.

 Case regarding the rape of minor Juvielyn by the mayor. Juvielyn filed a petition for desistance, however the case continued.
Upon arrest, accused recommended bail and waived his right to pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge
Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of the case on the merits. According to Alonte, however, Judge
Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the
affidavit of desistance.
 JOvelyn then manifested for the dismissal of the case, however the Judge ruled it was submitted for decision.
 On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel forpetitioner Alonte received a notice from the RTC
Manila Branch 53, notifying him of theschedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the case.
Thecounsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduledpromulgation.On 18 December 1997,
after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty.Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not attend the
promulgation of thedecision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was conBned at the NBIclinic and that,
upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel wouldappear not to have been notiBed of the proceedings. The
decision was rendered finding the accused guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
 Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration

Issue: WON judge acted with grave abuse of discretion on the ground of violation of due process.

SC Ruling: Judge is excused to try the case, an affidavit of withdraw does not dismiss the case, there was violation of due process.

Due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with
judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the
accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice
system, are mandatory and indispensable.

In Tabao vs. Espina, 14the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly tothe above rules. It reminds that —". . . each step in the
trial process serves a speciBc purpose. In the trial ofcriminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of anaccused
requires that an accused be given su=cient opportunity to present hisdefense. So, with the prosecution as to its evidence."Hence, any
deviation from the regular course of trial should always takeinto consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in
theprosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn notonly to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and
just. The judicial gavelshould not be wielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense of justiceand fairness.

Judge Savellano avers none of the counsel for the accused interposed an intention to cross-examine the rape victim. the opportunity
wasmissed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is that the right to confrontand cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one
and may be waived."' – SC avers must be clearly established.

SOLGEN Notes: Parties were not given opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the
purpose; There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day
in court. Due process, rightly occupying the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and
invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

Case 1 PP v Dramayo

Facts:

 Dramayo and Ecubin were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Nagaraya. Three of their co-accused were
acquitted due to their testimony and alibis. The defendents’ alibis were not as persuasive as the latter
 The counsel de oficio of defendants filed a brief stating the absence of evidence sufficient to convict, there still being a
reasonable doubt to be implied from the fact that while conspiracy was alleged," only two of the seven accused were held
culpable. To repeat, a meticulous appraisal of the evidence justifies a finding of the guilt of the appellants for the
offense charged, thus calling for the affirmance of the decision.
o The starting point is the presumption of innocence. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law,
synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not
even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard,
this Court has always been committed. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion
that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the sentence
be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility
for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then
is moral certainty.
 The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two appellants, as from the evidence
deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not
come to their rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by the prosecution. What would
have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants
would have been acquitted likewise just because the other >ve defendants, for the reasons above stated, were not similarly
sentenced.
 Reasonable doubt: is not meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is that doubt engendered by an investigation of
the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute
certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge but moral certainty is required, and this
certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense."

SC: Decision affirmed

Case 2 Dumlao v COMELEC

Facts:

Igot and Salapatan questions the constitutionality of BP 52 Se. 4 stating: a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact. . . . "

SC Ruling:

 Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973
Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged
proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal.

 It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a
person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them
would be ineligible to run for public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges
have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the
penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code)
  Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an
administrative body such as the COMELEC. Ahighly possible conLict of :nding between two government bodies, to the
extremedetriment of a person charged, will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, alegislative/administrative determination of guilt
should not be allowed to besubstituted for a judicial determination.Being infected with constitutional in:rmity, a partial
declaration of nullity of onlythat objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the :rst portion of thesecond paragraph
of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which can stand by itself.

Case 3 Marquez v COMELEC

Facts:

 Petition for certiorari to determine the meaning of “fugitive from justice” under Sec. 40 of the LGC.
o Sec. 40.Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
o (e)Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad(.)"
 Losing candidate for the seat of governor Marquez files this petition to reverse the decision of COMELEC, which dismissed his
petition filed against Rodriguez (winning candidate) for allegedly being a “fugitive from justice.”
 Respondent Rodriguez filed his candidacy while a criminal charge for insurance fraud was pending before the courts of Los
Angeles. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on private respondent on account of
his alleged "flight" from that country.

Issue:

 Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and to date), is said to be facing
a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant for his arrest comes within the term "fugitive from
justice" contemplated by Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code and, therefore,disqualified from being a candidate
for, and thereby ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

SC Ruling: Remanded.

 The Court believes and thus holds, thus holds, albeit with some personal reservations of the ponente p (expressed
during the Court's during the Court's en banc en banc deliberations), that Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, to the extent Regulations Implementing the Local Government
Code of 1991 to the extent that it confines the term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the fugitive) "who
has been convicted by final judgment," is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law
o Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any de8nite 8nding onwhether or not, in fact, private respondent is a
"fugitive from justice" as suchterm must be interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. Theterm must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Court's opinion. Theomission is understandable since the COMELEC
dismissed outrightly theomission is understandable since the COMELEC dismissed outrightly thepetition for petition
for quo warranto quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules andon the basis instead of Rule 73 of the
Rules andRegulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court itself, notRegulations promulgated by the
Oversight Committee. The Court itself, notbeing a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to thebeing a
trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to theCOMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual
matter.COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual ma

Case 4 Corpus v People

Facts:

 Petitioner seeks the reversal of the decision of the court finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the charge of
malversation of public funds.
 Petiitoner was Supervising Accounting Clerk in Nueva Viscaya. Upon his resignation, there was found to be a deficit o P72k.
Petitioner was only able to pay 10k, and did not pay the remaining P52k, and he averred the shortage imputed to him was
malversed by other people. He imputed Paymaster Pineda for the bulk of P52k that the former encashed the checks while
petitioner was on leave and that he had no choice but to record such malversation.
 Pineda denied such imputation by petititoner and an employee corroborated the former’s testimony. In addition, they claim
petitioner was not leave on the alleged dates. The court finds the testimony to be true as indicated on the accused’s Leave
Card.
 The above findings are mainly factual and are based on substantial evidence. There is no reason to disturb them, absent any
of the exceptional circumstances that will justify their review and reversal. On the contrary, the Court is convinced that the
facts as established point unmistakably to the petitioner's guilt of the offense charged
  In addition, the SolGEn states despite his insistence that Pineda and Martinez misappropriated the money, he id not file any
case, whether civil or criminal.

Issue: WON accused is guilty of crime charged

SC Ruling: Peititon denied.

 The equipoise rule invoked by the petitioner is applicable only where the evidence of the parties is evenly balanced,
in which case the constitutional presumption of innocence should tilt the scales in favor of the accused. There is no
such equipoise here. The evidence of the prosecution is overwhelming and has not been overcome by the petitioner with his
nebulous claims of persecution and conspiracy. The presumed innocence of the accused must yield to the positive
finding that he malversed the sum of P50,310.87 to the prejudice of the public whose confidence he has breached.
His conviction must be affirmed.

 The absence of a post-audit is not, as the petitioner contends, a fatal omission. That is nota preliminary requirement to the
filing of an information for malversation as long as theprima facie guilt of the suspect has already been established. The failure
of a public officerto have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upondemand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put suchmissing funds or property to personal use.

 The petitioner's claim that he is the victim of a "sinister design" to hold him responsible fora crime he has not committed is less
than convincing. His attempt to throw the blame onothers for his failure to account for the missing money only shows it is he
who is lookingfor a scapegoat. The plaintive protest that he is "a small fry" victimized by the"untouchables" during the Marcos
regime is a mere emotional appeal that does notimpress at all. The suggestion that the supposed injustice on the petitioner
would beabetted by this Court unless his conviction is reversed must be rejected as an arrantpresumptuousness.

Additional:

Equipoise Rule - is the rule which states that when the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the
appreciation of such evidence calls for tilting of the scales in favor of the accused. Thus, the evidence for the prosecution must be
heavier to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. The constitutional basis of the rule is Bill of Rights which finds
expressions in Sec. 1, par. (a), Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended

PP v Ramilla (GR 101435)

Case 5 Feeder International Line v CA

The right to be presumed innocent is only available to an individual who has been accused in a criminal case.

Facts:

 The petition seeks the reversal of the decision of the CA finding the WAI vessel liable under Sec. 2530 of the Customs law,
which ordered the forfeiture of the vessel.
 The case stems from the ff. facts: The vessel was found in Zamboanga, upon inspection from the authorities, the same did
not contain the required documents for the vessel, hence a case was filed. The Commissioner ruled the vessel was forfeited,
the CTA (Court of Tax Appeals) affirmed such decision, hence this petition.

Issues:

 WON petitioner was deprieved of due process

 WON constitutional rights of Deposa and Torres were violated, having been taken without assistance of counsel

SC: Petition is denied.

 It must be here emphasized that a forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to
the argument advanced by herein petitioner.
o ". . . It is quite clear that seizure and forfeiture proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in
nature as they do not result in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for
in Section 3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings, such as those
instituted in this case, are purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce
the administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate possession.
The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that might be imposed against the
indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may be imposed
  Since proceeding is not criminal in nature, quantum of proof is not guilt beyond reasonable doubt, but substantial
evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
 In the case at bar, we find and so hold that the Government has sufficiently established that an illegal importation, or at least
an attempt thereof, has been committed with the use of the vessel M/T "ULU WAI," thus warranting the forfeiture of said vessel
and its cargo pursuant to the provisions of the Tariff and Customs Code. Before we proceed to a discussion of the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, it bears mention that petitioner, which is a corporate entity, has no personality to invoke the
right to be presumed innocent which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case
 The testimonies of Deposa and Torres, which were given without assistance of counsel may not be considered as
violation of their Constitutional right to be assisted by counsel.

o The right to the assistance of counsel is not indispensable to due process unlessrequired by the Constitution or a law.
Exception is made in the charter only duringthe custodial investigation of a person suspected of a crime, who may not
waivehis right to counsel except in writing and in the presence of counsel, and duringthe trial of the accused, who has
the right 'to be heard by himself and counsel,'either retained by him or provided for him by the government at its
expense. These guarantees are embodied in the Constitution, along with the other rights of the person facing
criminal prosecution, because of the odds he must contend with to defend his liberty (and before even his life)
against the awesome authorityof the State.
o In other proceedings, however, the need for the assistance of counsel is not as urgent nor is it deemed
essential to their validity. There is nothing in the Constitution that says a party in a non-criminal proceeding is
entitled to be represented by counsel and that without such representation he will not be bound by such proceedings.
The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in
the due process clause such that without the participation of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored
or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his
side.
 Besides, if ever there was any doubt as to the veracity of the sworn statements of Deposa and Torres, they should have been
presented during any appropriate stage of the proceedings to refute or deny the statements they made.

Right to be Heard by Himself and Counsel

Case 1 PP v Holgado
One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law", and that all
accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be
heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man
may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because
he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.

Facts:

 Holgado was charged with the CFI with slight illegal detention. During the proceedings, the court asked the accused:

“Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty? — A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.” What do you plead?
— A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr.Ocampo." Q.Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? — A. Mr.
Numeriano Ocampo.
 "Fiscal: "I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with this case and I found no evidence
against this Ocampo." Court:" Sentence reserved.
 The court filed its judgement, however, it appeared the offense charged was slight illegal detention, however it was changed to
serious illegal detention in the decision.
 The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense charged is merely "slight illegal detention" as the
offense is named therein or the capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his
judgment. Since the accused-appellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either
party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information.

Issue: WON RTC erred in its decision

SC Ruling: Decision is reversed and case is remanded for new arraignment.

 The court failed to inform accused of his right to have an attorney and asked if he desired the aid of one.
 Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused, who was unaided by counsel, it was not
prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years,
 without absolutely any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case.

 The proceedings of the RTC is irregular under sec. 3, ROC Rule 112:
o "If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney before
being arraigned, and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney,
the Court must assign attorney de officio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney."
o Under this provision, the ff. are the 4 important duties a court must comply if the defendant appears without an
attorney:
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de officio to defend
him;
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.

Additional:

One of the great principles of justice guaranteed by our Constitution is that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." In criminal cases there
can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill
in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is
guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a
constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his
right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de o:cio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own.

Case 2 People v Agbayani

If the accused fails to prove the court failed to inform him of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been obeyed and
official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court stand. In other words, the trial court is presumed to have
complied with its four-fold duties under Section6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court

Facts:

 14 year old Eden charges her own father with the heinous crime of rape. The RTC renders a decision finding accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, hence, this automatic review by the SC.
 At his arraignment, accused was assisted with 2 counsel de oficio and entered a plea of not guilty. Moreover, the defense
presented the affidavit of desistance of Eden. The latter retracted such affidavit, reasoning she was coerced to file such
affidavit by her mother and sisters. RTC rules in favour of Eden and accused files a Motion for New Trial on the grounds
irregularities prejudicial to his substantial rights were committed during trial.
 Accused alleged his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings, worse, even waived the
presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution was presented. He also averred that the trial court
used its inherent power of contempt to intimidate private complainant.

Issue: WON appellants rights were infringed

SC Ruling: No, decision is affirmed.

 The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript ofthe stenographic notes of the proceedings
of 22 December 1994 and the order issued bythe trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only state that the court
appointedde oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not categorically disclosethat the trial informed
appellant of his right to counsel of his own choice. However, thisdoes not mean that the trial court failed to inform appellant of
such right. The precise timethe two counsel de oEcio were appointed is not disclosed in the record either.
o Since appellant has miserably failed to show that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the
presumptions that the law has been obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court
stand. In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under Section6 of
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court
 It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge advised the accused of his right to counsel
is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with
 the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be overcome by an
affirmative showing to the contrary.
 Turning to the alleged violation of appellant's right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, Section 9 of Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court reads:
o SEC. 9.Time to prepare for trial. — After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial
unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
o It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof
constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the
instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right.

Case 3 Amion v Judge Chiongson

Case about an accused who capriciously delayed the judicial proceedings due to the unavailability of his counsel. The Constitution
concerning the right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a
person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution. Even if we were to extend the
application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential
discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to
the predilection of the accused.

Facts:

 An administrative complaint against Judge Chiongson filed by Amion on the grounds the former had appointed the latter with a
counsel de oficio despite his objection on the ground that he had his own retained counsel
 Complainant alleges a counsel de oficio was presented on said date because the former’s counsel could not attend as he was
sick. Moreover, the defense counsel again was not present during a scheduled hearing which prompted respondent to assign
a counsel de oficio despite the complainant’s refusal, he also aavers assigned counsel was incompetent.
 Complainant-accused asserts that the aforesaid incidents constitute a clear violation of his right to due process and
a deprivation of his constitutional and statutory right to be defended by counsel of his own choice.
 Judge states complainant is a policeman charged in a criminal case for allegedly killing a fellow policeman. From the time
respondent assumed role as Judge, the case has not been moved due to complainant’s counsel’s unavailability. In order to
avoid further delay, the court appointed the counsel de oficio. Respondent judge reiterated his belief that his appointment of a
counsel de oficio to represent the accused-complainant is justi6ed because of the vexatious and oppressive delay on the
latter's part who has been represented by a counsel de parte who refuses or fails to appear during hearings. He averred that
the records of the case will show that the accused-complainant and his lawyers have employed every means fair, but mostly
foul, to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 94-15772


Issue: WON complainant’s right to be defended by counsel of his own choice was infringed.

SC Ruling: Dismiss administrative case

 Judge did not violate rights of complainant since an examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the
right to counsel, will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to a person
under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution.
o Even if we were to extend the application of the concept of "preference in the choice of counsel" to an
accused in a criminal prosecution, such preferential discretion cannot partake of a discretion so absolute
and arbitrary as would make the choice of counsel refer exclusively to the predilection of the accused.
o In Pp v Barasina: The word “preferably” under Sec. 12 Art. 3 does not mean to exclude other competent and
independent attorneys. To rule otherwise will allow the accused to obstruct the progress of the investigation by
simply selecting a lawyer, who for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest.
 Applying this principle enunciated by the Court, we may likewise say that the accused's discretion in a criminal prosecution
with respect to his choice of counsel is not so much as to grant him a plenary prerogative which would preclude other equally
competent and independent counsels from representing him. Otherwise, the pace of a criminal prosecution will be entirely
dictated by the accused to the detriment of the eventual resolution of the case.
 Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right to due process as he was duly
accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not
appearing in court together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

 Case 1 PP v Quitlong
There was no conspiracy since the information filed against the accused did not state otherwise. Moreover, the right to be ingormed of
the nature and cause of accusation

Facts:

 The accused were sentenced to RP by the RTC, charging each with murder for the death of Capito. The accused averred it
was their co-accused, Jesus, who stabbed Capito resulting in the latter’s death.
 The facts are as follows: Capito and his 2 friends were playing billiards. When it was time to go home, they bought fishball,
where Capito was shorthanded by the vendor. Thereafter, not less than 8 men ran after Capito, one held his hand and
stabbed him below the nipple. A footpatrol officer demanded the accused stop and Capito was brought to the hospital where
he died.
 The appellants contended the RTC erred in finding the accused guilty of murder, and that the charge should be
homicide. In addition, they erred that there was conspiracy among the accused.


Issue:

 whether or not the herein three accused participated in, and may be held guilty as co-principals by reason of
conspiracy for, the fatal stabbing of the victim, Calpito, there being no dispute that the latter died due to the solitary
stab inflicted on him

SC: Quitlong guilty for the murder of Calpito

 Overwhelming, such as it may have been thought of by the trial court, evidence of conspiracy is not enough for an accused to
bear and to respond to all its grave legal consequences; it is equally essential that such accused has been apprised when
the charge is made conformably with prevailing substantive and procedural requirements
 Article III, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, mandates that no person shall be held answerable for a criminal
offense without due process of law and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall first be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him. The right to be informed of any such indictment is likewise explicit in procedural rules.
o In US v Karelsen:
First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; and second, to avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause, and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement
may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent;
these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of times, place, names (plaintiff and defendant),
and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged.
 In order to ensure that the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation is not
violated. An information must:
1. state the name of the accused
2. designation given to the offense by the statute
3. a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense;
4. name of the offended party
5. approximate time and date of the commission of the offense;
6. place where the offense has been committed
 The opinion of the trial court to the effect that conspiracy may be inferred from the allegation of abuse of superior strength and
with the aid of armed men, i.e., that ". . . the above-named accused, being then armed with a knife, with intent to kill . . . and
taking advantage of their numerical superiority and combined strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab JONATHAN CALPITO YCASTRO . . ." is difficult to accept.
 Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or that there has been a
community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the felony among the accused. Such an
allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words "conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in
conspiracy," must aptly appear in the information in the form ofde8nitive acts constituting conspiracy

 Conspiracy must be alleged, not just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter
that is not to be confused with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In establishing
conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be
inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused. In the absence of conspiracy, so averred and proved as heretofore
 explained, an accused can only be made liable for the acts committed by him alone and this criminal responsibility is individual
and not collective. And so it is that must be so held in this case.

Case 2 Soriano v Sandiganbayan

Facts:

• Accused-Petitioner, a prosecutor charged of violation of Sec 3(b) of the RA 3019 by demanding from a respondent Php4,000
and receiving Php2,000 in consideration for dismissing a case of qualified theft

• SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

• (a) x x x

• (b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer
in his official capacity has to intervene under the law."

• Convicted by SB, hence this appeal

Issues:

• Whether or not the investigation conducted by the petitioner can be regarded as a "contract or transaction" within the purview
of Sec. 3 (b) of R.A. No. 3019

• WON petitioner cannot be convicted of bribery under the Revised Penal Code because to do so would be violative of
his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him

SC:

 Petitioner’s argument -
The evidence for the prosecution clearly and undoubtedly support, if at all, the offense of Direct Bribery, which is not the
offense charged and is not likewise included in or is necessarily included in the offense charged, which is for violation of
Section 3, subparagraph (b) of Rep. Act 3019, as amended
 Respondent’s argument –
A reading of the above-quoted provision would show that the term 'transaction' as used thereof is not limited in its scope or
meaning to a commercial or business transaction but includes all kinds of transaction, whether commercial, civil or
administrative in nature, pending with the government.
 It is obvious that the investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this
term must be construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some
considera¬tion as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by the
petitioner
 A reading of the information which has been reproduced herein clearly makes out a case of bribery so that the
petitioner cannot claim deprivation of the right to be informed SB judgment is modified to reflect the correct offense
which is Direct Bribery under Art. 210 of the RPC

Case 3 Borja v Mendoza

An arraignment is indispensible since its purpose is To make accused fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life,
depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. It is not a useless formality.

Facts:

• Accused-petitioner was charged of slight physical injuries before City Court of Cebu, was not arraigned, was tried in absentia,
and was convicted

• CFI of Cebu affirmed the conviction

Issue:
 • WON the failure to arraign accused is violative of his constitutional right to procedural due process, more specifically of his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and of his right to be heard by himself and counsel

SC Ruling:

 The procedural process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be
informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on a showing that his
guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him

 An arraignment thus becomes indispensable as the means "for bringing the accused into court and notifying him of
the cause he is required to meet
 Purpose of arraignment –
 To make accused fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime
imputed to him.
 At the very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him
 It is not a useless formality, much less an idle ceremony
 Petition for certiorari, granted. Case remanded back to City Court of Cebu for arraignment of the accused

Right to Speedy, Impartial, Public Trial

Case 1 PP v Tee
A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from vexatious,
capricious, and oppressive delays

Facts:

 Accused here was charged and convicted of illegal possession of marijuana of about 592 kilos
 During arraignment, accused refused to enter a plea. Trial court entered a plea of not guilty for him

Issue:

 WON the reopening of the case and absences of the prosecution witness has caused prejudice to appellant’s right to speedy
trial
o He points out that a total of eight (8) scheduled hearings had to be reset due to the failure or willful refusal of
Abratique to testify against him
o OSG points out that the two-month delay in the trial is not such a great length of time as to amount to a violation of
appellant’s right to a speedy trial. A trial is always subject to reasonable delays or postponements, but absent any
showing that these delays are capricious and oppressive, the State should not be deprived of a reasonable
opportunity to prosecute the criminal action

Ruling:

• A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays

• The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty (180)
days

• The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:

• (1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays;

• (2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or

• (3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his
case tried
 • Although the absences of prosecution witness Abratique totaled twenty (20) hearing days, there is no showing
whatsoever that prosecution capriciously caused Abratique’s absences so as to vex or oppress appellant and deny
him his rights
• After Abratique repeatedly failed to show up for the taking of his testimony, the prosecution went to the extent of
praying that the trial court order the arrest of Abratique to compel his attendance at trial
• Tried to get NBI to produce Abratique but to no avail
• Prosecution just waived presenting Abratique
• A delay of twenty (20) hearing days is not an unreasonable length of time
• One must take into account that a trial is always subject to postponements and other causes of delay

Additional:

A speedy trial means a trial conducted according to the law of criminal procedure and the rules and regulations, free from
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In Conde v. Rivera and Unson, 45 Phil. 650, 652 (1924), the Court held that "where a
prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable
period of time, as in this instance, for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom."

The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative. A determination as to whether the right has been violated involves the weighing of
several factors such as the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the conduct of the prosecution and the accused, and
the efforts exerted by the defendant to assert his right, as well as the prejudice and damage caused to the accused.

The Speedy Trial Act of 1998, provides that the trial period for criminal cases in general shall be one hundred eighty (180)
days. The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when:
(1) the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
(2) when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
(3) when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.

Case 2 Flores v PP

Facts:

 Accused was charged with robbery. However, it took CA nearly a decade (1955-1965) to act on motions of appellant (motion
for reconsideration, motion to quash on the grounds of violation of right to speedy dispostition of cases. Hence, this appeal to
SC

Issue: WON right was violated

SC Ruling: Decsision denying MR and MTQ set aside. Case dismissed.

 Petitioners can thus invoke the constitutional guarantee that the trial should bespeedy. In the absence of any valid decision,
the stage of trial has not been completed.In this case then, as of May 10, 1965, when they moved to dismiss in the Court
ofAppeals, petitioners could validly contend that they had not been accorded their right tobe tried as promptly as
circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court ofAppeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at
times unavoidable thatappellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them.What is
decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolutionof August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly
premise their plea for dismissal on thisconstitutional safeguard. That is the sole basis for the conclusion reached by us —
considering the controlling doctrine announced with such emphasis by this Court timeand time again
 The constitutional right to a speedy trial, as was noted in a recent decision,Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 99 "means one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressivedelays, . . ." 1010 Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the
shortesttime possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, andif culpable, he will
not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within aperiod of course compatible with his opportunity
to present any valid defense. As wasalso pointed out in Sarmiento: "The remedy in the event of a non-observance of
thisright is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari,prohibition, or mandamus for the :nal
dismissal of the case." 1111 The above ruling is areiteration of the doctrine announced, even before the 1935 Constitution, in
Conde v.Rivera, 1212 a 1924 decision. In that case, Justice Malcolm announced categorically thatthe trial, to comply with the
requirement of the then organic law, the PhilippineAutonomy Act, must be "free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays."
 As was pointed out by the ponente, Justice Laurel: "The Government should be the last to set an example of delay
and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the
 criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody
of the law."

Case 3 Conde v Rivera

Facts:

 Conde has been forced to respond to 5 criminal informations, all of which had been postponed 8 times. A year after the
information has been filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged
 Philippine organic and statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
have a speedy trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in order that if innocent she
may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law.
 Dismissed from herhumble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while investigationsand trials are arbitrarily
postponed without her consent, is pal palpably and openlyunjust to her and a detriment to the public. By the use of upon the
appropriateinformation, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination, and could haveprepared the case for a trial
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. Hence, appellant comes to SC to redress her grievances

SC:

 Government ofthe Philippine Island s which should be the last to set an example of delay andoppression in the administration
of justice. The Court is thus under a moral and legalobligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the
accused isdischarged from the custody of the law.
 We lay down the legal proposition that, where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of
the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a
year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he
be restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.

RA 8493

Case 4 Mateo Jr v Villaluz

Elementary due process requires ahearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty ofrendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free fromsuspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity."

Case 5 Garcia v Domingo

Right to public trial: It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner a judge conducts the
proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such attendance.

 Case about the court holding the case of the accused in the chambers of the Judge for intentional secrecy.
 The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this petition, as set forth at the outset,
explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear,
under the present dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only a single,
terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to
gain acceptance. As was stressed by him: "Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it
in an illegal and unjust manner."
o In the case at bar, despite being held in the chamber of the Judge, the right to public trial was not violated
since it was not shown the public was excluded.
o It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be
present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform
dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver
opinion, it success to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives
and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged."
 There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in
observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on such
attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to the parties need be shown. The thought
that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be
conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety.

Case 6 Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino’s Libel Case

Facts:
 • Then Pres. Cory was scheduled to testify in a case People v. Beltran

• The proceedings were telecast live by several television stations

• The day after the trial, Sectoral Representative Art Borjal wrote Justice Marcelo Fernan lamenting the live coverage by several
television stations of the court proceedings

• in the United States and other democratic countries, live TV and radio coverage is strictly prohibited under their Rules
of Court

Issue:

• WON denying permission to the media to broadcast, record, or photograph court proceedings is a denial of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial

Ruling:

• Considering the prejudice it poses to the defendant's right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of
justice and considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be served and
satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television coverage of court proceedings shall not
be allowed

• Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial
officers, the parties and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings

• No video shots or photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.

Case 7 RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA

Facts:

• SOJ’s MR of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to televise and broadcast live the trial of former President
Estrada before the SB

• Petitioner’s ground - No conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the press, on the one
hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial

• Estrada’s contention - Allowance will violate the sub judice rule and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial,
live media coverage will only pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations
aimed at pressuring the SB to render a decision one way or the other

• the right of the people to information may be served through other means less distracting, degrading, and prejudicial
than live TV and radio coverage

Issue:

• WON denying permission to the media to broadcast, record, or photograph court proceedings is a denial of the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial

SC Ruling:

• In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, has resolved to order the audio-
visual recording of the trial

• Rationale:

• the hearings are of historic significance

• involve matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their government is
conducted
 • for documentary purposes

concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after
the decision of the cases by the SB

the possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just
determination of the cases can be minimized

the possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice can render its own will be avoided.

Additional:

Accordingly, in order to protect the parties' right to due process, to prevent the distraction of the participants in the proceedings and in
the last analysis, to avoid miscarriage of justice, the Court resolved to PROHIBIT live radio and television coverage of court
proceedings. Video footages of court hearings for news purposes shall be limited and restricted as above indicated.

Rights of the accused and power of courts to control its proceedings, freedom of press and right to public information,
among these, rights of the accused are preferred.

With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it behooves all to make absolutely certain
that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or subtle, in
proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret veritable facts free from improper influence, and
decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind, unbridled by running emotions or passions.

Case 8 RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right to a fair
trial. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of
a transparent, open and public trial

Facts:

• On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed while on their way to Shariff
Aguak in Maguindanao

• Touted as the worst election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history, the tragic incident which
came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre”

• A year later, NUJP, et al filed a petition before SC praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal
cases be allowed, recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the
working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices

• To revisit the former Estrada ruling which violates the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be
narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative
the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence
of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders,
and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of
media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution

• Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public
trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of
association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.

Ruling:

• To revisit the former Estrada ruling which violates the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be
narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable alternative
the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence
of the accused, and the number of media personnel killed reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders,
 and cellular devices upon entry, and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of
media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media institution

• Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information, right to a fair and public
trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of
association, subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.

• A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial

• it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe the trial process a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings
• The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties, whether
private complainants or accused, is unfortunate enough
• Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial
• SC PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court proceedings
of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to the guidelines herein outlined.

Case 9 People vs. Mapalao [G.R. No. 92415, May 14, 1991]

Facts:

• Case about robbery with homicide wherein one of the accused (all of the accused are Muslims) escaped during trial thereof.
The SC held:
o Thus when as in this case he escaped from confinement during the trial on the merits andafter his
arraignment, and so the trial in absentia proceeded and the judgment against him was promulgated in
accordance with Section 14(2) Article III of the 1987 Constitution, nonetheless, as he remained at large, he
should not be afforded the right to appeal therefrom unless he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the
court or is otherwise arrested, within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment against him. While at
large as above stated he cannot seek relief from the Court as he is deemed to have waived the same and he
has no standing in court.
o It should provide instead that if upon promulgation of the judgment, the accused fails toappear without
justifiable cause, despite due notice to him, his bondsmen or counsel, he isthereby considered to have
waived his right to appeal. However, if within the fifteen (15)day period of appeal he voluntarily surrenders to
the court or is otherwise arrested, then hemay avail of the right to appeal within said period of appeal.

Case 10 PP v Valeriano

Right to Confrontation

Case 1 US v Javier
confrontation is essential becausecross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunalmay have before
it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.

Facts:

• Natividad fastened his carabao in a corral, the next day, it disappeared. He reported the matter to the Constabulary, and a
patrol of the Constabulary under the leadership of sergeant Presa (who is now deceased), following, encountered theaccused
Lazaro Javier, Apolinario Mendoza, and Placido de Chavez leading a carabao. The next day the carabao was found in the
house of one Monterola
• As corroborative of such evidence, we have the well-known legal principle, which as applied to cases of this character is that,
although the persons who unlawfully took a certain carabao are not recognized at the time, and their identify remains entirely
unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen animal is found in the possession of the accused shortly after the commission of the crime
and they make no satisfactory explanation of such possession they may be properly convicted of the crime.
• Appellant contends the lower court erred in admitting in evidence the sworn statement of Sgr. Presca ow deceased,
whose signature was identi9ed, before the justice of the peace of the municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of
Batangas. Appellant's argument is predicated on the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights which says, "That in all
 criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face," and the provision of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, section 15 (5), which say that "In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall be
entitled: . . . to be confronted at the trial by and to cross-examine the witnesses against him."
o It was intended to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions or ex parte aHdavits, and particularly
topreserve the right of the accused to test the recollection of the witness in the exerciseof the right of cross-
examination." In other words, confrontation is essential becausecross-examination is essential. A second
reason for the prohibition is that a tribunalmay have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness
while testifying.

Issue: whether the present facts entitle the accused to the protection of the Bill of Rights or whether the facts fall under some
exception thereto.

SC Ruling:

• Although we are faced with thealternative of being unable to utilize the statements of the witness now deceased, yet
ifthere has been no opportunity for cross-examination and the case is not one comingwithin one of the exceptions,
the mere necessity alone of accepting the statement willnot suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was improperly received in
evidence in the lower court

Case 2 Talino v SB
The accused was not given the opportunity to rebut the testimony against him, however, right to confrontation was not violated since
RTC did not use as basis the testimony against appellant. They merely considered factual findings.

Facts:

 Case about government employees being tried for estafa through falsification of public documents. One of the accused was
called to court to testify. After which, the same’s case was dismissed due to insufficiency of evidence. The person whom he
testified was charged with such crime. The latter files a motion for reconsideration, questioning the judgement on the grounds
it violated his right to confrontation, he was not able to rebut the testimony against him

SC: Judgement is affirmed. Right was not violated since the RTC did not use as basis the testimony against appellant. They merely
considered the factual findings.

 Respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting the petitioner. The part of that
decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in
approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government.
 The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused, especially
where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. While it is true that Rule 119,
Section8, of the Rules of Court does not specify when the motion for such a trial should be filed, we have held in several cases
that this should be done before the prosecution commences presenting its evidence, although, as an exception, the motion
may be granted later, even after the prosecution shall have rested, where there appears to be an antagonism in the
respective defenses of the accused. In such an event, the evidence in chief of the prosecution shall remain on record
against all the accused, with right of rebuttal on the part of the fiscal in the separate trial of the other accused
 The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial,
allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that
may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of
confrontation.
 The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal
prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their
charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted
if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite
in secrecy. That is also the reason why ex parte affidavits are not permitted unless the affiant is presented in court and
hearsay is barred save only in the cases allowed by the Rules of Court, like the dying declaration.
 Confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential.

Complusory Processes

Roco v Cervantes