CASES ON JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Angara vs. Electoral Commission

Facts: Petitioner, Jose Angara won the election for National Assembly for the first district of
Tayabas Province. The National Assembly passed Resolution No 8 declaring the deadline for
filing protest on 3 December 1935.On the other hand the Electoral Commission set the
deadline on 9 December 1935. Losing candidate, Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. Angara contended in his
Motion to Dismiss the Protest that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was adopted
in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during
which protests against the election of its members should be presented and that the protest
was filed out of the prescribed period. Electoral Commission dismissed Angara’s petition.
Angara filed for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission from taking cognizance of Ynsua’s protest.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to review the rulings of the Electoral
Commission organized under the National Assembly.
Decision: Writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is denied. In cases of conflict
between several departments and among the agencies, the judiciary is the only
constitutional mechanism devised to resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional
boundaries. The judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and
appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch
or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all
authority.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as
complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. The express
lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial of the exercise of that
power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the legislative
power as an express prohibition in the Constitution. If the Court concede to the power
claimed of the National Assembly and cut off the power of the commission to lay down the
period to file protests, the grant of power to the commission would be ineffective.

People vs. Pilotin

Facts: Vincent Crisologo through counsel filed a verified motion praying for the transfer to
the New Bilibid Prisons or, alternatively, to Camps Crame, Aguinaldo or Olivas, of the place
of trial of Criminal Case No. 3949 of the municipal court of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, wherein he, as
sole defendant, is charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. As
justificatory ground, he alleged that his life would be in jeopardy if he were to be confined in
the Vigan municipal jail during the trial because there are many political enemies of the
Crisologo family in that vicinity. Some of the adherents of the Crisologos, including his
father were murdered in that vicinity.
Issue: Whether or not there would be miscarriage of justice if the place of trial was not
changed.
Decision: Petition accepted; hostile sentiment against the accused at the place of trial is a
justification for transfer of venue
The change of venue involves not merely the change of the place of hearing but also the
transfer of the expediente of Criminal Case No. 3949 to another court.

Kilosbayan vs. Guingona

Facts: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by
B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct “charity sweepstakes races,
lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery
system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.
Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an
on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad became interested to offer its services and
resources to PCSO. Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors in March
1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation
(PGMC), which “was intended to be the medium through which the technical and
management services required for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO.”
KILOSBAYAN submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease
with the PGMC because it is an arrangement wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the
on-line lottery system in “collaboration” or “association” with the PGMC, in violation of
Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42. respondents allege that the
petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing our resolution in Valmonte
vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office.
Issue: Whether or not Kilosbayan has standing to maintain instant suit?
Decision: Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners should, indeed, be resolved in their
favor. A party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, 29
this Court brushed aside this technicality because
“the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.

Zaldivar vs. Gonzales

Facts: Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is one of several defendants in a criminal case pending
before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary
investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases. Petitioner filed with this
Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus naming as respondents both the
Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with
power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft
and corruption against public officials and employees, and hence the criminal case against
the petitioner were all null and void. The Court further resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE
and DESIST from hearing and trying the criminal cases againts the petitoner Zalvidar.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition
initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent for recommending that additional
criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5)
other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan’s lack of
authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the
same.

The Court again: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2)
issued a temporary restraining order ordering respondent Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in the pending cases from filing the criminal information consequent
thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having
caused the filing of the additional information against petitioner in criminal cases before the
Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in
relation to the proceedings.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondent Gonzalez in which he alleged
interference in due process by sitting judges of the court. Respondent Gonzalez also
continued to make statements to the media regarding the subjudice case repeatedly
alleging bias in the judiciary against him.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent Gonzalez is in contempt of court?

Decision: Guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct as an
officer of the court and member of the Bar.
The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the
Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes
as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Apart from this constitutional
mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an
inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish
for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the
Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before
the Court. The power to punish for contempt is “necessary for its own protection against an
improper interference with the due administration of justice,” “(it) is not dependent upon
the complaint of any of the parties litigant.

In re: Cunanan

Facts: Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar (Republic Act No. 972), “in
order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all
subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject.” Nevertheless, considering the
varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree
of strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court passed and
admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in
1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953,
the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent. Congress (via Senate Bill No. 371) reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. Although
the members of this court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President
allowed the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful post-war candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of
their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional
ground for admission. Others sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without,
however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court
first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise their
grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972
which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed
petitions or not.

Issue: Whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional

Decision:
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of
1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void
and without force and effect.

2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers
to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to
1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with
section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Power to admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. There is no express
provision in the Constitution which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the
judicial department should in any manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the
dominant thought of the framers of our constitution was to make the three great
departments of government separate and independent of one another. There is no
legislative power to compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law.

In re: Edillion

Facts: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its
Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP since the
latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice.
Court required the respondent to comment on the IBP’s resolution and the respondent
reiterated his refusal to pay the membership fees on the basis that the above IBP provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as
a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic,
he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concluded, the above provisions of the Court Rule and
of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly
questioned the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body.”

Issue: Whether or not a) the Court has the power to compel a lawyer to be member of IBP
b) Court ruling requiring payment of a membership fee is void.
Decision: Provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. Respondent Marcial A.
Edillon be disbarred and his name struck from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or
not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its
elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving
the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

1973 Constitution explicitly granted to the Court the power to “Promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice … and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar
… (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

Under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court
to perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable
or arbitrary.
Matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities.

Dela Llana vs. Alba

Facts: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An act reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating
Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes”, mandates that Justices and judges of inferior
courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior courts
established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary.
Independence of the judiciary is safeguarded by this constitutional provision: “The Members
of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal.”

Petitioners alleged that the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored
and disregarded.

Issue: Whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 reorganizing the judiciary is
constitutional?
Decision: Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional. Removal is, of course, to be
distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in
that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security
of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the
abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance.

IBP vs. Zamora

Facts: Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the
Constitution, President Ejercito Estrada directed the Armed Forces of the Philippines Chief of
Staff and Philippine National Police Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper
deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing
criminal or lawless violence. The President declared that the services of the Marines in the
anti-crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until
such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed
a petition seeking to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines null and void and
unconstitutional. Solicitor General contend that petitioner has no legal standing to assail.
Issue: Whether or not IBP has legal standing to assail constitutionality of calling the AFP to
assist PNP to suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion?
Decision: IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule
of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration the IBP asserts no other basis in
support of its locus standi. While undoubtedly true it is not sufficient to merit standing.
However, when the issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure. The Court relaxed the rules on standing and
resolved the issue now.

Ople vs. Torres

Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System” was issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12
December 1996. Senator Blas Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating
the right to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two constitutional
grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the
citizen’s right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the Senate. As a Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issue
of Administrative Order No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the
Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable.
The blurring demarcation line between the power of legislature to make laws and the power
of executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.

Fabian vs. Desierto

Facts: Section 27 of RA 6770 was assailed on the ground that it provides for an appeal to
the Supreme Court from decisions in administrative cases decided by the Ombudsman. It is
contended that the provisions goes against Section 30 of Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution
which states that “no law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and consent.”
Issue: Whether or not the court may appeal from decisions of the Ombudsman?
Decision: Section 27 of RA 6770 can not validly authorize an appeal to the Supreme Court
from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently
violates the proscription of Section 30 Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which was
intended to give the Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its
appellate jurisdiction, otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Supreme Court.

People vs. Gacott

Facts: For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge
Eustaquio Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Supreme Court. The
respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross
ignorance of law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence to
administratively discipline respondent judge?
Decision: To require the entire court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative
matter or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a
congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in
administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require
action by the Court En Banc.

Bengzon vs. Drilon

Facts: Republic Act No 1797 provided that pensions of Justices of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals who served for 20 years shall be adjusted. In 1979, Presidential
Decree 644 repealed RA 1797 but was not published. In 1991, the Court issued a resolution
adjusting their pensions in accordance to RA 1797. The General Appropriations Act
authorized the Chief Justice to use savings for the adjusted pensions. The president vetoed
all portions containing references to the adjustment of pensions.
Issue: Whether or not the selective veto of the President is valid?
Decision: Petition granted. The veto power is not absolute. The Constitution provides that
only a particular item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a
part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.