1. No.

Grijaldo’s obligation was to pay a generic thing — the amount of money representing the
total sum of the five loans, with interest. In the case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Jose
Grijaldo, the obligation of the appellant under the five promissory notes evidencing the loans in
questions is to pay the value thereof; that is, to deliver a sum of money — a clear case of an
obligation to deliver, a generic thing. Article 1263 of the Civil Code provides: In an obligation to
deliver a generic thing, the loss or destruction of anything of the same kind does not extinguish
the obligation.
The chattel mortgage on the crops growing on appellant's land simply stood as a security for the
fulfillment of appellant's obligation covered by the five promissory notes, and the loss of the
crops did not extinguish his obligation to pay, because the account could still be paid from other
sources aside from the mortgaged crops.
2. a) No, C cannot appropriate the ring. The agreement stated in the contract that in case of
nonpayment “the debt of P500 shall be considered as full payment of the diamond ring without
further action” constitutes pactum commissorium, which is expressly prohibited by Art. 2088 of
the NCC. According to this article, “the creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of
pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null and void.”
b) Yes, this would make a difference. In both of these cases, there is no automatic transmission
of the right of ownership over the thing which is given by way of pledge, but merely a promise to
constitute an assignment of property. As held in the case of Dalay vs. Aquiantin, what is
prohibited by the law is where the stipulation would have the effect of giving to the creditor
automatic ownership over the property.
3. No, the mortgage in the case was not valid. Art. 2085, par. 2, of the New Civil Code
specifically requires that the pledgor or mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing pledged or
mortgaged. Thus, since the disputed property was not owned by the Olidiana spouses when
they mortgaged it to petitioner the contracts of mortgage and all their subsequent legal
consequences as regards Lot No. 2029 (Pls-61) are null and void.
In the case of Cristina Marcelo Vda. De Bautista Vs. Brigida Marcos, Et Al, the court ruled
that it is an essential requisite for the validity of a mortgage that the mortgagor be the absolute
owner of the property mortgaged, and it appearing that the mortgage was constituted before the
issuance of the patent to the mortgagor, the mortgage in question must of necessity be void and
ineffective. For, the law explicitly requires as imperative for the validity of a mortgage that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of what is mortgaged.
4.
5. No, such a clause is not valid and effective. The Supreme Court held in the case of Acme
Shoes, Rubber and Plastic Corporation vs. CA, that while a pledge, rem, or antichresis may
secure after-incurred obligations so long as these future debts are accurately described, a
Chattel Mortgage, however, can only cover obligations existing at the time the mortgage is
constituted. Although a promise expressed in a CM to include debts that are yet to be
contracted can be a binding commitment that can be compelled upon, the security itself,
however, does not come into existence or arise until after a chattel mortgage agreement
covering the newly contracted debt is executed either by concluding a fresh chattel mortgage or
by amending the old contract conformably with the form prescribed by the Chattel Mortgage
Law.
Sec. 3 of the Chattel Mortgage Law requires that the parties must execute an oath that the
“mortgage is made for the purpose of securing the obligation specified in the conditions thereof,
and for no other purpose, and that the same is a just and valid obligation, and one not entered
into for the purpose of fraud.”
The debt referred to in the law must be a current one, not an obligation that is merely
contemplated. In this case, the only obligation specified in the chattel mortgage was the P3-
million loan that was already paid. By virtue of Sec. 3 of the Chattel Mortgage Law, the payment
of the obligation automatically rendered the CM void or terminated. Hence, there was no longer
any CM that could cover the new loans that were concluded thereafter.
6. In the redemption of properties sold at an execution sale, the amount payable is no longer the
judgment debt, but the purchase price.
The factual antecedents of the case resemble that of Manuel R. Dulay, vs. Hon. Judge
Glicerio V. Carriaga wherein the court ruled that the procedure for the redemption of properties
sold at execution sale is prescribed in Sec. 26, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thereunder, the
judgment debtor or redemptioner may redeem the property from the purchaser within 12 months
after the sale, by paying the purchaser the amount of his purchase, with I % per month interest
thereon up to the time of redemption, together with the taxes paid by the purchaser after the
purchase, if any. In other words, in the redemption of properties sold at an execution sale, the
amount payable is no longer the judgment debt but the purchase price.
The Mirang case is not controlling as it involves the redemption of mortgaged property sold at a
foreclosure sale and the mortgagor was ordered to pay his entire indebtedness to the
mortgagee, plus the agreed interests thereon, before redemption can be effected, because the
charter of the mortgagee (DBP) required the payment of such amount. The instant case, on the
other hand, involves the redemption of property levied upon and sold at public auction to satisfy
a judgment and, unlike the Mirang case, there is no charter that requires the payment of sums
of money other than those provided for in Section 30 of Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court.
7.
8.