.

,
.1
v.
¡,;:,-

~
1
¡. -"'" 1:;
I thought that ifthis is the case, Mind in setting all things in
. j
order orders each thing in whatever way is best. So if one
The Place of the Prime Mover .
f
wishes to tind out the explanation of anything-how it comes in Aristotle'sTeleology ~>t1
,

to be or perishes or just is-one rnust find out this about it, ~.~
nainely, hówit is best for it to be or actor be acted upon. As a ~
. K(i
Charles H. Kahn

1
result of this reasoning, I thought that conceming each and
every object ofinquiry aman should look fornothing but what
is most excellent and best. (97c-d) ·" . .. ¡¿\~_x-C
It is r.ot enough, Aristotle objects, to claim that sornething is best: we must say ljj For Anstotle, we know, Jt !S !ove that makes the world go round. Desire for
..., .
what it is bestfor.~ the perfec¡ actuality of the Prime Mover causes the eterna! revolution of the
1
:, ti~
~~

:.·
First He aven, which earríes with it, a3 Dar;tc said, 'the sun and the other stm'. .-.:.t.,;.
NOTES · And the influence of the Prime Mover (here2.ftcr the PM) is nót limited to the . ~

' lt is a pleasure to be able to dedícate this anide ta David Salme. who guided my first
~teps into the field of Greek philosophy, and whose articles, especíally ·Greá Science and
heavens: it is in so me sense a universal cause,' as the tirst of aH things, the mover
.. · , f'Y'Io t¡)c r-t , t::-
0! a!I thmgs (Meta. 1070b34). Also, su'rce it'óperates as obiect nfde<ir" the
1

1
~

Mechanism·, have served as a model tome as to many others in the lield. · . '
PM is a final cause and its action on the Fiist Heaven is teleological. .
1 Rossl936. 42-43; Charlton 1970,120-126; Balme 1965; Nussbaum !978, 94 and

322: Gotthelf 1976. 246-249.
2 Simplicius. J¡¡ phys. 374.18ff.; Aquinas. De ph,1•sico audiw. ·¡t lectio Xll; A.
Mansion l 94ó, 25 2n2: Sorabji 1980, !47n85: Cooper !982. 216-218 with n12.
3 Allan Gonhe!f points out tome that 'immediately' is overstated, since the assertion
and the example are separated by the words twv ó' (¡¡¡o !1!:01~ ltal1:ou o.Ü1:a).látov ou5É:v. He
himself defends the interpretation oftaú.ta as referring t.J Úle parts of animal bodies, the rainfail
{jj So mueh is commonground. Disagreement begins when we as k how far this
<eleolo~cal influence ofthe PM extends into the natural world: How general is
the tfiinf't'A~ it causes motion w~ i:gw¡.tEvov, as an object .of !ove? I can
find no adequate discussion ofthis question in the !iterature. Since it is of sorne 1 l~
irnportance f.x Aristotle's general doctrine ofteleology, I aro glad to have the
.·~)"!:''
·~

opporknity to dedícate this essay to David Balrne, who has contributed so

1
exampl~ being quoted on!y to illustrate a generic point about chance: we do not cal! regular wintc~
rainfall a matterofchance.Butifwe are not then to be thrown back on to Aristotle's altemative. 'for much to our understanding of what Aristotle has to say on the topic of
the sake ofsomething', rainfa!l must be showrt. to be outside the class of evems to which he applies teleology.
the disjunction.lfthere is any way out in this directicn, it must be that rainfall is dueto narure in the

1
sense ofmatter, as op?Osed to form. This isCharlton's view agaín, and 1thinkit is cpen ta the objec·
tions I ha ve stated above. ~Whatis agreed, then, is that the PM causes motion in two ways: directly, as
4 The conclusion this paper comes te raises many problems; some ofchem ar~ discus~ed
final cau$c or object of desire; and indirectly, by the rncchanical motions and
now by Juhn Cooper( 1982). He points ounhatin the rainiall example the end oft~e prvcess is stil!
qualitative changes that result frorn its direct action on the heavens. Wh<.t is in
the 'good' ofbio!ogical species: Aristotle 's not committed by it a!one toa cosraic te!eoiogy útE: ¡"
refe;s to lhe good of the whol~ wor!d. dispute is how far the direct o.ction as fmal cause extends. .
This artic!e was completed befare I read Sarah Waterlow, Nature, Change and Agency in 8::( 1) On a narrow view, the teleological action of the PM is lirnited te the
Ariswlle's Physics. [n an exceptio~ally c!ear and interesting treatment oft.he problems ofPhysics ii heavens. Sine e the heavens an:: alive, they can be rnotivated by a rational desire
8, she does not quite comrn.it herself on the issue discussed here, but seems inclin~d towards the
for what is best, justas human beings and other animals are rnJved to pursue
vicw 1 ha ve taken. See Waterlow 1982, 80n29.
whatseerns good to them . On the very narrowest view, the onlYaction which is.
directly caused by !cwe-1wlesire foct}~e-~BF;::ri :;f:;ofthe Unmoved Maver is the- -- ~;¿
etcmally urriform revolution ofthe out~r sphere. This víew is strongly suggested ~
h::m

t~
by the statements in A 8 thatjustify the po1iting of other Unrnoved Movers: the
Ptvf is rnovd 'neither per se noí accide:Jt:l.liy, but it causes the first motion
wh.ich !s etema! and single (Kal !llav) ... A single motion must be caused
.
··-~.·~::~'
;(.~

~~
~~~
by a singlí! mover' ( J0731114-28). Hence it is necessar¡ t.1at the etenai ~.
revolutions of sun, moon and planets 'each be moved by J. substance which is ~~
~

~· ...
!·:
etemal and unmoved per se' ( 1073 a33). But sinee the motion of the outer
he aven earríes with it the other .f¡ilit;Ji~1t makes all of their motions unceasing
and continuous, including that ofthe sun. It is the eyele ofthe sun in tu m whicli,
by variation in the heat produced, functions as prirnary motive cause for all
generation and change in the sublunary wor!d (see GC ii l 0). Indirectly, then,
the PM is respor.>.iUe for all sublunary change, but only in a mechanical way,
through motions and alterations (such as heating and cooling) derived from the
m,ovement of the celestial spheres.
:s,(2) Tlie broader view agrees in thís account of the indirect, rnechanicál
ac-tion of the PM, but it assigns an equally importan! role to direct teleologica!
causality within the sublunary world. As supreme instance of ·unqualified
actuality and divine life, the PM serves as a kind of metaphysical rnagn••.
drawing aH natural potencies on to their realization in act and to the acquisition
oftheir specific form. On this view, everything in nature aspires tothe conditicn
of deity; but each kind of thing can attain this goal only in a limited, specifi<"
way. This broader .view takes notas rhetoric,al effusion but as a metaphorical
expression of sober doctrine such statements as those of Physics i 9, where thé
principie of fom1 is described as 'divine and good and desirable (Ec¡>etóv)'
while matter is said 'natural! y to aim at and to des ire (i:cptwem xal.
ÓQ€yw8m) <the corresponding foim) in accordance with its own nature'
( ! 92al7-! 9), and cf.Dean. ii 4 where plants and anirnals are said to reproduce .
their kind 'in order to h~ve a share in what is divine, as far as theycan; for that ¡~
what all ofthern desire (ogtyttat), and it is for the sake ofthis that they act in·
wh~tever they do according to nature' (415a24-b2). On this broader view, ·
when in A 1OAristotle compares 'the good and the best' which are immanent in
nJture to the order of an army and of a well-govemed city where •all things are
organized in relation to one principie', one ruler( 1075 al 8, 1076a4), we are to
understand him to be refming not simply to the rnechanical transmission of
motion and change via the cycle of the sun, but also and primarily to the direct
final causality of the PM in our world, as the eterna! guarantee and ultirnate --
driving( drawing) force for aH pattems ofteleology in nature as well as in human .2~
.J.
- líie and action. . . .. ~ •
. _· ~-=-..~f~.e find this second, .bro~der vi.;\i.in earlit~~reter.~ su eh as Zell?r and _·_·
_~ . __ Joa~him. 1 Recent authors tend t~ -b~. more -c~utious, and to restrict their ' ~ ~rrot only to be superfluous but actually to undennine Aristotl~'s conception of ·- . _:·~=:j~
account of the PM toa narrow_er,.rn.ore explicitly docurnented interpretation ::..
like(l) above.2 Perhaps sorne will regard{ 1) as the more 'scientific' view ofthe
. PM, sinee it makes a minimal use of the rnetaphysical explanation of rnotion in
terms of desire for the suprerne good, limiting this principie to the eterna!
rnotion of the heavens where Aristotle has supported his doctrine by careful
argument and closely tied it to the requirernents of !lis astronomical theory.
i ..
~·~ ..
. ;.-,,~· :-
:nze Prime Mo ver and Tele&.c. >
·~:.: >·
However, I hope to show that (1) is wholly inadequate as an account of the
principie ·from which the he avens and nature are suspepded' (Meta. 107 2b14),
·and that there are a large number of texts scattered·:·throughout the corpus,
·· which only make sense in the context ofthe broader view (2). I suspcct thar
_; much ofthe scholarly resistance against the broader view is due not only to its
metaphysical character- the resistance being a re tic ofposítivism in the exegesis
ofAristotle- but also to the fact that(2) has not always been clearlydistinguished
frorn a quite different and indefensible interpretation, which we rnay cal! the
ª emiurgic view of the Piv[:
(l. ( 3) Sorne medieval interpreters and a number of 19th century scholars
assimilated Aristotle's deity as far as possible to the God ofBiblical religíon, ·
characterizing the PM as a creator who shows providential concern for man.kirld
and who rules the world as hís kingdorn.; Such demiurgic or regal inter-
pretations were not always grounded in the text, but they could to sorne extent
be based on Aristotle's own implicit comparison ofthe PM toa general and a
ruler::.and also oif'a very literal reading ofte;<ts likeGC ii 10, where 'the-god' is
said tó ha ve completely filled the uni verse by rnaking corning· to-be unce~sing. 4
Every conternporary student of Aristotle would recognize such language símply
as Arístotle' s use of popular· or Platonic ways of talking about the divine, no
more to be taken literally than his occasional personification ofMother Natu re
who does nothing in vain.5 There is no place in Arístotle' s system for a
transcendent artisan or potentate: The PM is not properly an agent at all; its
only' action' is its eterna! act ofthough~·which must be unchanging because it is
wholly actual. Its direct causal relation to the world can only be that of final
causality, as spelled out in ( 1) and (2) abo ve.
,) Once this demiurgic view has been set aside, the only question in dispute is
whether, or how, the te!eological influence ofthe PM extends throughout the ·. -t
heavens and thc sublunary world, as clairned in (2). I be!ieve the textual
. .......... .- .. -- ..... , .. __ _1 ···
evidence in favor óf su eh a claim is overwhelming. But we are then faced with a
- number of objections, beginning witb (a) the principie cited above frorn A 8,
1 that a sin~e Mover must be responsible for a single rnotion. Also (b), s~nce · -~~- --:--
immanent teleology in the sub!unary world can apparently be rnade fully .5:. ~:,:<i
- . ·--=-.:::-=.:.. Í!f~..:gible withour~¡:;~o a universal fmal cause, any stteh appeai-seems .. ;~~~: i~
~··:..~ :: - ·- irnrnan~nt teleology. Furthennore (e), it is riot ~-ªsy to· se~_w¡¡._t sense could he . -_·:;EJ1~~
. made
·--...of-.. the claim
~- ---- -
that inanimate
.......... .-..-·. ..-.. boclies
····· such ..... _ __,., as______
the elements.
._______ --or matter : .~. -~~~
in .. ·___;_:_,{¿
- - ·-·---
general, are move_<! l:?Y..~.9m~.!hi!'lgJikt;_d.~Iir.dQ.Uhe f..M, · ~:·. ': ::::;;
(l~Th;se obje~tions rnust be rnet if we are to exhibit Aristotle' s position as a -~<::~!¡:
consisten! one. But whether his doctrines are consis ten! is a funher question, .. ... < . ....
wh!ch cannot be decided befare we determine what these doctrines are. We ·.-"'· ·' ·;7.
.·.·•: '- · · -··~ .

i.-•.: :;
·~ ·. :. ; :\H~~ cannot use the assumption of consistency in order to rule outlhe plain meaning
of the texts: that would be a strange abuse of the principie of charity.
@one prelirninary word before turning to the texts. In ~peaking ofte!~ology I
am using the word without any philosophical preconceptrons, to refer srmply to
-- what Aristotle describes in tenns of final cause (to oú EV!:Xa) and end or .
goal (tt!.o<;). I shall in the end have something to say about what Aristotle's
conception offinal'Cause amounts to, but my aim is to document and construe
_....... .
Aristotle' s doctrine of cosmic teleology within his own system, rather than to
· ·relate it to modem notions of causality.
II
Ür begin with a dogmatic summary of what I take to be Aristotle's view of
cosmic teleology, as a system of final causes ancho red in the causality of the
PM. The PM is responsiblefor the universal tendency of every being to achieve'
the fullest actualization of that range of capacities and potentialities which
constitutes its nature. Thus the universal causality of the PM makes acorns·
grow into oak' trees just _a:;·it makes the·celestial bodies revolve eternally in their
orbits. In each case th·e-causa!ity ofthe PM acts not to override but to complete
the immanent causality of the thing's specific nature: this nature is always an
interna! source of motion, even if motion as such comes from the Prime Mover.
What kind oftree the acom grows into is determined not by the PM but by its
own nature, i.e., by what kind oftree has produced it The causality ofthe PM
accounts only for the fact that it grows at al!: that the natural potentialities are
realized and that natural kinds are reproduced. (See text § 8 below.) So for the
heavenly bodies: each particular orbit is determined by the specific mover (or
movers) for that star, but the general tendency which accounts for movement
( the maximal actualization ofthe poten tia! as such) and the unifying continuity
ofthe whole system of celestial motions are both dueto the PM. (Se e§ l.) Only
in the case of the absolutely simp!e and unifonn motion of the First He aven
does the PM determine not only the general tendency to actualization but the
1 specific form which is actualized.(More precisely, perhaps, given the spherical
1
form and outennost position of the first Heaven, there is nothingspeczfic to be
i together in re!ation to one thin~ (1075al6-19), so that there will be good
·._ t det~nnined by the PM e~cept the direction of rotatioiL 6) In inanimate nature, .
the PM is simJl:lliyr~s2~~ible for e:rct.t~~-~-+..ieving its nature, i. e., for the
; .....~7·? ·
general·fact of' -~~cured change, the orderly realiz~tion of specific poten-
tialities. Thus it is frre's own nat.ure which causes it to be hot and to heat other
things; andit is the nature ofthe hot to move upwards. But it is th.e causality of
the PM which causes these natu resto be constanti y realized, to be continuously
passingfrom potencytoactas the oceas ion permits. And so forhuman beings: it
is our own rational nature which is realized in the exercise of moral and
, l!tJ' r t:t~ · ~ !.. . . .. ~ ~, ··-" (,-,. ¡ ~ ; ... . L-..... ¡ ,,· ,: ' . ·
, . .-r•. · · · \ "'• "" ;
\
intellectual virtue; but the urge to realize this nature (our desire for happiness) is
the specifically human form ofthe universal tendency from potency to act And
because of the unique kinship between intellect in us and in the cosnúc deity,
· there is a peculíarly intimate connection between our own highest goal in
_e(wgta and the final cause of the whole_U!!iverse. .... :. .... . . .. __
.:: \(,Áristotle-never gives a Únified statement of the view 1 have just sketched, as
.·· he ~ever gives usan over-all account ofhow thé theology of Metaphysics A is
. to be integrated with the rest ofhis system. Because he never fully articulated
..this ovér-aiching structure, sorne of his partía! statements may well be incon-
sistent with one another. And in any case, my own sketch of a synthesis cannot
be documented at every point Aristotle never says that the PM must be
irivoked in-order'to explain why ai1 agent that is aétua_lly F operate.> (as efficient
cause) to change something that is potentially F to make it actually F, e.g., in
order to explain why fire heats watei, any more than he tells us that the causality
·of the PM is required to explain why embryos grow into full-fonned adults. I
· think this more general claim is entailed by text §5 below, taken together with
§ § 3, 4, and 8; and this is the doctrine summarized in'Aristotle's-description of
the PM as 'the mover of al! things as the first of alltfiii)gs' . But I will not defend
this full synoptic accoun~ and I presentir simpl:; :o orient the discussion and to
. clarify myown view. Whatthe following texts demonstrate is les~; thc.n";:;y ~o~;.:;
picture, but still too much to be accounted for by the narrow construal of
releology in ( l ).
§ l. That the celestial movers (and hence their spheres) form a unified
system by reference to the PM (GC ii 10.337a21).
[We have shown elsewhere that for an eterna}, continuous
motion there must be one mover, unmoved, ungenerated and
unchangeable,] and if there are several <eterna!> circular
motioris there must be severa! principies (Ct.gxa[) but all of
these must necessarily be somehow under a single agx~.'
This is aspecial applicationofthe principie of 1\. 1O, that' all things areordered
government and 'a single ruler' (1 076a4). Howthe movers of the different
spheres a~hned to the PM in a single syst_em is.not explained.-Rcss-"Süf,~es-~
i
th~t they are directly motivated by a desire ror tfie PM, but it is not easy tose e
how this is compatible with( eir own status as unmoved.8 The celestial
rnotions themselves are unifiect'b'y the fact that eaeh body is also carried along
by the diurna! revÓlution of the First HeaveiL Arístotle assumes that there is
sorne corresponding subordination of the Movers, but he does not tell us
1
what it is.
: '!

·;··
§2. The mechanical ' control' of sublunary phenomena by the celestial
cycles (Meteor. i 2.339al9-32).
The xoa!lÓ~ around the earth, composed of these <four
simple> bodies ... is necessarily continuous with the higher
motions, so that all its power is controlled (x1JÓE:gváo8m)
from abo ve. For we regard as primary cause (ahia) that from
which the principie of motion comes for al! thing~ ... Thus
tire, earth, and the like are to be counted as material cause of
\ ·the phenomena of this region (for it is as matter that we
describe the passive subject of change), whereas the cause as
principie of motion must be assigned to the power of those
things which are in eterna! motion.
1 This text might be cited as evidence for the narrower view which I mean to
challenge, since the metaphor of cosmic control (xuoegvaa8at) is applied he re
to the mechanical causality of the heavens upon meteorological phenomena,
exercised by means of.heating árid cooling. Aristotle' s point in §2 seems to be
·..~
that, ifleft to themsei~es, the four elements wou!d simply settle in their natural
places and produce none of the phenomena rv : ;; explained. 9 The disturbing
(and creative) infiutnc~ q;<,:IC:S from above, frorr: the efficient causality ofthe
StJfl But it i.: ~haracteristic of Aristotle's tdeology that it is notan alternative
but a supplement to the explanation in terms of efficient causality. The connec-
l'
tion between celestial cycles and sublunary change is reinterpreted teleolo-
gica!ly in th~ next passage.
§ 3. The chain'ofbeingcontinued downwards. by the cycle of generation and
corruption for the elements (GC ii 10.336b27-337a7)
We affi.rm that in al! things na ture always desires(ogtywBm)
what ís beuer, and that being( tb dvaL) is betterthannot being
... Butsince it is impossible for being to be present < always>
in al! things, because they are far removed from the CxQX~. the
deity has jilled up the universe in the way that was left, by
· making coming· to-be unceasing. For thís was the besi wayfor
being__ro b~-~E_&ne'Cted t9g~fbg,_~ª-!lse eterna! geo~ration .·
arid éom!.~g:.fó-be is the closest thing to being <f~reyer>_. __
-·-' · ·· And the cause of this, as we ha ve repeatedly said, is the ~ .
...... _____ .. ·· · ·· ·Cli-.cUlaT-rrioVerñe~t <of the heavens>. For' circular mOve- ·
~
.! . . ..
ment alone is continuous.
Hence all the other things which change into one another -
by their powers and passivities, such as the simple bodies,
'·'
•••·- . . . "" •""' . . , ,·.. . , ~ '-"''- V i. Vt:~ · ·. _~ .i 0 -~
1~cj
'<c-..i'
imitate the circular movement <ofthe heavens>. For when
.air ís generated from water and tire from air; and in turn water
from frre, Wt say they have completed the cycle of generation
. . tv. tuming back < to where they began>. Thus the straight
,. . ~tíon <of simple bodies up and clown> is continuous by
imitatíng circular motion.
In GC ii lO Aristotle has just given the astronomical-mechanical explanation of
growth and decay in terms of ·the _movement of the sun. The teleo!ogical
account, in terms of nature's desire for the hest and the imitation of higher
cycles by lower ones, is thus entirely supervenient on the mechanical account.
Final causality does not exp!ain how something happens or what brings it
about; it explains why it happens, i.e., why it is a good thing to happen, what
goal it contributes to. The goal he re is fullness of'being', in other words approx-
imation to exte rna! existence and activity. ·
§ 4. The continuity of celestial and sublunary change in ~rpreted in tenns of
.........
actuality (i:vÉQYEta) (Meta. e 8.1Ql,Q_b,22-30).
Thus the sun and stars and the whole heaven are always in act
<since they have no potentiality, except for change ofplace>
... And things involved in change, like earth and fire, imitate
the imperishable things <i. e., the he aven!y bodies>. Forthey
<se. the elements> are also always in act; for they possess
motion per se and in themselves.
In his commentary on l050b30 Ross says: 'It is doubtful whether this refers to
the natural movement of fire upwards, and of earth ·ctownwards, or- to the
constant tendency of the elements to change into one another.' 10 On the latter
reading, the point of §4 would be the same as in § 3, expressed \n the language
of actuality {f:VEQYE:tv). On the former reading, the same principie of 'imitating
. the imperishable' is applied to the eterna! movement of the elements to their
natural places. This interpretation is much more likely, since only the natural
motíons properly be long to the elements 'per se and in themse!ves'. The ; .:~ :·:...:..~
. ·. . argument of GC ii lO is precisely that the motive for elemental transfonnation .·: .7\ .,
-r
:.~mu_st·\':'dm~rom
~~·
outside, namely, from th~. sun.
-
By contras t., the movemeñt of . · ··\ ~X:C.
. .- -~ -~--
.. ·, ·• · the simple bodies to theirplacesis an etemaiiactjust be cause itis an expression -.~.""'" ;:.
-·-. :..:. ..-. ~-:.:.. -·of their essentia! natures. In following their Owrf nature, then, the -elementS ·- --·-~~:;.-:;
.. imitate their ontological superiors, justas living things do in reproducing their . ' ,•'',:
... ::': : _:_
.. . own kind. (See § 8 below.) .·, - •
§ 5.Every chain of actua!ization can be tráced back to the PM as first cause
(Meta. e 8.1 050b5-6).
 [Actuality U:vÉQyna) is not only prior to potentiality
{Mva¡.w;) in substantial being{oua[a} but also in time:] one
actuality prec~~es another in time right back to the actuality
~ ·::. of the primary eterna! mover.
_
-~S.::_ ~- ->~"'~~:~ ,_:·Thís remark, rnade almost in passíng, is probably as elose as Aristotle ever--- ---.---- -
. :~·: '~ - -- - -\~ .~: - ~- -- comes toa general assertíon ofthe point ofview I arn ascribing to him: the PM --__
--- -- ;,-; -- as the source of ac~alízation in every forro. In view of its brevity, ene might be
_, tempted to interpret §5 in terrns of efficient causality alone: the mechanical
--_,_ -~ - -.. derivation of all celestial and sublunary rnotion from the first cycle of the outer
_ heavens. But the natural motion (as distinct from the transformation) of the
- -' ' • _ -. _ simple bodies cannot be soderived, norcan the specific'self-starting' activitíes
.. : -----~~:::-:' --:- · of growth, feeding, and the Iike on the part of living things. In tenns of efficient
-- causation, the chain of actuality which precedes the developing embryo leads
:~
- back to pareilt, grandparent, and so on across the generations, but not to the
PM. How then are we to bríng in the PM as origin of every chain of actuality?
Our passage refers back (at 1050b4) to 1049bl7-l 050a3, where we have the
· .· ' ·-~ _:,:general principie thát 'in every case what is in act is produced from what ís
- potentially by what is <already> in act' (1049b24), which is one of the
essential prinCipies of efficient causality. I suggest that the PM is needed ro
-explain chis principie, namely theieñé'iaÍcáusation of change by the power of
- actuality to produce' another Iike itself , which is thus seen as aderivation of all
generated actuality from the eterna! actuality ofthe PM. The derivation would
-be of the following fonn. The most generallaw of nature is that like produces
like, namely that what is actually X makes something else actually X out vf
something potentially X, as fire makes water hoL Now for Aristot!e, I suggest,
this law in tum-thar actuality produces actuality-is explained by sorne
relation of desire or assimilation to the PM as the paradigm Being which is
eternally in act because its essence is actuality as such. As with the biological
reproduction of like by like, so with the physical and metaphysical production
of actuality by actuality: producing more ofthe same is the best approximation
to a stage of complete and permanent actuality.
It is a teleologicai interpretation ofthis kind for §5 which is suggested by the
. , ~lk ofimitstin_g the._a_ct ofimperishable things in §1, wh:ch occurs !:1 a later
_ _...... . -C.:.~ - ~ ·~-~· --~ . • - ----· -- ·-··
- -:-_- - . - context ofthe -saité1;hapter (0 8). ' . ...-~-
We have the teleo\ogical vie_w expressed frorn the other direction, notas the
_upward imitation of superior by inferior but as the downward dependence or
'suspension' ofthe latter from the former in an eloquent passage where Aristotle is
descríbing the eterna! existence (atcúv) of the entities that lie 'outside of the
heaven', where there is neither Úine norplace (De cae/o 279al2): they pass the
whole of etemity (aicúv) in th~ best and supremely self-sufficient life (~w~).
-·- :_~_-_::-:- -Piaying on the various senses of aLÚJv, Aristotle remarks ·that tlús tenn ís
·'-: · ~·-- ·: d·r~in~ly inspired.
___ ___-_ - ' · §6.The Prime-Mover as source of cosmic_ lif~. (De cae/o i 9.279a22-
30).
,· . . .
-- -- =--'---~ --é.C:..---Forthe goal and completion (ttAo~) which embraces the
·- . time of eachone's life . .. is called the lifetime (aiwv) of
· eách person. And forthe same reason the goal and completion
· ., · (tD.os) of the whole heaven and the goal which embraces
all time and infinity is eternity (a1wv) which takes its name
frorn 'being forever' (aid), and is immortal and di vine.
And from this sotirce is suspended the life and being for ot!ter
things, for sorne in more distinct form (ÓXQL6tmeeov) for
otlÍers in a dim way (cq.wugws).
There are sorne peculiarities in this context which suggest that Aristotle in §6
may not be envisaging the PM in precisely the same way as inMetaphysics A.
Without getting embroilerLín exegetical coritro~ersy,_ I note only that §6
characterizes the eterna.llife 'of the PM (i) as the tÉAO~ for the whole heaven,
which must mean for the whole urüverse (see the preceding definition of
oueuvó~ at 278b l9- 24); and (ii) as source of life and being for everything
else, but in different grades or degrees,
What are these different grades of eosmíe life? The simplest answer would
be: heavenly bodies on the one hand, mortal beíngs ( animals and plants) on the
o-ther. But the parallel statement that' heaven and nature' are suspended from
the PM (at Meta. 1072b14; cf. De motu 700a5) suggests a more general
reference here to al! motion and change, not simply to living things. Thus,
Physics viii compares the'deathless and unceasing' motion of the world order
to 'a kind oflife foral! t~ings composed by nature' (250bl4). On this view, the
natural rnotions and transforrnations-ofthe simple bodies would count among
the more obscure forrns of cosmic life, even dinuner than that of plants.lf so,
Aristotle is clearly using 'Ji fe' in an extended or rnetaphorical way in§ 6, just as
we will find him using 'desire' for plants and inanímate things. (See §8 and
Physics i 9.192al8, cited below.)
- The nouon of a cosrnic hie_rarchy str.etchjngr.lt:}w_:_1{rom the PM is most full~ _ ___' ,
articulated in a later section oftheDe caelo, where Aristotle is considering the
. · essentially tek :·''Jgical (or esthetic) question: Why do the planets, though
· '-placedclosertd1nluriiforrn motion ofthe outer sphere, ha ve more complicated
mov-:.nents than the sun and moon, which are lower and further from the
primary body? The mechanical theory of celestial motions explains only how
the planets move; it cannot explain why they ha ve the motions they do. The

soluticn lies in recogruzing that the heavenly bodies are not inanimate beings
1Al. {a'IJruxa) but that they have a share in action and life (1tQa~t~ xa.l !;w~).
§7.Howdifferent leveis ofcosmic beings attaiñtheir gccd in different ways
(De cae/o ii 12.292a22-b25, trans. after Guthrie).
It is appropriate ( i) for what is in the best state to possess the
good (10 eu) without tahng action, (ii) for what is nearest to
obtain it by mea!ls of a single actíon, ( ii0 for things further
away to need more; justas in the case ofbodies one may be in
good condition without exercise, another by a little walking, a
1hird may need running and wrestling, and again a fourth
cannot obtain this good no matter how hard he works, but <he
must be satisfied with> something else . . . Hence we must
consider the activity of the heavenly bodies to be like that of
animals and plants. F or here in our region it is the actions of
man ( üi) that are the most varied, beca use he cari obt:ún rnany
goods, so that he perfonns many actions for the sake of further.
ends. But what is in the best state ( i) has n~ ~.~d of action
( ngá~t~) for it is itselfthe end(-co oú rvD<a) ... But(iv) other
animals have fewer actions, and plants even less-perhaps
only one ... Now then ( l) one th.ing has and shares in what is
bes~ (2) a.nother thing reaches itdirectly by way offew steps;
(3) a third reaches it through many steps; and yet (4) another
\ does note ven attempt to re aeh it but is content to come close
to the extreme goal (-ca i:oxm:ov) ... To attain the end ('to
tD.o~) would cenam1y be the best for all things. But if that is
1
impossible, the nearer a thing is to what is best the better it is.
And that is why (4) the earth does not move at al~ and the
bodies elose to it have few motions. For they do not re aeh the
extreme goa~ but they advance as far as they are able to attain
the most di vine principie (aQx~). The first he aven attains it
\ directly by a single motion. The bodies in between the frrst
and the lastones (3) do reach the goal, but they reach it
through a number of motions.
O ; O- O O ~ " o # ~ O - :7 7=-~-=---
. .. .-:. .I have-·aücted ñUmt'm to the text to .bring ouT'tl'e'"Stríct'Parallel Aristotle is
- / . . .
dráwing between (a) degrees of approximation to what is best( the divine life or
atrov .of § 6), (b) ascending levels of the asfral spheres; (e) fue ·~cale of action
for plants and animals, including man, and (d) different levels of effort required
for human health. The hierarchical scale thus extends frorn the first heaven
down to the plants and to the eanh itself, with 'the most divine principie', the
1
1 ~?
end and goal atwhich all things aim. securely identified with the first member of
the series: the good or ÚQtmov .to which only the first heaven has immediate · ··
access. Here again there is a ~· \estion whether the De cae/o conceives this
·cosmic , i;/..o.; injust.the same way as Meta. A 11 What is clear in any case is
that we have aspati< ·', g¡aded hierarchy fpr thecosmos, with the whole system
presented as a pursuit of di vine life as far as eaeh leve! of being pennits.
For the earth, the best it can do is to stay put in the center, those parts which
·are separated and raised upwill returnto the cent:;:r as soon as they get a chance.
Aristotle does not mention the· restofthe simple bodies in § 7, but we knowfrom
other passages that their natural places are arranged in the same scale of
hierarchical grading: the closer anythíngcomes to the outer limit, the better it is.
' For the higher <element> is always related to what !ies beneath it as fonn to
~atter' (De cae/o iv 3.310b14). Hence air is more form and substance (TÓÜE
u) than earth {GC i 3.3!8b32). Fire is uniquely or especially the principie of
form because it is na tu rally carried to the limit of the sublunary world (GC ii
8.335 al9); it limits and defines the elements below while at the same time .. ··-
coming nearer to-t+.e EO'J..dí.ov, the di vine principie at which all things somehow ~-.;.
·' aim. Thus the stratifi~~tion ofthe simple bodies completes the cosmic hierarchy.
Each kind ofthing approaches the goal as best it can, sharing in what is best by
realiz.ing its own potentiality, achieving its own form and actuality.
. The notion of cosmic desire, which was expressed metaphorically in § 3
('nature always desires what is better'), is tacitly implied by the references in
§ 7 to ' attaining what is best'. In Physics i 9 we again have the principie of
nátural fonn described as 'something divine and good and desirable (Eqle"CÓV)'
wlüle matter is said ' naturally to aim at and desire (tcptwem x.al OQÉ'f!:.oBat)
<the corresponding fonn> in accordance with its own nature' ( 192al7- 19).
Thus the cosmic teleology reaching down from the outer heavens is thought of
as ·including both inanimate nature and the biológica! world, where it will ···
coincide with the patterns of immanent teieology, including the hierarchical ".·:~::
···· ordering of elements, tissues, and organs within the organisrn. 12 In a familiar . , .. ,,
echo of Plato's Symposium, Aristotle describes the begetting oflike by like in ~···:::·~:·.·~::
. .
tenns of a desire for survival that transcends the rnortality of the individual. ·-~·;,..:.._:::.
§ 8. That the vegetative souJ }iros ~ortality in repr'oductio~ ~:.·:~::<
.: . ari"4.415ai6=.b2f. ~ · .. ' - ~~-,;;~.:
-- ----~
... ---- - - - . -··
-~ - -­
The most natural of its works (se. of the nutritive 1\JVXTU for "ti~S;4¡
living things ... is to make another like oneself, an animal for
an animal, a plant for a plant, so that they may share in the ·.~.~~~~:\
.. i
eterna! a.."'ld divine as far as they can:. For all things desire this,
. . t.
and it is for the sake of this that they do whatever they do
;. )::-j¡
::~ ...... .:·;-.
~.:-
 ..... . .
\
194 CHARLES H. KL\HN ! j
. . .
- "-·- .. --- .· _ according
- -~ -· : · --:--·· - .... ~- -- .to .nature.
· ···- .. - . . why there is always a kind-of men and of animals and
··· - The !anguage of desire is doubly metaphorical he re, sin ce ii does not literal!y
~~>:'~ ·:-::~ - _ _:- -- apply to plants at all, andeven though animals do have desires, they would not
· · · --- ;::·_,-~:: -,-,,,nonnally be said to reproduce out ofadesire to.síiare tñ wliat iúiivine, much · · -----:-:~=- ~---~---- _-: :. .
,, -'. e .- less to do al/. of their natural actions for .such an end! The thesis is more
... : .. ·' modestly fonnulated inPolitics i 2: theunion ofmale andfemale'forthe sake of
· · . · begetting does not occur by choice, but as in the other animals and plants as
well, it is natural to strive {t<ptw6m) to !eave behind another being !ike
- : ,, ·- . .
oneself ( I252a27-30). Even this statement invo!ves assigning something like
·~-.. '
. desire to plants, and interpreting the sexual drive for mating asan expression of
the desire for offspring. It would surely be a mistake to see su eh passages as an
unthinking reflection of Platonic dicta. Both in the context of his cosmic
teleology and on the basis ofhis biofogy, Aristotle seems sincerely convinced of
the need to posit an unconscious urge or directedness towards goals which are
in the creature'~' deeper' interest, but ofw..hich the subject itselfhas no conceptioo.
..Thus propos of the universal pu;;it ~f pie asure he remarks: 'Perhaps even
a to pass by his doctrine of cosinic teleology with eyes averted. Th-e- doctrine
in base beings there is something good by nature which is superior to their own
condition and wlúch aims at (Écp[rrat) their proper good' (EN x 2.11.73a4f.).
I conelude this catalogue of texts with a passage from the Generation of
Animals, where the existence of the sexes is explained on the basis of cos-
mic te!eology.
§ 9. Why there are two sexes (GA ii 1.731 b20-732a9, trans. after Balme)
[We wi!l give !ater the explanation of maJe and female in
.· '• tenns of necessary causes: the moving cause and matter.
He re we give the explanation in tenns offinal cause and' what
is better', which has its prinCipie 'from higher up'.]
l. Sorne things are eterna! and divine, others are contin-
gent and ab!e both to be and not to be; but the noble and
divine is always according to its own nature a cause of
,what is better ¡yn_ong conting~nt things ... Now sou! is a
:..::·-:-.- --- -.- · bett~r thing th~--h.~y, andln; anim~tte bette_r than the
inanÍf!late ... ;(¡
being beÚ-er th~not being -;m·anv{ng
' - ~- than n.ot living. So it is as a result of these causes that the
generation of aniinals occurs.
· 2. · Since it was impossible for the nature of sucli a kind to
be 'eterna!, wh~t is generated ís etemal in the way that is ·
open to it Now i~cannot be numerically eterna! . .. but ·
·· --- '-- -•A--1 :" r,..,..,..., (r,r in ~n~c- i es dli€t). That is
1 "" •'- ,.,,~...., ,.,_, \4··- . . . ., . ..,v·~o.l .. ., ..,
. . . 1~ ~
f; -~ ;.·."· • :'
of plants. . _ ..
3. Since male and female are the source arid principie
(UQX~) of these <creatures>, it will be for the_ s_ak~ ~f. _
. . . - -"-. -- .....__:.. - ··- · - generation that male and female exist in those that
· · ·· have them.
., ·. ·
4. Now the proximate moving cause, in which is found the
definition and the form, is better and more divine in its
nature than the matter. And it is better for the superior
to be separated from the female. For as p~nci_ple of
motion it is better and more di vine, whereas the fe maJe
is matter.
...· (I have numbered the distinct stages of the argu111ent forconvenient reference.)
,We see fro~ this pass.age why somany modern admirers of Aristotle prefer
rarely contributes to his best science, and more often deforms it, as in this case
where the 'chauvinist' view that the maJe provides the specific fonn for the
embyro while the female provides only matter is glorified by the identification
ofthe male with what is better and more di vine in the universe as a whole. It is
the same kind of reasoning from general principies of cosmic perfection, by
way of dubious empírica! assumptíons, that is applied to the motion of the
planets in §7 and which !ed to the view of the heavenly bodies as unchanging
and incorruptible, the view which Galileo and his telescope had such difficulty .
. in overcoming in the 17th century. Of course the conception of c!ivine order
pervading tl:e whole of nature is not necessarily harmful to scientificresearch.
Aristotle can in voke such a viewto justify the study of insignificant animals, on
· the grounds that 'in all ofthem there is something natural and beautiful' (PA i
5.645 a23): the great chain ofbeing reaches down to the lowliest creatures, 'for
here too there are gods' (645a2 1).
_ . Returning to §9, we S!;e that( 1) and(2) contain a rather solemn restatep1en~ .'
_·_~ñ quasi-ded•1ctive fonn, of the doctrine of §8: thatgeneration takes place for
-=.... :=m;
e:::
_.. .=-= _~Je"sake ofth~~~t;;~e!k~""ofthe species, as the best thingoa~ailabltH'órmorta!-­
O~R:inisms. 13 Although there is no talk here of desire for immortal.ity, the
c~<l'~ality is explicitly teleological, as in the explanation of the existence of
. sexes in (3) and their separatio_n in (4). From the point of view ofbiology, the
cosmic te!eology rides piggy-back on the immanent teleology of reproduction,
making no contribution to the immanent account except to embrace it within a
wider pattem. And to the extent that a claim like 'it is better for the superior to

1 196 CHARlES H. KAH
1·
be distinct' is regarded as an explanation, it might well irnpede the search for a
genuinely fun ct!onal account of the separation of the sexes.
m the functional role of the final cau.~e in biology as a special case of the cosmic ..
Why does Aristotle insist upon the cosmic pattem of teleological explana-
tion? The question is a larg'; one, and I can oiTer only a few suggestions by way
of answer. From the very beginning, the Greek philosophers conceived the
arder of nature in nonnative terms. The very names for order-xóo¡.¡o~ and
tá~L;- ha~e strong norrnative connotations. Anaximander and Heraclitus
described the regularity of nature in terrns ofjustice, punishment, and compen-
sation; Diogenes argued that the me asures ofthe seasons were 'so handsomely
arranged' that they must be the work ofintel!igence (vór¡au;, frJ), thus echoing
the view of Anaxagoras that 'Intelligence has set al! things in order'. In the
Phaedo Plato makes Socrates complain that Anaxagoras and his fellows have
not after al! explained nature as an intelligent system in which ' things are
l
lidanged for the bes~. and in the Timaeus he introduces the Derniurge precisely
¡;·the causal factor designed to insure thaúhe world and its éom-ponent parts
will be rendered as good as possible.
Aristotle' s doctrine of the final cause is his official recognition of this
P!atonic or even Presocratic claim that the orderofnature must be explained by
reference to a goal or ttA.o~, by directedness to a good outcome (ro oú
EvExa). And he shares the Platonic intuition that the principie of divinity is
mostfully rnanifest in the movernents ofthe heavenlybodies. 14 Whathe rejects,
of course, is the anthropomorphic artisan. For Aristotle, nature and art (as in
other contexts nature and choice) are two irreducibly dífferent modes of goa!-
directedness. He sees nature as a vast self-maintaining systemof interlocking
goals, corresponding to diiTerent levels of order and n!gularity, culminating in
the rnost perfect order of al!, the rnotion of the fixed stars. The Prime Mover ís
Aristotle' s 'scientific' substitute for the mythical Demiurge, both as immediate
cause of the suprerne celestial rotation and as ultimate cause of the entire
system:-the oú tvEY.a of nature as a whole.
·"'.l. ·· .,,. . - Our reaction to Aristotie' s revision ofPiatonic teleology will inevitably be
nñúd. W-heíÍ.fue ~f~:AI~ explain~d is the structure cJ.'&'-aD~flal' s body a!id.:::~· -
the goal invoked is its survival or reproduction, we ·may··well be favorably
··· -···'-· · impressed. When the explanandum is the complex movement ofthe planets - ·
and the goal ínvoked is to approximate the life of the PM, our enthusiasm is
naturally more restrained. But the pattem of explanation is the same, and
Aristotle hirnself assimilates the immanent finality ofthe biological case to the
metaphysical finality of the celestial motions, in a text like § 8. When we are
con>idering Aristotle's doctrine as a point of comparison for contemporary
,.
The Prime 1'!/over and Teleol~~ . 1~ : '
'~- ·-··
issues in biological explanaticn, itjs reasonable to ignore his cosmic teleology.
But for an historical understanding ofhis owr ;.¡oint of vie\v, we must recognize
principie of goal-directedness. ...,
It will be convenient io sketch Aristatle's general pattem of teleological
exp!anation to see how it applies to the cases we ha ve illustrated. The fo!lowing
schema is borroweu L·om AndrewWOQdíield, whose analysis seems tome the
most insightful. ll (The forrnu liúion he re is limited to the simpler case of natural
teleology, as distinct f¡om the intentional finality of art and choice). A is (or
occurs) for the sake ofB may be analyzed as:
(i)- B is good (for the relevant subject)
(ii) A contributes to, or is necessary for, B
(iii) Therefore, A occurs (tlle relevant subject has or does A).
A full philosophical account would require a careful functional analysis of the
relations contributes to and is necessary jor in (ii), but for our purposes the
· axamples will mak~ this é~r enough. If B is the survival of an organism, then
A is for the sake of B if ánd only if the organism's doing or having A wi!J
contribute to its survival (and this fact somehowexplains the piesence of A).
Thus breatlting and eating are for the sake of life, teeth and digestive organs are
forthe salce of eating, gills and lungs and nostrils are for the sake ofbreathing,
and so on. If B is achieving perrnanent being, then A is reproduction; if B is
reproduction, then A is the division into male and female. (See § 9.) In the case
ofthe e!eme.~ts in§ 3, Bis pennanent beingand A is incessantcoming-to-be by
way of elemental transformation, but 'contributes to' must be replaced by
'approximates to' (what Aristotle calls 'imitation' or, in §8, ' participation'
( j.ltt"ÉXEtv]). Similarly, in §7 the rüo~ is the complete actuality or etemal life of
the divine principie, whereas A, the phenomenon to be expiained, is whatever '.1:. .__.
action t.he heavenly body or natural organismcan take to achieve its own most .. , '·
complete actuality.
· The scherna adapted from Woodfield has the advantage of making explicit
the norrnative or evaluative _g a!us of the ti:f..o~. which Aristotle will usually
describe as 'thc good', 'the best', or' the divine' (10 5í:h~ov, 1:0 agLatcv, to , , ~.;;.
:-· · xa/..óv; t o ÓJ,--=\.e;8dov -tfr.TI- so c~.rr¡.=It i~.Jfat Aristotle al so speaks ~
of acruality ( i:vi:Qyt:m, i:vtd.É;(t:La) as the goal in teleological cootexts, -. ·:~-:~
- -· -·- .. . -.- and we-c·an give a partía! explication ofhis notion oftéf..o~ in terms of degrees-- ~·~·:r:,;z
of actuality, as the more or most complete rea}ization of a thing's poten.. -·
tialities. 16 But this strategy can give an adequate account of Aristotle's conception - - ~· ~.. . -
oniy if we build' into the analysis of actualization the required normative . -·.- . -~·
componen e For potentialities are typically two-way possibilities, anda living
organism is ahvays potentially a dead body. As Aristarle remarks, ir would be
 (J '
. . . .. ...
ridiculous to describe this final stage in the life cycle as 'that for the sake of
which' the thing was bom.(Phys. ii 2: 194a30-33).
.,. :.. :·· · In what sense is su eh a scheme explanatory? We must distinguish severa!
.. ·. . -~ · questions.( 1) In what sensedidAristotle thinkofitas explanatory? (2) Howfar
·- -;-·-- --~-~--':--·did he providegood arguments for his notíon of final causality? (3) How far can ... . . . ___ ·___ .:...~::.... ___.:..Laws, s~~ms_ to pa~e ~eell_ systematically. expressed in Aristotle's early work
. •• : .1 . • ~: --: su eh a :Se heme be relevant to explanation in biology today? Question ( 3) is the
' · most difficult and the rnost interesting philosophically. I shall not touch on it at
_,:· · · al!, except to note that any new attempt to relate Aristotle's view to modem
-~:·; .· .. biology will ha ve to begin with David Balme's account. 11 With regard to (2},
John Cooper has recently emphasized the extent to which the arguments in
:. · ·: •: ·support of teleological explanation in Physics ii 8-9 rely upon the assumptíon
··· ·~ :: ·· _. that the present order of nature, including the presentsystem oflivingspecies, is
18
· -- · eterna! and unalterable. Cooper may be right in claiming that this assumption
must serve as a premise in Aristotle's argument against the explanation of
teleological outcomes by chance (in Physics ii 8) if that argument is to be
strictly valid. But Aristotle could scarcely rely on the regularity of natural
reproduction in arder to justify ·his genera1~rinciple of teJeological explanation
for living things. For as § § 8 and 9 indicate, he invokes a teleological principie
·· in arder to explain the perpetua! reproduction of otTspring like their parents.
The etemity ofspecies could not figureas a premise in these explanatio'ns, since
it is, in effect, their conclusion. 19
IV
We have still ro consider the question how Aristotle himse!f conceived
teleology as explanatory, on which I want to offer sorne speculation, befare
ending with a question raised at the beginning: How far is Aristotle's broad
notion of teleological action by the PM consisten! with other principies that
1
he endorses?
First a word aboutAristotle' s cosmic optimism, his willingness to see things
· arranged 'for the best' not only in the heavens and in biology but in human
· affairs gene rally. For éxample,.he finds the biological pattem of development
replicated in cultural histo_ry. Thus Attic_g-~gedy 'after undergoing many
_ . . changes, stoppe~ when it attainedits own nature' (Poerics 4.1449al4); and the
_-=:_:__~ · ~reek city-state is the naturaf-;;tA.o~ óf a cievelop~ent from-sim¡l~~communi­
ties, beginning with th~ family and the .village (Poi. i 5.1252b27-34). One
confinnation of Aristotle' s definition of happiness in terms of virtuous activity
is that it maJ<es the good life less·dependent upon chance: things in nature are
natural!y ·arranged 'in the finest way possible' (ws oióv n; xá.Utma); and ·
all the more so when the causal principie is the best one (i.e., the divine)-'-it
would be shocking to entrust th~ greatest and finest tlúng to chance! (EN i
9.1099b20-25). The argument is one from plausibility and it relíes upon a
popular or Platonic conception of deity, but the premise does express Aristotle's
·~:¡. - - ; ~- deep conviction that the world is a well-ordered place. This ouJ!ook, which
._.. .-~-: .. bathes in the atmosphere oflate Platonism as reflected in the Timaeus and the
... · ,- \ :·.- . ..._.> On Philosophy (see nl4); but it is n~t ·ab~-e nd~o~ his.iaiest .wnti'ng. . . -
.· • Ifsuch a teleological pattem is a universal factofthe world order, it can only
·· -~' .. ' be explained bY the universal cause, the Prime Mover. Buthow can an unchanging,
-impassive, and hence indifferent deity be responsible for the' al!- inclusive
ordering? Metaphysics /\. tells us only that the PM acts Iike an object of desire
, (ÓQtXt"ÓV) and an object of inteiJect (vor¡tÓv): Ít causes motion Without
.
-- •.·
·· being moved itself, Jike an object of !ove (EQ<Í.>~EVo~) ( l072a26, b3). To this
- - -
corresponds the statement airead y quoted about formas' something di vine and i
good and desirable', whichmatter in factdesires 'as ifit were the femaledesiring
the male, or what is ugly desiring what is beautiful' (Physics i 9.192al 6-24),
and the similar statement that 'natu re in all things a!ways des ires what is better'
( § 3, GC ii 1 0.3-~6b27). In the case of matter desiring form, thec~;.~Lationship
intended seems to be fundamentally the same as what is called ' imitation' in
§ § 3 and 4 or desire and 'participation' in § 8.
What explanatory power can lie behind these metaphors? Striétly speaking,
onlyanimals have desire inAristotle's scheme, and only rational animals might
conceivably apprehend and desire a noetic, non-sensible object such as the
PM. Although the activity of human contemplation is described as a likeness
(ó¡.LO(wf.La) of divine activity (EN x 8.1 178b27), so that the philosophic
life is implicitly presented as an imitation of divine intellec~ion (EN x
7.11 77b26-34: cf. Meta. 1072b14-16, 24-26), even the p!úlosopher is never
:_, said to be moved by !ove or desire for the Prime Mover. So there is no literal
sense in whichAristotle claims that the PM causes motion asan object oflove,
U!J.Ies~ it is for ihe privileged case of the First Heaven. Now the celestial
spheres, or at Íeast their astral bodies, are alive (De cae/o ii 2.285 a29, 286a9-
.ll; ii l2.292a20-b2: cf. i 10.279a28-30); and presumably these possess asoul
rational enough to apprehend and desire the mode of being of an Unrnoved
Mover. ButAristotle does oot tell us ( and does not claim to know) anything at
.: _ •· -~ . di.U.about such~e.lestial¡¡culs; so even in thls c~e the n~iQg o( desir~ is·, if no_t_,_c ., ~·
·•· ~etaphorical, at least mysterious. ·..,.,- -· -::e =-- '
,f."
·-..,-~~' When we descend to the sublunary world, we are faced with two different
types of cases: the motions of the elements and the life-activities of animals and
<Oj..- ..
plants. Now Aristotle is no panpsychist, and he never speaks of desire on the
part of the elements. 20 He does, however, describe both their cycle of transfo.r-
mation and (if i am correct in my interpretation of §4) their motion to their
 2UU CHARLES H. KAJ
natural ptaces as imitations ofthe di vine revolutions of the heavens. And he re
we ha ve a clue to the explanatory force of the metaphors. For what is literal! y
true oflhese 'imitations' on Aristot!e's acccunt is that they involve a maximal
approximation to eterna! being by a continuous process of actualization
(hEQy~'lv in §4) andrealization ofspecific form. (See the passages fromDe
cae/o and GC on the elements, citedabove onp.l93.) Thismustbe thesober
doctrinal content ofthe statement in § 6 that varying degrees oflife and being
are distributed to other things from the divine life ofthe heavens. For it is this
principie that runs through all the examples of cosmic teleology surveyedhere,
and that connects them all to the PM: 'oné hégyna preceded by another
back to the primary and eterna! cause ofmotion' ( § 5), the great chain ofbeing
l~at links plants and animals to the everlasting reality of the heavens, 'which
they desire to possess as far as they are able, and perform al! their natural
actions for the sake of this end' ( § 8). The literal sense of these metaphors-
what sorne would cal! their cash value-lies in this notion of a universal
tendency towards positfv{being, realiL<::d fo1m, and unceasing actÍ'Iity.
How is the PM sUpposed co account for this universal tendency? Of course
;, is the supreme case of complete actuality; but how is it supposed to exert any
influence on the world? We cannot at this point simp!y invoke the attraction of
the bdoved object, since it is precisely the language oflove that we are trying to
explica te. Or rather, we can invoke the case of desire only by analogy: as the
object of desire is an unmoved cause of animal motion, so the PM is unmoved
cause of al! movementfrom privation to form, from potency to act I amnotsure
thatAristotle thought there was any hope of somefurther explanatíon, beyond
the careful working out ofthis analogy. He is keenly aware ofthe difficulty of
any definite knowledge concemin~ celestial phenomena and theircausal expla-
nation, since we are so far away 'not only spatially, but even more because we
can perceíve so few oftheir properties; nevertheless we must try to say something'
(De cae/o ii 3.28ób4-7: cf. PA i 5, and so on). His method for coping with this
situation ís made up of procedures which are extremely di verse, ranging from
quasí-geometrical demonstrations to dialectical ·appeals to the traditional
Greek conceptivn ofthe gcds as located in the heavens. I want to call attention
·to a single aspe(;fcf tliis nieili.od whiffimay thrdw~~·Gme Jight on his use ofthe ~ , ,...._,,..;;;;._"·
analogy to desire.
The methodical function of analogy in such a case is indícated by Aristotle's
críticism ofEmpedccles for not making sufficient use of bmywy¡í in support
ofhis cosmic hypotheses. Empedodes' theory of altemating periods of motion
and rest, says Aristotle, is more rational than the arbitrary assumption of a
beginningofmotion( as in Anaxagoras' view), 'butone should not mere! y assert
i
1
such an arder, but give sorne causal explanation (aL1tav J..tyav), and not
~·
t':
mere!y posit an unargued premise (á1;lw!J.' af.oyov) but pro vide either demon-
stration or induction (f:.."'Caywyf¡)'. Asan example ofthis, he cites Empedocles'
own conception ofLove and Strife as bringing togethcr and separating things,
which can be illustrated (q;aívrrm yag) ir ··::e role played by these forces
among human beings (Phys. viii l.252a22..:.3¡ ). I want to suggest that the
parallels which Aristotle draws between cosmic phenomena and the behavior
of animals (including hum::n beings), for example, in the De motu animalium,
may be properly seen jS his own use of braywy¡í, a way of supporting and
clarifying the role of his theoretical principies for the explanation of large and
re mote processes by the example of similar cases with which we are familiar.
The term tnaywyf¡ suggests sorne kind of generalization, 21 and Aristotle
do es use explicit analogies, in the proportional fom1' as A is to B, andas C is to
D, ... , so X is to Y' to define such transcategorial notions as matter-form and
potency-act. 22 The cosmic metaphors of desire and imitation do not provide a
clear analogical generalization in this form, but they do point to a general
c'ónception of how final causes can operate as unnw·¡ed movers.
There is every reason to·suppo.se that the. analogy works heuristically in
both directions: Aristotle may have come to see the need for a theory of
unmoved movers as cause of animal desire precisely beca use he was confronted
with the problem of explaining the causal action of an unchanging cosmic
principie. This cannot be more than a guess, but the sequence of ideas is a
natural one, and it would account for the fact that the doctrine of an unmoved
object of desire in theDe anima seems tailor-made to fit the analogy in which
we are interested.
l suggest, then, that Aristotle first worked out the case for an unmoved
mover of celestial cycles, as established by the general argument ofPhys ics'viii.
This will subsequently have led him to analyze the more familiarfacts of animal
motion in terms ofthe final causality of an unmoved objectof desire, along the
línes of De an. iii 10. The generaf theory of an unmoved mover plays no
essential role in his psychological account of action; but it makes possible the
cosmological explanation of Meta. A 7. I do not claim that the texts we ha ve
were written ínjust this sequence, but this does seem the most plausible arder of
discovery forthe ideas in question. And wh~tever the__ piographical sequell.S!---~
may ha ve be en, it is an undeniable fact thatthe analysis of animal motion g!ven ~
in De an. iii 1Oprovides the conceptual basis for the advance in cosmological- ---- ---
theory fromPhysics viii ( where the nature and action of 1he Unmoved Mover
are left wholly unexplained) to the fuller account ofMeta. A. At the end ofthis
conceptual sequence comes theDe motu, which gíves a more detaíled analysis
ofthe psychology and psycho-physiology of animal motion, as promised in De
an. iií 1O( 433bl 9-21 ). In the course of doing so it not only shows how the
 - . ~·· .-) . ',
l .
:'
·-~-....
general theory 'fits' the more familiar cases (including the pushing of a boat
from the shore, as wéll as the movements of animals in mud or sand): it also
.. ·.- reviews the cosmological basis for the theory as expounded in earlier works . __
·-. · ..:~·- ..
. · · such as the De cae/o. The result is not so much to test the theory against new
data (as ifthe encounter with hard facts not.previously noticed might lead to its ·~= !·. :: :_·.:.~- teleology, since the growth, nutrition, and reproduc.tion ofliving things, hke the
. 1
rejection) but rather to expand and correct the whole account-to expand it by
··-
. . introducing new applications (such as the resistance of the medium and the
corporeal irnpact ofthe emotions), and to correct it where necessa.ry by adjusting
the analysis of particular phenomena to produce a more consistent theory. 23
The applications to new phenoll!ena, such as the resistance ofthe medium and
the relative immobilityof an innerjoin~ serve both to make the general theory of
an unmoved mover more plausible by illustrating it in familiar cases, and alsoto
make it more precise by marking off the differences between cases. (Thus the
or
need for an inner point restas a condition for movement applies only to the
animal body, not to the heavens: De motu 3.699a31-bll; 4.700a6-Il.) For
the eterna! motion of the beavens and for the existence of a First Mover,
Mistotle had deáúctive arguments that he could well rank as demoñ¿trations.
Butfor understanding the nature and the causal action ofthe PM he has only an
elaborate set of comparisons or analogies that he miglit best describe as ele-
ments of b-caywyi¡, 'inductive insights', comprehending what is obscure by
critica! extrapolation from cases that appear clear and inteiligible to us.
In the end, t.;1aywyf) or 'induction' is a more accurate term than 'analogy'
as a designatíon forthis appeal to desire as a model for understanding teleological
· causation. Forin the case of desire-for example, in regard to the appetites-
we know from our own life what the moti vating force of a goal of action is like. 24
And this experience ofteleoiogical causality from the inside, as it were, is most
infonnative in the case of ooúA.~m~. rational desire, which takes as its object
thegood, i.e., happiness, which in the best case means 9e:wg[a, the activity
that we share (in sorne sense) with the Prime Mover. Our own desire, and
particular! y our desire for happiness, is thus an instan ce of and not mere!y an
analogue for the géneral motivating power of the goal of fullest actualíty. Hence
... we can reasonably infer.that the-activíty of the PM is a mode of pleasure (Meta.
107}bl6_; 24).,.9ec~use \ye_know in our own case that pleasure is, or is a
.· ,..=.:~Q~mitant of, the- unimped.ed exercise (tvtgye:w) of our natural É~EL~,
··our perfected capacities (EN vii 12.li53al4; x 4.1174b32).
¡"-
.... (~:'¡:""".
V l See Ross 1924, i cxxv and; Ross 1949, l ?i-:-132. Compare Solmsen 1960, chs. LO
If the broad teleological view presented he re is correct as an ' account of
Aristotle's fntentions, does 'any inconsistency arise with regard to ltis other
doctrines? Since, as I have suggested, the language of desire (like the language
. . : . 0 [ ¡'mitation) is nearly always metaphorical in these contexts, it does not imply
1 . . any panpsychist view ofthe elements or matter ofthe sublunary world. F urther-
_,.,. . ¡-~ ----- ·· iriore, the autonomy ofbiological developaient and functi~n is not undennined
- : · ·. _·-. ·(though it ¡nay occasionally be distorted) by the larger cosmic patt_ern of
. - . ·· - - . • •
:··¡ : . appetites which accompany sorne of these funct10ns, tum out to be s1mply a
! special case ofthe universal tendency to realized fonn and continuous activity.
i (Thus for animals both hunger and eating exemplify in different ways the same
1 principie of final causality, as nutrition alone does in plants.) It is only the
1. relation of the PM to the other celestial movers that remains a problem, since
-~ ' 'each one is responsible for a single motión, yet all together they fonn a unified
;yst~-~- But thisproblerri is essentially thesame on eitherthe broad or the
1
--: .
'. ,• narrow view ofcosmÚ: teleology. The only special problem with the broad víew
. is: Why ifthe PM can be thegoal ofa/1 movements towards fonn andactuality
(as seems to be irnplied forthe heavens in§§ 6 and 7), is Aristotle not satisfied
with a single unmoved mover? Why ?oes he require this embarrassingly indefinite
plurality of movers? 15 But here Aristotle himse.lf gives us the answer: 'A single
mover must be the cause of a single motion' (1073a28). So eaeh sphcre [;as it.-:.
own. And so the Prime Mover has a special role as mover ofthe simple, uniform
motion ofthe First Heaven, 26 in addition to its more general role as the goal of
the universal tendency of nature to move from potency to act, from unrealized
matter to realized fonn. 27
NOTES
See Zeller !869-I879, ii 373-375, and more emphatically Joachim !922, 256:
•Aristotle represents aH things in the Cosmos as inspired by love of God, as strivi.~g, so far as in
them lies, toattain toGod; i.e. to imitate in their activities that perfectand etemallife ... The ete mal
Iiie, which is God, radiales through the whole system.' Similarly Lovejoy !9J6, 55. So Düring
( 1966, 220) d~scribes the PM as'Zielalles Streben im Weltall'. DavidBalme(!965, 24) hasgiven
a. more moderate fonnulation of this broader view oi the PM: 'As the ultimare cause (through
imitation) of motion and goal-directedness, it is the sustaining cause of nature's finality.'
It should be remembered that this 'broader' view was defended by Zeller in the late nineteenth
century as the sober,narrowerconstrual ofthe PM, in the face ofB rentano's irúluential anempt to
e~dow Aristotle with the doctrines of divine providence and fuJI.scale creatioll Thus the book of
Konrad Elser, Die Lehre des Anstote/es !iber das Wirken Gottes \ I 893) ~ does not deal with our
problem at all but only reviews-the ev!dence for and against Brentano' s extravagant theses, many
ofwhich were supported by other s~iiofars as well( se e 28--31). This is the interpret.ation described ¡ .
in the text as the demiurgic view of the PM.
i .·
and 20. For the key passage atMera. A !072 b3, both text and interpretation are dispute d: ;uvd w~
(Q<Íl¡u:vov, ;<tvou¡.ti:vq¡ óhilla xLvti; (so Jaeger with most MSS.; one has KLVOÚ¡.tt:Vov; Ross
prints xLvoÚ¡.tt:Va). Even ifthis means 'ltmoves <the heaven> as objectofdesire; by means ofthe
moving <body of heaven> it moves other things', this does not exclude a double action on the
~
:!!- ·""'
5
sublunary world Smee both preceding and foll owing contexts are concerned exclusively with a most recently, by John Cooper ( 1982. and }lis contribution to this vo!ume). ·
c~use for the e!ernal motion of the first heaven ( 1072 a2t-14, b5-10). the 'others' may be simr·iy Balme. Charlton, Gotthelf and Cooper rie.h:ly romplain that'authors such as Wieland, Nuss-

1
1
the other s¡:.heres moved by the motion of the tirs:. El'en if ;áiJ..a do:s include the subh:nary
e1ements, that cannm help us to decide between (1 ) and (2), since both views assign indire•:t
baum, and Sorabji( in di!ferent ways) emphasize the epistemological role ofteleo1o,Yca! exp1anation
for Aristot1e but neg!ect its ontological sta!'Js: for Aristotlc fina! causes are explanatory because the
causation to the PM. Hence this text provides on1y specious evidencc for preíerring ( 1). tendency ro actualize forros is pan oi the dynamic structure of'~i -··.•.
1~ ·
See Brentano 1867, 234ff. with full dis~~ssion in Elser ( 189 3).
3
4
18 Cooper 1982,204-216.
~ GC 336b31: OlJVEltA~QWOE tb oJ..ov ó 9E~. Í:VÓEÁEZ~ ;roil]<!a~ ti¡v yi:vrolV. This is
· 19
Hence, I do noten tire!:- agree ;.,ilh Coopcr's claím that'A ristotle does not consider
~
~ ofcourse how Plato describes the benevolent a~tion ofthe Demiurge in Timaeus 29e, JOa-b, d, 3¡e
the possíbility of dcri1•¡ng the permaner:ce of lhe $9Jecies in this Platonic sort of way. from above·
~ andpassim.
~ ( 1982. 206). It is true thatAristotle r. ev~r argues lhat precise1y the forms which exist'constitute the
5
,,:r. See Balme 1972, 95. mJximally rich a~d varied wNid': Bul. he does argue that the forms which exist are pennanent
§.,¡ ~ E ven the direction of rotation is apparent1y lhed by a ccsmic preference for rigl1• beclusc '!leing is better than not bein{; and he himse1f actually describes such an explanation as

!1 (e:Jsl· west) over leit (west·eJst); see De caelo ii 5, whe re the ~nswer is given on the basis of th~;
principie that 'nature always produces th¡; bes t out of available possibilities' (28832). The PM is
th~s required only to assure that the First Heaven wil! enactmrna!ly its best poteatiality. But this
beginning ·frcm abcve' (§9. GA ii l.í31b23).
~o Cf. EE i 8.12 13327: 'How~an we positdesire inthings which do not possess life'>' [r.
the same .;ontext Aristotle speaks ofthe eyedesirin gsigh~ tite body desiring he alth, and ·eaeh tn ing
is nota specia 1operation ofthe PM: it is the very principie of cosmic te1eology. Thus what is unique cesiring its proper good' ( !2 !8a30-32); butthis is in a polemical argument directed against thc
about the action ofthe PM on the first Heaven is not the mode of ~ction but the fact thatno olh P.r
1 cause of motion is invol••ed except for the nawre of tl1e sphere ar.d the example of the PM as ·a
Plawnic l'iew that nHthings desire a single good Dirlmeier (citing Gígon) compares the opening
sent~nce; ofth~ E.'li and claims that 'everything strives for its own good' is Aristote!ian doctrine

l principie whose essence is actuality' (Mm. l 071 b20).

1
Compare De philosophia fr. l 7 Ros e (RooS 195 5¡, 85): 'Either there is one aex~
(l%2, 2()9: cf. 1956) 66f.). 8ul in EN i l.I094al - 3 andPol. i 1.!252al- 4, ·aimíngat.a good' is
explicidy ascríb~d ortly to huma~ 'aclions and enterprises. Since other animals do not havc a
~
.?.
or rr.~ny ... Frher.: a•e m~ny. :'•·::: ~e~ ei:~:cr.)rdered or unorder~d~ ·.. lirhey are orderd , eióer conc~p1icn ot' th;·gc~d. ir is only with significan! quaJifications that Aristotle will ¡¡ssign such
····: ...- ..... :" ~~ " :· ·~ ·~msd;,, .;_ :;y >•);:·,e external cause. Bu¡ if they are ordered by themseives. ·a:miog' ¡o them as well (e.g., EN 11 í3a~6 . cited above).
trlt)' nave someth iog commori ":.:<:h Cé·;¡necr: •he m, and this is !he ciqz~.' For a systematic attempt to depkt Aristotle as a panpsychisl with 'an aspiration coursing
Ross 1924, i c.~ -::v:i-cn~-rii. Ross himse1i notes the obvious objection on p. ex!. througb the whc!e cosmos', see Rist ( 1965) with parallels cited in Sorabji ( 19SO, 164n26). The
.i difference between pan ~sychism and lhe broad conception of te1eology defended here is tbat l
1 This ís H.D.P. Lee's suggestion ( 1952. 9). Cf. GC ii 10.337 a8-1 5.
1 10 Ross 1924, íi 2ó5f. refuse to take iiterally the metaphors of desiring, striving, or imitating in cosmic conte~tS.
l
~ 11
Se~ the review and critique of earlier discussions ir. Chemiss [944, Appendix 1O, . 21 For an exceilent recent discussion see Engberg.Pedersen (1979), which shows
,j cor.vincing!y that btaywyi¡ is not a form. of inference or argument, but any merhod oi' acquiring
esp. 584-59 1, which argues for an essential identity of docuine berwe~n the De cae/o and Meta.
j A.. Che miss' concJusions are accepted by Düring( 1966, 365nl 23).
12
insight ir.:o sorne universai point as a consequence of attending to particular cases' (305).
l2 See Physics i 7.19 1ai-1 2 for maner.form; Meta. El 6. i04Sa35- bl l for potency·
1 SeePA ii 1.64ó b5ff.: 'the rr.Jtteroithe eiements must cxist for the sake ofthe uniform
<tüsues>. These come later in the arder of generation <bar ¡¡rior L'l the order of nature and · a~l In the latter case it is preci;~ly tb~ notion of btaytoyrí which sertes to introduce the propor·
j teleo1ogy> , and after them come the noo-,.111iform <~ans and the whole organism>: The tissues
are for the sakc oí the organic pans. and the iatter ·af course ior the sake of the organism, the tuli-
tional analogy (!C48~3~lT.l.
:.t 11'l y C('rr.meilcs nere are inspired oy, but dilfer from, the view presented by MarthJ
i fled2ed sunstonr~ ·
Jj
See an important discussion of text §9 by Jam~s Lennox ~~ his cont:ibution to
Nussbaum ( t9iS, ll4 ff.).
:~ Compare WO<Y.ifie ld' s accour.t of ' intemalist' theories of teleological exp!anation.
i
this volume.

i 1•
For the appareot importance oflate- Platoníc astral re li~íon in Aristotle's earlv work
D~ philosophia, see Festugiere 1949, 227-259. Cf. Ross !955a: 80ft., esp. frr. 12a-:b. 13,
which assumes that there is ·a core conceprofmental goal-directedness', where havíng Gas a goal
ir. voll'es ~>'antlirg G, anda more general concept ofgoal·directedness formed by extension t'rom this
· r.otion, where there is tacit appeal to ·an interna! state ana!ogous to wanting G' (1976, 16JC).
- __ ...._.. ~.2:1. -":.~-'' ~l TniH¡~estÍon was put.ro.:M.by G..E.R. L!oyd.
Woodfield 1976, esp. the 'table of anaiyses' on 20( w·hich 1 hav~dapted iñ~y-:;-.
15
2
'1"1"'- ~·=
~~ ";eeñóabove ior an,imporuntquaiificationon the'special' roleoithe PM in regard to .:: ~.

owr. schema. the First Hea~en. .:. -·.. -

t~rms of acrualizati~n,~e~
16
For an interesting attempt to define final causality in ' ' An ini tia1 ve:-sion ofsome pans ofthis paperwas ¡l!'esented to the Ninth Symposium
Gonheif 1976-1977, 226-254 . ..\ristotelicum in Berlin. September 19.81 . 1 wam to thank Professor Paul Moraux for ar.angir.g te
1
.• 'See: in addition to the works cired in notes 2 and 6, Balme's forthcoming article, hal'e my paper discussed in Berlin, and to thar~~ my fellow symposíastS for rheir friendlycriticism.
'Teleology and Necessity' (1986d); and also Richard Sorabjfs díscussion, 'Purpose in Nan; rc' which en~b led me to avoid a considerable numb~r of errors. 1am particularly grarefu1 to Richard
(1980, ch. 10). There are valuable discussioos by Wieland (1970, ch. 16). bv M. Nussbaum Sorabji fur hís custom anly g~ nerou s su~piy of wrirte:n comments.
(! 978, 59-99). by W. Charlior.( 1970, 11 7-1 26 ). as we!l as b~· Allan Gotthe!f( ¡ 976-19i7l. and,