Journal of Knowledge Management

Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts

Kristian Kreiner
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Kristian Kreiner, (2002),"Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts", Journal of Knowledge Management, Vol. 6 Iss 2
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Tacit knowledge
management: the role
of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
The author
Kristian Kreiner is a Professor at Copenhagen Business
School, Department of Organization and Industrial
Sociology, Frederiksberg, Denmark.
Downloaded by Texas Southern University At 10:04 19 December 2014 (PT)
Keywords
Knowledge, Knowledge management,
Product development
Abstract
This article discusses both the management of tacit
knowledge and the tacit approach to knowledge
management. Tacit knowledge must be made
manageable by being explicated and separated from the
knowledge workers, so that the knowledge resources do
not go home at night. However, the less knowledge
leaving in the evening, the less knowledge will return the
following morning. Making the organization as
independent as possible of the tacit knowledge of its
knowledge workers is an ironic program for knowledge
management, since it advocates a reduction of the total
resource pool for the sake of managerial control. The
article searches for alternatives to knowledge
management exercised from a position of control and
ownership. A case study of product development is
analyzed. This specialized context focuses attention on
knowledge mobilization rather than knowledge control
and sharing. The artifact provides sufficient pressure for
order and coordination to emerge spontaneously.
Knowledge management can in such circumstances
become tacit without losing its value.
Electronic access
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is
available at
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/1367-3270.htm
Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . pp. 112±123
# MCB UP Limited . ISSN 1367-3270
DOI 10.1108/13673270210424648
112
Introduction
Knowledge is the icon of the new economy. It
has achieved such prominence because of the
role it plays in economic growth.
Increasingly, there is less and less return on the
traditional resources, labour, land and (money)
capital. The only ± at least the main ± producers
of wealth are information and knowledge
(Drucker, 1993, p. 167).
Unsurprisingly, knowledge has also become a
desired object of management in modern
organizations. However, the obvious interest
in managing knowledge and information is
not mirrored by an immediate ability to do so.
Its abstract and elusive ± almost philosophical
± character does not fit well into a commonly
action-oriented managerial approach. Thus,
some kind of transformation of knowledge
and information is required before it can be
managed on conventional terms. A large part
of the literature on knowledge management
can be read as a search for advice on how to
make knowledge manageable. The
voluminous literature symbolizes the
difficulty of getting a managerial handle on
knowledge ± probably more than it
symbolizes an extended universe of solutions.
A first conventional step in the direction of
making knowledge manageable is apparently
to ascertain ownership to it. Managing on
conventional terms means managing from a
position of legitimacy and control, and
ownership provides exactly such a position.
However, ``[i]n knowledge work, the means of
production is now owned by the knowledge
worker'' (Drucker, 1999, p. 54). Thus,
knowledge needs either to change owners or
to be managed on unconventional terms.
While the present article explores the latter
possibility, the knowledge management
literature's focus on intellectual capital and
knowledge assets signal intention to claim
ownership, and the strategy for transforming
knowledge into capital and assets is to make it
explicit.
Underlying the prescriptions [of the new
information economy] is the need to explicitly
manage the intellectual capital and other
knowledge assets of a firm. Corporate success in
today's economy comes from being able to
acquire, codify, and transfer knowledge more
effectively and with greater speed . . . (Myers,
1996, p. 1).
Obviously, it is difficult to claim ownership to
(or mere possession of) something that one
cannot point at. It is also difficult to hoard,
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
store and retrieve things that are not present
in some codified form. It is difficult to
allocate, transfer and share things in large
organizations that do not exist in a
communicable format. Arguably, the
prescription to manage knowledge as capital
and assets originates in the managerial desire
to own and control the resources on which the
success of the organization depends. The
ultimate goal is to ensure that the knowledge
resources ``does not go home at night'', and
the managerial focus is the knowledge that
``belongs to the organization as a whole [and]
can be reproduced and shared'' (Stewart,
1997, pp.108-9).
While gaining control and ownership are
highly legitimate aims for managers, reducing
knowledge management to merely a question
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of transforming knowledge into explicit and
controllable form would probably be a
mistake. It would confound the issue of
making knowledge resourceful to the
organization with the issue of control through
ownership. To insist on controlling
knowledge resources may be especially
paradoxical in the context of new product
development. To the extent that such
ventures entail a substantial element of
innovation, the focus will be on creating new
knowledge ± not asserting control over
existing knowledge. Knowledge resources
that cannot be transformed into explicit form
(e.g. tacit knowledge) may still be resourceful
in relation to innovative processes. The
resourcefulness of such knowledge that is in
fact made explicit may possibly be lower after
the transformation than before.
This article focuses on new product
development process and discusses the
management in knowledge in that context.
The title of the article, ``Tacit knowledge
management'', is intentionally left
ambiguous. In one sense, it refers to the
management of ``tacit knowledge'' ± and the
possibility that management is especially
complicated when the object of managerial
intent and action is this particular form of
knowledge. In another sense, it refers to ``tacit
management'' of managing knowledge in
general ± and the possibility that management
may be exercised from a different position
than ownership and control. The two
interpretations become unified in the central
contention of the article, namely that tacit
knowledge needs to be managed in tacit ways.
In a nutshell, it will be argued:
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Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
. knowledge in relation to new product
development processes cannot be
managed on unconventional terms ± i.e.
not from a position of ownership and
control, but needs to be managed from a
different position yet to be established
below;
. tacit knowledge is the central resource in
new product development processes, and
that it is paradoxical to seek its
eradication;
. coordination and efficiency of the new
product development process, which
obviously are important and legitimate
aims, can be achieved in more tacit ways
than by design and authority ± and that
even tacitly conceived products and
artifacts may provide a unification of
perspectives across dispersed and
diversified development teams that
enable participants more spontaneously
to coordinate designs and solutions.
Content
In the following section I will prepare a few
analytical distinctions in preparation for a
specific case study of a new product
development process. The distinctions relate
to the character of the development process,
the nature of the knowledge resources, and
the type of existence (or ontology) that we
may ascribe to the product or artifact. These
distinctions are mobilized in an analysis of a
highly successful new product development
process. The article concludes by discussing
the knowledge management requirements in
relation to new product development
processes.
Analytical preparations
As mentioned in the introduction, in this
article knowledge management is discussed in
a narrower context of new product
development processes. This focus allows us
to use less space on the broad knowledge
management rhetoric, and more space on the
analysis of specific practices and
prescriptions. With the focus on knowledge
management in relation to the organizing of
product development work, I will in particular
seek to highlight the tacit elements of the
process.
New product development can be
understood as a process by which knowledge
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
is built into products (Kreiner and
Tryggestad, forthcoming; Davis, 1999). ``The
actual products . . . [is] no more than
packaging for knowledge'', said Drucker
(1993, p. 166). In preparation for the case
study, let me elaborate on three different sets
of issues that may serve as analytical
distinctions for the subsequent discussion.
The first set of issues relates to the process
of new product development itself. The
discussion seeks an alternative to the classical
conception of organizing and managing
efficient processes of innovation. The second
set of issues relates to the knowledge
resources involved in the new product
development process. The discussion evolves
around two notions of resourcefulness, one
being that knowledge resources are
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constituted by explicit knowledge and
information allocated to particular ventures,
the other one being that knowledge becomes
resourceful by particular tacit processes of
mobilization and interpretation. The third set
of issues relates to the outcome, the product.
The discussion raises the question when a
product exists ± in what capacity and with
what organizational consequences.
Obviously, these sets of issues can be given
only a very cursory treatment here. They are
meant mainly to provide tools and
perspectives for the subsequent analysis of the
case study.
The process of new product development
The process of new product development is
seldom studied independently of its ascribed
outcome and success. The presumption is
made that things are tightly coupled. Thus,
planning and control are supposed to
determine the subsequent fate of the venture.
Instrumentality and rationality rein in
organizational processes. The tight couplings
allow us to infer the quality and character of
the process from the observed outcomes. For
example, failures signal lack of planning and
coordination; successes signal a rational and
well-managed pursuit of well-defined aims.
Only occasionally are coincidence and
serendipity given permission to play a role in
the success of new product development
processes (Kidder, 1981; Roberts, 1989).
The modularity school may illustrate the
conventional thinking on knowledge
processes in relation to new product
development. This school claims that the
product design work must be fully planned on
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Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
a higher level in order to make the
development process rational and fast.
``Product architecture'' is the foundation and
prerequisite for subsequent success, and it
designates the specifications of and the
interfaces between modules of the envisioned
product:
. . . a modular product design process creates a
complete information structure ± i.e. the fully
specified component interfaces of a modular
product architecture ± that defines required
outputs of component development processes
before beginning development of components.
To fully specify component interfaces in modular
product architecture, a firm must have, or have
access to, advanced architectural knowledge
about relevant components and their interactions
(Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996, p. 70).
First, we notice that the knowledge
management task is derived from the desire to
manage the process on conventional terms.
Architectural knowledge must exist for the
organization to make early decisions about
the product architecture. Such early decisions
about the product architecture enable the
managers to coordinate the process
efficiently, i.e. coordination by plan and
delegation. If the organization has the
advanced architectural knowledge a plan can
be made, and the new product development
processes can be managed on conventional
terms.
The notion of the new product
development process that one gets from this
account is one of implementation. The
architectural decisions have by and large been
done when the process begins, and little more
than doing what was decided is left to do. The
little creative design work left is confined to
the designated solution spaces defined by the
product architecture. While not emptied of
innovative content, it is only locally that
innovativeness can be accommodated in such
a new product development process.
Alternatively, the new product development
process might be considered a learning
process. The difference between an
implementation process and a learning
process is easy to illustrate in relation to the
modularity school. While in the former case
the product architecture is the premise for the
development process, in the latter case the
architecture of the final product is an integral
part of the outcome of the process. This is
more than a change of focus on different,
sequential phases in the new product
development process. If the process is truly a
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
learning process, the premises and the
solutions will co-evolve. They are stabilized as
a logical pair only at the conclusion of the
process. In a sense, it is a total integration of
the design and the implementation phases ± in
a not too literal sense, an example of
concurrent single and double-loop learning.
In short, the distinction I suggest is one
between, on the one hand, a product
architecture that is the pre-defined starting
point and that acts as the premise for the
subsequent new product development process
± and, on the other hand, a product
architecture that is an emergent property of
the product being developed ± and as such an
outcome as much as a premise for the
process.
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Knowledge resources
As Drucker was quoted for saying in the
introduction, knowledge has become the most
important producer of wealth in society and
in organizations. This is probably especially
true in connection with new product
development processes, since the purpose is
to build new knowledge into the products to
enhance their quality, worth and
competitiveness.
As an idea, knowledge is inspiring and
easily understood. As a concept, however, it
has caused us problems for a long time.
Socrates pointed out in his famous discussion
with the young Theaetetus that we may not be
able to define knowledge except in terms of its
object. Similarly, we may only observe
knowledge as effects on that object. In
modern lingo, we can claim that knowledge
by nature is tacit, i.e. implied and understood
implicitly in the situation, without being
definable and visible. In more recent time,
Polanyi put tacit knowledge on the agenda
with his dictum that ``we can know more than
we can tell'' (Polanyi, 1966, p. 136). The
concept has been generally embraced, and has
become one of two types of knowledge, the
other one being explicit knowledge. Most
illustrative, it has been suggested that one of
the central ``motors'' of knowledge creation is
the transformation of knowledge from one
type to the other (Nonaka and Takeuchi,
1995). However, as pointed out many times
(e.g. Brown and Duguid, 2001), Polanyi
never intended tacit knowledge to be a
separate category of knowledge, but rather to
be an integral part of all knowing:
115
Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
[In] general, an explicit integration cannot
replace its tacit counterpart. The skill of a driver
cannot be replaced by a thorough schooling in
the theory of the motor car; the knowledge I have
of my own body differs altogether from the
knowledge of its physiology; and the rules of
rhyming and prosody do not tell me what a poem
told me, without any knowledge of its rules
(Polanyi, 1966, p. 143).
There is a very practical reason for pointing to
these more philosophical issues. I want to
make a distinction, not between different
types of knowledge, but between different
types of knowledge resources. It is clear that
there exists a body of knowledge about how to
drive a car ± a body of knowledge that is
written down and taught to people joining the
community of car drivers. This body of
knowledge exists independent of the
individual drivers and their actual practices. If
it is unrelated to the actual practice, it is hard
to consider this body of knowledge as a
resource in practice. However, it is not
difficult to imagine that it might be made
relevant to actual practice ± that it might
inspire, inform and regulate action. In this
sense, an explicit body of knowledge like all
other types of informational input are not
knowledge resources by nature, but by use:
input made resourceful by individual actors in
some context of action count as resources. In
mobilizing resources, ascription of meaning,
significance and implication is done. Such
ascriptions by which explicit knowledge and
information are made resourceful are
themselves tacit, i.e. implied and impossible
to define, but nonetheless very important.
To simplify the terminology, let me claim
that the distinction is really one between
information and knowledge. Information that
is mobilized and made relevant and
resourceful by some actor becomes
knowledge resources. Knowledge
management can focus more or less on the
two ``ingredients'' in knowledge resources ±
the informational inputs and explicit
knowledge, or the tacit process of
mobilization, interpretation and use. The
former part may be owned and possessed,
stocked as knowledge and information and
distributed or allocated by central authority.
The latter part cannot be separated from its
behavioral expression, and could not be
managed on conventional terms.
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
The new product
A new type of biographies is emerging,
biographies of ``things'' such as scientific
objects (Daston, 2000b), natural resources
(Ball, 1999), technical systems (Latour,
1996), and natural laws (Bodanis, 2000).
Such biographies may surprise because
``things'' are normally not supposed to have a
life, only some kind of invariant existence ±
already discovered or still awaiting discovery.
These authors claim that existence is a matter
of degree and will vary over time. Things,
ideas, products, etc. gain or lose status as
ontological entities from one phase to the
next.
If ``scientific objects can be simultaneously
real and historical'' (Daston, 2000a, p. 3) we
may speculate that the same could be true of
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products and artifacts in general. In the
present context, these ideas can be translated
into the conjecture that the physical
materialization of an artifact is not quite as
epoch-making and dramatic an event, since
the product may have existed tacitly long
before that. Again, Polanyi is the resource, as
he claims that we can have tacit
foreknowledge of things:
. . . [We] can have a tacit foreknowledge of yet
undiscovered things. This is indeed the kind of
foreknowledge the Copernicans must have
meant to affirm when they passionately
maintained, against heavy pressure, during 140
years before Newton proved the point, that the
heliocentric theory was not merely a convenient
way of computing the paths of planets, but was
really true (Polanyi, 1966, p. 145).
This tacit existence, and this type of
foreknowledge of products yet to be invented,
is important in one particular sense, namely
that it may organize people and co-ordinate
efforts in the new product development
process. An object, ``because it exists, unifies
points of view'', claims Latour (1996, p. 77).
Tacitly existing objects may, possibly to a
lesser extent, unify perspectives and order the
ways of relating to it. Part of such relating to a
tacitly existing product may be the search for
ways of making it more real, which may entail
a common, inspired search and mobilization
across fields, communities, organizations and
departments. Tacit existence, with a tacit
foreknowledge of what is to be invented, may
so govern the interaction that no other
coordinating power or authority is needed to
ensure efficiency in a distributed process of
new product development.
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Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
In the present context, tacit foreknowledge
may represent a parallel to the concept of
``premise control'' (Weick, 1990) that
represents a more unobtrusive (but not
necessarily an always intentional) way of
managing other people's action. The
alternative to a focus on a pre-decided
architectural order as the common input to
the process, the distributed experts may be
able to spontaneously create such an
architectural order without much explicit
communication and coordination, and they
may be able to achieve such order simply by
enacting the same tacit foreknowledge and
heedfully seek to contribute to the realization
of some tacitly existing product or technical
system (Kreiner and Tryggestad, 2001;
Kreiner, 1999; Weick and Roberts, 1996).
Thus, two types of managerial strategies
may follow from the context of new product
development. The fact that the product under
development does not yet exist in material
form may provoke an explicit managerial
effort to make it exist as a plan. The decision
on the product architecture co-ordinates
subsequent action by distributing tasks and
responsibilities for the various components of
the product. On the other hand, the fact that
the product already exists tacitly in the minds
of many people may in itself align distributed
action in such a way that component
compatibility and product architecture may
be left to emerge more spontaneously. The
role and content of knowledge management
in the two cases would obviously be very
different. In the former case, knowledge
management would entail the provision of the
necessary information on which the tasks of
each participant could be given an ostensive
definition. In the latter case, knowledge
management would entail the mobilization of
experts to enact their tacit foreknowledge and
to commit heedfully to make the tacitly
existing product materialize.
Knowledge management in relation to
new product development
Within the overall theme of the paper, i.e.
knowledge management, we have now briefly
discussed three different aspects of the new
product development process, the process
itself, the knowledge resources for such
development, and the relative existence of an
outcome. This discussion led to a set of
distinctions that may form an analytical basis
for empirical studies. The first distinction was
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
made between a learning notion and an
implementation notion of the new product
development process. The second distinction
was made between an understanding of
knowledge management as either information
provision or knowledge mobilization. The
third and final distinction was made between
explicitly organized processes versus
spontaneously emerging orders.
We will return to these distinctions after a
brief account of a highly successful invention
of a hearing instrument.
The invention of a digital hearing
instrument
The artifact I will use as a case in this article is
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a digital hearing instrument. It was a major
breakthrough for the Danish manufacturer,
Oticon A/S, that had already been made a
celebrity by CNN and Peters for its spaghetti-
organization (Peters, 1992). In 1995 Oticon
introduced a new product, branded
DigiFocus. This product created a landmark
not only for the company, but also for the
whole industry. By turning the hearing
instrument into a computer, it created a new
technological path that all other
manufacturers have traveled since then. By
providing hi-fi sound quality to the hearing
impaired users, it set new performance
standards for the industry. The product was
the result of four years of complicated
development work and ten years of
audiological research (Oticon, 1995).
In terms of physical size, DigiFocus was
indeed a tiny landmark. Actually, size is the
kernel of the challenge in developing hearing
instruments. In my logical reconstruction of
the development process, the miniaturization
requirement is the original problem. For
aesthetic reasons, the instrument is supposed
to disappear into the ear, or behind the ear,
and must consequently be as tiny as possible.
Building a computer into a tiny hearing
instrument meets with a host of difficulties,
e.g. that the necessary batteries for computers
powered by electricity are voluminous, heavy
and short-lived relative to the performance
requirements. Thus, size concerns will soon
be translated into power conservation
challenges in the development process.
One very important determinant of the
power consumption in electronic equipment
is the voltage. Standard at the time was
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Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
five-volt, but eventually DigiFocus was
developed with a one-volt chip. This reduced
the power consumption to 1/25, but was
nonetheless not an easy and obvious choice ±
as indicated by the fact that no one had ever
done it before. Thus, there were no design
tools available, and no easily identifiable
manufacturer of such chips. More
importantly, lowering the voltage also meant
lowering the speed of the chip. This could
likely have been the winning argument against
adopting this one-volt design, especially
because the very ambitious goals of hi-fi
quality required more, not less computing
capacity. For example, the compression
normally done in three frequency bands was
now to be done in seven bands in the
DigiFocus case. Rather than defining this
contradiction as a logical impasse, the chip
designers took it as a challenge to find ways of
increasing the performance of a slower chip.
New inventive ways of parallel processing
were to become part of the eventual solution.
But the one-volt solution was met with
more difficulties. Translating the full scale of
frequencies into a one-volt scale required an
unattainable precision. Skipping frequencies
were not the intuitive solution since quality
was identified with the ``true'' representation
of sounds. Nonetheless, the idea arose
(possibly from desperation) that some
frequencies might be skipped without the
human ear detecting the difference. The IC
designers sent the problem to researchers in
the field of psycho-acoustics at a university in
a different country. They conducted clinical
experiments that delayed the project, but
which eventually produced the results and
algorithms that allowed the chip designers to
complete a feasible and efficient one-volt
design.
The triumph of this new product
development project was not merely an
acclaimed hearing instrument. It was also a
triumph to have designed the one-volt chip,
and to have a new ``problematic'' for psycho-
acoustics research in the form of the idea of
redundant frequencies.
Analysis
The success story of DigiFocus is recounted
in a brief version that has put more emphasis
on the logical steps than on the actual process.
It is worth mentioning that considerably more
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
information was in fact exchanged between
the parties, and many more disciplines and
people took part in the process. Thus, the
case story is a logical reconstruction, more
than it is a true empirical account. Still, the
case story holds important lessons that I will
now tease out of the story by means of the
analytical framework developed earlier.
Learning or implementation process
In ordinary terms, it would be unreasonable
to define the recounted process as an
implementation process. The product was not
architecturally predetermined by the
conventions of the trade. It could not be,
since digitalization was just in its very
beginning. Foreign competitors expected
such a product introduction to be five to ten
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years away and were consequently taken by
surprise at Oticon's success. Neither was the
product architecture pre-designed by
managerial decision. If it were, at least the
participants did not take the decision
seriously. Nobody could from the beginning
have made the decision that the solution was a
one-volt design, because at the moment that
would have been highly unrealistic and
probably considered unnecessarily risky. The
foundation for such a solution and decision ±
and the mobilization of fields of expertise
relevant to such a solution ± was only
gradually established. The decision of the
product architecture was not made until it
had proven feasible, which happened only
very late in the process. Thus, the
fundamental architectural decision was the
outcome of the new product development
process, much more than it was the initiating
event. The choice was in fact (but not
necessarily by intent) postponed until real
alternatives had been created and evaluated.
Thus, the choice was really just a codification
of the achieved results of the development
efforts, which for a long period were
dedicated to making the one-volt design
feasible. Making it feasible meant finding,
designing and exploiting interfaces between
components and fields of expertise.
Things might have developed differently.
There was nothing logical or natural about
the eventual choice of design, since its
immediate consequence was a slower chip in a
situation that called for much higher
calculation capacity due to the ambition of
providing hi-fi sound. Furthermore, it is far
from inconceivable that the Oticon
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Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
management might have pre-established the
architecture of DigiFocus and still have met
with success. Presumably, concerns for
credibility, risk and legitimacy might have
urged the management to opt for a five-volt
design ± the industry standard at the time. We
have no reason to believe that a DigiFocus
could not have been invented on such a
platform. Probably, on many performance
criteria (such as sound reproduction quality
and battery life) it would have been inferior to
the eventual DigiFocus based on the one-volt
chip. But it might still have been superior to
existing hearing instruments on the market. It
might still have been marketed as hi-fi sound,
and it might have captured as much media
attention as the actual DigiFocus did. We
have little doubt that the five-volt design
might have been celebrated as an optimal
compromise between speed and power
consumption.
Similarly, it is far from inconceivable that
the one-volt venture might have proven
disastrous, even though we now know that
technically it is feasible. The search for
optimal solutions may prevent people from
doing good and sensible things, especially in
markets with high firstcomer's advantage.
Delaying the introduction of the DigiFocus in
anticipation of a technical solution may have
been inviting competitors to catch up, and
Oticon might have lost the whole show to a
local competitor that announced a competing
product just a few months later. Luck and
timing was on Oticon's side in this case, but
mere eventualities might have changed the
history completely.
Writing alternative histories entails lots of
speculations, but even such speculations help
us remember that things might have ended
differently, for many important as well as for
seemingly less important reasons. We cannot
claim that keeping the product architecture
open proved to be the ultimate source of
success in the case study ± and we cannot
claim that had management frozen the
architecture at a five-volt solution it would
have met with less success. The only fact that
remains is the simple one that it proved to be
a feasible and viable strategy to treat the
process as a learning process, not an
implementation process. For knowledge
management this means that organizations
and teams may succeed on less than
complete, rationalized and easily available
information. The sacrifices that, e.g. the
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
modularity school (and knowledge
management in general) seems willing to
make in the name of conventional planning
and co-ordination, would in hindsight be
difficult to justify in the present case. The
alternative to managing the process on
ordinary terms proved not to be chaos, but a
highly innovative and effective product
innovation process.
Information provision or knowledge
mobilization
As mentioned earlier, a distinction can be
made between information provision and
knowledge mobilization. I do not want to
argue that explicit knowledge was not
immensely important as a foundation for the
development of DigiFocus. Lots of formalized
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skills (e.g. in chip design) and scientific
knowledge (e.g. in psycho-acoustics) were
indispensable, and yet, the issue we need to
raise is, in what ways such explicit knowledge
and competence became mobilized and
resourceful to the development process.
In this connection, the critical moment in
the case story is when the chip designers send
a question to the experts in psycho-acoustics.
As far as we know this question was neither
specified in great detail, nor explained and
situated to ensure an appreciation of the
reason for asking. Therefore, it is unlikely that
the psycho-acoustics scientists in fact worked
on the chip designers' problem. We have
reasons to believe that the psycho-acoustics
scientists knew the Oticon people and the
hearing instrument trade well enough to
appreciate the general context of the question,
but still it is likely the psycho-acoustics
scientists became committed on a poorly
specified, but highly stimulating request. The
reason why a poorly specified request was able
to mobilize the skills and enthusiasm of these
seasoned scientists had probably little to do
with the intentions and needs of Oticon.
The request in itself might under different
circumstances have been claimed to be
inappropriate, in form (e.g. underspecified)
and in content (e.g. a stupid conjecture that
the human ear would not notice a reduction
in quality just because the chip designers
needed to skip some frequencies). With all the
authority and weight of the explicit knowledge
of psycho-acoustics the request might have
been rejected as unserious. The fact is that it
was not rejected, but rather embraced. The
way the psycho-acoustics scientists reacted
119
Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
turned a potentially stupid question into a
stroke of genius. And we may speculate that
the sole reason for this transformation may
have been the psycho-acoustics scientists'
intimation that such an algorithm might be
possible ± that indeed, the human ear is not
solely dependent on stimuli, but actively
shaping and integrating them in the pursuit of
meaning (Polanyi, 1966, p. 137).
In spite of the empirical indications that
contracts may not effectively motivate
participation in innovation projects (Kreiner
and Schultz, 1995), we do not know that the
psycho-acoustics scientists would not have
been motivated to mobilize knowledge and
enthusiasm on the basis of a more elaborated
contractual basis. All we know is that the
apparent foreknowledge that allowed them to
recognize a good scientific question was far
enough for such enthusiasm to emerge. For
knowledge management in general we may
conclude that foreknowledge may prove
important to the success of new product
development projects, and that appeals to
such foreknowledge may mobilize experts to
do more than we know how to ask for.
Explicit co-ordination or spontaneous
ordering
The case story suggests that the product
changed character along the way and that it
might have ended differently. Thus, there
existed some flexibility in the phenomenon
that was labeled DigiFocus. It had high
ontological reality long before it was
physically manifest, however. It was definitely
a major part of the development effort of
Oticon ± and no one in competing projects
could be in doubt of its privileged status in the
organization. It was real in the sense that it
appeared everywhere, in speech, in resource
allocation, in identity campaigns. Its reality
did not depend on the lack of final product
architecture until the very last minute. It was
real more tacitly ± i.e. whatever it might be
precisely and eventually it had consequences
and it allowed people to make sense of
experience and to make sensible decisions.
The tacit existence of DigiFocus long
before it existed physically was important for
organizational reasons. It unified perspectives
sufficiently for every participant to act
heedfully towards the common goal. The fact
that it was a hearing instrument, that it was
digitalized, and that it was supposed to
provide hi-fi quality gave apparently everyone
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
sufficient appreciation of the context that they
could search for solutions in productive
directions, that they could critically evaluate
their own component solutions and
convincingly challenge the proposals of
others. Not much formal co-ordination was
necessary. No a priori definition of the lines of
skirmish between the various modules and
their experts was necessary. Lines of skirmish
existed tacitly and were used constructively in
the search for better solutions.
From a management point of view, we may
conclude that managing contexts and
facilitating interaction apparently suffice to
co-ordinate ventures in new product
development processes. It is not because the
context as such co-ordinates everything ± the
point is that people co-ordinate themselves
Downloaded by Texas Southern University At 10:04 19 December 2014 (PT)
when the context is conducive to such
co-ordination. The context of a specific
product, tacitly defined, is apparently
conducive enough for people to seek
coordination, to mobilize and utilize whatever
ideas and information they can find to
contribute to a common solution across all
components and modules. The theory here
might be that especially when the outcome of
the process is a product or an artifact, the
more we can allow ourselves to rely on order
to emerge from the process ± and the less we
need a priori to establish a platform for
managerial co-ordination and leadership. The
more interdependent the modules and
components, the more obvious it will be when
co-ordination is not achieved in practice, and
the more pressure there will be on the
participants to find at co-ordinated and
calibrated solution. Thus, it may be agued
that it is not interdependence that requires
co-ordination by prior plan. When lack of
co-ordination becomes self-evident, order will
emerge spontaneously (Hayek, 1948; Kirzner,
1992; Kreiner, 1999).
Discussion
Since they dwell on particular circumstances
and distinctive individuals, case studies
cannot claim much general validity for their
findings ± except perhaps for the implied
finding that any generalization is a dangerous
abstraction. And yet, analyzing a case study
will rest on the sensible presumption that we
may in fact learn from it. If we did not tacitly
know that there is something to be learnt from
120
Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
analyzing case studies, we would not bother.
We might proceed as if the observed
particular circumstances and distinctive
individuals were representative of a larger
class of cases. This being highly hypothetical,
it could not be taken literally. Probably it
would be better if learning from case studies
were different from mere generalizations of
experience. We cannot learn that future cases
will proceed like the one studied, since they
will all be governed by their own particular
circumstances and dynamics. However, we
may ``learn'' that subsequent ones might
proceed in just that way, and this potentiality
can help us to appreciate the particularity and
individuality of this subsequent case when it
in all likelihood will divert in different
directions. The actual experience of the
original case can thus be treated as
generalized possibilities, without being
assumed also to predict the future.
Knowledge of such generalized possibility
may serve as a backdrop for the discovery and
definition of the actual peculiarity and
individuality of the second, the third and
more future cases.
In this sense, the fruits of learning do not
constitute a prediction of how things will or
should proceed. The past experience provides
us with a tacit integration of generalized
possibilities, which may serve us as a platform
for probing into the nuances and divergent
trends of future cases. It is from the
generalized possibilities that we see and enact
the actual new product development
challenge ± and that we develop additional
meaning and significance of new events and
experiences. The accumulation of experience,
i.e. the continued, tacit integration of more
generalized possibilities, shows in the ability
to recognize productive problematics ± the
kind of tacit foreknowledge that directs us to
the contradictory demands and the dilemmas
that need handling and resolution in
accordance with the particular situation. Such
foreknowledge will be valid across cases,
because only the handling of dilemmas is
situation specific, not the dilemmas
themselves.
In the above mentioned sense, what were
the lessons from the DigiFocus case?
Remember that only little information was
exchanged between the chip designers in
Denmark and the psycho-acoustics scientists
abroad. A simple request from the former had
large effects in terms of the commitment of
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
the latter. The subsequent reply in the form of
an algorithm was apparently easily integrated
with the final architectural product design.
We were drawn to this observation because
we expected technologically path-breaking
product design to require much more
communication and co-ordination. We
expected the product architecture to be
specified from the outset and the solution
spaces for each module to be clearly
delineated to ensure that decentralized work
would produce compatible component
solutions. Since no central authority
produced such decisions up front, the psycho-
acoustics scientists must have been able to,
and motivated to, create co-ordination and
compatibility themselves. We speculate that
they mobilized the sufficient knowledge,
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including the tacit foreknowledge of what a
digitalized hearing instrument would look
like, and that they utilized this fund of
mobilized knowledge in a dedicated and
heedful manner in producing a compatible
solution. Afterwards, it looked as if it had
been co-ordinated and well planned, even if
no such plan and co-ordination was exercised
on beforehand.
The problematics raised from this can be
expressed as the ratio between centrally
communicated information and the locally
mobilized knowledge. We would have little
reason to expect this ratio to have a particular
magnitude, large or small. But I hypothesize
that we will learn more about future cases of
new product development if we committed to
explain why, in that particular case, more
emphasis is put on facilitating the local
production and mobilization of knowledge, or
more emphasis is put on providing centralized
information ± as the case may be. We may
also theorize the conditions under which
more emphasis will be put on one or the other
strategy. For example, the less radical an
innovation conceived, the more likely it will
be that centrally provided information will be
reliable and inexpensive, and thus more
emphasis will be put on this knowledge
source. We may further theorize why the
knowledge management literature appears to
be advocating a heavy emphasis on providing
information independent of the situation.
One may speculate that information provision
gives managers a higher visibility than
facilitating others to create the necessary
knowledge locally. Concerns for becoming
and being recognized as knowledge managers
121
Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
are legitimate, but they do not necessarily
enhance the organization's production of
wealth.
Another lesson can be drawn from the case
study. A simple question seemed to stir a lot
of knowledge creation. The amount of
informational input seemed very low in
relation to the knowledge output. We was
drawn to these observations because we
expected that if knowledge production was
distributed and local, the prerequisite for a
relevant knowledge output would be fairly
specific instructions. Precise and instructive
communication was not a characteristic of the
described organizational practice; a simple
idea, undoubtedly characterized by high
interpretive flexibility, seemed to capture the
imagination of several actors and to reinforce
a search for new knowledge and new
solutions. Possibly, communication may
sometime be less important because it helps
actors solve their problems and choose their
actions, and more important because it
motivates actors to find solutions and create
action alternatives. Like `` . . . decisions with
action-reinforcing functions should not obey
the norms of rational decision-making''
(Brunsson, 1989, p. 17), maybe action-
reinforcing communication should not obey
traditional norms of information and
knowledge sharing. Especially sharing tacit
knowledge and foreknowledge cannot be
done in explicit terms, and more specific
words would add to the uncertainty and
confusion, not alleviate it.
It seems that we return in the end to a point
already elaborated when we discussed
knowledge resources. We may choose to
consider knowledge as a resource per se ± and
consequently aim to accumulate knowledge
assets to create more resources; or we may
choose to consider knowledge as something
that is made resourceful by being competently
mobilized and utilized ± and consequently we
may build new knowledge resources by
improving the ability to mobilize and utilize
existing knowledge. The former alternative
gives a larger role to the knowledge provider ±
e.g. the knowledge manager; the latter
alternative gives a larger role to the knowledge
receiver ± e.g. the knowledge worker. The
same is true in relation to communication
since meaning may be more or less dependent
on the active interpretation of the receiver.
The ability to see explicit knowledge as useful,
and actively to make communicated messages
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
sensible, etc., is an indispensable tacit power
of all knowing, according to Polanyi (1966,
p. 137). If we were to interpret this position
literally, the function of knowledge
management would be radically different
from what it is conventionally defined to be in
the literature. As we have seen, however,
alternatives exist, and there are sensible roles
for knowledge management to play in relation
to building intellectual capital and sharing
knowledge. How these different sets of roles
are integrated in practice is hard to know ±
and can probably only be known tacitly.
Conclusion
The traditional knowledge management
Downloaded by Texas Southern University At 10:04 19 December 2014 (PT)
program has focused on the acquisition, the
codification and the transfer of knowledge,
and in relation to tacit knowledge this
program has spelled out the logic of
externalization ± translating tacit knowledge
into explicit knowledge. In this way,
knowledge is made manageable, and
knowledge resources can be managed on
conventional terms. Only then is the central
producer of organizational wealth,
knowledge, separated from the individual
knowledge workers and prevented from going
home at night.
To transform tacit knowledge into company
property is a legitimate managerial goal. It
makes good sense to find ways of taking care
of the knowledge that leaves the company at
night. But simply put, the less knowledge that
leaves in the evening, the less knowledge
returns in the morning! The ideal picture of
having intellectual capital that has value
independently of the use the organization
makes of it may appease stockowners and
bankers, but a knowledge management
strategy that aims at capitalizing on even the
tacit knowledge resources of knowledge
workers would seem to have the potential of
producing better results. The legitimate
concern for protecting one's rights and assets
must be balanced against equally legitimate
concerns for creating new things that may
capture the market and lay the ground for the
future fortunes.
Knowledge management needs to rest on a
double-sided concern: to protect and utilize
existing knowledge resources, on the one
hand, and to facilitate the mobilization and
expansion of new knowledge resources, on
122
Journal of Knowledge Management
Volume 6 . Number 2 . 2002 . 112±123
the other hand. It is my final contention that
the knowledge management program is in
need of a better conceptualization of its own
role and function ± a conceptualization that
reflects this double-sided concern. Given the
nature of things, such a better
conceptualization is not equal to a more
specific and well-defined one. It is probably
equal to one that reflects the fundamental role
of tacit knowledge in management. It is one in
which the simplicity of behavioral
prescriptions is replaced by the implicitness of
things to be achieved and realized. The tacit
knowledge of management, including the
management of knowledge, is worth a
sermon.
With the help of a case study of a product
development process, it was possible to
analyze the specifics of the mobilization of
knowledge and intellectual resources. The
conventional prescriptions for proper
knowledge management had little explanatory
power in this case, but this does not mean that
they are wrong. However, the success of the
new product development process legitimizes
us to question whether these prescriptions are
always appropriate. Happy beginnings ± in
the form of well-defined product architecture
± will not guarantee happy endings, like
unhappy beginnings will not prevent them. If
unhappy beginnings are action-reinforcing,
we may even speculate that what is missing
from the beginning may possibly be more
than regained by knowledge workers actively
pursuing knowledge and information.
Capturing the imagination of the psycho-
acoustics scientists with an under-specified
idea proved immensely valuable, not because
the idea was good in traditional terms, but
because it was good in terms of the tacit
foreknowledge of the scientists. In the end,
the idea became good also in traditional
terms, because the knowledge workers
delivered the requested algorithms. Tacitly
mobilizing the tacit foreknowledge of these
experts was intelligent management, whether
or not it was intentionally done or not. We
know for sure that any under-specified idea
will not produce such an effect. We also
suggested above that a mobilization of tacit
foreknowledge would possibly not be
indispensable to successful new product
development processes. However, it is safe to
conclude that if knowledge management
embraces tacit knowledge as a constructive
object of management (and not merely as a
 Tacit knowledge management: the role of artifacts
Kristian Kreiner
potential risk), more tacit ways of managing
need to be developed.
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