Reliability Engineering and System Safety 117 (2013) 73–80

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Reliability Engineering and System Safety

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Seismic vulnerability of natural gas pipelines

Giovanni Lanzano a, Ernesto Salzano b,n, Filippo Santucci de Magistris a, Giovanni Fabbrocino a
a
Dipartimento di Bioscienze e Territorio, StreGa Laboratory, Università del Molise, Termoli, CB (IT), Italy
b
Istituto di Ricerche sulla Combustione, CNR, Via Diocleziano 328, 80124 Napoli (IT), Italy

art ic l e i nf o a b s t r a c t

Article history: This work deals with the analysis of the interaction of earthquakes with pipelines transporting and
Received 19 November 2012 distributing natural gas for industrial and civil use. To this aim, a new large data-set of seismic information
Received in revised form classified on the basis of selected seismological, geotechnical and structural parameters is presented and
19 February 2013
analyzed. Particular attention is devoted to continuous pipelines under strong ground shaking, which is the
Accepted 22 March 2013
geotechnical effect due to passage of waves in soil.
Available online 10 April 2013
Results are provided in terms of the likelihood of the loss of containment with respect to Peak Ground
Keywords: Velocity (PGV), a seismic intensity parameter which may be easily retrieved either from local authorities and
Pipeline public databases or from site dependent hazard analysis.
Earthquake
Fragility functions and seismic intensity threshold values for the failure and for the loss of containment of
Natural gas
gas from pipeline systems are also given.
Fragility
Na-tech The obtained functions can be easily implemented in existing codes and guidelines for industrial risk
assessment, land-use planning, and for the design of public distribution network, with specific reference to
Natural—Technological interaction (Na-Tech).
& 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction
The natural gas-based system is increasing its centrality in the
worldwide economy because its employment in the energy
production, either for industrial or for civil use. In this context,
the adoption of pipeline is strategic, starting from the large-scale
gas transportation from the production areas (mainly Russia,
especially Siberia, Middle East – Qatar or Iran – or US, e.g. Texas
[1]), to the local distribution in urbanized context, which implies a
large number of medium and small-diameter pipelines built by
steel or High Density Polyethylene (HDPE).
In this framework, a rational estimation of the seismic risks is
required. Indeed, the earthquake impact on pipelines may cause
significant losses in terms of economic and environmental assets
and human life. As a matter of fact, in some of strong historical and
recent earthquakes, the natural gas network suffered heavy
damages, causing abrupt service stop or fires and explosions in
the most severe cases as in the catastrophic earthquakes of
Northridge (1994) [2], Kobe (1995) [3] and Kocaeli (1999) [4,5].
In the next sections, new tools for the estimation of structural
damage to pipelines containing natural gas and for the following
loss of containment from the damaged system due to earthquake
action, are given. Results are provided either in terms of fragility
curves or in terms of threshold values for the intensity of the
n
Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 817621922; fax: +39 817622915.
E-mail addresses: salzano@irc.cnr.it, ernesto.salzano@tiscali.it (E. Salzano).
earthquake and more specifically with respect to the Peak Ground
Velocity (PGV). These results can be easily implemented in existing
codes and procedures for industrial risk assessment, land-use
planning, with specific reference to Natural—Technological inter-
action (Na–Tech) [6,7] and can be extended to pipelines transport-
ing any other gas unless specific construction requirement.
2. Earthquake characterization
Before quantitative seismology was developed, the seismic inten-
sity was measured on the basis of the damaging effects of the
earthquake. Seismic intensity was mainly quantified by using the
Modified Mercalli Intensity scale (MMI), which is still used nowadays
for its practical implications. Quite obviously, this is not an objective
scale, because the values are depending on the characteristics of the
existing structural system and natural environment. Despite these
limitations, several governmental agencies, as e.g. the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS), have produced MMI maps in order to describe the
distribution of the earthquake effects in a given area. As a conse-
quence, many empirical relations for the performance of the structures
during earthquakes, including pipelines, are dependent on MMI [8].
More recently, the deployment of measurement stations on
large regions has allowed the recording of the acceleration time
history at the point of installation, and has addressed the use of
more objective seismic parameters. Among the others, the most
significant, synthetic seismic parameter for structural applications
is the Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA), which is the peak of the

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74 G. Lanzano et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 117 (2013) 73–80
horizontal acceleration time history obtained from accelerometer
measurements. For aboveground structures as buildings, the PGA
is directly related to the structural damage, because of its propor-
tionality with inertial effects due to the seismic loadings.
When pipelines or underground structures are of concern, the
damaging effects due to the passage of seismic waves in the soil
are generally proportional to the Peak Ground Velocity (PGV),
which is the peak value of the horizontal velocity time histories
and which is less sensitive to the higher frequency component of
the ground motion. Quite clearly, the PGA and PGV are only
synthetic description of a seismogram and do not give a complete
description of the local ground motion, in terms of frequency
content and signal duration, which are also important parameters
for the structural response. However, these instrumental, synthetic
parameters are frequently used to relate structural damage and
seismic intensity for their simplicity and clarity.
Also for the performance of pipelines, many analytical and
empirical formulations are based on PGA or PGV [8]. Quite
obviously, the deterministic measurement of these parameters is
available only for the instrumented sites, which of course do not
correspond exactly to the damaged sites. For this reason, it is
necessary to use special predictive correlations which give an
estimation of selected seismic site-dependent parameter on the
basis of other synthetic parameters, as magnitude, epicentral
distance and ground conditions. These expressions are commonly
called attenuation laws. A large review of the existing attenuation
equations, both for ground motion parameters and spectral
ordinates, is given and discussed by Douglas [9]. By using attenua-
tion laws for each specific seismic region and instrumental
information provided by the seismic network, the values of PGA
and PGV may be obtained and plotted on shake maps, similarly to
MMI maps.
3. Natural gas pipelines
The natural gas (NG) system includes different structures and
components for the production, processing, purification, transmis-
sion, storage and distribution of the fluids. Among others, the
pipeline network is one of the most important components. Due to
their strategic importance, these structures need special consid-
erations in design and construction, including the likelihood of the
interaction with destructive natural events.
With specific reference to earthquakes, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) in U.S. gives specific indications and
tools (collected under the name HAZUS [10]), for the estimation of
possible damage scenarios due to natural catastrophic events,
although somehow simplified. In the European context, concern-
ing the seismic behaviour of industrial systems and equipment,
very few indications are given in existing codes, even if the part
4 of Eurocode 8 (EC8) [11] gives some general principles to ensure
earthquake protection for aboveground pipelines and buried
pipelines. The EC8 guidelines prescribes that for buried pipelines
the soil/structure interaction should be always considered,
whereas for aboveground pipelines, the geotechnical effects are
essentially related with the loss of support of the structure and
differential movements. Furthermore, the hydraulic dynamic
effects are considered negligible, due to the filling level inside
the pipelines, except for the case of wastewater system. Finally, the
use of continuous pipelines for systems which treat flammable
and pollutant material is mandatory. A simplified analytical for-
mulation to evaluate the maximum strains and curvatures induced
in continuous pipelines by wave passage (transient deformations)
derived from the work of Newmark [12] is also given. No calcula-
tion methods are given for pipeline strains induced by permanent
ground displacements.
In the next following, the main important aspects relative to
the working and construction technology of the pipelines are
discussed, focusing on the seismic behaviour of these structures.
3.1. Operating pressure
A fundamental classification of pipeline system has to be
carried out by separating the transportation and distribution
network. The transportation network is generally used to transfer
the natural gas from the production place to the industrial plants
or urban distribution system. The long way transportation pipe-
lines operate generally at high pressure (4 70 bars) in order to
transfer a large amount of fluid in the unit time. In U.S., the large
scale NG transmission system includes around 300,000 km of
high-strength, steel pipelines, with diameter ranging between
0.6 and 0.9 m and pressures between 34 and 97 bars [13].
The distribution network supplies the gas for industrial use or
for the individual users of urban systems and is currently designed
for medium or low pressures values, generally lower than 4 bars.
From a structural point of view, the difference between transpor-
tation and distribution systems is essentially related to the
nominal diameter of pipelines. According to HAZUS, with specific
reference to the seismic vulnerability analysis of pipeline systems,
two large categories can be recognized: (a) D≥400 mm for high
pressure transmission system; and (b) D o400 mm for distribu-
tion and low pressure transmission systems.
The supra-regional transmission system, which is considered
the first level of NG network and includes the structure used to
transport NG through different countries, has generally a main
network with diameters up to 1.4 m. The second level for the NG
network accounts for the regional transmission system: the
diameter range varies for each country. The third level is referred
to local distribution pipeline system of industrial plants or for
urban networks. In this case, the diameters of pipelines are less
than 1.25 cm (0.5 inches).
Finally, it is worth considering that the thickness of the
pipelines is generally proportional to the diameter and working
pressure, and depends on the construction material. Hence, it is
not an independent parameters.
3.2. Materials and joints
The most common materials for natural gas pipelines are cast
iron, steel and plastic materials. Cast iron has been largely adopted
in the last century. This material shows high fragility and lacks of
ductility, which is an important safety requirement for natural gas
pipelines. For these reasons, natural gas pipelines are nowadays
made by ductile iron, steel and plastic material, as polyvinylchlor-
ide, polyethylene (HDPE) and glass reinforced fiber polymers.
More specifically, the pipelines used for transmission systems
are made of steel and, especially in recent years, the distribution
pipelines are made by HPDE.
If seismic response is of concern, the damage patterns occurred
in these structures are largely dependent on the material base
properties and the joint detailing. For this reason, all the possible
combinations of material and joints were divided in two signifi-
cant categories, namely continuous pipelines (CP) and segmented
pipeline (SP). It is worth noting that a similar approach has been
already adopted in the context of HAZUS, where the pipelines are
divided in brittle (SP) and ductile (CP) on the basis of the seismic
performance, in terms of pre-failure deformations.
Table 1 reports the damage patterns for continuous NG pipe-
lines. Table 1 refers to the breaking mechanisms that may occur
along the pipe body and can be also used for future reference for
the aims of post-earthquake damage analysis.
 G. Lanzano et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 117 (2013) 73–80 75

Table 1
Structural aspects in the seismic behaviour of NG pipelines.

Pipelines Materials Joints Damage patterns

Continuous Steel; polyethylene; polyvinylchloride; glass fiber Butt welded; welded slip; chemical weld; mechanical Tension cracks; local buckling;
(CP) reinforced polymer joints; special joints beam buckling

Table 2
Typical joints commonly used for NG pipelines. D¼ Nominal diameter; OAW ¼ oxyacetylene welding; SAW ¼ submerged arc welding.

Joint Drawings Use/technology

Welded joints: Steel pipelines (OAW or SAW):

a) Butt welded a) All
b) Cylindrical b) D≤150 mm;
welded slip joint c) D 4150 mm.
c) Spherical welded
slip joint

Mechanical joints: Steel pipelines/HDPE:

a) Slip-on welding These joints are commonly used in buried/above-ground pipeline as regulator station,
flanges; metering/reduction pressure station
b) welding neck
flanges

a) electro-fusion HDPE pipelines:

welding a) Two techniques:
b) Coupling joints 1) First involves heating and ends of the pipe to be joined against an
electrically heated plate.
2) Electro-fusion joining involves an electrically conducting implant being
incorporated into special couplings.

b) Steel couplings fixed with screws

Compression fittings HDPE, LDPE pipelines:

D o 110 mm.

The choice of the joints is a crucial issue in the seismic design of
natural gas pipeline. Indeed, in order to avoid that the pipeline
joints perform as weakness point for the structure, they must be
designed aiming at restoring the continuity of pipeline body, in
terms of strength and stiffness. To obtain this goal, the most used
joints are mainly welded, according to different technology.
However, in some cases, mechanical and special joints are also
used (Table 2).
Despite these considerations on continuity restoration, signifi-
cant cases of damage to welded steel joints were found in the past
earthquakes, especially when the breaks or leaks are related to bad
quality or execution of welds. However, these latter cases are
related to very old pipelines (first half of the last century), because
of a lack in the protocols of quality controls.
Among several welding technologies, three welds techniques
are remarkable for steel pipelines: (i) oxyacetylene welding
(OAW); (ii) submerged arc welding (SAW); (iii) high quality
welding. In the past, the most used welding belonged to first
and second categories: the SAW gives a good strength recovery
compared to OAW, which suffered extensive damage in the past
earthquakes. O'Rourke and Deyoe [14] observed a different per-
formance between the spigot and socket welded joints and the
butt welding, showing a better resistance recovering for the
second category.
In the following, the high quality welding is not considered,
because no damage data to this joint type have been found in the
available post-earthquake literature or documents. This is a clear
evidence of the very good performance of this joint during seismic
events.
3.3. Interaction with soil
Pipelines may be divided in underground and aboveground
pipelines. Generally, the burial depth of NG pipelines is in a range
of 1–2 m; less frequently, as for pipelines with very large diameter,
pipelines are buried deeper. For the above-ground case, the use of
support is common. NG pipes are frequently placed under the
ground level. The burying process is beneficial for two main
reasons. Quite obviously, the landfill protects the pipeline from
above ground damaging events, natural or human accidents. Two,
the lateral confinement given by the surrounding soil, which
increases with depth, reduces the seismic effects. Therefore, the
pipeline tends to accommodate the soil deformation and the
performance of the structure is strongly related to the geotechnical
effects only.
Based on experience and data collected during past earth-
quakes, geotechnical dynamic effects related to the pipeline
damage can be divided in two categories [15]:
76 G. Lanzano et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 117 (2013) 73–80
– Strong ground shaking (SGS): the effect is a deformation of the
soil, which surrounds the pipeline, without breaks or ruptures
in the soil depending on the earthquake intensity;
– Ground failure (GF): the surrounding soil is affected by failure
phenomena caused by the earthquake as active fault move-
ment (GF1), liquefaction (GF2) and landslides induced by the
shaking (GF3). Quite clearly, these seismic failure mechanisms
could appear only in specific geotechnical conditions, so that
they are site dependent (i.e., for the loose sands under ground-
water level for the GF2 phenomenon).
Ground shaking is the common seismic phenomenon for the
design of industrial and civil systems whereas other seismic-
induced phenomena may produce permanent deformation only
for specific site conditions and therefore, in some cases, may be
neglected.
3.4. Overview of the existing fragility formulations
The most common tool for the estimation of the damage of civil
and industrial equipment, and pipelines, is based on the fragility
curve, a function in which a performance indicator is expressed
with respect to a seismic intensity measure. Fragilities are mainly
based on observational data of the past earthquakes, obtained as
best fitting of the available information coming from the post-
earthquake reconnaissance. A review of the existing fragility
curves for pipelines is given by Tromans [8].
The most used performance indicator for the damage of pipe-
line due to the earthquake is the repair rate (RR), which gives the
numbers of repairs for a unit length of pipeline. O'Rourke and
Deyoe [14] observed that a possible limit in the calculation of RR is
the reference length of pipe. Hence, they proposed a criterion to
obtain the limit pipe length for a given RR, in order to select
reliable data for the fragility construction.
The intensity indicators for the seismic action, instead, are
strictly dependent on the geotechnical aspects related to the
pipeline damage. Pineda-Porras and Najafi [16] have discussed
the most common fragility formulations for seismic damage
estimation of pipelines (including water pipelines). Almost all
the available formulations give however the RR as a power
Table 3
Most common empirical fragility expressions for NG pipelines under SGS (S: steel; CI: cast iron; WJ: welded joints; FJ: flange joints).
The terms a and b are the coefficients of Eq. (1)).
N1 earthquakes. No. of points
6 11
7 ∼19
18 81
5 14
Table 4
Structural damage states (DS) for NG pipelines.
States Damage Patterns
DS0 Slight Investigated sections with no damage; slight pipe buckling; damage to the supports of aboveground pipelines without damage to the pipeline
DS1 Significant Significant pipe buckling; longitudinal and circumferential cracks; compression joint break
DS2 Severe Tension cracks for continuous pipelines; joint loosening in the segmented pipelines
function of the seismic intensity measures IM:
RR ¼ a  IM b ð1Þ
where a and b are two are constants which depend on pipeline
characteristics. In Table 3, a list of the most used fragility
formulations for gas pipelines and PGV as IM are given. The table
includes the information on the number of earthquakes used
for the curves construction and the different criteria performed
to account the different structural, geotechnical, geological and
seismological aspects.
In the authors’ opinion, the repair rate RR cannot be considered
as the only objective parameter, because it depends on the
reference length of pipeline, which is not uniform among the
different formulations. Furthermore, these empirical formulations
are mainly based on few data (see Table 3), with the exception of
ALA [18]. Finally, the RR value does not refer to the probability of
structural damage and accidental scenarios which may be trig-
gered by the earthquake action. In such perspective, the investiga-
tion described in the next section is aimed at developing seismic
fragility curves able to fit specific requirements of industrial risk
analysis methodologies.
4. Methodology
The procedure employed here is a general extension of the
seismic damage estimation for aboveground tanks as developed
previously [19–21]. Similar procedures for the evaluation of
seismic vulnerability of the geotechnical structures based on
performance criteria were adopted by the PEER (Pacific Earth-
quake Engineering Research) and discussed by Kramer et al. [22].
The methodology is essentially based on large collection of post-
earthquake data and in the definition of significant classes for the
pipeline failure based on structural Damage State (DS) and Risk
State (RS) indicators.
In Table 4, the structural damage indicators (DS) have been
properly recalibrated from the simplified classification of HAZUS.
They give an approximated correlation between damage patterns
(breaks or leaks) and geotechnical aspects (SGS or GF): the result is
that most of SGS are related to leaks and most of the GF to breaks.
a (10−4) b Reference
0.3 (Ductile) 2.25 [10]
0.829 (S, WJ, small D, unknown soil) 1.98 [17]
1.33 (S, WJ, small D, corrosive soil)
0.497 (S, WJ, small D, non-corrosive)
0.249 (S, WJ, large D, all soils)
0.995 (S, WJ, small D, unknown soil) 1 [18]
1.49 (S, WJ, small D, corrosive soil)
0.497 (S, WJ, small D, non-corrosive)
0.249 (S, WJ, large D, all soils)
2.16 (S, FJ, small D, all soils)
64 (Rayleigh waves, mainly CI) 0.92 [14]
3.5 (Body waves, mainly CI)
 G. Lanzano et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 117 (2013) 73–80 77

Table 5
Risk states (RS) for NG pipelines.

States Risk Release of containment

RS0 Null No loss of fluid from damaged pipeline

RS1 Low Limited, time-distributed loss of hazardous substance
RS2 High Large loss of hazardous substance (e.g. entire tube surface)

The two HAZUS damage levels correspond approximately to DS1

and DS2 of Table 4, which are better defined in each damage point,
including an initial class of negligible damage for pipeline
working. Fig. 1. Chart for the seismic damages to pipelines, for each database class,
expressed as number of cases and percentage over the total number of observa-
Based on the complete database and on the observed behavior
tions. CP: continuous pipelines; SP: segmented pipelines; AP: aboveground
of pipelines, five possible classes of fragility curves have been then pipelines; SGS: strong ground shaking; GF: ground failure.
recognized: (a) buried CP under SGS; (b) buried CP under GF; (c)
buried SP under SGS; (d) buried SP under GF; (e) aboveground
pipelines (AP). Table 6
In order to correlate the pipelines damage with the effects of Database used for the construction of fragility curves.
the damage itself, together with the damage states DS, other
Earthquake Country Year PGV range (cm/s)
indicators of performance have been defined as “Risk States” (RS),
on the basis of the possible negative effects of pipeline damage on Long Beach U.S. 1933 7
the environment (Table 5). To this aim, the indicator for the Kern County U.S. 1952 26–112
harmful effects was the intensity of loss of containment. Kern County U.S. 1954 7–28
San Fernando U.S. 1971 40–78
Finally, the RS levels were then organized in order to match the Michoacan Mexico 1985 14–22
Whittier Narrows U.S. 1987 18–22
corresponding damage states DS, i.e.:
Erzincan Turkey 1992 48–74
Northridge U.S. 1994 8–164
a) the RS0 corresponds to DS0, in which the damage type did not L'Aquila Italy 2009 24–31
cause any loss of containment; Maule Chile 2010 22–26
b) the RS1 was formulated in order to match DS1 class, where
were inserted all the damage that cause the loss of a limited or
time-distributed amount of fluid; Some details on the earthquakes used for the construction of
c) the RS2 has the highest level of risk and accounts all the fragility functions for natural gas pipelines under strong ground
damage in DS2, relative to the release of large amount of fluid shaking are given in Table 6. Most of the available data came from
in a very short time interval. the Californian Earthquakes of San Fernando 1971 and Northridge
1994. For each event, in the table, the Peak Ground Velocity range
In the following, for the RS classes, with the aims of Quantita- is given. The total number of available data is 123.
tive Risk Analysis or Land Use Planning, fragility and probit The database was further divided in subsets, accounting for
functions are shown for the continuous pipelines (which is the four relevant topics:
typical class for gas pipelines) under strong ground shaking (SGS),
which is the most common seismic effect [15]. – pipeline nominal diameter D: the entire database was approxi-
mately divided on the basis of HAZUS classification between
transmission pipelines (D≥400 mm) and distribution pipelines
5. Results and discussion (Do 400 mm);
– construction material: metallic (steel) or plastic (HDPE);
The collected data set is composed of approximately 400 – joint type: this is a very important topic because the type and
samples, coming from about 300 edited books, papers and post- quality of the joints strongly affect the seismic response; the
earthquake reports. The investigated earthquakes were about 40. whole set was divided between welded and mechanical joints
However, not all the earthquake database has been used for the and different types of welding were recognized (OAW or SAW,
analysis of pipeline response to the seismic action. Hence, only 22 see Table 1);
earthquakes have been found to be significant because well- – fluid: the analyses has been addressed to natural gas pipelines,
documented damage cases were found. In these cases, a detailed but other fluids, e.g. water, were also considered if the pipeline
information set was provided including type (aboveground or was made by the same materials, with similar joints and
buried/transmission or distribution), location, construction mate- execution techniques of NG pipelines. No damage data relative
rial, joint type, transported fluid, diameter/thickness/exercise to other kind of gas were available.
pressure, geotechnical aspects related to pipeline damage and
structural damage pattern (see Table 4 and e.g. the paper of In Fig. 2, the histograms of the data amount in each RS class,
O'Rourke and Palmer [23], which described relevant cases of according to the above mentioned subsets are given.
accidents during some historical Californian earthquakes). Most of the available damage data are relative to steel pipelines
The database has been divided in the five abovementioned with welded joints. The amount of HPDE pipelines and mechanical
classes (CP-SGS, SP- SGS, CP-GF, SP-GF, AP) as shown in Fig. 1. joints was not considered statistically meaningful for the fragility
Large parts of the data (33%) are relative to continuous pipelines construction. The limited amount of damage data relative to water
under strong ground shaking, due to the large diffusion of this system was included in the analyses, in the cases in which there
type of pipeline. This class has been then considered as relevant were made by the same construction technology of gas pipelines.
for natural gas pipelines. Other relevant aspects in the pipeline performance, as pipeline
78 G. Lanzano et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 117 (2013) 73–80
50%
RS0
40% RS1
Data percentage
RS2
30%
20%
10%
0%
D<400mm
50%
40%
Data percentage
30%
20%
10%
0%
Steel
Fig. 2. Percent amount of damage cases depending on: (a) nominal diameter; (b) fluid; (c) material; and (d) joint type of the pipeline.
age, corrosion and imperfect welds, at the moment, were not
considered in the classification.
The only subsets, which may be considered statistically reliable,
were relative to the pipeline diameter. It is possible to distinguish
between the seismic behavior of pipelines for transmission net-
works (D≥400 mm) and pipelines used for distribution systems
(D o400 mm) as urban networks and industrial plants. Starting
from these considerations, fragility curves and PGV threshold
values, for each RS, were obtained for many of the investigated
sub-datasets.
5.1. Fragility curves
Each (sub-)dataset was arranged in order to obtain an uni-
modal distribution of the damage cases for DS (and RS) with
respect to the PGV value. The maximum observed value of PGV
corresponds to 120 cm/s. Hence, 8 intervals spaced have been
defined, each characterized by a range of 15 cm/s. The data were
finally fitted by a cumulative log-normal distribution.
Fig. 3 shows the fragility curves for continuous pipelines under
SGS for RS≥RS1 (low risk) and RS ¼RS2 (high risk). The curves
represent the probability of each possible damage, as function of
PGV. According to the histograms shown in Fig. 2, these curves are
considered strictly valid for steel pipelines with welded joints,
which are commonly used for gas pipelines. As regards the
pipeline diameters, three different classes of fragility curves were
accounted: all diameters, small diameters (Do 400 mm) and large
diameters (D≥400 mm).
In Table 7, the median μ and the shape parameter β of the
cumulative distribution are given. In the same table, the number of
used samples, the number of investigated earthquakes and the
correlation coefficient, between empirical data and the distribu-
tion, are also reported.
The results of Table 7 show an increase of the value of median
parameter μ from RS≥RS1 to RS ¼ RS2, coherently with the increase
of the risk state. An exception is the case of RS ¼RS2 for
D≥400 mm, where the median decreases and the shape parameter
50%
40%
Data percentage
30%
20%
10%
0%
D≥400mm Natural Gas Water
50%
40%
Data percentage
30%
20%
10%
0%
HDPE Welded Joints Mechanical Joints
β increase. This different behavior is due to a less reliable
estimation of fragility, because it was based on a limited number
of data (27 samples) and of investigated earthquakes (only 2). For
this reason, for the transmission pipelines, at the present stage, it
is recommended to refer to the fragility curve derived for all
diameters. It is however expected that further work and data can
provide a more reliable definition of the fragility function for DS2
in the case of large diameters (D≥400 mm). Accordingly, in the
next section, the results referring to large diameters and RS ¼RS2
are not provided for transmission pipelines.
5.2. Probit functions and threshold values
The seismic vulnerability of pipelines for QRA has been esti-
mated by using the classical probit analysis. The probit variable Y
is the likelihood measure of a certain damage occurence in
function of a variable “dose” V, which was the PGV in this specific
case (see [17,18] for more details):
Y ¼ k1 þ k2 ln V ð6Þ
The variable Y should be related to a probability of pipeline
damage. The probit functions were shown in Fig. 4. The calculated
probit coefficients k1 e k2, together with the threshold values of
the PGV are reported in Table 8. The threshold value was obtained
through a “cut-off” of the probit curve with the abscissa, which is
the PGV providing a value of the probit corresponding to the zero
probability.
The difference in the threshold PGV values for RS≥RS1 and RS2
is about 10 cm/s both for the “all” and Do400 mm classes. The
threshold values for all diameters are coherently averaged
between small and large diameter; the corresponding PGV
increase is about 5 cm/s.
6. Conclusions
In this work, results are provided in terms of pipeline perfor-
mance with respect to the Peak Ground Velocity (PGV), a seismic
 G. Lanzano et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 117 (2013) 73–80 79

Fig. 3. Fragility curves for NG pipelines under SGS for (a) all dataset; (b) small
diameter (D o 400 mm) and (c) large diameter pipelines (D≥400 mm).
Fig. 4. Probit curves for NG pipelines under SGS for: (a) All dataset; (b) small
diameter (D o400 mm), and (c) large diameter pipelines (D≥400 mm).
intensity measure which can be easily retrieved from local
authorities and public databases or from site-dependent seismic
hazard analyses.
Fragility curves and PGV cut-off values for natural gas pipelines Future work will be devoted to the extension of this analysis to
(CP, under SGS action) are given and can be used as simple model other joints and different seismic geotechnical mechanisms
for Quantitative Risk Analysis and for Land Use Planning [24] and (ground failure, GF, and other pipeline typologies). The results
more in general for the public authority in response to the increase may be assumed as valid, in the first application, for pipeline
of public awareness on Na–Tech accidents [25,26]. transporting other liquid and gaseous substances.
80 G. Lanzano et al. / Reliability Engineering and System Safety 117 (2013) 73–80

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