PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANITA AYOLA y AREVALO and VALENTIN BARNESO (at large), accused,
ANITA AYOLA y AREVALO, accused-appellant.

G.R. No. 138923 September 4, 2001

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Anita Ayola y Arevalo was convicted by the RTC of the crime of
murder for the alleged killing of her common-law husband, Eduardo Irog-Irog. In finding
accused-appellant guilty of murder, the trial court relied on the following circumstantial
evidence: (1) The allegation contained in the letter about the killing of Eddie Irog-Irog which led
to the unearthing of his skeletal remains just five meters behind the house where the accused and
Irog-Irog lived in the evening of February 20, 1994 at about 9:45 p.m.; (2) The T -shirt and the
green-colored pants identified to that worn often by Irog-Irog in the pursuit of his vocation as
mason-carpenter identified by witnesses Romeo Bacabac and Norberto Braca; (3) The dentures
identified by the sister of Irog-Irog referring to the quarter crown on both upper and lower teeth;
and (4) The transfer to Mallorca by the accused and had the house rented after an agreement to
separate was concluded by the accused and Barneso before the barangay kagawad.

Accused-appellant now appeals from said Decision of the RTC alleging that the trial
court has committed a grave error in not acquitting her of the crime charged considering the
presence of reasonable doubt in her favor.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the aforementioned circumstantial evidence are sufficient for conviction

RULING:

NO. It is true that to warrant a conviction, direct evidence is not always necessary. The
rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of
guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which
the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is founded on experience and observed facts
and coincidences establishing a connection between the known and proven facts and the facts
sought to be proved. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, provides that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction only if the following requisites are complied
with: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person.

The Court finds that the circumstances relied upon by the trial court in convicting
accused-appellant do not satisfy the foregoing requirements. They do not indubitably point to
accused-appellant as the author of the killing of Eddie Irog-Irog. The prosecution evidence, at
best, prove that Irog-Irog is dead. They, however, do not show the circumstances surrounding his
death, i.e., when and how he died, and if he was indeed murdered, who killed him.

To support its case, the prosecution tried to show that accused-appellant had a motive to
kill Irog-Irog. It tried to prove through the testimonies of its witnesses the existence of an illicit
affair between accused-appellant and Barneso. The prosecution also stressed the fact that the
victim’s remains were unearthed at the backyard of accused-appellant’s house and that after the
victim’s disappearance, she vacated said house and moved to her daughter’s residence in another
barangay. These facts, however, are inadequate to prove beyond doubt the culpability of
accused-appellant. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record are
sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be
consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the
accused’s guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. It must exclude the possibility that some
other person has committed the offense. The evidence for the prosecution fail to meet the test.
Henceforth, the accused-appellant is acquitted.
 CONCEPCION M. CATUIRA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. 105813 September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Two (2) Informations for estafa were filed against petitioner Concepcion M. Catuira with
the RTC. After the prosecution had presented its evidence, Catuira filed a Motion to Dismiss by
way of Demurrer to Evidence. Petitioner contended that the testimony of private respondent
Ocampo was inadmissible in evidence since it was not properly introduced when she was called
to testify as mandated in Sec. 35, Rule 132, of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The trial court
denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Petitioner elevated her case to the CA through a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. In a similar move, the appellate court rejected
her petition and sustained the trial court in its denial of the motion to dismiss.

Petitioner claims that the CA erred when it accepted the testimony of private respondent
despite the undisputed fact that it was not offered at the time she was called to testify and that her
testimony should have been stricken off the record pursuant to Sec. 34, Rule 132, which
prohibits the court from considering evidence which has not been formally offered. Thus, it was
an error for the CA to declare that petitioner's objection was not done at the proper time since
under Sec. 36, Rule 132, objection to evidence offered orally must be made immediately after the
offer is made. Evidently, petitioner could not have waived her right to object to the admissibility
of the testimony of private respondent since the rule requires that it must be done only at the time
such testimony is presented and the records plainly show that the opportunity for petitioner to
object only came when the prosecution attempted, albeit belatedly, to offer the testimony after it
has rested its case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the testimony of private respondent Ocampo was inadmissible in

evidence for it not formally offered at the time the she was called to testify

RULING:

NO. The reason for requiring that evidence be formally introduced is to enable the court
to rule intelligently upon the objection to the questions which have been asked. As a general rule,
the proponent must show its relevancy, materiality and competency. Where the proponent offers
evidence deemed by counsel of the adverse party to be inadmissible for any reason, the latter has
the right to object. But such right is a mere privilege which can be waived. Necessarily, the
objection must be made at the earliest opportunity, lest silence when there is opportunity to speak
may operate as a waiver of objections.
 Thus, while it is true that the prosecution failed to offer the questioned testimony when
private respondent was called to the witness stand, petitioner waived this procedural error by
failing to object at the appropriate time, i.e., when the ground for objection became reasonably
apparent the moment private respondent was called to testify without any prior offer having been
made by the proponent.