Fetishised Objects and Humanised Nature: Towards an Anthropology of Technology

Author(s): Bryan Pfaffenberger

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Man, New Series, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 236-252
Published by: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland
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 FETISHISED OBJECTS AND HUMANISED NATURE:
TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY
BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER

University
ofVirginia

The concept oftechnologybecomesusefulonlywhenitstacitpreconceptions areunpacked.

Linkedwiththetermin Western discourse aretwo polesof mythic thinking:technological
determinism andtechnologicalsomnambulism. The formerdepictstechnologyas thecauseof
socialformations;
thelatterdeniesa causallink.Both,however,disguisethesocialchoicesand
thatfigure
socialrelations inanytechnological system. To counter
suchnotions, technologyis
redefinedhere as a totalsocial phenomenonin the sense used by Mauss; it is simultaneously
material, socialandsymbolic.To create andusea technology,
then,is
tohumanise nature;itis to
expressa socialvision,create
a powerful symbol ina form
andengageourselves oflife.Thestudy
oftechnology, is wellsuitedtotheinterpretive
therefore, toolsofsymbolicanthropology. This
ina brief
pointiS illustrated ofSriLanka'sirrigation-based
analysis schemes.
colonisation

The studyof technology,Marx wrote, is of paramountimportancefor the

humansciences:it 'disclosesman's mode ofdealingwithnature,theprocessby
whichhe sustainshislife'(Marx 1938). Few anthropologists would disputethis
view. Yet social and culturalanthropologists rarelyturnthefullforceof their
theoretical toolson thesubject.That,I wishto argue,is a pity,sincetheunique
fieldmethodsand holisticorientationof anthropologysituatethefieldadvan-
tageouslyforthestudyoftechnology.
Social and culturalanthropologists, to be sure,have made valuable contri-
butionsto the studyof subsistenceand extractivestrategiessuch as irrigation
(BeardsleyI964; Downing & Gibson I974; Geertz1972; Gray I973; Hunt &
Hunt 1976; Leach I959), fishing(AchesonI98I), mining(Godoy I985;J. Nash
1979; Taussig I980), industry(Holzberg& GiovanniniI98I), and theimpactof
technologicalchange(especiallyindustrialisation) on traditionalsocieties(e.g.
Bodley I982; Mitchell1973; Nash I967; Pelto I973; Sharp1952; Wallace 1978).
Withoutbelittling thecontributionsthesestudieshave made,however,one can
observein mostof thema curiousoversight.Technologyis onlyrarelyseenin
thesestudiesas a subjectthatis itselfintrinsically
of interest.On the contrary,
anthropologists equatetechnologywithmaterialcultureand see itas
frequently
a given. Technologyis portrayedas somethingfundamentally extraneousto
humanlifeand a forceto whichcommunitiesandbeliefsareobligedto adapt.In
theanthropologyof mining,forexample,thereis an evident'lack ofinterest in
the productiveprocessand workplaceitself',whichin a book-lengthmono-
graphon miningmaybe treatedin a 'page or two' (Godoy I985: 21I). One can
Man (N S ) 23, 236-252

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 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER 237

onlyconcludethat,in theeyesofmostanthropologists, technologylies beyond

theboundsof disciplinary interest.
The lackofinterest intechnologyis pairedwithan equallymarkedinattention
to theterm'sdefinition. In the1, 25 5 pagesofHonigmann'sHandbookofsocialand
culturalanthropology, forinstance,the termis used, peripherally and without
definition,on onlysixpages. A computersearchofSociological Abstracts
revealed
that,of the 8,355 articlesretrievedby a free-text searchforanthropology and
cognate terms,only thirty-eight containedthe word 'technology'in their
abstractsor subjectdescriptorsand only fourcontainedit in theirtitles;none
definedtheterm.
The inattentionto definitionis surprising,to say the least, in a discipline
concernedwith cross-culturaltranslationand the critique of ethnocentric
constructs.And herewe have a termthatstands,arguably,at theverycentreof
whatWesterners (andWesternised people)tendto celebrateaboutthemselves.It
would be surprising indeedifit werenot suffusedthroughoutwithwhatMills
(i963: 435) calledthe'ethnocentricities of meaning'.The firststeptowardsan
anthropologyof technology,then,is to unpack the culturalbaggage or pre-
understandings thatare tacitlypairedwith the termtechnology.Taking this
step, as will be seen, illuminatesthe unreliability of the culturally-supplied
Westernnotionoftechnologyand,in addition,mandatestheterm'sredefinition
foruse by anthropologists. It also demonstrates why technologyis in itselfa
subjectofinterestto symbolicand interpretive anthropology.

Technology andWesternideology
Textbookdefinitions oftechnologyraiseseriousdoubtsabouttheterm'sutility
in anthropological discourse.Technologyis frequentlydefined,forinstance,as
the sum totalof man's 'rational'and 'efficacious'ways of enhancing'control
over nature'(alternatives:'command over nature','dominationover nature',
etc.); e.g., technologyis 'any tool or technique,any physicalequipmentor
methodof doing or making,by whichhumancapabilityis extended'(Schon
I 967).
The historianLynn White (I967) notes the implicitlinkagebetweensuch
definitionsand the roots of Christianmetaphysics,which dictate human
dominationof thenaturalworld. Accordingto White,thistraditionhas led the
Westto thethresholdofa seriousand self-destructive
ecologicalcrisis.Whether
or not one agrees with White's analysis of the origins of this inherently
ideologicalnotionof technology,he suppliessufficient
reasonto treattheterm
with suspicion.At the minimum,it must be recognisedthatthe conceptof
technologyis normative.
Yet even greaterperilsawait beneaththe surface.The culturally-supplied
notion of 'technology'carrieswith it two tacitmeanings,two implicitand
mythicviewsoftheworldin relationto technology,thatprofoundly affect
how
we understand technologyandhow we viewitsrelationship to ourlives.As will
be seen,thesetwo tacitmeaningsstandinapparentcontradiction to one another.
Yet underlying themis a deeplyhiddenunity.

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23 8 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER

Technologicalsomnambulism
The firstofthesetacitnotionsis calledtechnological
somnambulism by thepolitical
scientistLangdon Winner(I986). In the somnambulisticview of technology
providedby Westernculture,thehumanrelationship to technologyis simply
'too obvious to meritseriousreflection'.This relationshipconsistsmerelyof
'making',whichis ofinterest onlytoengineersandtechnicians, and'use', which
amountsonly to an 'occasional,innocuous,[and] nonstructuring occurrence'.
Use is understoodto be a straightforward matter:you pickup a tool,use it,and
put it down. The meaningof theuse of technologyis, in thismistakenview,
'nothingmore complicatedthanan occasional,limited,and nonproblematic
interaction'(5-6). In thisview, technologyis morallyand ethically'neutral'.It
is neithergood norbad, and its'impact'dependson how itis used.
What is wrong with this dream-likeorientationto technology,Winner
argues,is its denialof themanyways in whichtechnologyprovidesstructure
and meaningforhumanlife.This pointwas made powerfullyby Marx in the
Germanideology (Marx & Engels 1976:3I):

The way in whichmenproducetheirmeansofsubsistencedependsfirstofall on thenatureof the

means of subsistencethey actuallyfind in existenceand have to reproduce.This mode of
productionmustnotbe consideredsimplyas beingthereproduction of thephysicalexistenceof
theseindividuals.Ratherit is a definiteformof activityof theseindividuals,a definiteform
of expressingtheirlife,a definitemodeoflifeon theirpart.As individualsexpresstheirlife,so
theyare.

Technologies,then,are not merelyways of 'making' and 'using'. As tech-

nologiesare createdand put to use, Winner(I986: 6) argues,theybringabout
alterationsin patternsof humanactivityand humaninstitutions'.
'significant
Whatmustbe recognised,Winnerinsists,is that:

Individualsare activelyinvolvedin thedailycreationand recreation,productionand reproduc-

tion,of theworldin whichtheylive. Thus, as theyemploytools and techniques,workin social
labor arrangements, make and consume products,and adapt theirbehavior to the material
conditionstheyencounterin theirnaturaland artificial environment,individualsrealizepossi-
bilitiesforhumanexistence.. . . Social activityis an ongoingactivityof world-making(I986:
I4-I 5).

Winnerdoes not mean to suggesta simplistictechnologicaldeterminism, the

idea thattechnologicalinnovationsare themajordrivingforcesof humanlife
suchthatsocialand culturalformsareinevitablyshapedby them.To takesucha
view, Winner(I986: io) suggests,would be like describing'all instancesof
sexual intercoursebased only on the conceptof rape'. Choices exist in the
process of technologicaldeployment/and consequentsocietaltransformation
(e.g., Noble I986). Yet technologicalsomnambulismleads us to ignorethem
while, in a trance-likestate,we blindlyaccept whateverimplementationof
technologythosein power choose to foistupon us. Once entrenchedin our
lives,however,thetechnologymakesa new worldforus. We weave itintothe
fabricof daily life (WinnerI986). Yet the human choices and decisionsare
masked,so thetechnologyseemsto operatebeyondhumancontroland appears
to embodytheresultofan automatic,inevitableprocess(Winner1977).

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 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER 239

Technologicaldeterminism
The second tacit notion supplied with the term technology,the one that
contrastsso sharplywith the first,is preciselythis notion of technological
determinism thatWinneris so carefulto avoid. Here we have no dismissalof
technologyas ways of making and using. On the contrary,technologyis
viewedas a powerfuland autonomousagentthatdictatesthepatternsofhuman
social and culturallife.
Liketechnologicalsomnambulism,technologicaldeterminism oftenoperates
as a tacit,unexaminedassumptionin scholarlydiscourse.In the grip of this
notion all of historyseems to have been dictatedby a chain of technological
eventsin whichpeoplehavebeenlittlemorethanhelplessspectators.So deeply
encoded is this notion that technology'sautonomyis frequentlyassumed
without comment. Indeed, the idea often operates, in scholarlywriting
about technology'in the elusive mannerof an unquestionedassumption'
(StaudenmaierI985: 143).
Some scholars,however,make thispositionexplicitand defendit, arguing
thattechnologyis appliedscience.Sincescienceis progressing rapidly,thepace
of technologicaldevelopmentis, in thisview, so rapidthattechnologyis out of
control;we cannotevaluateourown creationsordefendourselvesagainstthem.
Yet thereare amplegroundsto doubtthattechnologyis appliedsciencein this
simplistic,linearsense (Fores I982). The relationshipbetweentechnologyand
scienceis complex,dynamic,and historically recent.Many importantinven-
tionsof theeighteenth and nineteenthcenturies,suchas thesteamengine,were
in no realsensetheresultoftheapplicationofscience.Indeed,muchtwentieth-
centurysciencestemsfroman attemptto discoverwhy certaintechnologies
work so well. New technologies,moreover,make new lines of scientific
inquirypossible, and with them,new technologies.And even when a new
technologydoes incorporatescientific itis notdrivenby sciencealone.
findings,
To createa new technologyis notmerelyto applyscienceto technicalmatters.It
is also, and simultaneously,to deal with economic constraints,to surmount
legal roadblocksand to get politicianson one's side (Hughes I983). A tech-
nology's form derives, then, from the interactionof these heterogeneous
elementsas theyare shaped into a networkof interrelated components(Law
I987). However inhumanour technology mayseem,itis nonethelessa product
ofhumanchoicesand socialprocesses.
Otherswould arguethatmoderntechnologybecomesan autonomousforce
because,once adopted,itsorganisational imperativesrequiretheascendanceof
technicalnormsof efficiency and profitability
over alternativenorms,such as
workerhealthand safety,environmentalpreservation,and aestheticvalues
(EllulI962). Thus,in Chapple'searlyview(I94I), theveryfactthatindustrial
productionrequires rational organisationdictatesthe ascendancy of such
norms. And further:Salz (I955) argued thatthe technicaland organisational
imperativesof industrialisation
'remainthe same regardlessof who or what
entitiesown, finance,and managea givenindustrial plant. . . and regardlessof
thewideraimswhichindustrialism is to serve'(I955: 5). To bringin a plantand
automated equipment,then, is to bring in the efficiencynorms a factory

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240 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER

requires,and theinevitableresult-even in in a socialistsetting(Goonatilake

1979)-is the exploitationand 'deskilling'of factoryworkers(e.g. Gottfried
I982). Yet efficient factorieshave indeed been built thatdo not lead to the
degradationof workingconditions(Noble I979), and theannalsof industrial-
isationin theThirdWorldtellofnumerousinstancesin whichefficiency norms
takea back seatto otherones. Even whereautomateddevicesareintroducedin
theWest,thereis no necessary,inevitable'impact'on social relations(Attewell
& Rule I984). On the contrary,the outcome stemsfromsocial and political
choicesmade by engineers,managersand workers(Noble I986).
The relationshipbetweentechnologyand society,to be sure,can be simple
and unproblematicin certaininstances.Givingup a bullock fora tractor,for
instance,irretrievably forcesa farmerinto an international economy of pet-
roleum and replacementparts. Beyond obvious points such as this one,
however, the outcome of a given innovationis still subject to substantial
modificationby social, politicaland culturalforces.It is, furthermore, fun-
damentallywrong to argue thata technologycarrieswithit any necessaryor
consequentpatternof social and culturalevolution.The literature on thesocial
impactof GreenRevolutiontechnologyprovidesa tellingcase in point (e.g.
Farmer 1977). Experience shows that the technologydoes not necessarily
producethe higheryieldsforeseenby its proponents.Nor does it necessarily
produce the socio-economicdifferentiation foreseenby its critics.A new or
introducedtechnologysuchas thisone simplybringsa new setofpossibilitiesto
a situation.Whetherpeople capitaliseon those possibilitiesdependson their
abilityto conceptualisethe restructured politicalfield,to set new goals for
themselves,and to mobilisepersonneland resourcesin pursuitof thesenew
goals. We hereconfronta seriesofindeterminacies in whichtheoutcomeis far
frompredictable.
The determinist thesis,in sum, is difficultto sustainin comparativestudies.
Yet thisfactis no argumentfora returnto thetenetsof technologicalsomnam-
bulism.The factthattechnologyis sociallyconstructed(Pinch& Bijker I984)
implies thatit has social content;it is far from'neutral'. Pinch and Bijker
describethe social constructionof technologyin the followingway. In its
inception,a new technologyappears in a varietyof forms.The process is
analogousto thespecies-multiplying effects ofan adaptiveradiationofbiologi-
cal formsintoan unoccupiedseriesofniches.Some forms'survive';others'die'.
In this process, the determinantof survival is not merely (or even con-
spicuously)economic, technicalor rational.On the contrary,the surviving
formis theone selectedby a social groupthatsucceedsin imposingits choice
over competingforms(and againstthe objectionsof weaker groups). Such
social groups,as Pinchand Bijkerstress,includeinstitutions and organisations,
as well as organisedandunorganisedgroupsofindividuals,buttheirfundamental
characteristic is that'all membersof [thesocial group] sharethe same set of
meanings . . . attachedto a specificartefact'(I984: 30, myemphasis).The social
constructionof technology,in sum, occurs when one set of meanings gains
ascendancy overotherones,and wins expressionin the technicalcontentof the
artefact. A technologyis thus,in Noble's words,'hardenedhistory'or a 'frozen
ofhumanandsocialendeavor'(I986:
fragment xi).

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 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER 241

The social vision woven into technologiesis at timespatentlyobvious and

deliberate,as in thenow-famousexampleof Long Island'slow bridges.Their
designer,RobertMoses, intendedthemto obstructbuses, therebyrestricting
the Long Island populationto automobile-owningwhitesof the 'upper' and
'comfortablemiddle' classes (Winner I980: 121-3). And at the end of the
nineteenth century,theradicalPariscitycouncilused preciselythesame trickto
accomplisha verydifferent politicalobjective.By makingthe tunnelsof the
Paris Metro verynarrow,too narrowforstandard-gaugerailwaytrains,the
councilpreventedtheprivaterailwaycompaniesfromappropriating theMetro
fortheirown ends(AkrichI987).
Even where such designs are absent technologiesstill bring with them a
definitesocial content.Any technologyshouldbe seen as a system,notjust of
tools, but also of relatedsocial behavioursand techniques.We meanjust this
when we refer,forinstance,to 'woodworking' or 'irrigation'.One can go
further.Technology,necessarily, consistsofpracticalknowledgeor knowhow
which,althoughoftenresistant to codification orverbalisation(Ferguson1977),
mustsomehow be sharedand transmitted just like any otheraspectof culture
(Layton 1974). Technology can indeed be defi-ned as a set of operationally
replicablesocialbehaviours:no technologycan be said to existunlessthepeople
who use it can use it over and over again. To the extentthattechnological
behavioursarereplicable,theinterpenetration ofphysicalelements(e.g., tools,
resources,etc.) and social communication(diffusion,apprenticeship, etc.) is
presupposed (Tornatzkyet al. I983: 2). And furtherstill: the product of
technology,materialculture,is farmore thana practicalinstrument.Tech-
nologyis, simultaneously, a social objectendowed withsufficient meaningto
mystify thosewho becomeinvolvedwithitscreationor use. Technology,then,
is essentiallysocial, not 'technical'. When one examines the 'impact' of a
technologyon society,therefore, one is obliged to examinetheimpactof the
technology'sembeddedsocialbehavioursand meanings.
Technologicaldeterminism, in short,restson speciousgrounds.Technology
is not an independent,non-socialvariablethathas an 'impact' on societyor
culture.On the contrary,any technologyis a set of social behavioursand a
systemof meanings.To restatethe point: when we examinethe 'impact' of
technologyon society,we are talkingabout theimpactof one kind of social
behaviouron another(MacKenzie & Wajcman I985: 3)-a point thatMarx
graspedwith clarityand subtlety(MacKenzie I984). To thispointthisarticle
will return,but it is possiblenow to disclosetheunitythatunderliestechno-
logicalsomnambulismand itsapparentopposite,technologicaldeterminism.

Fetishisedobjects
What is so strikingabout both naive views of technology,the view that
emphasisesdisembodiedwaysofmakinganddoing(technologicalsomnambul-
ism) and theotherthatassertstechnology'sautonomy(technologicaldetermin-
ism), is thatthey bothgravelyunderstateor disguise the social relationsof
technology.In thesomnambulistic view, 'making'concernsonlyengineersand

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242 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER

'doing' concernsonlyusers.Hidden fromview is theentirenetworkof social

and politicalrelationsthataretiedto makingand areinfluenced by doing. In the
technologicaldeterministview, the technologyitself(usually conceived as
materialculture)is seen as somethingapartfromthisnetwork.Technologyis
thus,in thisview, an independent variableto whichtheformsofsocialrelations
and politicsstand as dependentvariables.So thereis indeed a hidden unity
underlyingthesepositionsthatseem to standin apparentcontradiction: tech-
nology, underthe sway of Westernculture,is seen as a disembodiedentity,
emptiedofsocialrelations,and composedalmostentirely oftoolsand products.
It standsbeforeus, in otherwords,in whatMarx would callfetishisedform:what
is in reality
producedbyrelations
amongpeopleappearsbeforeus in afantasticformas
relationsamongthings.
Marx's conceptoffetishism stemsfromhisdiscussionof commoditiesin the
capitalistsetting.The worldoffetishised commodities,Marx argued,is likethe
'mist-enveloped regionsofthereligiousworld.In thatworldtheproductionsof
thehumanbrainappearas independentbeingsendowedwithlife,and entering
into relationboth withone anotherand thehumanrace' (Marx 1938: 43). As
Godelier(1977: xxv) putsit,fetishism is
the effectin and for consciousnessof the disguisingof social relationsin and behindtheir
appearances.Now theseappearancesarethenecessary pointof departureof therepresentations
of
their. . . relationsthatindividualsspontaneously
formforthemselves.Such imagesthusconstitute
thesocial realitywithinwhichtheseindividualslive, and servethemas a meansof actingwithin
and upon thissocialreality.

Marx's discussionwas limitedto thevalue ofcommoditieswhich,he argued,

is inrealitydetermined bythesurplusvalueextractedfromthewage labourer.It
nevertheless appearsto us in fetishisedformas a propertyof the commodity
itself,ratherthanof thesocialrelationships thatproducedit. WhetherMarx's
analysisof surplusvalue is correctin economictermsis of littleconcernhere,
exceptto statethatit is temptingindeedto see thefetishism of technologyas a
naturalconcomitantof thefetishism of commodities(and the capitalistecon-
omy in general).What is of interestis Marx's extraordinary anthropological
insight:theWestern ideologyofobjectsrendersinvisible
thesocialrelationsfrom which
technologyarisesandinwhichanytechnology isvitallyembedded.This invisibilitylies
at theheartof technologicalsomnambulismand determinism. The taskof the
of
anthropology technology is to bringthesehidden social relationsto light.

Technology inanthropological
discourse
Anthropologists, unfortunately,
have been slow to detectthehiddeninfluence
of technologicalsomnambulismand determinism(Digard 1979). Under the
sway of the somnambulisticview, forinstance,technologyis simplynot of
muchinterest.Waysofmakingandusingareseento deservedescriptiononlyin
so far as theypreserveevidence of a disappearingway of life. Thus one is
confronted withdrearycataloguesofsuchthingsas arrowsand potsthatare,as
Spierobserved,'dull, unimaginative,myopic,and guiltyof generalizingfrom
theparticular'
(I 970: 143).

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 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER 243

A concomitantof thisview is thattechnology,which is afterall a simple

matterofmakingandusing,does notdetermine socialand culturalformsexcept
in waysthatareso obviousthattheyareoflittleinterest.Horticulture obviously
precededirrigation, forinstance,but suchobservationstellus verylittleabout
thecultureswe study.This was a pointmadebyBoas and a whole generationof
Americananthropologists, who denied thatattemptsto link technologyand
social organisationor culturewould go beyondtheobvious. Whatwas of far
greaterinterestto Boas was the evidence,as he saw it, thatdissimilartech-
nologiescould be associatedwithsurprisingly similarculturalforms:'we have
simpleindustriesand complexorganization',he wrote(I940: 266-267), as well
as 'diverse industriesand simple organization'.Ruth Benedict (1948: 589),
concurringwithBoas's radicaldenialof a necessarylinkbetweentechnology
and culture,assertedthat'man can at any stateof technologicaldevelopment
createhisgods in themostdiverseform'.This positionis an old one in American
anthropology,and itis notwithoutitscontemporary advocates.
Replyingfor technologicaldeterminismare such authorsas L. A. White
(I959), Wittfogel(I959) and Harris(I977), who tracemajor developmentsin
culturalevolutionto thepatternsof technologicalchange.Technology,in the
determinist view,is seento evolveaccordingto itsown, autonomouslogic: 'the
diggingstickhad to precedethe plow, the flintstrike-a-light had to precede
thesafetymatch,and so on' (HarrisI968: 232). In thisview theconsequencesof
this evolutionaryprocess for social organisationand cultureare regularand
predictable:whentheploughreplacesthehoe, forinstance,thesexual division
of labour altersin predictableways (Newton I985: 2I4). Wittfogel,to cite
anotherdeterminist theorist,believedthatlarge-scaleirrigationsystemsentail
bureaucraticcentralisation and politicaldespotism.And for Harris, the odd
customsand bizarrepracticesof tribalcultures,such as human sacrificeand
witchcraft,have a readyexplanation:theyhave some hiddentechno-economic
whichis exposed onlyby reducingsuch practicesto their'hidden'
rationality,
materialaims (e.g. Harris1974). In thisview, thereareno surprisesin thejungle
of ethnographicdata. Every seeminglybizarretraitcan be laid down to its
underlyingtechno-economic rationality.
Both oftheseanthropological versionsofWesternculturaltheoryareremark-
able for theirinherentdogmatism,itselfa sign of theirideological origin.
Somnambulistsdenyat theoutsetthatthereis a demonstrable relationbetween
technologyand culture.Determinists assumesucha relationship alwaysexists.
Both views, in short,see technologyin fetishisedform.Both disguise the
fundamentally socialbehavioursin whichpeopleengagewhentheycreateor use
a technology.

Humanised nature
The anthropologyof technology,must be founded,not on simplisticand
ideologically-shapedpropositions,but ratheron a recognitionof the role of
fetishism-specifically, in disguisingthe deep interpenetration and dynamic
interplayof social forms,culturalvalues and technology(Spier 1970: 6-9). To
counterthemystifying forceof fetishism,it is necessaryto see technologyin a

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244 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER

radicallydifferent way: to view it, not throughthe fetishismof technological

somnambulismor determinism, butratheras humanisednature.
To say thattechnologyis humanisednatureis to insistthatit is a fundamen-
tallysocialphenomenon:it is a social constructionof thenaturearoundus and
withinus, and once achieved,it expressesan embeddedsocial vision, and it
engages us in what Marx would call a formof life. The interpenetration of
cultureand naturehere describedis, in short,of the sort thatMauss (I967)
would readilycall total:any behaviourthatis technologicalis also, and at the
same time, political,social and symbolic. It has a legal dimension,it has a
history,itentailsa setofsocialrelationshipsand ithas a meaning.
So farfromdisguisingthe social relationsand culturaldimensionof tech-
nology,thisview logicallynecessitatesa recognitionof theinterpenetration of
technologywith social formsand systemsof meaning. Any studyof tech-
nology's 'impact' is in consequencethe studyof a complex, intercausalrela-
tionshipbetweenone formofsocialbehaviourandanother.Thereis no question
offindinga nice,neatcausalarrowthatpointsfroman independent variableto a
dependentone, forthecausalarrowsrunbothways (or everywhichway), even
in what appears to be the simplestof settings.One mightbe tempted,for
instance,to regardthecultureofthe!Kung-Sanpeoplesofsouthwestern Africa,
huntersand gathersuntilrecently,as theproductofenvironmental dominance
broughton by a low level oftechnologicaldevelopment-until,however,one
learnsthatthe !Kung-Sanregularlyand deliberately set fireto the grasslands,
and so shape theenvironment thatwe mightsuppose shapesthem.'Humans',
Lee observes,'have been cooking theirenvironment foras long as theyhave
been cookingfood' (I979: I47). and interpenetration
Dynamicinterplay of
variables is to be expected from the theoreticalstandpoint.Assertionsof
one-waycausality,in contrast,aresuspectand requireradicalquestioning.
Viewing technologyas humanisednaturedoes not, unfortunately, make
thingssimple.On thecontrary, it forcesrecognitionofthealmostunbelievable
complexitythatis involvedin virtuallyanylinkbetweenhumantechnological
formsand human culture.The questionsthisrelationshipraises,to be sure,
seem simpleenough on the surface(e.g. 'What is theimpactof gravity-flow
irrigationschemeson peasantsin SriLanka?'). Yet, in practice,discoveringthe
ofa giventechnologyon societyis, as MacKenzie and Wajcmannote,an
effects
and problematicexercise'.Consider,forinstance,theimpact
'intenselydifficult
of themicrochipon employment:
easyto guesswhatproportionofexistingjobs couldbe automatedaway by present
It is relatively
or prospectivecomputertechnology.But thatis nottheeffect ofthemicrochipon employment,
preciselybecausethequestioncannotjustifiably be approachedin isolationlikethis.To know the
microchip'seffect on employmentlevels,one needsto know thedifferent ratesat whichitwillbe
adoptedin different locations,thenatureof theindustriesproducingcomputertechnology,the
indirecteconomiceffects ofthecreationanddestruction ofjobs, thelikelyroleofdevelopmentsin
one countrywithwhatgoes on in othercountries,thegrowthor decline,and changingpatterns,
of theworldeconomy. . . in otherwords,answeringthequestionof theeffects on societyof a
particulartechnologyrequiresone to have a goodtheory ofhowthatsociety works.The simplicityof
the questionis misleading.Answering itproperlywill oftenrequirean understandingoftheoverall
dynamics ofa society,
anditisthusoneofthemostdifficult,
ratherthanoneoftheeasiest,
questionstoanswer
(MacKenzie & Wajcman i985: 6-7, myemphasis).

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 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER 245

Anthropology,at its best,is uniquelysuitedto the studyof such complex

relationshipsbetween technologyand culture.Anthropologyis distinctive,
afterall, not only forits local-level,small-scalestudiesusing the participant-
observationmethod.It is also distinctiveforits holism,an approachthatsees
any societyas a systemof moreor less interrelated components.To undertake
suchan analysisrequires at leasta workingknowledgeofa society'sbiological
environment, history,social organisation,politicalsystem,economicsystem,
international relations,culturalvaluesand spirituallife.Such analysesareby no
meanseasy; theyrequirenothingless thana commitment to situatebehaviours
and meaningsin theirtotalsocial, historicaland culturalcontext.Yet nothing
less will sufficeif we seek to illuminatethe natureand consequencesof our
attemptsto humanisenature.

An example:SriLanka'sirrigation settlement
schemes
To illustratethisapproachfullyrequiresmorespace thancan be takenhere,but
thebroadoutlinesofa studyphrasedinthetermsdevelopedherecanbe sketched
out forpurposesof illustration.(Referenceswill be omittedforbrevity;see
Pfaffenberger n.d. fora fullaccount.)
The island nationof Sri Lanka has been much concernedof late with the
developmentof gravity-flow irrigationsettlement schemes,thelatestofwhich
is the massiveMahaweli DevelopmentProject.This projectseeks to develop
fullythe irrigationcapabilitiesof the 208-mileMahaweli Ganga, Sri Lanka's
longestriver.A major goal of theproject,like its predecessors,is to resettle
landless peasantson newly irrigatedlands withinthe country'sDry Zone.
Althoughthestill-unfinished projecthas raisedSriLanka's riceproductionand
helped to freethe countryfromdependenceon rice imports,the economic
performance of thenew rice-growingcommunitieshas fallenshortof expec-
tations.Particularlydisappointingis the project'ssocial performance.So far
fromliberatinglandlesspeasantsfromdebtservitudeand agricultural tenancy,
the Mahaweli settlementsappear to be reproducingthe adverse featuresof
traditionalpeasantsocietythattheprojectwas designedto cure.
The Mahaweli Project'soutcomesecho thedisappointingperformance ofits
predecessors,which were markedby seriousdeficienciesin the management
and distributionofwaterresources.The reasons,some argue,are 'technical'in
nature.Since theirinceptiondecades ago, Sri Lanka's irrigationdevelopment
projectshaveemployedgravity-flow principles,in whicha riveris dammedand
diverted,via canals, to agriculturalsettlements.The volume and pressureof
watersupplyin gravity-flow irrigationworksis alwaysgreatestat the'top end'
of the system.And not surprisingly, settlersat the top end of the irrigation
projects,where the water supplyis continuousand ample, use fromtwo to
seventimesas muchwateras theyneed. At thesametime,settlersat thetailend
of the projectsreceiveinsufficient water-or no water at all. The resultis a
processof socio-economicdifferentiation, in whichtop-enderstendto become
wealthyand tail-enders tendto becomepoor and, eventually,lose theirland to
moneylenders and land speculators.
Top-endersuse theextrawaterto freethemselvesfromtheexpenseofhiring

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246 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER

labourersto clearweeds (thecopious waterdoes thejob instead)and to assure

themselvesan abundantcrop. They investtheirprofitsby encouragingirri-
gationmanagementofficials(in variedways) to keep thefloodgateswide open
and byinvolvingless fortunate in high-interest
settlers loans (whichoftenresult
in thedebtorsbecomingtenantson landstheythemselvesonce owned). In the
end, thesesocial processeslead to thereproductionof some of thefeaturesof
traditionalpeasant society (such as landlessness,sharecropping,and debt
servitude)thattheprojectwas expresslycreatedto circumvent.
That this disparityin income between top-endersand tail-endersshould
emergeis hardlysurprisingwhen one considerswhat one observercalls the
'harshfactsof hydraulics',namely,thepronouncedtendencyof gravity-flow
irrigationtechnologyto rewardtop-endersand punishtail-enders.This ten-
dencycan be combattedby buildingextensivesystemsof fieldchannelsand
automateddeliverysystems,butsuchsystemscanadd so muchto thecostofthe
projectthatit ceasesto be cost-effective. Ifone buildsan irrigationsystemthat
lacks such features,the seeminglyinevitableresult is economic disparity
betweentop-endersand tail-enders.
Yet thisinterpretationsmacksoftechnologicaldeterminism, a viewpointthat
theanthropology oftechnologymistrusts on theoretical
grounds.And on closer
inspection,usingethnographic materialsuppliedby SriLankaitself,itturnsout
thatthe'harshfactsofhydraulics'arenot as determinative of social relationsas
thisview would haveit. SriLankans,afterall,havebeenirrigating ricefieldsfor
two millennia,and as it happens traditionalSri Lankan villages had devised
severalcustomsthatoperatedto mute,ifnot negate,theeconomicdisparities
implicitin gravity-flow irrigationsystems.In a village studiedby Leach, for
instance,top-end and tail-end landholdingswere alwayslinked,even in prop-
ertytransfers, so that the benefits of the top end were balanced out by the
penaltiesof thetailend. This custom was accompaniedby a complexsystemof
to
rights irrigation water that discouragedtop-endwastage and adjustedthe
of
scope agricultural activity to theamountofwateravailable.At theheartofthe
systemwas a clearrecognitionthat,in an irrigatedproductionsystem,what
countsis accessto water,notmerelytoland. Subsequentresearchhas shownthat
such customs are common in traditional,community-basedirrigationsys-
tems. The pointhereis not to romanticisetraditionalirrigationcustoms,but
simplythis:gravity-flow irrigationtechnologyis notmerelya matterofthings,
thatis, dams, canalsand water.This technologyis also a system ofhumansocial
behaviours, characterisedby theascription or thenon-ascription-ofrightsto
water. If rightsto land are ascribedinsteadof rightsto water, one possible
outcome (in the absence of countervailingcustoms) is socio-economicdif-
ferentiation.The designflawin SriLanka'sirrigation settlements is thattheneed
to designwater-allocation proceduresand rightsintothetechnologyhas been
consistentlyand thoroughlyignored. The reasons for this oversightcan be
knownonlyby graspingthesocial and culturalcircumstances underwhichthe
technologywas constructed.
The SriLankanprojectplannersenvisionedcommunitiesofsturdy,indepen-
dent,yeoman farmerswho possess secureland tenure.Thus protectedfrom
exploitationand poverty,suchfarmerswould naturallyregardtheirprotector,

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 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER 247

thestate,withaffection and loyalty.This idea, obviouslyof European cultural

origin,occurredto SriLanka's conservativepoliticalleadership(with,perhaps,
Britishencouragement)afterthe second world war, when landlessnessand
politicalradicalismwere growingominouslyin the densely-populated south-
westerncoastal plan. The extensionof irrigationfacilitiesinto the sparsely-
populatedDry Zone was expresslyconceptualisedas a way ofdomesticating or
co-optingthisdangerous(andincreasingly lumpen)ruralproletariat.Yet thereis
more to thesocial construction of thistechnologythanthisbrandof Western
politicalsensibility.What made it so usefulis thatit dovetailshandilywith a
particularly SriLankanmodalityofpoliticallegitimation.
SriLanka'spoliticalelitefindsitslegitimacy, inpart,in anindigenouspolitical
frameworkthatstemsfromtheancientSinhalacivilisationaltradition(or more
accurately,frommoderninterpretations ofthattradition).The ancientSinhala
kings legitimatedtheirrule by constructingirrigationworks, and modern
politicians-especially those of the rulingUnited National Party-emulate
theirexample. The earlymovers of irrigationprojects,the United National
PartyleadersD. S. Senanayakeand his son Dudley, claimeddescentfromthe
ancientDry Zone kings.TheirUNP successor,PresidentJ.R. Jayawardene,is
oftendescribedas a Boddhisattvawho, likethekingsof old, is bringingwater,
prosperityand justice (dharma)to the people; in an annual ceremony,he
emulatesthekingofold bydrivingthebuffaloesintothefieldto cuttheseason's
firstfurrow.
The sameelitedrawsitslegitimacyfromanothersource,as well: a politically-
constructedmyth about the deleteriousimpact of the colonial plantation
economy on peasantsociety.This mythinsiststhatthe foreign-ownedplan-
tations,in collusionwiththeBritishcolonialgovernment, deprivedtraditional
villagesof land neededforexpansion,and in so doing set offa viciouscycleof
land fragmentation thatfinallyculminatedin widespreadlandlessness,share-
cropping,povertyand moral degradationfor huge masses of peasants. By
seeking independenceand promisingto rightthese wrongs by developing
irrigationsettlements, Sri Lanka's indigenouspoliticalelitefounda successful
formulaforpoliticallegitimacy.To describethis notion of the plantation's
impactas a 'myth'is notto deny,to be sure,thattheremaybe some truthto it.
But it is to insistthat,likeall myths,thismythtendsto be applieduncritically.
And nowheredid it operatemoreperniciouslythanin thesocial designof the
irrigation settlements.
The social goals of the irrigationsettlementswere, fromthe beginning,
expresslyintendedto forestallland fragmentation, which was seen to have
played a major role in the rise of landlessnessduringand afterthe colonial
period. So thesettlement plots-surveyed and fixedplotsof up to fiveacresof
irrigatedriceland-were notgivento thesettlers outright,butwereassignedto
themby perpetuallease and made indivisible.A peasantcould pass themon to
hisheirsonlyby nominatinga singlesuccessor.
Althoughthissocial visionmayhave been politicallysatisfying, it could not
have been more inappropriateforSri Lankan conditions.By focusingon the
politicallymarketableimage of securelandrightsforthepeasantry,it failsto
acknowledgetheimportanceof waterrightsforstableirrigationcommunities,

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248 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER

and so condemnsthesettlements topreciselythesocio-economicdifferentiation

thattheprojectswereintendedto avoid. Ruled out in thestrokeof a pen, too,
was the kind of careful,inter-familial juggling of land holdings that, in
traditionalSri Lankancommunities,help farmersto put togethera holdingof
economic size. In the politically-focused lens of the project's design, such
jugglings appear as 'fragmentation', and are branded-often wrongly-as
undesirableindices of communitydegradation.Finally,the atomisticindi-
vidualismof theproject'ssocial design,coupledwiththediversesocial origins
of the settlersthemselves,has militatedagainstthe formationof kin-based
systemsof reciprocityand resourcesharing. In successfulirrigationcom-
munities,such systems frequentlyfunctionto mute processes of socio-
economic differentiation by enabling what amounts to a process of
intracommunity capitaltransfer, as familieshelpeachotherout (forinstance,by
hiringkinsmenat ratesfarabove theeconomicwage).
Whatwas notruledoutin theprojectdesign,however,was anyeffective legal
or politicalmechanismto forestallthe'sale' of thesettler'splots to mudalalis, a
class of 'self-made'landholdersand moneylenderswho have long preyedon
peasantsthroughoutSri Lanka. Such sales areillegalin principle,but common
in practice.Sincetitlesareheldto land,notwater,'tail-end'settlersquicklyfall
behindin thecompetitionforwaterand wealth,and surrender theirholdingsto
land speculators.Some wind up as tenantson theirown lands,an arrangement
thatmaywell bringthetenantmoreeconomicsecuritythanwas possibleas an
impoverished'owner' of theland in question.Moreover, the prohibitionon
landfragmentation fliesin thefaceofSriLankaninheritance customs.Not a few
settlerspreferto 'sell' theirplots(illegally)ratherthanfacethedisconcerting and
uncomfortable prospectof favouringone heirover others.Otherfactors,such
as irregularitiesin watersupply,thevicissitudesof thericemarket,theriseof
fertiliserand herbicideprices,and mismanagement, also contributeto the'sale'
of plots to mudalalis.In one settlement scheme,a mudalaliwas foundto have
amasseda 'holding'of IOO acresofprimericeland,irrigatedat publicexpense.
Thereis nothingnew abouttheactivitiesofmudalalis. Whatis new is themassive
public investmentin the settlementschemes,which have createdrich new
opportunitiesfor the mudalalis'activities.Indeed, the schemes create new
mudalalis.They enrichtop-endersso that theymay choose, among several
alternativecareers,the mudalali'sway of money-lending,briberyand land
speculation.
That the older irrigationsettlements were promotingsocio-economicdif-
ferentiation has been known forsome time,but the new phase of irrigation
developmentundertheAcceleratedMahaweliDevelopmentProgram(AMDP)
soughtto forestallsuch processesby usingtheexpensivetechnicalsolutionof
constructing fieldchannelsto groups of settlers.For reasonsthatare hardly
surprising giventheabove analysis,thisstrategy does notappearto be working.
Processesofsocio-economicdifferentiation arewell at workin thenew AMDP
settlements.Pricefluctuations, irregularities in watersupplyand otherprob-
lems frequently bringthesettlersto themudalaliwho, forall his propensityto
exploitthe peasantand deprivehim of his land, stilloffersthe peasantmore
day-to-daysecuritythan the government-sponsored arrangements.In the

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 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER 249

absenceof kinsmenin theatomisedsettlement communities,thereis nowhere

else to turnwhen a child fallsill or new clothesare needed foran important
event.The 'technicalfix' of fieldchannels,in sum, has not workedverywell
because only thematerialcomponentof thetechnologyhas been changed.Its
social, legal and mythiccomponentshave been left alone, and expose the
peasantsettlerto a socio-politicalcontextin whicheconomicdifferentiationis
virtuallyassured.

Conclusion
Technology,definedanthropologically, is notmaterialculturebutrathera total
socialphenomenonin thesenseused by Mauss, a phenomenonthatmarriesthe
material,the social and the symbolicin a complex web of associations.A
technologyis farmorethanthematerialobjectthatappearsunderthesway of
theWesternpenchantforfetishism, thetendencyto unhingehumancreations
fromthe social relationsthatproduce them. Every technologyis a human
world,a formofhumanisednature,thatunifiesvirtuallyeveryaspectofhuman
endeavour.To constructa technologyis not merelyto deploy materialsand
techniques;it is also to constructsocial and economicalliances,to inventnew
legal principlesforsocial relations,and to providepowerfulnew vehiclesfor
culturally-provided myths.The 'impact'ofirrigation technologyon thesociety
taking shape in Sri Lanka's irrigation-basedsettlement schemes cannot be
grasped,therefore, until this technology is seen in its a totalitythat
totality,
embracesnotonlythe'harshfactsofhydraulics'(theimplicitdisparitybetween
top-endersand tail-enders),but what is more, the choices that the project
designersmade in definingthecolonies'social relations,and, in particular,the
powerfulpoliticalmythsthatguidedthemto thesechoices.
Thereremainsto concede,however,thata technologicalinnovation'ssocial
and mythicdimensionsmay become starklyapparentwhen it is perceivedto
fail. Afterthe Challengerdisaster,for instance,the Americanspace shuttle
programmecameto be seenas a product,notofscienceandreason,butratherof
politicalcompromise,flawedcommunicationand confusedgoals. If an inno-
vation succeeds, however, the social and mythicdimensions stay in the
background. The innovation's success will be attributedto the project's
unerringnavigationof the true course laid down by the laws of nature,
efficiencyand reason.
Here is yetanothertrapforthe mind,one thatis even more insidiousthan
fetishism.To arguethatonlya failedtechnologyis sociallyconstructed (and,by
implication,that successfulones are not socially constructed)violates the
principleof symmetryin sociological explanation:we should use the same
explanatoryprinciplesto account for a successfulinnovationas a failedone
(Latour I987). Many examples-the Americanautomobile,forinstance(Flink
1975)-can indeedbe foundof successfultechnologiesin which the technical
design betraysthe thoroughinterweavingof materialsand techniqueswith
socialvisionsand mythicconceptions.Yet we mustgo further. To createa new
technologyis to createnot only a new artefact, but also a new world of social

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250 BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER

relations and myths in which definitionsof what 'works' and is 'successful' are
constructed by the same political relations the technology engenders. It could
be objected, to be sure, that a technology either 'works' or it doesn't, but this
objection obscures the mounting evidence that creating a 'successful' tech-
nology also requires creating and disseminating the very norms that define it
as successful (MacKenzie I987). In Sri Lanka, for instance, the web of political
associations created along with the dams and canals-a web that includes the
influx of foreign economic assistance, the provision of lucrative construction
contracts,and the creation of politically indebted communities-is of such vital
significanceto the ruling United National Party government that the project's
'failings' cannot be admitted, save in private and offthe record. The project may
have plunged generationsof Sri Lankans into debt, damaged the ecology of river
valleys and created dangerous new contexts forpolitical violence, but none of
this can be conceded without undermining a political edifice of impressive
dimensions and complexity. So far as Sri Lankan government officials are
concerned, the AMDP project is a great success. To put it another way, these
officialsare part of a huge enterprisewhose stabilityand endurance depends, in
part, on constructingnew norms of 'success' and, equally, resistingthe intru-
sions of external and unwanted norms of 'failure'. If they succeed, the tech-
nology becomes a 'black box': few question its design or the norms thatdefineit
as a success (MacKenzie I987). And its social origins disappear from view.
Technology, in short, is a mystifyingforceof the firstorder, and it is rivalled
only by language in its potential (to paraphrase Geertz) for suspending us in
webs of significance that we ourselves create. That is why it is an appropriate
-indeed crucial-subject foranthropological study.

NOTE

My thanksto Mel Cherno,W. BernardCarlsonand H. L. Seneviratne,whose commentson an

earlierdraftof thisarticlehelped me shape its argument,forwhich I alone take responsibility.
Thanksaredue, too, to theSchool ofEngineeringandAppliedScience,UniversityofVirginia,fora
summerresearchgrantthatfacilitated thisessay'scomposition.

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Objets feticheset nature humanisee: vers une anthropologie de la

technologie

Resume
Le conceptde technologiedevientutileseulementlorsqueses pr6conceptions tacitessontmises
au jour. Dans le discoursoccidentalle termetechnologieest 1i6a deux extr6mites de la pensee
mythique:le d6terminisme etle somnambulismetechnologiques.Le premierdecritla technologle
comme la cause de la formationsociale; le derniernie ce lien de causalite. Tous les deux,
cependant,occultentles choix soclaux et les relationssocialesqui appartiennent
a toutsysteme
technologlque.Pour rendrede tellesnotionscaduques, la technologieest red6finieici comme
etantun phenomenesocial totaldans le sensutilis6par Mauss; un ph6nomenea la foismat6r&el,
social, et symbolique. Creer et utiliserune technologie,c'est alors humaniserla nature;c'est
exprimerune visionsociale,creerun symbolepuissant,ets'engagersoi-memedansune formede
vie. L'6tude de la technologie,par consequent,s'adapte bien aux outils d'interpr6tation de
l'anthropologlesymbolique. Ce point est illustr6par une analysebreve des projetscoloniaux
d'irrigationdu SriLanka.

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