Sarmiento vs Mison Consequently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and
uently, we rule that the President of the Philippines acted within her constitutional authority and power in
G.R. No. 79974 December 17, 1987
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA, petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET,
respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor.
FACTS:
In this petition for prohibition, the petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador Mison from performing
the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s salaries and
emoluments, on the ground that Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is
unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The
respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison’s appointment without the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE: W/N all appointments made by the president require approval of the Commission on Appointments to be
valid?
HELD: NO. Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces
from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest
the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the
departments, agencies, commissions or boards.
The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary
or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on
Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress.
It is apparent, that there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups
are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him
in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. By following the accepted rule
in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group
of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as
already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes “heads of bureaus” among those officers whose
appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution on the other hand,
deliberately excluded the position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments that need the consent (confirmation)
of the Commission on Appointments.
appointing respondent Salvador Mison, Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs, without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for confirmation. He is thus entitled to exercise the full authority
and functions of the office and to receive all the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Perfecto v Meer 85 Phil 552
GREGORIO PERFECTO vs. BIBIANO L. MEER[G.R. No. L-2348. February 27, 1950.]
Facts:
In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon
his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action
in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for
the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Issue:
Does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary amount to a diminution thereof?
Held:
Yes. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in
the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be
indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did
not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing
official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here ; and second, when
the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution of the judges'
compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. This is
not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, orcars or
other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. Andon
incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on
their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend
—
that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter. Judges would indeed be
hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in
whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and
therefore waivable — but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposedin the public interest
(Evans vs. Gore).
#70 Perfecto v. Meer (85 Phil
552)
Facts: The 1935 Constitution
provides in its Article VIII, Section
9, that the members of the
Supreme Court and all
judges of inferior courts “shall
receive such compensation as
may be fixed by law, which shall
not be diminished
during their continuance in office”.
It also provides that “until
Congress shall provide otherwise,
the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall receive
an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and
each Associate Justice,
fifteen thousand pesos”. When
Justice Perfecto assumed office,
Congress had not “provided
otherwise”, by fixing a
different salary for associate
justices. He received salary at the
rate provided by the Constitution,
i.e., fifteen
thousand pesos ayear. The
Collector of Internal Revenue
required Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon
his salary as member of the
judiciary. The latter paid the
amount under protest. He
contended that the assessment
was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes there on
would reduce it in violation of
the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the imposition of
an income tax upon the salary of
a member of the Judiciary
amount to a diminution
thereof., and thus violate the
Constitution.
Held: The imposition of an
income tax upon the salary of a
member of the judiciary amounts
to adiminution thereof. If
said imposition would not be
considered as a diminution, it
would appear that, in the matter
of compensation and
power and need of security, the
judiciary is on a par with the
Executive. Such assumption
certainly ignores the
prevailing state of affairs. Further,
the Constitution provides that
judges shall hold their offices
during good behavior,
and shall at stated times receive
for their services a compensation
which shall not be diminished
during their
continuance in office. Thus, next
to permanency in office, nothing
can contribute more to the
independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for
their support. In the general
course of human nature, a power
over a man’s
subsistence amounts to a power
over his will. The independence
of the judges as of far greater
importance than any
revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries. Exemption of
the judicial salary from reduction
by taxation is not
really a gratuity or privilege. It is
essentially and primarily
compensation based upon
valuable consideration. The
covenant on the partof the
government is a guaranty whose
fulfillment is as much as part of
the consideration agreed
as is the money salary. The
undertaking has its own particular
value to the citizens in securing
the independence of
the judiciary in crises; and in the
establishment of the
compensation upon a permanent
foundation whereby judicial
preferment may be prudently
accepted by those who are
qualified by talent, knowledge,
integrity and capacity, but
are not possessed of such a
private fortune as to make an
assured salary an object of
personal concern. On the
other hand, the members of the
judiciary relinquish their position
at the bar, with all its professional
emoluments,
sever their connection with their
clients, and dedicate themselves
exclusively to the discharge of the
onerous duties
of their high office. So, it is
irrefutable that the guaranty
against a reduction of salary by
the imposition of a tax is not
an exemption from taxation in the
sense of freedom from a burden
or service to which others are
liable.
The exemption for a public
purpose or a valid consideration
is merely anominal exemption,
since the valid and full
consideration or the public
purpose promoted is received in
the place of the tax. The
Supreme Court affirmed
the judgmen
#70 Perfecto v. Meer (85 Phil
552)
Facts: The 1935 Constitution
provides in its Article VIII, Section
9, that the members of the
Supreme Court and all
judges of inferior courts “shall
receive such compensation as
may be fixed by law, which shall
not be diminished
during their continuance in office”.
It also provides that “until
Congress shall provide otherwise,
the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court shall receive
an annual compensation of
sixteen thousand pesos, and
each Associate Justice,
fifteen thousand pesos”. When
Justice Perfecto assumed office,
Congress had not “provided
otherwise”, by fixing a
different salary for associate
justices. He received salary at the
rate provided by the Constitution,
i.e., fifteen
thousand pesos ayear. The
Collector of Internal Revenue
required Justice Gregorio
Perfecto to pay income tax upon
his salary as member of the
judiciary. The latter paid the
amount under protest. He
contended that the assessment
was illegal, his salary not being
taxable for the reason that
imposition of taxes there on
would reduce it in violation of
the Constitution.
Issue: Whether the imposition of
an income tax upon the salary of
a member of the Judiciary
amount to a diminution
thereof., and thus violate the
Constitution.
Held: The imposition of an
income tax upon the salary of a
member of the judiciary amounts
to adiminution thereof. If
said imposition would not be
considered as a diminution, it
would appear that, in the matter
of compensation and
power and need of security, the
judiciary is on a par with the
Executive. Such assumption
certainly ignores the
prevailing state of affairs. Further,
the Constitution provides that
judges shall hold their offices
during good behavior,
and shall at stated times receive
for their services a compensation
which shall not be diminished
during their
continuance in office. Thus, next
to permanency in office, nothing
can contribute more to the
independence of the
judges than a fixed provision for
their support. In the general
course of human nature, a power
over a man’s
subsistence amounts to a power
over his will. The independence
of the judges as of far greater
importance than any
revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries. Exemption of
the judicial salary from reduction
by taxation is not
really a gratuity or privilege. It is
essentially and primarily
compensation based upon
valuable consideration. The
covenant on the partof the
government is a guaranty whose
fulfillment is as much as part of
the consideration agreed
as is the money salary. The
undertaking has its own particular
value to the citizens in securing
the independence of
the judiciary in crises; and in the
establishment of the
compensation upon a permanent
foundation whereby judicial
preferment may be prudently
accepted by those who are
qualified by talent, knowledge,
integrity and capacity, but
are not possessed of such a
private fortune as to make an
assured salary an object of
personal concern. On the
other hand, the members of the
judiciary relinquish their position
at the bar, with all its professional
emoluments,
sever their connection with their
clients, and dedicate themselves
exclusively to the discharge of the
onerous duties
of their high office. So, it is
irrefutable that the guaranty
against a reduction of salary by
the imposition of a tax is not
an exemption from taxation in the
sense of freedom from a burden
or service to which others are
liable.
The exemption for a public
purpose or a valid consideration
is merely anominal exemption,
since the valid and full
consideration or the public
purpose promoted is received in
the place of the tax. The
Supreme Court affirmed
the judgmen
Endencia vs. David
G.R. No. L-6355-56
August 31, 1953
FACTS
Collector of Internal Revenue Saturnino David ordered the taxing of Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice
Fernando Jugo’s compensation pursuant to Sec 13 of RA 590 which states that “SEC. 13. No salary wherever
received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income
tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or
by law.” According to Solicitor General Juan R. Liwanag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro on behalf of appellant
Collector of Internal Revenue, “our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably
by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. The Solicitor
General also reproduces what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127
which became Republic Act No. 590.
ISSUE
Whether Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional or not.
HELD
By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, RA No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial
officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office,” found in section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution
or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction
of the Judiciary. “The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A
legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise,
the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. The reason behind the exemption in the
Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the
independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership
number more than 990 judicial officials. The independence of the judges is of far greater importance than any
revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.
In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution.
We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive
province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby
tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the
highest court of the land.
Nitafan v CIR 152 SCRA 284
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987]
FACTS:
1. Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were duly appointed and qualified
Judgesof the RTC National Capital Judicial Region.2. Petitioners seeks to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin
respondents, (CIR and the Financial Officer of theSupreme Court) from making any deduction of withholding
taxes from their salaries.
3. Petitioners submit that “any tax withheld from their emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes
a decreased or diminution of their salaries, contrary to Section 1
0, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.”
 ISSUE:Is a deduction of withholding tax a diminuition of the salaries of Judges/Justices?
HELD:
The SC hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in PERFECTO VS. MEER (88 Phil 552)
andENDENCIA VS. DAVID (93 Phil 696), that declared the salaries of members of the Judiciary exempt from
payment of the income tax and considered such payment as a diminution of their salaries during
their continuance in office.The Court hereby reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are property
subject to general income taxapplicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax by
Justices and Judges does not fallwithin the constitution protection against decrease of their salaries during their
continuance in office.The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional provision
in question until it wasfinally approved by the Commission disclosed that the true intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, inadopting it, was to make the salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The
ascertainment of that intent is but inkeeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the
intent of the framers of the organiclaw and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
The ruling that “the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a diminution thereof, and so violates the
Constitution in Perfecto vs. Meer, as affirmed in Endencia vs. David must be deemed discarded.
Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS
267 SCRA 402
3 February 1997 En Banc
Alternative title: manila prince hotel petitioner vs. government service insurance system, manila hotel
corporation, committee on privatization and office of the government corporate counsel
FACTS
The Respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in pursuant to the privatization program of the
Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders
participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner of MHC, petitioner matched
the former’s bid prize also with Php 44.00 per share followed by a manager’s check worth Php 33 million as Bid
Security, but the GSIS refused to accept both the bid match and the manager’s check.
The petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution “Filipino first policy” and submits
that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. To all intents and purposes, it has
become a part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy.
ISSUE
Whether or not the provisions of Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is self
executing or non self executing

If self executing: the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad is violative of the Constitutional provision of Filipino
First policy (Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution) and is therefore null and void.

HELD

As the Filipino first policy was deemed self executing, the court ruled that the qualified Filipino entity must be
given preference by granting it the option to match the winning bid because the provision. The Supreme Court,
therefore, directed the GSIS and other respondents to cease and desist from selling the 51% shares of the MHC
to the Malaysian firm Renong Berhad, and instead to accept the matching bid of the petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel.

The rule is that (from Agpalo) in the case of doubt, the constitution should be considered self executing rather
than non self executing. Such is the case with Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution
which states that “in grant of rights and privileges and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the state shall give preference to qualified Filipino”. According to Justice Bellosillo, ponente of the
case at bar, Section 10, second paragraph, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory provision, a
positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or implementing laws to enforce it.
The Court En Banc emphasized that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred over foreigners, as mandated by the
provision in question.

Furthermore, (agpalo) in its plain ordinary meaning the term patrimony pertains to heritage . the constitution
speaks of national patrimony , it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos and
therefore an example the Manila hotel which has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage

The Court also reiterated how much of national pride will vanish if the nation’s cultural heritage will fall on the
hands of foreigners, and this is not to be taken lightly as Nationalism is inherent in the concept of the Philippines
being a democratic and republican state. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Puno said that the provision in
question should be interpreted as pro-Filipino and, at the same time, not anti-alien in itself because it does not
prohibit the State from granting rights, privileges and concessions to foreigners in the absence of qualified
Filipinos. He also argued that the petitioner is estopped from assailing the winning bid of Renong Berhad
because the former knew the rules of the bidding and that the foreigners are qualified, too.