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Interpretation of Words and Phrases

I. In General

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (2001)

Facts:

 Pres. Estrada is being prosecuted for plunder. In this case, he seeks to have the Court declare RA 7659, also known
as An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as unconstitutional, alleging that it is void for vagueness
and that it does away with the elements of reasonable doubt and mens rea. Specifically, the petitioner argues that
the words “combination” and “series” in the phrase “a combination or series of overt criminal acts” in Sec. 2, and
“pattern” in Sec. 4 are not well-defined, and this means that the whole law is void for vagueness.

Issue:

 Is RA 7659 void for vagueness?

Held:

 No.
 A statute is not rendered unconstitutional by the use of general words.
 It is a well-settled principle in legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain, and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a
technical or special legal meaning to those words.
 In this case, the words “combination” and “series” were used in their ordinary meanings.
 The Deliberations of the Bicameral Committee also show that the legislators intended them to mean their ordinary
definitions.
 Voidness for vagueness, also, is used only in free speech cases, not criminal cases, because it is unfair to nullify a
law “on its face”.
 Plunder is a mala in se offense because the acts in combination to be considered are also mala in se.
 It is ironic that Estrada was one of the senators who passed RA 7659 in the Senate.

JJ Disini vs. Sec. Of Justice

Facts:

 Petitioners JJ Disini, Biraogo, Colmenares, National Press Club, TG Guingona, etc. question the constitutionality of
certain provisions of RA 10175, also known as the Cybercrime Law.
 In particular, Sections 4(a)(3), 4(b)(3), 5 in relation to 4(c)(4), and 12 are challenged for being vague and/or
overbroad.
 Sec. 4(a)(3) speaks of the crime of Data Interference, the reckless or intentional alteration, damaging, deletion, or
deterioration of computer data.
 Sec. 4(b)(3) speaks of the crime of Computer-related Identity Theft, the intentional acquisition, use, misuse, transfer,
possession, alteration, or deletion of identifying information.
 Sec. 5 speaks of the crime of Aiding or Abetting Cybercrime, and in particular, aiding and abetting libel (Sec. 4(c)(4)
speaks of libel as defined by the RPC but used in the computer).
 Sec. 12 speaks of Real-Time Collection of Data, which authorizes law enforcement agencies, with due cause, to
collect traffic data from the internet.

Issue:

 Are the assailed sections of the Cybercrime Law void for vagueness and/or overbreadth?

Held:

 With respect to Sec. 4(a)(3), no. Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental purpose,
constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its
subject broadly, thereby invading the area of protected freedoms. All penal laws have an inherent chilling
effect, an in terrorem effect, or the fear of possible prosecution hanging over the heads of citizens. But to
prevent the State from legislating criminal laws because they instill such fear is to render it powerless from
addressing and penalizing socially harmful conduct. In this case, the law clearly punishes what is a form of
vandalism. Vandalism has no connection to guaranteed constitutional freedoms.
 With respect to Sec. 4(b)(3), no. The law does not intrude into freedoms such as speech. What it regulates are the
specific actions therein, the acquisition, use, misuse, and deletion of other people's data. There is no fundamental
right to acquire other people's data.
 With respect to Sec. 5 as applied to 4(c)(4), yes. When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of
speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable. Who is to decide when
to prosecute persons who boost the visibility of a post by liking it? How will a court ascertain whether or not a
netizen's comment abetted or aided a cybercrime, while another comment did not?
 With respect to Sec. 12, no. The provision neither punishes nor regulates speech.

A. General Rules on Interpretation

Orceo vs. COMELEC

Facts:

 Petitioner assails the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 8714, or Rules and Regulations on the: (1)
Bearing, Carrying or Transporting of Firearms or other Deadly Weapons; and (2) Employment, Availment or
Engagement of the Services of Security Personnel or Bodyguards, During the Election Period for the May 10, 2010
National and Local Elections.
 It prohibits an unauthorized person from bearing, carrying, or transporting any firearm at any public place, including
all public buildings, streets, parks, and private vehicles or public conveyances, even if licensed to possess or carry
them, during the election period.
 Said resolution contains the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Sec. 32 and 33 of RA 7166, or An Act
Providing forSynchronized National and Local Elections, and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.
 Petitioner asserts that RA 7166 prohibits real firearms in their common and ordinary usage only, while Resolution
No. 8714 prohibits airsoft guns and their replicas as well, and is therefore violative of the statute it implements.

Issue:

 Is Resolution No. 8714 invalid?

Held:

 No, except with respect to replicas of airsoft guns. Replicas are to be excluded from the resolution.
 The details of implementation of RA 7166 are left to the COMELEC, who may issue rules as long as they are not
against the law.
 PNP Circular No. 11 exists, and it includes airsoft guns under regulated firearms.
 Furthermore, a license to possess an airsoft gun, like other licenses, do not confer an absolute right, but only a
personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions. Resolution No. 8714 is a reasonable restriction,
because it seeks to ensure honest, orderly, and peaceful elections.

Mustang Lumber vs. CA

Facts:

 Narra flitches, shorts, and slabs were seen in petitioner's lumberyard in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The DENR tried
to get in but was not given permission by the owner.
 Judge Osorio of the Valenzuela RTC granted the DENR a search warrant, and 4 truckloads of narra shorts,
trimmings, and slabs, plus 200,000 board feet of narra and other species such as almaciga and supa were found
and seized.
 In a consolidated criminal case, respondent Ri Chuy Po motions to quash the information against him, saying that
the subject matter is LUMBER, and that the word does not appear in Sec. 68 of PD 705, as amended by EO 277,
the law which is the basis of the complaint against him.
 Said law punishes cutting, getting, and/or collecting timber and/or other forest products without a license. The law
does not mention LUMBER, only TIMBER AND OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS.

Issue:

 Should information against Ri Chuy Po be quashed?

Held:
 No.
 Sec. 3(aa) of the same law, which defines a processing plant, mentions that a processing plant is a mechanical set-
up used for processing logs into lumber and other forest products.
 This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material. Clearly, the Code uses lumber
in its ordinary or common usage. The dictionary defines lumber as timber, or logs after being prepared for the
market.
 In addition to possessing lumber, the respondent also possessed shorts, trimmings, and slabs, and other species,
which clearly violate Sec. 68 of PD 705.

Lito Corpuz vs. People

Facts:

 Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy gave pieces of jewelry to petitioner who offered to sell them. They agreed that
petitioner will give proceeds of the sale after 60 days. Tangcoy turned over P98,000 worth of jewelry to petitioner.
Petitioner failed to pay, thus the complaint for estafa before the RTC of San Fernando.
 In his defense, Corpuz argued that he did not violate Art. 315 of the RPC, which pertains to the crime of estafa.
 The elements of estafa in Art. 315 (b) (estafa with abuse of confidence) are as follows: a) that money, goods, or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any
other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or return the same; b) that there be misappropriation or
conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and d) that there is a demand made by the
offended party on the offender.
 Petitioner argues that fourth requisite, demand, is not present, because there is no formal letter of demand given to
him.

Issue:

 Is a formal demand letter necessary to fulfill the fourth requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence?

Held:

 No.
 When the law does not qualify, we should not qualify. The law does not prescribe any form of demand. Based
on other cases of estafa, it can be said that complainant's verbal demand is enough to constitute the demand
mentioned as an element of estafa.
 Meanwhile, in this case, the court deemed the penalty excessive, so copies were sent to the President as well as
the Senate President and Speaker of the House, in accordance with Art. 5 of the RPC.

CS Garment vs. CIR

Facts:

 On Oct. 23, 2001, petitioner received 5 demand letters with accompanying Assessment Notices from the
respondent, requiring petitioner to pay deficiency VAT, Income, DST, and withholding tax assessments for the year
1998, amounting to P2,046,580.10.
 The petitioner filed to protest the taxes levied against it. As the court battle dragged on, the 2007 Tax Amnesty Law
was passed, cancelling all tax obligations from the year 2005 and backwards.
 The petitioner told the CTA that it wishes to avail of the tax amnesty given by the law, but the OSG, on behalf of
respondent, argues that the BIR still has to see if petitioner is still eligible for the tax amnesty.
 The OSG argues that BIR RMC 19-2008 states that exceptions to amnesty include corporations with issues and
cases which were ruled (even without finality) in favor of the BIR prior to amnesty availment of the taxpayer.

Issue:

 Is petitioner eligible for tax amnesty?

Held:

 Yes.
 Said RMC does not follow the rule laid out in Sec. 5 of RA 9480 that exceptions cover only cases subject of final and
executory judgment by the courts.
 The BIR's inclusion of “even without finality” is misplaced.
 While tax amnesty, like tax exemption, should construed strictly against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the taxing authority, it is a well-settled doctrine that the rule-making power of administrative agencies
cannot be extended to amend or expand statutory requirements or to embrace matters not originally
encompassed by the law. Administrative regulations should always be in accord with the provisions of the
statute they seek to carry into effect, and any incosistency shall be resolved in favor of the basic law.

People vs. Derilo

Facts:

 Derilo and 4 others were charged with the crime of murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation in the
CFI of Samar.
 Only accused Isidoro Baldimo was apprehended. At first, he pleaded not guilty, and after the presentation of the
evidence by the prosecution on Aug. 6, 1986, he changed his plea to that of guilty.
 Accused Baldimo wants the court to commute his penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, with his basis being that
while he is no longer qualified to the mitigating circumstance in par. 7 of Art. 13 of the RPC, he is qualified under par.
10 of the same article, using the doctrine in the People v. Coronel case.

Issue:

 Is the accused's sentence lowered from death to reclusion perpetua?

Held:

 Yes.
 People v. Coronel is inapplicable because during the time that decision was made, the Court decided by voting in an
automatic review if the accused should receive the death penalty. Coronel did not get enough votes to be put to
death, because the court took cognizance of his late plea of guilty.
 Par. 10 is not applicable, because the law cannot allow the accused to speculate on the outcome, and substitute his
plea in case the People have a strong case against him.
 HOWEVER, with the ratification of the Constitution in 1987, that sentence should have been reduced to
reclusion perpetua under such constitutional fiat.
 From the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission, Mr. Monsod clearly stated that “death penalty already
imposed shall be commuted to reclusion perpetua”.
 The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is
embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis
valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view upholding it rather than destroying it.

B. Where the law does not distinguish

Republic vs. Yahon

Facts:

 Daisy Yahon, respondent, filed for a protection order under the provisions of RA 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004) against her husband, Staff Sargeant Charles Yahon, in the RTC of Cagayan de Oro.
 The lower courts ruled in her favor and issued a TPO against Charles Yahon. In addition to him not being able to be
near his wife, he is required to support her financially.
 The Court ordered the execution/garnishment of his funds in the AFP Finance Center.
 Petitioner argues that its funds are public funds, and therefore are not subject to execution by reason of sovereign
immunity.
 Sec. 8(g) of RA 9262 directs employers to withhold a part of their employees' salary in favor of a court order to
garnish funds for family support.

Issue:

 Should funds be allowed to be executed from the AFPFC in favor of a child support order from the court?

Held:

 Yes.
 Sec. 8(f) used the word “employer”, which includes in its coverage the military institution.
 Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
 While Sec. 13 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure exempts money and property from pension or
gratuties received from the Government from execution, RA 6292 allows it, and because it is a later law, it is
considered as an exception from Sec. 13 of Rule 39.

Visayas Community vs. Yballe

Facts:

 Respondents are nurses and midwives in the petitioner hospital. The labor union that represents respondents is
NFL.
 A group of employees who want to represent the workers in collective bargaining went on strikes when they were
not recognized. These were deemed as illegal strikes.
 Several employees filed complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against the hospital after the action
taken on their mass actions.
 Labor arbiter ruled in favor of the hospital, dropping the illegal dismissal complaints but ordering the hospital to give
separation pay.
 The CA reversed the ruling, finding the respondents were only union members who only wore armbands during the
strike, committing no illegal acts during the strike.
 Par. 3, of Art. 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that “any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike
and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be
declared to have lost his employment status”.
 Respondents argue that they did not commit illegal acts even as they supported the strike.

Issue:

 Were respondents illegally dismissed?

Held:

 Yes.
 The law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker merely participating in an
illegal strike may not be terminated from employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike
that he may be deemed to have lost his employment status.
 15 years have passed since the incident, so while the illegal dismissal ruling was upheld, reinstatement to their old
jobs was not possible for the respondents. They were awarded their benefits, however.

C. Disjunctive and Conjunctive Words

Dayao vs. COMELEC and LPGMA

Facts:

 Petitioner represents Federation of Philippine Industries, Inc., and he seeks the cancellation of registration of
respondent LPG Marketers Association as a sectoral party-list. This is an appeal from the COMELEC's decision in
favor of LPGMA.
 Petitioner thinks that since LPGMA represents business owners who actually own 45% of the national LPG market.
 Respondent ruled in favor of LPGMA, stating, among other things, that the complaint has to be dismissed because
petitioner waited for 4 months before filing for a cancellation, when LPGMA has already been granted accreditation.
 This argument rests on an interpretation that Sec. 6 of RA 7941 titled “Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration”
means that cancellation may only be requested if the petitioner requested first for refusal at the first instance. The
COMELEC ruled that the belated filing is an unfortunate attempt to circumvent on the final and executory
accreditation by the COMELEC of the LPGMA party-list.

Issue:

 Is petitioner entitled to file for cancellation of accreditation of the respondent party-list?

Held:

 Yes.
 The legal meaning of the term “and/or” should be taken in its ordinary significance. The word “or” is a
disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from the other things enumerated.
 In the present case, cancellation need not be preceded first by a request for refusal. It may be filed for
independently even without filing first for a refusal.
 In this case, however, the petitioner still lost because LPGMA was validly accredited.

People vs. Comadre

Facts:

 The victims were having a drinking spree in Lupao, Nueva Ecija when the accused and his companions came.
Antonio Comadre threw a grenade to the roof which exploded and injured several people and killed one person.

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