G.R. No.

L-16749             January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-
appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA

FACTS:

The will of Edward Chiristensen was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following
provisions:
1. Declaration of only one child named Maria Lucy Christensen, the payment of only P3,600 to Helen
Christensen Garcia and that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it
deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by
Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen.

It was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the
internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof because several foreign elements are involved,
that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the
California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable.

It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of
the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his
will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is
sacred and inviolable
Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these
were denied. Hence, this appeal.

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the
amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by
the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term
"national law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within
the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore,
possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the
State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The
decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California
Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, But
appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow
the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.

The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it
in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the
decision and testified to by a witness. It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen
was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case,
should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such
law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back
to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In
re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are
to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman
should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not
domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile
in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of
American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of
the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner
of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be
looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted
in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the
personal estate in case of intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an
attempted testamentary dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect
beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate
succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point: 'The
general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the owner, is valid
anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was one of
the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more
apparent than ever.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is
the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of
laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing
therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law
of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must
enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as above explained,
i.e., apply the internalws. law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the
property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the
national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the
various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on
conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile,
the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to
California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be
like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent
was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in
the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts.
887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of
the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59
Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two
important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United
States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the
state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the internal law of California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court
with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment
reversed, with costs against appellees.

G.R. Nos. L-11483-11484             February 14, 1958

In the matter of the Testate Estate of the deceased Edward E. Christensen, ADOLFO CRUZ
AZNAR, petitioner.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY and ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA and BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, oppositors-appellees.
BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, as Executor of the Deceased EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, defendant-
appellant.

FACTS:

As of 1913,Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen, was already residing in Davao and on the
following year became the manager of Mindanao Estates located in the municipality of Padada of the
same province. At a certain time, which the lower court placed at 1917, a group of laborers recruited from
Argao, Cebu, arrived to work in the said plantation. Among the group was a young girl, Bernarda
Camporendondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter, thegirl and Edward E. Christensen,
who was also unmarried staring living together as husband and wife and although the records failed to
establish the exact date when such relationship commenced, the lower court found the same to have
been continous for over 30 years until the death of Christensen occurecd on April 30, 1953. Out of said
relations, 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen, were allegedly born.

G. R. NO. L-11484.

Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable amount of properties his will naming
Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor was duly presented for probate in court and became the subject of Special
Proceedings No. 622 of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Said will contains, among others, the
following provisions:
xxx             xxx             xxx.
3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard
Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I have no living ascendants, andno descendantsexcept my above named
daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx             xxx             xxx.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, now married toEduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the factthat she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor hasshe been at any time adopted to me, and who, from all information I have now
resides in Egipt, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREEE THOUSAND SIXHUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600) Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trustfor said Maria Lucy Christensen with the
Davao Branch of the PhilippineNational Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100),
Philippine Currency per month until the the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have
accrued thereon, is exhausted.
8. I give devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA CAMPORENDONDO, now residing inPadada, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000), Philippine Currency.
xxx             xxx             xxx.
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA Lucy
CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my
property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, andwheresover
situated; of which I may be possessed at any death and which mayhave come to me from any source
whatsoever, during her lifetime,Provided, honvever, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY at any time prior to her decease having living issue, then, and in that event, the life interest herein
given shall terminate, and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my said daughter, the
said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest remainder and residue of my property, with the
same force and effectas if I had originally so given, devised and bequeathedit to her; and provided,
further, that should be said Maria Lucy ChristensenDaney die without living issue then, and in that event, I
give, devise and bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my property, one-half (1/2) to my well-
beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOIUSE C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124 Twentieth Street,
Bakersfield, California, U.S.A. and one-half (1/2) to the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C.
CRISTENSEN, . . .
13. I hereby nominate and appoint Mr Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of Davao City, Philippines, my executor, and
the executor of this, my last will and testament.

. . . (Exh. A).

Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by Maria Helen Christensen Garcia and
Bernarda Camporendondo, the first contending that thewill lacked the formalities required by law; that
granting that he had, thedispositions made therein were illegal because although she and Lucy
Christensen were both children had by the deceased with Bernarda Camporendondo, yet she was given
only a meager sum of P3,600 out of an estate valued at $485,000 while Lucy would get the rest of the
properties;and that the petitioner Adolfo Cruz Aznar was not qualified to be appointed as administrator of
the estate because he had an interest adverse to thatof the estate. It was therefore prayed by his
oppositor that the application for probate be denied and the will disallowed; that the proceeding be
declared intestate and that another disinterested person be appointed as administrator.
Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership over one-halfof the entire estate in virtue
of her relationship with the deceased, it being alleged that she and the testator having lived together as
husband andwife continuously for a period of over 30 years, the properties acquired during such
cohabitation should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. This opposition was dismissed by the
probate court on the ground that shehad no right to intervene in said proceeding, for as such common-law
wife she had no successional right that might be affected by the probate of thewill, and likewise, she could
not be allowed to establish her title and co-ownership over the properties therein for such questions must
be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction. In view of this ruling of the Court and in order to attain the
purpose sought by her overruled opposition Bernarda Camporedondo had to institute, as she did institute
Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao (G.R. No. L-11483) which we will consider
and discuss hereinafter.
In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special adminsitrator of the estate after filing a bond
for P5,000 pending the appointment of a regular one, and letters of special administrition were
correspondingly issued to him on May 21, 1953.
The records further show that subsequent to her original opposition. Helen Christensen Garcia filed a
supplemental opposition and motion to declare her an acknowledged natural child of Edward E.
Christensen, alleging that shewas conceived during the time when her mother Bernarda Camporendondo
was living with the deceased as his common-law wife; that she had been in continous possession of the
status of a natural child of the deceased; thatahe had in her favor evidence and/or proof that Edward
Christensen was her father; and that she and Lucy had the same civil status as children of the decedent
and Bernarda Camporedondo. This motion was opposed jointly by the executor and Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney asserting that before, during and after the conception and birth of Helen Christensen
Garcia, her mother was generally known to be carrying relations with 3 different men; that during the
lifetime of the decedent and even years before his death, Edward Christensen verbally as well as in
writing disavowed relationship with said oppositor; that oppositor appropriated and used the surname
Christensen illegally and without permission from the deceased. Thus they prayed the Court that the will
be allowed; that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia be declared not in any way related to the deceased; and
that the motion of said oppositor be denied.
After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28, 1953, found that oppositor Maria
Helen Cristensen had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased
Edward Christensen notwithstanding the fact that she was disowned by him in his will, for such action
must have been brought about by the latter's disaproval of said oppositor's marriage to a man he did not
like. But taking into considerationthat such possession of the status of a natural child did not itself
constitute acknowledgment but may only be availed of to compel acknowledgment, the lower Court
directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney toacknowledge the oppositor as a natural child of Edward E.
Christensen. Thewill was, however, allowed the letters testamentary consequently issued toAdolfo Cruz
Aznar, the executor named therein. From the portion of the decision requiring Lucy Christensen to
acknowledge Helen as a natural child of the testator, the former and the executor interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 13421-R), but the appellate tribunal elevatedthe same to Us on the
ground that the case involves an estate the value of which far exceeds P50,000.00 and thus falls within
the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Section 17 (5), Republic Act No. 296.
The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower court erred in finding that the oppositor Maria
Helen Christensen Garcia had been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the
deceased EdwardE. Christensen and in directing Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, recognizeddaughter
and instituted heirs of the decedent, to acknowledge the former assuch natural child.
Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen Christensen on July 2, 1934, of the
same mother, Bernarda Camporedondo, during the period when the latter was publicly known to have
been living as common-law wife of Edward E. Chrisiensen. From the facts of the case there can be no
question as to Lucy's parentage, but controversy arose when Edward Christensen, in making his last will
and testament, disavowed such paternity to Helen and gave her only a legacy of P3,600. ln the course of
the proceeding for the probate of the will (Exh, A), Helen introduced documentary and testimonial
evidence to support her claim that she, Lucy,was a natural child of the deceased and, therefore, entitled
to the hereditaryshare corresponding to such descendant. Several witness testified in herfavor, including
the mother Bernarda Camporendondo, her former teachers andother residents of the community, tending
to prove that she was known in the locality as a child of the testator and was introduced by the latter to
the circle of his friends and acquaintances as his daughter. Family portraits, greeting cards and letters
were likewise presented to bolster herassertion that she had always been treated by the deceased and by
Lucy herself as a member of the family.
Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to repudiate herclaim by introducing evidence
to prove that on or about the period when shewas conceived and born, her mother was carrying an affair
with another man,Zosimo Silva, a former laborer in her Paligue plantation. Silva executed an affidavit and
even took the witness stand to testify to this effect. Appellants also strived to show that the defendant's
solicitations for Helen's welfare and the help extended to her merely sprang out generosity and
hammered on the fact that on several occasions, the deceased disclaimed any relationship with her (Exh.
O-Daney, Exh. Q-Daney, Exh. Z-Daney, Exh. 8-Helen).
Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appears indubitable that on or about the period when
Helen was born, Bernarda Camporendondo had established residence at her plantation at Paligue,
Davao, and that although Edward Christensen stayed in Davao City to manage his merchandising
business, he spent the weekends with the former and their child Lucy in the Christensenplantation. Even
granting that Zosimo Silva at his stage fitted himself intothe picture, it cannot be denied that Helen's
mother and the deceased weregenerally and publicly known to be living together as husband and wife.
Thismust have been the reason why Christensen from Helen's birth in 1934 providedfor her maintenance;
shouldered the expenses for her education to the extentthat she was even enrolled as an intern in an
exclusive college for girls inManila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname "Christensen", and
ineffect gaver her the attention and care that a father would only do to this offspring. We should take note
that nothing appears on record to show thatChristensen ever entertained any doubt or disputed Helen's
paternity. Hisrepudations of her relationship with him came about only after he andBernarda
Comperodondo parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently after Helentook sides with her mother.
Furthermore, it seems that despite that decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored the
same andgot married to a man for Christensen held no high esteem. We may state at hisjuncture that
while it is true that herein appellants introduced witnesses todisprove oppositor'r claim, the lower Court
that had the opportunity to observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying and could better
gaugetheir credibility and impartiality in the case, arrived at the conclusion that Maria Helen Christensen
had established that she had been in continouspossessions of the status of a natural child of the
deceased. Considering the preponderant evidence on record, We see no reason to reverse said
ruling.The testator' lastacts cannot be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or
not, for human frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a person to adopt unnatural or harsh measures
against an erring child orone who displeases just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In
theconsideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude or directacts of the person against
whom such action is directed or that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if he
predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or an isolated occasions but as a whole, must be
taken into account. The possession of such status is one of the cases that gives rise to the right, in favor
of the child, of coumpulsaryrecognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code).
The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, an heir of the
decedent, to recognize oppositor as a natural child of the deceased. This seems improper. The Civil Code
for 2 kinds of acknowledgement of a natural child: voluntary and compulsory. In the first instance, which
may be effected in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in an authentic writing
(Art. 278,Civil Code), court intervention is very nil and not altogether wanting, whereas in the second,
judicial pronouncement is essential, and while it is true that the effect of a voluntary and a compulsory
acknowledgment onthe right of the child so recognized is the same, to maintain the view of thelower Court
would eliminate the distinction between voluntary acts and those brought about by judicial dicta. And if
We consider that in the case, where, the presumed parent dies ahead of the child and action for
compulsory recogniton is brought against the heirs of the deceased, as in the instant case, the situation
would take absurd turn, for the heirs would be compelled to recognize such child as a natural child of the
deceased without a properprovision of the law, for as it now stands, the Civil Code only requires a
declaration by the court of the child's status as a natural child of the parent who, if living, would be
compelled to recognize his offspring as such.Therefore, We hold that in cases of compulsory recognition,
as in the case at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all the
evidence on record, would declare that under any of the circumstances specified by Article 283 of the
Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a natural child of the presumptive parent and as such is
entitled to all rights granted it by law, for such declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of the
paternity of the parent concerned which is her against whom the action is directed, are bound to respect.
G.R. No. L-11483
Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Bernarda Camporendondo
claimed in her complaint 1/2 of the properties of thedeceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her
relations with the deceased. She alleged as basis for action that she and the deceased Edward E.
Christensen had lived and cohabitated as husband and wife, continously and openly for a period for more
than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff and the deceased acquired real and personal properties
through their common effort and industry; and that in virtue of such relationship, she was a co-owner of
said properties. As the executor refused to account forand deliver the share allegedly belonging to her
despite her repeated demands, she prayed the court that said executor be ordered to submit an inventory
and render an accounting of the entire estate of the deceased;to divide the same into 2 equal parts and
declare that one of them lawfully belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises. In his answer, the executor denied the avermentsof the complaint,
contending that the decedent was the sole owner of the properties left by him as they were acquired
through his own efforts; thatplaintiff had never been a co-owner of any property acquired or possessed by
the late Edward christensen during his lifetime; that the personal relationship between plaintiff and the
deceased was purely clandestinebecause the former habitually lived in her plantation at Paligue, Davao,
from the time she acquired the same in 1928; that she also maintained relations with 2 other men; and
that the claim of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article 2253 of the Civil Code as the vested rights
of the compulsory heirs of the deceased would be impaired. Defendant thus prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint and as counterclaim demanded the sum ofP70.000.00 representing actual, moral and
exemplary damages.
Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties ad submitted theirrespective memoranda, the
lower Court on August 25, 1954, rendered judgmentfinding that the deceased Edward Christensen and
Bernarda Camporendondo,not otherwise suffering from any impediment to contract marriage, lived
together as husband and wife without marital ties continously for over 30years until the former's death in
1953; that out of such relations 2 childrenwere born; and that the properties in controversy were acquired
by either orboth of them through their work or industry. Relying on Section 144 of theCivil Code which
said court considered to have created another mode ofacquiring ownership, plaintiff was held to be
entitled to one-half of saidproperties as co-owner thereof in view of her relationship with the deceasedand
ordered the executor to account for and deliver the same by her. Fromthis decision, defendant Aznar, as
Executor of the will, perfected an appealto the Court of Appeals, but as the property involved in the
litigation exceeds P50,000.00 said tribunal elevated the case to Us for consideration.
It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward Christensen was the owner of certain
properties, including shares of stock in the plantation bearing his name and a general merchandising
store in Davao City. It is also undeniable that the deceased and appellee, both capacitated to enter into
the married state, maintained relations as husband and wife, continuously and publicly for a considerable
number of years which the lower Court declared to be until the death of Christensen in 1953. While as a
general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower court's findings of fact, unless said finding is
not supported by or totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on record, such finding must
ofnecessity be modified to confrom with the evidence if the reviewing tribunalwere to arrive at the proper
and just solution of the controversy. In theinstant case, the court a quo overlooked or failed to consider
the testimonies of both Lucy and Helen Christensen to the effect that the deceased and their mother
Bernarda Camporendondo had some sort of quarrel or misunderstanding and parted ways as of March,
1950, a fact which appelleewas not able to overcome. Taking into account the circumstances of this
caseas found by the trial court, with the modification that the cohabitation should appear as continuous
from the early 20's until March, 1950, the question left for our determination is whether Bernarda
Camporedondo, byreason of such relationship, may be considered as a co-owner of the properties
acquired by the deceased during said period and thus entitledto one-half thereof after the latter's death.
Presumably taking judicial notice of the existence in our society of a certain kind of relationship brought
about by couples living together as husbands and wives without the benefit of marriage, acquiring and
bringingproperties unto said union, and probably realizing that while same may not beacceptable from the
moral point of view they are as much entitled to theprotection of the laws as any other property owners,
the lawmakersincorporated Article 144 in Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines) to govern
their property relations. Said article read as follows:
ART. 114. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or
industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership.
It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and the woman thus living together
must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties realized during their
cohabitation be acquired through the work, industry, employment or occupation of both or either of them.
And the same thing may be said of whose marriages are by provision of law declared void ab intio. While
it is true that these requisites are fully met and satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember that the
deceased and herein appellee were already estranged as of March, 1950. There being no provision of
law governing the cessation of such informal civil partnership, if ever existed, same may be considered
terminated upon their separation or desistance to continue said relations.The Spanish Civil Code which
was then enforce contains to counterpart of Article 144 and as the records in the instant case failed to
show show thata subsequent reconciliation ever took place and considering that Republic ActNo. 386
which recognizeed such form of co-ownership went into operation onlyon August 30, 1950, evidently, this
later enactment cannot be invoked as basis for appellee's claim.
In determining the question poised by this action We may look upon the jurisprudence then obtaining on
the matter. As early as 1925, this Court already declared that where a man and a woman, not suffering
from any impediment to contract marriage, live together as husband and wife, an informal civil partnership
exists and made the pronouncement that each of them has an intereat in the properties acquired during
said union and is entitled to participate therein if said properties were the product oftheir JOINT efforts
(Marata vs. Dionio G.R. No. 24449, Dec. 31, 1925). In another case, this Court similarly held that
although there is no technical marital partnership between person living maritally without being lawfully
married, nevertheless there is between them an informalcivil partnership, and the parties would be
entitled to an equal interest where the property is acquired through their JOINT efforts (Lesaca vs.
FelixVda. de Lesaca, 91 Phil., 135).
Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the product of their joint industry apparently in
her desire to tread on the doctrine laiddown in the aforementioned cases, would lead Us to believe that
her help wassolicited or she took a hand in the management of and/or acquisition of thesame. But such
assertion appears incredible if We consider that she wasobserved by the trial Court as an illiterate woman
who cannot even remembersimple things as the date when she arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when
shecommenced relationship with the deceased, not even her approximate age orthat of her children. And
considering that aside from her own declaration, which We find to be highly improbable, there appears no
evidence to proveher alleged contribution or participation in the acquisition of the properties involved
therein, and that in view of the holding of this Courtthat for a claim to one-half of such property to be
allowed it must be provedthat the same was acquired through their joint efforts and labor (Flores
vs.Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, * 50 Off. Gaz. 1029), We have no recoursebut reverse the holding
of the lower Court and deny the claim of BernardaCampredondo. We may further state that even granting,
for the sake ofargument, that this case falls under the provisions of Article 144 of theCivil Code, same
would be applicable only as far as properties acquiredafter the effectivity of Republic Act 386 are
concerned and to no other, forsuch law cannot be given retroactive effect to govern those already
possessedbefore August 30, 1950. It may be argued, however, that being a newly created right, the
provisions of Section 144 should be made to retroact if only toenforce such right. Article 2252 of the same
Code is explicit in thisrespect when it states:
SEC. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid down by this Code which may prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall have ro retroactive effect.
xxx             xxx             xxx.
As it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the compulsory heirsof the deceased Edward
Christensen would be impaired or diminished if the claim of herein appellee would succeed, the answer to
such argument wouldbe simply obvious.
With regard to appellant Aznar's contention that the lower Court erred in admitting the testimony of
appellee Bernarda Camporedondo dealing with facts that transpired before the death of Edward
Christensen on the ground that it is prohibited by Section 26-(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. We
deem it unnecessary to delve on the same because even admitting that the court a quo committed the
error assigned, yet it will not affect anymore the outcome of the case in view of the conclusion We have
already arrived at on the main issue.
On the strength of the foregoing considerations, We affirm the decision of the lower Court in case G.R.
No. L-11484, with the modification that MariaLucy Christensen Daney need not be compelled to
acknowledge her sister Maria Helen Christensen Garcia as a natural child of her father Edward E.
Christensen, the declaration of the Court in this respect being sufficient to enable her to all the rights
inherent to such status.
The decision appealed from in case G.R. No. L-11483 is hereby reversed and another one rendered,
dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Costs are taxed against appellants in G.R. No. L-11484 and against appellee Bernarda Camporedondo in
G.R. No. L-11483. It is so ordered.