The Institutional Interplay Regarding The New Architecture For The EC's External Assistance

European Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5, September 2008, pp. 655–679.
© 2008 The Author

Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
The Institutional Interplay Regarding

the New Architecture for the EC’s
External Assistance
Sandra Bartelt*
Abstract: The article concerns the inter-institutional relations and describes the dynamics
between the main EC institutions in the decision-making process regarding the adoption of
the new external action instruments. In 2004, the Commission had proposed a set of new
external action instruments as base for the delivery of the Community’s external assis-
tance. By that time, the existing instruments amounted to more than 30 different legal
instruments, which implicated a loss of efficiency in the management of the EC’s external
assistance. After 2 years of inter-institutional negotiations between the European Parlia-
ment, Council and the Commission, the new set of instruments was finally adopted.
Compared to the initial Commission proposals, the design of the new instruments got
significantly reshaped in the course of the inter-institutional decision-making procedure.
In particular, the European Parliament had gained an unprecedented degree of power over
the legislative framework for external spending.
Compared to the former range of geographic and thematic regulations, the new external
action instruments fundamentally reform the delivery of external financial assistance with
their streamlined and simplified structure. They consist of three horizontal instruments to
respond to particular needs or crisis situation: an Instrument for Stability, an Instrument
for Nuclear Safety Co-operation) and a European Instrument for Democracy and Human
Rights. With regard to geographic coverage, four instruments will implement particular
policies: the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, the European Neighbourhood and
Partnership Instrument and the Instrument for Development Co-operation and an Instru-
ment for Co-operation with Industrialised Countries.
The first comprehensive reform of the EC external financing instruments, which took
effect in January 2007, put the relations of the main EC institutions to the test. In 2004,
the Commission had proposed a set of new external relation tools as base for the
delivery of EC external assistance. By that time, the existing instruments amounted to
more than 30 different legal instruments, which implicated a loss of efficiency in the
management of the Community’s external financing programmes. Against this back-
ground, the present article has a twofold purpose: first, it concerns the inter-
institutional relations and describes the dynamics between the main EC institutions in
* LL.M, Ph.D. The author works for the European Commission, Directorate-General for Development
Cooperation and writes here in her personal capacity.
European Law Journal Volume 14
the decision-making process regarding the adoption of the new external financing
instruments (first section). Second, the article presents the new legislative architecture
for EC external assistance with a particular focus on the relationship between the
different instruments (second section). The first two sections of the article are compli-
mented by a third section, which relates to the implementation of the new instruments,
ie the streamlined programming steps and the newly introduced so called ‘democratic
scrutiny dialogue’ with the European Parliament.
I The Institutional Interplay Towards the Adoption of the New Set of

External Action Instruments
After 2 years of inter-institutional negotiations, the new set of instruments was finally
adopted in 2006. Compared to the initial Commission proposals of 2004, the design of
the new instruments got significantly reshaped in the course of the inter-institutional
decision-making procedure.1 At the beginning, the Commission had proposed four new
instruments, namely an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), the European
Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the Instrument for Development
Co-operation and Economic Cooperation (DCECI) and the Instrument for Stability
(IfS).2 Out of the four new instruments merely two were submitted to co-decision
procedure (DCECI and ENPI). By contrast, the final outcome summed up to seven
new instruments, with four out of seven being co-decided, which gave the European
Parliament an unprecedented degree of power over the legislative framework for exter-
nal spending.
Compared to the former range of geographic and thematic regulations, the new
external action instruments fundamentally reform the delivery of external financial
assistance with their streamlined and simplified structure. They consist of three horizon-
tal instruments to respond to particular needs or crisis situations—an IfS,3 an Instrument
for Nuclear Safety Co-operation (INSC)4 and a European Instrument for Democracy
and Human Rights (EIDHR).5 With regard to geographic coverage, four instruments
will implement particular policies—the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA),6
the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI),7 the Instrument for
1
On the negotiations see Commission communication pursuant to Article 251 (2), second subparagraph of
the EC Treaty concerning the common position of the Council on the adoption of a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development coopera-
tion, COM (2006) 628 final.
2
Original Commission proposal concerning an Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (COM (2004) 627
final), the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (COM (2004) 628 final), the Commis-
sion proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing
instrument for development cooperation and economic cooperation, (COM (2004) 629 final) and the
Original Commission proposal for an Instrument for Stability (COM (2004) 630 final).
3
Regulation 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Instrument for
Stability, [2006] OJ L327/1.
4
Council Regulation 300/2007 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, [2007]
OJ L81/1.
5
Regulation 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an financing instru-
ment for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, [2006] OJ L386/1.
6
Council Regulation 1085/2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), [2006]
OJ L210/82.
7
Regulation 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general provisions
establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, [2006] OJ L310/1.
656 © 2008 The Author

Journal compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
September 2008 New Architecture for the EC’s External Assistance
Development Co-operation (DCI)8 and an Instrument for Co-operation with Industria-

lised Countries (ICI).9 The new instruments are complimented by the already existing
instrument for humanitarian aid.10 They apply during the validity of the new Financial
Framework from 2007 until 2013, ie they automatically expire by the end of 2013.11
A The Initial Commission Proposal for an Instrument for Development and

Economic Cooperation
The initial DCECI was supposed to be the cornerstone of the new set of new external
financing instruments. The architecture of the new instruments was closely intercon-
nected and further outlined in the Commission communication ‘On the Instruments for
External Assistance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007–2013’.12
The DCECI was designed to be the main vehicle to support developing countries in
their efforts to progress towards the achievement of the Millenium Development Goals.
It covered not only cooperation with all developing countries,13 including the African,
Caribbean and Pacific countries, but also with industrialised countries.14 For this
reason the initial Commission proposal had a double legal base, both Articles 181A and
179 TEC, the latter bringing the proposal under the co-decision procedure pursuant to
Article 251 TEC. It further included thematic initiatives for the benefit of the partner
countries, such as environment, human and social development, migration and asylum,
human rights and democracy, food security and non-state actors.15
In the following, the article describes how the original Commission proposal for the
DCECI was reshaped and how the legislative architecture was thereby restructured due
to the inter-connected character of the new instruments. The other new external action
instruments will be discussed in the second section of the article.
B The First Reading Amendments of the European Parliament

Under the co-decision procedure the Parliament is at the same footing as the Council
as Community legislator.16 This procedure considerably increased the legislative
powers of the Parliament insofar as the proposed act is deemed not to have been
adopted if it rejects the common position of the Council by absolute majority in second
reading.17
8
Regulation 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument
for development cooperation, [2006] OJ L378/41.
9
Council Regulation 1934/2006 establishing a financing instrument for cooperation with industrialised and
other high-income countries and territories, [2006] OJ L405/41.
10
Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid, [1996] OJ L163/1.
11
See the Inter-institutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission
on budgetary discipline and sound financial management, [2006] OJ L139/1.
12
On the Instruments for External Assistance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007–2013, COM
(2004) 626 final.
13
However, those developing countries which were eligible under the ENPI or the IPA were excluded from
financing under the DCECI.
14
COM (2004) 629 final, op cit n 2 supra.
15
For more information on the thematic programmes see Pt xx.
16
The co-decision procedure becomes the ordinary legislative procedure under the new Treaty of Lisbon,
Article 251 of the Treaty on the Functioing of the European Union, which is intended to enter into force
on 1 January 2009 (upon ratification by the Member States), [2007] OJ C306/1.
17
Article 251 (2), second subparagraph, b) TEC.
© 2008 The Author 657

Being aware of its legislative powers, the Parliament already flexed its muscles at first
reading where it called on the Commission to withdraw its initial proposal for a DCECI
and to submit a new proposal which took into account Parliament’s concerns.18 Its
main preoccupations at this stage were twofold: first, the Parliament was worried about
an erosion of its parliamentary powers by the reduction of the number of instruments.
Indeed with the reform it was intended to replace the existing range of more than 30
regulations by a set of six new instruments plus the already existing humanitarian aid
instrument. Whereas the old co-decided regulations contained sufficient detail as
regards the policy content, the Parliament felt that the new proposals left a large margin
of discretion to the Commission in the implementation, which, as a consequence, would
have lead to an erosion of its parliamentary powers.19 Second, it disliked the merging of
cooperation of developing countries with industrialised countries in a single legal
instrument, since it was concerned that the financing of the cooperation with the
industrialised countries would come to the detriment of the developing countries.20
To accommodate these concerns the three institutions went back to the negotiation
table to reach an overall agreement on the structure of the new external action instru-
ments. This was finally achieved by an exchange of letters between the Commission’s
President Barroso, the President of the European Parliament, Borrell, and the Austrian
Presidency in June 2006, which confirmed the creation of a separate instrument for
cooperation with industrialised countries and a separate instrument for human rights
and democracy.21
a) The Cooperation with the Industrialised Countries

From the very beginning of the inter-institutional decision-making procedure the Euro-
pean Parliament aimed at steering the DCECI towards an instrument exclusively for
the benefit of the developing countries.22 Its main concern was that the financial
envelope of the DCECI did not earmark funds for specific policy objectives, and
notably for economic cooperation with industrialised countries. This would have left it
to the Commission to determine these allocations by programming documents on
which the Parliament would have had no influence, which would have lead to an
interchangeability of the funds to the detriment of the developing countries.23 It there-
fore objected the double legal base, Articles 179 and 181A TEC, and opted in its
first reading amendments for a separate regulation to cover the cooperation with the
industrialised countries.24 As a consequence and in the spirit of finding an overall
compromise for the whole package of external action instruments, a new proposal for
an ICI was presented, which cut the industrialised countries out of the DCECI. As a
18
European Parliament, 1st report on the Commission proposal COM (2004) 629 final, draft resolution,
doc-n° A6-0060/2005 of 21 March 2005.
19
See part 3 on the institutional balance with regard to the implementation of the basic legal acts.
20
1st report on the Commission proposal COM (2004) 629 final, op cit n 18 supra, explanatory statement,
doc-n° A6-0060/2005 of 21 March 2005.
21
COM (2006) 628 final, op cit n 1 supra.
22
1st report on the Commission proposal COM (2004) 629 final, op cit n 18 supra, points 2 and 3 of the
explanatory statement, doc-n° A6-0060/2005 of 21 March 2005.
23
1st report on the Commission proposal COM (2004) 629 final, op cit n 18 supra, point 5 of the explanatory
statement, doc-n° A6-0060/2005 of 21 March 2005.
24
European Parliament, 2nd report on the Commission proposal COM (2004) 629 final, amendments 1 and
2, doc-n° A6-0109/2006 of 27 March 2006.

consequence, an instrument was created which specifically targets developing countries,

the DCI, and which is based on Article 179 TEC only.25
b) A Separate Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy

The original intention of the Commission was that its activity in the field of democracy
and human rights took the form of a thematic programme in line with the Commission
communication on a thematic programme for the promotion of democracy and human
rights worldwide,26 using the DCECI as a legal base.27 However, the European Parlia-
ment strongly argued for a separate regulation, as opposed to a thematic programme,
given the special character of EU action on democracy and human rights.28 Although
the Commission was aware of the concerns of the Parliament, it wished first to ensure
an inter-institutional consensus on the overarching plan for the simplification of the
regulatory architecture governing external assistance.29 Only after an agreement on the
overall structure was reached, the Commission presented a new proposal for a Regu-
lation on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and
human rights on 26 June 2006.30
C The Cooperation with the African Carribean and Pacific States

The initial Commission proposal for the DCECI included the financing of the geo-
graphic cooperation with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in line
with the Commission communication ‘Towards the full integration of co-operation
with ACP countries in the EU budget’.31 This was insofar a novelty as the cooperation
was traditionally financed on an intergovernmental basis by the European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF). The cooperation of the European Community with the ACP states
as such is governed by the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement.32 However, the European
Council decided in December 2005 to maintain an intergovernmental European Devel-
opment Fund33 to finance the geographic co-operation with the ACP countries (except
South Africa) and the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), which further
reshaped the geographic coverage of the DCECI.
Nevertheless, the legal framework establishing the tenth European Development
Fund, which covers the period from 2008 until 2013, aims at harmonising procedures
with those under the general budget. Contrary to previous EDFs, the legal framework
of the 10th EDF does not only consist of an Internal Agreement and a Financial
25
European Parliament, Recommendation for second reading, doc-n° A6-9999/2006 of 5 December 2006,
at 2.
26
COM (2006) 23 final of 25 January 2006.
27
See Commission proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establish-
ing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights worldwide, COM (2006)
354 final of 26 June 2006, point 5 of the explanatory memorandum.
28
Amendment 4; see COM (2006) 354 final of 26 June 2006, op cit n 27 supra, point 6 of the explanatory
memorandum.
29
Ibid.
30
COM (2006) 354 final of 26 June 2006, op cit n 27 supra.
31
Commission communication COM (2003) 590 and Article 24 of the initial Commission proposal for a
DCECI.
32
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000, and the revised Agreement signed
in Luxembourg on 25 June 2005, [2005] OJ L287/4.
33
Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusiosn, 15 and 16 December 2005, available at
http://europea.eu/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm.

Regulation, but also of an Implementation Regulation which contains the details

on the programming process, including the role of the EDF committee therein, on
reporting and evaluation, voluntary additional contributions from Member States,
co-financing managed by the Commission as well as the decision-making procedures
for the African Peace Facility.34
D The Council’s Common Position: From a DCECI to the Development

Co-operation Instrument
The first reading amendments of the Parliament in the co-decision procedure concern-
ing the DCECI already led to a reshuffle of the legislative structure of the new external
action instruments by creating a separate human rights instrument and an instrument
for cooperation with industrialised countries.35 Moreover, in co-decision the Council
reacts to the Parliament’s first reading amendments by adopting a common position in
case of non-agreement, which leads to the second reading.36 To avoid going into
conciliation, the Council already included large parts of the Parliament’s amendments
in its common position, so that the latter could approve it in second reading without
further amendments.37 To prepare the Council’s common position in such a way to
make it acceptable for the Parliament, the two co-legislators and the Commission held
negotiations between the transmission of the first reading amendments of the European
Parliament and the adoption of the common position of the Council, the so called
‘trialogues’.
In the co-decision procedure such trialogues have an important role in preparing for
the conciliation procedure, ie or in the case of the DCI to avoid going into conciliation.
If the formal procedure was followed under co-decision, the Council adopts a common
position in first reading if it does not approve the European Parliament’s amendments,
which leads to second reading where the European Parliament might reject the
common position, whereby the legal act is deemed not to have been adopted, or it
adopts second reading amendments which lead to the conciliation procedure. In short,
the informal trialogues facilitate the institutional interplay to avoid the severe conse-
quences of the co-decision procedure. These trialogues are not formally mentioned in
the EC Treaty, but rather form part of the ‘underworld’ of administrative cooperation
between the institutions.38 Thus, some of the checks and balances between the
34
Internal Agreement between the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States, meeting
within the Council, on the financing of Community aid under the multiannual financial framework for the
period 2008 to 2013 in accordance with the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement and on the allocation of
financial assistance for the Overseas Countries and Territories to which part four of the EC Treaty
applies, [2006] OJ L247/32. The total funding of the tenth EDF is €22.682 million (€21.996 million are
dedicated to the ACPs and €286 million to the OCT). See Article of the tenth EDF Internal Agreement
and Council Regulation 617/2007 of 14 May 2007 on the implementation of the tenth European Devel-
opment Fund under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, [2007] OJ L152/1.
35
See section I, point B, above.
36
See Article 251(2), first subparagraph, third indent TEC.
37
Recommendation for second reading, doc-n° A6-9999/2006 of 5 December 2006, op cit n 25 supra.
38
C. Neuhold and E. Radulova, ‘The involvement of administrative players in the EU decision-making
process’, in H. C. H. Hofmann and A. Türk (eds) EU Administrative Governance (Edward Elgar Pub-
lishing Limited, 2006), 55.

institutions are suspended since the deals are done in an informal way and it becomes
unclear who is checking who.39
With regard to the substance of the negotiated common position, it was important
for the Parliament to gear the reshaped Development Cooperation Instrument
towards an instrument solely for the benefit of developing countries; this is the reason
for the DCI merely being based on Article 179 TEC and not on Articles 179 and
181A TEC jointly.40 Another important element of the final compromise, the com-
mitment of the Commission to enter into a democratic scrutiny dialogue with the
European Parliament on the draft strategy papers will be discussed in the third part
of the article.
a) Thematic Programmes
One part of the compromise on the negotiated common position was the inclusion of
specific articles on thematic programmes to add policy content in response to Parlia-
ment’s request for better defined policy priorities in the form of policy setting regula-
tions.41 The Parliament had initially requested additional policy setting regulations to
forestall erosion of its legislative powers, since it perceived the status quo as being more
advantageous under which most development policy initiatives were based on separate
co-decided regulations that usually contained an expiry date, after which the policy was
reviewed and a new regulation adopted.42 It furthermore opposed the fact that the
original Commission proposal on the DCECI did not contain any articles on the policy
contents of the thematic programmes, leaving them to be formulated in the thematic
strategy paper which would be adopted by Commission decision without further sub-
stantial involvement of the Parliament.43
Therefore Articles 11–16 were included in the DCI, whereby Article 11 is of a
horizontal nature, setting out the conditions under which the thematic programmes
complement the geographic cooperation, and Articles 12–16 concern the specific the-
matic programmes.44 They take the existing thematic regulations as a starting point, but
go beyond them in order to address new priorities which have evolved over the last few
years, and which have been set out in the ‘European Consensus on Development’.45 The
thematic programmes are particularly important for the projection of internal policies
outside the EU and thereby to ensure thematic visibility for the external aspects of
internal policies.46 Therefore, there is no more need for separate legal instruments to
deal with external aspects of internal policies.47 The financial resources assigned to the
39
T. Larsson and G. F. Schaefer, ‘The problem of democratic legitimacy in a supranational government’,
in Hofmann and Türk, op cit n 38 supra, at 560.
40
Recommendation for second reading, doc-n° A6-9999/2006 of 5 December 2006, op cit n 25 supra, at 7.
41
European Parliament’s first reading amendment n°50; COM (2006) 628 final, op cit n 1 supra, Pt 3.2.
42
1st report on the Commission proposal COM (2004) 629 final, op cit n 18 supra, point 6 of the explanatory
statement, doc-n° A6-0060/2005 of 21 March 2005.
43
Recommendation for second reading, doc-n° A6-9999/2006 of 5 December 2006, op cit n 25 supra, at 7.
44
For the demarcation between geographic and thematic cooperation, see section II, point F, c).
45
COM (2006) 628 final, op cit n 1 supra, Pt 3.2; the ‘European consensus on development’ is a joint
statement by the Council and the representatives of the Member States meeting within the Council, the
European Parliament and the Commission on European Union development policy, [2006] OJ C46/1.
46
COM (2004) 626 final, op cit n 12 supra, at 10; Commission Communication, Financial Perspectives
2007-2013, COM (2004) 487 final, at 27.
47
See for example Regulation 2493/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the full
integration of the environmental dimension in the development process, [2000] OJ L288/1; on policy
coherence for development see the European Consensus, points 35, 49 and 109.

thematic programmes are set out in Article 38 of the DCI in conjunction with its
Annex IV.48
All thematic programmes are implemented by multiannual thematic strategy papers
which are adopted by Commission decision according to Article 20 of the DCI.49 In
turn, the thematic strategy papers will be implemented by annual action programmes
pursuant to Article 22 of the DCI. The thematic programmes laid down in Articles
12–16 of the DCI are as follows.
i) ‘Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources Including

Energy’, Article 13 of the DCI
The thematic programme on ‘environment and sustainable management of natural
resources including energy’ is laid down in Article 13 of the DCI. Its basic objective is
‘to integrate environmental protection requirements into the Community’s develop-
ment and other external policies as well as to help promote the Community’s environ-
mental and energy policies abroad in the common interest of the Community and
partner countries and regions’.50 The thematic programme replaces the Regulation
2494/2000 on tropical forests51 and Regulation 2493/2000 on the integration of the
environmental dimension in the development process.52 The thematic strategy paper
focuses particularly on degrading key ecosystems, climate change, inadequate global
environmental governance and inadequate access to and security of energy supply.53
ii) ‘Migration and Asylum’, Article 16 of the DCI

Since 2004 and in parallel with the contribution of the geographic instruments, the
Commission has been implementing a specific programme under the so called
‘AENEAS Regulation’ with a view to assisting third countries in their efforts to
manage migratory flows better.54 The AENEAS Regulation was repealed by the DCI
and a thematic programme on migration and asylum was inserted as Article 16 of the
DCI. This programme is primarily, but not exclusively, focused on migration to the
EU.55 It will not directly address the root causes of migration, but is particularly suited
to capacity-building and to encourage co-operation initiatives between countries of
origin, transit and destination.56 More specifically, it will support activities aiming at:
48
In addition, an indicative amount of €465 million has been ring-fenced to finance activities that benefit the
countries eligible under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Article 38(4) of the
DCI.
49
Commission decision C(2007)1924 of 4 May 2007 on food security; Commission decision C(2007)1957 of
10 May 2007 on investing in people; Commission decision C(2007)2378 of 8 June on migration and
asylum; Commission decision C(2007)2572 of 20 June 2007 on environment; Commission decision
C(2007)2585 of 21 June 2007 on Non-state actors and local authorities.
50
Article 13(1) of the DCI.
51
Regulation 2494/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council on measures to promote the
conservation an sustainable management of tropical forests in developing countries, [2000] OJ L288/6,
amended by Regulation 2110/2005.
52
Regulation 2493/2000, op cit n 47 supra, amended by Regulation 2110/2005.
53
Commission decision C(2007)2572 of 20 June 2007, op cit n 49 supra.
54
Regulation 491/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 March 2004 establishing a
programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum
(AENEAS), [2004] OJ L80/1.
55
56
Article 16(2)a) of the DCI.

fostering the links between migration and development; promoting well-managed

labour migration; fighting illegal immigration and facilitating the readmission of illegal
immigrants; protecting migrants against exploitation and exclusion; and promoting
asylum and international protection.57
iii) ‘Non-state Actors and Local Authorities in Development, Article 14 of the DCI
The thematic programme ‘Non-state actors and local authorities in development’,
which has its legal basis in Article 14 of the DCI, is the successor to the co-decided
regulations on non-governmental organisation (NGO) co-financing and on decentra-
lised co-operation.58 In the co-decision procedure, the Parliament opposed the inte-
grated structure of the programme which links non-state actors to local authorities.
It was therefore agreed to introduce a percentage, according to which ‘at least 85% of
the funding foreseen under this thematic programme will be allocated to non-state
actors’.59 In addition, it is made clear that the support to local authorities is subsidiary
to geographic cooperation and only comes in where the country strategy papers ‘do not
provide appropriate support, particularly in situations such as difficult partnerships,
fragile states and post-conflict’.60
The programme will give financial support to initiatives from non-state actors and
local authorities in the EU and partner countries at three levels:
— supporting interventions in developing countries and regions where geographic

programmes do not support non-state actors and local authorities;
— raising public awareness of development issues and promoting education on
development in the EU and acceding countries;
— supporting activities to strengthen co-ordination and communication between
civil society and local authority networks.61
iv) ‘Food Security’, Article 15 of the DCI

The Community’s food security policy, which was established in 1996 under Regula-
tion 1292/96 on food aid and in support of food security,62 continues to help achieving
57
See Article 16(2) of the DCI; Commission communication, External Actions through thematic pro-
grammes under the future financial perspectives 2007–2013, COM (2005) 324 final.
58
Council Regulation 1659/98 of 17 July 1998 on decentralised cooperation, [1998] OJ L213/6, last amended
by Regulation 625/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2004] OJ L99/1. Council
Regulation 1658/98 of 17 July 1998 on co-financing operations with European non-governmental organi-
sations (NGOs) in fields of interest to the developing countries, [1998] OJ L213/1, as last amended by
Regulation 2110/2005.
59
See Article 14(1) of the DCI.
60
See Article 14(3) of the DCI. ‘Difficult partnerships’ are considered to exist where the usual cooperation
instruments cannot be fully used to support initiatives undertaken by stakeholders other than central
governments: (1) countries where cooperation has been suspended; (2) countries where the authorities are
not committed to objectives of poverty reduction and to other basic principles of development policy,
including good governance and participation of civil society and decentralised authorities; (3) countries
where the dialogue on participatory approaches to development is very limited, see Commission com-
munication, The thematic programme ‘Non-state actors and local authorities in development’, COM
(2006) 19 final, at 7.
61
COM (2005) 324 final, op cit n 57 supra, at 7.
62
Council Regulation 1292/96 on food aid policy and food aid management and special operations, [1996]
OJ L166/1; as amended by Regulation 1726/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2001]
OJ L234/10.

the first Millennium Development Goal on hunger.63 In this sense the objective of the
thematic programme according to Article 15(1) of the DCI is ‘to improve food security
in favour of the poorest and the most vulnerable and contribute to achieving the first
MDG, through a set of actions which ensure overall coherence, complementarity and
continuity of Community interventions, including in the area of transition from relief
to development’. As a general principle, all food aid of a humanitarian nature will be
included under the humanitarian aid instrument rather than being dealt with under
separate thematic funding.64 This is due to the fact that Community policy on food
security has evolved towards supporting broad-based food security strategies at
national, regional and global level, limiting the use of food aid to humanitarian situa-
tions and food crisis avoiding disruptive effects on local production and markets, and
needs to take into account the specific situation of countries that are structurally fragile
and highly dependent on support for food security.65
v) ‘Investing in People’, Article 12 of the DCI

The thematic programme ‘Investing in people’ provides a coherent and holistic
approach to human and social development, its objective is to ‘support actions in areas
which directly affect people’s living standards (. . .), focusing on the poorest and least
developed countries and the most disadvantaged sections of the population’.66 The
programme will focus on the core themes ‘good health for all’, ‘education, knowledge
and skills’, ‘gender quality’, ‘employment and social cohesion’, youth and culture,
thereby going beyond the past practice which was centred on health, gender and basic
education and based on separate regulations.67
vi) Accompanying Measures for Sugar Protocol Countries, Article 17 of the DCI
Article 17 of the DCI regarding the co-operation with the ACP Sugar Protocol Coun-
tries has a special status as a sui generis programme. It reflects the old Regulation
266/2006 establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by
the reform of the sugar regime which ceased to exist with the entry into force of the
DCI.68
b) Geographic Programmes
Like for the thematic programmes, additional articles with policy content were added
for the implementation of the geographic programmes. As a consequence, the DCI now
63
Commission communication, ‘A thematic strategy for food security’, COM (2006) 21 final, at 5.
64
COM (2006) 21 final, op cit n 63 supra, at 1; Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid,
[1996] OJ L163/1.
65
Recital 17 of the DCI.
66
See Article 12(1) of the DCI.
67
For the new focal areas see Article 12 of the DCI; Commission communication, ‘Investing in people’,
COM (2006) 18 final, at 4. The Regulations which are replaced by ‘Investing in people’ are: Regulation
806/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council on promoting gender equality in development
cooperation, [2004] OJ L143/40; Regulation 1568/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on
aid to fight poverty diseases (HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria) in developing countries, [2003]
OJ L224/7, as amended by Regulation 2110/2005; Regulation 1567/2003 of the European Parliament and
of the Council on aid for policies and actions on reproductive and sexual health and rights in developing
countries, [2003] OJ L224/1, as amended by Regulation 2110/2005.
68
Regulation 266/2006 establishing accompanying measures for Sugar Protocol countries affected by the
reform of the sugar regime, [2006] OJ L50/1.

contains individual articles on the separate regions (Articles 6–10 of the DCI) which are
preceded by a horizontal article which precisely sets out the areas of cooperation in line
with the areas identified in the ‘European Consensus on Development’.69 Those areas
are: human development; governance, democracy, human rights and support for insti-
tutional reform; trade and regional integration; environment and sustainable develop-
ment of natural resources; water and energy; infrastructure, communication and
transport; post crisis situations and fragile states.70
The geographic programmes are implemented by multiannual regional and country
strategy papers which are accompanied by a multiannual indicative programme and
adopted by Commission decision according to Articles 19 and 21 of the DCI. The
multiannual indicative programme sets out the priority areas selected for Community
financing as well as the indicative financial allocations.71 The strategy papers will be
implemented by annual action programmes pursuant to Article 22 of the DCI.
c) Official Development Assistance Eligibility of the Financing Measures

At the strong request by Parliament a provision was included in the DCI which
ensures that funding under geographic co-operation shall be designed so as to fulfil
the criteria for Official Development Assistance (ODA), ie in principle 100% of the
funding will be reportable as ODA and that at least 90% of the funding earmarked
for thematic programmes will be eligible as ODA.72 This provision is a novelty; since
for the first time the criteria of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are recognised
in a binding legal text. The DAC started to codify the notion of foreign aid under the
name ‘official development assistance’ in the late 1960s. It defined official develop-
ment assistance as those flows to developing countries and to multilateral institutions
which are:
1. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their

executive agencies;
2. each transaction of which:
a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and
welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and
b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25%.73
Due to the specificity of some of the thematic programmes, namely ‘environment and
sustainable management of natural resources, including energy’ as well as ‘migration
and asylum’ it was necessary to provide for a larger margin as regards the eligibility for
ODA. This was explicitly agreed in the co-decision procedure with the Parliament
and the Council.74 In this regard Article 2(4) of the DCI postulates that thematic
programmes:
69
In the ‘European consensus on development’ see points 70–99, [2006] OJ C46/1.
70
Article 5 of the DCI.
71
72
Article 2(4) of the DCI; COM (2006) 628 final, op cit n 1 supra, Pt 3.3.
73
See ‘Is it ODA?’, papers on Official Development Assistance, [2002] 3(4) The DAC Journal III-5.
74
COM (2006) 628 final, op cit n 1 supra, Pt 3.3.

shall be designed so as to fulfil the criteria for ODA established by the OECD/DAC, unless:
— the characteristics of the beneficiary require otherwise75, or
— the programme implements a global initiative, a community policy priority or an international
obligation or commitment of the Community (. . .) and the measure does not have the character-
istics to fulfil such criteria.
At least 90% of the expenditure foreseen under thematic programmes shall be designed so as to fulfil the
criteria for ODA (. . .).
II The Other New External Action Instruments

The new legislative architecture for external assistance consists of a set of instruments
with a geographic coverage, going in concentric circles around the EU. The first circle
comprises the candidate countries in the Balkans and Turkey which are covered by the
Pre-Accession Instrument. It is followed by the countries which are eligible under the
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. As a third layer the instru-
ments extend to the developing countries with whom the cooperation is covered on the
one hand by the DCI and by the European Development Fund on the other hand. The
geographic instruments are complemented by horizontal instruments, which respond to
special needs and to crisis situations. The implementation and the programming of
these new instruments will be discussed in the third section of the article.
A Council Regulation 1085/2006 Establishing an Instrument for

Pre-Accession Assistance
The Council Regulation 1085/2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assis-
tance (IPA) supports the membership perspective of candidate countries (Croatia,
Turkey, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) and potential candidate coun-
tries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia). Its financial envelope
is €11,468 million for 2007–2013. The strategy for cooperation will be set out in a
multi-annual indicative planning document for each country, detailing the main areas
of intervention and the main priorities for each component under the IPA (transition
assistance and institution-building, cross-border co-operation, regional, human
resource and rural development) for that country.
B Regulation 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
This instrument covers countries which are targeted by the European Neighbourhood
Policy, ie the countries of the south and eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East as well
as the countries of the southern Caucasus, including Russia.76 Enlargement was an
75
See in this context recital 12 of the DCI: ‘while thematic programmes should primarily support developing
countries, two beneficiary countries as well as the overseas countries and territories (OCT) whose
characteristics do not meet the requirements to be defined as ODA recipients (. . .) should also be eligible
for thematic programmes (. . .)’.
76
See Article 1 and the Annex of the ENPI, the countries are: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt,
Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Russian Federa-
tion, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine.

opportunity to formulate a policy specifically geared towards neighbouring countries

to support cooperation among them and between them and the EU with the aim of
developing a zone of shared stability, security and prosperity.77 Consequently, the
Regulation 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) pursues two main
objectives. First, it promotes progressive economic integration and deeper political
cooperation between the EU and partner countries and, second, it addresses the specific
opportunities and challenges related to the geographic proximity common to the EU
and its neighbours.78 It replaces the former ‘MEDA Regulation’ concerning the coop-
eration with the Mediterranean countries, the ‘TACIS Regulation’ on assistance to
the partner countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and the regulation for the
cooperation with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.79 Its financial envelope is €11,181
million. The ENPI operates in the framework of the existing bilateral agreements
between EC partner countries.80 The scope of the ENPI goes beyond promoting
the eradication of poverty and sustainable development, extending to legislative ap-
proximation, regulatory convergence, institution-building and border management.81
Ultimately, what is at stake is the EU’s abaility to develop an external policy comple-
mentary to enlargement that is effective in promoting transformation and reform.82
With Israel and Russia it covers non-developing countries as well and is, consequently,
based jointly on Articles 179 and 181A TEC.
A specific and innovative feature of the instrument is its cross-border co-operation
component.83 Under this, the ENPI finances ‘joint operational programmes’, bringing
together regions of Member States and partner countries sharing a common border.84
This component is co-financed by the European Regional Development Fund.85
C Regulation 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Establishing an Instrument for Stability
As a horizontal instrument the IfS has a global coverage with a clear focus on (re-)
establishing the conditions essential to the implementation of EC development co-
operation policies.86 In the first place, it is the successor of the ‘Rapid Reaction
Mechanism’,87 but replaces also the Council Regulations on action against anti-
personnel landmines, the uprooted people in Asia Regulation as well as the Regulation
77
Copenhagen European Council conclusions of 12 and 13 December 2002; point 62 of the European
Consensus; recital 8 of the ENPI.
78
COM (2004) 626 final, op cit n 12 supra, at 8; Article 2 (1) of the ENPI.
79
‘MEDA’, Council Regulation 1762/92, [1002] OJ L181/1, as amended by Regulation 2112/2005, [2005]
OJ L344/23; West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Council Regulation 1734/94, [1994] OJ L182/4, as amended
by Regulation 2110/2005 of the European Parliament and of the Council, [2005] OJ L344/1; ‘TACIS’,
Council Regulation 99/2000, [2000] OJ L12/1, as amended by Regulation 2112/2005.
80
81
Article 2(2) of the ENPI.
82
Commission communication, ‘A strong European Neighbourhood Policy’, COM (2007) 774 final, at 2.
83
See Articles 6(1)a)ii) and 7(3) of the ENPI.
84
For the joint operational programmes see Article 9(1) of the ENPI; Title III of the ENPI on programming
of and eligibility for cross-border cooperation.
85
86
Article 1 of the IfS.
87
Council Regulation 381/2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, [2001] OJ L57/5.

on rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries.88 The Instru-

ment for Stability has a twofold focus, combining short-term and long-term components
and aims to, first, ensure an effective, rapid and flexible initial response to situations of
political crisis or natural disaster in third countries through the crisis response provisions
in its Article 3,89 and, second, to develop longer-term Community actions to counter
global and trans-regional threats arising from organised crime, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, the trafficking of people, drugs and arms, as well as major
threats to critical infrastructure and public health.90 The long-term component aims as
well at ensuring preparedness to address pre- and post-conflict situations.91
The IfS operates merely in the first pillar, but addresses issues where there is a
clear interrelationship between foreign and security policy and development policy
objectives.92
The implementation of the assistance in response to situations of crisis is subject to
specific programming due to the unforeseeable nature of such actions. The financial
assistance will be carried out through exceptional assistance measures with a duration
of up to 18 months with a possibility of a 6-month prolongation.93 In addition, interim
response programmes build on exceptional assistance measures with a view to
re-establishing the conditions necessary for the effective implementation of the regular
instruments for geographic cooperation.94 The duration of the financing measures and
the possibility to prepare for the transition to the geographic cooperation instruments
is certainly an advantage compared to the old ‘Rapid Reaction Mechanism’ where
operations could not be financed for longer than 6 months.95 Regarding the decision-
making procedure of these measures, the Commission has to consult the Member
States in the committee in line with the management procedure of the Comitology
Decision,96 except for exceptional assistance measures below €20 million.97
The areas of activity under the long-term component are set out in Article 4 of the IfS
and will be implemented through multiannual strategy papers and annual action
programmes.98
88
The regulations to be repealed by the IfS are the following: Regulation 2130/2001 of the European
Parliament and the Council on operations to aid uprooted people in Asian and Latin American
developing countries, [2001] OJ L287/3; Council Regulation 1725/2001 concerning action against anti-
personnel landmines in third countries other than developing countries, [2001] OJ L234/6; Regulation
1724/2001 of the European Parliament and the Council concerning action against anti-personnel land-
mines in developing countries, [2001] OJ L234/1; Council Regulation 1080/2000 on support for United
Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the office of the High Representative in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (OHR), [2000] OJ L122/27; Council Regulation 2046/97 on north-south cooperation in the
campaign against drugs and drug addiction, [1997] OJ L287/1; Council Regulation 2258/96 on rehabili-
tation and reconstruction operations in developing countries, [1996] OJ L306/1; see as well Article 26 of
the IfS.
89
See Article 1(2)a) of the IfS in conjunction with Article 3 of the IfS. See also ‘flexibility clause’ in
Article 3(3) of the IfS which might extend the scope of action under the short-term component.
90
See Article 1(2)b) of the IfS in conjunction with Article 4(1) and (2) of the IfS.
91
See Article 1(2)b) of the IfS in conjunction with Article 4(3) of the IfS.
92
See section II, point F, a), below.
93
Article 6(2) of the IfS.
94
Article 6(4) of the IfS.
95
Article 8(2) of Regulation 381/2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism.
96
The comitology procedure as laid down in Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999, as amended by
Council Decision 2006/512 of 17 July 2006.
97
Article 6(3) and (4) of the IfS.
98
Articles 7 and 8 of the IfS.

According to Article 24 of the IfS only 27% of the overall financial envelope for the
implementation of the instrument shall be dedicated to long-term measures.99 This
threshold reflects the intention of the Community legislators that the Instrument for
Stability should primarily be an instrument for crisis response, and that long-term
measures under this instrument should not be a substitute for those that could be more
effectively delivered under country or regional strategies funded from the instruments
for geographic cooperation.100
Although the original Commission proposed also cooperation in the field of nuclear
safety, this element was cut out in the course of the negotiations and a new proposal for
a Council Regulation establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation was
presented.101 This is due to the fact that the original proposal for the IfS was based on
Article 308 TEC, which was not well perceived by Parliament since Article 308 TEC
only foresees consultation of the Parliament.102 By contrast, the splitting brought the
Instrument for Stability under the co-decision procedure due to its double legal base of
Articles 179 and 181A TEC, albeit without its component related to military monitor-
ing and support for peace-keeping operations, which was contained in the initial
proposal. The Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation is based on Article 203 of the
Euratom Treaty.103
D Regulation 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council

Establishing an Financing Instrument for the Promotion of Democracy and
Human Rights Worldwide
The Regulation is the successor programme to the European Initiative for Democracy
and Human Rights which was based on two regulations that expired at the end of
2006.104 The available funding for the period 2007–2013 is €1,103 million. As a global
financing instrument, the Regulation 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the
Council establishing an financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and
human rights worldwide (EIDHR) covers all third countries.
The EIDHR promotes the founding values of the EU, which are the principles of
liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of
law as expressed in Article 6(1) of the EU Treaty. Likewise these principles constitute
a prime objective of the Community’s development policy.105 In this sense, the ‘Euro-
pean Consensus on Development’ underlines that ‘progress in the protection of human
rights, good governance and democratisation is fundamental for poverty reduction and
sustainable development’.106 The EIDHR intervenes as an independent instrument to
99
The total IfS envelope for the period 2007–2013 is €2,062 billion, see Article 24 of the IfS.
100
See Commission decision C (2007)3701 of 27 July 2007 on the strategy paper for longer term actions,
Pt 1.
101
See recital 11 and COM (2004) 630 final, op cit n 2 supra, Articles 1 and 2c); Council Regulation 300/2007
establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, [2007] OJ L81/1.
102
See COM (2004) 630 final, op cit n 2 supra, Article 2 in the explanatory memorandum.
103
See Council Regulation 300/2007 establishing an Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation, [2007]
OJ L81/1.
104
Council Regulation 975/1999, as amended by Regulation 1882/2003, Regulation 2240/2004 and Regula-
tion 2110/2005; Council Regulation 976/1999, as amended by Regulation 907/2003, Regulation 2242/2004
and Regulation 2112/2005.
105
Recital 3 of the EIDHR.
106
Paragraph 86 of the European Consensus.

complement the other tools for implementation of EU policies on democracy and

human rights, which include political dialogue and diplomatic demarches as well as
the various instruments of financial and technical cooperation, including geographic
cooperation under the long-term development instruments such as the DCI and the
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement.107 Community assistance under this instrument is
designed to address global, regional, national and local human rights and democrati-
sation issues in partnership with civil society organisations which are the main benefi-
ciary of the EIDHR.108 Another focus of this instrument is on fostering the reliability
of election processes, in particular through election observation missions.109
Specific financing tools are ad hoc measures outside the comitology procedures,
which allow for the allocation of small grants to human rights defenders in response to
urgent protection needs.110
E Council Regulation 1934/2006 Establishing a Financing Instrument for

Cooperation with Industrialised and other High-income Countries and
Territories
The ICI provides a legal basis for cooperation with industrialised countries. In addition
to long-standing partner countries—such as the USA, Canada, New Zealand, Austra-
lia, Japan—the new instrument will also cover countries of the Gulf Cooperation
Council and additional high income Asian countries and territories (Brunei, Hong
Kong, Singapore).111 Financial support under the ICI will feature in the Community’s
external action, but will not qualify as ODA.112 The main fields of co-operation are: (1)
economic and business co-operation (promotion of bilateral trade and investment,
support for market access and business partnerships for EU companies); (2) public
diplomacy (EU-focused awareness-raising campaigns and project and policy-oriented
research); (3) people-to-people links (including education and training); and (4) the
promotion of dialogues between political, economic and social actors and other non-
governmental organisations (civil society, regulators, media, consumers, etc).
F The Relationship between the Different Instruments

One of the major challenges in the implementation of the new external instruments will
be to ensure maximum efficiency and continuity in financing. Hence, the first step is to
identify the appropriate instrument for funding. Whereas the demarcation between the
geographic cooperation instruments can easily be done via their geographic scope,
the interplay between the horizontal and the geographic instruments is considerably
more challenging. For instance, in states emerging from crisis a policy mix needs to be
applied to link relief, rehabilitation and development.113
107
Recital 11 of the EIDHR; see human rights component for the geographic cooperation under the DCI in
Article 5(2) f)–j) of the DCI.
108
Article 2(1)a) of the EIDHR; for the eligibility of civil society organisations see Article 10(1)a) of the
EIDHR.
109
Article 2(1) c) of the EIDHR.
110
Article 9(1) of the EIDHR.
111
See Article 2 of the ICI in conjunction with its Annex.
112
The indicative reference for 2007–2013 is €172 million, see Article 16 of the ICI.
113
Commission communication, Towards a European consensus on humanitarian Aid, COM (2007)
317 final, at 10.

a) IfS vs Instruments for Long-term Geographic Development Cooperation:

The Principle of Complementarity
Regarding the relationship between the Stability Instrument and the instruments for
long-term geographic cooperation the pivotal point for the delineation is Article 2(1) of
the IfS which reads: ‘Community assistance under this Regulation shall be complemen-
tary to that provided for under related Community instruments for external assistance.
It shall be provided only to the extent that an adequate and effective response cannot
be provided under those instruments’. This provision defines the relationship with
other instruments by the principle of complementarity, according to which it first needs
to be ensured that an adequate and effective response cannot be provided under the
other Community instruments.114
The short-term component of the IfS is potentially interacting with the humanitarian
aid instrument115 and the so called ‘B-envelope’ of the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement.
The ‘B-envelope’ is a country allocation under the EDF which covers unforeseen needs
such as emergency assistance where such support cannot be financed from the EC
budget.116 This provision therefore refers back to the general budget where not only the
IfS, but also the humanitarian aid instrument might provide the necessary financing. By
contrast, the humanitarian aid instrument solely delivers on the basis of a need to
provide emergency relief as well as preventive action to ensure preparedness for disaster
risks,117 whereas the application of the IfS always entails an element of political
consideration to assess whether a crisis situation is given. Since it is needs-based, the
humanitarian aid instrument is not an instrument for crisis management in the strict
sense and therefore the respective scopes of application do not overlap.118
With regard to long-term geographic cooperation instruments, the IfS is comple-
mentary insofar as it shall provide assistance designed to establish the necessary con-
ditions for the implementation of the policies supported by the long-term cooperation
instruments. In addition, by addressing global and transregional threats with a poten-
tially destabilising effect it is targeted towards other issues than those instruments.119
b) IfS vs Common Foreign and Security Policy Measures: The Principle of

Consistency
Whereas the final version of the IfS is limited to civilian measures of crisis management,
the original Commission proposal also foresaw military monitoring and support for
peace-keeping or peace-support operations.120 Consequently, the original proposal
for the Stability Instrument intended to deliver Community exceptional assistance
114
For the DCI this order got slightly modified due to its Article 2(6) according to which measures which
are eligible for funding under the long-term component of the IfS shall not be funded under the DCI,
except ‘where there is a need to ensure continuity of cooperation from crisis to stable conditions for
development’.
115
Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid.
116
See Article 3(2) of Annex IV attached to the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement.
117
See Article 1 of Council Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid.
118
In this sense it is stated in recital 10 of the IfS that humanitarian aid should continue to be delivered
under Regulation 1257/96 concerning humanitarian aid; see as well COM (2007) 317 final, op cit n 113
supra, at 5.
119
See Article 1(2)b) and recital 11 of the IfS; for the DCI see its Article 2(6).
120
COM (2004) 630 final, op cit n 2 supra, Articles 2a) and 6. The final version of the IfS merely foresees
support for th efforts undertaken by international and regional organisations and non-state actors in
promoting confidence-building, mediation, dialogue and reconciliation, see Article 3(2)a) of the IfS.

measures alongside measures adopted by the Council under Title V of the TEU relating
to the Common Foreign and Security Policy.121 Such a commitment is no longer
contained in the IfS; it rather reads in its recitals that measures taken under the IfS ‘may
be complementary to and should be consistent with measures adopted by the EU in
pursuit of Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives within the framework of
Title V (. . .) The Council and the Commission should cooperate to ensure such con-
sistency, each in accordance with their respective powers’.122 Thereby it shall be ensured
that the Stability Instrument does not prejudice action taken by the EU under Title V
of the TEU in pursuit of Common Foreign and Security Policy objectives and that,
likewise, such action shall not affect the powers of the Community under the TEC.123 In
this context the conclusions of the Advocate-General in the ‘ECOWAS- small arms’
case provide guidance on the interpretation of Article 47 of the EU Treaty, which states
that nothing in the EU Treaty shall affect the competences laid down in the EC
Treaty.124
c) Geographic vs Thematic Cooperation: The Principle of Subsidiarity

The thematic programmes contained in the DCI cut across its geographic coverage. In
addition to the countries and regions eligible for assistance under geographic coopera-
tion,125 they cover countries, territories and regions eligible for assistance under the
ENPI126 as well as for geographic cooperation under the European Development Fund,
ie ACPs and OCTs.127
According to Article 11(1) of the DCI a thematic programme shall encompass a
specific area of activity of interest to a group of partner countries not determined by
geography, or cooperation activities addressed to various regions or groups of partner
countries, or an international operation that is not geographically specific. Moreover,
thematic programmes shall be subsidiary to geographic programmes, the latter being
the preferred instrument for co-operation.128 Nevertheless, in some circumstances,
geographic programmes are not the best instrument for interventions in a particular
domain. Thematic programmes are therefore meant to complement geographic
co-operation where better results can be achieved at a thematic level.129
In line with Article 11(2) of the DCI they may therefore be established, if, first, the
EU policy objectives cannot be achieved through the country and regional programmes
and the programme is implemented by or through an intermediary organisation, ie
global initiatives in the area of sustainable development or in support of global public
goods; and/or, second, the programme leads to actions in partner countries, which are
121
Article 4(2) of the original Commission proposal for an IfS.
122
Recital 3 of the IfS.
123
See in this regard the conclusions of the Advocate-General in Case C-91/05 Commission of the Euopean
Communities v Council of the European Union, paras 110, 111 and 116 (‘ECOWAS-small arms case’).
124
Ibid.
125
See also Annex I of Regulation 1905/2006 for countries eligible for assistance under the geographic
cooperation according to Articles 5–10 of Regulation 1905/2006.
126
Regulation 1683/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 laying
down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, [2006]
OJ L310/1. For the eligible partner countries see the Annex to the ENPI.
127
See Article 1(2) of Regulation 1905/2006 and section I, point C, above.
128
129
European Consensus, Pt 63: ‘(. . .) In this framework, the thematic programmes are subsidiary, comple-
mentary and defined on the basis of their distinctive value added vis-à-vis the geographical programmes’.

additional to and coherent with actions funded under the country and regional pro-
grammes, where they exist, ie:
— The action is multiregional and/or cross-cutting (including pilot projects and

innovations);
— There is no agreement on the action with the partner government;
— The action is in response to a unilateral policy priority or an international
obligation or commitment of the Community;
— There is no geographic programme or it has been suspended.130
d) Conclusion
The aforementioned fields for demarcation show that the relationship between the
different instruments is an extremely complex issue, which is even exacerbated by the
cross-pillar structure and the specific character of the geographic cooperation with
the ACP states under the European Development Fund. However, it is to be expected
that the review of the new external instruments, which is foreseen by the end of 2010,
will be a good opportunity to draw first conclusions on the interplay of the different
instruments.131 In addition, the entry into force of the new Treaty of Lisbon, which is
anticipated for 2009, might also enhance the coherence of the EU’s action in the field
of external relations due to the suppression of the pillar structure.132
III The Institutional Balance in the Implementation of the New Financing

Instruments
The new external action instruments confer upon the Commission the power to imple-
ment the relevant provisions, whereby its executive action will be framed by the policy
contents of the basic legal acts. It has become the general rule to entrust the Commis-
sion with implementing powers as expressed in Article 202, third indent TEC according
to which the Council ‘shall (. . .) confer on the Commission, in the acts which the
Council adopts, powers for the implementation of the rules which the Council lays
down’.133 Likewise, Article 1 of the Comitology Decision provides that ‘(other) than in
specific and substantiated cases where the basic instrument reserves the Council the
right to exercise directly certain implementing powers itself, such powers shall be
conferred on the Commission’.134
130
See Article 11(2) of the DCI and COM (2005) 324 final, op cit n 57 supra, at 4.
131
See the review date in Article 40 of the DCI; Article 25 of the IfS; Article 30 of the ENPI; Article 20 of
the EIDHR.
132
See in particular the new Title V in the Treaty on the European Union on the ‘General provisions on the
Union’s external action and specific provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy’, [2007]
OJ C306/1.
133
The Treaty refers only to ‘Council’ although the Parliament and the Council are co-legislators in the
co-decision procedure. Accordingly, the ECJ held that references made in the Treaty to Council acts
concerning matters to which the co-decision procedure now applies must be read as referring to acts of the
Council and the Parliament, see Case C-259/95, European Parliament v Council of the European Union
[1997] ECR I-5303, para 26. Under the new Lisbon Treaty this omission is rectified, see Article 289 of the
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, available at http://consilium.europa.eu/cm3_fo/
showPage.asp?id=1296&lang=en.
134
See Article 1 of Council Decision 1999/468, [1999] OJ L184/23; see for ‘comitology’ in more detail under
section III, point B, below.

The constitutional requirement resulting from this limited attribution of implement-

ing powers means that the Commission does not have autonomous decision-making
powers in the implementation. The relevant secondary legislation—as basic act—rather
provides the necessary legal basis for implementing measures, thereby creating a hier-
archy between the law directly based on the Treaty itself—the basic act—and imple-
menting measures.135 Consequently, a distinction needs to be drawn between the rules
which are essential to the subject-matter envisaged and are therefore reserved to the
Council’s powers and those which are of an implementing nature and can therefore be
delegated to the Commission.136 The lack of distinction between the primary lawmak-
ing activity of the Community, and its secondary, administrative enforcement activity
is one of the most troubling shortcomings of EC administrative law.137 The new Treaty
of Lisbon for the first time introduces a differentiation between legislative, delegated
and implementing acts.138 According to the Court the classification ‘essential elements’
can only be attributed for provisions which are intended to give concrete shape to the
fundamental guidelines of Community policy.139 As a matter of fact, in all cases the
implementing act must comply with provisions enacted in the delegating act; it may not
be ultra vires.140 In the field of development cooperation, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) recently held in the ‘Philippine Border Management’ case that the inclusion of
new areas of activity in the implementing measures would not be admissible, but
reserved to the basic act.141 Consequently, it annulled the contested decision as the
Commission had exceeded its implementing powers.142
With regard to the external action instruments, this principle is reflected in the DCI
which now contains detailed provisions on the geographic and thematic programmes,
which are supposed to curb the Commission’s discretion in the implementation.143
A The Different Programming Steps in Development Cooperation

In the implementation phase, the new instruments basically follow the same structure,
aside from programming measures owed to their specific objectives.144 At the multian-
nual level the Commission will adopt (country, regional or thematic) strategy papers by
Commission decision, which cover the whole period of the Financial Framework.145
135
Case 25/70, Einfuhrstelle v Köster [1970] ECR 1161, para 6; H. C. H. Hofmann and A. Türk, ‘Explaining
implementation-the internal and the external point of view’, in Hofmann and Türk, op cit n 38 supra, at
76.
136
Case 25/70, ibid, at para. 6. See also case C-240/90, Germany v Commission [1992] ECR I-5383, para 36;
C-156/93, European Parliament v Commission [1995] ECR I-2019, para 18; C-417/93, European Parliament
v Council [1995] ECR I-1185, para 30.
137
M. P. Chiti, ‘Forms of European administrative action’, (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 42.
138
Articles 290 and 291 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
139
Case C-240/90, op cit n 136 supra, at para 37.
140
See on the case-law, K. St. C. Bradley, ‘Comitology and the courts: tales of the unexpected’, in Hofmann
and Türk, op cit n 38 supra, at 424f.
141
The contested Commission decision pursued an objective concerning the fight against terrorism and
international crime which fell outside the framework of the development cooperation policy pursued by
the basic legal act, Regulation 443/92, so that the Commission exceeded its implementing powers,
judgement of 23 October 2007 in Case C-403/05, European Parliament v Commission, paras 68 and 69, not
yet published in the ECR.
142
Ibid.
143
See section I, point D a) and b), above.
144
These specific measures are briefly mentioned in section II.
145
Articles 19–21 of the DCI; Article 7 of the ENPI; Article 7 of the IfS; Article 5 of the EIDHR.

The strategy papers might be accompanied by multiannual indicative programmes

which set out the indicative financial allocations in relation to the priority areas of
action, the specific objectives and the expected results.146 Further to reviews of the
strategy papers the programmes may be adjusted where necessary.147
Under the DCI, the strategy papers shall, in principle, be based on a dialogue with
the partner country or region which involves civil society and regional and local
authorities to ensure ownership of the partner country concerned.148 To promote
complementarity among cooperation activities, the Commission and the Member
States shall consult each other, as well as other donors and development actors includ-
ing representatives of civil society and regional and local authorities, at an early stage
of the programming process.149 Moreover, the cross-cutting issues mentioned in Article
3(3) of the DCI, which correspond to those set out in the ‘European Consensus’, are to
be mainstreamed in the programmes.
The multiannual strategies are implemented by annual action programmes which
shall specify the objectives pursued, the expected results and the total amount of
financing planned. They shall further contain an indication of the amounts allocated
for each operation and an indicative implementation timetable.150 The annual action
programmes will also be adopted by Commission decision.
These two sets of programming documents are accomplished by special measures
which are not covered in the strategy papers and which the Commission may adopt in
the event of unforeseen and duly justified needs or circumstances.151 For the DCI and
the ENPI it is further specified that the special measures may also be used to fund
measures to ease the transition from emergency aid to long-term development
operations, including those to better prepare people to deal with recurring crisis.152
Special measures are subject to simplified decision-making procedures compared to the
other programming measures since the Commission is allowed to adopt a decision
up to a certain amount without prior consultation of the respective comitology
committee.153
B The Comitology System

The executive action by the Commission is not only framed by the material scope of
the basic legal act, but also procedurally by the Comitology Decision which can be
considered to be part of the constitutional framework for the implementation pro-
cess.154 The decision is binding on legislative acts that confer implementing powers.155
Hereby ‘comitology’ has to be understood as a method of decision-making whereby
146
For regional and country strategy papers, see Article 19(4) of the DCI; Article 7(5) of the IfS; Article 7(1)
of the ENPI; Article 5(2) of the EIDHR.
147
Article 19(4) of the DCI; Article 7(7), (8) of the IfS; Article 7(6) of the ENPI; Article 5(3) of the EIDHR.
148
See Articles 19(3) and 20(2) of the DCI.
149
See Articles 19(8) and 20(2) of the DCI; Article 5(4) of the EIDHR.
150
See Article 22 of the DCI; Article 8(2) of the IfS; Article 12 of the ENPI; Article 6 of the EIDHR.
151
Article 23 of the DCI; Article 9 of the IfS; Article 13 of the ENPI; Article 7 of the EIDHR.
152
Article 23(1) of the DCI; Article 13(1) of the ENPI.
153
For the DCI and ENPI the threshold is €10 million (Articles 23(3) of the DCI and 13(2) of the ENPI),
€5 million for the IfS, Article 9(3) of the IfS; €3 million for the EIDHR, Article 7(3) of the EIDHR.
154
The comitology procedure as laid down in Council Decision 1999/468 of 28 June 1999, as amended by
Council Decision 2006/512 of 17 July 2006.
155
H. C. H. Hofmann and A. Türk, ‘Explaining implementation-the internal and the external point of view’,

committees consisting of representatives from Member States and chaired by the

Commission, assist the Commission in implementing Community legislation, so that
the Member States retain some influence over the exercise of implementing powers by
the Commission.156
The Comitology Decision was revised in 2006 to take into account the reinforced role
of the European Parliament as co-legislator in the co-decision procedure. Therefore a
‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny’ was introduced which gives both legislative arms,
the Council and the European Parliament, a right of control over the substance of draft
implementing measures if these measures are of general scope and designed to amend
non-essential elements of the basic instrument which was adopted under co-decision.157
With regard to the aforementioned programming documents the new ‘regulatory
procedure with scrutiny’ does not apply, since it is only related to quasi-legislative
implementing measures, which closely approximate to legislation.158 By contrast the
programming measures under the new instruments do not modify the legislative frame-
work, but their implementation has substantial budgetary implications, thus it was
decided to deal with them under the management procedure according to Article 2 a)
in conjunction with Article 4 of the Comitology Decision.159
For the implementing measures under the new external action instruments which
were adopted under co-decision, the Parliament has a ‘right of scrutiny’ which is
designed to preclude ultra vires measures.160 The Parliament can adopt a resolution on
the grounds that the Commission exceeded its implementing powers.161 However,
Article 8 of the Comitology Decision does not give the Parliament the right to revoke
or delay any implementing act contrary to its opinion.162 The Commission is merely
obliged to inform the Parliament on the action it intends to take and of its reasons for
doing so.163
Regarding the current programming exercise under the new co-decided financing
instruments, the European Parliament exercised its supervision of the executive
action by the adoption of three resolutions under its right of scrutiny (Article 8 of
the Comitology Decision), in which it called on the Commission to withdraw its
draft decisions on the respective strategy papers.164 In all three cases it claimed that
the financial allocations in certain areas of cooperation were not in compliance with
156
K. Lenaerts and A. Verhoeven, ‘Towards a legal framework for executive rule-making in the EU? The
contribution of the new comitology decision’, (2000) 37 CML Rev 645; J. Trondal, ‘EU committee
governance and the multilevel community administration’, in Hofmann and Türk, op cit n 38 supra, at
391; W. Wessels, ‘Comitology: fusion in action. Politico-administrative trends in the EU system’, (1998)
5(2) Journal of European Public Policy 209.
157
See definition in Article 2(2) of Council Decision 2006/512/EC; for the new regulatory procedure with
scrutiny see its Article 5a.
158
Ibid.
159
See Article 35 of the DCI; Article 22 of the IfS; Article 26 of the ENPI; Article 17 of the EIDHR.
160
Article 8 of the Comitology Decision.
161
Resolution according to Article 81 of the Parliament’s rules of procedure.
162
According to Article 8 of the comitology decision the Commission can either submit new draft measures
to the management committee or continue with the procedure or submit a proposal to the Parliament and
the Council on the basis of the Treaty.
163
Ibid.
164
Resolution of 13 February 2007 on the draft strategy papers for Malaysia, Brazil and Pakistan, B6-0067/
2007; Resolution of 5 June 2007 on the regional strategy papers for Mercosur and Latin America,
B6-0236/2007; Resolution of 18 June 2007 on the regional strategy paper for Asia, B6-0265/2007. The
resolutions were adopted pursuant to Article 81 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure.

Article 2(1) and (4) of the DCI, as the primary objective of those elements was not
the eradication of poverty and as they did not fulfil the criteria for ODA.165
C The Democratic Scrutiny Dialogue with the Parliament under the New
Co-decided Financing Instruments
As a novelty under the new co-decided instruments, an informal ‘democratic scrutiny
dialogue’ will be conducted with the Parliament in parallel to the comitology proce-
dure. This ‘democratic scrutiny dialogue’ goes back to first reading amendments by
the European Parliament with regard to the original Commission proposal for the
DCECI.166 The Parliament initially suggested a modification of the comitology proce-
dure insofar as it requested the Commission, before adopting the multiannual strategy
papers, to submit a draft text to the Parliament and the Council. It was then foreseen
that within 3 months of the submission of the draft text, each institution may either
suggest amendments, if it considered that the text did not meet the objectives laid down
by the legislative authority, or object to the adoption of the text, and, if appropriate,
ask the Commission to submit a proposal for a legislative act to be adopted in accor-
dance with Article 251 TEC. Parliament and Council should both have the right to
call for the programmes to be suspended (call back).167 Such a role of the European
Parliament in the implementation of Community policies would have even gone
beyond the newly introduced ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny’ in the (revised)
Council Decision 1999/468/EC.168 At the end of the trialogue in the DCI co-decision
procedure, it was finally agreed to establish an informal dialogue between the Parlia-
ment and the Commission during the programming exercise.169
This commitment for an informal dialogue is also expressed in the joint declaration
on democratic scrutiny and coherence of external actions attached to the Inter-
institutional Agreement on the new Financial Framework 2007–2013, according to
which ‘under the basic legislative acts adopted under the codecision procedure, the
Commission will systematically inform and consult the European Parliament and the
Council by sending draft country, regional and thematic strategy papers (. . .)’.170
Further to this joint declaration, the Commission reiterated that it would undertake to
‘enter into a regular dialogue with the European Parliament on the content of the draft
country, regional and thematic strategy papers and to take due account of the position
of the European Parliament when implementing the strategies’.171
165
Ibid; Article 2(1) of the DCI reads: ‘The primary and overarching objective of cooperation under this
Regulation shall be the eradication of poverty in partner countries and regions in the context of sustain-
able development, including pursuit of the Millenium Development Goals (. . .)’.
166
Amendments n° 59 and 67, European Parliament second report on the proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council establishing a financing instrument for development coopera-
tion and economic cooperation, ref-n° A6-0109/2006 final of 27 March 2006.
167
Similar suggestions were made in the first reading amendments regarding the IfS and EIDHR.
168
In this regard, see also case C-378/00, Commission v Parliament and Council, para 40.
169
Moreover, Article 3(9) was introduced in the DCI according to which ‘the Commission shall inform and
have regular exchanges of views with the European Parliament’.
170
Declaration n° 4 on democratic scrutiny and coherence of external actions attached to the Inter-
institutional Agreement, [2006] OJ C139/15.
171
Declaration n° 5 on democratic scrutiny and coherence of external actions attached to the Inter-
institutional Agreement, [2006] OJ C139/16.

With regard to the exercise of the democratic scrutiny dialogue under the DCI, the
Parliament summed up the results in a resolution pursuant to Article 103 of its Rules
of Procedure.172
The participation of the Parliament in the implementation via the democratic scru-
tiny dialogue goes beyond its tasks as Community legislator which consist in exercising
political and legal supervision, primarily in the light of the principle of legality.173 The
Parliament usually exercises a supervisory function by ensuring that the implementing
measures are not ultra vires; either by an ex ante control in the comitology procedure
or ex post by bringing an action before the ECJ.174 Nevertheless, by taking a closer look
at the comitology procedure the two co-legislators do not seem to be at the same
footing, since the Member States do participate in the implementation via the comi-
tology.175 Hence, at first sight a participation of the Parliament in the implementation
might appear to be necessary. However, the reason for such a direct intervention of the
Member States in the implementation phase is that the Council brings together the
Member States, which must be able to take part in this process due to the logic of
executive federalism.176 In a multi-layered system of governance, where the Community
adopts binding law for its Member States, the participation of representatives of the
governments of Member States in the comitology committees is an important element
for the functioning of the system.177 If the Parliament was to a larger extent involved in
the implementation, it would be part of the administrative decision-making process
which would frustrate its supervisory function.178 The democratic scrutiny dialogue is
however of an informal nature and as long as it does not materialise in a formal right
of the Parliament the risk of interference with the inter-institutional balance might be
rather small. But, in any case, it should not jeopardise the efficiency of law-making in
the implementation phase, which requires certain flexibility for the Commission in
carrying out its tasks. In this sense it rather seems important to safeguard the Parlia-
ment’s prerogatives by a sufficient level of detail as regards the policy content of the
basic legal act.
D Conclusion
There are two main observations to be made regarding the inter-institutional relations
and the new set of external action instruments.
First, the long inter-institutional negotiations towards the adoption of the new
external financing instruments led to a new quality in the relations between the
172
Resolution of 9 July 2007, B6-0310/2007.
173
For the principle of legality see C. Franchini, ‘European principles governing national administrative
proceedings’, (2004) 68 Law and Contemporary Problems 185; Lenaerts and Verhoeven, op cit n 156 supra,
at 680.
174
On judicial proceedings see J. Schwarze, ‘Judicial review of European administrative procedure’, (2004)
68 Law and Contemporary Problems 85, at 85ff; Lenaerts and Verhoeven, op cit n 156 supra, at 646.
175
Lenaerts and Verhoeven, op cit n 156 supra, at 646.
176
The basis of implementation in EC law is generally referred to as the system of ‘executive federalism’
under which the member States are generally entrusted with implementing EC acts and the Commission
would only carry out implementation if the Council conferred these powers on the Commission. Lenaerts
and Verhoeven, op cit n 156 supra, at 680.
177
178

institutions in the field of external action. The outcome shows that the European
Parliament gained considerable weight in the inter-instiutional dialogue through the
extension of the co-decision procedure. It not only preserved and enforced its preroga-
tives as legislative authority, but with the establishment of the democratic scrutiny
dialogue it also assumed a new role in the implementation of the new co-decided
instruments which goes beyond its supervisory function. In generating legitimacy for
the system the checks and balances exerted by the institutions over each other are
important to create democratic accountability.179 Nevertheless, the new ‘democratic
scrutiny dialogue’ leaves room for debate with regard to the institutional balance. In
particular, in view of the fact that at the legislative level, the Parliament injected a large
amount of policy content as regards the thematic and geographic cooperation in the
DCI, which will frame the Commission’s consecutive action in the implementation
phase.
Second, the new legislative architecture considerably simplifies the financing of the
external action by the significant reduction of the number of geographic and thematic
instruments which will provide for greater synergies and thereby enhance the effective-
ness of Community aid.
Merely the cooperation with the ACP states under the European Development Fund
in its intergovernmental clothes remains outside this frame. In streamlining the pro-
gramming procedures the new external instruments will make an important contribu-
tion in filling the gaps in EC law as regards administrative action in the field of EC
development cooperation.
First submitted: March 2008

Final draft accepted: April 2008
179
T. Larsson and G. F. Schaefer, ‘The problem of democratic legitimacy in a supranational government’,


The Institutional Interplay Regarding The New Architecture For The EC's External Assistance

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The Institutional Interplay Regarding The New Architecture For The EC's External Assistance

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European Law Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5, September 2008, pp. 655–679.

© 2008 The Author

The Institutional Interplay Regarding

I The Institutional Interplay Towards the Adoption of the New Set of

656 © 2008 The Author

Development Co-operation (DCI)8 and an Instrument for Co-operation with Industria-

A The Initial Commission Proposal for an Instrument for Development and

B The First Reading Amendments of the European Parliament

© 2008 The Author 657

a) The Cooperation with the Industrialised Countries

658 © 2008 The Author

consequence, an instrument was created which specifically targets developing countries,

b) A Separate Instrument for Human Rights and Democracy

C The Cooperation with the African Carribean and Pacific States

© 2008 The Author 659

Regulation, but also of an Implementation Regulation which contains the details

D The Council’s Common Position: From a DCECI to the Development

660 © 2008 The Author

© 2008 The Author 661

i) ‘Environment and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources Including

ii) ‘Migration and Asylum’, Article 16 of the DCI

662 © 2008 The Author

fostering the links between migration and development; promoting well-managed

— supporting interventions in developing countries and regions where geographic

iv) ‘Food Security’, Article 15 of the DCI

© 2008 The Author 663

v) ‘Investing in People’, Article 12 of the DCI

664 © 2008 The Author

c) Official Development Assistance Eligibility of the Financing Measures

1. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their

© 2008 The Author 665

II The Other New External Action Instruments

A Council Regulation 1085/2006 Establishing an Instrument for

B Regulation 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council

666 © 2008 The Author

opportunity to formulate a policy specifically geared towards neighbouring countries

C Regulation 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council

© 2008 The Author 667

on rehabilitation and reconstruction operations in developing countries.88 The Instru-

668 © 2008 The Author

D Regulation 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council

© 2008 The Author 669

complement the other tools for implementation of EU policies on democracy and

E Council Regulation 1934/2006 Establishing a Financing Instrument for

F The Relationship between the Different Instruments

670 © 2008 The Author

a) IfS vs Instruments for Long-term Geographic Development Cooperation:

b) IfS vs Common Foreign and Security Policy Measures: The Principle of

© 2008 The Author 671

c) Geographic vs Thematic Cooperation: The Principle of Subsidiarity

672 © 2008 The Author

— The action is multiregional and/or cross-cutting (including pilot projects and

III The Institutional Balance in the Implementation of the New Financing

© 2008 The Author 673

The constitutional requirement resulting from this limited attribution of implement-

A The Different Programming Steps in Development Cooperation

674 © 2008 The Author

The strategy papers might be accompanied by multiannual indicative programmes

B The Comitology System

© 2008 The Author 675

committees consisting of representatives from Member States and chaired by the

676 © 2008 The Author

© 2008 The Author 677