MARIA SHEILA ALMIRA T. VIESCA v.

DAVID GILINSKY
G.R. No. 171698               July 4, 2007

FACTS:
Respondent filed a Petition praying that he be entitled to the company of Louis Maxwell
at any time of any given day; he be entitled to enjoy the company of Louis Maxwell
during weekends and on such occasions the child shall be allowed to spend the night
with his father; and he be entitled to enjoy a yearly three-week vacation in any
destination with his child.

During the pendency of respondent’s petition, the parties arrived at a compromise

agreement. Respondent filed an “Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.” It
was alleged in said motion that petitioner had repeatedly refused to abide by the terms
of the compromise judgment, particularly the provision allowing Louis Maxwell to spend
a night with him at any day of the week.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution insisting that said writ was issued
with “indecent haste” violative of her right to due process, and that the writ varied the
terms of the Compromise Agreement since it failed to take into consideration the
parties’ understanding that in the enjoyment of respondent’s visitorial rights, petitioner
“shall have the right to designate any person of suitable age to accompany the child.”

The court ruled to deny the motion to quash the writ of execution filed by [herein
petitioner] thru counsel for lack of merit and grant the prayer of the respondent that he
be allowed to exercise his visitorial rights over the minor LUIS MAXWELL VIESCA
today under the conditions imposed by the petitioner, some of which are contained in
the compromise agreement.

Petitioner filed an “Ex-Parte Reiterative Motion to Inhibit” claiming that Judge Mariano
could no longer handle the case “with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” because
of her statement pertaining to petitioner’s failure to abide by the Compromise Judgment.
Respondent filed his opposition thereto. Respondent once more filed a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Execution, Judge Mariano issued an Order, directing the parties to
attend an in-chamber conference on 20 May 2005 relative to respondent’s Motion to
Withdraw Support and petitioner’s Ex-Parte Reiterative Motion to Inhibit. Respondent
requested that his Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights be heard
notwithstanding the three-day notice rule required under the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure, as he was about to go on a two-week business trip. The RTC granted the
urgent motion. CA affirmed.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in amending or altering the terms of the Compromise judgment
without the concurrence of both parties.

HELD:
A compromise agreement has been described as a contract whereby the parties, by
making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already
commenced. A compromise agreement that is intended to resolve a matter already
under litigation is normally called a judicial compromise. Once it is stamped with
judicial imprimatur, it becomes more than a mere contract binding upon the parties.
Having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it
has the force and effect of any other judgment. Such agreement has the force of law
and is conclusive between the parties. It transcends its identity as a mere contract
binding only upon the parties thereto, for it becomes a judgment that is subject to
execution in accordance with the Rules. Thus, a compromise agreement that has been
made and duly approved by the court attains the effect and authority of res judicata,
although no execution may be issued unless the agreement receives the approval of the
court where the litigation is pending and compliance with the terms of the agreement is
decreed.

The settlement of disputes brought before the courts is encouraged. In fact, in the Civil
Code and in the Revised Rules of Court, courts are directed to persuade the litigants in
civil cases to agree upon some fair compromise.

Unfortunately in the case before us, the compromise agreement entered into between
the parties fell way short of its objective of finally putting an end to their dispute. The
sheer number of incidents which cropped up shortly after the trial court’s approval of the
compromise agreement reveals that the compromise judgment failed to bring peace to
the parties. Interestingly enough, the only points of disagreement are Clause II(b) of the
Compromise Judgment which pertains to the overnight visits of Louis Maxwell with
respondent and the last paragraph of the same clause regarding the appointment of the
child’s accompanying guardian.

More importantly and as correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is settled that neither the
courts nor quasi-judicial bodies can impose upon the parties a judgment different from
their compromise agreement or against the very terms and conditions of their
agreement without contravening the universally established principle that a contract is
the law between the parties. The courts can only approve the agreement of parties.
They can not make a contract for them.

Nevertheless, we cannot totally blame the trial court for having granted respondent’s
Very Urgent Motion to Enforce and Enjoy Visitorial Rights. Perhaps, in its desire to
finally put to rest the bothersome issue concerning Clause II(b) of the Compromise
Judgment and to prevent future disagreements between the parties, the trial court saw
the wisdom, as this Court does, in providing the specifics in the said indefinite portion of
the Compromise Judgment.