SECOND DIVISION

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 172804

represented by his heirs,
Petitioner, Present:
 
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
- versus -  PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
 
 
SPOUSES FROILAN and Promulgated:
LEONILA BRANOCO,
Respondents. January 24, 2011

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

 
DECISION

 CARPIO, J.:
 
The Case
1 2
 This resolves the petition for review  of the ruling  of the Court of Appeals dismissing a suit to recover a realty.

The Facts

Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs,3 sued respondents,

spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional Trial Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492
square-meter parcel of land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect damages. Petitioner claimed ownership over the
Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo
(Rodrigo) in August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it.

In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1983
from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation
(Deed), signed at the bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in full:
 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
 
That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a resident of
Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del Norte, Philippines, hereby depose and
say:

 
That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot children, namely:
LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed ARCILLAS, and by reason of poverty
which I suffered while our children were still young; and because my husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was
with our destitution separated us [sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what happened to his
family; and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who also suffered with our
poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house, and because of the love and affection which I feel
[for] her, I have one parcel of land located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878
 declared in the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, her
heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the improvements existing thereon, which parcel of land is
more or less described and bounded as follows:
 
1.      Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico; and
West, by Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It is planted
to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of P240.00; 5. It is now in
the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the concept of an
owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my demise.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already devise in
favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and that if the
herein Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be inherited by the
heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
 
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described
from Inay Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life; however, I
will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.4

 Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

 The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered respondents to surrender
possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of the Propertys produce since 1982 until petitioners repossession and the
costs.5 The trial court rejected respondents claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis causawhich Rodrigo
effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in
1983, she had no title to transfer.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial courts interpretation of the Deed as a testamentary
disposition instead of an inter vivos donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA granted respondents appeal and set aside the trial courts ruling. While conceding that the language of the [Deed is]
x x x confusing and which could admit of possible different interpretations,7 the CA found the following factors pivotal to its
reading of the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in possession of the Property as owner since 21 May 1962,
subject to the delivery of part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deeds consideration was not Rodrigos death but her love and
affection for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case
Rodriguez predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguezs estate; and (4) Rodriguez accepted the donation in the Deed
itself, an act necessary to effectuate donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between Rodriguez
and respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigos
lack of title.

  In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial courts ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the
Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years.9

 Respondents see no reversible error in the CAs ruling and pray for its affirmance.

The Issue

 The threshold question is whether petitioners title over the Property is superior to respondents. The resolution of this issue rests,
in turn, on whether the contract between the parties predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a donation or a devise.
If the former, respondents hold superior title, having bought the Property from Rodriguez. If the latter, petitioner prevails, having
obtained title from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the earlier devise to Rodriguez.
 The Ruling of the Court

We find respondents title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.

 
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a
Perfected Donation
We examine the juridical nature of the Deed whether it passed title to Rodriguez upon its execution or is effective only upon
Rodrigos death using principles distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically
 
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
 
(2) That before the [donors] death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at
will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to
dispose of the properties conveyed;

  (3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.10

Further
 
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be revoked by the donor
indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a disposition mortis causa[;]
 
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that
the donation is to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be
construed together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor[;]
[and]
  (6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter vivos rather
than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.11
  It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a perfected
donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez, signaling the irrevocability of the passage of title to Rodriguezs
estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This transfer of title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguezs
acceptance of the disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigos
acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need
acceptance by the recipient.13 Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have easily stipulated, as
the testator did in another case, that the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated
x x x14 or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
 In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulations damning effect on his case, petitioner tries to profit from it,
contending it is a fideicommissary substitution clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The question of the
Deeds juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present controversy. By treating the clause in question
as mandating fideicommissary substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is entrusted with
the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole or part of the inheritance,16 petitioner assumes that the Deed
is a will. Neither the Deeds text nor the import of the contested clause supports petitioners theory.
 Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property, evident from Rodriguezs
undertaking to give one [half] x x x of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime.17 Thus, the Deeds stipulation that
the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise, taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigos beneficial title. We arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as here, the donor, while b[inding]
herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x xthat none shall question or disturb [the donees] right, also stipulated that the
donation does not pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the true owner of the donated
parcels of land. In finding the disposition as a gift inter vivos, the Court reasoned:
   
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the donor] guaranteed to
[the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to said property thus conferred. From the moment [the
donor] guaranteed the right granted by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land by virtue of the deed of
gift, she surrendered such right; otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right. Therefore, when
[the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base their contention that the gift in question is a
donation mortis causa [that the gift does not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the
true owner of the two aforementioned parcels] the donor meant nothing else than that she reserved of
herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time
the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)
 
 Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve
partial usufructuary right over it.20

 Third. The existence of consideration other than the donors death, such as the donors love and affection to
the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true of devises, nevertheless corroborates the express irrevocability of
x x x [inter vivos] transfers.21 Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigos statement of love and affection for
Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.

It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed tending to serve his cause (e.g. the
ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise and devise). Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are
interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the donors intent. In no less than seven cases featuring deeds of donations styled
as mortis causa dispositions, the Court, after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter vivos,22 consistent
with the principle that the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is
to take effect at the death of the donor are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed together with the rest of the
instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of the transferor.23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to
favor inter vivos transfers to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property subject of the deed.24

 Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigos post-donation transfer of the Property to Vere as proof of her retention of
ownership. If such were the barometer in interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on
gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while
founded on liberality, is a valid mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels against
licensing such practice.25
 Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo cannot afterwards
revoke the donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another.26 Thus, Rodrigos post-donation sale of the Property
vested no title to Vere. As Veres successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other hand,
respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latters title which they may invoke against all adverse
claimants, including petitioner.
 
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through his and Veres combined possession of the
Property for more than ten years, counted from Verespurchase of the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner initiated his
suit in the trial court in February 1986.27 Petitioner anchors his contention on an unfounded legal assumption. The ten year
ordinary prescriptive period to acquire title through possession of real property in the concept of an owner requires uninterrupted
possession coupled with just title andgood faith.28 There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief that the person from
whom the possessor received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.30
 
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired the Property through sale, neither was a good
faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property in the concept
of an owner (como tag-iya31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years before Rodrigos donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years
before Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo and all those tracing title to the
Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed, petitioners insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only
in 1982, when she started paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought the Property from Rodrigo in
1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith.
Lacking good faith possession, petitioners only other recourse to maintain his claim of ownership by prescription is to show open,
continuous and adverse possession of the Property for 30 years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this requirement.
Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant
Petitioner brings to the Courts attention facts which, according to him, support his theory that Rodrigo never passed ownership
over the Property to Rodriguez, namely, that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the Property only in 1982 and
Rodriguez obtained from Vere in 1981 a waiver of the latters right of ownership over the Property. None of these facts detract
from our conclusion that under the text of the Deed and based on the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and Rodriguez, the latter,
already in possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo admitted, obtained naked title over it upon the Deeds execution in
1965. Neither registration nor tax payment is required to perfect donations. On the relevance of the waiver agreement, suffice it to
say that Vere had nothing to waive to Rodriguez, having obtained no title from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguezs motivation in
obtaining the waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the title Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under
the Deed.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005 and the Resolution dated 5
May 2006 of the Court of Appeals.
 
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION
  
CORAZON CATALAN, G.R. No. 159567
LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM,
EULOGIO CATALAN,
MILA CATALAN-MILAN,
ZENAIDA CATALAN, Present:
ALEX CATALAN, DAISY
CATALAN, FLORIDA PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CATALAN and GEMMA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CATALAN, Heirs of the late CORONA,
FELICIANO CATALAN, AZCUNA, and
Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:
 
JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA,
LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA,
JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES
CATALAN,
Respondents. July 31, 2007
x------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 PUNO, C.J.:
 This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case
No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and
damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service. The Board of Medical
Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to his schizophrenic reaction,
catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect, preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and
sparce (sic) and pointless speech.[1]
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.[2]
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled Absolute Deed of Donation,[3] wherein Feliciano allegedly donated to his sister
MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe Basa; on the South
by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan; and on the West by Roman Basa. Containing an area of Eight Hundred
One (801) square meters, more or less.
 
The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax Declaration No.
2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 18080[4] to Mercedes for the 400.50 square meters donated to her. The
remaining half of the property remained in Felicianos name under Tax Declaration No. 18081.[5]
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings No. 4563[6] before the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its Order for Adjudication of
Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance[7] of Feliciano. The following day, the trial court
appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company as Felicianos guardian.[8] Peoples Bank and Trust Company has been subsequently
renamed, and is presently known as the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property, registered under Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.[9]
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa.[10] The Deed of Absolute
Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax Declaration No. 12911 was issued in
the name of respondents.[11]
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property registered under OCT No. 18920
to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo
donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida Catalan.[12]
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of
Possession and Ownership,[13] as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the Deed of Absolute Donation
to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In addition, BPI averred that even if
Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still be void, as he was not of sound mind and was
therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the
subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell
the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long after the death
of Mercedes Catalan indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of BPI as
complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to overcome the
presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in favor of Mercedes Catalan.
Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly impugned, the presumption of due
execution of the donation in question must be upheld.[14] It rendered judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.      Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;
2.      Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful owners of the land in question which is now declared in their
names under Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);
3.      Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorneys fees of P10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court.[16] The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in disposing that plaintiff-appellants failed to prove the
insanity or mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when the property in dispute was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951 donation coupled with compliance with certain
solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real property under Article 749, which provides:
xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue of her ownership, the property is
completely subjected to her will in everything not prohibited by law of the concurrence with the rights of others (Art. 428, NCC).
The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees Folder of Exhibits) of the property by Mercedes
Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities which allegedly flawed its
authenticity is evident much less apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the fact
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after the death of Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab
initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed of absolute sale carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public
document with respect to its due execution (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it that
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same,
there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, is
hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[17]
 
Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:
1.                  WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A
WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO PROVE THE INSANITY OR MENTAL
INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE WAS DONATED;
 
2.                  WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT S) AND THE
REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS
S-1 AND S-2) ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;
 
3.                  WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV NO. 66073 IN A
WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES
CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND DELIA BASA; AND-
 
4.                  WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.[18]
 
Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos competence to donate property to Mercedes had been rebutted because they
presented more than the requisite preponderance of evidence. First, they presented the Certificate of Disability for the Discharge
of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20, 1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. Second,
they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and
put under the guardianship of BPI. Based on these two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been suffering
from a mental condition since 1948 which incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until his death on August
14, 1997. Petitioners contend that Felicianos marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not
insane at the time he made the questioned donation. They further argue that the donations Feliciano executed in favor of his
successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency because these donations were approved and
confirmed in the guardianship proceedings.[19] In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on March 26,
1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated and fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the
fact that the document was registered only on February 20, 1992, more that 10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already
died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew that Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to
be innocent purchasers of the property in question.[20] Lastly, petitioners assert that their case is not barred by prescription or
laches under Article 1391 of the New Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before the four year
period after Felicianos death on August 14, 1997 had begun.[21]
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it.
[22]
 Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the following requisites: (1)
it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should be free; and (3) it should be
spontaneous.[23] The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of consent, like any contract, renders the donation
voidable.[24]
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the donation.
Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given.[25] However, the burden of proving such
incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is presented, capacity will be presumed.[26]
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the petitioners was
insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in question to
Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be suffering from
schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself, however, the allegation cannot
prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his property
rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a German psychiatrist,
combined hebrephrenia and catatonia with certain paranoid states and called the condition dementia praecox. Eugene Bleuler, a
Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins conception in the early 1900s to include cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed
the condition schizophrenia. According to medical references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of
symptoms, with symptoms becoming increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses. The condition improves (remission or
residual stage) and worsens (relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other patients in
remission may appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings
and are prone to have ideas of reference. The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors are directed against the
sufferers.[27] It has been proven that the administration of the correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic medications help
bring biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions, hallucinations and incoherent
thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of relapse.[28] Schizophrenia can result in a dementing illness similar in many aspects to
Alzheimers disease. However, the illness will wax and wane over many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect.[29]
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose his
competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners failed to show
substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total control of his mental faculties.
Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time and that this condition continued to exist until
proof to the contrary was adduced.[30] Sufficient proof of his infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.[31]
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at the time he donated the property, yet did not see fit to
question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo or when he executed deeds of
donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano remained competent to execute contracts, despite
his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts. Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have
existed in the other acts done or contracts executed, are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.[32]

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever she chose.[33] Not a shred
of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes sale of the property to her children was tainted with fraud or
falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the death of Mercedes. What is material is that the
sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question
belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before this Court. It is
sufficient for this Court to note that even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was still a voidable, not a
void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court within four years.[34]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001]
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA,
DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE,
BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Cirila Arcaba seeks review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte in Civil Case No. 4593, declaring as void
a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in her favor and its subsequent resolution[3] denying
reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On January 16, 1956, Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A located
at the corner of Calle Santa Rosa (now Balintawak Street) and Calle Rosario (now Rizal Avenue) in Dipolog City, Zamboanga
del Norte. The total area of the lot was 418 square meters.[4] After the death of Zosima on October 3, 1980, Francisco and his
mother-in-law, Juliana Bustalino Montallana, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights, in which the latter
waived her share consisting of one-fourth (1/4) of the property to Francisco.[5] On June 27, 1916, Francisco registered the lot in his
name with the Registry of Deeds.[6]
Having no children to take care of him after his retirement, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo,[7] the latters cousin,
Luzviminda Paghacian,[8] and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside.[9]
Conflicting testimonies were offered as to the nature of the relationship between Cirila and Francisco. Leticia Bellosillo said
Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the same room,[10] while Erlinda Tabancura,[11] another niece of Francisco,
claimed that the latter had told her that Cirila was his mistress.[12] On the other hand, Cirila said she was a mere helper who could
enter the masters bedroom only when the old man asked her to and that Francisco in any case was too old for her. She denied they
ever had sexual intercourse.[13]
It appears that when Leticia and Luzviminda were married, only Cirila was left to take care of Francisco.[14] Cirila testified that
she was a 34-year old widow while Francisco was a 75-year old widower when she began working for the latter; that he could
still walk with her assistance at that time;[15] and that his health eventually deteriorated and he became bedridden.[16] Erlinda
Tabancura testified that Franciscos sole source of income consisted of rentals from his lot near the public streets.[17] He did not
pay Cirila a regular cash wage as a househelper, though he provided her family with food and lodging.[18]
On January 24, 1991, a few months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos, in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150 square meters, together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted
the donation in the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name. The deed stated that the
donation was being made in consideration of the faithful services [Cirila Arcaba] had rendered over the past ten (10) years. The
deed was notarized by Atty. Vic T. Lacaya, Sr.[19] and later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner.[20]
On October 4, 1991, Francisco died without any children. In 1993, the lot which Cirila received from Francisco had a market
value of P57,105.00 and an assessed value of P28,550.00.[21]
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for declaration of nullity of a deed of donation inter vivos,
recovery of possession, and damages. Respondents, who are the decedents nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate
succession, alleged that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her favor
is void under Article 87 of the Family Code, which provides:
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void, except
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to
persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage.
On February 25, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents, holding the donation void under this provision of
the Family Code. The trial court reached this conclusion based on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and certain documents
bearing the signature of one Cirila Comille. The documents were (1) an application for a business permit to operate as real estate
lessor, dated January 8, 1991, with a carbon copy of the signature Cirila Comille;[22] (2) a sanitary permit to operate as real estate
lessor with a health certificate showing the signature Cirila Comille in black ink;[23] and (3) the death certificate of the decedent
with the signature Cirila A. Comille written in black ink.[24] The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by the late Francisco Comille recorded as Doc. No. 7; Page No. 3; Book
No. V; Series of 1991 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Vic T. Lacaya (Annex A to the Complaint) null and void;
2. Ordering the defendant to deliver possession of the house and lot subject of the deed unto the plaintiffs within thirty (30) days
after finality of this decision; and finally
3. Ordering the defendant to pay attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[25]
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered on June 19, 2000 the decision subject of this appeal. As already
stated, the appeals court denied reconsideration. Its conclusion was based on (1) the testimonies of Leticia, Erlinda, and Cirila; (2)
the copies of documents purportedly showing Cirilas use of Franciscos surname; (3) a pleading in another civil case mentioning
payment of rentals to Cirila as Franciscos common-law wife; and (4) the fact that Cirila did not receive a regular cash wage.
Petitioner assigns the following errors as having been committed by the Court of Appeals:
(a) The judgment of the Court of Appeals that petitioner was the common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille is not correct
and is a reversible error because it is based on a misapprehension of facts, and unduly breaks the chain of circumstances detailed
by the totality of the evidence, its findings being predicated on totally incompetent or hearsay evidence, and grounded on mere
speculation, conjecture or possibility. (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 243 and other cases; cited in Quiason, Philippine Courts
and their Jurisdictions, 1993 ed., p. 604)
(b) The Court of Appeals erred in shifting the burden of evidence from the plaintiff to defendant. (Bunyi v. Reyes, 39 SCRA 504;
Quiason, id.)
(c) The Court of Appeals decided the case in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable jurisprudence in
Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 20 SCRA 908, and Liguez v. CA, 102 Phil. 577, 584.[26]
The issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals correctly applied Art. 87 of the Family Code to the circumstances of this
case. After a review of the records, we rule in the affirmative.
The general rule is that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject
only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion.[27] It appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented by both parties, the general
rule should apply.
In Bitangcor v. Tan,[28] we held that the term cohabitation or living together as husband and wife means not only residing under
one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially
when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is
the public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not
constitute such kind of cohabitation; they are merely meretricious.[29] In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient
proof of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties,[30]a conviction of concubinage,[31] or the existence of
illegitimate children.[32]
Was Cirila Franciscos employee or his common-law wife? Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a
long time. It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic massage and
Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship
of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife.
Aside from Erlinda Tabancuras testimony that her uncle told her that Cirila was his mistress, there are other indications that Cirila
and Francisco were common-law spouses. Seigfredo Tabancura presented documents apparently signed by Cirila using the
surname Comille. As previously stated, these are an application for a business permit to operate as a real estate lessor,[33] a
sanitary permit to operate as real estate lessor with a health certificate,[34] and the death certificate of Francisco.[35] These
documents show that Cirila saw herself as Franciscos common-law wife, otherwise, she would not have used his last
name. Similarly, in the answer filed by Franciscos lessees in Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy,
RTC Civil Case No. 4719 (for collection of rentals), these lessees referred to Cirila as the common-law spouse of
Francisco. Finally, the fact that Cirila did not demand from Francisco a regular cash wage is an indication that she was not simply
a caregiver-employee, but Franciscos common law spouse. She was, after all, entitled to a regular cash wage under the law.[36] It is
difficult to believe that she stayed with Francisco and served him out of pure beneficence. Human reason would thus lead to the
conclusion that she was Franciscos common-law spouse.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband and wife without
a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 140487. April 2, 2001]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LEON SILIM and ILDEFONSA MANGUBAT, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. 43840, entitled Leon Silim, et al. vs. Wilfredo Palma, et al., which declared null and void the donation made by respondents
of a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur.
The antecedents of this case are as follows:
On 17 December 1971, respondents, the Spouses Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of
land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the Deed of Donation,
respondents imposed the condition that the said property should be used exclusively and forever for school purposes only.[1] This
donation was accepted by Gregorio Buendia, the District Supervisor of BPS, through an Affidavit of Acceptance and/or
Confirmation of Donation.
Through a fund raising campaign spearheaded by the Parent-Teachers Association of Barangay Kauswagan, a school building
was constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was supposed to be allocated for the
donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1)
hectare parcel of land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent of the Province of Zamboanga del
Sur, Sabdani Hadjirol, authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange of the one-half (1/2) hectare
old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the
government. Pursuant to this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange whereby the
donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter. Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were
constructed on the new school site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and transferred to
the new location.
When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land,
he asked the latter why he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor Wilfredo Palma replied that he is
already the owner of the said property. Respondent Leon Silim endeavored to stop the construction of the house on the donated
property but Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma advised him to just file a case in court.
On February 10, 1982, respondents filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment of
Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with damages against Vice Mayor Wilfredo
Palma, Teresita Palma, District Supervisor Buendia and the BPS before the Regional Trial Court of Pagadian City, Branch 21. In
its Decision dated 20 August 1993, the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.[2] The pertinent portion of the
decision reads:
Thus, it is the considered view of this Court that there was no breach or violation of the condition imposed in the subject Deed of
Donation by the donee. The exchange is proper since it is still for the exclusive use for school purposes and for the expansion and
improvement of the school facilities within the community. The Deed of Exchange is but a continuity of the desired purpose of
the donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
In sum, it may be safely stated that the aforesaid transaction of exchange is a (sic) exception to the law invoked by the plaintiffs
(Art. 764, Civil Code). The donee, being the State had the greater reciprocity of interest in the gratuitous and onerous contract of
donation. It would be illogical and selfish for the donor to technically preclude the donee from expanding its school site and
improvement of its school facilities, a paramount objective of the donee in promoting the general welfare and interests of the
people of Barangay Kauswagan. But it is a well-settled rule that if the contract is onerous, such as the Deed of Donation in
question, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests, which in the instant case, is the donee.
x x x
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgement is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing the complaint for lack of merit;
2. Dismissing the counterclaim for the sake of harmony and reconciliation between the parties;
3. With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Not satisfied with the decision of the trial court, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 22
October 1999, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the donation null and void on the grounds
that the donation was not properly accepted and the condition imposed on the donation was violated.[4]
Hence, the present case where petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN
INVALID ACCEPTANCE BY THE DONEE.
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THE DONATION NULL AND VOID DUE TO AN
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF A CONDITION IN THE DONATION.[5]
The Court gives DUE COURSE to the petition.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the donation null and void for the reason that the acceptance was
not allegedly done in accordance with Articles 745[6] and 749[7] of the New Civil Code.
We agree.
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3)
conditional or modal; and (4) onerous. A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plain gratuity.[8] This is
donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding
the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt.[9] A conditional or modal donation is one where
the donation is made in consideration of future services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges
upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given.[10] Finally, an onerous donation is that which
imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable
consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more than the thing donated.[11]
Of all the foregoing classifications, donations of the onerous type are the most distinct. This is because, unlike the other forms of
donation, the validity of and the rights and obligations of the parties involved in an onerous donation is completely governed not
by the law on donations but by the law on contracts. In this regard, Article 733 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 733. Donations with an onerous cause shall be governed by the rules on contracts, and remuneratory donations by the
provisions of the present Title as regards that portion which exceeds the value of the burden imposed.
The donation involved in the present controversy is one which is onerous since there is a burden imposed upon the donee to build
a school on the donated property.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that there was no valid acceptance of the donation because:
xxx
Under the law the donation is void if there is no acceptance. The acceptance may either be in the same document as the deed of
donation or in a separate public instrument. If the acceptance is in a separate instrument, "the donor shall be notified thereof in an
authentic form, and his step shall be noted in both instruments.
"Title to immovable property does not pass from the donor to the donee by virtue of a deed of donation until and unless it has
been accepted in a public instrument and the donor duly noticed thereof.(Abellera vs. Balanag, 37 Phils. 85; Alejandro vs.
Geraldez, 78 SCRA 245). If the acceptance does not appear in the same document, it must be made in another. Solemn words are
not necessary; it is sufficient if it shows the intention to accept, But in this case, it is necessary that formal notice thereof be given
to the donor and the fact that due notice has been given it must be noted in both instruments (that containing the offer to donate
and that showing acceptance). Then and only then is the donation perfected. (11 Manresa 155-11, cited in Vol. II, Civil Code of
the Philippines by Tolentino.)."
This Court perused carefully the Deed of Donation marked as exhibit "A" and "1" to determine whether there was acceptance of
the donation. This Court found none. We further examined the record if there is another document which embodies the
acceptance, we found one. Although the Court found that in the offer of exhibits of the defendants, a supposed affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as exhibit "8" appears to have been offered.
However, there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants have been admitted nor such exhibits appear on
record.
Assuming that there was such an exhibit, the said supposed acceptance was not noted in the Deed of Donation as required under
Art. 749 of the Civil Code. And according to Manresa, supra, a noted civilist, the notation is one of the requirements of perfecting
a donation. In other words, without such a notation, the contract is not perfected contract. Since the donation is not perfected, the
contract is therefore not valid.[13]
xxx
We hold that there was a valid acceptance of the donation.
Sections 745 and 749 of the New Civil Code provide:
ART. 745. The donee must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power for the purpose,
or with a general and sufficient power; otherwise the donation shall be void.
ART. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be laid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charge which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, but it shall not take effect unless it is
done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and this step shall be
noted in both instruments.
Private respondents, as shown above, admit that in the offer of exhibits by the defendants in the trial court, an affidavit of
acceptance and/or confirmation of the donation, marked as Exhibit "8," was offered in evidence. However, private respondents
now question this exhibit because, according to them "there is nothing in the record that the exhibits offered by the defendants
have been admitted nor such exhibit appear on record."
Respondents' stance does not persuade. The written acceptance of the donation having been considered by the trial court in
arriving at its decision, there is the presumption that this exhibit was properly offered and admitted by the court.
Moreover, this issue was never raised in the Court of Appeals. Nowhere in their brief did respondents question the validity of the
donation on the basis of the alleged defect in the acceptance thereof. If there was such a defect, why did it take respondents more
than ten (10) years from the date of the donation to question its validity? In the very least, they are guilty of estoppel.[14]
Respondents further argue that assuming there was a valid acceptance of the donation, the acceptance was not noted in the Deed
of Donation as required in Article 749 of the Civil Code, hence, the donation is void.
The purpose of the formal requirement for acceptance of a donation is to ensure that such acceptance is duly communicated to the
donor. Thus, in Pajarillo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,[15] the Court held:
There is no question that the donation was accepted in a separate public instrument and that it was duly communicated to the
donors. Even the petitioners cannot deny this. But what they do contend is that such acceptance was not "noted in both
instruments," meaning the extrajudicial partition itself and the instrument of acceptance, as required by the Civil Code.
That is perfectly true. There is nothing in either of the two instruments showing that "authentic notice" of the acceptance was
made by Salud to Juana and Felipe. And while the first instrument contains the statement that "the donee does hereby accept this
donation and does hereby express her gratitude for the kindness and liberality of the donor," the only signatories thereof were
Felipe Balane and Juana Balane de Suterio. That was in fact the reason for the separate instrument of acceptance signed by Salud
a month later.
A strict interpretation of Article 633 can lead to no other conclusion that the annulment of the donation for being defective in
form as urged by the petitioners. This would be in keeping with the unmistakable language of the above-quoted
provision. However, we find that under the circumstances of the present case, a literal adherence to the requirement of the law
might result not in justice to the parties but conversely a distortion of their intentions. It is also a policy of the Court to avoid such
as interpretation.
The purpose of the formal requirement is to insure that the acceptance of the donation is duly communicated to the donor. In the
case at bar, it is not even suggested that Juana was unaware of the acceptance for she in fact confirmed it later and requested that
the donated land be not registered during her lifetime by Salud. Given this significant evidence, the Court cannot in conscience
declare the donation ineffective because there is no notation in the extrajudicial settlement of the donee's acceptance. That would
be placing too much stress on mere form over substance. It would also disregard the clear reality of the acceptance of the donation
as manifested in the separate instrument dated June 20, 1946, and as later acknowledged by Juan.
In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of
the existence of the school building put up on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association of Barangay
Kauswagan. It was when the school building was being dismantled and transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor
Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange. The
actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school building fulfilled the legal requirement that the
acceptance of the donation by the donee be communicated to the donor.
On respondents' claim, which was upheld by the Court of Appeals, that the acceptance by BPS District Supervisor Gregorio
Buendia of the donation was ineffective because of the absence of a special power of attorney from the Republic of the
Philippines, it is undisputed that the donation was made in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools. Such being the case, his
acceptance was authorized under Section 47 of the 1987 Administrative Code which states:
SEC. 47. Contracts and Conveyances. - Contracts or conveyances may be executed for and in behalf of the Government or of any
of its branches, subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, whenever demanded by the exigency or exigencies of the service and
as long as the same are not prohibited by law.
Finally, it is respondents' submission that the donee, in exchanging the donated lot with a bigger lot, violated the condition in the
donation that the lot be exclusively used for school purposes only.
What does the phrase "exclusively used for school purposes" convey? "School" is simply an institution or place of education.
[16]
 "Purpose" is defined as "that which one sets before him to accomplish or attain; an end, intention, or aim, object, plan,
project. Term is synonymous with the ends sought, an object to be attained, an intention, etc."[17] "Exclusive" means "excluding or
having power to exclude (as by preventing entrance or debarring from possession, participation, or use); limiting or limited to
possession, control or use.[18]
Without the slightest doubt, the condition for the donation was not in any way violated when the lot donated was exchanged with
another one. The purpose for the donation remains the same, which is for the establishment of a school. The exclusivity of the
purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance and enhancement of
the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the construction of
Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110644. October 30, 1998]
THE HEIRS OF SALUD DIZON SALAMAT, represented by Lucio Salamat and Danilo Salamat, VALENTA DIZON
GARCIA, represented by Raymundo D. Garcia, Jr. as Attorney-in-Fact, THE HEIRS OF ANSELMA REYES DIZON,
represented by Catalina Dizon Espinosa, petitioners, vs. NATIVIDAD DIZON TAMAYO, THE HEIRS OF EDUARDO
DIZON, represented by Angela R. Dizon, THE HEIRS OF GAUDENCIO DIZON, represented by Maria Dizon
Jocson, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the decision rendered by
the Court of Appeals dated June 15, 1993.
Agustin Dizon died intestate on May 15, 1942 leaving behind his five children Eduardo, Gaudencio, Salud, Valenta and
Natividad as surviving heirs. Among the properties left by the decedent was a parcel of land in Barrio San Nicolas,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, with an area of 2,188 square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 10384. [1]
On January 8, 1944, Eduardo sold his hereditary rights in the sum of P3,000 to his sister Salud Dizon Salamat. The sale
was evidenced by a private document bearing the signatures of his sisters Valenta and Natividad as witnesses. [2]
On June 2, 1949, Gaudencio likewise sold his hereditary rights for the sum of P4,000 to his sister Salud. The sale was
evidenced by a notarized document which bore the signature of Eduardo Dizon and a certain Angela Ramos as witnesses.
[3]
 Gaudencio died on May 30, 1951 leaving his daughters Priscila D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson as heirs.
Sometime in 1987, petitioners instituted an action for compulsory judicial partition of real properties registered in the
name of Agustin Dizon with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Malolos, Bulacan. The action was prompted by the
refusal of herein respondent Natividad Dizon Tamayo to agree to the formal distribution of the properties of deceased
Agustin Dizon among his heirs. Respondents refusal stemmed from her desire to keep for herself the parcel of land
covered by OCT 10384 where she presently resides, claiming that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the
conformity of the other heirs. The subject property is also declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
10376 in the name of respondent.
The trial court noted that the alleged endowment which was made orally by the deceased Agustin Dizon to herein
respondent partook of the nature of a donation which required the observance of certain formalities set by law.
Nevertheless, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that the partition of the estate of Agustin Dizon is in order, let a project of partition be drawn
pursuant to Sec 2, Rule 69, Rules of Court assigning to each heir the specific share to which he is entitled taking into
consideration the disposition made in favor of Salud Dizon Salamat and the adjudication of Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre
304-D owned by Natividad Dizon Tamayo, together with the improvements thereon, in her favor and the house owned by
Valenta Dizon Garcia, executing, if necessary, proper instruments of conveyance for confirmation and approval by the
Court.
Parties are enjoined to draw the prospect of partition as equitably and equally as possible with the least inconvenience and
disruption of those in possession or in actual occupation of the property. Should the parties fail to come up with an
acceptable project of partition, the Court will appoint commissioners as authorized by Sec. 3, Rule 69, Rules of Court,
who will be guided by the dispositive portion hereof.
All costs and expenses incurred in connection with the partition are to be shared equally by the parties.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners contend that Lot 2557, Cad 304-D, described and covered by OCT 10384 in the name of the heirs of Agustin
Dizon is part of the Dizon estate while respondent claims that her father donated it to her sometime in 1936 with the
consent of her co-heirs. In support of her claim, respondent Natividad presented a private document of conformity which
was allegedly signed and executed by her elder brother, Eduardo, in 1936.
Petitioners, however, question the authenticity of the document inasmuch as it is marred by the unexplained erasures and
alterations.
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the decision of the RTC, stated that notwithstanding the unexplained erasures and
alterations, a cursory reading of the signed statement of Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, showed that there
was an oral donation of the litigated land from Agustin Dizon to Natividad Dizon Tamayo[4] in 1936.
The Court of Appeals further stated that the attestation by Eduardo, of the oral donation of the subject land made by his
father to respondent Natividad, in 1936, coupled with the tax declaration and payment of taxes in respondents name
would show that the trial court did not err in ruling that the subject land should pertain to Natividad Tamayo as
inheritance from her parents.
We reverse.
Art 749 of the Civil Code reads:
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a public document, specifying therein the
property donated and the value of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public document, unless it is done during the
lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form and this step
shall be noted in both instruments.
It is clear from Article 749 that a transfer of real property from one person to another cannot take effect as a donation
unless embodied in a public document.
The alleged donation in the case at bar was done orally and not executed in a public document. Moreover, the document
which was presented by respondent in support of her claim that her father donated the subject parcel of land to her was a
mere private document of conformity which was executed by her elder brother, Eduardo in 1956. [5] It may not be amiss to
point out that the brothers Eduardo and Gaudencio had already ceded their hereditary interests to petitioner Salud Dizon
Salamat even before 1950.
The Court of Appeals, however, placed much reliance on the said document and made the dubious observation that x x x a
cursory reading of the signed statement of Eduardo Dizon, which execution is undisputed, shows that there was an oral
donation x x x.
Significantly, the document relied upon by the Court of Appeals could hardly satisfy the requirements of the rule on
ancient documents on accounts of unexplained alterations.
An ancient document refers to a private document which is more than thirty (30) years old, produced from a custody in
which it would naturally be found if genuine, and is unblemished by alterations or circumstances of suspicion. [6]
To repeat, the document which was allegedly executed by Eduardo was marred by unexplained erasures and alterations.
While the document was originally penned in black ink, the number thirty-six (36) in blue ink was superimposed on the
number fifty-six (56) to make it appear that the document was executed in 1936 instead of in 1956. Moreover, a signature
was blotted out with a black pentel pen and the three other signatures[7] of the alleged witnesses to the execution of the
document at the lower portion of the document were dated June 1, 1951. This could only mean that the witnesses attested
to the veracity of the document 5 years earlier, if the document was executed in 1956 or 15 years later, if we are to give
credence to respondents claim, that the document was executed in 1936. Curiously, two of the signatories, namely, Priscila
D. Rivera and Maria D. Jocson signed the document as witnesses two days after the death of their father Gaudencio, who,
as earlier mentioned, had already sold his hereditary rights to his elder sister Salud in 1949.
In any case, assuming that Agustin really made the donation to respondent, albeit orally, respondent cannot still claim
ownership over the property. While it is true that a void donation may be the basis of ownership which may ripen into
title by prescription,[8] it is well settled that possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be adverse
and under a claim of title.
Respondent was never in adverse and continous possession of the property. It is undeniable that petitioners and
respondent, being heirs of the deceased, are co-owners of the properties left by the latter. A co-ownership is a form of a
trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other[9] and possession of a co-owner shall not be regarded as adverse to
other co-owners but in fact is beneficial to them. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference that the
possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property.
In the case of Salvador v. Court of Appeals,[10] we had occasion to state that a mere silent possession by a co-owner, his
receipt of rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees thereon
and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing
evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the
other co-owners.
The elements in order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or the co-owner are: (1)
that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to ouster cestui que trust or other co-owners (2) that
such positive acts or repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners and (3) that the
evidence thereon must be clear and convincing.[11]
Not one of the aforesaid requirements is present in the case at bar. There are two houses standing on the subject property.
One is the house where respondent presently resides while the other is a house built by respondents sister Valenta.
Records show that the house on Lot 227 where the respondent lives is actually the ancestral house of the Dizons although
respondent has remodelled it, constructed a piggery and has planted trees thereon. [12] Respondent herself testified:
x x x x x x x x x
Q Now, who is in the possession of this particular residential land in Bo. San Nicolas, Hagonoy, Bulacan?
A I am in possession of that land, Sir.
Q Do you have your residential house there?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that you have your residential house there, since when have you stayed there?
A I was born there, Sir.
Q And you are staying there up to the present?
A Yes, sir.
x x x x x x x x x.[13]
It is obvious from the foregoing that since respondent never made unequivocal acts of repudiation, she cannot acquire
ownership over said property through acquisitive prescription. The testimony of her son that she merely allowed her
sister Valenta to build a house on the lot[14] is pure hearsay as respondent herself could have testified on the matter but
chose not to.
Finally, the fact that the subject property is declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent who pays realty
taxes thereon under Tax Declaration No. 14376 is of no moment. It is well settled that tax declarations or realty tax
payments are not conclusive evidence of ownership.[15]
As regards the improvements introduced by the respondent on the questioned lot, the parties should be guided by Article
500 of the Civil Code which states that: Upon partition, there shall be a mutual accounting for benefits received and
reimbursements for expenses made. x x x
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED. Lot 2557, Hagonoy Cadastre 304-D covered
by Original Certificate of Title No. 10384 is hereby declared to belong the estate of Agustin Dizon. No costs.
SO ORDERED.