96 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
a public that has no fixed attitude t o w a r d w h a t it wants d o n e , but simply a r a n g e
of only partially consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , s o m e o n e has got to play the role of
crystallizing issues in a way that can lead to a c t i o n .
Consider, in this c o n n e c t i o n , D o u g l a s A r n o l d ' s recent b o o k , The Logic of
Congressional Action (1990). A r n o l d shows that C o n g r e s s often takes blatantly
contradictory actions. It favors a balanced budget w h e n this is the issue, and
favors increased spending w h e n asked to vote on p a r t i c u l a r s p e n d i n g provisions.
L i k e w i s e , it favors " t a x i n c e n t i v e s " w h e n asked to vote on t h e m one item at a
t i m e , and also tax simplification w h e n asked to vote on tax reform. T h e key to
these and n u m e r o u s other inconsistencies in C o n g r e s s ' s r e c o r d , according to Ar-
n o l d , is h o w issue entrepreneurs frame t h e given issue, thereby linking it to o n e
rather than a n o t h e r potential distribution of public o p i n i o n . S u c c e s s in c o n g r e s -
sional politics turns on the ability to get o n e ' s colleagues and o t h e r elites, e s -
pecially in t h e p r e s s , to think about o n e ' s issue in a way that will p r o d u c e
majority s u p p o r t for it rather t h a n , as might be the c a s e u n d e r a different issue
frame, majority o p p o s i t i o n .
A similar a r g u m e n t might be m a d e for leadership in g e n e r a l . Political leaders
are s e l d o m t h e passive i n s t r u m e n t s of majority o p i n i o n . Nor, as it s e e m s to m e ,
do they often a t t e m p t openly to c h a l l e n g e public o p i n i o n . But they do regularly
attempt to play on the contradictory ideas that are always present in p e o p l e ' s
m i n d s , e l e v a t i n g the salience of s o m e and h a r n e s s i n g t h e m to new initiatives
while d o w n p l a y i n g or ignoring other ideas - all of w h i c h is just a n o t h e r way of
talking about issue framing.
I s u g g e s t , t h e n , that my a c c o u n t of an ambivalent public is not only m o r e
faithful to the wealth of m i c r o e v i d e n c e e x a m i n e d e a r l i e r in this chapter, but also
m o r e faithful to the c o m p l e x role of public opinion in d e m o c r a t i c politics.
All of the analysis in this and the last c h a p t e r involves the form and nature of
attitudes r a t h e r than the content of p e o p l e ' s opinion s t a t e m e n t s and the process
by which they are formed. T h e next five chapters are c o n c e r n e d with d r a w i n g
out the implications of the m o d e l in these latter areas.
The mainstream and polarization effects
W i t h the national inflation rate a p p r o a c h i n g the then-startling level of 7 percent,
President N i x o n went on television in late s u m m e r 1971 to a n n o u n c e a surprise
decision to i m p o s e w a g e and p r i c e controls on the e c o n o m y . A l t h o u g h such con-
trols w e r e a major d e p a r t u r e from administration policy, t h e decision w a s im-
m e d i a t e l y hailed by c o m m e n t a t o r s across the political s p e c t r u m as a n e c e s s a r y
step in t h e battle against inflation.
By g o o d luck, there exist excellent d a t a on the effect of N i x o n ' s s p e e c h on
public attitudes. A C o l u m b i a University survey of political activists h a p p e n e d to
be in t h e field at t h e t i m e of N i x o n ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t , and G a l l u p surveys on price
controls b r a c k e t e d the s p e e c h . T h e C o l u m b i a study found, first of all, that the
s p e e c h had little effect on D e m o c r a t i c activists, w h o tended to favor w a g e and
price controls even before N i x o n s p o k e . But t h e effect of t h e speech on R e p u b -
lican activists w a s d r a m a t i c . Virtually o v e r n i g h t , s u p p o r t for controls a m o n g
R e p u b l i c a n activists shot up from 37 percent to 82 percent, a rise of s o m e 45
p e r c e n t a g e points ( B a r t o n , 1 9 7 4 - 5 ) . T h e G a l l u p s u r v e y s , m e a n w h i l e , showed
that t h e public as a w h o l e b e c a m e about 10 p e r c e n t a g e points m o r e favorable
toward price controls in the w e e k s following the N i x o n s p e e c h .
T h i s c a s e suggests that a p o p u l a r president b a c k e d by a unified W a s h i n g t o n
c o m m u n i t y can have a powerful effect on public o p i n i o n , especially that part of
the public that is most attentive to politics.
T h i s is the first of a series of c h a p t e r s that a i m s at a c c o u n t i n g for the effects
of such elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on m a s s attitudes. In this c h a p t e r we e x a m i n e two
simple ideal typical s i t u a t i o n s , o n e type in which elites achieve a c o n s e n s u s or
near c o n s e n s u s on a value or policy, so that virtually all c o m m u n i c a t i o n s take
t h e s a m e side of t h e given issue, and a n o t h e r type in which elites disagree along
p a r t i s a n or ideological lines, so that there is a roughly even flow of c o m m u n i -
c a t i o n s on b o t h sides of t h e issue. T h e c a s e of w a g e and price controls is an
e x a m p l e of the first type of situation, and the nearly unified s u p p o r t of A m e r i c a n
elites for the w a r in V i e t n a m in 1964 is another. T h e sharply ideological division
of elites o v e r V i e t n a m in t h e late 1960s is an e x a m p l e of t h e s e c o n d . T h e R A S
m o d e l , as we shall see, leads us to expect that these t w o types of situations will
have regular and predictable effects on public attitudes.
98 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
L a t e r c h a p t e r s will e x a m i n e m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d c a s e s , ones in which the pat-
tern of elite m e s s a g e s switches from mainly consensual to mainly conflictual,
and others in which elites are d i v i d e d , but in w h i c h the relative intensity of c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n s c h a n g e s o v e r t i m e . Such c h a n g e s in the flow of elite c o m m u n i c a -
tions p r o d u c e quite interesting and nonintuitive patterns of c h a n g e in m a s s
attitude r e p o r t s , as will b e c o m e apparent.
MAINSTREAM EFFECT
W h a t , we m a y now a s k , would be t h e theoretically expected effect on public
opinion if elites across the political s p e c t r u m were to achieve a c o n s e n s u s in s u p -
port of a p a r t i c u l a r " m a i n s t r e a m " policy? Or, to ask the same question in the
l a n g u a g e of the m o d e l : W h a t w o u l d be t h e e x p e c t e d effect on public opinion if
virtually all the persuasive m e s s a g e s c a r r i e d in political media on a p a r t i c u l a r
policy were favorable to that policy, and if there were no cueing m e s s a g e s to
alert p e o p l e that the policy w a s inconsistent with their values?
A x i o m Al s u g g e s t s , first of all, that t h e greater a c i t i z e n ' s level of political
a w a r e n e s s , the greater the likelihood of reception of persuasive m e s s a g e s on this
hypothetical m a i n s t r e a m issue. If all of the cueing m e s s a g e s on this policy were
favorable, no o n e w o u l d have any basis via A2 for resisting it. F r o m this we can
d e d u c e that the greater a p e r s o n ' s level of political a w a r e n e s s , the greater the
n u m b e r of m a i n s t r e a m m e s s a g e s t h e person would internalize in the form of con-
siderations and h e n c e , all else e q u a l , the greater the p e r s o n ' s level of expressed
support for the m a i n s t r e a m policy (D25).
R e s e a r c h e r s w o r k i n g on a variety of substantive p r o b l e m s have r e p o r t e d
s u p p o r t for this implication of the m o d e l . In fact, t h o u g h using different
v o c a b u l a r i e s , several have m a d e roughly the s a m e a r g u m e n t as h e r e . For ex-
a m p l e , in Public Opinion and American Democracy (1961), V. O. Key, Jr.,
w r o t e that a p e r s o n ' s level of formal e d u c a t i o n may be an indicator of the extent
to which the person has been influenced by s o c i e t y ' s traditional or " o f f i c i a l "
values. Key w r o t e :
Probably a major consequence of education for opinion consists in the bearing of edu-
cation on the kinds of influences to which a person is subjected throughout his life. The
more extended the educational experience, the more probable it is that a person will be
exposed to the discussions of issues as they arise. When, as so often occurs, the current
discussion is heavily loaded on one side, it might be expected that this educationally con-
ditioned exposure would have some bearing on the direction of opinion. (1961: p. 341)
Noting that e d u c a t i o n w a s associated with greater support for racial equality,
private health i n s u r a n c e , and tolerance of n o n c o n f o r m i s t s , Key explained that
" f o r m a l e d u c a t i o n may serve to indoctrinate p e o p l e into the more-or-less offi-
cial political values of the c u l t u r e " (p. 3 4 0 ) .
W r i t i n g a few years later, G a m s o n and Modigliani (1966) noted a substantial
correlation b e t w e e n political information and support for the g o v e r n m e n t ' s for-
Mainstream and polarization effects 99
eign policies (see also S i g e l m a n and Conover, 1981). T h e i r explanation for this
paralleled K e y ' s a r g u m e n t . Information m e a s u r e d " o n e ' s a t t a c h m e n t t o the
m a i n s t r e a m and the resultant exposure t o influences such a s the m a s s m e d i a "
(1966: p. 189). M c C l o s k y and Brill's (1983) a r g u m e n t that e d u c a t i o n p r o m o t e s
the " s o c i a l l e a r n i n g " of libertarian ideals, and M u e l l e r ' s (1973) claim that bet-
ter e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s were m o r e likely to s u p p o r t the V i e t n a m W a r because they
were better " f o l l o w e r s " of official policy likewise appeal to the notion that
exposure to " m a i n s t r e a m " values tends to e n h a n c e s u p p o r t for t h e m . M o r e
recently, the t e n d e n c y of better e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s to be m o r e o p p o s e d to the quar-
antining of A I D S v i c t i m s ( S n i d e r m a n et a l . , 1991) appears to reflect the inter-
nalization of a m e d i c a l c o n s e n s u s that such action is u n n e c e s s a r y to prevent the
spread of the disease (Colby and C o o k , 1 9 9 1 ) . '
In a c o m p a r a t i v e study of the United S t a t e s and Britain, C a i n , Ferejohn, and
Fiorina (1987) turned up a finding that nicely illustrates the " i n d o c t r i n a t i n g ef-
f e c t " that e x p o s u r e to a p a r t i c u l a r elite culture often p r o d u c e s . Citizens in both
c o u n t r i e s w e r e asked w h e t h e r elected representatives should " s u p p o r t the po-
sition their p a r t i e s take w h e n s o m e t h i n g c o m e s up for a v o t e , or should they
m a k e up their o w n m i n d s r e g a r d l e s s of h o w their p a r t i e s want t h e m to v o t e . " In
B r i t a i n , w h e r e P a r l i a m e n t d e p e n d s on a high degree of p a r t y discipline, college-
e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s were m o r e likely than those with only high school e d u c a t i o n to
say that representatives should h e w the p a r t y line. But in the United S t a t e s , with
its a n t i p a r t y and individualist political tradition, c o l l e g e - e d u c a t e d persons were
m o r e likely to say that representatives should vote their o w n opinions. T h u s , the
better e d u c a t e d in each c o u n t r y are the m o r e faithful adherents of their c o u n t r y ' s
r e s p e c t i v e national traditions.
If the m a i n s t r e a m a r g u m e n t is c o r r e c t , c o r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and
s u p p o r t for a policy should be strongest w h e n elite c o n s e n s u s is strongest and
less strong w h e n elite c o n s e n s u s is less strong or nonexistent (D25). M u c h p u b -
lished e v i d e n c e (to be s u p p l e m e n t e d later in this chapter) s u p p o r t s this e x p e c -
tation. For e x a m p l e , M u e l l e r notes that the correlation b e t w e e n e d u c a t i o n and
s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m W a r w a s strong early in the war, w h e n most elites sup-
p o r t e d it, and weak in the late p h a s e s of the war, w h e n p a r t y and ideological
elites b e c a m e deeply divided. In a s y s t e m a t i c test of this hypothesis in the d o -
m a i n of civil l i b e r t i e s , M c C l o s k y and Brill ( 1 9 8 3 : p. 4 2 1 ) classified m o r e than
100 civil liberties items according to the d e g r e e of support for the libertarian
option in relevant S u p r e m e C o u r t decisions and in the attitudes of s o m e 2 , 0 0 0
elites they had s u r v e y e d . T h e y found that for items on which the C o u r t and other
elites had strongly e n d o r s e d the civil liberties position, m e m b e r s of the general
public w h o had attended college w e r e , on a v e r a g e , 24 p e r c e n t a g e points more
libertarian than w e r e those with less than a high school e d u c a t i o n . Yet e d u c a t i o n
had a progressively w e a k e r effect in inducing support for libertarian policies as
elite s u p p o r t for t h e m d e c l i n e d , until finally, e d u c a t i o n had a slightly n e g a t i v e
1 This is my interpretation of the education effect reported by Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock
(1991, chap. 4). For a further discussion of this point, see Chapter 12.
 100 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
association with s u p p o r t for civil liberties on those (few) items on w h i c h the
pre-Rehnquist C o u r t and most elites took an antilibertarian position (for ex-
2
a m p l e , civil d i s o b e d i e n c e ) .
It is w i d e l y supposed that political awareness - w h e t h e r m e a s u r e d by k n o w l -
e d g e , p a r t i c i p a t i o n , or e d u c a t i o n - e n g e n d e r s resistance to elite influence rather
than, as a s s u m e d in the m a i n s t r e a m m o d e l , susceptibility to it. As will b e c o m e
clear in C h a p t e r s 7 - 1 1 , this supposition has s o m e validity. Political a w a r e n e s s
does a p p e a r to e n g e n d e r resistance to the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of g o v e r n i n g
authorities. But awareness does so less by e n g e n d e r i n g resistance per se than by
increasing t h e p e r s o n ' s sensitivity to the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of countervailing
elites, especially the ideological o p p o n e n t s of the r e g i m e . T h u s , for e x a m p l e , it
will turn out in C h a p t e r 9 that a major source of opposition to t h e V i e t n a m W a r
was the e x p o s u r e of politically a w a r e citizens to a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that
were t o o faint to be picked up by the less a w a r e . T h e notion that politically
aware persons resist all forms of political persuasion is highly dubious.
O n e other c o m m e n t . T h e r e are in every society ideas on w h i c h virtually ev-
e r y o n e agrees. In such c a s e s , the idea is unlikely to b e c o m e the object of studies
of public o p i n i o n , except perhaps in studies of c u l t u r e . S u c h " m o t h e r h o o d is-
s u e s " in t h e United States m i g h t include m a i n t e n a n c e of free e l e c t i o n s , tax-
s u p p o r t e d public s c h o o l s , and state-organized a t t e m p t s to repulse an invading
e n e m y . T h e m a i n s t r e a m model is less useful for policies of this type than for
policies on which there is p o p u l a r reluctance to go along with an elite c o n s e n s u s ,
such as tolerance of disliked g r o u p s , or support for w a r w h e n the nation is not
immediately threatened.
THE POLARIZATION EFFECT
T h e r e a r e , of c o u r s e , many cases in which political elites heatedly d i s a g r e e , so
that no " m a i n s t r e a m " exists. In cases of this t y p e , the R A S m o d e l leads us to
expect quite different patterns of m a s s attitudes.
To see why, let us a s s u m e a situation in which elites are roughly evenly di-
vided on a p a r t i s a n issue, with o n e p a r t i s a n c a m p s p o n s o r i n g persuasive m e s -
sages favoring t h e liberal position and the other s p o n s o r i n g m e s s a g e s in support
of the c o n s e r v a t i v e position. We further a s s u m e that each c a m p sponsors cueing
m e s s a g e s indicating why the given policy is or is not consistent with liberal (or
c o n s e r v a t i v e ) values. Finally, let us a s s u m e that all of these m e s s a g e s are equally
intense in that a person at a given level of political a w a r e n e s s w o u l d be equally
likely to e n c o u n t e r and take in any one of t h e m .
Within the general p u b l i c , increases in awareness will lead to increased re-
ception of persuasive m e s s a g e s favoring both the liberal position and the c o n -
servative position (from A l ) and also increased reception of c u e i n g m e s s a g e s
c o n c e r n i n g t h e issue. Let us focus first on how this affects liberals. Since p o -
litically a w a r e liberals will be likely to possess cueing m e s s a g e s that e n a b l e t h e m
2 See also Chong, McClosky, and Zaller, 1984.
Mainstream and polarization effects 101
to see the ideological implications of the m e s s a g e s they r e c e i v e , they will be
likely to reject c o n s e r v a t i v e a r g u m e n t s on this issue; these c u e i n g m e s s a g e s will
not, however, i m p e d e their internalization of liberal m e s s a g e s . Less politically
aware liberals, by contrast, will be exposed to few persuasive m e s s a g e s , a n d ,
owing to their low reception of cueing m e s s a g e s and the lower accessibility
of these cues in m e m o r y , will be less selective about the persuasive m e s s a g e s
they internalize.
In c o n s e q u e n c e of this d y n a m i c , the most a w a r e liberals will fill their h e a d s ,
so to speak, with a large n u m b e r of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that a r e , on b a l a n c e , favor-
able to the liberal side of the issue. Less aware liberals, for their p a r t , will fill
their h e a d s with a smaller n u m b e r of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
will not consistently favor the liberal side of the issue.
T h e s a m e a r g u m e n t , mutatis mutandis, applies to c o n s e r v a t i v e s . Highly a w a r e
c o n s e r v a t i v e s should fill their heads with mostly c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,
while less a w a r e c o n s e r v a t i v e s should fill their heads with a smaller n u m b e r of
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are less consistently c o n s e r v a t i v e .
O u r e x p e c t a t i o n , t h e n , is that for cases in which there is a roughly even
flow of o p p o s i n g p a r t i s a n m e s s a g e s , the ratio of ideologically consistent c o n -
siderations to ideologically inconsistent o n e s should increase as political aware-
ness increases.
Figure 4 . 1 h a s already c o n f i r m e d this e x p e c t a t i o n . As s h o w n there, the r a t i o
of consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s to total c o n s i d e r a t i o n s increases from about .5
a m o n g the least informed persons to about .80 a m o n g the m o s t informed. Two
of the slopes in Figure 4 . 1 are statistically significant at the .01 level and the
3
third is significant at the .10 l e v e l .
O n e m a y expect that an increasing r a t i o of ideologically consistent to incon-
sistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s should translate into differences in p e o p l e ' s attitude state-
m e n t s : M o r e a w a r e liberals will be m o r e likely to call to mind c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
favorable to the liberal position and h e n c e will be m o r e likely to s u p p o r t it. Less
aware liberals will be less likely to be able to recall c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of any k i n d ,
which will lead to higher no-opinion r a t e s , and less likely to endorse the liberal
4
position w h e n they do offer an o p i n i o n .
T h e logic of this a r g u m e n t again applies equally to c o n s e r v a t i v e s . T h a t is, in-
creases in awareness m a k e m a s s c o n s e r v a t i v e s increasingly likely to m a k e con-
servative attitude s t a t e m e n t s w h e n asked about the issue.
T h u s , in the c a s e of an evenly divided p a r t i s a n elite and a balanced flow of
partisan c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , the effect of political a w a r e n e s s is to p r o m o t e the
3 The relationships depicted in Figure 4.1, however, apply to the sample as a whole; closer inspec-
tion of the data reveals that the expected relationships hold only for liberals, where they hold very
strongly. For conservatives, there appears to be little change in the ratio of consistent-
to-inconsistent considerations as awareness increases. The reason for this complication appears to
be that the assumed conditions for the test have not been met, namely, a roughly even division of
elite support for the opposing policy alternatives. For none of the three options is the division of
mass opinion close to 50-50, as it ought to be in the case of an equal elite division. See Chapter
8 for further tests of the effect of awareness and ideology on the internalization of considerations.
4 See Krosnick and Milburn, 1990, for a review of the evidence on the effects of political awareness
on no-opinion rates.
 102 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Mainstream and polarization effects 103

polarization of attitude r e p o r t s as m o r e aware liberals gravitate m o r e reliably to

the liberal position and m o r e aware c o n s e r v a t i v e s gravitate m o r e reliably to the 1964 1970
100 100
c o n s e r v a t i v e position (D26).
Conservatives Conservatives
80

Empirical support for the polarization effect Percent 60

supporting
Liberals
M u c h empirical e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s the e x p e c t a t i o n of an awareness-induced p o - war 40
larization of liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on p a r t i s a n issues. T h e polarizing effect Liberals
20
of political a w a r e n e s s on p a r t i s a n (as against m a i n s t r e a m ) issues w a s first noted
by G e o r g e B e l k n a p and A n g u s C a m p b e l l ( 1 9 5 1 - 2 ) and w a s incorporated into the 0
M i c h i g a n s c h o o l ' s classic, The American Voter (Campbell et a l . , 1960: p p . 186, Political awareness
2 0 7 ) . U s i n g different theoretical v o c a b u l a r i e s , G a m s o n and Modigliani (1966)
Cons. N 42 53 71 86 102 40 53 120 114 153
and C h o n g , M c C l o s k y , and Zaller (1984) have noted the same effect. T h e y ex- 25 32 65 51 33 12 19 30 41 73
a m i n e public attitudes toward n u m e r o u s issues on which elites d i s a g r e e , issues
r a n g i n g from foreign policy to civil liberties to welfare to race to e c o n o m i c pol- Figure 6 . 1 . An illustration of the mainstream and polarization models. Liberals are de-
icy. In each c a s e , increases in political a w a r e n e s s were associated with a s h a r p e r fined as persons who rated liberals fifteen or more points higher than conservatives on
separate 100-point feeling thermometers; conservatives are persons who exhibited the re-
p o l a r i z a t i o n of attitudes b e t w e e n liberals (or D e m o c r a t s ) , on o n e s i d e , and con-
5
verse pattern. Persons supporting the war are those who said either that the United States
servatives (or R e p u b l i c a n s ) , on the o t h e r . should "keep troops in Vietnam but try to end the fighting," which was the position of
T h e d a t a in Figure 6.1 illustrate both the m a i n s t r e a m and p o l a r i z a t i o n effects both the Johnson and Nixon administrations, or that the U.S. should take a stronger stand
of political a w a r e n e s s . W h e n , in 1964, A m e r i c a n elites nearly all s u p p o r t e d on the war. The awareness measure is described in the Measures Appendix. Source: 1964
the V i e t n a m War, increases in a w a r e n e s s led nonelite liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s and 1970 CPS surveys.
to b e c o m e m o r e s u p p o r t i v e of the " m a i n s t r e a m " war policy. Yet w h e n , in
1970, A m e r i c a n elites had b e c o m e d e e p l y divided about the war, increases in Two days after the e l e c t i o n , however, Bush a n n o u n c e d a d e c i s i o n to send
awareness are a s s o c i a t e d with greater p o l a r i z a t i o n of the attitudes of m a s s lib- several h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d additional troops to the gulf. T h i s decision s p a r k e d
6
erals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . strong congressional c r i t i c i s m , leading to congressional h e a r i n g s in which ad-
T h e Persian G u l f W a r affords a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y to o b s e r v e both the main- ministration policy w a s harshly criticized and later to a congressional vote on a
stream and the p o l a r i z a t i o n effect. F r o m the Iraqi invasion of K u w a i t in A u g u s t w a r policy resolution. As in the V i e t n a m c a s e , D e m o c r a t s w e r e the most salient
1990 through t h e fall 1990 congressional e l e c t i o n , there w a s only light criticism critics of the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s h a w k i s h policies and R e p u b l i c a n s were t h e most
of President B u s h ' s h a n d l i n g of the crisis a n d , in particular, virtually no a r t i c - salient defenders.
ulate opposition to the policy of sending U . S . forces to the region. T h u s , as In v i e w of t h i s , we should expect, in the period before C o n g r e s s reacted crit-
J. W. A p p l e w r o t e on the eve of the e l e c t i o n , ically to B u s h ' s troop a n n o u n c e m e n t , to find e v i d e n c e of the m a i n s t r e a m effect;
after criticism b e g a n , we should expect to o b s e r v e the p o l a r i z a t i o n p a t t e r n .
[A] midterm election campaign has taken place with war threatening in the Persian Gulf, By g o o d luck, the 1990 National E l e c t i o n Study went into t h e field on the day
and . . . the major foreign policy issue confronting the nation has generated almost no after the election and w a s able to c o m p l e t e m o r e than 2 5 0 i n t e r v i e w s before con-
debate among the candidates about what the U.S. should do.
gressional c r i t i c i s m of B u s h ' s military buildup b e g a n . It also c a r r i e d a question
Instead, President Bush has traded insults with Saddam Hussein of Iraq, and the Dem-
ocrats have barely mentioned the subject. (New York Times, 6 November 1991, p. A l ) a s k i n g w h e t h e r " w e did the right thing in sending U . S . military forces to the
Persian Gulf, or should we have stayed o u t ? ' '
R e s u l t s , which are d e r i v e d from a m a x i m u m likelihood logistic regression
5 In Gamson and Modigliani, these findings are the basis for a "cognitive consistency" model of
opinion formation; in McClosky et al., they are the basis for a "contested norms" model of opin- that controls for political a w a r e n e s s , p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t , gender, r a c e , and Jewish
ionation. Yet in both cases, the empirical regularity being explained, as well as the operational 7
ethnicity are s h o w n in Figure 6 . 2 . ( T h e coefficients on which the figure is
constructs in the models, are the same as in the Belknap and Campbell polarization model. b a s e d are in Table 6 . 3 of the a p p e n d i x to this chapter.) As e x p e c t e d , the d a t a
6 To validate these claims concerning elite consensus and division, I asked a research assistant to
classify cover stories on Vietnam in Newsweek and Time. In 1964 prowar cover stories outnum- 7 Democrats and Republicans in the figure are constructed as persons with a score of ± 1.3 on the
bered antiwar ones by a margin of approximately 3 to 1; in 1970, the ratio was close 1 to 1. (See party variable, where party ranges from -2 (strong Republican) to +2 (strong Democrat). Aware-
also Hallin, 1986.) ness scores in the figure run from —1.8 SD to +2.57 SD.
104 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Mainstream and polarization effects 105

Before congressional criticism After congressional criticism

100 T 100y Republicans
75
Percent who Republicans
say it was
Democrats
"right thing" 50
to send troops
to Gulf
25
Political awareness
i
Figure 6.2. Partisans become more polarized over time on "right to send troops." Es-
timates are derived from coefficients in Table 6.3. Source: 1990 NES survey.
betray little e v i d e n c e of p a r t i s a n p o l a r i z a t i o n in the period prior to t h e c o n g r e s -
sional c r i t i c i s m of B u s h ' s policies, but clear p o l a r i z a t i o n afterward. Public di-
vision d o e s not a p p e a r to be as s h a r p as in the V i e t n a m c a s e , but this is probably
b e c a u s e elite polarization on Persian Gulf policy did not a p p r o a c h that of the
V i e t n a m p e r i o d in t e r m s of either d u r a t i o n or intensity.
Before c o n t i n u i n g the analysis of opinion on Persian G u l f policy, I must dis-
cuss a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issue. In c r e a t i n g Figure 6 . 2 from the coefficients in a
logistic regression m o d e l , I had to m a k e certain c o d i n g decisions. For e x a m p l e ,
to show the effects of political a w a r e n e s s , I m a n i p u l a t e d scores from roughly the
1st percentile on political a w a r e n e s s to the 98th percentile. Since I need to m a k e
many similar decisions about how to c r e a t e g r a p h s from coefficients in the next
several c h a p t e r s , I want to s t a n d a r d i z e my p r o c e d u r e s in an intelligible set of
c o n v e n t i o n s . A s u m m a r y of these c o n v e n t i o n s , w h i c h will be used for the rest of
the b o o k , is given in the a c c o m p a n y i n g b o x .
T h e 1990 N E S survey c a r r i e d o n e other q u e s t i o n w h i c h is useful for g a u g i n g
public opinion on the gulf crisis. It reads:
Which of the following do you think we should do now in the Persian Gulf:
Pull out U.S. forces entirely.
Try harder to find a diplomatic solution.
Tighten the economic embargo.
Take tougher military action.
All but the first of these o p t i o n s imply support for the basic United States
policy of military involvement in the Persian Gulf. S i n c e , with the possible ex-
ception of the congressional Black C a u c u s , virtually all of B u s h ' s elite critics
accepted this policy, we should expect to find that, a m o n g the p u b l i c , political
Conventions of graphical analysis
For graphs showing the relationship between political awareness, political pre-
dispositions, and a political attitude or attitude change, the following conven-
tions will apply in the remainder of the book:
Basic design. In all cases, political awareness will be treated as the principal
independent variable and plotted against the jr-axis. The dependent variable,
usually the probability of a political attitude or attitude change, the will be plot-
ted against the y-axis, as in Figure 6.2. The effect of differences in political
dispositions (such as, being a Democrat rather than a Republican) will be
shown by separate lines within the graphs, as in Figure 6.2.
Range of political awareness. Except as noted, graphs depict the simulated ef-
fect of moving from about the 1st percentile to about the 98th percentile on
political awareness. This range leaves about 1 percent of the cases outside each
endpoint, though, of course, lumpiness in the data makes it impossible to
achieve this range in every case. Because different awareness scales have dif-
ferent skews, the range of political awareness scores will not always correspond
to a particular z-score range, such as ±2 SD. The particular z-score ranges
used in the simulations will be provided in footnotes.
Range of simulated attitude scores. With one clearly noted exception, graphs
showing probabilities or proportions will use a scale of 0 to 1.0. When means
are used, graphs will reflect the range of mean values in the data. Thus, in the
case of means, the ranges can vary from figure to figure. However, unless ex-
plicitly noted, identical scales will be used in figures that are being compared
to one another.
Range of predispositional variables. Throughout the analysis, party attachment
is coded from -2 (strong Republican) to -1 (weak or independent Republican)
to +1 (weak or independent Democrat) to +2 strong Democrat, with all others
assigned to the score of zero. In graphs that depict the effect of being a Re-
publican or Democrat, partisans are simulated by scores of either —1.3 or
+ 1.3, as appropriate. The effects of other predispositional measures (such as
equalitarianism, hawkishness) are simulated differently in different cases, de-
pending on how many measures are available for use in a given model. For ex-
ample, if only one measure is used in a model, the range may be ±2 SD for that
variable; if three measures are used, their joint effect - that is, the effect of
identical movements on all three variables - will be depicted over a smaller
range. The exact values are provided in each case. The aim will be to approx-
imate the raw data, insofar as the raw data can be directly observed.
a w a r e n e s s is associated with g r e a t e r s u p p o r t for keeping U . S . forces in the
G u l f - w h i c h is to say, greater levels of rejection of the " p u l l o u t " option in
favor of o n e of t h e o t h e r three r e s p o n s e a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h i s e x p e c t a t i o n is c o n -
firmed in Figure 6 . 3 (see Table 6 . 3 , the c h a p t e r a p p e n d i x , for coefficients).
E v e n within the g r o u p most resistant to using military action against Iraq -
black D e m o c r a t i c w o m e n - rejection of the pullout option rises from about 54
percent in the lowest a w a r e n e s s c a t e g o r y to about 92 percent in the highest
 106 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Modal
100 T Republicans
75
Black Democratic
Percent who women
favor option
other than 50
pulling out Modal
U.S. troops Democrats
25
Political awareness
Figure 6.3. Support for keeping U.S. troops in the Persian Gulf. Estimates are derived
from coefficients in Table 6.3. Source: 1990 NES survey.
8
c a t e g o r y . T h e trends in Figure 6 . 3 were about the s a m e throughout the period
of the s u r v e y .9
It is difficult to be certain w h a t to expect from the three response o p t i o n s -
m o r e d i p l o m a c y , a tighter e m b a r g o , and t o u g h e r military action - that I have
c o u n t e d as i m p l y i n g s u p p o r t for military involvement in t h e Gulf. Certainly,
D e m o c r a t s en m a s s e wouid be e x p e c t e d to reject the c h o i c e of " t o u g h e r military
a c t i o n , " since t h e D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y in C o n g r e s s w a s clearly identified with o p -
position to this idea. T h e p r o b l e m is that it is not c l e a r that R e p u b l i c a n s should
be e x p e c t e d to e m b r a c e it. For B u s h ' s public position, especially in the early
m o n t h s of the c r i s i s , w a s that an e m b a r g o , in c o m b i n a t i o n with skilled diplo-
macy, w o u l d m a k e it possible to avoid the use of force. In m i d - D e c e m b e r , how-
ever, the Bush administration rejected a proposed J a n u a r y 12th m e e t i n g in
B a g h d a d on the g r o u n d s that it w a s t o o near the United N a t i o n s deadline for
Iraqi w i t h d r a w a l from K u w a i t to be useful for averting military action. By that
point, therefore, it w a s clear at least that willingness to use force w a s a key fea-
ture of Bush policy. O n e m i g h t therefore expect that at about that t i m e o p p o s i n g
partisan g r o u p s in t h e public b e c a m e increasingly polarized over the q u e s t i o n of
military force.
Figure 6 . 4 a p p e a r s to s u p p o r t this e x p e c t a t i o n . H i g h l y aware D e m o c r a t s
and R e p u b l i c a n s were apparently m o r e polarized over the use of force after D e -
c e m b e r 15 than they had been before. D e s p i t e this, however, the increase in p o -
8 In separate regressions for blacks and whites, political awareness is associated with rejection of
the pull-out option at least as strongly among blacks as among whites. (In a simple linear re-
gression of this question [scored 0-1] on political awareness, the intercept and slope for blacks
are .55 and .047, respectively; for whites, the intercept and slope are .78 and .022, with all terms
highly statistically significant; the range of political awareness is 0 through 13.) See Chapter 9
for additional discussion of the effects of elite opinion leadership on Afro-Americans.
9 Insofar as there was a time trend, it was toward less party polarization, but the trend did not
approach either statistical or substantive significance.
Mainstream and polarization effects 107
When Bush more conciliatory When Bush more threatening
100
Percent who ^
favor tougher
military action 50
against Iraq
25
0
Political awareness
Figure 6.4. Partisans become more polarized over time on use of military force. Esti-
mates are derived from coefficients in Table 6.3. Source: 1990 NES survey.
larization does not achieve statistical significance and must therefore be taken as
equivocal s u p p o r t for my e x p e c t a t i o n (coefficients s h o w n in Table 6 . 3 ) .
T h e key point here is that exposure to public affairs, as m e a s u r e d by tests of
political a w a r e n e s s , has i m p o r t a n t effects on m a s s a t t i t u d e s , but that these ef-
fects differ across policies and across t i m e , d e p e n d i n g on the positions taken by
political elites and reflected in the m a s s m e d i a . A w a r e n e s s is associated with
s u p p o r t for those a s p e c t s of g o v e r n m e n t policy that have the consensual s u p p o r t
of political and m e d i a e l i t e s , but is a s s o c i a t e d with higher levels of polarization
1 0
over policies on which elites are d i v i d e d .
To d e m o n s t r a t e this point m o r e rigorously, I selected items from the 1972—
7 4 - 7 6 N E S survey that s e e m e d o n their face t o exemplify m a i n s t r e a m policies
and p a r t i s a n policies of the early 1 9 7 0 s . " Table 6.1 c o n t a i n s a list of these
items. S e l e c t i o n of t h e items w a s b a s e d on my j u d g m e n t of the positions of lib-
eral and c o n s e r v a t i v e elites, political p a r t y elites, and the m a s s m e d i a at the
t i m e of t h e N E S study. To confirm these j u d g m e n t s , I a s k e d a research assistant
to read t h e platforms of the D e m o c r a t i c and Republican p a r t i e s in 1972, and to
rate each p a r t y on each issue. T h e research assistant w a s u n a w a r e of my e x p e c -
tations and d i d the r a t i n g s on the basis of instructions that were conveyed in
1 2
w r i t i n g . I expected that both p a r t i e s w o u l d explicitly e n d o r s e the policies I had
identified as m a i n s t r e a m policies, and w o u l d take sharply o p p o s i n g positions on
policies I had identified as p a r t i s a n policies. T h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s were largely
10 In showing that the public became more polarized in its attitudes toward Vietnam and Persian
Gulf policy, I have been, in effect, examining mass opinion change. The actual patterns of
change occurring in these cases are, however, considerably more complicated than I have been
able to demonstrate in this initial treatment. For further examination of opinion change on Viet-
nam, see Chapter 9; for a treatment of opinion change on Gulf war policy along the lines sketched
in Chapter 7, see Zaller (1992).
11 I used the panel data because this test was part of a study to test the comparative ability of po-
litical knowledge, education, political interest, media exposure, and political participation to
specify relationships that a good measure of political awareness should specify. It turned out that
political knowledge outperformed all of the alternative measures (see Zaller, 1990).
12 The written instructions are available from the author upon request.
 108 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Table 6.1. Question stems for opinions on mainstream and partisan
issues
Mainstream issues
This country would be better off if we just stayed home and did not concern
ourselves with problems in other parts of the world.
Do you think that mainland China should be a member of the United Nations, or do
you think it should not?
Should farmers and businessmen be allowed to do business with Communist
countries or should they be forbidden to do business with Communist countries?
Should the government support the right of black people to go to any hotel or
restaurant they can afford, or should it stay out of this matter?
Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that
women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and
government. Others feel that women's place is in the home.
Partisan issues
There is much discussion of the best way to deal with racial problems. Some
people think achieving racial integration of schools is so important that it justifies
busing children to schools out of their neighborhoods. Others think letting
children go to their neighborhood schools is so important that they oppose busing.
Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person
has a job and a good standard of living. Others think the government should just let
each person get ahead on their own.
Do you think we did the right thing in getting into the fighting in Vietnam or should
we have stayed out?
Source: 1972 NES survey.
c o n f i r m e d . T h e o n e exception involved an item about w h e t h e r the federal gov-
e r n m e n t should g u a r a n t e e blacks t h e right to equal treatment in hotels and res-
taurants. A provision on equal a c c o m m o d a t i o n s w a s a key p a r t of 1964 Civil
Rights Act, w h i c h , S e n a t o r B a r r y G o l d w a t e r n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , passed the C o n -
gress with majority s u p p o r t from both the D e m o c r a t i c and Republican p a r t i e s .
T h e D e m o c r a t i c platform, as I had e x p e c t e d , explicitly e n d o r s e d this policy, but
the R e p u b l i c a n Party, although professing general s u p p o r t for equal r i g h t s , m a d e
no direct reference to it. I c o n t i n u e , in light of the b i p a r t i s a n history of the Civil
Rights Act and the fact that even S o u t h e r n opposition to it had collapsed by
1972, to c o n s i d e r equal a c c o m m o d a t i o n s in hotels and restaurants a m a i n s t r e a m
government policy. 13
13 In addition to the items in Table 6.1,1 asked my research assistant to rate an item on whether the
government should act against inflation. There was strong endorsement of this principle by both
parties, but a ceiling effect on mass support for the policy prevented a test on the effect of po-
litical awareness on support for this idea.
Mainstream and polarization effects 109
T h e m o d e l used to e s t i m a t e the effect of a w a r e n e s s on each of these policy
items w a s as follows:
Prob(Lib. Response) = Prob(Opinionation) x Prob(Lib. I Opinionation)
T h a t i s , t h e probability of a liberal r e s p o n s e is the probability of offering
any opinion at all, t i m e s t h e probability of m a k i n g a liberal r e s p o n s e , given
that an opinion has b e e n offered. T h e t w o p a r t s of the m o d e l have been esti-
m a t e d separately.
T h e probability of a liberal o p i n i o n , given that an opinion s t a t e m e n t has been
m a d e , h a s b e e n m o d e l e d as a logit function of a w a r e n e s s , ideological self-
14
d e s i g n a t i o n , p a r t y identification, and standard d e m o g r a p h i c variables ( r a c e ,
a g e , i n c o m e , and r e s i d e n c e in a S o u t h e r n state). In addition to these v a r i a b l e s ,
the initial specification of each e q u a t i o n contained an interaction t e r m for
A w a r e n e s s x Ideology and A w a r e n e s s X Party. T h i s e q u a t i o n w a s e s t i m a t e d
separately for each of the five m a i n s t r e a m and three p a r t i s a n issues. To m a x i -
m i z e c o m p a r a b i l i t y of results across different item f o r m a t s , each item w a s coded
15
to a three-point scale r u n n i n g from 0 to 0 . 5 to 1 . 0 .
T h e e x p e c t a t i o n from the m o d e l is that for p a r t i s a n policies, the t w o A w a r e -
ness x Values interaction t e r m s will be s t r o n g , but that for m a i n s t r e a m policies
these interactions will be a n e m i c . T h e s e c o n d e x p e c t a t i o n is that awareness will
have an i m p o r t a n t positive impact on s u p p o r t for m a i n s t r e a m policies.
T h e first of these e x p e c t a t i o n s is largely c o n f i r m e d . T h e Ideology x A w a r e -
ness t e r m gets coefficients that are large for t h e three p a r t i s a n issues and trivial
for t h e five m a i n s t r e a m issues, exactly as e x p e c t e d . T h e P a r t y x A w a r e n e s s
t e r m b e h a v e s erratically, but its coefficients are either statistically insignificant
or t o o small to have m u c h i m p a c t , thus leaving the ideology interaction t e r m to
d o m i n a t e the results. Let us l o o k first at results for t h e three p a r t i s a n issues.
T h e coefficients for the three p a r t i s a n issues are s h o w n in the left-hand side of
Table 6 . 2 , and a graphical analysis of these coefficients is s h o w n in the top half
14 The question asked respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale that ran from "ex-
tremely liberal" to "liberal" to "slightly liberal" to "moderate, middle of the road" to "ex-
tremely conservative." The question was asked in all three waves of the survey, and in the test
reported below, responses over all three waves were averaged. People who gave no opinion in
one year were assigned their average for the other two years; people who gave a response in only
one year were assigned their response from that year. People who gave a no-opinion response all
three times were assigned to the sample average. This way of including respondents with missing
data would be expected to produce differences in item reliabilities across different respondents,
but since this difference is constant across all dependent variables, and since the key hypothesis
involves differences in the effect of ideology across different items, it would not be expected to
produce biased results. Omitting respondents with any missing data would, on the other hand,
undermine ability to detect the effect of awareness on support for mainstream policies, since the
people omitted would be mainly less-informed persons.
15 When the original item was an agree/disagree item, "in between" responses were coded to .5
and other responses were coded zero or one. The jobs and women's rights items were originally
seven-point scales; 4 was coded to .5 and the other points were coded to zero or one. Busing was
also originally a seven-point scale, but it was so skewed in the antibusing direction that it was
necessary to transform it; the far conservative position, which contained 68 percent of all re-
spondents, was coded to zero, the next most conservative position was coded to .5, and the re-
maining five scale points were coded to one.
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TABLE 6.2. Coefficient estimates for partisan and mainstream issues

Partisan issues Mainstream issues

Job Vietnam School Equal W o m e n ' s China Comm. Anti-
guarantee war busing accom. rights in UN trade isolation
Direction of response function?
Intercept -1.99 -0.57 -3.52 0.62 -0.74 1.33 0.40 2.28
Awareness (standardized)-0.84* -0.71* -0.71* 0.26* 0.50* 0.65* 0.73* 1.12*
Ideology (7-point scale) 0.37* 0.27* 0.60* 0.18* 0.33* 0.13 0.14 -0.11
Awareness X ideology 0.18* 0.19* 0.30* b _ oj** b b -0.07
Party (range +2 to - 2 ) ) 0.01 -.07 0.07 -0.09** 0.31* 0.01 0.01 0.01
Awareness X party 0.06 0.01 -0.13** 0.13* 0.02 b b -0.06

Opinionation function
Intercept 1.98 2.70 2.48 2.64 2.83 2.68 1.35 5.01
Awareness 0.89* 0.62* 0.80* 0.99* 0.51* 1.32* 0.73* 1.58*

a
Coefficients are from logistic equation described in text. Estimation was by nonlinear least squares.
Equations also included controls for race, age, South, and income; these coefficients are the same as those
used, but not reported for reasons of space, in Zaller (1990).
* Term omitted after F-test showed that coefficient had no statistical effect on equation; nonsignificant
terms were omitted only when they caused severe multicollinearity; see text for further discussion.
* Significant at .01 level. ** Significant at .05 level.
Source: 1 9 7 2 - 7 4 - 7 6 NES panel survey.
 112 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
However, multicollinearity can greatly reduce the precision of e s t i m a t e s even
w h e n the true effect of one of the collinear variables is z e r o . To test w h e t h e r 1 6
the A w a r e n e s s x Value interaction t e r m s had any real effect on the mainstream
policies, I r e e s t i m a t e d each e q u a t i o n without the interaction t e r m s and did an
F-test to see if the omissions had a significant effect on the residual s u m of
squares. For a n t i i s o l a t i o n i s m , w o m e n ' s r i g h t s , trade with c o m m u n i s t n a t i o n s ,
and a d m i s s i o n of C h i n a to the United N a t i o n s , the /-"-test indicated that the in-
teraction t e r m s did not c o n t r i b u t e significantly to the fit of the m o d e l . Moreover,
with the interactions o m i t t e d , a w a r e n e s s t o o k on a statistically significant p o s -
itive coefficient in all four c a s e s , as e x p e c t e d . In the fifth c a s e , equal a c c o m -
m o d a t i o n s , the Party x A w a r e n e s s coefficient r e m a i n e d significant, but with the
nonsignificant Ideology x A w a r e n e s s t e r m o m i t t e d , a w a r e n e s s had the e x p e c t e d
positive effect on support for this m a i n s t r e a m race p o l i c y . 17
T h e r i g h t - h a n d side of Table 6 . 2 and t h e bottom half of Figure 6 . 5 present the
results for t h e m a i n s t r e a m issues. Two mainstream issues - antiisolationism and
trade with c o m m u n i s t nations - are not s h o w n in Figure 6.5 but closely r e s e m -
ble the p a t t e r n for the item on admission of C h i n a to the United N a t i o n s , which
is s h o w n in the figure.
Of the five m a i n s t r e a m issues, only the w o m e n ' s role item raises any doubts
about the p e r f o r m a n c e of the m o d e l . T h o u g h a w a r e n e s s d o e s , as e x p e c t e d ,
have a positive effect on s u p p o r t for g e n d e r equality, the effect on liberals in
this interactive model is m o d e s t . Moreover, the effect of ideology is quite
large, especially if, as I m a i n t a i n , elite m e s s a g e s consensually favored an equal
role for w o m e n .
O n e e x p l a n a t i o n for these results is that, despite the e n d o r s e m e n t of the t w o
p a r t i e s in 1972, w o m e n ' s rights w a s not really a m a i n s t r e a m issue at that t i m e ;
if s o , it is no p r o b l e m for t h e m o d e l , w h i c h takes elite c o n s e n s u s as an initial
c o n d i t i o n . O t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s , however, a p p e a r m o r e p l a u s i b l e . T h e m o d e s t
slope for liberals, first of all, is the result of a ceiling effect a m o n g liberals. It
w o u l d be h a r d to get very m u c h positive slope in view of the fact that s u p p o r t
a m o n g l o w - a w a r e n e s s liberals starts out at 71 percent. W i t h respect to the large
effect of ideology, recall that 1972 w a s near the h i g h w a t e r m a r k for radical fem-
i n i s m , a v i e w p o i n t that had little m a s s s u p p o r t and may have had d e l e t e r i o u s
spillover effects on s u p p o r t for equal rights for w o m e n ( M a n s b r i d g e , 1986). Re-
call also that the Republican Party, a l t h o u g h endorsing equal rights for w o m e n
in 1972, w a s shortly to w i t h d r a w its s u p p o r t for the Equal Rights A m m e n d m e n t .
All this m a k e s the w o m e n ' s role issue a p a r t i c u l a r l y tough test of the m a i n s t r e a m
hypothesis. A n d yet the hypothesis is, in the e n d , upheld in the sense that there
is an i m p o r t a n t positive effect for a w a r e n e s s .
Altogether, t h e n , the m a i n s t r e a m results, along with those for the three par-
tisan issues, s u p p o r t the t w o basic d e d u c t i o n s of the m o d e l : In cases of elite
16 See Hanushek and Jackson, 1977: pp. 231-3; Rao and Miller, 1971: ch. 3.
17 It is not permissible to do a parallel test omitting the direct awareness term, since awareness must
be in the equation if awareness X ideology is included.
Mainstream and polarization effects 113
c o n s e n s u s , political awareness leads to increased s u p p o r t for the m a i n s t r e a m
policy, and in cases of elite division, political awareness leads to increased p o -
18
larization a m o n g g r o u p s having o p p o s e d value o r i e n t a t i o n s .
A T T I T U D E C O N S T R A I N T AND MASS B E L I E F SYSTEMS
An extensive research literature h a s d o c u m e n t e d that people w h o are liberal (or
c o n s e r v a t i v e ) on o n e issue tend to be relatively liberal (or c o n s e r v a t i v e ) on a
r a n g e of o t h e r issues. T h i s t e n d e n c y is most c o m m o n l y explained by m e a n s of
the concept of " a t t i t u d e c o n s t r a i n t , " w h i c h implies that o n e sort of attitude
(ideological o r i e n t a t i o n ) constrains other attitudes (policy preferences), thereby
linking a r a n g e of attitudes into a c o h e s i v e " b e l i e f s y s t e m . " T h e classic state-
ment of this a r g u m e n t is Philip C o n v e r s e ' s famous paper, " T h e nature of belief
1 9
systems in mass publics" ( 1 9 6 4 ) .
As it h a p p e n s , the logic of the p o l a r i z a t i o n a r g u m e n t is i s o m o r p h i c with the
logic of C o n v e r s e ' s account of attitude constraint in his 1964 paper. T h u s in ex-
plaining m a s s attitude p o l a r i z a t i o n o n p a r t i s a n issues, the R A S model h a s also
explained attitude constraint.
This point is easily d e m o n s t r a t e d . A c c o r d i n g to C o n v e r s e , ideologies origi-
nate a m o n g a " m i n u s c u l e " n u m b e r of " c r e a t i v e e l i t e s " and subsequently
diffuse t h r o u g h t h e public. Elites, t h u s , are the source of m a s s ideologies. C o n -
verse a r g u e s , however, that the diffusion of elite-created belief s y s t e m s is highly
imperfect. O n l y the politically a w a r e pay e n o u g h attention to elite discourse to
find out the ideological implications of different policies - in C o n v e r s e ' s t e r m s ,
to learn " w h a t g o e s with w h a t . " As a result, attitude constraint of the c o n v e n -
tional l i b e r a l - c o n s e r v a t i v e t y p e develops mainly a m o n g the m o r e politically
a w a r e strata.
C o m p a r e this a r g u m e n t to the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e p o l a r i z a t i o n m o d e l in the
upper half of Figure 6 . 5 : Highly a w a r e liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s (or D e m o -
crats and Republicans) look to a p p r o p r i a t e p a r t i s a n elites to find out " w h a t goes
with w h a t . " H a v i n g acquired this i n f o r m a t i o n , they are able to b e c o m e consis-
tently liberal or consistently c o n s e r v a t i v e across a r a n g e of issues. T h e less
a w a r e , as s h o w n in Figure 6 . 5 , are less likely to acquire the attitude that is con-
ventionally a p p r o p r i a t e to their p a r t i s a n o r i e n t a t i o n , and h e n c e less likely to d e -
velop " a t t i t u d e c o n s t r a i n t " across issues. T h e well-established finding of belief
s y s t e m s studies - that average interitem c o r r e l a t i o n s a m o n g issues are higher
18 Mainstream norms are determined not by what all elites actually believe, but by what the elites
who have regular access to the public say in their public utterances. If, for example, there were
many Southern elected officials who continued to oppose equal accommodations for blacks in
1972 but who had no access to the media to express this view, and if, on the other hand, sup-
porters of equal accommodations had good access to the mass media to publicize their side of the
issue, then equal accommodations would be classified as a mainstream norm. The elites who
count as shapers of public opinion in this model are those who have or control access to the mass
media.
19 For the most recent work and bibliographies of the vast literature in this area, see Wyckoff (1987)
and Jacoby (1991).
 114 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
a m o n g m o r e a w a r e citizens - is j u s t a generalization of this pattern to a cluster
of ideologically c h a r g e d issues ( s e e , for e x a m p l e , S t i m s o n , 1975; Jacoby,
20
1 9 9 1 ) . T h u s the existence of attitude consistency across issues, and the well-
d o c u m e n t e d t e n d e n c y for consistency to b e c o m e stronger with increases in
21
a w a r e n e s s , can both be explained by the R A S m o d e l (D27, D28).
This account of attitude consistency does not, so far as I can tell, differ in any
i m p o r t a n t way from C o n v e r s e ' s . It is simply a s o m e w h a t m o r e fully specified
statement of his general a r g u m e n t .
I shall have m o r e to say about attitude constraint in C h a p t e r 9, w h e r e I show
h o w it d e v e l o p s and c h a n g e s in situations in which t h e flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
is not, as I have a s s u m e d it to be in this chapter, either stable over t i m e or evenly
balanced b e t w e e n liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s .
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
T h e r e are a l t e r n a t i v e explanations for the empirical regularities noted in this
chapter, and it is instructive to r e v i e w t h e m , for they illustrate the fragmented
state of the public opinion field of which I c o m p l a i n e d in t h e opening c h a p t e r
For e x a m p l e , Cantril (1944) found that persons scoring high on a m e a s u r e of
political k n o w l e d g e were m o r e likely to s u p p o r t A m e r i c a n involvement in W o r l d
W a r I I , including n u m e r o u s p a r t i c u l a r policies of the Roosevelt a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ,
such as the foundation of a United N a t i o n s o r g a n i z a t i o n upon the defeat of
the A x i s powers. Canti il s e x p l a n a t i o n for this p a t t e r n is that better informed
A m e r i c a n s are likely to have a c o r r e c t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of their true interests.
Stouffer (1954) argues that better e d u c a t e d persons are m o r e s u p p o r t i v e of civil
liberties b e c a u s e they are more likely to give a " s o b e r s e c o n d t h o u g h t " to free-
d o m issues; A l l p o r t (1954: p. 405) cites the greater personal security of better
e d u c a t e d persons as a possible explanation for their g r e a t e r racial liberalism;
B o b o and Licari (1989) c o n t e n d that e d u c a t i o n p r o m o t e s political tolerance b e -
c a u s e it is associated with " m o r e sophisticated m o d e s of r e a s o n i n g " ; and 2 2
20 Lane (1973) and Marcus, Tabb, and Sullivan (1974), among many others, criticize Converse's
belief-systems argument on the grounds that it overlooks idiosyncratic ways in which individuals
may structure their attitudes, and that it arbitrarily equates ideological consistency with sophis-
tication. My account accepts the first point, claiming, in effect, that political awareness drives
a socialization process that overrides idiosyncratic attitude structures. My account does not,
however, equate consistency with sophistication except in the possibly perverse sense that an
ideologically "consistent" individual has managed to absorb a particular set of conventions.
21 Even critics of Converse's position find evidence that constraint varies by political awareness
(see Wyckoff, 1987). Wyckoff concludes with an excellent analysis of the conditions under
which attitude constraint is most likely to appear.
22 In their study of Political Tolerance and American Democracy, Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus
(1981) maintain that better educated persons are not more tolerant, once dislike for the target
group is controlled for. Two comments are in order here. The first is that the mainstream model
would expect better educated people to be more tolerant only when a traditionally protected civil
liberty is at stake - as in the case of freedom of political speech, which has been well protected
by the Supreme Court in recent years. But the mainstream model would not predict education to
be associated with support for civil liberties that have not achieved mainstream status, such as
the right of members of a self-proclaimed terrorist group, like the Symbionese Liberation
115
Mainstream and polarization effects
H a m i l t o n ( 1 9 6 8 ) and H a h n (1970) suggest that higher levels of s u p p o r t for the
V i e t n a m W a r a m o n g e d u c a t e d persons may be d u e , as H a m i l t o n puts it, to
" u p p e r - m i d d l e class a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m " (p. 4 4 6 ) . E a c h of these a r g u m e n t s is
perhaps plausible on its face, but n o n e generalizes easily to other issues. T h e
m o r e p a r s i m o n i o u s explanation o f the R A S m o d e l w o u l d b e that better e d u c a t e d
and o t h e r w i s e m o r e politically aware p e r s o n s have been in each c a s e m o r e
heavily e x p o s e d to m a i n s t r e a m elite values. ( A l t h o u g h the w o r k n e c e s s a r y to e s -
tablish the existence of m a i n s t r e a m n o r m s in s o m e of these c a s e s has not been
d o n e , I believe it could b e . )
In a careful p i e c e of w o r k , J a c k m a n (1978) notes that e d u c a t i o n is associated
with liberalism on s o m e race items (such as " s t r i c t s e g r e g a t i o n " of t h e races)
but not on others (such as b u s i n g ) . She c o n c l u d e s from this that, c o n t r a r y to
m u c h past r e s e a r c h , e d u c a t i o n p r o m o t e s only " s u p e r f i c i a l " l e a r n i n g o f d e m o -
cratic values r a t h e r than g e n u i n e c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e m . T h e a l t e r n a t i v e a r g u m e n t
of the R A S m o d e l , of c o u r s e , w o u l d be that the first type of item taps a main-
stream policy and the s e c o n d a p a r t i s a n p o l i c y . 23
T h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f the R A S m o d e l , w h i c h follows from K e y ' s o b s e r v a t i o n o n
the " i n d o c t r i n a t i n g e f f e c t " of e x p o s u r e to elite d i s c o u r s e , is preferable in each
of these cases b e c a u s e it is e m b e d d e d in a theory having a w i d e r r a n g e of a p -
plications. In particular, it can explain why awareness h a s a polarizing effect in
s o m e c a s e s and a m a i n s t r e a m effect in o t h e r s , even w h e n the substantive issue
domain is the s a m e . 2 4
T h e r e also exist a l t e r n a t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s for attitude constraint. M o s t stress
the internal sources of constraint - that is, s c h e m a t i c a s s o c i a t i o n s that d e v e l o p
within the m i n d as a result of t h o u g h t about the p a r t i c u l a r issues. T h e s e expla-
n a t i o n s also stress that m o r e politically aware persons (often described as p o -
litical " e x p e r t s " ) are m o r e ideologically consistent than are less aware persons
Army, to teach in the public schools. In looking for a global effect of education, Sullivan et al.
fail to distinguish between cases in which the mainstream model would expect to find educa-
tionally induced tolerance and cases in which it would not. (From table 5.2 of Sullivan et al.,
it appears that the effect of education on tolerance is large in the case of free speech for one's
most disliked group, but that the effect of education is nonexistent when it comes to being
"pleased" at having one's child date a member of one's least liked group; it may be that citizens
in a democracy ought, in some sense, to be tolerant of having their children date members of
their least liked political group, but nothing in the mainstream model would predict that better
educated people would be more likely to be so pleased than less well-educated ones.) Second,
even if the better educated people are more tolerant in part because they are less frightened of
certain groups, which appears to be the case, the support they give to mainstream civil liberties
remains politically significant. It is, moreover, quite possible that learning to discount one's fears
of radical groups is simply another element of mainstream civil liberties norms that is better
learned by better educated persons. For example, learning to discount one's irrational fears of
domestic communism seems to have been a principal "mainstream" lesson of the so-called Mc-
Carthyism period.
23 For a critique of Jackman that uses different conceptual machinery to reach essentially the same
conclusion, see chapter 4 of Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991.
24 The fact that, as Duch and Gibson (n.d.) point out, the effect of education on tolerance varies
substantially from one nation to another is further reason to believe that it measures differences
in socialization rather than differences in cognitive capacity or psychological adjustment.
116 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Mainstream and polarization effects

(novices) b e c a u s e they think m o r e about politics (Fiske and Kinder, 1981; J u d d
and K r o s n i c k , 1989). T h o u g h a p p r o a c h i n g the p r o b l e m quite differently,
L u s k i n ' s (1987) treatment of the relationship between attitude constraint and p o -
litical sophistication likewise stresses c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n i d e a - e l e m e n t s within
a person's mind.
T h o u g h not denying the i m p o r t a n c e of intrapsychic c o n n e c t i o n s and t h e in-
d i v i d u a l ' s o w n thought in developing t h e m , the R A S m o d e l m a n a g e s to explain
attitude consistency without referring to such mental o r g a n i z a t i o n . It instead
stresses the extrapsychic or external sources of constraint, n a m e l y the p a t t e r n of
elite division or nondivision on the given issue. In m a i n t a i n i n g this external fo-
c u s , the R A S m o d e l is able to explain the quite different effects that awareness
has in different c o n t e x t s , as in Figures 6.1 and 6 . 5 . A l s o , the R A S m o d e l can
better explain p h e n o m e n a , including r a n d o m response variation and r e s p o n s e ef-
fects, that affect novices and e x p e r t s alike. Finally, the present m o d e l , as s h o w n
in the next four c h a p t e r s , adds a d y n a m i c e l e m e n t to o u r understanding of h o w
a w a r e n e s s (or expertise) affects attitude s t a t e m e n t s , n a m e l y an account of atti-
tude c h a n g e .
Notes to Table 6.3
Note: Cell entries are coefficients from ML estimation of logistic
regression model, with standard errors shown in parentheses.
First dependent variable is whether the U.S. did the right thing
in sending troops to the Persian Gulf (0-1); the second is
whether U.S. should pursue some policy other than a pullout of
troops from the gulf region; the third is whether the United
States should take tougher military action against Iraq.
a
For the "right thing" question, time is coded 0 in the period
through November 9, when congressional criticism of
American involvement began, and 1 afterward. For the
"tougher military action" question, time is coded 0 in the period
through December 15, at which time President Bush rejected an
Iraqi meeting proposal, thereby signaling clear intent to enforce a
January 15 pullout deadline, and 1 afterward.
b
Block of three coefficients is statistically significant on F-test
at p < . 0 1 .
Source: 1990 NES survey.

APPENDIX

Table 6.3. Coefficients for Gulf War opinion

Right Reject Tougher

to send pullout military
troops of troops action
Intercept -0.02 -2.19 1.33
Awareness -0.24 -0.73 0.13
(standardized) (.17) (.09) (.07)
Party 0.09 0.28 0.19
(range -2 to +2) (.14) (.07) (-06)
Party x awareness -0.03 0.12 0.06
(.14) (.07) (.06)
0
Time -0.18 _ -0.42
(.19) (.19)
Gender -.60 -0.35 -0.81
(female = 1, else 0) (.13) (•16) (.14)
Race 1.04 0.69 0.84
(black = l . e l s e O ) (.20) (.17) (.25)
Ethnicity 0.19 -0.15 -0.27
(Jewish = 1, else 0) (49) (.63) (.49)

Time x party X awareness 0.15* -0.12

(.15) (.17)
Time X party 0.23* — -0.05
(.15) (.15)
Time x awareness -0.18* -0.12
(.19) - (.21)
N 1976 1987 1987

7 S u p p o s e t h a t , after s o m e interval of t i m e , public opinion on a certain issue
Basic processes of "attitude change"
Within the R A S m o d e l , " a t t i t u d e s , " in t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l sense of t h e t e r m , do not
exist. Rather, p e o p l e m a k e " a t t i t u d e r e p o r t s " o r " s u r v e y r e s p o n s e s " o n the ba-
sis of m o m e n t a r i l y salient c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A t t i t u d e c h a n g e , t h e n , cannot be un-
d e r s t o o d within the R A S model as a conversion e x p e r i e n c e , the replacement of
one crystallized opinion structure by another. It must instead be u n d e r s t o o d as a
c h a n g e in t h e b a l a n c e of positive a n d n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to a given
issue. To m o d e l it, one must represent the process by which new c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
are a d d e d to t h e pool of existing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in the p e r s o n ' s m i n d , thereby
p e r m a n e n t l y altering l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e probabilities on the issue. Permanent
alterations in long-term response probabilities are the R A S m o d e l ' s equivalent
of attitude c h a n g e . Since this p h r a s e is a c u m b e r s o m e o n e , my discussion of t h e
p h e n o m e n o n will retain the m o r e s t a n d a r d locution, attitude c h a n g e . However,
the r e a d e r s h o u l d k e e p in m i n d that I am using it as a p h r a s e of c o n v e n i e n c e , and
am actually referring to an alteration in l o n g - t e r m response probabilities that has
been brought about by the acquisition of n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Attitude c h a n g e , u n d e r s t o o d in this way, m a k e s an e n o r m o u s l y m o r e inter-
esting subject of study than cross-sectional opinion. W h e n a d e q u a t e opinion
d a t a are available, as they are in a handful of c a s e s , the analyst is no longer
forced to infer a d y n a m i c process from a static distribution of o p i n i o n , as w a s
d o n e in C h a p t e r 6, but can directly o b s e r v e the processes that are shaping opin-
ion. T h i s p e r m i t s a m o r e c h a l l e n g i n g and s t i m u l a t i n g test of t h e R A S m o d e l t h a n
has been possible so far. It will, in particular, enable us to see in detail w h e t h e r
the effects of e x p o s u r e to streams of o p p o s i n g information f l o w s , a r e , as
c l a i m e d , major forces in shaping m a s s attitudes.
T h i s c h a p t e r deals with the basics of attitude c h a n g e , including s o m e initial
tests of t h e a r g u m e n t . M o r e d e m a n d i n g and revealing tests of t h e m o d e l a p p e a r
in later chapters. A l t h o u g h I will c o n t i n u e to use the R A S m o d e l in this c h a p t e r
to d e d u c e e x p e c t e d p a t t e r n s in the d a t a , the d e d u c t i o n s will be fewer and easier
to keep track of. H e n c e , I will c e a s e n u m b e r i n g t h e m as in e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s .
MODELING ATTITUDE CHANGE
T h e defining a x i o m s o f t h e R A S m o d e l have strong implications for h o w attitude
c h a n g e , as just defined, may be expected to occur. To d e v e l o p these implica-
tions, we return to the fundamentals of the m o d e l .
Basic processes of "attitude change' 119
has c h a n g e d . F r o m the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the R A S m o d e l , such c h a n g e can only
h a v e o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e the relative salience of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d -
erations in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s is different from w h a t it w a s previously; t h i s , in t u r n ,
m a y have c o m e about by o n e of only t w o routes.
T h e first is that recent events or i n f o r m a t i o n m a y have increased t h e salience
of preexisting liberal or c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby bringing about
c h a n g e s in p e o p l e ' s attitude r e p o r t s , as discussed u n d e r the r u b r i c of salience
effects in C h a p t e r 5. A l t h o u g h salience effects m a y persist for any period of
t i m e , d e p e n d i n g on how long the events or information c a u s i n g t h e m remain
c u r r e n t , t h e y involve no c h a n g e s in p e o p l e ' s feelings t o w a r d the issue itself and
h e n c e do not fit the definition of attitude c h a n g e . Salience effects that persist
m a y b e m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e l y described a s " m o o d c h a n g e s . "
M o o d c h a n g e s m a y b e difficult t o distinguish e m p i r i c a l l y from attitude
c h a n g e , except in a laboratory e x p e r i m e n t that alters a p e r s o n ' s general state of
mind without e x p o s i n g h e r to any new ideas. N o n e t h e l e s s , I conjecture that the
w e l l - k n o w n presidential " r a l l y - r o u n d - t h e - f l a g e f f e c t s , " w h e r e b y the j o b perfor-
m a n c e r a t i n g s of U . S . presidents shoot up in t i m e s of international crisis ( M u e l -
ler, 1973; B r o d y , 1991), m a y be p a r t i a l l y d u e to m o o d shifts in t h e p u b l i c . T h a t
is, the public m a y lay greater stress on the p r e s i d e n t ' s leadership function in
t i m e s of threat, and evaluate h i m differently even t h o u g h the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s un-
d e r l y i n g t h e e v a l u a t i o n s a r e u n c h a n g e d . However, I stress that shifts in the na-
tional m o o d can b e , at m o s t , only a partial explanation for rally effects, since,
as B r o d y (1991) h a s s h o w n , t h e t i m i n g and m a g n i t u d e of rallies is d e p e n d e n t on
the extent to which other political elites support the president in t i m e of crisis.
O w i n g to t h e lack of d a t a , I shall have nothing further to say about m o o d effects
in this study.
T h e other way in which the R A S m o d e l allows c h a n g e s in the p u b l i c ' s re-
s p o n s e to an issue is as follows: S o m e m e m b e r s of t h e public have been e x p o s e d
to p e r s u a s i v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d a c c e p t e d t h e m as c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby al-
tering the b a l a n c e of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in their minds and
h e n c e their l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e probabilities. T h i s t y p e of c h a n g e fits the defi-
nition of attitude c h a n g e , as given a m o m e n t a g o . Attitude c h a n g e , t h u s , d e -
p e n d s on a t w o - s t e p process involving reception of new ideas and acceptance of
s o m e as n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby altering t h e b a l a n c e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in
people's minds.
Note that p e o p l e may form both n e w liberal and new c o n s e r v a t i v e consider-
a t i o n s d u r i n g a p e r i o d of attitude c h a n g e . All that is logically required for atti-
tude c h a n g e to o c c u r is that, if overall opinion h a s m o v e d , say, in a c o n s e r v a t i v e
d i r e c t i o n , t h e relative prevalence of c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in p e o p l e ' s
m i n d s h a s increased. If, as o u g h t n o r m a l l y to be the c a s e , the initially existing
balance of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s reflects the balance of c o m p e t i n g c o n s e r v a t i v e and lib-
eral m e s s a g e s in t h e p r e c e d i n g p e r i o d , t h e relative p r e v a l e n c e of c o n s e r v a t i v e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will increase if the relative intensity of the c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e
has increased.
 120 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
To take an e x a m p l e : S u p p o s e t h a t , e v e r y w e e k , t h e n e w s m e d i a broadcast n i n e
liberal stories on a given issue and o n e c o n s e r v a t i v e story, e a c h having equal
p r o m i n e n c e and credibility. T h e n s u p p o s e the m e d i a begin broadcasting eight
liberal and two c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s every w e e k . T h i s w o u l d count as a gain
in the relative intensity of the c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e and w o u l d create a m o v e -
ment of opinion in the c o n s e r v a t i v e direction.
It is helpful at this point to d r o p references to liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s -
sages a n d to recast the a r g u m e n t in t e r m s of d o m i n a n t and countervailing m e s -
sages. T h u s , t h e m e s s a g e that is m o r e intense d u r i n g the period of attitude
c h a n g e is defined as t h e dominant m e s s a g e , and t h e less intense m e s s a g e is t h e
countervailing m e s s a g e . O p i n i o n c h a n g e m a y s o m e t i m e s o c c u r in t h e direction
of t h e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g , or less i n t e n s e , m e s s a g e if t h e less intense m e s s a g e ,
t h o u g h r e m a i n i n g less intense, has n o n e t h e l e s s gained in relative intensity ( a s in
the e x a m p l e in the p r e c e d i n g p a r a g r a p h ) . Most often, however, opinion c h a n g e
probably r u n s in the direction of the m o r e intense or d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e .
Let us say that the probability a given individual will express s u p p o r t for the
d o m i n a n t position at t i m e 1 i s '
D,
Ci + D,
w h e r e C , a n d D , are t h e n u m b e r o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s i n t h e p e r s o n ' s m i n d initially
favoring t h e countervailing a n d d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n s , respectively. So if s o m e in-
dividual has three d o m i n a n t and t w o c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and if she
responds to survey q u e s t i o n s on the basis of the first c o n s i d e r a t i o n that c o m e s to
m i n d , the probability of stating a d o m i n a n t opinion is 3 / (3 + 2) = . 6 .
O v e r the next t i m e p e r i o d , persons may, in response to the political c o m m u -
nications they encounter, form n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . N e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s favoring
the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e will b e d e s i g n a t e d D , and n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s favoring
2
t h e c o u n t e r v a i l i n g position will b e C . G i v e n t h i s , c h a n g e i n l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e
2
probability - that i s , " a t t i t u d e c h a n g e " - can be specified as t h e difference b e -
t w e e n t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s favoring t h e d o m i n a n t position a t t i m e 2 ,
and t h e p r o p o r t i o n favoring this position at t i m e 1, as follows.-
(D\ + D)
2
C h a n g e in response probability =
D
C, + D , (7.1)
This e q u a t i o n , w h i c h simply c l a i m s that c h a n g e s in l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e p r o b -
abilities d e p e n d on c h a n g e s in the mix of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to an issue, is
the foundation for all of this s t u d y ' s subsequent investigation of attitude c h a n g e .
1 Again, I assume that individuals respond on the basis of the first consideration that comes to
mind, and also that some consideration always comes to mind - that is, people do not respond
"no opinion."
121
Basic processes of ' 'attitude change'
F r o m E q u a t i o n 7 . 1 , we can see that t h e incidence of attitude c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e
t o d o m i n a n t and countervailing m e s s a g e s d e p e n d s o n four q u a n t i t i e s : C , , D , ,
C , and D .
2 2
In b e g i n n i n g to think about the incidence of attitude c h a n g e , it is useful to
focus on resistance to c h a n g e in t h e direction of a d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e , given
e x p o s u r e t o d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s . S u c h resistance can take
three f o r m s , w h i c h I will d e s c r i b e as p a r t i s a n r e s i s t a n c e , inertial r e s i s t a n c e , and
c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance. E a c h d e p e n d s on o n e or m o r e of t h e t e r m s in Equa-
tion 7 . 1 , a s follows:
Partisan resistance. Individuals may refuse to internalize n e w d o m i n a n t m e s -
sages that they r e c o g n i z e as inconsistent with their u n d e r l y i n g p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s ,
w h e r e such recognition d e p e n d s (via a x i o m s A 1 - A 3 ) o n t h e possession and a c -
cessibility of contextual information from a relevant c u e i n g m e s s a g e . By reject-
ing d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e s , p e r s o n s e n s u r e that D is a small n u m b e r or p e r h a p s
2
z e r o , w h i c h r e d u c e s c h a n g e in the direction of t h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . B e c a u s e
such outright rejection of t h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e is r o o t e d in a p e r s o n ' s predis-
p o s i t i o n s , I refer to it as predispositional or p a r t i s a n r e s i s t a n c e .
Inertial resistance. Individuals, especially well-informed ones, may possess
large stores of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , C, and D , , so that even if s o m e n e w
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , D , are internalized, their effects will b e s w a m p e d b y t h e effects
2
of previously f o r m e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . B e c a u s e this form of resistance d e p e n d s on
t h e inertial m a s s of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , I refer to it as inertial resistance
to p e r s u a s i o n .
Countervalent resistance. Individuals may internalize countervalent consider-
a t i o n s , C , d u r i n g the p e r i o d of attitude c h a n g e . T h e effect of these consider-
2
ations in c o u n t e r a c t i n g newly f o r m e d d o m i n a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s is w h a t I call
countervalent resistance.
It follows from the logic of the R A S m o d e l that t h e incidence of each type of
resistance is likely to increase with increasing levels of political a w a r e n e s s . To
see why this is s o , we can c o n s i d e r the e x a m p l e of how liberals w o u l d be af-
fected by a d o m i n a n t c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e and a c o u n t e r v a i l i n g liberal m e s s a g e .
O b v i o u s l y , liberals will be m o r e likely than c o n s e r v a t i v e s to reject the d o m -
inant c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e - if they p o s s e s s the contextual information that en-
ables t h e m to r e c o g n i z e it as inconsistent with their predispositions. B e c a u s e
m o r e a w a r e liberals will, b y t h e R e c e p t i o n A x i o m , b e m o r e likely t o possess the
contextual information n e c e s s a r y to achieve such r e c o g n i t i o n , they will be more
likely to reject t h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e s w h i c h they r e c e i v e , thereby exhibiting
g r e a t e r partisan resistance than less a w a r e liberals.
T h e m o s t politically a w a r e liberals will also tend to have the largest stores
of existing liberal c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby m a k i n g t h e m most likely to exhibit
 122
N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
inertial resistance. T h e reason is that, as highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , they will h a v e
been m o r e heavily e x p o s e d to liberal m e s s a g e s previously, a n d , as liberals, they
will likely have internalized many of t h e m as c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Finally, highly aware liberals will be most heavily e x p o s e d to the countervail-
ing liberal m e s s a g e d u r i n g the period of attitude c h a n g e a n d , as liberals, they
will be likely to accept it. H e n c e they will be most likely to internalize new lib-
eral c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby exhibiting countervalent resistance to c h a n g e .
Note t h a t , in this e x a m p l e a n d t h r o u g h o u t my discussion of attitude c h a n g e ,
resistance to c h a n g e m e a n s resistance to c h a n g e in l o n g - t e r m r e s p o n s e p r o b a -
bilities. T h u s , the highly aware m a y internalize s o m e c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s but
yet, b e c a u s e they also form s o m e n e w c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s or exhibit
inertial r e s i s t a n c e , remain u n c h a n g e d in their l o n g - t e r m probability of giving a
conservative response.
M o r e generally, resistance to a d o m i n a n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow can take quite
different forms. People m a y resist either by rejecting u n c o n g e n i a l m e s s a g e s at
the point of e n c o u n t e r i n g t h e m , or, if s o m e a r e a c c e p t e d , by counteracting the
effects of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e s by m e a n s of c o u n t e r v a l e n t and inertial
considerations.
Since each of t h e three forms of resistance to persuasion p r o d u c e s distinctive
effects, it will be possible to d e m o n s t r a t e that each m a k e s an independent con-
tribution to resistance to attitude c h a n g e . C h a p t e r s 8 through 10 d e v e l o p the ev-
idence of t h e s e i n d e p e n d e n resistance effects.
T h i s chapter, however, takes a different tack. It will d e v e l o p a m o d e l of attitude
c h a n g e that m a k e s no direct reference to any of t h e three resistance m e c h a n i s m s ,
and no direct reference to c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . It will b e , therefore, a
" o n e - m e s s a g e " m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e , w h e r e the one m e s s a g e is the one that
is gaining in relative intensity and thereby bringing about attitude c h a n g e . T h e
o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l will serve to introduce the reader to the c o m p l e x patterns of
attitude c h a n g e that can be e x p e c t e d within the R A S m o d e l ; it will also be ca-
pable of functioning as a sort of " r e d u c e d f o r m " m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e in the
majority of situations in w h i c h t h e d a t a n e c e s s a r y to o b s e r v e t h e independent
effects of inertial, c o u n t e r v a l e n t , and p a r t i s a n resistance are unavailable.
A R E C E P T I O N - A C C E P T A N C E MODEL OF A T T I T U D E C H A N G E
F r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g discussion, attitude c h a n g e r e q u i r e s , at a m i n i m u m , r e c e p -
tion and a c c e p t a n c e of o n e or m o r e n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Accordingly, I will rep-
resent attitude c h a n g e as the o u t c o m e of the following probabilistic r e c e p t i o n -
acceptance process:
Prob(Change) = Prob(Reception) x Prob(Acceptance I Reception) (7.2)
where
Prob(Change) = probability of change in long-term response probability
Prob(Reception) = probability of reception of a change-inducing message; by
reception is meant that the person has been exposed to and
comprehended the message
Basic processes of "attitude change' 123
Prob(Acceptance I Reception) = probability of accepting (or internalizing) the mes-
sage, given reception
T h u s if, for e x a m p l e , an individual h a s a .5 probability of receiving a m e s s a g e
and a .5 probability of a c c e p t i n g it (having received it), his probability of atti-
tude c h a n g e , a c c o r d i n g to this m o d e l , is simply the product of these reception
and a c c e p t a n c e p r o b a b i l i t i e s , that is, .5 x .5 = . 2 5 .
As is o b v i o u s , this formulation of the attitude c h a n g e process omits any ref-
erence to " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , " which cannot be easily m e a s u r e d in most attitude
c h a n g e s i t u a t i o n s , and refers instead to the probability of c h a n g e in a p e r s o n ' s
s u m m a r y attitude r e p o r t . It also o m i t s any reference to c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s ,
even t h o u g h they will often be present in attitude c h a n g e situations. T h e s e are
significant simplifications. Yet, E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 does depict a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e
p r o c e s s , as required by the R A S m o d e l , and the e q u a t i o n c a n , as we shall see,
be filled out in a way that implicitly a c c o m m o d a t e s the effects of both c o n s i d -
e r a t i o n s a n d c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s o n the incidence o f attitude c h a n g e .
Let us begin filling out E q u a t i o n 7.2 by m o r e fully specifying the reception
and a c c e p t a n c e functions that jointly constitute it. F r o m previous c h a p t e r s , we
k n o w that the probability of reception of c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s is positively
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a p e r s o n ' s level of general political a w a r e n e s s . T h u s we can stip-
ulate that P r o b ( R e c e p t i o n ) in E q u a t i o n 7.2 is an increasing (positive) function
of political awareness.
W i t h respect to the a c c e p t a n c e function in E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 , we k n o w from the
previous s e c t i o n that - o w i n g to their g r e a t e r attention to c u e i n g m e s s a g e s , their
larger stores of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and their greater exposure to countervalent m e s -
sages - m o r e a w a r e persons are relatively m o r e resistant to the effects of d o m -
inant m e s s a g e s that are inconsistent with their predispositions. We can therefore
use a w a r e n e s s , a m e a s u r e d v a r i a b l e , to capture t h e effects of t h e s e three
difficult-to-observe resistance m e c h a n i s m s . M o r e specifically, we can specify an
a c c e p t a n c e function for E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 in which a c c e p t a n c e rates decline as
a w a r e n e s s and ideological distance from the m e s s a g e jointly increase.
Before c o m p l e t i n g specification of the reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions, it
will be useful to p r o v i d e illustrations of t h e ideas d e v e l o p e d so far and to sketch
their principal implications. C o n s i d e r the following hypothetical d a t a , which
give probabilities of r e c e p t i o n , a c c e p t a n c e , and attitude c h a n g e for persons hav-
ing different levels of political a w a r e n e s s :
Attitude change in response to a hypothetical message
Level of awareness
Low Middle High
Prob(Reception) .10 .50 .90
Prob(Accept I Reception) .90 .50 .10
Change (Reception x Acceptance) .09 . 25 .09
In the first row, reception probabilities increase from .10 to .50 to .90 as polit-
ical a w a r e n e s s increases from low to m i d d l e to h i g h . T h e s e n u m b e r s c a p t u r e t h e
n o t i o n , central t o t h e R A S m o d e l , that reception increases w i t h awareness. I n
 124 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
the s e c o n d row, a c c e p t a n c e probabilities d e c r e a s e from . 9 0 to . 10 as awareness
increases from low to h i g h . T h e s e hypothetical n u m b e r s capture the n o t i o n , d e -
veloped in t h e p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n , that a c c e p t a n c e levels tend to decline with in-
c r e a s e s in a w a r e n e s s . T h e resulting c h a n g e probabilities, which are formed by
m u l t i p l y i n g reception rates by a c c e p t a n c e rates within each c o l u m n , are shown
in the third row. As can be s e e n , persons in the m i d d l e levels of awareness are
most likely to e x p e r i e n c e attitude c h a n g e in this hypothetical c a s e .
T h u s , the m o d e l implies that the relationship b e t w e e n awareness and attitude
c h a n g e m a y be n o n m o n o t o n i c , that is, that p e r s o n s at m i d d l e levels of a w a r e n e s s
may be most likely to c h a n g e . As w a s indicated in t h e brief discussion of c o n -
gressional e l e c t i o n s in C h a p t e r 2, and as m u c h m o r e e v i d e n c e will attest, non-
m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e turn up with c o n s i d e r a b l e regularity in
o p i n i o n d a t a . H e n c e , E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 , w i t h further e l a b o r a t i o n o f t h e r e c e p t i o n and
a c c e p t a n c e functions, will be central to t h e explanation of attitude c h a n g e over
t h e next four c h a p t e r s .
It must i m m e d i a t e l y be a d d e d , however, that attitude c h a n g e does not always
c o n f o r m to a n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n . M a r k e d l y different p a t t e r n s of c h a n g e are
e x p e c t e d , d e p e n d i n g on how various message-level and individual-level factors
interact. T h u s , a nonmonotonic pattern of attitude change is simply one special
case among many possibilities. T h e s e different possibilities do not occur at ran-
d o m but a d h e r e to a definite theoretical m o d e l . T h i s point is best m a d e by re-
v i e w i n g the w o r k of William M c G u i r e ( 1 9 6 8 , 1969), t h e social psychologist w h o
first p r o p o s e d a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e h a v i n g t h e form
of E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 .
PATTERNS OF ATTITUDE CHANGE
M c G u i r e began with a p r o b l e m that had long vexed social p s y c h o l o g i s t s , namely
the relation b e t w e e n personality and persuasibility. M c G u i r e noted that several
personality traits - self-esteem, intelligence, and freedom from anxiety - had
been shown to be associated with n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e in
e x p e r i m e n t a l studies of persuasion in laboratory settings. To explain this occur-
r e n c e , he suggested that these personality traits m i g h t be positively associated
with reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s but negatively a s s o c i a t e d with dis-
2
position t o w a r d a c c e p t a n c e , given r e c e p t i o n . In t h e c a s e of t h e e x p e c t e d p o s -
itive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n self-esteem and r e c e p t i o n , for e x a m p l e , o n e m i g h t
a r g u e that high self-esteem is a s s o c i a t e d w i t h low need for e g o defense, greater
capacity for focusing o n e ' s a t t e n t i o n , a n d lower levels of anxiety - all of w h i c h
3
c o n d u c e t o w a r d a h i g h e r probability of reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n .
As r e g a r d s the e x p e c t e d n e g a t i v e relationship between self-esteem and a c c e p -
2 McGuire's term for what I am calling acceptance was yielding.
3 For evidence that self-esteem is associated with exposure to political values in a nonlaboratory
setting, see Sniderman, 1975.
Basic processes of ' 'attitude change' 125
tance of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s which one has received, one could a r g u e that p e o -
ple possessing little self-esteem tend to yield uncritically to w h a t e v e r c o m m u -
nications they h a p p e n to encounter.
H a v i n g thus posited that self-esteem h a s a positive relationship with reception
and a n e g a t i v e relationship with a c c e p t a n c e , M c G u i r e proposed t h e logic of t h e
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , as e m b o d i e d in E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 and illustrated in t h e
hypothetical d a t a just e x a m i n e d , to explain why the e x p e c t e d relation b e t w e e n
self-esteem and attitude c h a n g e is, u n d e r certain c o n d i t i o n s , n o n m o n o t o n i c .
M c G u i r e goes o n , however, to show that E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 can account for a va-
riety of other patterns of opinion c h a n g e . In fact, the great value of t h e
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model proposed by M c G u i r e is that it e n a b l e s the analyst
to explain results that s e e m at first to be contradictory. C o n s i d e r a typical " h a r d
l e a r n i n g " s i t u a t i o n , which is defined as a situation in which the persuasive m e s -
sage is, for s o m e r e a s o n , difficult to receive. T h e factors m a k i n g for difficulty
of reception might include b a c k g r o u n d n o i s e , the presence of d i s t r a c t i o n s , or t h e
inherent difficulty of the m e s s a g e . A prototypical h a r d l e a r n i n g situation is a
college lecture in physics. All physics students may be p r e s u m e d to have a h i g h
disposition toward a c c e p t a n c e of the c o n t e n t s of the lecture, but only the most
intelligent may be able to understand it.
O n e can capture this situation by saying that e v e r y o n e h a s a 1.0 probability of
a c c e p t i n g the contents of the physics lecture, given reception of it. But effective
reception of the physics lecture will be positively c o r r e l a t e d with intelligence.
W h e n we represent these ideas in a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e t a b l e , like the one fol-
lowing, we find (in the b o t t o m row of t h e table) that the most intelligent students
are most likely to u n d e r g o " a t t i t u d e c h a n g e " in response to the instructor's
"persuasive argument."
Attitude change in a "hard learning" situation
Levels of intelligence
Low Middle High
Prob(Reception) .10 .20 .30
Prob(Accept 1 Reception) 1.0 1.0 1.0
Change (Reception x Acceptance) .10 .20 .30
As will be seen below, there are also political situations in which m e s s a g e s
h a v e so little intensity, or are so difficult to c o m p r e h e n d , t h a t , like s o m e physics
lectures, they reach only the most a w a r e persons. In such c a s e s , w h i c h m i g h t
also b e called " h a r d l e a r n i n g " s i t u a t i o n s , the most a w a r e persons are most
likely to c h a n g e . A l t h o u g h generally resistant to p e r s u a s i o n , they are the only
people w h o will have been effectively e x p o s e d to any n e w i n f o r m a t i o n .
Now c o n s i d e r an entirely different kind of persuasion situation, an " e a s y
l e a r n i n g " situation in which s o m e o n e stands in front of a large a u d i e n c e and
repeats suggestively, " Y o u r head is m o v i n g back and forth, back and f o r t h . "
W h a t m a k e s this an e a s y l e a r n i n g situation is that the persuasive m e s s a g e is so
extremely s i m p l e and c l e a r that w e m a y a s s u m e that essentially e v e r y o n e , except
 126 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Basic processes of ' 'attitude change' 127

perhaps the h a r d of h e a r i n g , receives it. To capture the d y n a m i c s of such an easy

Attitude change in response to a liberal message within three ideological groups
learning situation, we set e v e r y o n e ' s reception probability to 1.0. If, as s h o w n
Level of awareness
below, we a s s u m e that a c c e p t a n c e probabilities in this situation would be neg-
Among liberals Among centrists Among conservs.
atively c o r r e l a t e d with intelligence, and then c a r r y out the multiplication of
Low Middle High Low Middle High Low Middle High
rows in a c c o r d with the m o d e l , we find that p e o p l e with the least intelligence
should be m o s t likely to begin swaying their heads back and forth. Prob(Reception) .10 .50 .90 .10 .50 .90 .10 .50 .90
Prob(Accept I Reception) _90_ .85 .80 .90 .55 .20 .90 .46 .02
Attitude change in an "easy learning" situation Change(Reception x Acceptance) .09 .425 .72 .09 .275 .18 .09 .23 .018
Levels of intelligence
Low Middle High W i t h i n all three g r o u p s , r e c e p t i o n of t h e liberal m e s s a g e increases from . 10 to
Prob(Reception) 1.0 1.0 1.0 .50 to .90 as political a w a r e n e s s i n c r e a s e s ; this is shown in the top row of each
Prob(Accept 1 Reception) .90 .50 .10
p a r t of t h e t a b l e and indicates that the intensity of the persuasive m e s s a g e is the
Change (Reception x Acceptance) .90 .50 .10
s a m e for all three g r o u p s . A l s o within all g r o u p s , a c c e p t a n c e rates decline with
a w a r e n e s s . Yet t h e decline in a c c e p t a n c e rates is m u c h steeper for c o n s e r v a t i v e s
M c G u i r e cites n u m e r o u s studies w h o s e results, t h o u g h o n c e apparently con- ( w h e r e it falls from .90 to .02) than a m o n g liberals ( w h e r e it declines only from
tradictory, m a k e sense w h e n interpreted in light of this m o d e l . For any individ- .90 to . 8 0 ) , with centrists falling in b e t w e e n . T h e result is that attitude c h a n g e
ual trait v a r i a b l e that is positively c o r r e l a t e d w i t h reception of persuasive is expected to follow different p a t t e r n s in the two g r o u p s : C h a n g e rises with
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and negatively c o r r e l a t e d with likelihood of uncritically ac- awareness a m o n g liberals (from .09 to .425 to .72) but is n o n m o n o t o n i c with
cepting t h e m , t h e relation between the trait and attitude c h a n g e can be positive, respect to a w a r e n e s s a m o n g centrists and c o n s e r v a t i v e s .
n e g a t i v e , or n o n m o n o t o n i c , d e p e n d i n g on w h e t h e r the persuasion situation B e c a u s e these p a t t e r n s r e a p p e a r in v a r i o u s guises t h r o u g h o u t t h e rest of t h e
stresses t h e capacity of subjects to receive the m e s s a g e (as in the educational or b o o k , generally r e s e m b l i n g actual e s t i m a t e s of reception and a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s ,
" h a r d l e a r n i n g " situations), their willingness to accept the m e s s a g e (as in the as s h o w n in F i g u r e s 7 . 4 and 1 0 . 1 , it is essential for t h e r e a d e r to be entirely c l e a r
case of the easy but repetitious m e s s a g e ) , or both (which m a y s o m e t i m e s pro- about h o w t h e n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y c o m e s about: C o n s e r v a t i v e s and centrists h a v i n g
duce a n o n m o n o t o n i c pattern of c h a n g e ) . low levels of awareness do not c h a n g e m u c h b e c a u s e only 10 percent of t h e m a r e
Political a w a r e n e s s , like the personality traits that M c G u i r e e x a m i n e d , would ever e x p o s e d t o any c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s . H i g h l y a w a r e c o n s e r v a t i v e s a n d
be e x p e c t e d to be positively c o r r e l a t e d with reception of persuasive c o m m u n i - centrists a r e very likely to be e x p o s e d to t h e liberal m e s s a g e (their r e c e p t i o n r a t e
c a t i o n s a n d negatively correlated with likelihood of uncritical a c c e p t a n c e . is 90 p e r c e n t ) , but their a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s are so low (2 and 20 p e r c e n t , respec-
H e n c e , the relation between a w a r e n e s s and attitude c h a n g e m a y be p o s i t i v e , tively) that few e n d u p c h a n g i n g their attitudes. T h i s leaves m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e
n e g a t i v e , or n o n m o n o t o n i c . In fact, w h o l e families of c u r v e s can be g e n e r a t e d in c o n s e r v a t i v e s and centrists m o s t s u s c e p t i b l e t o c h a n g e : T h e y pay e n o u g h atten-
theory and m a t c h e d to actual d a t a , d e p e n d i n g on how an individual's p r e d i s p o - tion to be likely to receive t h e liberal m e s s a g e but are not sufficiently a w a r e to
sitions and a w a r e n e s s interact with p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e s . be able to reject it as inconsistent with their values. T h e shapes of the n o n m o n o -
W h a t gives rise to families of c u r v e s , r a t h e r than a single c u r v e p a t t e r n , is that tonic c h a n g e c u r v e s a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s a r e , a s can b e seen, s o m e w h a t differ-
persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s vary c o n t i n u o u s l y from very hard (or " l o w inten- ent than a m o n g centrists, b e c a u s e the n e g a t i v e effect of a w a r e n e s s on a c c e p t a n c e
s i t y " ) to very e a s y ( " h i g h i n t e n s i t y " ) , and as m e s s a g e intensity c h a n g e s , the is stronger in the former c a s e than in the latter.
shapes of the attitude c h a n g e curves g e n e r a t e d by the m e s s a g e s c h a n g e incre- A q u e s t i o n that arises in this e x a m p l e is why, a m o n g liberals, there is any
mentally. Similarly, resistance to a m e s s a g e may differ incrementally in different t e n d e n c y for a w a r e n e s s to c r e a t e resistance to persuasion by a liberal m e s s a g e .
g r o u p s , d e p e n d i n g on the fit b e t w e e n their p a r t i s a n s h i p and the p a r t i s a n color- I n d e e d , m i g h t not a c c e p t a n c e rates rise with political a w a r e n e s s w h e n the m e s -
ation of the m e s s a g e source. T h i s w a s a type of factor that M c G u i r e did not c o n - sage is a congenial o n e ?
sider, but it can greatly affect the shape of the attitude c h a n g e c u r v e s that o n e
My a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n is e m p i r i c a l : W h e n a m o d e l is d e s i g n e d to allow
observes. Let me offer s o m e illustrations.
for this sort of i n t e r a c t i o n , there turns out always to be a negative relation
T h e following set of tables illustrates h o w p a t t e r n s of r e c e p t i o n and a c c e p t a n c e b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and probability of a c c e p t a n c e , even w h e n the m e s s a g e is
of a liberal message a m o n g three ideological g r o u p s - liberals, c e n t r i s t s , a n d ideologically c o n g e n i a l . T h e effect of a w a r e n e s s on a c c e p t a n c e m a y be slight, as
c o n s e r v a t i v e s - m i g h t c o m e together to form a family of attitude c h a n g e c u r v e s : in this e x a m p l e of liberals r e s p o n d i n g to a liberal m e s s a g e , but it s e e m s a l w a y s
 128 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
4
to be n e g a t i v e . W h a t this indicates is that, p e r h a p s for r e a s o n s of inertial re-
sistance, m o r e a w a r e p e r s o n s a r e a l w a y s s o m e w h a t m o r e resistant t o c h a n g e ,
given r e c e p t i o n of a c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e , t h a n a r e less a w a r e persons.
I N I T I A L TESTS O F T H E MODEL
Even t h o u g h d e v e l o p m e n t of the abbreviated r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is not
yet c o m p l e t e , it is useful to d e m o n s t r a t e that the s i m u l a t i o n s just outlined re-
s e m b l e cases of attitude c h a n g e that actually occur in the political w o r l d . I will
take t w o such c a s e s , o n e involving opinion c h a n g e in a liberal direction and the
other c h a n g e in a c o n s e r v a t i v e d i r e c t i o n .
T h e first c a s e involves public attitudes t o w a r d defense s p e n d i n g . In the 1980
and 1982 e l e c t i o n studies, t h e N E S a s k e d the following q u e s t i o n :
Some people believe we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that de-
fense spending should be greatly increased. Where do you stand on this issue, or haven't
you thought much about it?
R e s p o n d e n t s w e r e then a s k e d to place t h e m s e l v e s on a seven-point s c a l e , from
greatly r e d u c e d s p e n d i n g at point 1 to greatly increased s p e n d i n g at point 7.
D u r i n g t h e t w o - y e a r interval b e t w e e n s u r v e y s , c o v e r a g e of t h e defense issue
in the press w a s heavily unfavorable t o w a r d defense s p e n d i n g . As discussed in
C h a p t e r 2, a c o n t e n t analysis of stories in Newsweek found that stories favoring
cuts in s p e n d i n g o u t n u m b e r e d p r o - s p e n d i n g stories by a r a t i o of about 2 to 1.
Thus, although countervalent communications were present, there was a domi-
nant, a n t i - d e f e n s e - s p e n d i n g m e s s a g e in this p e r i o d . P r e s u m a b l y as a result of
this d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e , the p e r c e n t a g e of persons favoring cuts in defense (per-
sons w h o t o o k point 1, 2, or 3 on the defense scale) in the t w o N E S surveys rose
from 10 percent to 28 p e r c e n t . 5
T h e s e c o n d e x a m p l e involves U . S . policy in Central A m e r i c a . T h e q u e s t i o n ,
w h i c h w a s a s k e d in the fall of 1986 a n d again to a s u b s a m p l e of the s a m e re-
s p o n d e n t s in J u n e 1987, w a s as follows:
Some people feel that the United States should become much more involved in the in-
ternal affairs of Central America. Others feel we should become much less involved.
Where do you stand on this issue, or haven't you thought much about it?
T h e I r a n - C o n t r a controversy e m e r g e d in November, as the N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n
Study w e n t into t h e field, and hit full stride over the next few m o n t h s . At the h e a r t
of t h e controversy w e r e a l l e g a t i o n s that t h e R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n had illegally
used funds from t h e sale of w e a p o n s to Iran to s u p p o r t t h e C o n t r a g u e r r i l l a s ,
4 In particular, there is no tendency for awareness to interact with ideology in the acceptance pro-
cess so as to produce a positive awareness slope for one ideological group and a negative one for
the other. Except in Tables 7.3 and 9.1,1 have not reported the results of such tests, because I have
regarded them as exploratory.
5 In the period from 1978 to 1980, coverage of the defense issue in the same magazine favored
increases in defense spending by about the same ratio it favored decreases in spending over the
period 1980 to 1982. However, the NES surveys did not begin to carry parallel measures of at-
titudes toward defense spending until the 1980-2 period.
Basic processes of ' 'attitude change' 129
w h o w e r e fighting t o o v e r t h r o w t h e c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t o f N i c a r a g u a . T h e
S e n a t e ' s I r a n - C o n t r a h e a r i n g s w e r e u n d e r way at the t i m e of the reinterview in
J u n e . As we will see in the next chapter, this controversy brought a steep decline in
President R e a g a n ' s popularity. But it also brought increased publicity to the Pres-
i d e n t ' s Central A m e r i c a policy, as exemplified in the defiant testimony of Lieuten-
ant C o l o n e l Oliver N o r t h at the S e n a t e C o n t r a h e a r i n g s . T h e result was increased
public s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a . In the 1 9 8 6 - 7
N E S s u r v e y s , the increase w a s from 2 8 percent s u p p o r t t o 3 8 percent s u p p o r t . 6
G i v e n that m a s s attitude c h a n g e h a s o c c u r r e d , t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e
m o d e l gives u s definite e x p e c t a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p a t t e r n s o f t h e c h a n g e .
W h e n opinion c h a n g e s in r e s p o n s e to a p r e d o m i n a n t l y liberal m e s s a g e , as in t h e
c a s e of defense s p e n d i n g , we expect t h a t , for liberals, t h e r e will be a positive
relation b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and likelihood of c h a n g e , as in the preced-
ing e x a m p l e . For c o n s e r v a t i v e s r e s p o n d i n g to a liberal m e s s a g e , we expect a
n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n in w h i c h m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e c o n s e r v a t i v e s are most likely
to c h a n g e , as also indicated in the p r e c e d i n g . But w h e n , as in the Central A m e r -
ica issue, m a s s attitude c h a n g e occurs in r e s p o n s e to a conservative m e s s a g e ,
our e x p e c t a t i o n s for liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s reverse: We anticipate a positive
relation b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and c h a n g e a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s , and a n o n m o n o -
tonic relation with a w a r e n e s s a m o n g liberals.
To test t h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s , we n e e d , for e a c h survey, a m e a s u r e of political
a w a r e n e s s and a m e a s u r e of i n d i v i d u a l s ' values or p a r t i s a n s h i p . A w a r e n e s s can
be readily m e a s u r e d in b o t h s u r v e y s w i t h tests of neutral political k n o w l e d g e .
For t h e s u r v e y s c a p t u r i n g attitude c h a n g e on Central A m e r i c a , an excellent m e a -
sure of political values is available, namely, t h e H u r w i t z - P e f f l e y items on an-
7
t i c o m m u n i s m and military vigilance ( H u r w i t z and Peffley, 1 9 8 8 ) . For the
1 9 8 0 - 2 s u r v e y s , the most a p p r o p r i a t e m e a s u r e of values c a r r i e d on both sur-
veys is the traditional m e a s u r e of p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t . Since differences between
D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on defense spending were one of the major e l e m e n t s
of i n t e r p a r t y conflict in the early 1980s, p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t is a r e a s o n a b l e m e a -
sure of individual predispositions on this i s s u e .
8
T h e results o f t h e tests a r e s h o w n i n Tables 7 . 1 . a n d 7 . 2 . Let u s l o o k first a t
Table 7 . 1 , w h i c h deals w i t h t h e defense s p e n d i n g issue. T h e table s h o w s r a t e s o f
6 See Sobel (1989) and Bowen (1989) for evidence on commercial polls of similar increases in sup-
port for U.S. involvement in Central America.
7 The 1986 NES postelection study carried a question on U.S. involvement in Central America.
This question was repeated in the June wave of the 1987 NES pilot study, which reinterviewed 457
people from the fall survey. Hurwitz-Peffley (1988) militarism items were carried in the second
wave of the pilot survey, which began in August and was able to reinterview only 360 of the
original 457 pilot respondents. Since the militarism scale is necessary to the analysis, the analysis
will be based on the fall 1986 and June 1987 interviews of respondents who agreed to be inter-
viewed in the second wave of the pilot study in August.
8 Both the defense spending and Central America items were originally asked in the form of seven-
point scales. For purposes of this analysis, positions 1, 2, and 3 on the defense scale have been
collapsed into support for greater cuts; positions 5, 6, and 7 on the Central America scale have
been collapsed into support for greater U.S. involvement.
 130 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Basic processes of "attitude change' 131

T a b l e 7 . 1 . Support for cuts in defense spending, 1980 T a b l e 7 . 2 . Support for greater U.S. involvement in
and 1982 Central America, 1986 and 1987

Level of political awareness Level of political awareness

Low Hieh Low Hieh
Democrats
Hawks
1980 12" 11 12 20 1986 22° 30 43 60
N (318) (131) (129) (123)
1987 33 48 50 80
1982 16 36 41 57
(304) (185) (128) (153) Change rate 1986 to 1987 14% 26 12 50
N (18) (40) (44) (15)
Change rate 1980 to 1982* 4% 28 33 46

Centrists
Republicans 1986 l7a 08 18 21
1980 8 fl
12 3 4 1987 23 30 38 21
(134) (78) (125) . (161)
Change rate 1986 to 1987 7% 24 24 00
1982 10 23 29 14 (30) (37) (40) (14)
(113) (103) (100) (128)

Change rate 1980 to 1982* 2% 13 27 10 Doves

3
1986 20 10 08 08
a
Cell entries give percent who favor defense cuts. 1987 20 10 18 19

* Change rate is calculated as (Opinion82 - Opinionso)/ (100 - Change rate 1986 to 1987 0% 0 11 12
Opinion80)- (15) (3D (50) (26)

Source: 1980 and 1982 NES surveys. a

Cell entries give percent who favor greater U. S.
involvement in Central America.
support for cuts in defense s p e n d i n g , separately in 1980 and 1982, for D e m o - Source: 1986 NES survey and 1987 NES pilot survey.
crats and R e p u b l i c a n s by level of political awareness. T h u s , it can be seen that
in 1980, 12 percent of D e m o c r a t s in the lowest awareness c a t e g o r y favored cuts
e x p e c t a t i o n s : M o r e a w a r e D e m o c r a t s are m o r e likely to have switched to a p o -
in defense s p e n d i n g ; but in 1982, 16 percent of D e m o c r a t s in the l o w - a w a r e n e s s
sition of favoring defense cuts.
c a t e g o r y favored such cuts. T h i s a m o u n t s to a difference of 4 p e r c e n t a g e points.
T h e lower panel of the table provides parallel d a t a for R e p u b l i c a n s . Note the
M e a n w h i l e , the m o s t highly aware D e m o c r a t s went from 20 percent in favor of
c h a n g e figures for R e p u b l i c a n s in t h e b o t t o m row of the table; as can be seen,
defense cuts to 57 percent in favor, a difference of 37 p e r c e n t a g e points.
c h a n g e levels r u n from 2 percent in the lowest a w a r e n e s s c a t e g o r y to 13 percent
O u r interest h e r e is in the probabilities of attitude c h a n g e , that is, the p r o b -
in t h e next c a t e g o r y to 27 percent in the third c a t e g o r y and then d o w n to 10
ability that a person not already c o m m i t t e d to cuts in defense s p e n d i n g would
percent in the highest c a t e g o r y , a r e l a t i o n s h i p that is, as e x p e c t e d , n o n m o n o -
switch to favor such cuts in the second survey. T h u s if 20 percent of highly a w a r e
tonic. Altogether, t h e n , the results from the defense s p e n d i n g issue c o n f o r m well
D e m o c r a t s favored cuts in 1980 and 57 percent did so in 1982, then the per-
to theory.
c e n t a g e of p e r s o n s not initially favoring cuts w h o switched w a s
Table 7 . 2 presents c o m p a r a b l e d a t a for the Central A m e r i c a n issue. T h e fit to
D [Time - Time,]
2 [57% - 20%] e x p e c t a t i o n s here is fairly g o o d but, at least at first g l a n c e , not perfect. A m o n g
Percent c h a n g e = -—— - = '- = 4 6 % " h a w k s " there is a positive relationship b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and c h a n g e
s 4 b /
[100% - T i m e , ] [100% - 2 0 % ] °
in the direction of greater s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r -
C h a n g e r a t e s , calculated in this way for D e m o c r a t s at each level of a w a r e n e s s , ica. A m o n g " c e n t r i s t s " this relationship is sharply n o n m o n o t o n i c , a result that
are displayed in the third row of Table 7 . 1 . As can be seen, they generally fit is quite in the spirit of t h e m o d e l .
132 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Basic processes of ' 'attitude change' 133

T h e r e is, however, a p r o b l e m with the " d o v e s . " As would be e x p e c t e d , doves

were m u c h less responsive to the p r o - C o n t r a m e s s a g e than were either h a w k s or
centrists. But c o n t r a r y to e x p e c t a t i o n , the tiny handful of d o v e s w h o did m o v e in
a c o n s e r v a t i v e direction were not m o d e r a t e l y aware d o v e s , but very highly
aware doves.
This d e p a r t u r e from e x p e c t a t i o n is m o r e apparent t h a n real. For o n e t h i n g , the
n u m b e r of c a s e s in the critical cells is such that small d e p a r t u r e s from expec-
9
tations should not be taken too s e r i o u s l y . (Different r e s p o n s e s by just two in-
dividuals in the cell for highly a w a r e doves w o u l d have brought the c h a n g e rate
in this g r o u p d o w n to .04.) Table 7 . 2 also shows t h e effect of only o n e predis-
positional v a r i a b l e ; there m a y be other predispositions that need to be controlled
before we can get a clear picture of h o w attitudes were c h a n g i n g .
T h e need for controls and statistical tests highlights the limitations of tabular
analysis for t e s t i n g the R A S m o d e l . To address these n e e d s , it is n e c e s s a r y to
d e v e l o p a statistical model of the attitude c h a n g e process. Since variants of this
m o d e l will be at t h e c e n t e r of my analysis in the r e m a i n d e r of the b o o k , I will
fully d e s c r i b e each step of the m o d e l d e v e l o p m e n t . T h i s will involve detail that
statistically a c c o m p l i s h e d readers m a y find t e d i o u s , but that o t h e r s will, I h o p e ,
find useful.

A STATISTICAL MODEL OF A T T I T U D E C H A N G E

T h e basis of the statistical m o d e l will be E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 , r e p e a t e d below:

Prob(Change) = Prob(Reception) x Prob(Acceptance I Reception)

c. Logistic form
Attitude c h a n g e , t h u s , is a m u l t i p l i c a t i v e function of s e p a r a t e reception and a c -
c e p t a n c e functions. To m a k e this e q u a t i o n a statistical m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e , 1.0
we need to specify the nature of these reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions.
F r o m e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n s , we have a fair a m o u n t of information about w h a t Probability
of correct
these specifications must b e . We k n o w , first of all, that political a w a r e n e s s is answer .50
positively a s s o c i a t e d with reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and we
k n o w that a w a r e n e s s and political values (and perhaps other variables) are neg-
atively a s s o c i a t e d with the likelihood of uncritical a c c e p t a n c e . But to m a k e full
use of this i n f o r m a t i o n , we must k n o w the functional form of the relationships
6 12
b e t w e e n these i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s , on o n e side, and the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s , Years of school
reception and a c c e p t a n c e , on the other. We need to know, in o t h e r w o r d s ,
Figure 7 . 1 . Three functional forms for relations between two variables.
w h e t h e r the form of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s is strictly linear, e x p o n e n t i a l , or s o m e -
thing else.
If this s e e m s an a r c a n e issue, c o n s i d e r the following p r o b l e m . S u p p o s e that bility of getting t h e c o r r e c t a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n . O b v i o u s l y , we w o u l d expect
we have tested several million schoolchildren from k i n d e r g a r t e n through g r a d e to find a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p . T h a t is, m o r e years of schooling w o u l d be asso-
twelve o n t h e q u e s t i o n , " W h a t i s the square root o f 4 ? " A n d s u p p o s e that w e ciated with a h i g h e r c h a n c e of getting the a n s w e r right. But as Figure 7.1 s h o w s ,
now want to m o d e l the relationship b e t w e e n years of schooling and the proba- there are several forms this relationship could t a k e . T h e top panel depicts a
9 In evaluating this table, it is useful to keep in mind that, for a difference of means test with strictly linear relationship: E a c h additional year of school increases the proba-
p = .20 and « = 25, the standard error of the mean difference is 0.11. bility of a c o r r e c t r e s p o n s e by a constant a m o u n t . T h e m i d d l e panel depicts an
 134 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
exponential relationship: S c h o o l i n g affects k n o w l e d g e of s q u a r e roots slowly at
first, but has an increasingly powerful effect as one goes further in school. T h u s
going from the first to the s e c o n d g r a d e has scarcely any effect, but going from
eleventh to twelfth g r a d e has a very large effect. T h e b o t t o m panel of Figure 7.1
claims that the relationship b e t w e e n schooling and m a t h k n o w l e d g e follows the
form of a logistic function: T h e earliest and latest years of school have little
effect, but the m i d d l e years of school have a substantial effect.
T h e point h e r e is that in o r d e r to m o d e l the relationship b e t w e e n two vari-
a b l e s , o n e m u s t k n o w m o r e than just the fact that they are positively c o r r e l a t e d .
O n e must k n o w - or at least be able to m a k e a plausible g u e s s about - the form
of their r e l a t i o n s h i p . To resolve this p r o b l e m in the present e x a m p l e , we w o u l d
use o u r b a c k g r o u n d k n o w l e d g e of h o w e d u c a t i o n is organized in the United
States. K n o w i n g , that is, that square roots are n o r m a l l y taught b e t w e e n the third
and eighth g r a d e s , we w o u l d a s s u m e that little learning about square roots o c -
curs in t h e very e a r l y or very late years of s c h o o l , and h e n c e that the logistic
functional form best describes the relationship b e t w e e n years of school and cor-
rect a n s w e r s on this p a r t i c u l a r test q u e s t i o n .
T h e choice of functional form in the c a s e of awareness and reception is also
fairly clear. S i n c e we are dealing with probabilities of r e c e p t i o n , we w o u l d like
to have a function that v a r i e s naturally b e t w e e n 0 and 1. T h e logistic form m e e t s
that r e q u i r e m e n t . T h e lowest value it can take is 0 and t h e largest value is 1.
Empirical studies of the dl 'fusion of ideas also often find that logistic functions
(or close equivalents) provide a g o o d fit to the actual d a t a ( P r i c e , 1961; N e u m a n ,
1990). 10
For all these r e a s o n s , I will a s s u m e that the relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s
and reception can be represented by the following logistic function:
Prob(Reception), = 1 — (7.3)
1 + / + e(flu + «i Awareness,)
where
ProbfReception), = the probability that individual (i) will receive a persuasive
message
a = coefficient designating the intensity of message
0
a, = coefficient designating strength of relationship between awareness
and reception
/ = floor parameter
e = the natural logarithmetic base, 2.7214
10 In tests of individual differences in ability, such as IQ tests, researchers regard each question as
a "test" that some people will "pass" and others will "fail," depending on their general levels
of ability. They next argue, from elementary statistical considerations, that the relationship be-
tween any particular test item and a general measure of ability should be described by the normal
ogive function, which is a close approximation of the logistic function (Torgerson, 1958; Lord
and Novick, 1968). In a similar fashion, one can regard reception of a particular persuasive mes-
sage as a "test" that some will pass and others will fail, depending on their general levels of
political awareness. By analogy to test theory, it would then follow that the relationship between
reception of a particular persuasive message and general levels of political awareness should be
described by a logistic function.
Basic processes of "attitude change' 135
E q u a t i o n 7 . 3 can be equivalently written as
- 1
P r o b ( R e c e p t i o n ) , = 1 - [1 +/ + E x p ( a 0 + ^Awareness,)] (7.3')
Since m a n y readers will not be greatly familiar with this type of logistic func-
tion, and since it will be heavily and s o m e w h a t unconventionally used in my
e x a m i n a t i o n of attitude c h a n g e , it is w o r t h digressing to gain s o m e familiarity
with t h e function and its a s s o c i a t e d p a r a m e t e r s .
T h e " a , " p a r a m e t e r is, first of all, a m e a s u r e of t h e strength of the relation-
ship b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and r e c e p t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e . T h u s , it
is the a n a l o g u e of the slope in a s t a n d a r d linear regression. T h e top panel of
Figure 7.2 shows h o w the relationship b e t w e e n awareness and reception varies
for a typical r a n g e of values of a , : ( a , = . 5 , a, = 1.0, a, = 2 . 0 ) . " T h e higher
the value of a , the stronger the relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and r e c e p t i o n .
x
For the c a s e in w h i c h a = 2 . 0 , reception levels are near zero at low a w a r e n e s s ,
x
begin a s h a r p rise at about - 2 , and a p p r o a c h a ceiling of 100 percent by the t i m e
awareness reaches a level of +2 units.
Political a w a r e n e s s in Figure 7 . 2 has been scored in s t a n d a r d units. T h e m e a -
sures of political a w a r e n e s s that I will use in m o d e l i n g attitude c h a n g e have also
been expressed in s t a n d a r d units. Since the awareness m e a s u r e s usually have a
roughly n o r m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n , this m e a n s about 96 percent of individuals will usu-
ally have a w a r e n e s s scores that fall within an interval of ±2 units on Figure 7 . 2 .
K n o w i n g t h i s , t h e reader can interpret the m a g n i t u d e of t h e coefficients r e p o r t e d
in later sections of this b o o k by referring back to Figure 7 . 2 . For e x a m p l e , for
a c a s e in which the a w a r e n e s s coefficient is 1.0 and a is near z e r o , Figure 7.2
0
implies that reception levels rise from about 10 percent at low levels of aware-
ness to 90 percent at high levels of a w a r e n e s s . Relationships of this strength or
greater will be c o m m o n in the empirical analyses reported below.
T h e a p a r a m e t e r captures the difficulty or the " l o u d n e s s " of the p a r t i c u l a r
0
m e s s a g e , and is the a n a l o g u e of the intercept in s t a n d a r d regression. T h e m i d d l e
section of Figure 7.2 shows how reception varies with information at three dif-
ferent values of a (and a fixed value of a, = 2 . 0 ) . H i g h values of a indicate
0 0
high levels of reception at given levels of a w a r e n e s s , w h i c h in turn indicate
" h i g h - i n t e n s i t y " m e s s a g e s . If a p p r o p r i a t e care is taken in the c o n s t r u c t i o n of
v a r i a b l e s , the a coefficients can be c o m p a r e d across m o d e l s to see which in-
0
volve the most intense m e s s a g e .
This brings us to t h e / p a r a m e t e r . All of the projections in the top and m i d d l e
panels of Figure 7.2 set the floor p a r a m e t e r , / , to z e r o . W h e n / t a k e s on positive
v a l u e s , it sets m i n i m u m or " f l o o r " levels of r e c e p t i o n , r e g a r d l e s s of an indi-
v i d u a l ' s level of awareness. T h e b o t t o m panel of Figure 7.2 shows three r e c e p -
tion c u r v e s that are identical to those in the m i d d l e p a n e l , except that the floor
p a r a m e t e r is set to . 3 0 . T h u s , instead of rising from a floor of z e r o , reception
rises from a floor d e t e r m i n e d by / . 1
11 These examples assume that Political Awareness runs from -3 to + 3 .
12 On the use of floor parameters in such situations, see Lord and Novick (1968: ch. 17).
 136 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Basic processes of "attitude change' 137

a. Logistic curves for three values of the a j coefficient no way of a c c o m m o d a t i n g the fact that such persons give a n s w e r s to survey
questions. T h e / parameter, t h u s , is a n u i s a n c e t e r m that i m p r o v e s the fit of t h e
1.0
m o d e l to t h e d a t a without c o n v e y i n g substantive significance. As Figure 7 . 2
s h o w s , it has an effect only at lower levels of a w a r e n e s s , w h e r e g u e s s i n g is likely
1 3

Probability t o b e most c o m m o n .
of .50 T h e probability that an individual will accept a persuasive m e s s a g e (having
reception received it) d e c r e a s e s with awareness and ideological distance from the m e s -
s a g e . Again a s s u m i n g that the logistic function d e s c r i b e s the form of this rela-
t i o n s h i p , w e m a y write
-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 P r o b ( A c c e p t I Reception), = [1 + E x p ( — b — fo]Awareness,
0

Level of political awareness

(scored in standard units) — ^Predispositions, . . . ) ] " ' (7.4)

where

b. Logistic curves for three values of the a coefficient

0 Prob(AcceptancelReception), = the probability that individual (/) will accept the per-
suasive message, having received it
I.OT
b = coefficient designating the difficulty or credibility of
0

message
Probability b = coefficient designating the effect of awareness on re-
x

of .50 sistance to persuasion

reception
b = coefficient designating the effect of predispositions
2

on resistance to persuasion

E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 differs from E q u a t i o n 7 . 3 in t w o i m p o r t a n t w a y s . First, its form

-3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3
has been altered so as to m a k e its coefficients m o r e intelligible. In particular,
Political awareness
E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 h a s been set up so that if, as e x p e c t e d , higher levels of a w a r e n e s s
are associated with lower a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s , the coefficient on awareness will
1 4

c. Logistic curves when the floor parameter is 0.30 take a n e g a t i v e s i g n . T h e second difference is that the a c c e p t a n c e function
contains a t e r m for differences in political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , that is, ideology,
1.0V party, religiosity, or whatever.
An i m p o r t a n t feature of logistic functions is that w h e n e v e r two or more vari-
ables are u s e d , the variables automatically interact with one another - which is
Probability
to say, the effect of o n e variable d e p e n d s on the values taken by the others. T h u s ,
of -50
reception in E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 , the effect of a w a r e n e s s will always d e p e n d on the effect of the
predispositions v a r i a b l e ( s ) . It is n e c e s s a r y to allow for such A w a r e n e s s x Pre-
dispositions interactions b e c a u s e the R A S m o d e l h o l d s that predispositions have
no effect unless the individual is sufficiently politically a w a r e to possess the
-2 -1 0 +1 +2
contextual information that e n a b l e s resistance to uncongenial m e s s a g e s . T h u s ,
Political awareness

Figure 7.2. Variations of the logistic function.
Floor p a r a m e t e r s are n e c e s s a r y in situations in which p e o p l e m a y respond to
survey q u e s t i o n s w i t h o u t having received any information about the q u e s t i o n -
w h i c h , in m a n y c a s e s , probably m e a n s g u e s s i n g . W i t h o u t a floor p a r a m e t e r to
assign " r e c e p t i o n " scores to g u e s s e r s , t h e model I am developing w o u l d have
13 T h e / parameter may also be thought of as creating a more flexible, three-parameter reception
function. Or again, it might be thought of as specifying floor levels of reception that are inde-
pendent of political awareness.
14 In earlier work with this model (Zaller, 1989, 1991; Geddes and Zaller, 1989), the acceptance
function was specified in such a way that obtaining a positive coefficient on awareness in this
function indicated a negative relationship between awareness and probability of acceptance. In
this book, I have changed the specification of the acceptance function to avoid this possibly con-
fusing outcome.
 138 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
1.0 Republicans
Probability
of .50
acceptance
Level of political awareness
(scored in standard units)
Figure 7.3. The automatically interactive nature of the logistic function Values of the
logistic function are b = 2, b, = - 1 , b = - 1 , with scores of -2 and +2 on the pre-
0 2
dispositions variable for Republicans and Democrats, respectively. The model is Equa-
tion 7.4.
as we saw in Table 7 . 1 , u n a w a r e D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s did not differ m u c h
in their resistance to a n t i - d e f e n s e - s p e n d i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n s : T h e former b e -
c a m e 4 percent less favorable t o w a r d defense s p e n d i n g , w h i l e the latter b e c a m e
2 percent less favorable. Yet p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t h a d a large impact on resistance
t o antidefense m e s s a g e s a m o n g highly aware p a r t i s a n s : D e m o c r a t s b e c a m e 4 6
percent less favorable and R e p u b l i c a n s 10 percent less favorable. T h e s a m e sort
of Predisposition x A w a r e n e s s interaction a r o s e , mutatis mutandis, for h a w k s
and d o v e s in r e s p o n s e to a c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e , as s h o w n in Table 7 . 2 .
Figure 7 . 3 s h o w s h o w E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 h a n d l e s A w a r e n e s s x Predisposition in-
teractions. In this figure, b is set to + 2 , b is set to — 1, and b is set to — 1;
0 { 2 are simply not so rigid in their information-seeking b e h a v i o r that they will ex-
party is scored —2 for R e p u b l i c a n s a n d + 2 for D e m o c r a t s . T h e s e v a l u e s , as will
be seen below, fall within t h e r a n g e of t h e values o b t a i n e d e m p i r i c a l l y from t h e
application of E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 to actual d a t a . T h e figure shows that increases in
awareness lead to lower a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s a m o n g both D e m o c r a t s and Republi-
c a n s , but to a m u c h steeper d e c l i n e a m o n g D e m o c r a t s . T h u s , the effect of a w a r e -
ness on a c c e p t a n c e d e p e n d s on w h e t h e r t h e person is a D e m o c r a t or R e p u b l i c a n .
(This interaction would occur only w h e n the c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e w a s a con-
servative m e s s a g e ; for a liberal m e s s a g e , the sign on b w o u l d reverse, thereby
2 o f c o n c e r n e d vigilance m u c h greater than most c i t i z e n s , w h o are relatively a p -
causing a w a r e n e s s to have a greater effect on the a c c e p t a n c e rates of Republicans.)
T h e r e a d e r m a y w o n d e r why, since t h e R A S m o d e l e x p e c t s this t y p e o f inter-
action, I do not simply include a specific t e r m for A w a r e n e s s x Predispositions
in E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 . T h e reason is practical: Most of the t i m e such interaction t e r m s
c o n t r i b u t e little or n o t h i n g to the fit of t h e m o d e l but n o n e t h e l e s s introduce large
a m o u n t s of t r o u b l e s o m e multicollinearity. Or, to put it differently, E q u a t i o n 7 . 4
n o r m a l l y picks up interaction effects without the need for specific interaction
t e r m s (see Table 7 . 3 ) . However, in o n e c a s e , reported in C h a p t e r 9, I found in-
teraction t e r m s helpful and so did include t h e m in an a c c e p t a n c e function.
Basic processes of ' 'attitude change' 139
I w o u l d , incidentally, e n c o u r a g e readers w h o have access to a spreadsheet
p r o g r a m to replicate the results in Figures 7.2 and 7 . 3 , to e x p e r i m e n t with o t h e r
p a r a m e t e r v a l u e s , and to plot the results of t h e more c o m p l e x functions I shall
r e p o r t h e r e . D o i n g this will greatly e n h a n c e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the claims I m a k e
on behalf of the R A S m o d e l .
We are now ready to b r i n g t h e reception and a c c e p t a n c e functions together.
Substituting E q u a t i o n s 7 . 3 and 7 . 4 into E q u a t i o n 7 . 2 , w e get
1
P r o b ( C h a n g e ) = (1 - (1 + / + E x p [ + a 0 + a , A w a r e n e s s ] ) " ) x (1 +
re
E x p [ — b — frjAwareness — b P d i s p o s i t i o n s . . . ] ) " '
0 2 (7.5)
T h e first t e r m in E q u a t i o n 7.5 is a monotonically increasing function of aware-
n e s s , while the s e c o n d is a similarly d e c r e a s i n g function of a w a r e n e s s and value
distance from t h e m e s s a g e .
T h e r e is an i m p o r t a n t and n o n o b v i o u s feature of this formulation of the
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . It is the implicit a s s u m p t i o n that a p e r s o n ' s pre-
d i s p o s i t i o n s , a l t h o u g h affecting a c c e p t a n c e of persuasive m e s s a g e s , do not af-
fect r e c e p t i o n . This a s s u m p t i o n is signaled by the fact that predispositional
variables are included only in the a c c e p t a n c e function. This specification of the
m o d e l w o u l d be i n a p p r o p r i a t e if, as e a r l y o p i n i o n research indicated, individu-
als e n g a g e d in " s e l e c t i v e r e c e p t i o n " of political information - if, that is, they
e x p o s e d t h e m s e l v e s mainly to ideas they thought they were likely to find ac-
c e p t a b l e and avoided e x p o s u r e to u n c o n g e n i a l ideas. However, m o r e recent
research has been u n k i n d to the notion of selective reception (Sears and Freed-
m a n , 1967; M c G u i r e , 1969; W i c k l u n d and B r e h m , 1976; C o t t o n , 1985; Patter-
son a n d M c C l u r e , 1974; Patterson 1980). M o s t p e o p l e , this research m a i n t a i n s ,
pose t h e m s e l v e s only to ideas that they find c o n g e n i a l . To the extent selective
e x p o s u r e o c c u r s at all, it a p p e a r s to do so u n d e r special c o n d i t i o n s that do not
typically arise in situations of m a s s p e r s u a s i o n . 15
T h e likely r e a s o n s for the relative u n i m p o r t a n c e of selective reception are
several. First, m o s t p e o p l e inform t h e m s e l v e s by m e a n s of e x p o s u r e to a fairly
w i d e variety of o u t l e t s , m o s t of which are " c o m m o n c a r r i e r s " of a national
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s flow (Key, 1961). S e c o n d , selective reception requires a level
athetic about politics, are likely to m a k e (Graber, 1984: p. 128). A n d third, m o s t
n e w s events i m p o r t a n t e n o u g h to e n g a g e t h e attention of survey researchers
15 For example, the one case in which, according to Cotton (1985), selective exposure has been
rigorously documented in a nonlaboratory setting involved new car purchasers. The new car pur-
chasers were more likely than ones who had bought their cars a year earlier to look at adver-
tisements for the car they had just purchased than ads for a car they had examined but decided
not to buy.
Recently, Price and Zaller (1990) have turned up some evidence of selective exposure effects
in reception of new stories. The effects were typically small to nonexistent, but were large in two
cases, both involving minor news stories. (For laboratory evidence of selective exposure, see
Markus and Zajonc, 1985.)
140 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
are major, c o n t i n u i n g stories such as the V i e t n a m W a r or the I r a n - C o n t r a scan-
d a l , so that p e o p l e w h o pay any significant degree of attention to politics are
unlikely to r e m a i n u n a w a r e of t h e m even if they are not avidly interested in each
new detail.
T h e s e l e c t i v e reception hypothesis cannot be entirely false. After all, it w o u l d
be extremely s u r p r i s i n g if, say, liberal i d e o l o g u e s were as likely to subscribe to
National Review as to Nation. But, by the available e v i d e n c e , selective reception
apparently d o e s not o c c u r on a sufficiently broad scale to affect the diffusion of
major political i d e a s , and hence poses little d a n g e r to my formulation of the
1 6
reception-acceptance m o d e l .
A l t h o u g h E q u a t i o n 7.5 is a m o d e l of attitude c h a n g e , it requires a d a p t a t i o n
before it can be applied to the t w o cases u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n h e r e . T h e r e are three
reasons for this. T h e first is that, in the defense s p e n d i n g c a s e , we have no
individual-level d a t a on attitude c h a n g e ; rather, we have s e p a r a t e cross-section
surveys in w h i c h similar i n d i v i d u a l s , rather than the same individuals, are c o m -
pared across t i m e . ( T h u s , for e x a m p l e , the low-awareness D e m o c r a t s in the
1980 survey in Table 7.1 w e r e not reinterviewed in 1982 to find out w h e t h e r
their attitudes had c h a n g e d ; rather, a s e p a r a t e s a m p l e w a s d r a w n in 1982 to
m e a s u r e t h e attitudes of l o w - a w a r e n e s s D e m o c r a t s . ) F r o m this sort of d a t a
one can calculate aggregate-level c h a n g e rates across different types of p e r s o n s ,
as in Table 7 . 1 , but not individual-level c h a n g e rates of the type required by
Equation 7.5.
T h e s e c o n d limitation of e q u a t i o n 7 . 5 is that it a c c o m m o d a t e s c h a n g e in o n e
direction only - the direction of t h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . T h i s creates a p r o b l e m
even w h e n individual-level c h a n g e d a t a are available, as it is in the Central
A m e r i c a c a s e . If, as h e r e , s u p p o r t for a hawkish policy rises from 28 percent to
38 p e r c e n t , E q u a t i o n 7.5 implicitly a s s u m e s that 10 percent of the s a m p l e has
c h a n g e d its attitude in the direction of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e and the other 90
percent has r e m a i n e d stable. O w i n g , however, to r a n d o m response variability
(see Table 2 . 1 ) , the actual p a t t e r n of c h a n g e is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d . T h u s , in the
Central A m e r i c a c a s e , 22 percent c h a n g e d in the direction of the d o m i n a n t
h a w k i s h m e s s a g e while 12 percent c h a n g e d in a dovish d i r e c t i o n , for a net
c h a n g e of 10 percent. E q u a t i o n 7.5 cannot a c c o m m o d a t e such two-way patterns
of c h a n g e .
A final difficulty is that if, as in E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 , o n e m o d e l s only individual-
level c h a n g e r a t e s , o n e is inefficiently discarding information about the baseline
and final distributions of opinion. T h i s information is often essential for gaining
leverage on t h e overall r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process.
16 The reader may wonder why I do not subject these arguments about selective reception to an
empirical test by entering measures of political predispositions in the reception function. If they
attract significant coefficients, it would indicate that selective reception occurs; if not, it would
show that there is no problem. The reason is that Equation 7.5 would not be identified if all
predispositions variables were entered in both the reception and acceptance functions. There
would then be complete collinearity between the two functions, and hence no ability for the
model to distinguish the separate effects of variables on the reception and acceptance steps.
Basic processes of "attitude change' 141
For these r e a s o n s , t h e n , we need a m o d e l of the attitude c h a n g e process that
is c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g c h a n g e b e t w e e n a baseline distribution of opinion and a
subsequent opinion d i s t r i b u t i o n , and that does so without implicitly a s s u m i n g
that all individual-level c h a n g e r u n s in t h e direction of the d o m i n a n t persuasive
message.
O n e can d e v e l o p such a m o d e l by m a k i n g separate e s t i m a t e s of baseline at-
titudes at t i m e , and the probability of attitude c h a n g e , so that t i m e attitudes are 2
a function of baseline attitudes and c h a n g e probabilities, as follows:
Prob(Opinion ) = Prob(Baseline Opinion) + Prob(Change)
2
* (1 — B a s e l i n e O p i n i o n ) (7.6)
T h a t is, the probability of h o l d i n g a p a r t i c u l a r opinion at t i m e is the probability
2
of h o l d i n g it at the baseline p e r i o d , plus the probability of c o n v e r t i n g to the
opinion if not already h o l d i n g it at t i m e , .
T h e baseline and c h a n g e functions can be specified straightforwardly as s e p -
a r a t e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l s , each having the form of E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 . T h a t
is, baseline opinion is the o u t c o m e of a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process that is c a p -
tured by E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 , and attitude c h a n g e is also t h e o u t c o m e of a reception-
a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s that is captured by E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 .
This m o d e l m u s t be e s t i m a t e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y on d a t a from both the t i m e , and
t i m e p e r i o d s , a s follows:
2
Prob(Opinion), = Prob(Baseline) + Dum, * Prob(Change)
* (1 - Baseline) (7.7)
w h e r e D u m , takes the value of 0 at t i m e , and the value of 1 at t i m e . T h u s , 2
opinion at t i m e , d e p e n d s on the baseline r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process only,
while opinion at t i m e d e p e n d s on both the baseline and the c h a n g e models.
2
Since the / p a r a m e t e r in the r e c e p t i o n function is intended to pick up the
effects of g u e s s i n g , and since these effects are absorbed in the baseline m o d e l ,
it is u n n e c e s s a r y to include an / p a r a m e t e r in the reception function of the
change model.
Coefficients from the application of E q u a t i o n 7.7 to the d a t a on defense
spending are s h o w n in the left c o l u m n of Table 7 . 3 . T h e d e p e n d e n t variable is
a 0 - 1 variable that distinguishes those w h o s u p p o r t cuts in defense spending
17
from all o t h e r s , including those w h o m a k e no-opinion r e s p o n s e s . To facilitate
17 This scoring of the dependent variable has advantages and disadvantages. The obvious disad-
vantage is that it throws away information from the original seven-point scales by making ev-
eryone either a zero or a one. This poses an efficiency problem. But on the other hand, to keep
information from the seven-point scale, I would have to discard no-opinion respondents as miss-
ing data. No-opinion respondents, whose typically low political awareness scores indicate they
have failed to receive any information that would enable them to have an opinion, help to define
the effect of awareness on reception. Hence to discard them would introduce bias. A second
advantage of 0-1 scoring is that it enables me to retain the natural metric of "percent support-
ing" a given position, which adds to the intelligibility of the results (note the relationship of
Figure 7.4 to Figure 8.2). I return to this issue in Chapter 11.
212 N A T U R E A N D ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Basic processes of ' 'attitude change' 143

Ipeldii'g' C o e f f i c i e n t s
f° r
°P i n i o n c
hange on defense Probability of Probability of Probability of
receiving anti-defense- accepting anti-defense- opinion change
spending message spending message, (reception x
given reception acceptance)
N o
One With
7—7 ;— Efflisjmints constraint i n w r t ^ n

Baseline reception/unction
Intercept^) ^ l g - 3 , 5 1 _ 4 2 9

Awareness ( a ; ) " Dems.

L 2 4 QQ f i

(standardized) ( . 8 2 ) °$ £
Ind.
Floor parameter (/) 0 .10 0.10 0.10

acceptance function (
'° 3 ) ( - 0 2 ) Reps.
Intercept 0 ) O 6 5 6 L 9 f i

Awareness (bj) _ 0 5 9 _q 4 1 _ 2 3 j
Political awareness
4 9
P r t u (°- ) (-40) (2.63) Figure 7.4. Estimated effects of reception and acceptance on changing support for
Party attachment (b ) 2 6.12 2.03« . l5 8
defense spending. Estimates are derived from the change function in Equation 7.7 and
(6.96) (.46) (5.06) the coefficients for the unconstrained model in Table 7.3. Source: 1980 and 1982 NES
Party x Awareness surveys.
-1.65
(2.52)
replication of these results, I include in the appendix to this chapter the S A S
Change reception function
p r o g r a m c o d e used t o p r o d u c e t h e m .
Intercept(a ) 0 _ l m l f i _ n
T h e coefficients in Table 7 . 3 all have g o o d m a g n i t u d e s , as can be seen by
Awareness ( a / ) q.91 .97
2 03 0
c o m p a r i n g t h e m to the coefficients used to p r o d u c e Figure 7 . 2 , and signs that
1 9
(- ) (-14) (.16) run in t h e theoretically expected directions. However, there is a great deal of
Change acceptance function
Intercept^) 2 3 J 3 J Q ^ g Q
statistical i m p r e c i s i o n in the coefficients in the a c c e p t a n c e function of the b a s e -
Awareness ( t y _ L 3 9 _ L 6 5 _ 2 Q g
line m o d e l . T h e reason for the imprecision in this subfunction a p p e a r s to be that
there is little v a r i a n c e in s u p p o r t for cuts in defense spending in 1980, as can be
(0.53) (.64) (1.02)
Party attachment (b ) 1.23 .03* 2 26 seen in Table 7 . 1 . To r e d u c e this i m p r e c i s i o n , I constrained t h e value of the most
2 2

unstable coefficient, that of party, to be equal in both the baseline and c h a n g e

(•37) (.46) (1.07)
Party x Awareness _ _ _ Q 52
m o d e l s . T h i s resulted in a m o r e stable set of e s t i m a t e s , as s h o w n in the center
c o l u m n of Table 7 . 3 . T h e constraint did b r i n g about a statistically significant
Residual sum o f squares 538.23 538.97 5 3 7 ^ reduction in t h e statistical fit of the m o d e l to the d a t a (F ( 1 , 2 , 9 9 3 ) , 4 . 1 2 ,
p < . 0 5 ) , but did not affect t h e visual or qualitative fit of the m o d e l to the r a w
d a t a , as s h o w n earlier in Table 7 . 1 .
Note: Model is Equation 7.7, estimated by maximum likelihood The
cuTSXfre ' ^ ^ ^ 4 ^ S p « £ d d « S
DemSc dfrelrinn °P - « « y
P
< ° 5 ^ o r e d in
n S e S
K
m d u d j n g n o i n i o n i s
T h e right-hand c o l u m n of Table 7.3 shows the coefficients that are obtained
w h e n A w a r e n e s s X Party t e r m s are put into the m o d e l . T h e inclusion of these
1«£3£$?£
e c U o S e e ch
^ "- a p t e r appendix for details o f estimation
Smndard errors are m parentheses. fteTtaexM, t e r m s did not significantly i m p r o v e t h e statistical fit of the m o d e l , and I present
t h e m only to satisfy the interest of readers w h o might w o n d e r about the effect of
a
Coefficients constrained to be equal. interaction t e r m s on the p e r f o r m a n c e of the m o d e l .
Source: 1980 and 1982 NES surveys. T h e r e is little m o r e to be learned about the d y n a m i c s of attitude c h a n g e from
simple visual i n s p e c t i o n of t h e coefficients from the m o d e l . I h a v e , therefore,
used the coefficients, in conjunction with E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 , to construct graphical
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s of the implied effects of these coefficients. T h e s e g r a p h s , based
on coefficients from the unconstrained m o d e l and using t h e graphing c o n v e n -
tions set forth in C h a p t e r 6, are s h o w n in Figure 7 . 4 .
144 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Basic processes of ' 'attitude change' 145

Figure 7 . 4 d e c o m p o s e s the attitude c h a n g e process into its c o m p o n e n t s : re-

c e p t i o n , a c c e p t a n c e , and attitude c h a n g e . In t h e left-hand p a n e l , the figure Table 7.4. Coefficients for opinion change on
shows e s t i m a t e d rates of reception of a n t i - d e f e n s e - s p e n d i n g m e s s a g e s b e t w e e n U.S. involvement in Central America
1980 and 1982. T h e s e e s t i m a t e s have been obtained by p l u g g i n g the reception
coefficients from t h e c h a n g e m o d e l in Table 7.3 into the reception function, No Two
constraints constraints
E q u a t i o n 7 . 3 , and calculating r e c e p t i o n rates at different levels of political
Baseline reception function
awareness. As e x p e c t e d , r e c e p t i o n of a n t i - d e f e n s e - s p e n d i n g information in- -1.15 -1.27
Intercept
18
creases as political awareness i n c r e a s e s . a
Awareness 2.52 2.13
A c c e p t a n c e r a t e s , given r e c e p t i o n , are s h o w n in the c e n t e r panels of the fig- (standardized) (1.69) (1.20)
u r e . T h e y have been obtained by p l u g g i n g the a c c e p t a n c e coefficients from Ta- Floor parameter 0.37 0.35
ble 7.3 into t h e a c c e p t a n c e function, as given in E q u a t i o n 7 . 4 . As can be seen, (.17) (.16)
these r a t e s differ m a r k e d l y for R e p u b l i c a n s and D e m o c r a t s . A m o n g Republi- Baseline acceptance function
Intercept -0.33 -0.19
c a n s , political a w a r e n e s s g e n e r a t e s m u c h lower rates of a c c e p t a n c e of a n t i d e -
Awareness -0.76 -0.80"
fense i n f o r m a t i o n - or alternatively, m u c h higher levels of resistance; a m o n g (.42) (.37)
D e m o c r a t s , a w a r e n e s s also p r o d u c e s higher resistance r a t e s , but only barely so. Hawk-dove -1.38 -1.42
T h u s , as e x p e c t e d , a w a r e n e s s interacts with political predispositions to g e n e r a t e (standardized) (.43) (.46)
selective resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . Reagan fall disapproval -0.30 -0.33
M u l t i p l i c a t i o n of the reception rates on the left of Figure 7 . 4 by the a c c e p - (range -2 to +2) (.19) (.20)
tance rates in t h e c e n t e r yields e s t i m a t e d rates of attitude c h a n g e on cuts in d e -
Change reception function
fense s p e n d i n g , w h i c h are s h o w n on t h e right. To illustrate how this w o r k s , the Intercept -1.40 -0.60
figure focuses on a hypothetical R e p u b l i c a n and D e m o c r a t w h o are s o m e w h a t Awareness 1.17 2.13 a

above t h e m e d i a n level of political a w a r e n e s s . E a c h h a s a 52 percent c h a n c e of (1.16) (1.20)

e x p o s u r e to antidefense i n f o r m a t i o n , but their a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s are quite differ- Change acceptance function
ent: 30 percent for t h e Republican and 94 percent for t h e D e m o c r a t . Multipli- Intercept 1.50 -0.10
cation of these r e c e p t i o n and a c c e p t a n c e rates yields attitude c h a n g e r a t e s , as Awareness -1.39 -0.80*
(1.56) (.37)
s h o w n on the right. For the R e p u b l i c a n , the c h a n g e rate is .52 x .30 = . 1 5 .
Hawk-dove -0.66 -0.52
T h e s e e s t i m a t e d rates "of attitude c h a n g e agree well with the r a w d a t a on attitude
(.93) (.47)
c h a n g e , a s s h o w n i n Table 7 . 1 .
Reagan disapproval -0.29 -0.14
Let us turn n o w to the issue of U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a . Coef- (.47) (.28)
ficient e s t i m a t e s for the application of E q u a t i o n 7.7 to the d a t a from this issue Residual sum of squares 155.99 156.18
are s h o w n in Table 7 . 4 . O w i n g to the m u c h smaller s a m p l e involved, these e s -
t i m a t e s are even less precise than those for the defense s p e n d i n g issue, and here
Note: Model is Equation 7.7, estimated by maximum
the instability extends to both the baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s . Of t h e six sub- likelihood. The dependent variable is a 0-1 variable
stantive coefficients, only two reach statistical significance. In order to i m p r o v e indicating support for greater involvement in Central
the statistical precision of the fit, I constrained the coefficients on political America. Other political variables are scored in liberal
direction. Standard errors are in parentheses. The Timei N
awareness to be t h e s a m e in both the baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s . T h a t is, and Time2 N are 360.
awareness w a s constrained to have the s a m e effect on reception in both p e r i o d s a
Coefficient constrained to equal another coefficient
and t h e s a m e effect on a c c e p t a n c e in b o t h periods. T h e s e constraints b r o u g h t the Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys.
theoretically i m p o r t a n t coefficients of a w a r e n e s s to statistical significance at the
.05 level, as can be seen in Table 7 . 4 , and did so without p r o d u c i n g a significant It is interesting that h a w k - d o v e attitudes a p p e a r about four t i m e s m o r e impor-
reduction in t h e fit of the model to the d a t a (F [2, 7 0 7 ] , . 4 3 , n . s . ) . A l s o , t h e tant as a d e t e r m i n a n t of Central A m e r i c a attitudes than approval of presidential
qualitative fit of the constrained m o d e l to the d a t a is as g o o d as the fit of t h e 19
j o b p e r f o r m a n c e . (Since the h a w k - d o v e scale has been s t a n d a r d i z e d and t h e
unconstrained model. approval m e a s u r e r u n s from - 2 t o + 2 , the t w o variables have a p p r o x i m a t e l y the
18 The z-scores on the awareness variable in this graph run from -1.86 to +1.96; these scores
correspond to about the 1st and 98th percentiles on political awareness. 19 Hawk-dove attitudes remain dominant if party attachment is substituted for Reagan approval.
 146 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Basic processes of ' 'attitude change' 147

1.0 T
Hawks, after
Iran-Contra
Proportion
Proportion changing Hawks, before
supporting .75
to favor greater U.S. 79 Iran-Contra
greater U.S.
involvement in involvement
Central America, in Central
fall 1986 to summer America
1987 before and
after Iran-
Contra Doves, after
Iran-Contra
Doves, before
Political awareness Political awareness Iran-Contra

Figure 7.5. Attitude change on U.S. involvement in Central America. Estimates are de- Figure 7.6. Estimated support for greater U.S. involvement in Central America before
rived from the change function in Equation 7.7 and the coefficients for unconstrained and after Iran-Contra. Estimates are derived from Equation 7.7 and the coefficients for
model in Table 7.4. Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys. unconstrained model in Table 7.4. Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys.

same r a n g e . ) T h u s , it w a s not R e a g a n s u p p o r t e r s per se w h o mainly rallied b e -

hind U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a d u r i n g the I r a n - C o n t r a controversy;
it w a s p e o p l e h a v i n g h a w k i s h values. (For additional discussion of this issue, see
the a p p e n d i x to C h a p t e r 8.)
T h e e s t i m a t e d patterns of attitude c h a n g e in the Central A m e r i c a c a s e are
2 0
shown in Figure 7 . 5 . T h e s e p a t t e r n s , which are derived from the c h a n g e m o d e l
in Table 7 . 4 , are highly similar to those for the defense-spending issue. T h e only
i m p o r t a n t difference is that, for the Central A m e r i c a issue, it is the left-wing
g r o u p that is resistant to c h a n g e , w h e r e a s in the defense c a s e , the r i g h t - w i n g
g r o u p is m o r e resistant. T h u s , together, the defense and Central A m e r i c a cases
show that t h e m o d e l w o r k s as well w h e n opinion s w i n g s to the right as w h e n it
s w i n g s to t h e left.
In o r d e r to be certain the reader u n d e r s t a n d s w h a t is and is not being s h o w n
in Figure 7 . 5 , I present Figure 7 . 6 , which displays the Central A m e r i c a d a t a
from a different v i e w p o i n t . R a t h e r than show rates of change b e t w e e n t w o points
in t i m e , as in F i g u r e 7 . 5 , it shows absolute levels of support in each p e r i o d .
T h u s , 7 9 percent o f the most a w a r e h a w k s s u p p o r t e d greater U . S . involvement
in the fall, w h i l e 89 percent did so in the summer. T h i s absolute difference of
10 points (89 - 79 = 10) a m o u n t s to a conversion rate of about 50 percent
for highly a w a r e h a w k s not already s u p p o r t i n g greater U . S . involvement in
the fall (10/[100 - 79] = 10/21 = 48 p e r c e n t ) . M e a n w h i l e , there is an 11-point
shift a m o n g h a w k s scoring just below the m e d i a n on political awareness
(46 - 35 = 11). This 11-point shift represents the conversion of only 17 percent
20 The z-score values for awareness in this graph are - 1.87 and + 1.92 SD. The higher awareness
score leaves about 2 percent of cases, rather than the usual 1 percent, in the upper tail; this cutoff
has been used because it more accurately represents the actual data. Hawks and doves are defined
as scores of ±2 on the hawk-dove scale and ± 1.5 on Reagan disapproval, which has been scored
from -2 to +2.
(11/[100 - 35] = 17 percent) of h a w k s at this level of political awareness.
T h e s e c o n v e r s i o n rates are what I have plotted in Figure 7 . 5 . T h e reception-
a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , t h u s , d o e s not deal in the absolute magnitudes of opinion
c h a n g e within s u b g r o u p s ; it deals in conversion rates a m o n g the u n c o n v e r t e d
m e m b e r s of p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s . T h e difference is great.
Figure 7 . 6 m a k e s a n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t point. It m i g h t s e e m odd that the I r a n -
C o n t r a controversy p r o d u c e d attitude c h a n g e in a p r o i n v o l v e m e n t d i r e c t i o n . Yet
if it w e r e instead a s s e r t e d that I r a n - C o n t r a further polarized public attitudes
about U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a , the assertion w o u l d not s e e m o d d
at all. W h a t Figure 7 . 6 also shows is that a critical effect of the controversy w a s ,
in fact, to further p o l a r i z e h a w k s and doves. If p o l a r i z a t i o n p r o d u c e d greater
overall s u p p o r t for the p r o i n v o l v e m e n t p o s i t i o n , it w a s b e c a u s e the public w a s ,
at the b e g i n n i n g of the I r a n - C o n t r a affair, so one-sidedly o p p o s e d to U . S . in-
v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a that p o l a r i z a t i o n entailed gains in s u p p o r t for the
p r o - i n v o l v e m e n t position.
Before closing the chapter, I should n o t e that the w i d e c o n f i d e n c e intervals for
coefficients of t h e u n c o n s t r a i n e d m o d e l are w o r r i s o m e , and that I discuss this
p r o b l e m in my c o n c l u d i n g evaluation of the m o d e l in C h a p t e r 11. In the m e a n -
t i m e , let me say briefly that there a p p e a r to be t w o r e a s o n s for the p r o b l e m .
T h e y are multicollinearity arising from the fact that awareness must be entered
in the m o d e l four t i m e s (in the reception and a c c e p t a n c e subfunctions of both the
baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s ) , and t h e d e p e n d e n c e of s o m e coefficients on a
small s u b g r o u p of r e s p o n d e n t s , n a m e l y p e o p l e w h o both rank high on political
awareness and a p p e a r predisposed to resist a given m e s s a g e . A l t h o u g h neither of
these p r o b l e m s is a p r o b l e m with the m o d e l itself, they m a k e testing the m o d e l
difficult. S o m e steps to m a x i m i z e t h e efficiency of future tests are also discussed
in C h a p t e r 11.
 148 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Basic processes of "attitude change' 149

entirely i m p l a u s i b l e . T h e a s s u m p t i o n of a one-sided information flow is less ex-

C O N C L U D I N G REMARKS
t r e m e in the c a s e of defense s p e n d i n g , w h e r e , as I w a s able to report, the flow
This c h a p t e r has d e v e l o p e d s o m e basic principles of attitude c h a n g e , p r o p o s e d a of i n f o r m a t i o n in t h e m e d i a p r e d o m i n a n t l y favored cuts in defense spending. But
simplified m o d e l that is broadly consistent with these p r i n c i p l e s , and u n d e r t a k e n even h e r e , the public w a s exposed to s o m e c o u n t e r v a l e n t information from the
simple tests of the m o d e l s . T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of the points m a d e in this chapter R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , w h i c h sought to justify its policy of increased s p e n d i n g .
is that attitude c h a n g e may be u n d e r s t o o d as a t w o - s t e p process involving, first, Taking full account of t h e existence of such two-sided information flows is per-
reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d , s e c o n d , a c c e p t a n c e or n o n a c c e p - haps t h e m o s t interesting c o m p l i c a t i o n to be added to this intitial discussion of
tance of their contents. attitude c h a n g e .
T h e reception step in this process d e p e n d s on the i n d i v i d u a l ' s level of political
awareness: T h e greater the p e r s o n ' s a w a r e n e s s , t h e greater his or her c h a n c e s of APPENDIX
receiving - that is, being exposed to and c o m p r e h e n d i n g - a given c h a n g e -
T h i s appendix explains h o w to obtain m a x i m u m likelihood (M L) e s t i m a t e s of
inducing m e s s a g e .
T h e a c c e p t a n c e step is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d , but the central idea is that politi- Equation 7.7.
cally a w a r e persons are better able to resist persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that are E q u a t i o n 7.7 takes t h e general form
inconsistent with their basic values than a r e less aware persons. T h e m a g n i t u d e Prob(-y = 1) =fiX, B).
of the a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance effect d e p e n d s on the value distance of the
w h e r e y is a 0 - 1 d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e , X is a vector of independent v a r i a b l e s , and
individual from the persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n . W h e n the distance is m i n i m a l ,
P is a coefficient vector. T h e first step is to w r i t e out t h e likelihood function, as
awareness m a y have little or no effect in inducing resistance to c h a n g e , as in the
follows:
case of D e m o c r a t s r e s p o n d i n g to t h e a n t i - d e f e n s e spending m e s s a g e in Figure
7 . 4 . But w h e n the distance is great, a w a r e n e s s is strongly associated with re- L = n D\ *fiX, B) X n D2 * (1 -f(X, 3))
sistance to c h a n g e , as in the case of R e p u b l i c a n s r e s p o n d i n g to t h e s a m e liberal
w h e r e Dl takes t h e value of 1 if y = 1 and zero o t h e r w i s e , and D2 takes t h e
m e s s a g e in Figure 7 . 4 .
value of 1 w h e n y = 0 and 0 o t h e r w i s e . T h e log of t h e likelihood function is then
L a t e r chapters will fill out this a r g u m e n t in several ways. O n e i m p o r t a n t step
that r e m a i n s to be taken is an e x a m i n a t i o n of the effects of m e s s a g e s of different
intensities. As M c G u i r e ' s analysis of e a s y - l e a r n i n g and h a r d - l e a r n i n g situations
Log(L) = 2 m io x
* M > 0)1 +
2 D 1
* l o
8 [ 1 3 ) 1

indicates, t h e expected pattern of m a s s attitude c h a n g e is m a r k e d l y different T h e aim is to m a x i m i z e the value of L o g ( L ) . B e c a u s e t h e log of a n u m b e r

w h e n the p e r s u a s i v e m e s s a g e s a t u r a t e s , - o r nearly s a t u r a t e s , a p o p u l a t i o n , than b e t w e e n 0 and 1 is n e g a t i v e , and b e c a u s e 0 < f(X, 3) < 1 since it gives p r o b -
w h e n the m e s s a g e has so little intensity that it can reach only the most politically abilities, this expression can be rewritten as
aware m e m b e r s of the g r o u p . 02 10 1
A n o t h e r c o m p l e x i t y c o n c e r n s t h e novelty or freshness of the issue that the per- -Log(L) = * l ° g W * . P)] ~ X*^ -M> P)J ) 2

suasive m e s s a g e addresses. If the issue is an extremely familiar o n e , most citi-
zens will have relatively large stores of existing c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and this will
produce high overall levels of inertial resistance to the m e s s a g e . Such resistance
will not only lessen the a g g r e g a t e amount of attitude c h a n g e that occurs in re-
sponse to a m e s s a g e of given intensity, but also alter the pattern of c h a n g e .
Yet a n o t h e r task that r e m a i n s is to d e v e l o p e v i d e n c e that the d y n a m i c s of the
attitude c h a n g e m o d e l hold at the level of the most basic e l e m e n t of the R A S
m o d e l , the f o r m a t i o n of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in response to persuasive c o m m u n i c a -
tions. I have m a d e specific claims c o n c e r n i n g the role of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in the
c h a n g e p r o c e s s but have yet to p r o d u c e direct e v i d e n c e that the claims a r e valid.
Finally, t h e m o d e l proposed in this c h a p t e r a s s u m e s that attitude c h a n g e re-
sults from the e x p o s u r e of the public to a single, d o m i n a n t flow of c o m m u n i -
cations. T h i s , as I have m a d e clear, is a major simplification. I n d e e d , in t h e case
of U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a , w h e r e p r o i n v o l v e m e n t c h a n g e took
place a m i d t h e I r a n - C o n t r a s c a n d a l , t h e simplification is so e x t r e m e as to be
B e c a u s e n o n l i n e a r regression will find t h e coefficient values of a right-hand
expression that m i n i m i z e t h e s u m of squared residuals from a left-hand vari-
a b l e , o n e can find t h e values of B that m i n i m i z e the nonsquared value of - L o g
(L) - w h i c h is t h e s a m e as m a x i m i z i n g t h e n o n s q u a r e d value of Log(L) - if one
uses nonlinear regression to e s t i m a t e
0 = y/-D\ * \og\flX, 3)] - D2 * log[l -f(X, 3)] (7.8)
This a l g o r i t h m for p r o d u c i n g m a x i m u m likelihood e s t i m a t e s , w h i c h h a s w i d e
utility but h a s not b e e n previously p u b l i s h e d , w a s suggested by D o u g Rivers of
Stanford University.
In o r d e r to apply E q u a t i o n 7 . 8 to d a t a on attitude c h a n g e b e t w e e n t w o t i m e p e -
riods for a case in w h i c h / ( X , 3) equals E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 , it is n e c e s s a r y to c o m b i n e
the d a t a from t h e t w o p e r i o d s into a single stacked data file, with a 0 - 1 d u m m y
variable t o indicate w h i c h data are from t i m e , and w h i c h are from t i m e . T h e 2
 150 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N

following S A S p r o g r a m l a n g u a g e can then b e used t o p r o d u c e M L e s t i m a t e s 8

from such a d a t a file. This e x a m p l e involves the c a s e of c h a n g e s in attitudes
toward defense s p e n d i n g b e t w e e n 1980 and 1982, w h e r e t h e value of 1 on
D E F S P N indicates s u p p o r t for cuts in s p e n d i n g , and the value of 1 on Y E A R
Tests of the one-message model
indicates attitudes in 1982:
DATA;
INFILE MYDATA;
INPUT AWARE 1-11 DEFSPN 12-19 PID 20-27 YEAR 28-35;
IF DEFSPN EQ 1 THEN Dl = l;
IF DEFSPN EQ 0 THEN Dl = 0 ;
IF DEFSPN EQ 0 THEN D 2 = 1;
IF DEFSPN EQ 1 THEN D 2 = 0 ; T h e p u r p o s e of C h a p t e r 7 w a s to familiarize the reader with the basic logic of the
VAR1=0; r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process and to d e v e l o p a m o d e l c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g the
PROC NLIN M E T H O D = D U D ; essentials of t h e process as it manifests itself in t h e limited attitude c h a n g e d a t a
PARMS B 9 9 = . 1 0 B 0 = - 3 . 9 B1 = 1.2 B 2 = 4 B3 = - . 6 B4=4 that are available in typical surveys. T h e present chapter develops and tests the
B10= — 1.1 Bl 1 = 1 B 2 1 = 2 . 4 B31 = —1.4 B 4 4 = 1 . 2 ; m o d e l ' s d e d u c t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s , including s o m e nonintuitive o n e s . T h e a i m i s t o
Tl = (1-(1/(1+B99+EXP(B0+B1*AWARE))))* c o n v i n c e the r e a d e r that t h e success of the m o d e l in its initial tests w a s not
(1/(1+EXP(-B2-B3*AWARE-B4*PID))); m e r e l y fortuitous but a r i s e s from a significant c o n g r u e n c e b e t w e e n its structure
T2 = (1-(1/(1+EXP(B10+B11*AWARE))))* and the actual d y n a m i c s of m a s s o p i n i o n .
(1/(1+ EXP( - B21 - B31 * A W A R E - B44*PID)))* T h e c h a p t e r h a s three p a r t s . T h e first analyzes t w o message-level d e t e r m i -
PI = T1+YEAR*T2*(1-Tl); nants of attitude c h a n g e : the intensity of the c h a n g e - inducing m e s s a g e s , and
MODEL VAR1 = ( - D 1 *LOG10(P1) - D 2 * L O G 1 0 ( 1 - P l ) ) * * . 5 ; w h e t h e r the m e s s a g e s deal with a familiar or unfamiliar issue. T h e s e factors cre-
ate predictably different p a t t e r n s of opinion c h a n g e . T h e s e c o n d p a r t e x a m i n e s
It is also possible to use nonlinear regression to e s t i m a t e the simpler
the d y n a m i c s of resistance to persuasion at the level of the R A S m o d e l ' s p r i m -
expression: M O D E L D E F S P N = PI
itive t e r m , c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Finally, t h e c h a p t e r uses the m o d e l to shed light on a
T h i s will g i v e e s t i m a t e s that are u n b i a s e d and consistent but inefficient; also, classic p r o b l e m of opinion r e s e a r c h , g e n e r a t i o n a l differences in receptivity to
the s t a n d a r d e r r o r s will be incorrect, o w i n g to heteroskedasticity arising from a n e w ideas.
0 - 1 dependent variable. 21
I should w a r n that, in the course of developing these diverse tests of the
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , t h e c h a p t e r skips from o n e e m p i r i c a l e x a m p l e t o
21 The only difficulty in implementing this estimation technique is the selection of good starting a n o t h e r - from public s u p p o r t for foreign wars to presidential approval ratings
values for parameters in the model. In small datasets, this can be a serious problem, since non-
sensical estimates will be generated unless the starting values for most parameters are reasonably to racial attitudes - without d e v e l o p i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e picture of opinion in
close to actual values. My approach to finding starting values is as follows: First, confirm by any single d o m a i n . T h i s m a k e s the c h a p t e r a bit of a h o d g e p o d g e to read, but
visual inspection of the raw data, as organized in the manner of Table 7.1, that there is reason
I see no a l t e r n a t i v e if I am to exploit fully the limited d a t a that are available to
to believe that the reception-acceptance model will apply. That is, confirm the existence of clear
nonmonotonicities in the data; if the appropriate patterns are not apparent, further modeling is test the m o d e l .
unlikely to be helpful. Second, eliminate all but the essential variables from the model; in most
cases, this will mean using only awareness in the reception function, and only awareness and one
predispositions variable in the acceptance function. Third, fix the parameter values for these CHARACTERISTIC PATTERNS OF ATTITUDE CHANGE
three variables to plausible values; if all three have been standardized and if the predispositions
variable has been scored so that high values indicate resistance to change, plausible values are T h e analysis o f attitude c h a n g e h a s s o far c o n c e n t r a t e d o n h o w t w o types o f
+ 1 , - 1 , and - . 4 , respectively. Then, using starting values of 0 for the intercepts in the recep- individual-level factors, differences in habitual political a w a r e n e s s and in polit-
tion and acceptance functions, estimate the baseline function for data from the initial time period
alone. Once intercept estimates for the baseline model have been obtained, they can be used as ical p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , interactively affect attitude c h a n g e . T h i s section will b r i n g
starting values. As constraints are serially loosened, remaining pieces of the model are put back into play t w o message-level factors that also systematically affect p a t t e r n s of at-
and additional variables are added.
titude c h a n g e .
An alternative approach is to use a spreadsheet to manually fit the model to the data by choos-
T h e first of the message-level differences is the p e n e t r a t i n g p o w e r or intensity
ing appropriate parameter values, where the data have been organized in the form of Table 7.1.
I suspect that many researchers wanting to use the reception-acceptance model will need to learn of c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s . T h e idea here is that s o m e m e s s a g e s have greater
to manipulate it on a spreadsheet before they are able to use a statistics package to fit it to data.
 152 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
capacity than o t h e r s to transfuse a public that is differentially attentive to poli-
tics. A few m e s s a g e s have such great p e n e t r a t i n g p o w e r that they reach virtually
e v e r y o n e , r e g a r d l e s s of their level of attention to politics. C o m m u n i c a t i o n s con-
c e r n i n g the U . S . policy of o p p o s i n g G e r m a n y and Japan in W o r l d W a r II are an
e x a m p l e of such very high-intensity m e s s a g e s (Cantril, 1944). But m a n y m e s -
sages reach only p e r s o n s w h o are relatively attentive to politics. M o s t c o n g r e s -
sional a c t i o n s , S u p r e m e C o u r t d e c i s i o n s , and presidential d i r e c t i v e s , even those
that m a k e the front p a g e s of n e w s p a p e r s and arouse s o m e controversy, fall into
this c a t e g o r y , as we shall s e e .
O n e m i g h t suspect that the capacity of a m e s s a g e to p e n e t r a t e the c o n s c i o u s -
ness of m e m b e r s of the p u b l i c , w h i c h is w h a t I m e a n by intensity, is wholly a
function of t h e a m o u n t of broadcast t i m e or front-page space that the n e w s m e -
dia devote to it. T h e r e i s , however, a factor that is at least as i m p o r t a n t : h o w
m u c h p e o p l e already k n o w and care about the issue that the m e s s a g e addresses.
T h e greater their c o n c e r n and initial k n o w l e d g e , the m o r e likely they are to n o -
tice and c o m p r e h e n d additional information that c o m e s their way.
This can be seen from the 1989 N E S pilot study, w h i c h m e a s u r e d the diffusion
of p a r t i c u l a r n e w s stories through t h e p u b l i c . T h e following three n e w s stories
b r o k e j u s t before or d u r i n g t h e pilot survey:
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North was given a suspended sentence, a fine, and 1,200
hours of community service for his conviction of crimes in connection with the Iran-
Contra controversy. North's sentencing was a highly discrete event that was the lead
story on the national television news and in most newspapers for one day.
Speaker Jim Wright resigned his speakership and left the House of Representatives
amid allegations of scandal. Wright's resignation was the final act in a long drawn-out
political controversy that was at or near the top of the news for several months.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that juveniles and mentally retarded persons could
be executed for the crime of murder. Like North's sentencing, this was a discrete
event that was at the top of the national news for a short time and then disappeared
from view.
In the survey, r e s p o n d e n t s were q u e s t i o n e d to find out w h a t , if a n y t h i n g , they
had l e a r n e d about these n e w s m e s s a g e s . For e x a m p l e , on the W r i g h t story, p e o -
ple w e r e a s k e d :
Have you heard or read any stories on the resignation of Congressman Jim Wright from
the House of Representatives?
( I F Y E S ) D O you happen t o recall why h e resigned?
Persons w h o c o u l d give a minimally correct a n s w e r to the follow-up q u e s -
tion - for e x a m p l e , any m e n t i o n , however v a g u e , of scandal or a c c u s a t i o n s of
w r o n g d o i n g - w e r e c o u n t e d as having " r e c e i v e d " the story of the W r i g h t res-
ignation. F r o m such d a t a , it can be e s t i m a t e d that a p p r o x i m a t e l y 75 percent of
the public l e a r n e d of N o r t h ' s s e n t e n c e , about 45 percent b e c a m e aware of t h e
W r i g h t affair, and 25 percent h e a r d of the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e a t h penalty d e c i -
sion (Price and Zaller, 1990).
Tests of the one-message model 153
Political awareness
Figure 8.1. Diffusion of political news. Estimates are derived from Equation 7.3 and the
coefficients in Table 8.6. Source: 1989 NES pilot survey.
T h e only way to explain these d a t a is to a s s u m e that the p e n e t r a t i n g p o w e r of
a m e s s a g e m a y be as m u c h a p r o p e r t y of t h e a u d i e n c e that d o e s or d o e s not find
it interesting as it is of the a m o u n t of m e d i a c o v e r a g e devoted to it. T h u s , t h e
story of Oliver N o r t h ' s sentencing achieved w i d e r recognition in o n e day than
the W r i g h t scandal achieved in several m o n t h s . Similarly, w h e n former Presi-
dent R o n a l d R e a g a n fell off his horse w h i l e v a c a t i o n i n g in M e x i c o , m o r e people
l e a r n e d about it t h a n l e a r n e d the reason for the W r i g h t r e s i g n a t i o n , even t h o u g h
t h e horse incident o c c u r r e d on a Saturday and received m i n i m a l coverage in
1
lightly w a t c h e d w e e k e n d n e w s s h o w s . T h u s , w h e n I refer to t h e intensity of a
m e s s a g e , t h e r e a d e r should k e e p in m i n d that I am m a k i n g a statement about
both the m e s s a g e itself and the a u d i e n c e that d o e s or d o e s not b e c o m e interested
in i t .2
T h e diffusion p a t t e r n s of these differently intense n e w s stories are w o r t h ex-
a m i n i n g m o r e carefully b e c a u s e , unlike the cases of attitude c h a n g e we have
e x a m i n e d , they e n a b l e us to m e a s u r e r e c e p t i o n of p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e s indepen-
dently of w h e t h e r the m e s s a g e s brought about attitude c h a n g e . T h u s , we can see
very clearly j u s t h o w different p i e c e s of information diffuse t h r o u g h the p u b l i c .
D a t a on the diffusion of the N o r t h , W r i g h t , and d e a t h penalty stories are
s h o w n in F i g u r e 8 . 1 . T h e r e i s , as e x p e c t e d , a strong relationship b e t w e e n p e o -
p l e ' s habitual levels of political a w a r e n e s s and their reception of p a r t i c u l a r n e w s
stories. S o m e m e m b e r s of the public (those w h o score high on habitual political
awareness) l e a r n about virtually all i m p o r t a n t political n e w s , w h i l e o t h e r s learn
3
about almost n o n e of i t . (The c u r v e s in Figure 8.1 are d e r i v e d from logistic
1 More complex stories may also have less penetrating power than simple stories. However, it seems
to me that the stories mentioned here are all fairly simple, and that differences in people's interest
in them are therefore the key to the observed differences in penetrating power.
2 In principle, one could obtain separate measures of intensity of coverage of an issue and the pub-
lic's familiarity with it, but such data are not available for the present study.
3 Compare these results with those of Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien (1970).
 154 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
regressions o f t h e form o f E q u a t i o n 7 . 3 ; t h e associated coefficient e s t i m a t e s a r e
s h o w n in Table 8.6 in the a p p e n d i x to this chapter.)
T h e r i g h t h a n d panel of Figure 8.1 c o n t a i n s c o m p a r i s o n d a t a on the diffusion
of a nonpolitical story, t h e c r a s h of a D C - 1 0 airliner w h i l e trying to m a k e an
e m e r g e n c y landing. T h e disaster, w h i c h killed m o r e than 100 p e r s o n s , w a s c a p -
tured on v i d e o t a p e and s h o w n repeatedly on television for several days. It w a s
p r o m i n e n t l y featured in all t h e n a t i o n ' s political m e d i a - local and national TV
n e w s , the n e w s w e e k l i e s , r a d i o , and press. In view of the a m o u n t of this cover-
a g e , the intrinsic interest of the story, the vividness of the a c c o m p a n y i n g tele-
vision and still p i c t u r e s , and the simplicity of the plotline, it is striking that a
large n u m b e r of people n o n e t h e l e s s remained u n a w a r e of its existence. T h e s e
m u s t be persons either w h o were entirely cut off from the n e w s media or w h o
m a n a g e to r e m e m b e r almost n o t h i n g of w h a t they e n c o u n t e r in the m e d i a .
T h e diffusion p a t t e r n s for the four differently intense n e w s stories in Figure
8.1 h a v e t h e u t m o s t i m p o r t a n c e for the study of attitude c h a n g e . T h e attitude
c h a n g e c u r v e s we saw in the last c h a p t e r take m a r k e d l y different s h a p e s , d e -
pending on w h e t h e r they involve a story that has the p e n e t r a t i n g p o w e r of the
D C - 1 0 c r a s h , t h e N o r t h s e n t e n c i n g , o r the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e a t h penalty
decision.
If m e s s a g e s can vary in their intensity, they can also vary in the extent to
w h i c h they a d d r e s s issues on w h i c h t h e public h a s a large store of existing con-
siderations. T h i s is the second m e s s a g e - l e v e l variable that systematically affects
patterns of attitude c h a n g e . A c c o r d i n g to our e a r l i e r discussion of inertial re-
s i s t a n c e , large stores of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s act to dilute t h e effects of any
new m e s s a g e . For this r e a s o n , m e s s a g e s addressing issues that a r e , in this par-
ticular s e n s e , familiar to the public are likely to p r o d u c e less attitude c h a n g e , all
4
else e q u a l , than m e s s a g e s that a d d r e s s novel or unfamiliar t o p i c s . T h e y also af-
fect the e x p e c t e d patterns of c h a n g e , as depicted in attitude c h a n g e c u r v e s of the
type e x a m i n e d in C h a p t e r 7.
T h e attitude c h a n g e m o d e l e m b o d i e d i n E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 , r e p e a t e d b e l o w , h a s
been designed to capture these two message-level variables:
-1
Prob(Change) = (1 - (1 +/ + E x p [ + a + o.\Awareness]) )
0
x (1 + E x p [ — b — b | A w a r e n e s s
0
- 1
— ^Predispositions]) (7.5)
Differences in m e s s a g e intensity are captured by the a p a r a m e t e r in the re-
0 effects on attitude c h a n g e . T h e first is t h a t , as would be e x p e c t e d , m e s s a g e s on
ception function; higher values of a indicate that people at the same level of
0
political a w a r e n e s s will have h i g h e r levels of r e c e p t i o n of t h e given m e s s a g e , all
else e q u a l . ( C o m p a r e the m i d d l e panel of Figure 7.2 with Figure 8.1.) Differ-
e n c e s in m e s s a g e familiarity, w h i c h affect a c c e p t a n c e r a t e s , are captured by the
b coefficient in t h e a c c e p t a n c e function; lower levels of b indicate lower levels
0 0
of a c c e p t a n c e , at given levels of reception of persuasive m e s s a g e s .
4 Note that message intensity, as discussed here, and message familiarity are not entirely indepen-
dent, since both depend on the public's prior level of information about the topic of the message.
Tests of the one-message model 155
B e c a u s e the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is highly interactive - b e c a u s e that
is, the effect of o n e variable d e p e n d s on the values of all other variables - the
effects of shifts in a and b ramify t h r o u g h o u t the m o d e l . In o r d e r to illustrate
0 0
their effects, I have c o n s t r u c t e d a typology, s h o w n as Figure 8 . 2 , to illustrate
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c patterns o f attitude c h a n g e . T h e typology h a s b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d
from E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 by using typical values for t h e p a r a m e t e r s on individual-level
variables ( a w a r e n e s s and predispositions) while v a r y i n g the m e s s a g e level pa-
r a m e t e r s , a and b , to capture typical differences in intensity and familiarity.
0 0
5
To facilitate exposition of the typology, I a s s u m e the diffusion of a liberal m e s -
sage through s u b p o p u l a t i o n s that are liberal, centrist, and c o n s e r v a t i v e in their
p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , but o t h e r m e t r i c s o f d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n m e s s a g e s o u r c e s a n d m e s -
sage receivers, such as those associated with religion or ethnicity, would pro-
d u c e the s a m e theoretically expected p a t t e r n s .
L o o k first at the t o p panel of Figure 8 . 2 . It s h o w s e x p e c t e d p a t t e r n s of attitude
c h a n g e on " l e s s f a m i l i a r " topics for m e s s a g e s of low, m e d i u m , and high inten-
sity, w h e r e levels of m e s s a g e intensity roughly c o r r e s p o n d to the intensity of
stories o n t h e S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s d e a t h p e n a l t y d e c i s i o n , t h e W r i g h t r e s i g n a t i o n ,
and the D C - 1 0 c r a s h , as depicted in F i g u r e 8 . 1 .
W h e n the c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e has low intensity, as in panel A, attitude
c h a n g e is c o n c e n t r a t e d a m o n g t h e m o s t highly a w a r e persons. T h i s is b e c a u s e
highly a w a r e p e r s o n s are the only o n e s w h o meet the first requirement for atti-
tude c h a n g e : r e c e p t i o n of a relevant m e s s a g e . But as t h e c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s -
s a g e b e c o m e s m o r e i n t e n s e , as in panel B and especially C, attitude c h a n g e
b e c o m e s c o m m o n a m o n g m o d e r a t e l y aware and finally modestly aware persons.
O n e can see from these g r a p h s t h a t , in g e n e r a l , the lower the intensity of the
message, the smaller the proportion of attitude change that occurs among less-
aware persons. Conversely, the higher the intensity of the m e s s a g e , the higher
t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f attitude c h a n g e that o c c u r s a m o n g less-aware persons.
Note that t h e p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e on the issue of U . S . involvement in
Central A m e r i c a , as depicted in Figure 7.5 of the last chapter, roughly c o r r e -
s p o n d to t h e p a t t e r n in panel B of this figure. T h i s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e will be a
critical e l e m e n t in tests of the validity of the typology later in this section.
T h e lower panel of Figure 8.2 uses the s a m e p a r a m e t e r values as in the t o p
p a n e l , except that t h e b coefficient h a s b e e n set higher to indicate attitude
0
c h a n g e on a " m o r e f a m i l i a r " topic. T h e increase in issue familiarity has t w o
m o r e familiar subjects p r o d u c e less overall attitude c h a n g e . S e c o n d and m o r e
subtly, a higher proportion of the attitude change on more familiar issues (com-
pared to less familiar issues) is concentrated among less-aware persons. This
5 The values used in constructing the typology are a| = 1.25 and b, = - 1.25; a for low-, middle- 0
, and high-intensity messages are - 2 . 5 , 0, 2.5, respectively; b for low-familiarity and high-
0
familiarity messages are +3 and 0, respectively; liberal, centrist, and conservative persons had
additional resistance effects of +1.5, 0, and - 1 . 5 , respectively. The / parameter is 0. In con-
structing the simulated change scores, awareness runs from -2 to +2. These values, when sub-
stituted into Equation 7.5, will precisely reproduce the curves shown in Figure 8.2.
 Tests of the one-message model 157

Figure 8.3. Simulated effects of message intensity and familiarity on opinion change
(three dimensional).

can be seen by noting the peak level of c h a n g e on each c u r v e and c o m p a r i n g it

with its vertical c o u n t e r p a r t ; the peaks are m o r e toward the low-awareness end
6
of the s p e c t r u m in the b o t t o m p a n e l s .
O b v i o u s l y , the c u r v e s depicted in Figure 8.2 do not exhaust the patterns of
attitude c h a n g e that might be g e n e r a t e d by E q u a t i o n 7.5 and o b s e r v e d in actual
data. In particular, one might e n c o u n t e r m e s s a g e s that are even m o r e intense
than those d e p i c t e d h e r e , in which c a s e the c h a n g e rates a m o n g the least a w a r e
persons in panels C and F of Figure 8.2 w o u l d be even higher. Alternatively, o n e
might e n c o u n t e r issues that are even less familiar than those e x a m i n e d in the
figure, in which c a s e there would be even larger a m o u n t s of attitude c h a n g e ,
especially a m o n g highly aware persons. T h e important point about Figure 8 . 2 ,
t h e n , is not that it tells us exactly w h a t to expect in every possible situation, but
that it gives us a basis for projecting how, in a general way, c h a n g e s in m e s s a g e
intensity and issue familiarity interact with each other and with individual-level
factors in the a t t i t u d e - c h a n g e process.
S i n c e , as this discussion indicates, the p a r t i c u l a r attitude-change curves d e -
rived from the model d e p e n d on the p a r t i c u l a r p a r a m e t e r values used to con-
struct t h e m , I wanted to m a k e sure that the typology is not overly d e p e n d e n t on
the p a r t i c u l a r p a r a m e t e r values I c h o s e . Accordingly, I c o n s t r u c t e d Figure 8 . 3 ,
which generalizes Figure 8.2 to three d i m e n s i o n s a n d , in the process of d o i n g s o ,
shows the joint effects of m e s s a g e intensity and issue familiarity across a m u c h
6 Given that awareness has both reception and acceptance effects.
 158 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 159

w i d e r r a n g e of p a r a m e t e r values. (As a visual aid to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the regions t w o years. Yet it is implausible to claim that this w a s an issue that really gripped
of Figure 8.3 that c o r r e s p o n d to the different cells of Figure 8.2 are labeled a c - t h e public m i n d . O n e indication of this is that the p u b l i c ' s level of factual in-
cordingly.) I found that three-dimensional representations of the m o d e l , of the f o r m a t i o n on this issue, as g a u g e d by direct tests of i n f o r m a t i o n , w a s notori-
type shown in F i g u r e 8 . 3 , retain the s a m e general shape over all plausible values ously low. For e x a m p l e , only 38 percent of A m e r i c a n s k n e w in 1986 that the
7
of a and b , provided that a w a r e n e s s r e m a i n s positively a s s o c i a t e d with re-
0 0 U n i t e d States w a s s u p p o r t i n g the C o n t r a guerillas and not the N i c a r a g u a n gov-
ception of c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s and negatively a s s o c i a t e d with a c c e p t a n c e e r n m e n t (Shipler, 1986).
to roughly the s a m e d e g r e e . Figure 8 . 3 , t h u s , depicts the general p a t t e r n s of at- As we saw earlier, attitude c h a n g e on the Central A m e r i c a issue c o n f o r m e d to
titude c h a n g e that can be e x p e c t e d if E q u a t i o n 7.5 has accurately captured the the p a t t e r n indicating a m e s s a g e of m i d d l e intensity and a lower level of issue
d y n a m i c s of the attitude-change process. familiarity (Figure 8 . 2 b ) . Let us therefore stipulate the Central A m e r i c a c a s e to
T h e t y p o l o g i e s of expected p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e in Figures 8.2 and 8.3 have defined t h e s t a n d a r d for middle-intensity persuasive m e s s a g e s and low is-
create the potential for tests of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l that a r e , by the sue familiarity. To t h e extent that o t h e r cases differ from t h e s e s t a n d a r d s , they
standards of social s c i e n c e , rather d e m a n d i n g , as the next section will show. will be classified as having m o r e or less intensity, and m o r e or less average fa-
miliarity within t h e public.
T h e first c a s e to be e x a m i n e d in light of these standards is the d e c l i n e in Pres-
The case of presidential popularity ident R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e r a t i n g over the course of the I r a n - C o n t r a con-
troversy. In the p e r i o d b e t w e e n late N o v e m b e r 1986 and J u n e 1987, R e a g a n ' s
C o n f i r m a t i o n of the empirical value of the typology in Figure 8.2 requires
disapproval r a t i n g rose from 32 percent to 48 percent in r e s p o n s e to c h a r g e s that
independent m e a s u r e m e n t of the t w o message-level v a r i a b l e s , intensity and
the president had k n o w n about the illegal diversion of g o v e r n m e n t funds to the
familiarity. T h i s is no e a s y task. W i t h respect to intensity, the p r o b l e m is that,
C o n t r a guerrillas in N i c a r a g u a . W h a t can be said about m e s s a g e intensity and
as indicated, intensity involves m o r e than the a m o u n t of m e d i a attention to an
issue familiarity in this c a s e ?
issue, which could by itself be fairly easily m e a s u r e d . Intensity, as used h e r e ,
In c o m p a r i s o n to the intensity of m e s s a g e s c o n c e r n i n g t h e Central A m e r i c a
also involves the degree to which the public finds the subject an inherently in-
issue, m e s s a g e s on R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e must be classified as m o r e in-
teresting and e n g a g i n g o n e A l t h o u g h o n e might be able to capture this less tan-
t e n s e . First, with respect to t h e sheer a m o u n t of m e d i a a t t e n t i o n , the I r a n - C o n -
gible factor by m e a s u r i n g h o w m u c h the public k n o w s or cares about different
tra scandal w a s the major c o n t i n u i n g n e w s story in the United States for several
issues, the d a t a n e c e s s a r y for m a k i n g such c o m p a r a t i v e m e a s u r e m e n t s are cur-
m o n t h s , w h i c h is a status that t h e Central A m e r i c a issue, by itself, never
rently unavailable.
a c h i e v e d . S e c o n d , with respect to public interest, President R e a g a n w a s in this
W i t h respect to issue familiarity, the m e a s u r e m e n t p r o b l e m is essentially t h e
period the c o u n t r y ' s leading political figure and the focal point of a large frac-
s a m e . It w o u l d be fairly e a s y to use surveys to g a t h e r d a t a on w h a t the public
tion of the n e w s broadcast in the U n i t e d States on a day-to-day basis ( G r o s s m a n
k n o w s about different issues, and to use this as a m e a s u r e of a g g r e g a t e levels of
and K u m a r , 1981; I y e n g a r and Kinder, 1987). It is therefore likely that his con-
issue familiarity. But, at the m o m e n t , such d a t a are unavailable. C o m p a r a t i v e
duct of t h e p r e s i d e n c y w a s a m o r e interesting issue than a guerrilla w a r w h o s e
rates of no o p i n i o n , as utilized in B a r t e l s ' s 1988 analysis of voter k n o w l e d g e of
principal a d v e r s a r i e s w e r e not even w i d e l y k n o w n .
different c a n d i d a t e s , might be a plausible indicator of a g g r e g a t e levels of issue
A m e r i c a n s w o u l d also be e x p e c t e d to have larger a m o u n t s of stored informa-
familiarity, except that different q u e s t i o n formats raise different hurdles to the
tion about R e a g a n , w h o w a s then in his sixth year as president, than about af-
expression of no opinion on different issues.
fairs in Central A m e r i c a . If s o , t h e issue of R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e w o u l d
A l t h o u g h r i g o r o u s m e a s u r e m e n t s of intensity and familiarity a r e , for these
have been a m o r e familiar issue.
r e a s o n s , i m p o s s i b l e in the present study, informal but plausible c o m p a r a t i v e
G i v e n that t h e c a s e of R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e involved m e s s a g e s of higher
m e a s u r e m e n t s can be m a d e for at least s o m e issues. My m e t h o d will be to take
intensity and h i g h e r familiarity, in t h e p a r t i c u l a r senses i n d i c a t e d , than m e s s a g e s
the issue of U . S . involvement in Central A m e r i c a as a baseline c a s e , and to
on Central A m e r i c a , it follows that t h e p a t t e r n of attitude c h a n g e on R e a g a n ' s
j u d g e other c a s e s in relation to it. So let us begin with a close e x a m i n a t i o n of
j o b evaluation should differ from t h e Central A m e r i c a pattern in roughly the way
this c a s e .
that Figure 8.2b differs from Figure 8.2f.
U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in the guerrilla wars of Central A m e r i c a w a s frequently
T h e attitude c h a n g e d a t a n e c e s s a r y to evaluate this e x p e c t a t i o n are presented
e n o u g h in the n e w s through 1986 and 1987 to indicate serious m e d i a attention.
in Figure 8.4. T h e s e d a t a show t h e probability of a c h a n g e t o w a r d disapproval of
For e x a m p l e , both Time and Newsweek devoted cover stories to it d u r i n g these
President R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e b e t w e e n N o v e m b e r 1986 and J u n e 1987, a s
7 That is, a and b values between ± 10.
0 0 captured in the regular N E S p o s t e l e c t i o n survey and the 1987 N E S pilot study.
 160 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 161

From raw data Estimated from model 1.0

Proportion of .75
Liberal Democrats
November Probability
Reagan of opinion
approvers Centrist change among .50
who switch to Democrats centrists
disapproval Democrats
in June .25
Central America
Republicans
Presidential disapproval
Political awareness
Centrist Centrist Political awareness
Republicans Independents
Nov. N = 140 126 182 141 142 Figure 8.5. Patterns of opinion change among centrists on two issues. Estimates are
June N = 44 49 39 45 39 transposed from Figures 7.5 and 8.4.
Reps. Nov. N = 85 62 130 114 149
June N = 25 36 36 31 37
W i t h respect to t h e apparent conflict with the raw d a t a , there is a c o m p o s i -
Figure 8.4. Opinion change on Reagan approval following Iran-Contra controversy. Es- tional p r o b l e m . T h e r a w d a t a show p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e among Demo-
timated change rates are derived from Equation 7.7 and the coefficients in Table 8.5.
crats who were capable of exhibiting attitude change in an anti-Reagan
Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys.
direction, that i s , a m o n g D e m o c r a t s w h o did not already disapprove of R e a g a n ' s
j o b p e r f o r m a n c e in fall 1986. T h i s g r o u p did not contain m a n y liberal D e m o -
T h e c h a n g e c u r v e s on the left have been calculated from r a w d a t a in the m a n n e r c r a t s , since m o s t liberal D e m o c r a t s , especially those high on political aware-
of Tables 7.1 and 7 . 2 . As; can be s e e n , the match b e t w e e n Figure 8.2f and the n e s s , already disapproved of R e a g a n ' s p e r f o r m a n c e at that t i m e . T h u s , the
r a w d a t a is r e a s o n a b l e . simulated attitude c h a n g e c u r v e for liberal D e m o c r a t s d o e s not attempt to ex-
T h e c h a n g e c u r v e s on the right have been e s t i m a t e d from t h e reception- plain w h a t w a s g o i n g on a m o n g the majority of D e m o c r a t s in the fall w h o were
a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , as expressed in E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 . T h e model controls for p a r t y available for c o n v e r s i o n to an a n t i - R e a g a n position. T h e o n e for centrist D e m -
identification, e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , and attitudes toward U . S . involvement in Central ocrats d o e s , and this c u r v e generally agrees w i t h the r a w d a t a .
A m e r i c a , as m e a s u r e d in the baseline survey. (The coefficients from which Fig- But if the p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e that o c c u r at any point d e p e n d on the
ure 8.4 is d e r i v e d , along with a discussion of their e s t i m a t i o n , are c o n t a i n e d in ideological c o m p o s i t i o n of the g r o u p available for attitude c h a n g e , can we still
the a p p e n d i x to this chapter.) W h e n the effects of the two value m e a s u r e s are m a k e a fair test of t h e t y p o l o g y ?
controlled - as in the three c u r v e s in Figure 8.4 for centrist R e p u b l i c a n s , cen- Yes, p r o v i d e d we control for p a r t i s a n c o m p o s i t i o n . Figure 8.5 i m p o s e s such a
trist I n d e p e n d e n t s , and centrist D e m o c r a t s - t h e p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e control by c o m p a r i n g t h e attitude-change c u r v e s of centrists on the issues of
closely r e s e m b l e b o t h the r a w d a t a and the theoretically derived p a t t e r n s in cell presidential popularity and of Central A m e r i c a i n v o l v e m e n t , the defining in-
F of t h e typology. (Centrist D e m o c r a t s are defined as persons w h o have a m e a n stance of a m e d i u m - i n t e n s i t y and low-familiarity issue. W i t h p a r t i s a n c o m p o s i -
p a r t y identification of 1.3 and w h o score at the p o p u l a t i o n m e a n on egalitari- tion controlled, we can see that - even t h o u g h t h e total a m o u n t of attitude c h a n g e
anism and the h a w k - d o v e scale.) is about the s a m e on b o t h issues - t h e a n t i - R e a g a n m e s s a g e w a s louder, since it
Yet w h e n we e x a m i n e the fourth c u r v e in Figure 8 . 4 , that of liberal w a s m o r e successful in p e n e t r a t i n g t h e lower a w a r e n e s s strata. We can also see
8
D e m o c r a t s , the typology appears to fail. For in this c a s e there is no e v i d e n c e of that the a n t i - R e a g a n m e s s a g e w a s m o r e familiar, since it e n c o u n t e r e d greater re-
nonmonotonicity. Moreover, there a p p e a r s to be a conflict with the r a w d a t a on sistance a m o n g highly aware p e r s o n s , as is expected for m o r e familiar issues.
the left-hand side of Figure 8.4, which shows a strongly n o n m o n o t o n i c pattern It is striking that, a m o n g the most politically a w a r e c e n t r i s t s , the I r a n - C o n t r a
a m o n g D e m o c r a t s . W h a t i s going o n ? controversy had virtually no effect on R e a g a n ' s approval r a t i n g . It is t e m p t i n g to
attribute this s t o u t h e a r t e d resistance to t h e effects of ideology, but since we are
8 Liberal Democrats are defined as persons having a mean party identification of 1.3 and who score
1 SD above average on egalitarianism and dovishness. Political awareness in Figure 8.4 ranges dealing with c e n t r i s t s , this is h a r d to d o . An a l t e r n a t i v e explanation is that we
from -1.87 SD to +2 SD. are seeing the effects of t h e inertial resistance that develops on familiar issues.
 162 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Six years into the R e a g a n presidency, these politically attentive centrists had al-
ready acquired so m u c h information that the revelations of the I r a n - C o n t r a hear-
ings m a d e little additional impact. Rather, the scandal had its greatest impact on
those w h o s e initial information about R e a g a n , as j u d g e d by their overall levels
of political a w a r e n e s s , w a s relatively m o d e s t .
Opinion formation on new issues
This section applies the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model to three additional cases;
the f o r m a t i o n of attitudes toward federal involvement in school d e s e g r e g a t i o n in
the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , the f o r m a t i o n of p o p u l a r j u d g m e n t s on the p e r f o r m a n c e of the
national e c o n o m y at t h e t i m e the c o u n t r y a p p e a r e d to be c o m i n g out of the re-
cession of 1 9 8 1 - 2 , and the f o r m a t i o n of attitudes toward a p r o p o s e d freeze on
nuclear w e a p o n p r o d u c t i o n in the e a r l y 1980s. E a c h of these cases has consid-
erable intrinsic interest, but the m a i n p u r p o s e in examining t h e m is to provide
further tests of the typology of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c patterns of attitude c h a n g e as d e -
picted in Figure 8 . 2 .
N o t e , however, that the previous p a r a g r a p h refers to cases of attitude forma-
tion r a t h e r t h a n , as earlier, to attitude change. T h e reason is that here I am deal-
ing with attitudes that were formed and m e a s u r e d early in the life of the given
issue, at t h e point w h e n the issue w a s j u s t e m e r g i n g on the national a g e n d a and
beginning to attract the attention of pollsters. In such s i t u a t i o n s , attitude c h a n g e
cannot be m e a s u r e d against a baseline of p r i o r opinion b e c a u s e , at least in these
c a s e s , t h e issues w e r e so n e w that there w e r e no p r i o r m e a s u r e m e n t s and quite
possibly no p r i o r opinions. I will therefore a s s u m e that most of the opinion in
favor of the n e w issue h a s been formed in r e s p o n s e to recent c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,
a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , that opinion h a s formed in a c c o r d a n c e with the usual
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process. I will a s s u m e , in other w o r d s , that attitude for-
mation is a type of attitude c h a n g e that d e p e n d s on a t w o - s t e p process in which
political a w a r e n e s s is positively associated with reception of m e s s a g e s on the
n e w issue, and in which a c c e p t a n c e of these m e s s a g e s d e p e n d s on awareness and
on political values.
C o n s i d e r school d e s e g r e g a t i o n in the 1950s. Until the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s ruling
on Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the idea that the federal g o v e r n m e n t
should take the leading role in d e s e g r e g a t i n g the public schools of the S o u t h w a s
simply not a subject of salient public controversy. Neither of the t w o major par-
ties had a d v o c a t e d it in its p l a t f o r m s , no major legislation on t h e subject had
c o m e close to p a s s a g e in C o n g r e s s , and no major politician w a s identified with
it. School d e s e g r e g a t i o n w a s still largely a " n o n i s s u e , " in the sense of B a c h r a c h
and B a r a t z (1962). H e n c e , no polling a g e n c y a t t e m p t e d to m e a s u r e public atti-
tudes on the issue until the S u p r e m e C o u r t suddenly thrust school d e s e g r e g a t i o n
9
o n t o the national a g e n d a .
9 Page and Shapiro, in press: ch. 3.
Tests of the one-message model 163
In 1956 t h e C e n t e r for Political Studies at the University of M i c h i g a n posed
the following a g r e e - d i s a g r e e q u e s t i o n in a national survey:
The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and col-
ored children go to the same schools.
G i v e n the novelty of this issue, one m a y r e a s o n a b l y c o n c l u d e that m o s t of the
p e r s o n s (except for blacks) w h o favored federally m a n d a t e d school desegrega-
1 0
tion in this poll were fairly new adherents to this v i e w .
A parallel a r g u m e n t can be m a d e for the o t h e r two issues to be e x a m i n e d here:
Nuclear freeze. T h e notion of a freeze on t h e production of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s
enjoyed a brief but intense v o g u e in the early 1980s. Television talk shows d e -
b a t e d it, a spate of n e w b o o k s w a s devoted to it, and both h o u s e s of C o n g r e s s
passed resolutions favoring it. A l t h o u g h no national polling o r g a n i z a t i o n c a r r i e d
a q u e s t i o n on this issue until its e m e r g e n c e as an issue in 1 9 8 1 , p o p u l a r support
for it w a s strong in all of t h e early polls on t h e subject. In the fall of 1982, the
N E S asked t h e following question:
Do you think the United States should freeze the production of nuclear weapons on its
own, do so only if the Soviet Union agrees to a freeze as well, or do you think that the
United States should not freeze production of nuclear weapons at all?
S u p p o r t for a n u c l e a r freeze, as captured by the first t w o o p t i o n s , could only
have b e e n n e w s u p p o r t , since the idea for a " f r e e z e " on n u c l e a r w e a p o n s pro-
duction had been self-consciously invented by a n t i w a r activists only a few
m o n t h s before t h e issue e m e r g e d in t h e national limelight ( P r i n g l e , 1982).
The economy. T h r o u g h t h e first six m o n t h s of 1982, the c o u n t r y w a s mired in
the deepest recession since the G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n of the 1930s. By the fall, how-
ever, there b e g a n to be r e p o r t s in the m a s s m e d i a that the e c o n o m y w a s turning
a r o u n d and h e a d i n g t o w a r d a period of e x p a n s i o n . T h e s e mainly t o o k the form
of n e w s r e p o r t s about v a r i o u s e c o n o m i c indicators and of p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s by
e c o n o m i c forecasters. In N o v e m b e r and D e c e m b e r of that year, the N E S asked
the following q u e s t i o n :
Over the past year, has the economy gotten worse, stayed about the same, or improved?
G i v e n t h e b l e a k n e s s of t h e e c o n o m y in t h e earlier m o n t h s of 1982, such support
as existed for t h e p r o p o s i t i o n that the e c o n o m y w a s i m p r o v i n g at the t i m e of the
fall survey m a y be c o n s i d e r e d new s u p p o r t for this view.
10 It is true, as Page and Shapiro (in press) point out, that American public opinion had been mov-
ing steadily leftward on race since at least the mid-1940s, presumably at least partly in response
to other Supreme Court decisions on race, President Truman's efforts to achieve fair employment
for blacks, and agitation by Hubert Humphrey and others within the Democratic Party. One
might therefore take the sum of media reports of these activities as "the message" which, fil-
tering through the reception-acceptance process, produced the degree of support for school de-
segregation that existed in 1956.
 164 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 165

In order to test p a t t e r n s of attitude formation on these topics against the typology

in Figure 8 . 2 , it is n e c e s s a r y to m a k e rough j u d g m e n t s about the intensity and
issue familiarity of each of these three issues.
To begin with issue intensity: T h e segregation and freeze issues s e e m , from
my casual e x a m i n a t i o n of the periodical literature of the 1950s and 1980s, to be
typical instances of controversial issues. T h a t is, they received significant press
c o v e r a g e , s o m e t i m e s as the lead story of the day, but did not d o m i n a t e the
W a s h i n g t o n c o m m u n i t y and political n e w s for m o n t h s at a t i m e . T h e y s e e m e d ,
t h u s , to involve political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s of roughly m i d d l e intensity, m u c h as
in the case of U . S . policy in Central A m e r i c a . T h e n e w s on the e c o n o m y s e e m s ,
by c o m p a r i s o n , significantly less intense than c o v e r a g e of the Central A m e r i c a
issue. M o s t of it w a s c a r r i e d as second-level n e w s , worthy of a 3 0 - s e c o n d spot
well back in the national evening n e w s or a headline in the business p a g e s , but
never of major story status.
W i t h respect to general familiarity, I w o u l d j u d g e race to b e , by far, the most
familiar. This issue is, as many o b s e r v e r s have noted (for e x a m p l e , C o n v e r s e ,
1964; C a r m i n e s and S t i m s o n , 1982, 1989), o n e of the few political subjects on
which A m e r i c a n s are likely to have well-crystallized opinions. T h e n u c l e a r
freeze issue, however, seems at the other p o l e of issue familiarity, a c o m p l e t e l y
novel twist on a subject that is, however i m p o r t a n t , still a foreign policy issue
that is relatively r e m o t e from most p e o p l e ' s lives.
T h e familiarity of n e w s on the e c o n o m y is, by my lights, t h e most difficult to
evaluate. On the o n e h a n d , the p e r f o r m a n c e of the e c o n o m y is s o m e t h i n g that
touches e v e r y o n e ' s lives and is, in this s e n s e , highly familiar; but on the other
h a n d , few p e o p l e keep close tabs on technical indicators of e c o n o m i c perfor-
m a n c e , w h i c h m e a n s that any new information of this type w o u l d not e n c o u n t e r
a large store of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . " In view of the difficulty of classi-
fying e c o n o m i c n e w s on issue familiarity, I will leave this classification o p e n .
F r o m the foregoing, we expect p a t t e r n s of attitude formation on the freeze to
r e s e m b l e cell B of the typology ( m i d d l e intensity and low familiarity) and the
segregation issue to r e s e m b l e cell E ( m i d d l e intensity and high familiarity). Pat-
terns of e c o n o m i c j u d g m e n t should r e s e m b l e one of the low-message-intensity
cells (a or d ) .
T h e attitude c u r v e s n e c e s s a r y for e v a l u a t i n g these e x p e c t a t i o n s are reported
in Figure 8.6. T h e s e curves have been derived from a straightforward applica-
tion of E q u a t i o n 7.5 to d a t a on each of the three issues (coefficients for these
applications m a y be found in Table 8.7 in the appendix to this c h a p t e r ) . As can
12
be seen, the fit with theoretical e x p e c t a t i o n s is r e a s o n a b l e .
Note that for the two liberal issues, t h e freeze and school d e s e g r e g a t i o n , there
is, as we w o u l d e x p e c t , a positive relationship between a w a r e n e s s and support
11 For example, only about 15 percent of respondents to the 1985 NES pilot study were able to
identify Paul Volker as chairman of the Federal Reserve.
12 Awareness runs from -2.54 to + 1.35 for the school issue and -1.86 to + 1.96 for the other two.
To achieve equivalence across cases, scores on the two scales in the school case have been set at
- . 8 5 and +.85; for the other two issues, scores on the solo scales range ±1.5. Ranges for the
party and approval variables are ±1.3. Age is set at 45.
Percent believing that Percent favoring Percent favoring federally
economy is improving, nuclear weapons mandated school
fall 1982 freeze, fall 1982 desegregation, 1956
Political awareness
Figure 8.6. Estimated patterns of opinion change on three new issues. Estimates are de-
rived from Equation 7.5 and coefficients in Table 8.7. Source: 1982 NES survey and
1956-58-60 CPS survey.
for the n e w idea a m o n g liberals, and that this s a m e relationship is n o n m o n o t o n i c
a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s . W i t h respect to the e c o n o m y , w h e r e the n e w s of the im-
proving e c o n o m y had a c o n s e r v a t i v e v a l e n c e ( " R e a g a n o m i c s is w o r k i n g " ) ,
these p a t t e r n s reverse: T h e r e is a positive a w a r e n e s s relationship for c o n s e r v a -
tives and a n o n m o n o t o n i c o n e for liberals.
Evaluating the attitude-change typology
A l o n g with the results of the previous chapter, these d a t a lend significant s u p -
p o r t to t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l and to e x p e c t a t i o n s of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c pat-
t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e d e r i v e d from it. In particular, they lend s u p p o r t to these
d e d u c t i o n s from t h e m o d e l :
The diffusion of a liberal message through a very liberal group, or a conservative mes-
sage through a very conservative group, will produce a monotonic pattern of attitude
change in which the most aware persons are most likely to change, at least in cases in
which the issue is a relatively unfamiliar one.
The diffusion of a moderately intense liberal message through a conservative group, or
a moderately intense conservative message through a liberal group, will produce a non-
monotonic pattern of attitude change in which moderately aware persons are most
likely to change.
Low-intensity messages, as compared to high-intensity ones, will produce a higher
proportion of change among highly aware persons, as in Figure 8.2.
Attitude change on less familiar issues, as compared to more familiar issues, will more
often occur among highly aware persons, as in Figure 8.2.
T h e e v i d e n c e in s u p p o r t of the first t w o of these d e d u c t i o n s s e e m s quite
s t r o n g , and m o r e s u p p o r t i n g e v i d e n c e will be r e p o r t e d below. T h a t is, there is
presently a significant n u m b e r of c a s e s in which there exist m o n o t o n i c i t i e s and
n o n m o n o t o n i c i t i e s in t h e e x p e c t e d p l a c e s , and it s e e m s likely that m o r e such
cases will a c c u m u l a t e in the future.
166 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
T h e c o m p l e x series of d e d u c t i o n s e m b o d i e d in the typology of attitude c h a n g e
is less strongly s u p p o r t e d , for two r e a s o n s : weak m e a s u r e m e n t of the key inde-
pendent v a r i a b l e s , intensity and familiarity; and a scarcity of cases that c a n ,
even by the weak m e a s u r e m e n t used h e r e , be plausibly assigned to p a r t i c u l a r
cells. Still, t h e available e v i d e n c e is s u p p o r t i v e : As e x p e c t e d , a low-intensity
m e s s a g e (on the e c o n o m y ) produced a higher p r o p o r t i o n of its c h a n g e a m o n g
highly aware persons than the m o r e intense m e s s a g e (on Central A m e r i c a ) .
A l s o as e x p e c t e d , a larger p r o p o r t i o n of c h a n g e on the two m o r e familiar issues
(segregation and R e a g a n approval) o c c u r r e d a m o n g m o d e r a t e l y aware persons
than o c c u r r e d a m o n g these persons on less familiar issues. But confident con-
firmation that t h e typology h o l d s , especially in c o n n e c t i o n with the p u t a t i v e ef-
fects of m e s s a g e familiarity, awaits stronger e v i d e n c e .
Before leaving this topic, it is n e c e s s a r y to repeat an i m p o r t a n t caveat:
T h r o u g h o u t this and the last chapter, I have sought to model the diffusion of a
single m e s s a g e , that is, a m e s s a g e in which all c o m m u n i c a t i o n favors o n e side
of the issue. W h e n , as often o c c u r s , m a s s opinion c h a n g e s in r e s p o n s e to infor-
m a t i o n flows that c a r r y o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s - and especially w h e n t h e o p p o s i n g
m e s s a g e s differ in intensity from each o t h e r and across t i m e - the expected pat-
terns of attitude c h a n g e can be quite different.
As in the previous chapter, none of the cases e x a m i n e d m e e t s the requirement
of a strictly o n e - s i d e d information flow. Satisfactory resolution of this p r o b l e m
awaits d e v e l o p m e n t of a " t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l " of attitude c h a n g e to replace
the simple " o n e - m e s s a g e ' m o d e l that I have been using so far. T h a t will c o m e
in C h a p t e r 9. In the m e a n t i m e , it is apparent that the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l is
robust to fairly substantial d e p a r t u r e s from its a s s u m p t i o n of a strictly one-sided
information flow, which m e a n s that it can be a useful theoretical tool in cases
in w h i c h the d a t a n e c e s s a r y for testing a m o r e e l a b o r a t e t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l
are unavailable.
M I C R O F O U N D A T I O N S OF RESISTANCE TO PERSUASION
A central feature of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is that greater political
awareness is associated with greater resistance to ideas that are inconsistent with
o n e ' s political v a l u e s , and that the a m o u n t of added resistance d u e to awareness
increases as value distance from the m e s s a g e increases. A l t h o u g h there can be
little d o u b t , in light of the e v i d e n c e already presented, that a w a r e n e s s has such
resistance effects u n d e r at least s o m e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the r e a s o n s for the resis-
tance are yet to be m a d e clear. E a r l y in C h a p t e r 7, three explanatory m e c h a -
nisms were proposed:
13 The middle-intensity message on race also produced a higher proportion of its change among
highly aware persons than the more intense message on presidential performance. However, a
confounding factor here is that race is probably a more familiar issue than presidential perfor-
mance; the effect of this difference is to reinforce rather than cross cut the effect of the intensity
difference, which makes it difficult to be certain whether the apparent difference is due to in-
tensity or familiarity or both.
Tests of the one-message model 167
More aware persons are more likely to possess and have available in memory the
cueing messages that enable them to recognize messages that are inconsistent with
their values.
More aware persons are likely to have larger stores of preexisting considerations on
most issues. This "informational ballast" counteracts the effects of any new messages
that might be accepted.
1 3 More aware persons are more likely to be exposed to relatively esoteric communica-
tions which run counter to the dominant message in the political environment. The
acceptance of such countervalent communications counteracts the effects of any dom-
inant messages that might also be internalized.
T h e s e three forms of resistance, each rooted in the R A S m o d e l , were d e -
scribed as p a r t i s a n resistance, inertial r e s i s t a n c e , and c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance,
respectively. T h e aim of this section is to search for e v i d e n c e of the empirical
validity of the first t w o types of resistance. I will c o n t i n u e this effort in C h a p t e r s
9 and 10, w h e r e I will also provide e v i d e n c e of c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance.
Preexisting considerations and inertial resistance
It w o u l d obviously be highly valuable to m a k e direct o b s e r v a t i o n s of the stored
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h i c h , as the R A S m o d e l c l a i m s , are the basis of inertial resis-
tance to p e r s u a s i o n . T h e r e is only o n e c a s e of attitude c h a n g e for which such
o b s e r v a t i o n s are available: the decline in President R e a g a n ' s approval ratings
over the course of the I r a n - C o n t r a controversy of 1 9 8 6 - 7 . As we saw earlier,
Reagan suffered his greatest losses a m o n g persons of m o d e r a t e political a w a r e -
ness. Highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , t h o u g h m o r e heavily exposed to the d a m a g i n g n e w s
of I r a n - C o n t r a , were relatively resistant to c h a n g e . So the q u e s t i o n to be asked
is: Is there e v i d e n c e that the inertial effects of previously formed c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
contributed to the resistance of highly a w a r e p e r s o n s ?
A m e a s u r e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s affecting R e a g a n ' s j o b e v a l u a t i o n s can be found
in the J u n e wave of the 1987 N E S pilot study. R e s p o n d e n t s were asked to rate
R e a g a n ' s p e r f o r m a n c e and then i m m e d i a t e l y afterward were asked the following
14
open-ended question:
Still thinking about the question you just answered, I'd like you to tell me what ideas
came to mind as you were answering that question. Exactly what things went through
your mind? (Up to three follow-up probes of "Any others?")
14 The Reagan approval item used here was included near the end of the survey as part of a priming
experiment. That is, several items ahead of the approval item were a series of questions that
made salient either favorable or unfavorable aspects of Reagan's job performance. The open-
ended probes were included in order to directly assess the effects of the primes.
The priming experiment failed in the sense that it failed to produce a shift in marginal approval
rates for Reagan. However, half of the sample was primed with information concerning the Iran-
Contra controversy, and these persons were slightly more likely to mention Iran-Contra in their
open-ended remarks. Hence all persons from this half-sample have been eliminated from the
analysis that follows.
Note that the approval item used to measure attitude change on presidential approval is a
separate item that was carried early in the survey and hence was unaffected by the failed priming
experiment.
 168 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 169

T h e majority of r e m a r k s elicited by these p r o b e s c o u l d be c o m f o r t a b l y a c -

c o m m o d a t e d within t h e standard N E S c a n d i d a t e m a s t e r c o d e s (these a r e t h e Table 8.1. Relationship between political awareness and remarks
c o d e s used for classifying r e s p o n s e s to q u e s t i o n s a s k i n g for the r e s p o n d e n t s ' on Reagan job performance
likes and dislikes about the c a n d i d a t e s in the regular N E S s u r v e y s ) . However,
Level of Dolitical awareness
s o m e r e m a r k s c o n c e r n i n g R e a g a n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e had never c o m e u p i n con-
Low Middle Hi^h
nection w i t h o t h e r c a n d i d a t e s and h e n c e required new c o d e s . T h r e e of these n e w
c o d e s s e e m to involve direct or indirect reference to the I r a n - C o n t r a scandal: 0.68 a
1.21 1.30 1.55 1.63
Mean number of remarks not
related to Iran-Contra affair
Uninformed; doesn't (seem to) know anything about the issues/what is going on in the 0.41 0.42 0.28
country/government. 0.09° 0.23
Mean number of remarks related
to Iran-Contra affair
Doesn't work (hard) at job; not involved (enough) in the work of his office; delegates Ratio of Contra remarks to all 0.08* 0.15 0.23 0.21 0.13
too much authority to others; has chosen poor/incompetent aides; his aides have not per-
remarks
formed well. 44 52 54 38 46
N
15
(Involvement in) Diversion of money to the Contras (in violation of the l a w ) .
a
Cell entries in this row represent mean number of remarks of type indicated.
R e m a r k s falling into any of these n e w c a t e g o r i e s , plus direct references to at- Cells include all respondents, including those who had no opinion on Reagan
t e m p t s to free h o s t a g e s (which w e r e a c c o m m o d a t e d within an existing c o d e ) , job approval.
have been c o m b i n e d into a simple index that m a y be considered a rough indi-
Cell entry in this row is the average of an individual-level measure.
c a t o r of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to I r a n - C o n t r a that e n t e r e d into p e o p l e ' s cal-
Source: 1987 NES pilot survey.
c u l a t i o n s o f R e a g a n ' s approval r a t i n g .
T h i s index, it m u s t be e m p h a s i z e d , is a v e r y r o u g h indicator. First, there is highest a m o n g persons in t h e m i d d l i n g levels of political a w a r e n e s s . T h i s n o n -
a r e m a n y t h i n g s that p e o p l e m i g h t h a v e said about R e a g a n that w e r e 'inspired 16
monotonicity, w h i c h easily achieves statistical s i g n i f i c a n c e , h a s c o m e about i n
b y I r a n - C o n t r a (such a s " H e i s d i s h o n e s t " ) but that w o u l d not h a v e been
p a r t b e c a u s e t h e large n u m b e r of n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in the m i n d s of
captured b y these specie! c o d e s . S e c o n d , s o m e p e o p l e , n o t a b l y highly a w a r e
highly a w a r e p e r s o n s has been able to dilute t h e effects of C o n t r a - r e l a t e d ones.
D e m o c r a t s , m a y have had s o m a n y m o r e i m p o r t a n t (to t h e m ) r e a s o n s for d i s a p -
T h u s , Table 8.1 is consistent with the notion that stored information c o n c e r n i n g
proving of R e a g a n that they failed to m e n t i o n I r a n - C o n t r a even t h o u g h it
R e a g a n ' s overall p e r f o r m a n c e as president helped to offset t h e effects of nega-
w e i g h e d in their minds as a n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h i r d , it is possible that
tive n e w s c o n c e r n i n g I r a n - C o n t r a .
people are u n a b l e to recall on a m o m e n t ' s notice all of the ideas that have in-
T h e r e a r e t w o additional points t o n o t i c e i n Table 8 . 1 . O n e i s t h e v e r y low
fluenced their e v a l u a t i o n s , as m a i n t a i n e d by L o d g e , M c G r a w , and Stroh (1989).
level of s p o n t a n e o u s m e n t i o n of the controversy in the least a w a r e strata of the
For these r e a s o n s , the index almost c e r t a i n l y understates the influence of the
public; even allowing for s o m e u n d e r m e a s u r e m e n t , 9 percent is a low level of
scandal o n R e a g a n ' s ratings.
p e n e t r a t i o n for a controversy of the m a g n i t u d e of I r a n - C o n t r a . T h i s , p r e s u m -
N o n e t h e l e s s , these d a t a do e n a b l e us to test notions about how information
ably, is why there w a s relatively little c h a n g e in popularity ratings a m o n g t h e
about I r a n - C o n t r a interacted with o t h e r information about R e a g a n ' s j o b perfor-
least a w a r e , as s h o w n earlier. T h e o t h e r point to n o t i c e is t h e p a t t e r n of n o n -
m a n c e t o affect his overall j o b r a t i n g . W h a t exactly, t h e n , d o w e w a n t t o test?
m o n o t o n i c i t y i n s p o n t a n e o u s references t o t h e s c a n d a l . T h i s n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y
If stored i n f o r m a t i o n e n g e n d e r s resistance to persuasion a m o n g highly a w a r e
c o n t r i b u t e d to the n o n m o n o t o n i c r a t i o in the b o t t o m row of Table 8 . 1 ; its ex-
p e r s o n s , we should find, first, that highly a w a r e p e r s o n s h a v e large stores of
planation is c o n s i d e r e d in t h e next s e c t i o n .
n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and s e c o n d , that t h e s e n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
serve to offset the impact of scandal-related c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . As can be seen in
Table 8 . 1 , the first e x p e c t a t i o n is strongly s u p p o r t e d . T h e m o r e attention p e o p l e
Partisan resistance at the level of considerations
paid to politics, t h e better able they were to recall n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s on
which to j u d g e R e a g a n . T h e s e c o n d e x p e c t a t i o n is also s u p p o r t e d ; as can be seen Inertial resistance i s , as we have s e e n , a m e c h a n i s m for diluting t h e effects of
in the b o t t o m row of Table 8 . 1 , the r a t i o of C o n t r a to n o n - C o n t r a c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
n e w l y a c q u i r e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A m o r e efficient form of resistance to persua-
15 By inadvertence, codes for the open-ended Reagan remarks were not included in the code-
s i o n , however, is outright rejection of n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s at t h e point of first
book for the 1987 pilot. However, the new codes have been permanently incorporated into the
e n c o u n t e r i n g t h e m , if they are inconsistent with o n e ' s predispositions.
existing NES master codes, and so can be found in the party/candidate master codes in the early-
release codebook for the 1988 election study. They are distinguished from preexisting codes by 16 This can be confirmed by regression analysis. If ratio is the dependent variable, and information
an asterisk. and information-squared are the independent variables, the coefficients on both independent
variables are significant at the .05 level, one-tailed.
 170 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 171

W i t h i n the R A S m o d e l , p e o p l e can reject ideas only w h e n they possess

Consistent
cueing i n f o r m a t i o n to let t h e m k n o w that a p a r t i c u l a r idea is inconsistent with considerations
their v a l u e s , and they are m o r e likely to possess this information and have it
available for use if they are politically a w a r e (see Table 4 . 4 ) . H e n c e we should
expect g r e a t e r p a r t i s a n resistance t o u n c o n g e n i a l c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a m o n g well-
informed p e r s o n s .
F r o m this r e a s o n i n g , we should find that, for typical p a r t i s a n issues, the in- Average
c i d e n c e of inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are inconsistent number of
with t h e p e r s o n ' s ideology - tends to be n o n m o n o t o n i c with respect to political considerations
awareness. T h e reason s t e m s from n o w familiar logic: Highly aware persons
will, in the n o r m a l course of e v e n t s , be heavily e x p o s e d to inconsistent m e s s a g e s
but, being highly a w a r e , they will p o s s e s s the contextual information n e c e s s a r y
to r e c o g n i z e and reject these m e s s a g e s . Very u n a w a r e persons will be exposed to
0H 1 1 1 1 1
few m e s s a g e s of any kind and h e n c e also form few inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Political awareness
This w o u l d leave m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e p e r s o n s as most likely to form inconsistent
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : T h e y pay e n o u g h a t t e n t i o n to politics to be fairly heavily ex- Figure 8.7. Effect of political awareness on formation of consistent and inconsistent con-
p o s e d to inconsistent m e s s a g e s , but often lack the m e s s a g e cues n e c e s s a r y to siderations. See Table 8.2 for data on which figure is based. Source: 1987 NES pilot
r e c o g n i z e inconsistency. survey.

In a d d i t i o n , we w o u l d expect a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and

acquisition of consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - that is, c o n s i d e r a t i o n s consistent with
a p e r s o n ' s ideology. The reason is that there is, as a l w a y s , a strong exposure
effect from a w a r e n e s s a n d , in this c a s e , no a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance effect.
T h u s we have a dual e x p e c t a t i o n : All else e q u a l , political a w a r e n e s s should
have a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p with t h e acquisition of consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and
a n o n m o n o t o n i c association with inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Or, m o r e gener-
ally, the t y p o l o g y in F i g u r e 8.2 should apply to the f o r m a t i o n of n e w consider-
ations as well as to attitude c h a n g e .
To test the e x p e c t a t i o n , I return to d a t a from the 1987 Pilot study. This survey,
it will be r e c a l l e d , contains m e a s u r e s of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for three issues: j o b guar-
a n t e e s , g o v e r n m e n t s e r v i c e s , and aid to blacks. E a c h c o n s i d e r a t i o n has been clas-
sified as either consistent or inconsistent with t h e p e r s o n ' s liberal-conservative
o r i e n t a t i o n (see M e a s u r e s A p p e n d i x for description of m e a s u r e ) ; t h u s , for a lib-
eral p e r s o n , any c o n s i d e r a t i o n that m i g h t induce the person to give a liberal re-
sponse h a s b e e n classified as a consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n and any that w o u l d tend
to induce a c o n s e r v a t i v e r e s p o n s e h a s been classified as an inconsistent consid-
e r a t i o n . S e p a r a t e indices have been c r e a t e d to tally the n u m b e r of consistent and
inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s each p e r s o n m e n t i o n e d . To m a x i m i z e c h a n c e s that
these indices w o u l d c a p t u r e the full r a n g e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in p e o p l e ' s h e a d s ,
they were built to include all relevant r e m a r k s over both w a v e s of the study. T h e
d a t a are from t h e stop-and-think p r o b e s since, as will be r e c a l l e d , these p r o b e s
were i n t e n d e d , inter alia, to elicit as m a n y as possible of t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
present in p e o p l e ' s m i n d s .
T h e d a t a on consistent and inconsistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are a r r a y e d in Figure
these d a t a (see discussion in C h a p t e r 4 ) , this figure presents results that have
been a g g r e g a t e d over all three items. As can be s e e n , these d a t a are consistent
with e x p e c t a t i o n s . W h e n t h e s a m e d a t a are e x a m i n e d at t h e level of individual
i t e m s , as s h o w n in Table 8 . 2 , t h e results are rather r a g g e d but still essentially
17
consistent with e x p e c t a t i o n s .
T h e n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n of references to t h e I r a n - C o n t r a controversy in Ta-
ble 8.1 also suggests the existence of p a r t i s a n resistance. T h e most informed
persons w e r e o b v i o u s l y heavily e x p o s e d to n e w s of I r a n - C o n t r a , but they were
apparently less likely to internalize it t h a n w e r e m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e persons.
W e should e x p e c t , however, that highly a w a r e R e p u b l i c a n s w o u l d b e m u c h
m o r e resistant to I r a n - C o n t r a n e w s than highly aware D e m o c r a t s . T h u s if we
look separately at R e p u b l i c a n s and D e m o c r a t s , we should find a n o n m o n o t o n i c
relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and I r a n - C o n t r a m e n t i o n s a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n s ,
and a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p a m o n g D e m o c r a t s . As can be seen in Table 8 . 3 , this
e x p e c t a t i o n is s u p p o r t e d by t h e d a t a .
Altogether, t h e n , the e x p e c t e d p a t t e r n s of monotonicity and n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y
have been o b t a i n e d separately for a g r o u p of three social welfare items and for
presidential p o p u l a r i t y r a t i n g s , and w e r e especially c l e a r in the latter c a s e . T h i s
pattern of results could have been o b t a i n e d by c h a n c e alone only about six t i m e s
17 Table 8.2 has folded the ideology scale at the midpoint, so that considerations for liberals and
conservatives can be examined at the same time, thereby boosting the number of cases for anal-
ysis. The expected relationships, however, are much stronger for liberals alone than they are for
liberals and conservatives together, as in Table 8.2. My attempts at simulation suggest that some-
thing like this pattern could be produced if the conservative messages on these social welfare
issues were more intense (reflecting the nation's tradition of economic individualism) and more
credible (i.e., lower values on the b coefficient in the acceptance function) than the liberal mes-
0

8 . 7 . To c o m p e n s a t e for the small n u m b e r of cases and t h e high level of e r r o r in sages. (For an argument that this is so, see Feldman and Zaller, 1992.)
 172 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 173

Table 8.2. Ideology, awareness, and consistency of Table 8.3. Relationship among party,
considerations awareness, and remarks on Iran-Contra

Level of political awareness

Level of political awareness
Low Middle High
Low Middle High
Republicans 0.25 0.33 0.30 0.23
Job guarantees
N (20) (18) (20) (26)
Consistent considerations 1.50 2.82 3.14 3.68 3.37 4.23
Inconsistent considerations 2.08 2.94 2.79 2.54 2.57 1.31 Democrats 0.07 0.28 0.41 0.46
N (12) (17) (34) (37) (30) N (27) (32) (32) (26)
(13)
Government services
Note: Cell entries are mean number of negative
Consistent considerations 2.62 3.57 2.95 3.25 4.73 5.29
references to Iran-Contra affair.
Inconsistent considerations 1.46 1.95 3.16 2.64 3.03 1.86 Source: 1987 NES pilot survey.
N (13) (21) (37) (36) (30) (14)
Aid to blacks
If the R A S m o d e l is a truly general m o d e l of attitude f o r m a t i o n and c h a n g e ,
Consistent considerations 2.92 3.70 4.26 5.42 6.06 5.36
it o u g h t to specify the effects of g e n e r a t i o n a l differences in susceptibility to per-
Inconsistent considerations 3.58 3.70 4.09 3.58 3.23 3.07
N (12) suasion as well as it specifies the effects of o t h e r predispositional factors. We
(20) (34) (38) (31) (14)
o u g h t , t h e n , to be able to o b s e r v e the s a m e k i n d s of interactions b e t w e e n p o -
Unweighted mean litical a w a r e n e s s and age that we found b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and other predispo-
Consistent considerations 2.34 3.36 3.33 3.74 4.72 4.96 sitional variables.
Inconsistent considerations 2.37 2.86 3.35 2.92 2.94 2.08 It is, however, by no m e a n s o b v i o u s than this will be the c a s e . C o n s i d e r the
issue of racial equality. T h e r e are well-established g e n e r a t i o n a l differences in
Note: Cell entries are mean number of remarks of the type indicated. support for racial equality, w i t h y o u n g e r c o h o r t s exhibiting greater racial liber-
Source: 1987 NES pilot survey. alism. Insofar as chronological age represents t h e distillation of a p e r s o n ' s life
e x p e r i e n c e with an issue - in this c a s e , the fact that most o l d e r A m e r i c a n s g r e w
in a h u n d r e d . ' - T h u s t h e results presented in this section offer helpful but not up in a period in w h i c h both political n o r m s and e v e r y d a y practice p e r m i t t e d or
clinching e v i d e n c e for p a r t i s a n resistance at the level of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s as a type even required racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n - age m i g h t retard a trend toward racial lib-
of resistance m e c h a n i s m . F u r t h e r e v i d e n c e on this point will be d e v e l o p e d in eralism, r e g a r d l e s s of political a w a r e n e s s or any other factor in t h e R A S m o d e l .
C h a p t e r 10. But s u p p o s e , as I s u g g e s t e d in C h a p t e r 2, that racial equality is not s o m e sort
of a m o r p h o u s trend, but a n e w n o r m c r e a t e d by v a r i o u s elites and transmitted to
the public via t h e political m e d i a . If s o , the m o r e politically a w a r e m e m b e r s of
AGE AND RESISTANCE TO C H A N G E each c o h o r t should be m o r e heavily e x p o s e d to t h e n e w i d e a , thereby creating at
least the potential for g r e a t e r attitude c h a n g e a m o n g the most a w a r e .
My analysis so far h a s e x a m i n e d the effects on attitude c h a n g e of several kinds
S u p p o s e also that the ability to defend o n e ' s predispositions against novel in-
of political predispositions: party a t t a c h m e n t , d o v i s h n e s s , e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , and so
fluences d e p e n d s on t h e possession of relevant contextual i n f o r m a t i o n . If s o ,
forth. However, the predispositions that regulate attitude c h a n g e need not be
older highly a w a r e persons w h o were e x p o s e d t o pro-equality c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
manifestly political.
might be better able to reject t h e m t h a n their less a w a r e c o u n t e r p a r t s . If this
O n e i m p o r t a n t but not manifestly political predisposition is chronological a g e .
reasoning is c o r r e c t , age o u g h t to interact with political a w a r e n e s s in the R A S
Research has p r o d u c e d a b u n d a n t e v i d e n c e of g e n e r a t i o n a l differences in s u s c e p -
m o d e l to explain susceptibility to new ideas about r a c e .
tibility to new ideas ( A b r a m s o n , 1983; G l e n n , 1977).
Let m e , t h e n , e x a m i n e t h e effect of age in c o n d i t i o n i n g r e s p o n s e s to three his-
18 Taking the summary data from Table 8.2 and the results from Table 8.3, there are four oppor- toric c h a n g e s in A m e r i c a n public opinion: t h e c o n v e r s i o n of t h e public from the
tunities to observe the expected patterns of monotonicity and nonmonotonicity, and expecta- isolationist attitudes that p r e d o m i n a t e d p r i o r to W o r l d W a r II to " l i b e r a l inter-
tions are upheld in all four cases. The probability of observing this outcome by chance alone
4
is , 5 ~ .06. Note that the numbers of cases on which the individual tests are based are quite n a t i o n a l i s m " in the late 1940s and 1950s, t h e retreat of m u c h of t h e public dur-
small. ing the V i e t n a m W a r from the original d o c t r i n e s of liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , and
 174 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
the a c c e p t a n c e by m u c h of the public of the n e w n o r m of racial equality in the
1950s. In e a c h c a s e , I will pay p a r t i c u l a r attention to why political awareness
m i g h t interact w i t h age to e n h a n c e resistance to p e r s u a s i o n .
Resistance to liberal internationalism
T h r o u g h o u t the 1930s and early 1940s, the D e m o c r a t i c Party, especially its lib-
eral w i n g , w a s t h e p a r t y of " i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . " It favored an activist foreign
policy in w h i c h U . S . military p o w e r w a s seen as n e c e s s a r y to defend A m e r i c a n
interests and to k e e p t h e c o u n t r y ' s e n e m i e s in c h e c k . F o r e m o s t a m o n g these en-
e m i e s , of c o u r s e , were N a z i G e r m a n y and Stalinist Russia. M e a n w h i l e , the Re-
publican Party, especially its c o n s e r v a t i v e w i n g , w a s the p a r t y of isolationism.
T h e United States had no need for an internationalist foreign policy, it c l a i m e d ;
we c o u l d r e m a i n peacefully secure behind o u r o c e a n buffers, leaving other na-
tions to l o o k after their own interests.
D u r i n g and after W o r l d W a r I I , t h e R e p u b l i c a n Party largely a b a n d o n e d its
isolationist p o s t u r e . W a r t i m e e x p e r i e n c e h a d , as it s e e m e d to t h e leaders of the
w a r effort, p r o v e n that A m e r i c a could no longer remain aloof from w o r l d affairs
without suffering disastrous c o n s e q u e n c e s . S o , u n d e r the leadership df Senator
A r t h u r V a n d e n b e r g , the Republican Party s u p p o r t e d D e m o c r a t i c President Tru-
m a n ' s initiatives on the e c o n o m i c rebuilding of E u r o p e , a s y s t e m of military
alliances in w h i c h the United States w a s always the key m e m b e r , A m e r i c a n
m e m b e r s h i p in t h e United N a t i o n s , a n d , finally, A m e r i c a n intervention in the
Korean War.
W i t h t h e R e p u b l i c a n Party largely in a s u p p o r t i n g r o l e , liberal international-
ism w a s by the 1950s a " m a i n s t r e a m " policy n o r m in the U n i t e d States. In the
t e r m i n o l o g y of t h e R A S m o d e l , there w a s a steady stream of m e s s a g e s favoring
this policy and few c u e i n g m e s s a g e s indicating inconsistency b e t w e e n interna-
19
tionalism and c o n s e r v a t i s m . W i t h i n most s e g m e n t s o f the p o p u l a t i o n , t h e n , w e
expect the s t a n d a r d m a i n s t r e a m p a t t e r n , namely, a strong positive association
b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and s u p p o r t for the m a i n s t r e a m n o r m .
But w h a t of highly a w a r e older R e p u b l i c a n s ? M i g h t not they h a v e resisted
the m a i n s t r e a m t i d e ? T h r o u g h o u t t h e 1920s and 1930s and even p a r t of the
1940s, they had been e x p o s e d to a steady stream of party c o m m u n i c a t i o n s o p -
posing liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m in the m o s t strenuous t e r m s . P r e s u m a b l y they
had internalized m a n y of these a r g u m e n t s in the form of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and
p r e s u m a b l y s o m e of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s were still alive in their m i n d s in the
early 1950s, thereby providing the basis for resistance to the n e w policy of main-
stream i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m .
If s o , o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g p a t t e r n s of support for internationalism
a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n s circa 1950 should be as follows. A m o n g y o u n g e r Republi-
19 It is true that some Republicans, led by Senator Bricker, continued to oppose liberal interna-
tionalism. Cohen (1963), however, maintains that most of the press in this period regarded iso-
lationism as a "provincial" view and hence tended to ignore it.
Tests of the one-message model 175
c a n s , w h o h a d little direct familiarity with R e p u b l i c a n isolationism in its heyday
in t h e 1930s, there should be a positive relationship b e t w e e n awareness and sup-
port for m a i n s t r e a m i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . A m o n g older R e p u b l i c a n s , however, we
m a y expect a n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship w i t h awareness: T h e least a w a r e pay
t o o little attention to be e x p o s e d to m e s s a g e s favoring the n e w m a i n s t r e a m n o r m
and h e n c e mainly fail to s u p p o r t it. T h e most a w a r e also resist, not b e c a u s e they
d o n ' t k n o w about it, but b e c a u s e they possess (from the 1930s) the contextual
information n e c e s s a r y to reject the n e w i d e a , and perhaps also b e c a u s e they p o s -
sess larger inertial stores of isolationist c o n s i d e r a t i o n s from previous d e c a d e s .
S u p p o r t for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m , t h e n , should be greatest a m o n g m o d e r a t e l y aware
older R e p u b l i c a n s : T h e y pay e n o u g h attention to receive m e s s a g e s favoring the
m a i n s t r e a m n o r m but do not possess sufficient contextual information and in-
formational ballast to e n a b l e t h e m to resist.
A 1951 survey by t h e C e n t e r for Political Studies at the University of M i c h -
igan p e r m i t s a test of these e x p e c t a t i o n s . A rarity a m o n g surveys of this p e r i o d ,
it contained a m e a s u r e of political i n f o r m a t i o n , as well as several items on
A m e r i c a n foreign policy. T h e toughest test of liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m in this
period w a s T r u m a n ' s K o r e a n W a r policy, w h i c h required major A m e r i c a n " s a c -
r i f i c e s " in the interest of w h a t w a s , from the isolationist p e r s p e c t i v e , u n i m p o r -
tant Asian real e s t a t e .
S i n c e the 1951 survey w a s a one-shot survey, we do not have d a t a on attitude
c h a n g e over t i m e . But since any s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n i n v o l v e m e n t in Korea
must have b e e n relatively n e w s u p p o r t , e x p e c t a t i o n s d e r i v e d from the reception-
a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l o u g h t to apply.
T h e m e a s u r e of s u p p o r t for T r u m a n ' s w a r policy w a s d i s a g r e e m e n t with the
assertion that t h e United States " s h o u l d get out of Korea now and stay o u t . "
T h e m o d e l used to e s t i m a t e support for t h e T r u m a n policy is a straightforward
application of E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 , except that an age variable h a s b e e n a d d e d .
T h e results, a l t h o u g h b a s e d on a small n u m b e r of cases in t h e critical cells,
sustain e x p e c t a t i o n s (see Figure 8.8). A m o n g all D e m o c r a t s (data not shown)
and a m o n g y o u n g e r R e p u b l i c a n s , there is a strong positive relation b e t w e e n
awareness and s u p p o r t for A m e r i c a n intervention in K o r e a . A m o n g older R e -
p u b l i c a n s , but no o t h e r s e g m e n t of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , this relationship is strongly
n o n m o n o t o n i c , the result p r e s u m a b l y of resistance to a new policy on the part of
highly aware R e p u b l i c a n s w h o had not yet forgotten their p a r t y ' s old isolationist
line. A l t h o u g h s o m e coefficients in the m o d e l do not achieve c o n v e n t i o n a l levels
of statistical significance, the critical coefficient on the age v a r i a b l e is signifi-
cant at t h e .07 level (see Table 8.7 in t h e a p p e n d i x to this c h a p t e r for coefficient
estimates).
Resistance to the liberal anti-Vietnam War movement
T h e V i e t n a m W a r p r o v i d e s a parallel c a s e for further tests of t h e effects of a g e .
T h e only i m p o r t a n t difference is that in V i e t n a m the shoe is on the o t h e r foot: It
 176 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 177

to t h e new policy, t h u s leaving m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e o l d e r liberals most susceptible

From raw data Estimated from model to c h a n g e .
1.0
18-44 yrs. 18-24 yrs. T h e d a t a for testing this e x p e c t a t i o n are m u c h stronger than in the Korean c a s e
in that they e n a b l e us to e x a m i n e patterns of actual c h a n g e over t i m e (rather t h a n ,
75
as earlier, s u p p o r t for a n e w p a r t i s a n policy in a single cross-sectional s u r v e y ) .
Proportion
of Republicans In e a c h of its four e l e c t i o n surveys b e t w e e n 1964 and 1970, t h e C e n t e r for Po-
supporting .50 Over litical Studies a s k e d its respondents a q u e s t i o n on s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m War,
intervention 44 yrs.
thereby p e r m i t t i n g the direct a s s e s s m e n t of attitude c h a n g e . T h e q u e s t i o n w a s
in Korea
Which of the following do you think we should do now in Vietnam?

Pull out of Vietnam entirely.

Political awareness
N = 12 61 23
7
27 58 43 A = 587
Figure 8.8. Cohort differences among Republicans in support for Korean War. Estimates
are derived from Equation 7.5 and coefficients in Table 8.7. Source: 1951 CPS survey.
is highly a w a r e o l d e r liberals w h o w e r e forced to a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m s e l v e s to a
shift in p a r t i s a n n o r m s .
T h e basic outline of the c h a n g e in liberal ideology d u r i n g t h e V i e t n a m W a r is
well k n o w n . For at least a g e n e r a t i o n p r i o r to the war, liberal ideology w a s , as
just indicated, closely identified with an activist foreign policy. T h u s , o l d e r lib-
erals w o u l d have e x p e r i e n c e d the " l e s s o n s of M u n i c h , " the m o s t i m p o r t a n t of
which w a s that " a p p e a s e m e n t " of aggressor n a t i o n s only e n c o u r a g e s further ag-
gression; they w o u l d have witnessed t h e c o m m u n i s t " t a k e o v e r s " of e a s t e r n Eu-
r o p e and C h i n a in t h e period before the resolve of t h e United States stiffened;
and they w o u l d h a v e " s e e n " in K o r e a , G r e e c e , Turkey, and West Berlin that a
display of strength can deter aggression. If these older liberals (and, increas-
ingly, o l d e r c o n s e r v a t i v e s too) w e r e following p a r t i s a n interpretations of these
e v e n t s , they w o u l d therefore have e n c o u n t e r e d n u m e r o u s a r g u m e n t s on the need
to " s t a n d up to c o m m u n i s m " in places like V i e t n a m . Younger, politically a w a r e
liberals m i g h t also have e n c o u n t e r e d s o m e of these " l e s s o n s , " but w o u l d have
had fewer o p p o r t u n i t i e s to learn t h e m than older liberals.
O v e r the c o u r s e of the V i e t n a m War, liberal s u p p o r t for i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m at
first w e a k e n e d and then reversed. L i b e r a l i s m c a m e to be associated with the
view that A m e r i c a n intervention in V i e t n a m w a s a tragic and u n w a r r a n t e d in-
trusion into t h e internal affairs of a sovereign n a t i o n .
So here we expect the d y n a m i c s of g e n e r a t i o n a l difference to be played out
2 0
within the liberal c a m p . T h a t is, w e expect that a m o n g y o u n g e r liberals, there
will be a positive relation b e t w e e n political awareness and attitude c h a n g e in t h e
direction of t h e n e w liberal n o r m . A m o n g o l d e r liberals, we instead expect a
n o n m o n o t o n i c relation in w h i c h highly a w a r e liberals exhibit inertial resistance
20 I refer to changes in "liberalism" rather than changes in the Democratic Party because liberal
ideology appeared to shift more rapidly than did the Democratic Party, which included a large
conservative wing.
Keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting.
Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam.
T h e s e c o n d o p t i o n , b e c a u s e it represents the official policy of both the
J o h n s o n and N i x o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s ( G e l b with B e t t s , 1979), will be c o u n t e d as
" w a r s u p p o r t " in t h e analysis that follows, as will the third r e s p o n s e o p t i o n .
T h e " p u l l o u t " o p t i o n will b e c o u n t e d a s o p p o s i t i o n t o the war.
T h e d a t a on c h a n g i n g s u p p o r t for t h e w a r b e t w e e n 1966 (which w a s high tide
for s u p p o r t of t h e war) and 1970 a m o n g three c o h o r t s of liberals are s h o w n in
21
Table 8 . 4 . T h r o u g h t h e noise c r e a t e d b y small c e l l s , t h e table clearly s u p p o r t s
the e x p e c t a t i o n of inertial resistance a m o n g highly a w a r e o l d e r liberals. A m o n g
y o u n g e r liberals, there is a positive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and
reduced s u p p o r t for t h e war, but a m o n g m i d d l e - a g e d and especially o l d e r liber-
als, this relationship is n o n m o n o t o n i c . ( T h e m e a s u r e of ideology used in this
table is discussed in detail in C h a p t e r 9 in c o n n e c t i o n with a m o r e extended ex-
a m i n a t i o n of attitudes on t h e V i e t n a m War.)
T h e reader s h o u l d n o t e that there is a significant a n o m a l y in these d a t a ,
namely t h e - 6 percent c h a n g e i n s u p p o r t for t h e w a r a m o n g t h e least aware
older liberals. T h i s n u m b e r indicates that u n a w a r e older liberals actually b e c a m e
more s u p p o r t i v e of the w a r b e t w e e n 1966 and 1970. In the next c h a p t e r we shall
see e v i d e n c e that this c o n t r a r i a n c h a n g e - that i s , c h a n g e that r u n s c o n t r a r y to
the direction of c h a n g e in most of the rest of society - is probably quite real. To
explain it, a m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d m o d e l is n e e d e d than h a s b e e n d e v e l o p e d so far.
In t h e m e a n t i m e , however, t h e d a t a in Table 8 . 4 , in conjunction with t h e K o r e a n
data j u s t e x a m i n e d , indicate that t h e R A S m o d e l helps to specify t h e effect of
age on susceptibility to attitude c h a n g e .
Generation and race
I have already d e v e l o p e d the r a t i o n a l e for e x p e c t i n g a g e to interact with political
awareness in d e t e r m i n i n g resistance to t h e n e w n o r m of racial equality. B e c a u s e ,
as we have s e e n , ideology is also an i m p o r t a n t resistance factor with respect to
21 For a difference of means test between two cells which have N = 25 and a true mean of .40, the
standard error is .14; and 95 percent confidence interval is then ± 2 8 .
 178 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 179

Table 8.4. Generational differences in support IDEOLOGY

for Vietnam War among liberals, 1966 to 1970 Liberals Conservatives

100r T

Level of political awareness

Low High Percent
Youngest cohort favoring
mandated
W a r support in 1966 60% 89 86 92 school
N (30) (47) (22) (50) desegre-
War support in 1970 50 67 54 43 gation
(38) (33) (35) (49)
Change rate 1966 to 1970 17 25 37 53
Political awareness
Middle cohort
War support in 1966 44 71 92 83 Figure 8.9. Cohort differences in support for school desegregation in 1956. Estimates are
(59) (52) (36) (59) derived from Equation 7.5 and coefficients in Table 8.7. Source: 1956-58-60 CPS
W a r support in 1970 43 61 54 57 survey.
(51) (38) (41) (51)
Change rate 1966 to 1970 2 14 41 31
s a m e m o d e l r e p o r t e d in Figure 8 . 6 , except that here age differences are shown
Oldest cohort rather than s u p p r e s s e d . As can be s e e n , the d a t a conform to e x p e c t a t i o n .
War support in 1966 32 But w h a t exactly, o n e m a y still wonder, w o u l d m a k e highly a w a r e o l d e r lib-
75 73 79
(54) (36) (15) (24) erals relatively resistant to c o u r t - m a n d a t e d school d e s e g r e g a t i o n in the S o u t h ?
W a r support in 1970 34 56 21 67 W h y w o u l d not their prior e x p e r i e n c e as liberal ideologues rather than as older
(47) (39) (19) (21) citizens have p r e d i s p o s e d t h e m to be especially s u p p o r t i v e of federal involve-
Change rate 1966 to 1970 -6 25 71 15 ment in this issue?
T h e a n s w e r to these q u e s t i o n s , t h o u g h perhaps o b s c u r e to persons living in the
Note: Youngest cohort is age 21 to 35 in 1966; middle late twentieth century, w o u l d , I believe, have been quite o b v i o u s to m i d c e n t u r y
cohort is age 36 to 55; oldest cohort is age 56 and above. liberals. F r o m the late nineteenth c e n t u r y until Franklin R o o s e v e l t ' s attack on
Liberals are persons who score in upper 40 percent of
the S u p r e m e C o u r t in the late 1930s, judicial activism in the United States al-
dove measure described in Chapter 9. Change rate is
calculated as 100 x (Support66-Support70)/Support66- most invariably served c o n s e r v a t i v e interests; in these s a m e y e a r s , the principles
Source: 1966 and 1970 CPS surveys. of s t a t e s ' rights and judicial self-restraint most often served to protect liberal
policies from federal judicial interference. T h i s w a s b e c a u s e liberal-minded state
legislatures in t h e N o r t h e a s t and M i d w e s t w e r e passing e c o n o m i c regulations
that the S u p r e m e C o u r t , acting in the n a m e of constitutional p r i n c i p l e , regularly
racial equality, we should expect a triple interaction, as follows: A m o n g p e o p l e
invalidated. Upset by t h i s , liberals stressed the " d e m o c r a t i c " principle that the
w h o are both liberal and y o u n g , there should be little or no resistance to racial
j u d i c i a r y should defer to the p o p u l a r b r a n c h e s of g o v e r n m e n t - especially
equality; h e n c e within this g r o u p - and only within this g r o u p - there should be
state and local g o v e r n m e n t s . T h u s , j u s t as highly aware o l d e r liberals in the
a positive linear relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and racial liberalism. As age
1960s had learned the " l e s s o n s of M u n i c h " t o o well to o p p o s e the V i e t n a m
and c o n s e r v a t i v i s m increase, the relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and s u p p o r t for
War, so highly a w a r e older liberals in the 1950s had learned the " d a n g e r s of j u d i -
racial equality should b e c o m e increasingly n o n m o n o t o n i c . Figure 8.9 tests this
cial a c t i v i s m " t o o well to be entirely c o m f o r t a b l e with Brown v. Board of Ed-
e x p e c t a t i o n by s h o w i n g levels of s u p p o r t for school d e s e g r e g a t i o n by a g e c o - 23
22
ucation. (There m a y be a parallel to this p h e n o m e n o n in the attitudes of s o m e
h o r t , ideology, and political a w a r e n e s s . T h e e s t i m a t e s are derived from the
22 The 1956-58-60 NES panel carried a question on desegregation in all three waves, and some 23 See White, 1976, for an account of the discomfit that race and civil liberties issues in the 1950s
pro-integration change occurred between 1956 and 1958, perhaps in response to President Eisen- caused one older liberal, Feli". Frankfurter. As a Supreme Court justice. Frankfurter appears to
hower's use of federal troops to enforce a desegregation order in Little Rock. There was, how- have been torn between his attachment to the doctrine of judicial self-restraint, formed in his
ever, too little change to show a distinct pattern. young adulthood, and his equally strong commitment to racial and civil liberty.
 180 NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION
c o n t e m p o r a r y liberals w h o personally fought to end racial d i s c r i m i n a t i o n but
now o p p o s e affirmative action on the g r o u n d s that racial selectivity is never
justifiable.)
General effects of age
I have e x a m i n e d these three cases in s o m e detail in order to s h o w why exactly the
effects of age on susceptibility to new ideas can be specified by the R A S m o d e l .
However, if, as I have s u g g e s t e d , age is a predispositional factor like any other,
no special c a s e - b y - c a s e justification is necessary. If older p e o p l e are m o r e or
less predisposed toward s o m e idea - w h e t h e r for reason of past l e a r n i n g , p h y s -
iological c o n d i t i o n , self-interest, life c i r c u m s t a n c e s , general c o n s e r v a t i v i s m , or
anything else - the logic of the R A S m o d e l should apply. T h a t is, m o r e a w a r e
older persons should be m o r e heavily e x p o s e d to c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g political c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n s , and they should also be better able to resist ideas that are c o n t r a r y
to their predispositions.
T h e r e is, I should a d d , no reason to believe that age will be generally a s s o -
ciated with greater resistance to c h a n g e . If a proposal to increase M e d i c a r e
benefits b e c a m e a highly salient political issue, the elderly w o u l d not be ex-
pected to be unusually prone to resist. S u p p o r t for the idea a m o n g the elderly
might increase w i t h level s of political a w a r e n e s s without any sign of resistance
a m o n g the most a w a r e . Resistance, if there were any, w o u l d be expected a m o n g
the politically a w a r e y o u n g .
My a r g u m e n t in this s e c t i o n , t h e n , is not that age is associated with resistance
to n e w ideas; it is that the predispositional effects of a g e , w h a t e v e r their direc-
tion, can be specified by the R A S m o d e l .
SUMMARY
This c h a p t e r has s h o w n that the o n e - m e s s a g e model of attitude c h a n g e , a l t h o u g h
a significant simplification of w h a t must occur in reality, h a s sufficient internal
complexity to g e n e r a t e interestingly different e x p e c t a t i o n s in different c i r c u m -
stances, and sufficient validity that these e x p e c t a t i o n s can r e m a i n plausible even
after e m p i r i c a l t e s t i n g . M o r e specifically, the c h a p t e r has s h o w n that different
patterns of attitude c h a n g e arise for different types of issues and c o m m u n i c a -
tions, that the f o r m a t i o n of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that u n d e r l i e p e o p l e ' s closed-
e n d e d survey r e s p o n s e s also a p p e a r to follow the logic of the o n e - m e s s a g e
m o d e l , and that t h e o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l specifies the effect of one i m p o r t a n t
type of nonpolitical predisposition, namely, a g e .
A variety of different kinds of e v i d e n c e , no o n e piece of w h i c h is c o n c l u s i v e ,
is a c c u m u l a t i n g in support of the R A S m o d e l . T h e next t w o c h a p t e r s add to this
c u m u l a t i o n in t h e context of c h a p t e r length e x a m i n a t i o n s of t w o substantive
p r o b l e m s , attitudes toward the war in V i e t n a m and e v a l u a t i o n s of c a n d i d a t e s in
partisan elections.
Tests of the one-message model 181
APPENDIX: ESTIMATING THE PRESIDENTIAL
POPULARITY MODEL
A l t h o u g h R e a g a n ' s approval r a t i n g s fell s h a r p l y in early N o v e m b e r in response
to revelations c o n c e r n i n g the I r a n - C o n t r a m a t t e r (Brody, 1991), they r e m a i n e d
steady t h r o u g h most of N o v e m b e r in the s a m p l e of the N E S p o s t e l e c t i o n survey,
which b e g a n on N o v e m b e r 6 and c o n t i n u e d t h r o u g h January. T h e r e a p p e a r s to
have been a s h a r p break in the d a t a series on N o v e m b e r 2 8 , which is the day
after T h a n k s g i v i n g and three days after A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l E d w i n M e e s e an-
n o u n c e d that the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s b e g i n n i n g a self-investigation of I r a n -
C o n t r a allegations. P r i o r t o N o v e m b e r 2 8 , R e a g a n ' s disapproval rating stood a t
32 percent in the N E S s a m p l e , with no indication of a t i m e trend; from N o v e m -
ber 28 until the e n d of the N E S i n t e r v i e w i n g p e r i o d , disapproval averaged 39
p e r c e n t , a c h a n g e that is highly statistically significant. In the 1987 pilot survey,
w h i c h r e i n t e r v i e w e d 4 5 7 of the fall N E S r e s p o n d e n t s , R e a g a n ' s disapproval rat-
ing w a s 48 percent. In light of these d a t a , I used t h e p r e - N o v e m b e r 28 period as
m y baseline period and the J u n e 1987 a s m y p o s t c h a n g e p e r i o d . 2 4
T h e e s t i m a t i o n of E q u a t i o n 7.7 on t h e s e d a t a is s h o w n in the left c o l u m n of
Table 8 . 5 . As can be s e e n , all theoretically i m p o r t a n t coefficients have g o o d
m a g n i t u d e s , but their s t a n d a r d e r r o r s are l a r g e , as in earlier a p p l i c a t i o n s of t h e
m o d e l . H e n c e I a d d e d t w o constraints to t h e basic m o d e l . First, I r e m o v e d the
floor p a r a m e t e r , w h i c h clearly w a s going b e y o n d its intended effect of picking
up t h e effects of g u e s s i n g and which had a h u g e standard error. I also con-
strained a w a r e n e s s to have t h e s a m e effect on reception in both the baseline and
c h a n g e subfunctions. T h e s e t w o constraints did not significantly diminish the
overall fit of t h e m o d e l to the d a t a (F, [ 2 , 1905], 1.6, n.s.) and also did not n o -
ticeably affect t h e q u a l i t a t i v e fit of t h e m o d e l , as analyzed graphically. T h e con-
straints d i d , however, b r i n g stability to the results; in particular, they brought
coefficient e s t i m a t e s for t h e t w o m o s t theoretically i m p o r t a n t coefficients -
those d e p i c t i n g the effect of a w a r e n e s s on reception and a c c e p t a n c e in the
c h a n g e m o d e l - into the r a n g e of c o n v e n t i o n a l statistical significance.
An interesting feature of these results is that t h e effects of the predispositions
variables - party, e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , and attitudes t o w a r d U . S . involvement in C e n -
tral A m e r i c a - on R e a g a n ' s evaluations a p p e a r to have increased over the p e -
riod. Of these a p p a r e n t i n c r e a s e s , only that associated with Central A m e r i c a
attitudes s u r v i v e s an F-test of statistical significance. This c a s e is an i m p o r t a n t
o n e , however, b e c a u s e it c o n f i r m s t h e analysis of Krosnick and K i n d e r (1990),
24 I also examined attitude change within the 457-person NES pilot sample, using the sample's
own fall interviews as the baseline. Using the small pilot sample, it was impossible to discard
that portion of the panel that had been interviewed after November 27. Thus, this dataset was not
only smaller than the one just described; it also contained less real attitude change. Despite this,
the patterns of change in the raw pilot data were essentially similar to those found in the larger
comparison. However, I was unable to get the model to reliably fit the smaller dataset, and chose
instead to use as my baseline the pre-November 27 portion of the whole NES postelection study,
as described.
182 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Tests of the one-message model 183

w h o found that t h e I r a n - C o n t r a controversy had " p r i m e d " p e o p l e ' s attitudes o n

Table 8.5. Coefficients for model of change
Central A m e r i c a n policy, thereby leading these attitudes to b e c o m e m o r e
in presidential job approval
strongly e n g a g e d as d e t e r m i n a n t s of presidential approval ratings.

No Two
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 contain the coefficients for t h e r e m a i n i n g figures in the
constraints constraints
Baseline reception function chapter.
Intercept 0.62 2.12
Awareness 3.35 0.79° Table 8.6. Coefficients for diffusion of news
(standardized) (4.39) (.43)
Floor parameter 2.84 Death DC-10
North Wright
(4.18) sentence resign penalty crash
Baseline acceptance function Intercept (an) 0.88 -0.42 -1.96 3.48
Intercept -0.88 0.92 (.11) (.10) (.17) (.65)
Awareness 0.03 0.07 1.92 1.03 2.43
Awareness (ai) 1.12
(.14) (.15) (.12) (.18) (.15) (.51)
Party attachment 0.94 0.91
(range -2 to +2) (.11) (.10)
Equalitarianism 0.35 0.36 Note: Model is equation 7.3, estimated by nonlinear least
(standardized) (.09) (.08) squares. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Central America attitudes* 0.28 0.23 Source: 1989 NES pilot survey.
(standardized) (.09) (.09)
Change reception function
Intercept -0.25 -0.22
Awareness 0.68 0.79 a

(.39) (.43)
Change acceptance function
Intercept 1.24 0.68
Awareness -2.68 -2.17
(2.16) (1.22)
Party attachment 2.02 1.76
(1.59) (.94)
Equalitarianism 1.81 1.64
(1.71) (1.14)
Central America attitudes 3.67 3.10
(3.00) (1.74)
Residual sum of squares 421.21 421.91

Note: Model is Equation 7.7, estimated by maximum

likelihood. Dependent variable is disapproval of job
7
performance (0-1). The Timei N is 1463; Time2 A is
457. Standard errors are in parentheses.
a
, Coefficients constrained to be equal.
* The items were Contra spending and United States
involvement in Central America, as measured in 1986.
Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys.
184 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

Table 8.7. Coefficients for opinion formation on school 9

desegregation, economic news, nuclear freeze, and Korea
Two-sided information flows
School Nuclear Economic Korean
• desegregation freeze news War
Reception function ~
Intercept 0.35 2.14 -1.02 1.52
Awareness 0.72 1.15 1.21 1.58
(.32) (.31) (.28) (.41)
Acceptance function
Intercept 2.17 2.05 1.35 3.59
Awareness -.71 -0.33 Until this chapter, I have m o d e l e d attitude c h a n g e as a response to a one-sided
-0.61 -0.35
(.40) (-22) (.34) (.46) stream of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - for e x a m p l e , the n e g a t i v e effects of I r a n - C o n t r a on
0
Age -0.038 -0.008 presidential popularity, or the a r g u m e n t for liberal internationalism in the p o s t -
-.033 -1.60
(.017) (.008) (.01) (1.09) W o r l d W a r II era. M u c h has been l e a r n e d about the d y n a m i c s of attitude c h a n g e
Domestic policy attiudes 0.55 _ from this a p p r o a c h b e c a u s e , in many c a s e s , the flow of political c o m m u n i c a -
(standardized) (•23)
tions really is, at least for a t i m e , heavily o n e - s i d e d . Yet it is rarely completely
Foreign policy attitudes 0.38 0.91
(standardized) one-sided over any a p p r e c i a b l e length of t i m e . Even a m i d the I r a n - C o n t r a scan-
(.22) (.20)
Reagan j o b approval —
d a l , for e x a m p l e , s o m e Republican senators defended the president, and their
0.08
(range -2 to +2) (.08) r e m a r k s m a y have had s o m e effect in p r e v e n t i n g even greater d a m a g e to Pres-
Party attachment ident R e a g a n ' s approval ratings.
-0.66
(range -2 to +2) (.16) T h e b u r d e n of this c h a p t e r is to d e v e l o p a m o d e l that is c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g
Fxonomic attitudes _ the effects of t w o - s i d e d information flows w h i c h c h a n g e public opinion - that
-0.13
(standardized) (-13) is, information flows that consist of both a d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e p u s h i n g m u c h of
Vote in 1948* _ public opinion in o n e d i r e c t i o n , and a less i n t e n s e , c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e that
-0.77
(1 = Dewey, 0 = Truman)
N 848 1400
. (.60) partly c o u n t e r a c t s the effects of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . Such a model is possible
1413 596 b e c a u s e , as will be s h o w n , d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s can have dif-
ferent effects in different s e g m e n t s of the p o p u l a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g on c i t i z e n s ' p o -
Note: Model for all issues is Equation 7.5, estimated by maximum litical a w a r e n e s s and ideological o r i e n t a t i o n s and on the relative intensities of
likelihood. Dependent variables are 0 - 1 , as follows: disagreement that the the t w o m e s s a g e s .
federal government should stay out of school desegregation (V74); support
But the larger p u r p o s e of this c h a p t e r is to integrate the w o r k of e a r l i e r c h a p -
for joint or unilateral freeze (V305); statement that economy has improved in
last year (V327); disagreement that the United States "should get out of ters into a general s t a t e m e n t of the effect on m a s s opinion of two-sided informa-
Korea now and stay out." Other political variables are coded in liberal tion flows. We saw in C h a p t e r 6 that w h e n elite discourse one-sidedly favors a
direction, except vote for Deweyf see Measures Appendix for additional given policy, it p r o d u c e s a " m a i n s t r e a m p a t t e r n " in which the most a w a r e m e m -
information. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
" Age was entered in years, except for Korea, where a five-point cohort bers of the public s u b s c r i b e to the elite c o n s e n s u s most strongly, and further, that
variable on 0 - 1 range was used because age in years was unavailable. w h e n elite discourse d i v i d e s along p a r t i s a n lines, the effect is to g e n e r a t e a " p o -
* Nonvoters from 1948 are excluded from the analysis because their l a r i z a t i o n " of m a s s o p i n i o n . T h e present c h a p t e r extends this analysis by show-
political predispositions are unknown.
ing how the m a i n s t r e a m and polarization p a t t e r n s form and c h a n g e over t i m e in
Sources: For school desegregation, 1956-58-60 CPS study; for freeze and response to c h a n g e s in t h e intensities of c o m p e t i n g m e s s a g e s in a two-sided in-
economic news, 1982 NES survey; for Korean War, 1951 CPS survey. formation flow. T h e c h a p t e r further s h o w s h o w c h a n g e s in t h e relative intensi-
ties of o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s can p r o d u c e not only the p a t t e r n s of attitude c h a n g e
o b s e r v e d in C h a p t e r s 7 and 8, but m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d o n e s as well.
M o r e generally, t h e n , this c h a p t e r seeks to show that public opinion can be
u n d e r s t o o d as a r e s p o n s e to the relative intensity and stability of o p p o s i n g flows
 186 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Two-sided information flows 187

of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . (Again, I stress that use of these

ideological labels is meant to convey only the directional thrust of the m e s s a g e . )
W h e t h e r public opinion is m o m e n t a r i l y stable in the m a i n s t r e a m or p o l a r i z a t i o n
p a t t e r n , o r u n d e r g o i n g attitude c h a n g e , d e p e n d s o n w h e t h e r the o p p o s i n g c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n flows are one-sided or evenly b a l a n c e d , and w h e t h e r they a r e stable
or c h a n g i n g over t i m e .
Unfortunately, there are few issues for which the relative intensity of o p p o s -
ing m e s s a g e s c h a n g e s clearly and crisply over a short period of t i m e , and only
one c a s e of w h i c h I am aware in which the resulting c h a n g e s in m a s s attitudes
have been a d e q u a t e l y captured by a series of high-quality surveys. T h i s c a s e ,
however, is an i m p o r t a n t and intrinsically interesting o n e : p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for
and opposition to A m e r i c a n involvement in the V i e t n a m War. T h i s c a s e will pro-
b. Pages of listings from New York Times index
vide most of t h e illustrative material for the a r g u m e n t of this chapter.
To a c c o m p l i s h the goals of this chapter, it will be n e c e s s a r y to e n g a g e in s o m e
statistical m o d e l i n g and a fairly extensive discussion of the d a t a e m p l o y e d . To
m a k e it easier to see w h e r e the technical w o r k is g o i n g , I have included a simple Total pages
illustration of the effects of two-sided information flows at t h e b e g i n n i n g of the listing stories
chapter. T h e n , in t h e m i d d l e section of the chapter, I d e v e l o p a statistical model on Vietnam
War in N.Y.
that is c a p a b l e of c a p t u r i n g attitude c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to c h a n g e s in a two-sided
Times index 20"
information flow. T h e final section d e s c r i b e s the m e a s u r e s used in testing the
model and t h e results of the m o d e l i n g effort. 0-1 i 1 "

64 66 68 70

EBB AND FLOW OF SUPPORT FOR T H E V I E T N A M WAR
T h e c a s e of the V i e t n a m W a r presents an unusually fertile p p p o r t u n i t y for ex-
a m i n i n g the d y n a m i c s of public o p i n i o n . A m o n g its attractive features are the
following:
Rapid change in elite positions on the issue. Liberal opinion leaders overwhelmingly
supported the war in 1964, but mainly opposed it in 1970. Conservative elites, by con-
trast, continued to support the war throughout the period of American involvement.
Chan ges in the intensity of the dominant message. President Johnson made far more
strenuous efforts to promote public support for the war after the increased commitment
of U.S. ground troops in 1965 than he had a year earlier, when he was in the midst of
an election campaign.
Changes in the intensity of the countervalent message. The antiwar message was vir-
tually nonexistent in 1964 and was still hardly more than a whisper in 1966. By 1970,
however, it was probably as intense, and perhaps more intense, than the prewar
message.
Transformation of Vietnam from a mainstream issue in 1964 to a polarization issue in
1970.
T h e election studies c o n d u c t e d by the C e n t e r for Political Studies ( C P S ) at
the University of M i c h i g a n d u r i n g the V i e t n a m W a r provide excellent d a t a on
the p u b l i c ' s r e s p o n s e to this issue. An almost identical q u e s t i o n , quoted in
C h a p t e r 8, w a s a s k e d in four different s u r v e y s , and each of these surveys c a r r i e d
Figure 9 . 1 . Two estimates of trends in media content on Vietnam. The story count mea-
sure gives the count of pro- and antiwar stories associated with cover stories on the Viet-
nam War in the period 1963 to 1970 in Life, Time, and Newsweek magazines.
a g o o d selection of explanatory v a r i a b l e s , especially political a w a r e n e s s and p o -
litical values.
Before t u r n i n g to t h e opinion d a t a , however, it is useful to e x a m i n e the sources
of m a s s opinion on t h e war, n a m e l y t h e flow of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on
V i e t n a m . I have d e v e l o p e d several indicators of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . First
and most i m p o r t a n t , I a s k e d a research assistant to u n d e r t a k e a content analysis
of w a r r e p o r t i n g in Time, Newsweek, and Life m a g a z i n e s for t h e period 1963 to
1970. T h e research assistant w a s u n a w a r e of my e x p e c t a t i o n s as to w h a t the
analysis m i g h t reveal. Following i n s t r u c t i o n s , he identified all m a g a z i n e issues
in which the V i e t n a m W a r or related events (such as a n t i w a r protests) w e r e fea-
tured on the cover and read all stories in these m a g a z i n e s relating to the war.
T h e stories selected in this way m a y be c o n s i d e r e d a r e a s o n a b l e s a m p l e of the
w a r r e p o r t a g e that w a s m o s t salient to t h e p u b l i c . T h e research assistant rated
e a c h as p r e d o m i n a n t l y p r o w a r in its slant, predominantly antiwar, or fairly
evenly b a l a n c e d . T h e resulting e s t i m a t e of trends in war c o v e r a g e are depicted
in Figure 9 . 1 a .
B y these d a t a , t h e p r o w a r m e s s a g e w a s only m o d e r a t e l y p r o m i n e n t i n 1 9 6 3 - 4 ,
averaging about four stories per year per m a g a z i n e in association with a cover on
V i e t n a m . (There w e r e , of c o u r s e , m a n y n o n - c o v e r - r e l a t e d stories on V i e t n a m . )
 188 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
But the p r o w a r story w a s n o n e t h e l e s s far m o r e intense than w a s the a n t i w a r
story, which averaged about 1.5 cover-related items per m a g a z i n e p e r year. A
close e x a m i n a t i o n of these early a n t i w a r stories s h o w s , in a d d i t i o n , that they did
not p o r t r a y p a r t i s a n opposition to the war, as did m u c h of the later c o v e r a g e ;
rather, they r e p o r t e d difficulties in the conduct of the w a r that might have been
interpreted as r e a s o n s for strengthening the U . S . c o m m i t m e n t .
As can also be seen in Figure 9 . 1 a , the p r o w a r m e s s a g e gained considerably
in intensity b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, m a i n t a i n i n g this higher level of intensity
through about 1968. After 1968 the p r o w a r m e s s a g e declined rapidly, falling al-
most to 1964 levels of intensity. M e a n w h i l e , the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e gained in in-
tensity each year and a p p e a r s to have caught and even o v e r t a k e n the p r o w a r
m e s s a g e in intensity by 1970.
A peculiarity of these d a t a is the overall fall-off in n e w s c o v e r a g e of t h e w a r
in 1970. Did the v o l u m e of w a r c o v e r a g e really decline in 1970, even t h o u g h
levels of U . S . t r o o p c o m m i t m e n t r e m a i n e d near peak levels, or did w a r n e w s
simply c e a s e to be featured in periodical p u b l i c a t i o n s ? 1
To c h e c k the latter possibility, I did a s i m p l e count of p a g e s in the New York
Times Index devoted to stories about V i e t n a m . T h e results, displayed in Figure
9 . 1 b , suggest that the total v o l u m e of w a r c o v e r a g e remained high in the later
years of the war. W h a t s e e m s to have h a p p e n e d , t h u s , is that w a r coverage lost
its novelty in later years of the conflict, and so tended to d r o p out of the trendier
periodical literature. In a n o t h e r m e d i u m , however, the overall v o l u m e of cover-
age r e m a i n e d h i g h .
As a further c h e c k on information flow d u r i n g the war, I e x a m i n e d H a l l i n ' s
(1984) published analysis of p r o w a r and a n t i w a r statements in the television
n e w s . A central finding of his study w a s that " s p o k e s m e n for administration
policy were heavily p r e d o m i n a n t d u r i n g the early period [prior to s p r i n g , 1968],
while after Tet there w a s relative parity b e t w e e n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and its crit-
i c s " (1984: 9 ) . Hallin also reports (personal c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) that the overall
v o l u m e of w a r c o v e r a g e on television increased through about 1966 and re-
m a i n e d roughly steady until after 1970.
O n e can also take the actions of leading political figures as an indicator of
trends in political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on the war. For e x a m p l e , w h e n in 1964 Pres-
ident J o h n s o n sought congressional a u t h o r i z a t i o n for his V i e t n a m policy in the
Gulf of Tonkin r e s o l u t i o n , it passed 4 1 4 to 0 in the H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and
by a m a r g i n of 88 to 2 in the S e n a t e . T h e s e congressional actions s u g g e s t , as did
the m e d i a analysis for this p e r i o d , that political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the e a r l y
p h a s e of the V i e t n a m W a r p r e d o m i n a n t l y favored A m e r i c a n involvement.
As U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t in the w a r increased in 1965 and 1966, President
J o h n s o n devoted m o r e of his public utterances to p r o m o t i n g his w a r policy.
However, real congressional d e b a t e over the V i e t n a m War, including t h e first
hints of opposition to it, also e m e r g e d in this p e r i o d , most p r o m i n e n t l y in hear-
1 A separate count of Vietnam articles in the Readers Guide to Periodical Literature shows a similar
decline across a wider range of media outlets.
Two-sided information flows 189
ings c o n d u c t e d by S e n a t o r William Fulbright in 1966. B e g i n n i n g in 1967, there
were also s o m e a t t e m p t s in C o n g r e s s to cut off funding for t h e war. Yet these
initial efforts w e r e soundly defeated, indicating c o n t i n u e d strong s u p p o r t for the
2
w a r by congressional e l i t e s . So again, the actions of leading political figures are
broadly consistent w i t h the trends in m e d i a c o v e r a g e , as depicted in Figure 9. l a .
T h e years 1969 and 1970 m a r k e d the height of heavily covered a n t i w a r pro-
tests, but they were also a t i m e in which the Nixon a d m i n i s t r a t i o n sought by its
well-publicized " V i e t n a m i z a t i o n ' p r o g r a m t o show that U . S . policy w a s suc-
c e e d i n g , and a t i m e in which attempts in C o n g r e s s to cut off w a r funding con-
3
tinued to be defeated, t h o u g h by closer m a r g i n s than p r e v i o u s l y . H e r e , t h e n , we
find a discrepancy b e t w e e n the two indicators of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s flow. Al-
t h o u g h the n e w s m a g a z i n e d a t a suggest that the flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s favored
the a n t i w a r position by 1970, the actions of political officeholders show that
there r e m a i n e d a stream of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that w a s , on b a l a n c e , s u p p o r t i v e of
A m e r i c a n involvement.
Taking all of these indicators together, it a p p e a r s that both the p r o w a r and the
a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s b e c a m e m o r e intense b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, with the p r o w a r
m e s s a g e initially far m o r e intense but losing this a d v a n t a g e by 1970. T h e flow
of pro- and a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s may have b e e n roughly even by 1970, and
probably still quite high in overall v o l u m e .
T h i s is a m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d pattern of c h a n g e in the flow of political c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n s than has b e e n examined so far, and o n e which cannot be fully ac-
c o m m o d a t e d in the s i m p l e model developed in C h a p t e r 7. To capture its effects,
a " t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l " of opinion c h a n g e is necessary.
T h e central idea in a t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l is that citizens are e x p o s e d to t w o
c o m m u n i c a t i o n f l o w s , o n e on each side of the issue. T h e s e o p p o s i n g c o m m u -
nications m a y have different effects in different s e g m e n t s of t h e p o p u l a t i o n , d e -
p e n d i n g on t h e relative intensity of t h e m e s s a g e s . For e x a m p l e , in t h e period
b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, o n e might expect the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e , w h i c h w a s still
very low in intensity even in 1966, to have had its greatest impact on the most
politically a w a r e liberals: Their high levels of awareness w o u l d ensure reception
of the m e s s a g e , and their liberalism w o u l d m a k e t h e m s y m p a t h e t i c to it. By con-
trast, the increase in the p r o w a r m e s s a g e from 1964 to 1966 m i g h t be expected
to have a relatively larger impact on persons of m o d e r a t e or low political a w a r e -
ness: T h e p r o w a r m e s s a g e w a s , as just s h o w n , already fairly intense in 1964, and
so w o u l d p r o b a b l y have reached most highly a w a r e persons at that t i m e . H e n c e
the increase in its intensity would m a i n l y affect persons w h o had not yet gotten
the m e s s a g e in 1964, that is, m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e or less-aware persons.
2 A 1966 proposal to repeal the Gulf of Tonkin resolution was defeated in a Senate vote by a margin
of 92 to 5; a 1967 House amendment barring funds for military operations over North Vietnam
was defeated 372 to 18. See Jack McWethy, The Power of the Pentagon (1972: p. 112).
3 In 1970 the Cooper-Church amendment, barring funds for U.S. military operations in Cambodia,
passed the Senate 58 to 37, but was defeated in the House 237 to 153. Later in 1970 the McGov-
ern-Hatfield amendment, setting a deadline for U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, was defeated in
the Senate by a vote of 55 to 39; the measure did not come to a vote in the House (ibid.).
 190 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
From raw data
From logit regressions
100
Percent 75 1964
supporting
Vietnam 50-|
War 1966
25-f
0
Political awarenes
1964 N= 17 37 73 31 26
14 27 65 22 18 Same N
Figure 9.2. Patterns of support for the Vietnam War among liberals in 1964 and 1966.
Logit estimates for the figure on right are constructed from a model in which awareness
and awareness squared were the only independent variables. The awareness scores used
in constructing this figure are given in footnote 15. The measure of support for the war
is described in Chapter 8. For reasons discussed in connection with Figure 9.6, this anal-
ysis is limited to whites. Source: 1964 and 1966 CPS surveys.
T h e s e s u p p o s i t i o n s , as can be seen in Figure 9 . 2 , nicely fit t h e c h a n g i n g
patterns of s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m W a r a m o n g liberals b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966.
( T h e m e a s u r e of liberal or dovish values u s e d in this figure will be d e s c r i b e d
later in the chapter.) S u p p o r t for the w a r a m o n g less aware d o v e s rose between
1964 and 1966, p r e s u m a b l y b e c a u s e t h e y had finally b e g u n to be heavily
e x p o s e d to p r o w a r a r g u m e n t s ; n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h i s , the most a w a r e doves began
to turn against the war b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, presumably b e c a u s e they en-
c o u n t e r e d and a c c e p t e d an a n t i w a r m e s s a g e that w a s still inaudible to less at-
tentive doves.
T h i s account of attitude c h a n g e b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, t h o u g h rough and
informal, is the clearest illustration I have for the main point of this chapter:
Public attitudes on major issues c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to c h a n g e s in t h e relative
intensities of c o m p e t i n g streams of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , as filtered
t h r o u g h t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process. As I have indicated, however, this ac-
count is preliminary. To m a k e it fully c r e d i b l e , it will be n e c e s s a r y to explain not
only attitude c h a n g e a m o n g d o v e s b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, but attitude c h a n g e
in the w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n b e t w e e n 1964 and 1970. (The C P S item on V i e t n a m w a s
c h a n g e d after 1970, w h i c h is why my analysis e n d s at that point.)
A T W O - M E S S A G E MODEL OF A T T I T U D E C H A N G E
T h e basic c l a i m of the R A S model is that p e o p l e respond to survey q u e s t i o n s on
the basis of w h a t e v e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are present in their m i n d s and i m m e d i a t e l y
accessible in m e m o r y . T h e f o r m a t i o n of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , for its p a r t , d e p e n d s on
the flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the political e n v i r o n m e n t . H e n c e , c h a n g e s in the
relative intensities o f t h e o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s d e t e r m i n e p e o p l e ' s relative p r o p e n -
Two-sided information flows 191
sities to form liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h i c h in turn d e t e r m i n e
their survey r e s p o n s e s .
In o r d e r to test this basic c l a i m , it is n e c e s s a r y to introduce s o m e simplifying
a s s u m p t i o n s in the R A S m o d e l . First, it is not possible to m e a s u r e reception and
a c c e p t a n c e of each of the discrete c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - official s p e e c h e s , press
r e l e a s e s , n e w s stories, and so on - that constituted the real-world p r o w a r and
a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s of t h e V i e t n a m era. H e n c e , I will a s s u m e that, within each
t w o - y e a r p e r i o d , all c o m m u n i c a t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g the war fell into a fixed but
reasonably small n u m b e r of c a t e g o r i e s , w h i c h I will take to be " m e s s a g e s . " I
further a s s u m e that all of the m e s s a g e s of a given direction and t i m e interval
are equally intense. T h u s , within each t w o - y e a r t i m e p e r i o d , there will be N
p r o w a r m e s s a g e s of uniform intensity, and N a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s of different but
uniform intensity. Since real-world c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are t o o n u m e r o u s and
varied to be actually m e a s u r a b l e or, if o r g a n i z e d into a m a n a g e a b l e n u m b e r of
t o p i c s , merely abstract entities anyway, n o t h i n g of i m p o r t a n c e seems lost by
this simplification.
T h e s e c o n d simplifying a s s u m p t i o n is that no c o n s i d e r a t i o n r e m a i n s active in
a p e r s o n ' s mind for m o r e than two years unless it is reinforced by reception and
a c c e p t a n c e of an identical a r g u m e n t , in w h i c h c a s e it is the s a m e as a new con-
s i d e r a t i o n . T h e value of this a s s u m p t i o n is t h a t , o n c e it has been m a d e , public
opinion in each of the four V i e t n a m surveys can be m o d e l e d as a response to
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s i n t h e p r e c e d i n g t w o y e a r s , w h i c h e l i m i n a t e s t h e n e e d t o take
account of the lagged effects of c o m m u n i c a t i o n from earlier t i m e p e r i o d s . Al- 4
t h o u g h t h e r e is no d o u b t that c o m m u n i c a t i o n s have effects that c a n last longer
than t w o y e a r s , the four surveys of the V i e t n a m dataset do not provide sufficient
leverage to d e t e r m i n e w h a t t h e lagged effects a r e . H e n c e , a g a i n , it d o e s not
s e e m that anything h a s been lost by t h e simplifying a s s u m p t i o n .
T h e final simplifying a s s u m p t i o n is t h a t individuals r e s p o n d to s u r v e y q u e s -
tions on the basis of the first c o n s i d e r a t i o n that c o m e s to m i n d rather than on the
basis o f w h a t e v e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are a c c e s s i b l e , a s allowed i n a x i o m A 4 . T h i s
a s s u m p t i o n greatly simplifies the formal structure of the m o d e l w i t h o u t , a g a i n ,
giving u p a n y t h i n g about w h i c h w e h a v e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e p r e s e n t d a t a .
We can now begin d e v e l o p m e n t of a m o d e l for the diffusion of c o m p e t i n g lib-
eral and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s about t h e V i e t n a m War. T h e m o d e l is based on
a t w o - s t e p process in which individuals a r e e x p o s e d to political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
t h a t , if received and a c c e p t e d , b e c o m e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for t h e m . I begin with a
m o d e l of the r e c e p t i o n p r o c e s s , as follows:
_l
Prob(Reception) , = 1 rt - [1 + /+ Exp(a k, + fl|*Awareness,)]
0
= RE ikl (9. l a )
E q u a t i o n 9. la is a s t a n d a r d logistic function, that is, one that varies b e t w e e n
a floor of zero and a ceiling of 1.0. T h e subscript / indicates individual-level
differences. T h e subscript k refers to the ideological c o l o r a t i o n of t h e m e s s a g e
4 See Appendix B to Chapter 10 for a model that permits lagged effects of previous
communications.
 192 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
(prowar and a n t i w a r ) while the / subscript refers to the t i m e of the survey ( 6 4 ,
6 6 , 6 8 , 70). Since the a p a r a m e t e r c a r r i e s these kt s u b s c r i p t s , shifts in the in-
0 specification will e n a b l e us to test w h e t h e r ideological distance and a w a r e n e s s
tercept of the logistic function vary by m e s s a g e and by t i m e , thereby allowing
shifts in the intensity of each m e s s a g e across t i m e . If the reader reviews my dis-
cussion of the basic reception function in C h a p t e r 7, this will be seen as an ap-
5
p r o p r i a t e way of specifying shifts in m e s s a g e i n t e n s i t y .
Since there are four t i m e periods and two m e s s a g e s , these kt subscripts indi-
cate that we will be e s t i m a t i n g eight different a p a r a m e t e r s , o n e for the inten-
0 c o m m u n i c a t i o n s as n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . W h a t r e m a i n s is to state how they trans-
sity of the p r o - and a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s in e a c h t i m e period. T h u s I h a v e , in effect,
m a d e the intercept of the logistic function into a variable for c a p t u r i n g t i m e -
related differences in m e s s a g e intensity.
I turn now to a m o d e l of the a c c e p t a n c e process. T h e Resistance A x i o m holds
that p e o p l e reject political m e s s a g e s that a r e inconsistent with their predisposi-
t i o n s , but only if they possess contextual information c o n c e r n i n g the relation-
ship b e t w e e n their predispositions and the m e s s a g e . F r o m a x i o m s A l and A 3 ,
respectively, both the reception and the accessibility of cueing information
(given reception of it) will be associated with higher levels of habitual political
awareness. H e n c e , rates of a c c e p t a n c e of i n c o m i n g m e s s a g e s , given reception of
t h e m , ought to decline as a joint function of political a w a r e n e s s and ideological
distance (a p h r a s e I will use instead of " p r e d i s p o s i t i o n a l d i s t a n c e " ) from the
m e s s a g e . T h e following logistic function meets these r e q u i r e m e n t s :
Prob(Accept I Recept),*, = [1 + Exp(-b 0k ~ b *Awareness,
u
- ^2f*Distance,]~'
= Accept,*,
As in E q u a t i o n 9 . 1 a , the subscripts in this e q u a t i o n e m b o d y definite claims
about t h e opinion formation process. First, the k subscript on the intercept
p a r a m e t e r b indicates that s o m e m e s s a g e s m a y e n c o u n t e r m o r e resistance than
0
others. For e x a m p l e , o n e might suspect that the liberal a n t i w a r m e s s a g e w o u l d
e n c o u n t e r m o r e resistance, at given levels of a w a r e n e s s and ideological dis-
t a n c e , than w o u l d the c o n s e r v a t i v e p r o w a r m e s s a g e , b e c a u s e it runs c o n t r a r y
to an established policy. Or, the liberal m e s s a g e m i g h t b e , for reasons of patri-
o t i s m or rhetoric or political a s s o c i a t i o n , an inherently less attractive or per-
suasive m e s s a g e . T h e subscript k e n a b l e s the m o d e l to capture such m e s s a g e -
level variation in overall a c c e p t a n c e notes.
S e c o n d , there are / subscripts for t i m e on the coefficients for a w a r e n e s s and
ideological distance from the m e s s a g e . S i n c e , as I have a r g u e d , the effects of
these variables d e p e n d on cueing m e s s a g e s from elites, and since these c u e s
5 An argument might be made that the a, coefficient, which captures the strength of relationship
between reception and awareness independently of message intensity, should also be subscripted
by time or by message. If, for example, a message was carried exclusively through political media
in its early phases, but was carried through entertainment and political media in a later phase, it
would be appropriate to allow for a stronger relationship between exposure and awareness in the
earlier period. Since, however, the Vietnam data are not strong enough to make credible tests of
the null hypothesis, I have specified a time-invariant a, parameter.
Two-sided information flows 193
c h a n g e d as liberal elites b e g a n to o p p o s e the w a r starting in about 1966, this
b e c a m e , as e x p e c t e d , m o r e strongly associated with resistance to persuasion af-
ter that t i m e .
W i t h t h e r e c e p t i o n function in E q u a t i o n 9 . 1 a and the a c c e p t a n c e function in
E q u a t i o n 9 . 2 , we h a v e precise s t a t e m e n t s about h o w individuals r e s p o n d to the
political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s they encounter, selectively internalizing s o m e of these
form c o n s i d e r a t i o n s into survey responses.
T h e R A S m o d e l , a s indicated, a s s u m e s that individuals s a m p l e w h a t e v e r con-
sideration is ' 'at t h e top of t h e h e a d ' ' at the m o m e n t of r e s p o n s e . Let /?, be defined
as a function g i v i n g the likelihood that a typical c o n s i d e r a t i o n , having been
f o r m e d , will be accessible for a n s w e r i n g survey q u e s t i o n s , and let it be a s s u m e d
that Ri v a r i e s directly w i t h political a w a r e n e s s and nothing e l s e , as follows :
1
Prob(Recall), = 1 - [1 + E x p ( c + c ^ A w a r e n e s s , ) ] "
0
= R, (9-3)
N o t e that b e c a u s e this function c a r r i e s no kt s u b s c r i p t s , it applies to each con-
sideration in a p e r s o n ' s m i n d , so that r e g a r d l e s s of w h e n a c o n s i d e r a t i o n h a s
b e e n formed or w h i c h side of the issue it favors, it is equally likely to be s a m -
p l e d . O n e can readily i m a g i n e m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d or ideologically biased sam-
pling functions, but t h e available d a t a p r o v i d e neither m e a n s for testing m o r e
c o m p l i c a t e d formulations n o r reason to try t h e m , since the present specification
t u r n s out to w o r k quite well.
(9.2)
W i t h the n e w /?, t e r m , we can w r i t e an expression for the probability that a
m e s s a g e to w h i c h an individual has b e e n exposed will be i m m e d i a t e l y accessible
in m e m o r y as a c o n s i d e r a t i o n . This is simply the probability that an individual
h a s received t h e m e s s a g e , t i m e s the probability that he has a c c e p t e d it, t i m e s the
probability that he h a s it accessible in m e m o r y at the m o m e n t of r e s p o n d i n g to
an attitude q u e s t i o n , as follows:
Prob(Accessible),*, = / ^ ( A c c e p t , * , ) / ? , -
= AC , ik (9.4)
Since we h a v e already a s s u m e d that there are N prowar a r g u m e n t s (k=P) and
N a n t i w a r a r g u m e n t s (k=A), the relative accessibility of p r o w a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
is equal to
Y^E^Accept,/.,)/?,
(95)
— ^
^/^(Accept,,.,)/?, + 2/^XAcceptM,);?,
6 In principle, of course, any variable that affects attention to an issue would also affect recall abil-
ity; however, nothing of value except general awareness is available in the Vietnam data series.
Also, it would follow from axiom A3 that recall ability varies inversely with the time since a
consideration has been formed. However, I omit this idea from Equation 9.3 because it has no
observable implications in the context of the present problem.
 194 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Two-sided information flows 195

T h i s expression can be simplified in t w o ways. First, the fl, t e r m s a p p e a r in = (1 -IT(1 -AC ,W(\ - AC ,))
iP iA

both the n u m e r a t o r and denominator, so they cancel and can be o m i t t e d . S e c o n d ,

b e c a u s e there a r e , by a s s u m p t i o n , equal n u m b e r s of p r o w a r and a n t i w a r m e s -
sages, and b e c a u s e all m e s s a g e s of each type are a s s u m e d to be equally i n t e n s e ,
the s u m m a t i o n signs also b e c o m e superfluous. This leaves
/?£,-/>,( Accept,-/.,)
/v£,/>,(Accept,/>,) + / ? £ , ( A c c e p t M lV4/ ) Vietnam.
as o u r m e a s u r e of the relative accessibility of p r o w a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s P over an-
tiwar c o n s i d e r a t i o n s A in the mind of i n d i v i d u a l a t t i m e t, w h e r e t h e reception
and a c c e p t a n c e functions are given by E q u a t i o n s 9 . 1 a and 9 . 2 . E q u a t i o n 9 . 6 is
intuitively q u i t e s i m p l e : Relative accessibilities d e p e n d on the r e c e p t i o n -
a c c e p t a n c e ratios of the two m e s s a g e s , w h e r e these ratios v a r y by t i m e and by
differences a m o n g individuals in a w a r e n e s s and ideological d i s t a n c e .
O n e p r o b l e m r e m a i n s : namely, w h a t t o d o about " N o o p i n i o n " r e s p o n s e s . I n
the V i e t n a m c a s e as in o t h e r s , large n u m b e r s of t h e public r e p o r t e d that they had
no opinion. P r e s u m a b l y , people m a k e such r e s p o n s e s w h e n they are u n a b l e to
call to m i n d any c o n s i d e r a t i o n that w o u l d give t h e m a reason for s u p p o r t i n g one
rather than the o t h e r side of the issue. If the c h a n c e that any p a r t i c u l a r consid-
th
e r a t i o n is accessible in the m e m o r y of the i individual is AC , (from E q u a t i o n
9 . 4 ) , then t h e c h a n c e that s o m e o n e w o u l d have n o n e of the 2N possible consid-
erations readily accessible in m e m o r y is
/?£,/>,Accept,/.,
* (y°)
RE ,Accept , + RE
iP iP i A , Accepts,
T h i s e q u a t i o n , in conjunction with a p p r o p r i a t e l y modified expressions for anti-
w a r and " N o o p i n i o n " r e s p o n s e s , is my m o d e l for fitting the opinion d a t a on
T h i s t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l is obviously quite different in form from the o n e -
m e s s a g e m o d e l d e v e l o p e d in C h a p t e r 7, which w a s intended as a simplification
of the basic a t t i t u d e - c h a n g e process. However, both m o d e l s are c a p a b l e of c a p -
t u r i n g , in essentially similar fashion, m a n y types of attitude c h a n g e , as will be
s h o w n below. T h e t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l i s , however, by far the m o r e versatile and
powerful, as will also be apparent.
T h e m o d e l d e v e l o p e d in this section is not, I might a d d , the only form that a
t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l c o u l d t a k e . In A p p e n d i x A to this chapter, I d e r i v e an al-
t e r n a t i v e form w h i c h , b e c a u s e it o m i t s any reference to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , is m a t h -
e m a t i c a l l y simpler.
Before e s t i m a t i n g t h e t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l on the C P S d a t a series on t h e Viet-
n a m War, I m u s t d e s c r i b e certain features of the d a t a . D e s p i t e their generally
ik N
high quality, there are s o m e p r o b l e m s in a d a p t i n g t h e m for use by t h e t w o -
message model.

P r o b ( N o opinion),, = (1 - AC ,)(\ik - AC ,)(\ ik - AC ) ikl ... (1 - AC J ikt

DATA AND RESULTS

A s s u m i n g , as I h a v e , an equal n u m b e r of liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s ,
N o n e of the major C P S surveys c o n d u c t e d from 1964 to 1970 w e r e reinterviews
this b e c o m e s
with t h e s a m e r e s p o n d e n t s . T h e analysis of m a s s attitudes across t i m e therefore
N N
P r o b ( N o opinion),, = Il (\ - AC ) l\ {\
iPl - AC )iAl requires c o m p a r i s o n s of p a r t i c u l a r types of persons across t i m e - c o m p a r i s o n ,
= n*(l - REinAceeptip, Ri) - RE ,Acce t , /?,) for e x a m p l e , of w a r s u p p o r t a m o n g " h i g h l y informed d o v e s " in 1964 with
iA P iA

w a r s u p p o r t a m o n g " h i g h l y informed d o v e s " i n 1966, 1968, and 1970. T h i s ,

T h e probability of having s o m e o p i n i o n , t h e n , is in t u r n , requires the c o n s t r u c t i o n of highly similar m e a s u r e s of awareness and
N
values in all four s u r v e y s , so that similar s u b g r o u p s of p e o p l e can be located in
Prob(Opinion),, = 1 - n"(l - AC ,)n (\ iP - AC ) iAt (9.7)
e a c h survey.
Putting this expression for o p i n i o n a t i o n together with the expression for the W i t h respect to a w a r e n e s s , this is e a s y to d o . As discussed in t h e M e a s u r e s
relative accessibility of p r o w a r a r g u m e n t s , we obtain the basic statistical m o d e l A p p e n d i x , each survey contains a set of information items sufficient to build an
for e s t i m a t i n g s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m War: awareness scale with an a l p h a reliability of .80 or better. A l t h o u g h m o s t of the
information i t e m s vary from year to year, there is no reason to believe that they
Probability
vary in c o n s e q u e n t i a l w a y s . Just as o n e c o u l d rank o r d e r individuals in t e r m s of
of p r o w a r
spelling ability with o n e r a n d o m l y selected set of twenty w o r d s about as well as
response//., = (Probability of recalling any c o n s i d e r a t i o n at all) X
with a n o t h e r r a n d o m l y selected set of twenty w o r d s , so the different information
tests used in the different C P S surveys should all serve roughly equally well.
/ Accessibility of p r o w a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s Building c o m p a r a b l e m e a s u r e s of political values is m o r e difficult. O n e p o s -
[ Accessibility of + Accessibility of sible m e a s u r e of values is a p e r s o n ' s " i d e o l o g i c a l " position on the l e f t - r i g h t
\ prowar considerations antiwar considerations c o n t i n u u m , w h i c h can be m e a s u r e d in the C P S surveys as t h e difference in
196 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N
" f e e l i n g t h e r m o m e t e r " scores for liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s . T h i s m e a s u r e ,
however, h a s a major difficulty. A l t h o u g h ideology must function as an e x o g e -
nous c a u s e of o p i n i o n toward the war in V i e t n a m , it is possible that influence
r u n s partly in t h e o t h e r d i r e c t i o n . It is p o s s i b l e , that is, that p e o p l e form eval-
u a t i o n s of liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s partly on the basis of their opinion on the
7
V i e t n a m issue r a t h e r than vice v e r s a .
A n o t h e r possibility is to use p e o p l e ' s general feelings of h a w k i s h n e s s or d o v -
ishness as the m e a s u r e of predispositions to support or o p p o s e the war. T h e ad-
vantage of h a w k - d o v e opinion is that it is the d i m e n s i o n of l e f t - r i g h t
o r i e n t a t i o n m o s t likely to affect opinions toward the V i e t n a m War. T h e p r o b l e m
is that t h e 1 9 6 4 - 7 0 C P S surveys contain no direct m e a s u r e of it.
T h e p r o b l e m is not, however, as intractable as it might s e e m . O n e can use
F r a n k l i n ' s (1989) t w o - s a m p l e instrumental variables t e c h n i q u e to c o n s t r u c t a
proxy m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e attitudes. T h i s t e c h n i q u e , which uses information
from one dataset to build an instrumental variable in a n o t h e r d a t a s e t , p r o d u c e s
m e a s u r e s that are a s y m p t o t i c a l l y u n b i a s e d and efficient.
T h e t e c h n i q u e w o r k s as follows. First, we locate a dataset that h a s a g o o d
m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e values. T h e one I use here is the 1988 N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n
Study, which asked several q u e s t i o n s of the following type:
Which do you think is the better way for us to keep the peace - by having a very strong
military so that other countries won't attack us, or by working out our disagreements at
the bargaining table? 8
A b a t t e r y of these i t e m s can be used to predict a p e r s o n ' s general predispo-
sition to s u p p o r t foreign wars. T h e next step is to locate a set of " a u x i l i a r y "
d e m o g r a p h i c and issue variables - gender, religion, racial attitudes - which are
related to the m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e values in the 1988 dataset and w h i c h are
c a r r i e d in identical form in the V i e t n a m d a t a s e t s . Having d o n e t h i s , o n e d o e s a
regression in the 1988 dataset to d e t e r m i n e the relationship b e t w e e n h a w k - d o v e
v a l u e s , on o n e s i d e , and the auxiliary v a r i a b l e s , on the other. T h e a s s u m p t i o n
behind the regression is that the coefficients it g e n e r a t e s , even t h o u g h b a s e d on
1988 d a t a , capture a time-invariant relationship b e t w e e n h a w k - d o v e values and
the auxiliary variables.
We then go back to t h e V i e t n a m d a t a s e t s , w h e r e we use the auxiliary vari-
ables (the s a m e o n e s that were c a r r i e d in the 1988 dataset) to m a k e predictions
about which p e o p l e w e r e likely to be h a w k s and doves in t h e 1960s. T h u s , if
w o m e n , Q u a k e r s , a n d racial liberals were d o v e s in 1988, we will predict that
w o m e n , Q u a k e r s , and racial liberals were likely to have been doves in the 1960s
as well.
But how do we c o m b i n e scores on n u m e r o u s auxiliary variables to predict a
p e r s o n ' s overall likelihood of having been a h a w k or dove in t h e 1960s? This is
w h e r e the coefficients from t h e 1988 regression c o m e in. If t h e coefficients
7 Party attachment could substitute for ideology; however, party is a weaker predictor of war atti-
tudes, while suffering the same endogeneity problem.
8 A series of hawk-dove items of this type were developed and validated by Hurwitz and Peffley
(1988).
Two-sided information flows 197
h a v e , as a s s u m e d , c a p t u r e d a time-invariant relationship between the auxiliary
variables and h a w k - d o v e v a l u e s , they should predict h o w exactly the auxiliary
variables w e r e related to h a w k - d o v e values in the V i e t n a m era. So we use these
coefficients as w e i g h t s on the auxiliary v a r i a b l e s to c o m b i n e t h e m into a n e w
" i n s t r u m e n t a l v a r i a b l e . " T h e new v a r i a b l e , a weighted c o m b i n a t i o n of the in-
f o r m a t i o n on n u m e r o u s auxiliary v a r i a b l e s , should predict w h o w a s likely to
have been a h a w k or a d o v e in the 1960s.
A limitation of this a p p r o a c h , as with any use of instrumental v a r i a b l e s , is
that the instrument is only as g o o d as the auxiliary variables that have been used
to construct it, w h i c h , in the present c a s e , is not very g o o d , since the /--square
on the first stage regression is only 0 . 1 4 . D e s p i t e t h i s , the m e a s u r e turns out to
perform extremely w e l l , as will be shown below. (See A p p e n d i x B of this c h a p -
ter for further details and discussion of the m e a s u r e ; see also footnote 14.)
O n e final m e a s u r e m e n t issue needs to be a d d r e s s e d . A l t h o u g h , as I indicated,
the M i c h i g a n s u r v e y s asked essentially the s a m e V i e t n a m q u e s t i o n over four sur-
v e y s , there is o n e n o t e w o r t h y discontinuity. In 1964 and 1966 all respondents
were asked w h e t h e r they had been " p a y i n g attention to w h a t is going on in Viet-
n a m , " and only those w h o responded affirmatively were subsequently asked
w h e t h e r they s u p p o r t e d or o p p o s e d A m e r i c a n involvement. In 1964 s o m e 20
percent of the r e s p o n d e n t s failed this m i n i m a l test of interest and were not asked
w h e t h e r they s u p p o r t e d or o p p o s e d the w a r ; in 1966 persons failing to pass the
initial interest screen fell to 7 percent. T h e n , in 1968 and 1970, the interest
screen w a s d r o p p e d , so that only those v o l u n t e e r i n g a " N o o p i n i o n " response
are c o u n t e d in that c a t e g o r y .
T h i s discontinuity m a k e s it difficult to offer confident e s t i m a t e s of the
c h a n g e s in " N o - o p i n i o n " rates b e t w e e n 1966 and 1968. Yet the trajectory of
decline from 1964 to 1966 in no-attention responses (from 20 percent to 7 per-
cent) suggests that the n u m b e r of such r e s p o n d e n t s still having no interest in
1968 w a s probably s m a l l . A n d , of c o u r s e , r e s p o n d e n t s could still volunteer a
" N o - o p i n i o n " r e s p o n s e to the V i e t n a m item itself. S o m e 7 percent did in 1968,
which w a s d o w n from 9 percent in 1966 and 13 percent in 1964. T h e fact that
volunteered rates of " N o o p i n i o n " c o n t i n u e d to fall from 1966 to 1968 despite
removal of t h e interest filter, as well as o t h e r published d a t a ( P i e r c e , Beatty, and
Hagner, 1982: p. 142), m a k e it c l e a r that " N o o p i n i o n " rates did actually con-
tinue to decline b e t w e e n 1966 and 1968. But the C P S d a t a probably o v e r e s t i m a t e
the a m o u n t by which they did so.
T h i s p r o b l e m can be a c c o m m o d a t e d by adding a t i m e subscript to the " f l o o r
p a r a m e t e r " in the reception function, as follows:
ProbC/?/:),*, = 1 - [1 + /, + Exp(a fa + a i * A w a r e n e s s , ) ] ~ '
0
= RE ikl (9.1ft)
w h e r e / , can take different values i n 1 9 6 4 - 6 and 1 9 6 8 - 7 0 . T h e s u b s c r i p t e d / -
p a r a m e t e r p e r m i t s different floor levels of o p i n i o n a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g on the pres-
e n c e or absence of a " N o - o p i n i o n " filter.
198 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Two-sided information flows 199

Estimation of the model Table 9.1. Coefficients for diffusion of prowar and
T h e m o d e l m a k e s m u l t i n o m i a l e s t i m a t e s of r e s p o n s e probabilities for three cat-
antiwar messages on Vietnam War
9
e g o r i e s : s u p p o r t for the war, opposition to it, and no o p i n i o n . T h e s e e s t i m a t e s
are m a d e across four datasets having 5 , 0 0 2 respondents. Initial e s t i m a t i o n of the Unconstrained Constrained
model model
m o d e l indicated that p a t t e r n s of opinion c h a n g e were different a m o n g A n g l o
Reception function (Equation 9db)
whites than o t h e r g r o u p s . A s e p a r a t e analysis w a s therefore u n d e r t a k e n for
Eight dummy intercepts (a ^ ) 0 t See Figure 9.3
blacks and is r e p o r t e d below; however, Hispanic and A s i a n - A m e r i c a n respon-
Message intercept 3
- -5.68
dents have been o m i t t e d b e c a u s e there are t o o few cases for s e p a r a t e analysis.
(1.29)
My first e s t i m a t e s of the m o d e l p r o d u c e d plausible values for all coefficients, Message slope — 1.71
but a graphical analysis showed that t h e e s t i m a t e d coefficients " u n d e r f i t " the (0.64)
r a w d a t a , in t h e sense that trends w h i c h w e r e clearly a p p a r e n t in t h e r a w d a t a , Awareness 0.51 0.50
as in Figure 9 . 2 , w e r e not a d e q u a t e l y r e p r e s e n t e d . T h e underfitting w a s not dra- (standardized) (0.32) (0.17)
m a t i c , but it w a s quite n o t i c e a b l e . To r e m e d y the p r o b l e m , I a d d e d a t e r m for Floor 6 4 - 6 6 (f )
t 0.008 0.01
a w a r e n e s s t i m e s values in t h e a c c e p t a n c e function, and this e n a b l e d the m o d e l to (0.11) (0.02)
1 0
do a better j o b of fitting the r a w d a t a , t h o u g h underfitting r e m a i n s a p r o b l e m . Floor 6 8 - 7 0 (f )
t 0.04 0.06
M a x i m u m likelihood coefficient e s t i m a t e s of E q u a t i o n 9.8 for whites are (0.53) (0.03)
s h o w n in the first c o l u m n of Table 9 . 1 . T h e coefficients in the table are d e -
Acceptance function (Equation 9.2)
scribed both in t e r m s of the substantive variable to which they refer and the sub-
Conservative message intercept (bok) 1.43 2.31
function in w h i c h they occur. T h e s t a n d a r d e r r o r s for all coefficients, w h i c h are (2.36) (1.48)
also s h o w n , should be r e g a r d e d as a p p r o x i m a t e . Liberal message intercept -1.06 -1.23
T h e most n o t a b l e aspect of these coefficient e s t i m a t e s is their lack of statis- (3.83) (0.43)
tical precision, w h i c h is to say, the very high s t a n d a r d errors that are associated Awareness -0.08 0.06
with t h e m . T h e r e are t w o fairly o b v i o u s r e a s o n s for this p r o b l e m . T h e first is (1.09) (0.50)
that the d a t a have given the m o d e l no indication of the actual intensities of the Awareness X time -0.27 -0.43
c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows that are supposedly shaping opinion - except that they (Time = 0 in 1964, 1 afterward) (0.78) (0.51)
differ by year and by m e s s a g e - or t h e n u m b e r of discrete m e s s a g e s citizens Hawk-dove* 0.11 0.19
were e x p o s e d to. T h i s c r e a t e s severe multicollinearity: T h e r e m i g h t Have been (standardized) (0.26) (0.30)
few m e s s a g e s of high intensity, or m a n y m e s s a g e s of low intensity, and the H a w k - d o v e X awareness* 0.01 -0.07
m o d e l h a s no w a y of telling. S e c o n d , political awareness has three s e p a r a t e roles (0.27) (0.32)
to play - namely, m e d i a t i n g m e m o r y s e a r c h , r e c e p t i o n , and resistance. On top Time 0.29 0.47
(2.55) (0.41)
of t h i s , a w a r e n e s s a p p e a r s in several interaction t e r m s in the a c c e p t a n c e func-
tion. T h e effect, o n c e a g a i n , is severe multicollinearity. H a w k - d o v e X time* 0.19 0.14
(.33) (0.30)
In an effort to reduce the multicollinearity, I introduced s o m e plausible con-
straints in the m o d e l . Before p r e s e n t i n g results from the constrained m o d e l , H a w k - d o v e X awareness X time* 0.09 0.22
(0.27) (0.35)
however, it is instructive to e x a m i n e the u n c o n s t r a i n e d coefficients.
Male -0.18 -0.05
9 As explained in the last chapter, the war support option combines two separate response (1 = male)* (0.21) (0.16)
options - keeping U.S. troops in Vietnam while trying to end the fighting, and taking a stronger
stand even if it means invading North Vietnam. The first represents the consistent position of the Recall function (Equation 9.3)
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations; the latter was the preferred strategy of some Intercept (co) 3.19 3.47
right-wing critics of the administration. Hawks and doves differed in expected ways in their (2.48) (2.36)
choices between the two prowar options, and it would be desirable to build a "three-message
Awareness (cj) 1.66 1.75
model" capable of capturing this variation.
(.94) (.94)
10 I should add that none of the substantive conclusions of this chapter would have to be changed
if the Awareness x Values terms were omitted; their inclusion serves only to enhance the visual
clarity of the simulations, as in Figure 9.4.
200 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Number of messages (AO 35.2 24
(560) (fixed)
Degrees of freedom 9980 9987
Residual sum of squares 1643.67 1650.77
Note: Dependent variable is a multinomial item on Vietnam policy:
support for the war, opposition to it, and no opinion. The model is
Equation 9.8, with subfunctions specified by Equations 9.1b, 9.2,
and 9.3. Estimation is by maximum likelihood. N of cases is 5002.
a
In the unconstrained model, changes in message intensity over
time are captured by eight dummy intercepts in the reception
function, one for the liberal and conservative message in each of the
four years, as plotted in Figure 9.3. In the constrained model, the
message intercept and slope operate on the eight logged story counts
shown in Figure 9.1 to produce eight estimates of message
intensity.
* Coefficient is negative in acceptance function for conservative
message (indicating lower acceptance among liberals) and positive in
acceptance function for liberal message.
Sources: 1964, 1966, 1978, and 1970 CPS surveys.
Note first t h a t , in the a c c e p t a n c e function, the effects of b o t h ideology and
a w a r e n e s s a p p e a r to increase m a r k e d l y from the period in which there w a s a
m a i n s t r e a m elite c o n s e n s u s (1964) to the period in which the w a r p r o v o k e d elite
d i s a g r e e m e n t (1966 through 1970). T h e direct effect of values increased by a
factor of 1.7, t h e direct effect of a w a r e n e s s increased by a factor of 3 . 4 , and the
awareness x values interaction increased by a factor of 9 . "
T h e s e results s u p p o r t a key point in my a r g u m e n t , n a m e l y that the effects of
values and a w a r e n e s s on political attitudes are not a u t o m a t i c but d e p e n d on elite
cues for a c t i v a t i o n .
As explained in the previous s e c t i o n , the model uses c h a n g e s in the intercept
of t h e reception function, in the form of the a , coefficients, to e s t i m a t e the
to
intensities of pro- and a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that would have been n e c e s s a r y
to p r o d u c e the o b s e r v e d patterns of opinion on the war. T h e values of these c o -
efficients are s h o w n in Figure 9 . 3 (rather than in Table 9 . 1 ) . T h e i r absolute val-
ues have little m e a n i n g , but c h a n g e s over t i m e indicate c h a n g e s in the relative
intensities of the t w o m e s s a g e s and therefore do have m e a n i n g . T h u s , the model
e s t i m a t e s that the p r o w a r m e s s a g e increased in intensity from 1964 to 1966, fell
back m o d e r a t e l y in 1968, and declined o n c e again in 1970. M e a n w h i l e , the
m o d e l e s t i m a t e s that the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e , t h o u g h initially very w e a k , steadily
gained in intensity until 1970, when it finally b e c a m e more intense than the pro-
war message.
11 In my earlier analysis of opinion on the Vietnam War (Zaller. 1991), awareness had positively
signed effects in the acceptance function. This difference is due to a change in the form of the
acceptance function, as explained in footnote 14 of Chapter 7.
Two-sided information flows 201
Antiwar
message
-3.0
Prowar
Magnitude
message
of a(Okt)
coefficients
from reception ^ „
function
(Equation 9.1b)
-5.0
1963-4 1965-6 1967-8 1969-70
Figure 9.3. Estimated intensities of prowar and antiwar messages, 1963-1970.
T h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n these e s t i m a t e d m e s s a g e intensities - w h i c h , I
stress, have been inferred by the model from trends in opinion d a t a alone - with
the actual c o u n t of pro- and a n t i w a r stories in national n e w s m a g a z i n e s in Figure
9 . 1 a is r e m a r k a b l y g o o d . Indeed, it may be a little t o o g o o d . As discussed ear-
lier, different indicators of m e d i a coverage yield s o m e w h a t different results than
those s h o w n in F i g u r e 9 . 1 a , and a different version of the t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l ,
as d e s c r i b e d in A p p e n d i x A to this c h a p t e r and applied to the V i e t n a m d a t a (Zal-
ler, 1991), p r o d u c e d s o m e w h a t different e s t i m a t e s of the pro- and a n t i w a r in-
1 2
formation f l o w s . E v e n s o , the basic result, very high a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n two
c o m p l e t e l y different types of e s t i m a t e s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow, a m o u n t s to an
i m p o r t a n t a c h i e v e m e n t for the t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l .
In r e e s t i m a t i n g the m o d e l , I i m p o s e d t w o constraints. T h e first is that I re-
quired the a coefficients to be a linear function of the logged story counts
0kt
s h o w n in Figure 9. l a . T h u s , the intensities of the pro- and a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s are
no longer c o m p l e t e l y free to take any value in a given year, but are constrained
to reflect an actual c o u n t of pro- and a n t i w a r stories a p p e a r i n g in the m e d i a .
S e c o n d , b e c a u s e t h e n u m b e r of m e s s a g e s in a two-year period is a purely the-
oretical entity, I arbitrarily constrained it to the n u m b e r of m o n t h s b e t w e e n sur-
v e y s , 2 4 . This constraint increased the residual v a r i a n c e in the m o d e l (but only
slightly, since any n u m b e r of m e s s a g e s b e t w e e n about eight and sixty s e e m s to
p r o d u c e an almost equally g o o d fit) while greatly d e c r e a s i n g e s t i m a t e s of stan-
dard e r r o r s .13
12 The correlation between the eight a , coefficients reported in Zaller (1991) and the log of the
llk
story counts in Figure 9.1 is 0.79; for the version of the two-message model used in this book,
the correlation is 0.89.
13 Another advantage of the constrained model is that it converges much more quickly to final pa-
rameter estimates. The unconstrained model took several hundred (expensive!) iterations to con-
verge on what seemed to me like firm estimates, even though the initial starting values were
fairly good. The greater computational efficiency of the constrained model makes it feasible to
do F-tests on particular coefficients, which must still be done in some cases.
 202 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Two-sided information flows 203

Percent elite divisions over the war activated the p u b l i c ' s predispositions toward s u p p o r t
supporting or o p p o s i t i o n .
war DOVES Of the substantively interesting v a r i a b l e s , only m a l e g e n d e r is insignificant in
100
the constrained m o d e l . T h i s is s u r p r i s i n g , since a g e n d e r effect is visibly present
in the r a w d a t a (see Zaller, 1991). I guessed that t h e p r o b l e m might be that gen-
d e r is an i m p o r t a n t contributor to the h a w k - d o v e instrument and so is, in a
s e n s e , being entered into the a c c e p t a n c e function twice. I therefore substituted a
m o r e direct m e a s u r e of ideology - the difference in each r e s p o n d e n t ' s r a t i n g s of
liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on 100-point feeling t h e r m o m e t e r s , as d e s c r i b e d
above - into the a c c e p t a n c e function and r e e s t i m a t e d the m o d e l . In this m o d e l ,
gender w a s statistically significant on an individual coefficient F-test
1 4
Political awareness (F,[2,9987], 13.68, p < . 0 1 ) .
HAWKS

1966 1968
Patterns of support for and opposition to the war

1970 M o r e i m p o r t a n t than the fit of the model to t h e d a t a is the substantive story im-
1964
plied by the d a t a and the m o d e l . T h e story e m e r g e s readily from a graphical
1 5
a n a l y s i s , as shown in Figure 9 . 4 . (This and subsequent figures are b a s e d on
results from the c o n s t r a i n e d m o d e l . )
Let us e x a m i n e first the attitudes of doves. Figure 9 . 4 s h o w s that in 1964 p o -
litical awareness had a roughly linear relation with s u p p o r t for the war. T h i s re-
Political awareness sult exemplifies the m a i n s t r e a m or " f o l l o w e r " model of opinion f o r m a t i o n , as
discussed in C h a p t e r 6.
Figure 9.4. Patterns of support for the Vietnam War among hawks and doves, 1964- By 1966, however, the J o h n s o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s a t t e m p t i n g to c o u n t e r an
1970. Estimates are derived from media-constrained coefficient estimates in Table 9 . 1 .
incipient a n t i w a r m o v e m e n t through " p e a c e o f f e n s i v e s , " c o n d e m n a t i o n s o f
See footnote 15 for additional information on the coding of variables in this figure.
Source: 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 CPS surveys. " c o m m u n i s t a g g r e s s i o n , " and other publicity ploys. T h e effects of t h e louder
14 Multicollinearity among the other variables in the acceptance function affected the precision of
the intercept, which in turn affected the precision of the gender coefficient.
E s t i m a t e s from the constrained m o d e l are s h o w n in the r i g h t - h a n d c o l u m n of Interestingly, the decrease in residual variance from using the feeling thermometers, despite
Table 9.1 As can be seen, the precision of the coefficient e s t i m a t e s is greatly the problem of endogeneity, as the measure of values over using the hawk-dove instrument is
improved. All but o n e of the coefficients in the reception and recall functions modest. This indicates both a slight level of endogeneity in the feeling thermometers and an im-
pressively good performance by the hawk-dove instrument.
is now statistically significant, and the e x c e p t i o n , the floor p a r a m e t e r / in 15 Hawks and doves are persons having a score of ± 1.85 on the hawk-dove variable; for compar-
1 9 6 4 - 6 , w a s not e x p e c t e d to diverge from z e r o . ison, the mean score of the doves depicted in Figure 9.2 was just over +2. The following table
T h e coefficients in the a c c e p t a n c e function, however, remain quite i m p r e c i s e . gives the z-score ranges for the awareness scores that were used in constructing Figure 9.4. Also
included are the extreme values of each awareness measure in each year.
Yet on a series of F - t e s t s , the i m p o r t a n t coefficients all e m e r g e d as statistically
z-score values of awareness scales
significant. T h u s , a w a r e n e s s , v a l u e s , and A w a r e n e s s x Values had no overall ef-
1964 1966 1968 1970
fect (these apply only to 1964), but t h e block of coefficients c a p t u r i n g the in-
Minimum value -2.51 -1.57 -2.58 -2.14
creased effect of these variables in the period 1966 through 1970 - A w a r e n e s s x
5th percentile -2.03 -1.57 -2.00 -1.70
T i m e , Values x T i m e , A w a r e n e s s x Values x T i m e , and T i m e - w e r e all sta- 98th percentile 1.61 2.24 1.61 2.13
tistically significant (F[4, 9 9 8 7 ] , 2 . 3 9 p < . 0 5 ) . T h e interaction t e r m s for Maximum value 1.84 2.66 1.96 2.57
a w a r e n e s s and values - A w a r e n e s s X Values and A w a r e n e s s X Values x Note that the lower range awareness scores represent the 5th percentile in this figure rather
T i m e - w e r e also statistically significant on an F-test. than the 1st as in most other figures. The reason is that the lowest z-score on the 1966 aware-
ness scale is -1.57, a score attained by 7.7 percent of the sample. To maintain rough compa-
W h a t all this m e a n s in plain English is that awareness and values had signif- rability between this lower end value and those of other years, I used a 5th percentile cutoff
icant effects on resistance to pro- and a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , but only after in the other years.
204 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
prowar m e s s a g e register mainly a m o n g respondents in the m i d d l e to lower
ranges of the information s p e c t r u m ; these are people w h o previously had been
only lightly e x p o s e d to the prowar m e s s a g e and were now readily c o n v e r t e d to
s u p p o r t i n g it. M e a n w h i l e , the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e , t h o u g h barely a u d i b l e to most
of the p u b l i c , had b e g u n to reach and c o n v e r t the most politically informed
d o v e s , w h o were the o n e segment of the public to b e c o m e less s u p p o r t i v e of the
war b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966.
T h e top m i d d l e panel of Figure 9 . 4 shows that, as late as 1968, a small pro-
war trend is still evident a m o n g the least informed doves (though this effect
is statistically u n c e r t a i n ) w h o were still j u s t getting the p r o w a r m e s s a g e , but
that the small p r o w a r trend at the low end of the awareness scale is offset by a
m u c h larger a n t i w a r m o v e m e n t in the m i d d l e and upper ranges of the a w a r e n e s s
scale. T h u s the b a l a n c e of p r o - and a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s that had mainly favored
the war in 1966 w a s w o r k i n g against it in 1968. Finally, as the top right panel of
Figure 9 . 4 s h o w s , all s e g m e n t s of the dove s u b g r o u p were turning against the
w a r by 1970.
Note that the biggest a n t i w a r shift in liberal opinion o c c u r r e d after Richard
Nixon took over the presidency in 1969. W i t h the w a r effort being led by a R e -
publican rather than a D e m o c r a t , many d o v e s found it easier to o p p o s e the war,
an o b s e r v a t i o n first m a d e in M u e l l e r ' s (1973) account of c h a n g i n g p a t t e r n s of
support for the war. Yet it is also n o t a b l e that the t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l quite
nicely picks up the a c c e ' e r a t i o n in liberal a n t i w a r opinion after 1969 without
including a special t e r m for c h a n g e in presidential leadership; the only source of
opinion c h a n g e on V i e t n a m in this period is c h a n g e in the p a t t e r n of pro- and
a n t i w a r information in the m e d i a , as s h o w n in Figure 9.1a.
C h a n g i n g p a t t e r n s of w a r support a m o n g h a w k s generally parallel those
a m o n g d o v e s , w i t h the c o n s p i c u o u s exception that w a r support a m p n g the most
aware h a w k s never really declines. B e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, s u p p o r t for the w a r
grows in all a w a r e n e s s g r o u p s , including those scoring at the very top of the
awareness scale. In 1968 gains in s u p p o r t for the war a m o n g t h e less informed
roughly balance small losses a m o n g the most informed. A n d in 1970, despite the
growing intensity of the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e , s u p p o r t for the w a r a m o n g h a w k s d e -
clines only slightly - mainly a m o n g m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e h a w k s . T h u s , t h r o u g h o u t
the war, political a w a r e n e s s r e m a i n s positively associated with what is, a m o n g
h a w k s , a strong p a r t i s a n n o r m .
It is interesting to c o m p a r e the effects of political a w a r e n e s s on h a w k s and
doves. First of all, t h e least informed within each c a m p behave similarly. O w i n g
to their habitual inattentiveness to politics, they are late to s u p p o r t the w a r
and also late to respond to a n t i w a r i n f o r m a t i o n . M o d e r a t e l y aware h a w k s and
doves also b e h a v e fairly similarly: T h e y fail to s u p p o r t the w a r in its initial
stage b e c a u s e they have not been sufficiently p r o p a g a n d i z e d ; as the p r o w a r
m e s s a g e heats u p , they b e c o m e m o r e s u p p o r t i v e of the war, but then just as
quickly begin to a b a n d o n the war w h e n the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e b e c o m e s loud
Two-sided information flows 205
100
Rates of
non-
opinionation
Political awareness
Figure 9.5. Estimated "No-opinion" rates among doves, 1964-1970. Estimates are de-
rived from media-constrained coefficient estimates in Table 9 . 1 . Source: 1964, 1966,
1968, and 1970 CPS surveys.
e n o u g h to reach t h e m . T h e most politically aware i d e o l o g u e s , m e a n w h i l e , b e -
have very differently. H i g h l y aware doves begin turning against the w a r as early
as 1966; highly a w a r e h a w k s , by contrast, largely hold their g r o u n d , so that they
are almost as likely to s u p p o r t the w a r in 1970 as they were at the start of the
conflict. T h e e x p l a n a t i o n , of c o u r s e , is that h a w k s were sustained by a steady
flow of ideologically congenial prowar m e s s a g e s and w e r e , at t h e s a m e t i m e ,
highly resistant to the ideologically inconsistent a n t i w a r m e s s a g e .
A l t h o u g h my analysis has focused on differing rates of s u p p o r t for t h e Viet-
n a m War, the m o d e l also accounts for trends in opposition to the w a r and in " N o
o p i n i o n " rates. T h e latter are rather interesting, as depicted in Figure 9 . 5 . T h e r e
i s , a s w o u l d b e e x p e c t e d , a strong relationship b e t w e e n " N o o p i n i o n " rates and
political awareness. But the relationship is m u c h steeper e a r l y in the war, w h e n
most politically u n a w a r e persons had no opinion on the war, than it w a s in later
y e a r s , w h e n most citizens had opinions. T h e model is able to a c c o m m o d a t e
these c h a n g i n g " N o o p i n i o n " rates b e c a u s e the opinionation function c a r r i e s
information (via E q u a t i o n 9 . 4 ) about the intensity of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on the
1 6
w a r , and m o r e intense m e s s a g e s a r e , of c o u r s e , associated with lower rates of
the " N o o p i n i o n " r e s p o n s e .
A l t h o u g h it is not shown in Figure 9 . 5 , the model predicts an increase in " N o
o p i n i o n " rates b e t w e e n 1968 and 1970. T h i s projected increase is s m a l l , about
2 p e r c e n t a g e points in the lowest awareness g r o u p and even s m a l l e r in o t h e r
g r o u p s , and so does not show up in the raw d a t a . However, P i e r c e , Beatty, and
H a g n e r (1982: p . 142) report that, across several s u r v e y s , " N o o p i n i o n " rates
did begin to c r e e p u p w a r d in 1971, a reflection perhaps of a d e c l i n e in the in-
tensity of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on the war.
16 More specifically, the RE , terms in Equation (9.4) carry the a„ coefficients.
lk kl
206 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Political awareness
Figure 9.6. Trends in black support for the Vietnam War, 1964-1970. Trend lines have
been derived from logistic regressions. The awareness measure in the figure runs
± 1.75 SD. Source: 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 CPS surveys.
A F R O - A M E R I C A N S ' SUPPORT FOR T H E WAR
T h e small n u m b e r of A f r o - A m e r i c a n s available for analysis in the C P S datasets
(despite black o v e r s a m p l e s in s o m e years) m a k e s it difficult to m a k e a confident
a s s e s s m e n t of black trends in support for the war. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e available d a t a
reveal s o m e highly s u g g e s t i v e p a t t e r n s , as s h o w n in Figure 9 . 6 . (The d a t a in this
figure have b e e n c o n s t r u c t e d from s i m p l e p o l y n o m i a l regression in order to
s m o o t h out l u m p i n e s s arising from s a m p l i n g error.)
T h e d a t a in the left panel of Figure 9 . 6 show p a t t e r n s of w a r s u p p o r t a m o n g
blacks in 1964 and 1966. T h e s e patterns generally r e s e m b l e those of w h i t e con-
s e r v a t i v e s , r a t h e r than w h i t e liberals, in Figure 9 . 4 ; there is, in other w o r d s , a
generally positive r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and support for the war, with
an increase in s u p p o r t b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966 that registers mainly a m o n g less-
a w a r e and m o d e r a t e l y aware persons. T h e j u m p i n w a r support p r e s u m a b l y re-
flects the increase in the intensity of p r o w a r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . C o n t r a r y to s o m e
a n a l y s e s , these d a t a offer no indication that blacks were initially reluctant to
1 7
s u p p o r t the V i e t n a m W a r .
After 1966, however, black attitudes toward the war begin to r e s e m b l e those
of w h i t e liberals, as can be seen from a c o m p a r i s o n of the right-hand side of
Figure 9 . 6 with trends a m o n g liberals in Figure 9 . 4 . That is, s u p p o r t for the war
declined significantly, especially a m o n g highly and m o d e r a t e l y informed b l a c k s ,
as a result of the g r a d u a l diffusion of the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e .
Nothing in t h e s e opinion d a t a c a n , by itself, explain why black attitudes to-
w a r d the w a r should r e s e m b l e those of w h i t e c o n s e r v a t i v e s until 1966 and those
17 There is a significant tendency for blacks to be less supportive of the war in both years, but it
disappears once a control for political awareness has been imposed. A close inspection of the
data further suggests that highly aware blacks were more supportive of the war than highly aware
white conservatives (or any other group) in both 1964 and 1966; at the same time, however, less
informed blacks were less supportive of the war than less informed white conservatives (or any
other group) in each year. These apparent racial differences, however, are unreliable because of
very small numbers of cases at the extremes of high and low information.
Two-sided information flows 207
of w h i t e liberals after that t i m e . T h e r e s e e m s , n o n e t h e l e s s , to be an o b v i o u s ex-
planation: T h e V i e t n a m W a r w a s led by President L y n d o n J o h n s o n , w h o in 1964
and 1965 w o n congressional approval for t w o historic civil rights bills and w h o
launched the a m b i t i o u s W a r on Poverty p r o g r a m . In light of t h i s , m e m b e r s of the
black public were likely to attach greater credibility to J o h n s o n ' s s t a t e m e n t s on
the w a r than w e r e o t h e r types of persons. By 1968, however, J o h n s o n ' s civil
rights a c h i e v e m e n t s w e r e well behind h i m and many m e m b e r s of the black civil
rights leadership g r o u p , including the recently assassinated M a r t i n L u t h e r K i n g ,
1 8
Jr., had c o m e out against the w a r . In this situation, blacks b e c a m e m o r e sus-
ceptible to the increasingly intense a n t i w a r m e s s a g e .
T h u s , blacks a p p e a r to have been as r e s p o n s i v e as whites to the flow of pro-
and a n t i w a r information on V i e t n a m , but blacks evaluated this information in
light of s o m e w h a t different leadership cues.
IMPLICATIONS
T h e results of this c h a p t e r have a d v a n c e d o u r understanding of the d y n a m i c s of
opinion c h a n g e in several respects. First, they p r o v i d e the first c l e a r e v i d e n c e of
c o u n t e r v a l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , m o s t strikingly in the period 1964 to 1966. T h e y show,
that is, that highly aware d o v e s w e r e able to resist t h e d o m i n a n t p r o w a r m e s s a g e
of this period in p a r t b e c a u s e they w e r e e x p o s e d to the c o u n t e r v a l e n t a n t i w a r
m e s s a g e . T h i s m e s s a g e , t h o u g h less intense than the p r o w a r m e s s a g e in the
early stage of the war, not only neutralized the p r o w a r m e s s a g e , but actually
induced s o m e of the m o s t a w a r e doves to b u c k t h e national trend by b e c o m i n g
less s u p p o r t i v e of the war.
T h e reason that the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are so clear in
the c a s e of V i e t n a m is that the c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e w a s b e c o m i n g m o r e in-
tense at a t i m e w h e n the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e w a s also b e c o m i n g m o r e i n t e n s e , so
that each m e s s a g e c o u l d p r o d u c e c o n v e r t s in a different part of the public. This
pattern of i n f o r m a t i o n flows is probably unusual (though see Figure 10.5). But
it is likely that there are m a n y other cases in w h i c h c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a -
t i o n s , t h o u g h not quite strong e n o u g h to p r o d u c e m o v e m e n t s against a p r e d o m -
inant national trend, are n o n e t h e l e s s i m p o r t a n t in inducing resistance to such a
trend. We shall see further clear e v i d e n c e of the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n s in the next chapter.
S e c o n d , t h e s e results e n a b l e us to see that attitude c h a n g e in r e s p o n s e to a
two-sided m e s s a g e can take different forms at different points in t i m e , d e p e n d -
ing on the relative intensities of the o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s and the prior distribution
of o p i n i o n . We see also that s o m e of t h e s e p a t t e r n s do not m a t c h those devel-
o p e d in the typology p r o p o s e d in C h a p t e r 8, a typology that w a s c o n s t r u c t e d
18 Johnson's approval ratings fell more rapidly among blacks than among whites in the period from
1966 to mid-1968, but then rebounded at the time of the election. (See Dawson, Brown, and
Cohen, n.d.)
208 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
100
Percent 75
decline in
support for
Vietnam War, ^ fectly through the p u b l i c , such that only the m o s t a w a r e m e m b e r s of the public
1968 to 1970
25
0 i n c o r p o r a t e d into t h e liberal belief p a c k a g e , w h e r e liberalism itself is o p e r a t i o n -
Political awareness
Figure 9.7. Changes in support for the Vietnam War, 1968-1970. Figure shows percent-
age of persons supporting the war in 1968 who no longer supported it in 1970. These
estimates are derived from the support scores shown in Figure 9.4. Source: 1968 and
1970 CPS surveys.
u n d e r the a s s u m p t i o n that opinion c h a n g e is a response to a o n e - s i d e d informa-
tion flow.
W h a t , t h e n , do we m a k e of the typology in C h a p t e r 8? A l t h o u g h I cannot say
precisely, my s i m u l a t i o n s of attitude c h a n g e with E q u a t i o n 9 . 8 , along with the
empirical results r e p o r t e d in C h a p t e r 8, suggest that the typology is, despite its
focus on one-sided information f l o w s , a g o o d a p p r o x i m a t i o n to a w i d e r variety
of c a s e s . T h e typology a p p e a r s to be an especially g o o d a p p r o x i m a t i o n to the
patterns of c h a n g e that m a y be expected w h e n one of the o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s
r e m a i n s equally intense or loses intensity over t i m e , while the other m e s s a g e
gains in intensity. T h i s pattern of c h a n g e s in a two-sided information flow is
perhaps the most c o m m o n form of s t i m u l u s to m a s s attitude c h a n g e ; in fact,
all cases of m a s s attitude c h a n g e of which I am a w a r e , except the 1964 to
1966 period of the V i e t n a m War, a p p e a r to have been produced by this type of
stimulus. For e x a m p l e , late in the V i e t n a m War, w h e n the p r o w a r m e s s a g e
w a s roughly stable or losing intensity and the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e w a s gaining in
intensity (see Figure 9 . 3 ) , the typology provides an a p p r o x i m a t i o n of the
patterns of attitude c h a n g e that actually o c c u r r e d , as can be seen in Figure
9.7.
N o n e t h e l e s s , it r e m a i n s t h e c a s e that the p a t t e r n s depicted in the t y p o l o g y in
C h a p t e r 8 strictly hold only under c o n d i t i o n s of a one-sided c o m m u n i c a t i o n
flow. T h e s e c o n d i t i o n s w o u l d s e e m most likely to hold w h e n the period b e t w e e n
attitude m e a s u r e m e n t s is s h o r t , and w h e n the gain in the relative intensity of o n e
of the m e s s a g e s is large.
T h i r d , the results presented in this chapter, along with the discussion of age
effects on the V i e t n a m issue, constitute an unusually detailed account of h o w
m a s s belief s y s t e m s form and c h a n g e o v e r t i m e in response to a c o m p l e x
Two-sided information flows 209
stimulus. T h e leading theoretical account of this general p h e n o m e n o n has long
been C o n v e r s e ' s " T h e nature o f belief s y s t e m s i n m a s s p u b l i c s " ( 1 9 6 4 ) . His
a r g u m e n t , it will be recalled, w a s that c e r t a i n " c r e a t i v e e l i t e s " manufacture
w i d e - r a n g i n g belief s y s t e m s - which is to say, clusters of attitudes that are
w i d e l y perceived as " g o i n g t o g e t h e r . " T h e s e belief s y s t e m s then diffuse imper-
m a n a g e to fully absorb t h e m .
T h e a r g u m e n t of this c h a p t e r has filled in i m p o r t a n t details of this general
a r g u m e n t a n d , in so d o i n g , has s o m e w h a t altered it. It has d o c u m e n t e d , first of
all, how a new e l e m e n t - an a n t i w a r posture on V i e t n a m - b e c a m e gradually
ally m e a s u r e d as general tendencies toward h a w k i s h n e s s or dovishness. (The
s a m e patterns of attitude c h a n g e arise m o r e s h a r p l y if a direct m e a s u r e of ide-
ology - scores for liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on 100-point feeling t h e r m o m e -
ters - are substituted for the h a w k - d o v e i n s t r u m e n t that I u s e d . ) T h e story of
this i n c o r p o r a t i o n is largely in the spirit of C o n v e r s e ' s analysis: T h e m o s t p o -
litically attuned liberals w e r e the first to adopt the new belief e l e m e n t , while
highly aware c o n s e r v a t i v e s t e n d e d , in g e n e r a l , to resist it.
T h e r e a r e , however, s o m e u n e x p e c t e d turns. I n C o n v e r s e ' s theory, ideology
o p e r a t e s as a " c o n s t r a i n t " on the o r g a n i z a t i o n of o n e ' s attitudes. T h u s , if o n e is
a liberal, one is e x p e c t e d to e m b r a c e all of the e l e m e n t s of the liberal belief
p a c k a g e . T h a t a r g u m e n t d o e s not, however, readily apply to the highly a w a r e ,
older liberals w h o c o n t i n u e d to resist t h e a n t i w a r e l e m e n t of the liberal belief
p a c k a g e as late as 1970. As they p r e s u m a b l y saw it, the constraints of liberal
ideology cut the o t h e r way - toward support of t h e V i e t n a m W a r as a n o t h e r c a s e
of p o s t - W o r l d W a r II liberal i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s m . S u c h lags in a d o p t i n g policies to
which individuals are p r e s u m a b l y predisposed by their general philosophy rep-
resent an interesting and heretofore u n g l i m p s e d aspect of the notion of ideolog-
ical constraint in a d y n a m i c setting.
A n o t h e r u n e x p e c t e d turn is the back-and-forth m o v e m e n t of m o d e r a t e l y
aware and less a w a r e liberals. T h e liberals w h o m o v e d in a p r o w a r direction be-
tween 1964 and 1966 m a y have t h o u g h t , if they stopped to reflect on it, that they
were m o v i n g in a liberal direction. After all, internationalism had been a c o r e
e l e m e n t of t h e liberal belief p a c k a g e for s o m e thirty y e a r s , and the principal ad-
vocate of t h e p r o w a r policy w a s t h e liberal D e m o c r a t i c president, L y n d o n
J o h n s o n . Yet, if, as s e e m s most r e a s o n a b l e , ideology is defined by t h e prefer-
e n c e s of its avant g a r d e elites, this is a n o t h e r c a s e in w h i c h persons w e r e " c o n -
s t r a i n e d " by w h a t they t o o k to be liberalism to adopt a policy attitude that w a s ,
for its t i m e , rapidly b e c o m i n g a litmus test of c o n s e r v a t i v e values.
T h e analysis of c h a n g i n g attitudes on t h e V i e t n a m W a r t h u s affords a rare
o p p o r t u n i t y - rare b e c a u s e the direction of elite cues on m o s t issues is stable
from year to year - to o b s e r v e the evolution of m a s s ideologies. A l t h o u g h this
19 For other treatments of the evolution of mass belief systems, see Miller and Levitan, 1976; Car-
mines and Stimson, 1989; and Hurwitz and Peffley, in press.
210 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
1964 1966 1970
0 1 , 1 , J ,
Political awareness
Figure 9.8. Partisan polarization on the Vietnam War. Estimates are a rearrangement of
the data appearing in Figure 9.4. Source: 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970 CPS surveys.
c a s e has involved foreign policy a t t i t u d e s , it is likely that ideological cues on
other issues s o m e t i m e s u n d e r g o similar c h a n g e s i n " w h a t g o e s with w h a t , " and
that w h e n they d o , they p r o d u c e similar c h a n g e s in the pattern of m a s s attitudes.
T h e r e a r e , it should be a d d e d , no c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between my analysis of the
V i e t n a m c a s e and the general theory outlined by C o n v e r s e . V i e t n a m has simply
provided e x a m p l e s of how, in a d y n a m i c situation, various types of lags may
lead to u n e x p e c t e d forms of ideological constraint.
Finally, and most importantly, the results of this chapter provide credible ev-
idence for a very strong claim: that public attitudes toward major issues are a
r e s p o n s e to the relative intensity of c o m p e t i n g political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on
those issues. W h e n elites unite on a m a i n s t r e a m issue, the p u b l i c ' s r e s p o n s e is
relatively n o n i d e o l o g i c a l , with the most a w a r e m e m b e r s of the public reflecting
the elite c o n s e n s u s m o s t strongly. W h e n elites c o m e to disagree along p a r t i s a n
or ideological lines, the p u b l i c ' s response will b e c o m e ideological as w e l l , with
the most politically aware m e m b e r s of the public responding most ideologically.
T h e degree of m a s s ideological p o l a r i z a t i o n on an issue reflects the relative in-
tensity of the o p p o s i n g information flows. T h u s , w h e n , in the c a s e of the Viet-
n a m W a r in 1966, the c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e w a s m u c h m o r e intense than the
liberal, the d e g r e e of p o l a r i z a t i o n w a s b o t h m o d e s t and skewed in the direction
of the c o n s e r v a t i v e position; as the o p p o s i n g information flows b e c a m e more
nearly b a l a n c e d , overall s u p p o r t for t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e position fell and ideolog-
ical p o l a r i z a t i o n b e c a m e m o r e intense. T h e s e points are highlighted in Figure
2 0
9 . 8 , which is a reorganization of d a t a presented earlier in Figure 9 . 4 . (Polar-
ization is s h a r p e r if the ideology t h e r m o m e t e r s rather than an instrument are used
to m e a s u r e p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s ; see Zaller, 1 9 9 1 , figure 8.
20 It is interesting that even though the model estimates the antiwar message to have been more
intense than the prowar message in 1970, it also indicates that public support for the war was
greater in that year than opposition. This is possible because the model also maintains that there
was more resistance to the antiwar message, at comparable levels of reception, than to the pro-
war message; this difference is captured in the intercept difference in the acceptance functions of
the two messages, as shown in Table 9.1.
Two-sided information flows 211
A l t h o u g h the t w o - m e s s a g e model used in this chapter has m a d e " c o n s i d e r -
a t i o n s , " defined as discrete reasons for favoring or o p p o s i n g an idea, its p r i m -
itive unit of analysis, no m e a s u r e m e n t s of public opinion on V i e t n a m were m a d e
at the level of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . As a result, I have been unable to provide direct
evidence that the d y n a m i c s of the model hold at the intrapsychic level at which
people either internalize or fail to internalize p a r t i c u l a r m e s s a g e s they e n c o u n -
ter. T h e next c h a p t e r fills out this part of the a r g u m e n t by s h o w i n g how the rel-
ative intensity of o p p o s i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows d e t e r m i n e s the formation of
new c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , which in turn d e t e r m i n e s the s u m m a r y preference state-
ments people m a k e .
APPENDIX A: AN A L T E R N A T I V E FORM OF T W O - M E S S A G E
MODEL
In this a p p e n d i x , I d e r i v e an alternative form of t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l . T h e alter-
native omits any reference to c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , but is o t h e r w i s e similar to the
model d e v e l o p e d in the text.
Let us a s s u m e a political w o r l d in w h i c h , within every t i m e period t and with
respect to every political issue, citizens are presented with t w o information
f l o w s , or " m e s s a g e s , " o n e tending to push m a s s opinion in a liberal direction
and the other in a c o n s e r v a t i v e direction. T h e t w o m e s s a g e s represent t h e s u m
of all directionally valenced c o m m u n i c a t i o n s relating to a given issue in the
period.
T h e following t h r e e - a x i o m model shows how, in such a w o r l d , t e m p o r a l vari-
ations in the intensities of the liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e s can explain
both the cross-sectional distribution of m a s s opinion at any o n e t i m e and
c h a n g e s in opinion over t i m e .
1. RECEPTION AXIOM. An individual's probabilities of receiving the liberal and con-
servative messages within any given time period t are independent, increasing functions
of general level of political awareness.
T h e m a t h e m a t i c a l form of this a x i o m is E q u a t i o n 9.\b.
2. ACCEPTANCE AXIOM. The probability that an individual will resist - that is, refuse
to accept - a message, given reception of it, increases with (I) distance between the val-
ues of the individual and the value coloration of the message, and (2) the likelihood that
individuals will be aware of the elite-supplied "contextual information" that gives mes-
sages their colorations.
T h e form of this a x i o m is given by E q u a t i o n 9 . 2 .
Before stating the third a x i o m , I define " s u p p o r t i n g m e s s a g e s " as those con-
sistent with an existing opinion and " o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e s " as those that are in-
consistent. T h e final a x i o m can now be stated:
3. CHANGE AXIOM. Two types of opinion change, conversion and decay, may occur:
A. When a person accepts an opposing message (having received it) and does not ac-
cept a supporting message (whether receiving it or not), the person converts to the op-
posing view.
 212 NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION Two-sided information flows 213
B. If a person accepts no messages in a given period, or accepts both a supporting
is a p r o p o r t i o n raised to an infinite power, g o e s to z e r o . T h i s leaves
message and an opposing one, the person's initial opinion decays toward "no opinion"
with a fixed probability of d. 1 - X N

Lib(,+/v) - P^L j _ %
We can use these a x i o m s to write an expression for the probability that, fol-
lowing s o m e t i m e p e r i o d , an individual w h o initially holds a liberal opinion or
(9.13)
no opinion will c h a n g e to a c o n s e r v a t i v e o p i n i o n . F r o m a x i o m s 1 t h r o u g h 3 A , + P^ L + d - d(P^c + P-
that probability m u s t be
T h u s , opinion at any point in t i m e represents an equilibrium o u t c o m e that is
=
Pt->c n[ Probability that an individual will switch independent of s t a r t i n g values. This equilibrium d e p e n d s , at the a g g r e g a t e level,
to a c o n s e r v a t i v e opinion following t i m e p e r i o d / on the intensities of t h e c o m p e t i n g information f l o w s , a n d , at the individual
= [RE {\ ia - *E ,)]Acceptjc,
/t + RE RE
iCl iLl level, on p e o p l e ' s attention to politics and their values. O p i n i o n c h a n g e in re-
[Accept, ,(l - Accept^,)] c (9.9) sponse to persuasive i n f o r m a t i o n , a central topic of my a n a l y s i s , can be captured
as a difference over t i m e b e t w e e n equilibrium p o i n t s , w h e r e c h a n g i n g equilibria
T h e first t e r m on the right-hand side is the probability that the individual will
d e p e n d on c h a n g e in t h e c o m p e t i n g information flows.
receive only a c o n s e r v a t i v e m e s s a g e - RE (\ - RE ) - t i m e s the probability iCt iLl

T h i s m o d e l h a s been used (Zaller, 1991) to e s t i m a t e the effect of ideology and

that the person will accept it, having been e x p o s e d , A c c e p t , , . T h e s e c o n d t e r m c

awareness on s u p p o r t for the V i e t n a m War, p r o d u c i n g results that are highly

is t h e probability that the individual will receive both m e s s a g e s - RE RE - iCl iU

similar to those r e p o r t e d in this chapter. T h e m a i n difference is that this model

but accept only the c o n s e r v a t i v e o n e - A c c e p t , , ( l - A c c e p t , , ) . T h e t e r m P ^ c x u + I

does less well in e s t i m a t i n g t h e intensities of the a n t i w a r and p r o w a r m e s s a g e s

can be similarly defined.
to w h i c h the public w a s e x p o s e d , in the sense that its e s t i m a t e s c o r r e s p o n d less
O n e can also w r i t e out the probability that the response of an individual ini-
well with the story c o u n t s s h o w n in Figure 9 . 1 . See footnote 12.
tially holding an o p i n i o n will decay to no o p i n i o n . T h a t probability is d t i m e s the
probability of either a c c e p t i n g no m e s s a g e s or accepting both a s u p p o r t i n g and
o p p o s i n g m e s s a g e , as follows: APPENDIX B: MEASUREMENT OF HAWK-DOVE ATTITUDES

^Non, + l = d[(l - RE t)(\

iC - RE ) iU + RE (\
iCt - RE ) iLl
F r a n k l i n ' s instrumental variables t e c h n i q u e p r o v i d e s " a m e t h o d o f e s t i m a t i n g
(1 - Accept ,) (C + RE (\ iU - RE ){\
ia - Accept,^) relationships b e t w e e n v a r i a b l e s not m e a s u r e d in the s a m e d a t a s e t " (1989:
+ /v^c/ff^Accept/oAccepti.,] p. 2 3 ) . T h e m e t h o d is as follows: O n e h a s a m e a s u r e of variable X in dataset A
= 41 " - P^ J (9.10) but not dataset B; h o w e v e r the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e of interest, v a r i a b l e Y, is in
U

dataset B. O n e then locates a set of auxiliary variables c a r r i e d in both datasets.

At s o m e initial m o m e n t , e v e r y o n e h a s a fixed probability of h o l d i n g a liberal T h e X variable is regressed on these auxiliary variables in dataset A, an instru-
or c o n s e r v a t i v e opinion or no opinion. Let us call these probabilities L i b , (() ment for X is built from t h e resulting coefficient e s t i m a t e s , and this instrument
Con,,) and N o n . T h e probability that s o m e o n e initially h o l d i n g a liberal opin-
( ; ) is used in dataset B as an independent predictor of variable Y. In t h e present
ion will still hold a liberal opinion at t i m e t + 1 is then c a s e , the X variable is a m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e attitudes, as m e a s u r e d in the
1988 National E l e c t i o n S t u d y ; the Y v a r i a b l e is opinion toward the V i e t n a m
Lib ( r + |) = Lib ( / ) - [P^ Lib c ( / ) ] - [P^ N o n Lib ,)] (

War, as m e a s u r e d in the C P S surveys of 1964 to 1970. Provided a p p r o p r i a t e as-

+ [^(Con w + Non )] ( ; ) (9.11)
s u m p t i o n s are m e t , F r a n k l i n ' s t e c h n i q u e m a k e s it possible to build an instru-
A parallel expression c a n , of c o u r s e , be written for c o n s e r v a t i v e opinion at t+1. mental m e a s u r e of h a w k - d o v e attitudes in t h e C P S datasets from information
W i t h s o m e algebraic m a n i p u l a t i o n , E q u a t i o n 9.11 can be rewritten as a dif- contained in the 1988 N E S .
ference e q u a t i o n that gives the probability of a liberal opinion after N t i m e pe- T h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t of these a s s u m p t i o n s are that both datasets be s a m p l e s of
r i o d s , as follows: the s a m e p o p u l a t i o n , and that relationships b e t w e e n the auxiliary v a r i a b l e s and
1 - X N the X variable be t h e s a m e in both datasets. T h e latter a s s u m p t i o n is obviously
Ub (t+N) = L i b ^ + P^ L{ _ x (9.12) the m o r e w o r r i s o m e , since the datasets w e r e created eighteen to twenty-four
years a p a r t . N o n e t h e l e s s , it is not implausible to believe that t h e types of persons
where X = 1 - P^ c - P_ L - d + d(P^ c + P^ ) L m o s t likely to be d o v e s in 1988, such as f e m a l e s , atheists, and civil rights lib-
O n e m a y c o n c e p t u a l i z e t i m e as consisting of an infinitude of arbitrarily tiny e r a l s , were likely to be d o v e s in t h e 1960s as w e l l , provided they w e r e given
N
t i m e units. If s o , N is infinity, in which c a s e the t e r m X in E q u a t i o n 9 . 1 2 , which a p p r o p r i a t e l e a d e r s h i p cues. A n d , in fact, all of these variables are c o r r e l a t e d
 214 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Two-sided information flows 215

sociated with less h a w k i s h n e s s in 1988 but greater support for t h e V i e t n a m War,

Table 9.2. First stage regression estimates for especially in the e a r l y p h a s e of the war. T h i s reversal is best explained by M u e l -
hawk-dove instrument l e r ' s (1973) o b s e r v a t i o n that better e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s , t h o u g h not dispositionally
h a w k i s h , are m o r e susceptible to elite opinion leadership, since they are m o r e
heavily e x p o s e d to w h a t elites are saying. A n d a g a i n , this d o e s not s e e m to rep-
Coefficient T-ratio
Agnostic or atheist 0.40 4.04 resent a c h a n g e in t h e last twenty y e a r s , since e d u c a t i o n w a s positively associ-
Catholic 0.15 2.51 ated with s u p p o r t for m a i n s t r e a m policy in the n a t i o n ' s m o s t recent w a r even
Fundamentalist 12
-0.18 2.54 t h o u g h it w a s negatively a s s o c i a t e d with h a w k i s h n e s s , as m e a s u r e d by the N E S
2 2

Jehovah's Witness 0.98 1.05 in 1 9 8 8 . But even t h o u g h no sign c h a n g e s a p p e a r to have o c c u r r e d over t i m e ,

Jew the " w r o n g - w a y " c o r r e l a t i o n s of age and e d u c a t i o n with h a w k i s h n e s s indicate
0.55 2.99
Pacifistic religion* that they should not be used in building an instrumental m e a s u r e that is intended
0.43 1.53
Church attendance c
0.08 to m e a s u r e predispositions to s u p p o r t t h e V i e t n a m War.
3.57
Too slow on civil rights (V845) rf
0.50 6.01 T h e O L S coefficients used i n building t h e h a w k - d o v e i n s t r u m e n t , along with
Too fast on civil rights -0.38 6.75 information c o n c e r n i n g the auxiliary v a r i a b l e s , are shown in Table 9 . 2 .
Border state -0.01 .16 22 Ibid.
Southern state -0.13 1.91
Union member -0.11 1.68
N 1441
2
Adjusted r .14

Note: Dependent variable consists of five items,

combined by principal components analysis into a scale:
Strong military or bargain for peace (V966); importance
of strong military (V967); United States stay most
powerful (V972); Communist takeovers always threat
(V973); United States must stop communism (V974).
High scores indicate dovish responses.
"Codes 130 to 149, and 152 on V527.
*Codes 153, 155, and 156 on V527.
<V530, range 1-4.
d It was necessary to subsitute Aid to Minorities,
appropriately recoded, in construction of the Form II
instrument of the 1970 CPS study.
Source: 1988 NES survey.

with opinions toward the V i e t n a m W a r in the expected directions. H e n c e , de-

spite s o m e c o n c e r n , it is r e a s o n a b l e to a s s u m e that the c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to
apply the Franklin t e c h n i q u e have been m e t .
Two variables require c o m m e n t , however. First, age is associated with greater
h a w k i s h n e s s in 1988, as m e a s u r e d by general h a w k - d o v e items of the type
shown in the text, but less support for the V i e t n a m W a r in the 1960s. T h i s does
not, however, a p p e a r to represent c h a n g e over t i m e , since older p e r s o n s , t h o u g h
p r e s u m a b l y still t e n d i n g to be hawkish in 1991, were also less likely to support
21
U . S . military involvement in the Persian G u l f c r i s i s . S e c o n d , e d u c a t i o n i s ' a s -

21 New York Times, December 14, 1990, p. A8.


10
Information flow and electoral choice
E l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n s are a t t e m p t s by c o m p e t i n g p a r t i s a n elites to reach citizens
with political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and p e r s u a d e t h e m to a point of view. In this e s -
sential respect, election c a m p a i g n s r e s e m b l e the o n g o i n g c a m p a i g n s to shape
public opinion that we have examined in previous chapters. O n e may therefore
suspect that the d y n a m i c s of contested e l e c t i o n s are m u c h like those we have
already seen. O n e m a y s u s p e c t , that is, that citizens vary in their susceptibility
to influence a c c o r d i n g to their general levels of political awareness and their pre-
dispositions to accept the c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s they r e c e i v e .
T h e aim of this c h a p t e r is to test this suspicion. I will e x a m i n e four types of
contested e l e c t i o n s : e l e c t i o n s for the H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s and U . S . S e n a t e ,
general presidential e l e c t i o n s , and presidential p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n s . In so d o i n g , I
will try to shed light afresh on the q u e s t i o n of how citizens c h o o s e their elected
representatives. No a t t e m p t will be m a d e , however, to develop a c o m p r e h e n s i v e
account of electoral b e h a v i o r in these four types of elections. Rather, my pri-
m a r y effort will be to use s y s t e m a t i c differences that exist a m o n g t h e m to in-
crease u n d e r s t a n d i n g of how, in g e n e r a l , m a s s attitudes form and c h a n g e in
r e s p o n s e to c o m p e t i n g flows of political i n f o r m a t i o n . Capitalizing on t h e fact
that most congressional c a m p a i g n s are d o m i n a t e d by incumbent officeholders, I
shall be especially interested in the p r o c e s s by which citizens resist d o m i n a n t
campaign messages.
T h e great a d v a n t a g e of electoral a t t i t u d e s , for the p u r p o s e s of this b o o k , is
that m o r e resources have been devoted to studying t h e m than to any o t h e r kind
of political attitude. In c o n s e q u e n c e , there exist datasets with strong m e a s u r e s of
all of t h e key v a r i a b l e s in the R A S m o d e l - i n c l u d i n g , most importantly, the
" c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " that underlie p e o p l e ' s opinion s t a t e m e n t s , w h i c h in this case
are r e p o r t s of vote decisions. T h e r e is also w i d e and readily m e a s u r a b l e vari-
ability in the relative intensity of the c o m p e t i n g m e s s a g e s (the political c a m -
paigns) to which p e o p l e are exposed.
O n e of the richest of the election d a t a s e t s , from the p e r s p e c t i v e of d a t a needs
of the R A S m o d e l , is the 1978 N E S congressional election study. T h e study car-
ries identical individual-level m e a s u r e s of a w a r e n e s s , ideology, and attitudes to-
w a r d c a n d i d a t e s across seventy-seven w i d e l y different contested e l e c t i o n s .
T h u s , w h e r e a s in the c a s e of attitudes toward the V i e t n a m W a r we had j u s t four
Information flow and electoral choice 217
s u r v e y s in w h i c h to o b s e r v e the effects of c o m p e t i n g m e s s a g e s of differing in-
1
tensity, here we h a v e , in effect, s e v e n t y - s e v e n .
T h e availability of such strong d a t a will e n a b l e us to u n d e r t a k e a relatively full
e x a m i n a t i o n of h o w t h e basic resistance m e c h a n i s m s of t h e R A S m o d e l , e s p e -
cially inertial and c o u n t e r v a l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , o p e r a t e in a d y n a m i c setting. In ad-
d i t i o n , we will e n c o u n t e r further instances of differential information flow, that
i s , cases in w h i c h c o m p e t i n g m e s s a g e s g e n e r a t e cross-cutting opinion formation
in different s e g m e n t s of the p u b l i c , d e p e n d i n g on levels of attentiveness and the
relative intensities of the t w o m e s s a g e s . T h e o u t c o m e of these analyses will be
a m u c h clearer picture of how c o m p l e x information flows affect the f o r m a t i o n of
citizen preferences.
B e c a u s e t h e largest single p a r t of this c h a p t e r is devoted to exploiting
the H o u s e e l e c t i o n d a t a , I begin with a brief review of c u r r e n t research on
House elections.
I N E R T I A L RESISTANCE T O I N C U M B E N T - D O M I N A T E D
HOUSE CAMPAIGNS
A central research p r o b l e m in congressional e l e c t i o n s in recent years h a s been
the d y n a m i c s of i n c u m b e n t a d v a n t a g e . S i n c e D a v i d M a y h e w raised the puzzle of
the " v a n i s h i n g m a r g i n a l s " in a famous 1974 paper, scholars have t u r n e d out a
torrent of papers a t t e m p t i n g to explain w h y politically marginal districts - that
is, districts c a r r i e d by t h e winning p a r t y by a m a r g i n of five points or less -
have tended to d i s a p p e a r over the past t w o d e c a d e s . M u c h of this research has
focused on the i n c u m b e n t ' s skill in c o n s t i t u e n c y service and i m a g e b u i l d i n g , by
w h i c h t h e m e m b e r c r e a t e s a " p e r s o n a l v o t e " that is significantly independent of
n o r m a l p a r t y a t t a c h m e n t s in the district ( E r i k s o n , 1971; F e n n o , 1978; F i o r i n a ,
1977;. M a n n , 1978; C a i n , Ferejohn, and F i o r i n a , 1987).
I n a s m u c h as H o u s e m e m b e r s m u s t reach and persuade m e m b e r s of an e l e c -
torate that vary in both attention to politics and p a r t i s a n p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , the
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l w o u l d s e e m ideally suited to studying t h e process
by w h i c h i n c u m b e n t s d e v e l o p their m a s s followings.
Let us begin with t h e reception of p r o i n c u m b e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . S o m e of the
self-promotional efforts of H o u s e m e m b e r s take the form of c a s e w o r k (for ex-
a m p l e , c h a s i n g after lost social security c h e c k s ) that will c o m e to the attention
of voters independently of their general political a w a r e n e s s . But m o s t of w h a t
H o u s e m e m b e r s do to publicize t h e m s e l v e s is likely to reach mainly p e o p l e w h o
are chronically attentive to politics. T h i s includes sending out newsletters (which
are m o r e likely to be read by the politically a w a r e ) , efforts to b r i n g particular-
istic benefits to t h e district ( w h i c h d e p e n d on n e w s p a p e r s and civic g r o u p s to get
the word o u t ) , c o l l e c t i n g political e n d o r s e m e n t s , and giving s p e e c h e s and at-
t e n d i n g rallies. W h e n , on t h e other h a n d , politically apathetic persons h a p p e n to
1 The NES study covered 108 districts, but my analysis focuses on the 77 in which an incumbent
House member sought reelection against an opponent from the other party.
 218 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
e n c o u n t e r information about their H o u s e m e m b e r , they may forget, ignore, or
o t h e r w i s e fail to react to w h a t they see; this, after all, is w h a t it m e a n s to be
politically a p a t h e t i c .
S o , meaningful e x p o s u r e to the activities of H o u s e m e m b e r s is likely to be
positively associated with habitual political a w a r e n e s s . A n d given that most
H o u s e e l e c t i o n s are low-key contests in which only the i n c u m b e n t m a n a g e s
to m o u n t a serious c a m p a i g n , most of w h a t politically a w a r e p e o p l e e n c o u n -
ter d u r i n g and b e t w e e n c a m p a i g n s will have a strong p r o i n c u m b e n t bias ( J a c o b -
s o n , 1991).
But this is only half the story. People w h o are politically aware m a y also be
better able to resist the appeals of a d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e , if they are
predisposed by p a r t y or ideology to do s o . T h i s is b e c a u s e , as we have seen,
such persons are likely to possess prior information that acts to dilute the effects
of n e w ideas. T h e y a r e m o r e likely to receive c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s (in this
c a s e , the c a m p a i g n information of the congressional challenger) and m o r e likely
to possess the contextual information n e c e s s a r y to recognize and reject outright
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that are inconsistent with their predispositions. In o t h e r w o r d s ,
m o r e aware persons are m o r e likely to exhibit inertial, c o u n t e r v a l e n t , and par-
tisan resistance to t h e b l a n d i s h m e n t s of t h e i n c u m b e n t H o u s e member.
If m o r e a w a r e p e r s o n s are m o r e heavily exposed to the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n of
t h e i n c u m b e n t , a n d also m o r e c a p a b l e of resisting its m e s s a g e s (given r e c e p -
t i o n ) , we might expect from the logic of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process to find
a n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and vote defection, such that
p e r s o n s w h o are moderately politically aware will be most likely to defect to t h e
i n c u m b e n t , thereby creating a " p e r s o n a l v o t e " for him or her.
As m a n y readers will recall, Philip C o n v e r s e found e v i d e n c e of such non-
monotonicity in his classic study of the 1952 presidential e l e c t i o n , " I n f o r m a t i o n
flow a n d the stability of p a r t i s a n a t t i t u d e s " ( 1 9 6 2 ) . He explained it in t h e s e now-
familiar t e r m s : Highly aware persons are heavily exposed to the p e r s u a s i v e ap-
peals of the c a m p a i g n , but, o w i n g to the strength of their preexisting attitudes,
they are difficult to influence. At t h e s a m e t i m e , p e r s o n s w h o pay little attention
to politics are also relatively stable - not b e c a u s e they have strong p a r t i s a n c o m -
m i t m e n t s , but b e c a u s e they pay so little attention to politics that they rarely en-
c o u n t e r c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that can c h a n g e their preferences. Finally, m o d e r a t e l y
aware people pay e n o u g h attention to politics to be exposed to p a r t i s a n c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n s but are not sufficiently c o m m i t t e d to their initial preferences to
be i m m u n e to c o n v e r s i o n . H e n c e this g r o u p t e n d s to be the most volatile of
the three.
C o n v e r s e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n for why politically aware persons might be m o r e
difficult to p e r s u a d e , despite their high levels of exposure to the c a m p a i g n , is
also familiar:
the highly informed voter operates with a large storage of political lore, and the unin-
formed voter is characterized by poor retention of past political information. Our re-
peated observations of the staggering differences in information level in the electorate,
Information flow and electoral choice 219
then, are observations of the great differences in this " m a s s " from voter to voter. And
the probability that any given voter will be sufficiently deflected in his partisan momen-
tum to cross party lines in a specified election . . . varies inversely as a function of the
mass of stored information about politics, (pp. 140-1, emphasis in the original)
If, as s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e , o n e substitutes the p h r a s e " p r e e x i s t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s "
for " m a s s of stored i n f o r m a t i o n , " C o n v e r s e ' s e x p l a n a t i o n for a w a r e n e s s -
induced resistance to persuasion c o r r e s p o n d s almost exactly to my notion of in-
ertial resistance. C o n v e r s e m a k e s no reference, however, to c o n c e p t s r e s e m b l i n g
my notions of countervalent or partisan resistance.
In his " I n f o r m a t i o n f l o w " a r t i c l e , C o n v e r s e looked briefly at data from the
1958 H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , but he turned up no e v i d e n c e of a n o n m o n o t o n i c pattern
of p a r t i s a n instability. C o n v e r s e ' s quite plausible explanation w a s that n e w s
about congressional e l e c t i o n s w a s so " e x t r e m e l y w e a k " that it went " u n h e e d e d
by all but t h e most avid readers of political n e w s " (p. 143). H e n c e defection
rates in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s were very low, and such defection as did o c c u r was
c o n c e n t r a t e d a m o n g the m o r e politically a w a r e voters.
But C o n v e r s e ' s analysis w a s based on c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s as they existed
three d e c a d e s a g o . H o u s e c a m p a i g n s have gained intensity in recent d e c a d e s ,
e n o u g h intensity p e r h a p s that they now reach voters w h o are only m o d e r a t e l y
attentive to politics. C e r t a i n l y t h e recent explosion of television a d v e r t i s i n g and
the a p p e a r a n c e of the new nonstop reelection c a m p a i g n s w o u l d justify t h e as-
s u m p t i o n that H o u s e c a m p a i g n s now reach a larger fraction of t h e e l e c t o r a t e
2
than they did in the 1 9 5 0 s . A n d if this is t r u e , it might turn out that p e o p l e of
m o d e r a t e political a w a r e n e s s are now m o r e susceptible to the appeals of con-
gressional c a m p a i g n s than a r e t h e most attentive voters.
A look back to C h a p t e r 8 will reveal that the difference b e t w e e n C o n v e r s e ' s
account of the 1958 H o u s e e l e c t i o n s and my expectations for the 1978 e l e c t i o n s
is perfectly captured by t h e difference b e t w e e n cell A and cell B in t h e typology
of attitude c h a n g e in Figure 8.2; cell A refers to the effects of low-intensity m e s -
s a g e s , w h e r e a s cell B refers to medium-intensity m e s s a g e s .
Let us t u r n , t h e n , to t h e d a t a to see w h e t h e r the basic r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e
dynamic holds in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s as in o t h e r political c o n t e x t s , a n d , if s o ,
whether, as C o n v e r s e t h o u g h t , " s t o r e d information about p o l i t i c s " plays a crit-
ical role in the g e n e r a t i o n of resistance to persuasion.
Defection patterns in House elections
In H o u s e e l e c t i o n s in which an i n c u m b e n t seeks r e e l e c t i o n , the i n c u m b e n t nor-
mally d o m i n a t e s the flow of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , with the result that al-
m o s t all defections a r e defections to the p a r t y of the i n c u m b e n t ( A b r a m o w i t z ,
2 Despite this, the ability of constituents to freely recall the name of their congressional represen-
tative has not changed since the 1950s (Nelson, 1978-9). Evidence of more intense campaign
activity is nonetheless abundant (Fiorina, 1977; Mann, 1978). It is possible, as Mann and Wolf-
inger (1980) suggest, that name recognition has increased even though recall has not.
 220 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
1980; J a c o b s o n , 1 9 9 1 ; especially at p. 115). T h e present a n a l y s i s , t h e n , will limit
itself to defections to the incumbent from m e m b e r s of the o p p o s i n g party.
T h e s e defecting " o u t p a r t i s a n s " hold c o n s i d e r a b l e political interest: T h e y are
precisely t h e voters w h o , by a b a n d o n i n g their n o r m a l party in o r d e r to s u p p o r t the
i n c u m b e n t , are most responsible for t h e " v a n i s h i n g m a r g i n a l s " and t h e rise of
the " p e r s o n a l v o t e . " T h e defectors also hold theoretical interest: T h e y have suc-
c u m b e d to the m e s s a g e of a d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n despite its inconsistency with their
political predispositions. O u r task is to find out w h y exactly they h a v e d o n e so.
My approach will be to model defection as the o u t c o m e of a s t a n d a r d
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , where the source of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n is
t h e d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n of t h e i n c u m b e n t . T h e m o d e l , t h u s , will take t h e fol-
lowing form:
- 1
Prob(Defection) = 1 — (1 + E x p [ a 0 + ^Awareness + . . . others])
- 1
x(l + Exp[-ft 0 ~ ft|Awareness. . . o t h e r s ] ) (10.1)
[adapted from E q u a t i o n (7.5)]
An attractive feature of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , from the point of v i e w of exercising
t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , is that t h e intensity of t h e d o m i n a n t i n c u m b e n t
c a m p a i g n varies m a r k e d l y from one district to another, and d o e s so in w a y s that
are readily m e a s u r e d by such variables as c a m p a i g n s p e n d i n g . T h e intensity of
t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n - w h i c h is to say, t h e intensity of t h e c o u n t e r v a l e n t
information flow - also varies in readily m e a s u r a b l e ways.
To capture the effects of fhis variation in information flow, I have included the
following variables in t h e t w o subfunctions of the model:
Reception function Acceptance function
Political awareness Political awareness
Intensity of media coverage Strength of party attachment
Incumbent's spending Inertia (preexisting considerations)
Challenger's spending Challenger's spending
Years in office (seniority)
Seniority x Challenger's spending
Each set of v a r i a b l e s requires c o m m e n t , b e g i n n i n g with t h e r e c e p t i o n vari-
ables. N o t e , first of all, that there is only o n e individual-level r e c e p t i o n v a r i a b l e ,
political awareness. T h e rest - m e d i a c o v e r a g e , i n c u m b e n t ' s s p e n d i n g , chal-
l e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g , a n d seniority - are aggregate-level variables i n t e n d e d to c a p -
ture the flow of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the political e n v i r o n m e n t . U s e of a logistic
function to model the reception process m e a n s that the a g g r e g a t e variables will
interact with individual differences in political awareness to d e t e r m i n e h o w
m u c h information different p e o p l e r e c e i v e .
To m e a s u r e the general intensity of m e d i a c o v e r a g e of a given r a c e , I begin
with responses to the following question:
How many newspaper articles did you read about the campaign for the U.S. House of
Representatives in your district - would you say you read a good many, several or just
one or two?
Information flow and electoral choice 221
T h e m e a n of r e s p o n s e s to this q u e s t i o n h a s been calculated for respondents in
each congressional district and purged of the effects of district-level variation
3
in political a w a r e n e s s . T h e s e purged m e a n s , which ranged from a low of 0 . 6
to a high of 1.9, c a n be u s e d as an aggregate-level m e a s u r e of the intensity of
media coverage.
Years in office has been included a m o n g the reception variables on the theory
that m o r e senior i n c u m b e n t s have had m o r e t i m e to get their m e s s a g e out to the
public via n e w s l e t t e r s , a p p e a r a n c e s , c a s e w o r k , and n e w s e v e n t s , a n d h e n c e will
be m o r e effective in a t t r a c t i n g defectors from the opposition party. Seniority,
t h u s , is intended as a proxy for the interelection c o m m u n i c a t i o n s by which in-
c u m b e n t s gradually build a personal following in their districts.
Seniority, it will t u r n o u t , h a s the effect e x p e c t e d , but only in lightly contested
races. In the most heavily contested r a c e s , long service in office s e e m s to hurt
rather than help t h e i n c u m b e n t . I sought to capture this cross-cutting effect by
4
including a t e r m for seniority t i m e s c h a l l e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g .
I turn n o w to t h e a c c e p t a n c e function. T h e m o s t interesting variable here is
inertia, by which I m e a n the m a s s of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that c a u s e voters to lean
toward their c h o s e n party, and that the i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n must o v e r c o m e if it
is to win t h e votes of p a r t i s a n s of t h e o p p o s i n g party.
T h r o u g h o u t my discussion of the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l , I have m a i n t a i n e d that
political a w a r e n e s s is a s s o c i a t e d with resistance to persuasion in p a r t b e c a u s e it
is a proxy for inertial resistance. In adding the inertia variable to the a c c e p t a n c e
function, I am a b l e , for t h e first t i m e , to m a k e a direct test for inertial resistance.
To m e a s u r e i n e r t i a , I u s e the standard N E S " l i k e s / d i s l i k e s " q u e s t i o n s about
the political p a r t i e s . T h e s e are o p e n - e n d e d p r o b e s in which voters are asked
w h a t they like and dislike about each party, as follows:
I'd like to ask you what you think are the good and bad points about the two national
parties. Is there anything in particular that you like about the Democratic [Republican]
party? What is that? Anything else? [Up to five responses were coded.]
Is there anything in particular that you don't like about the Democratic [Republican]
party? What is that? Anything else? [Up to five responses were coded.]
Inertia can then be m e a s u r e d as follows:
Inertia = + ^ ( O u t p a r t y likes) + ^ ( I n c u m b e n t p a r t y dislikes)
- ^ ( O u t p a r t y dislikes) - ^ ( I n c u m b e n t p a r t y likes)
3 If individuals in one district are, say, very well educated, the mean number of articles about the
House race that are reported for that district may be high even if there was only a light campaign.
These are the sorts of individual-level effects I have purged from the district-level means.
4 This term represents an ad hoc adaptation to the presence of a substantial antiincumbent infor-
mation flow in high-intensity races. Such adaptations are needed because Equation 10.1 is es-
sentially a one-message model. As the challenger campaign becomes more intense, Equation 10.1
becomes less capable of capturing what is going on in a theoretically coherent way. A two-
message model, along the lines of that proposed in Chapter 9, is needed here.
 222 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 223

B e c a u s e there are only 2 7 7 cases available for a n a l y s i s , n a m e l y t h e o u t p a r t i -

Table 10.1. Coefficients predicting vote for House incumbent
sans w h o voted in a race in which an i n c u m b e n t w a s o p p o s e d for r e e l e c t i o n ,
among outpartisans
m a n y of the coefficients in Table 10.1 lack statistical precision. N o n e t h e l e s s , all
Reception function of the individual-level variables achieve statistically significant coefficients,
Acceptance function
Intercept -1.71 thereby c o n f i r m i n g the basic applicability of t h e R A S m o d e l to this c a s e .
Intercept 3.39
Awareness 2.24 T h e significant n e g a t i v e coefficient on a w a r e n e s s in the a c c e p t a n c e function is
Awareness -1.01 5
(standardized) (1.20) (.41) especially n o t e w o r t h y . In the R A S m o d e l and especially in C o n v e r s e ' s " I n f o r -
Incumbent spending -0.11 Party strength -1.32 m a t i o n f l o w " m o d e l , political a w a r e n e s s is i m p o r t a n t as a resistance factor in
(in $10 thousands) (.09) (.48) part b e c a u s e it is a proxy for the stored m a s s of p r e c a m p a i g n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Challenger spending 0.28 Partisan inertia" / -0.22 W i t h preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c o n t r o l l e d , a s i n E q u a t i o n 1 0 . 1 , o n e m i g h t
(in $10 thousands) (.18) (.12) therefore have e x p e c t e d a w a r e n e s s to have little or no direct effect on resistance.
Media coverage 3.51 Challenger spending -0.05 T h e fact that a w a r e n e s s c o n t i n u e s to do so indicates that there is s o m e t h i n g
(range .59 - 1.9) (2.72) (.02)
Seniority about a w a r e n e s s , b e y o n d its effect as a proxy for preexisting or inertial c o n s i d -
2.84
(logged) (2.13) e r a t i o n s , that e n g e n d e r s resistance t o i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n s . T h e
Seniority X challenger -0.41 " s o m e t h i n g " will turn o u t , as my analysis unfolds, to be p a r t i s a n resistance and
N 277
spending (.26) especially c o u n t e r v a l e n t r e s i s t a n c e .
M e a n w h i l e , the effect of inertia, a l t h o u g h statistically significant, is only
Note: Model is Equation 10.1, estimated by maximum likelihood. Standard m o d e r a t e l y large. T h i s can be seen by c o m p a r i n g its effect to that of party.
errors are in parentheses. Dependent variable is vote for incumbent among Given i n e r t i a ' s coefficient of — . 2 2 , it takes a net score of 6 on inertia, which
outpartisans.
a
is a very high score on this v a r i a b l e , to equal the effect of strength of party
High scores run in direction of challenger party.
a t t a c h m e n t , w h i c h h a s a r a n g e of o n e unit and is applied against a coefficient
Source: 1978 NES sun ey.
of — 1 . 3 2 . O m i t t i n g inertia from the m o d e l leads to a 2 percent increase
in residual v a r i a t i o n , but omitting strength of party a t t a c h m e n t leads to a 4 per-
T h e higher an o u t p a r t i s a n ' s score on the inertia v a r i a b l e , t h e m o r e difficult it cent increase.
should b e , at a given level of exposure to an incumbent d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n , to It is n o t a b l e that only o n e of the aggregate-level m e a s u r e s of c a m p a i g n in-
deflect h e r or his vote to t h e p a r t y of t h e H o u s e i n c u m b e n t . tensity achieves a statistically significant coefficient. However, a block F-test on
T h e final v a r i a b l e in the a c c e p t a n c e function that requires c o m m e n t is chal- all six of the a g g r e g a t e m e a s u r e s indicates that their overall effect is statistically
l e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g . T h e idea h e r e is that o u t p a r t i s a n s will be less likely to accept significant ( F [ 6 , 2 6 5 ] , 2 . 6 2 , p < . 0 5 ) . 6

the i n c u m b e n t ' s m e s s a g e if they are being c o n c u r r e n t l y e x p o s e d to a strong
c a m p a i g n by a challenger. T h u s , the c h a l l e n g e r ' s spending v a r i a b l e in the a c -
c e p t a n c e function is an attempt to capture the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t informa-
tion.
Altogether, t h e n , E q u a t i o n 10.1 specifies a c o m p l e x interaction b e t w e e n
individual-level differences in propensities for reception and a c c e p t a n c e of c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n , a n d aggregate-level differences in t h e intensities of a d o m i n a n t and
countervalent c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow. As should be a p p a r e n t , however, E q u a t i o n
10.1 is not fully a t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l - it does not contain s e p a r a t e reception
and a c c e p t a n c e functions for each m e s s a g e , as did the m o d e l used for e s t i m a t i n g
V i e t n a m attitudes in C h a p t e r 9. But, like the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l p r o p o s e d in
C h a p t e r s 7 and 8, it does a t t e m p t , in the w a y s I have i n d i c a t e d , to c a p t u r e the
effects of a t w o - s i d e d information flow (see footnote 4 ) .
T h e coefficients o b t a i n e d from e s t i m a t i n g t h e m o d e l are s h o w n in Table 1 0 . 1 .
A l t h o u g h the interpretation of these coefficients requires, as u s u a l , a graphical
a n a l y s i s , s o m e information can be g l e a n e d from visual i n s p e c t i o n .
T h e most substantively interesting of t h e a g g r e g a t e variables is seniority,
which has a positive m a i n effect but a n e g a t i v e interaction with c h a l l e n g e r
s p e n d i n g . T h i s i n d i c a t e s , as suggested earlier, that seniority is helpful to i n c u m -
bents in low-intensity races but tends to be harmful in high-intensity ones.
B e c a u s e t h e apparently cross-cutting effects of seniority a r e b o t h statistically
marginal and not fully a n t i c i p a t e d , t h e c a u t i o u s reader m a y be inclined to dis-
c o u n t t h e m . However, a n F - t e s t o n the t w o seniority t e r m s indicates that their
joint effect is close to statistical significance (F[2, 2 6 5 ) , 2 . 9 6 , P < . 0 6 ) . T h e r e
5 In my earlier analysis of House elections (Zaller, 1989), awareness had a positive coefficient in
the acceptance function. This difference is due to a change in the form of the acceptance function,
as explained in footnote 14 of Chapter 7.
In another matter, I have discovered a typographical error in the statement of the reception func-
tion in the earlier paper (Zaller, 1989); the A coefficients in Equations 2 and 4 should have neg-
ative signs.
6 Owing to the probable endogeneity bias of the spending variables, there is no point in trying to
make a verbal interpretation of the individual coefficients. Rather, I will use graphical displays to
depict their effects as part of a block of variables capturing overall campaign intensity.
224 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

is also c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e for both the direct and interactive effects of se-

niority, as will be r e p o r t e d . I p r o p o s e , therefore, to accept the cross-cutting ef-
fects of seniority as p r o b a b l y real and to a t t e m p t over the course of the c h a p t e r
to explain h o w they have c o m e about.
I turn now to a graphical analysis of the implied effects of t h e coefficients in
7
Table 1 0 . 1 . T h i s analysis appears i n Figure 1 0 . 1 , which d e c o m p o s e s the pro-
cess of electoral persuasion into its three c o m p o n e n t parts. T h a t i s , it s h o w s es-
t i m a t e d rates of reception of defection-inducing c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s (left p a n e l ) ,
rates of a c c e p t a n c e of these m e s s a g e s a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s (center p a n e l ) , and
defection r a t e s to the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s (right p a n e l ) . T h e figure
shows these e s t i m a t e d r a t e s for three types of " c o n s t r u c t e d o u t p a r t i s a n s , " d e -
fined as follows: A strong p a r t i s a n identifies strongly with her p a r t y and has a
score of +3 on t h e inertia v a r i a b l e ; a disaffected partisan is a " n o t so s t r o n g "
or i n d e p e n d e n t - l e a n i n g p a r t y m e m b e r and has a score of —3 on inertia ( m o r e
dislikes of her p a r t y than likes); and finally, a m o d a l o u t p a r t i s a n h a s a score of
+ 0 . 7 on the inertia v a r i a b l e and a score of 1.30 on the party strength variable
( " s t r o n g " p a r t i s a n s w e r e scored a s 2 and " w e a k " and " l e a n i n g " p a r t i s a n s a s
1, so that 1.30 represents s o m e o n e falling b e t w e e n these p o s i t i o n s ) . T h e simu-
lations in the top panel of Figure 10.1 involve a race in w h i c h the H o u s e in-
c u m b e n t has j u s t t w o years of seniority; in the lower panel is a s i m u l a t i o n for a
race in which the i n c u m b e n t has c o m p l e t e d ten years in office. B o t h top and
b o t t o m panels involve a low-intensity r a c e , namely, o n e in w h i c h the i n c u m b e n t
s p e n d s $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 (in 1978 d o l l a r s ) , t h e c h a l l e n g e r m a k e s no s p e n d i n g r e p o r t , and
m e d i a c o v e r a g e is . 7 5 , w h i c h is near t h e b o t t o m of its r a n g e . A b o u t 10 percent
of all contested H o u s e e l e c t i o n s involve c a m p a i g n s of this t y p e .
For t h e sake of illustration, let us focus on a " s t r o n g p a r t i s a n " voter w h o
scores at the 50th percentile of habitual a w a r e n e s s . T h e top panel of t h e figure
s h o w s that, for a race with a o n e - t e r m i n c u m b e n t , this type of voter h a s a 72
percent c h a n c e of reception of a defection-inducing m e s s a g e , a 56 percent
c h a n c e of a c c e p t i n g it (given r e c e p t i o n ) , and therefore a .72 x . 5 6 = .40
c h a n c e of defecting to t h e i n c u m b e n t H o u s e m e m b e r . For a race with a five-term
i n c u m b e n t , the c h a n c e of reception of a defection-inducing m e s s a g e by the s a m e
type of voter rises to . 9 7 , w h i c h , all else e q u a l , drives e s t i m a t e d defection rates
up to 54 percent (.97 x .56 = .54).
W i t h the o r g a n i z a t i o n of Figure 10.1 n o w clear, we can turn to substantive
questions. Let us begin by looking m o r e closely at how seniority affects defec-
tions t o the i n c u m b e n t . A s noted earlier, H o u s e m e m b e r s c o n d u c t virtually non-
stop c a m p a i g n s for r e e l e c t i o n . This e n a b l e s t h e m , over t i m e , to reach even
voters w h o are relatively inattentive to politics. T h u s , as the t w o left-hand pan-
els in Figure 10.1 show, low to m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e voters are m u c h m o r e likely to
receive p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e s w h e n t h e i n c u m b e n t has been in office five
t e r m s rather than o n e t e r m . A typical voter of m o d e r a t e l y low a w a r e n e s s has a
7 In Figures 10.1, 10.2, and 10.6, political awareness has been manipulated over the range from
-1.88 to +1.8.
 226 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
roughly 25 percent c h a n c e of reception of a p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e if he h a p p e n s
to reside in the district of a o n e - t e r m H o u s e m e m b e r ; but this same voter, if re-
siding in the district of a five-term i n c u m b e n t , has a roughly 65 percent c h a n c e
of receiving such a m e s s a g e .
T h e s e seniority-induced differences in reception of p r o i n c u m b e n t c o m m u n i -
c a t i o n s lead to h i g h e r levels of defection by less aware voters to ten-year in-
c u m b e n t s , as seen in the right-hand panels. N o t e , however, seniority p r o d u c e s no
c o m p a r a b l e increase in defection rates a m o n g the most aware voters, w h o , as
the figure s h o w s , reach a saturation point for effective exposure after the i n c u m -
b e n t ' s first t e r m .
In a n o t h e r v e i n , n o t e that, in the center panels of Figure 1 0 . 1 , e s t i m a t e d ac-
c e p t a n c e rates d e c l i n e with both a w a r e n e s s and partisan o r i e n t a t i o n , which is
here m e a s u r e d by both strength of party a t t a c h m e n t and scores on the inertia
v a r i a b l e . This is a visual r e s t a t e m e n t of the earlier point that habitual a w a r e n e s s
contributes substantially to resistance even after controlling for p a r t i s a n "orien-
tation. W i t h o u t this independent a c c e p t a n c e effect of a w a r e n e s s , there w o u l d be
no n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y in the defection c u r v e s of the right-hand panels after con-
trolling for p a r t i s a n s h i p and inertia.
O n e can also see from the center panels of Figure 10.1 that the effects of p o -
litical awareness and p a r t i s a n s h i p are highly interactive. T h a t i s , the variables
m e a s u r i n g p a r t i s a n s h i p h a \ e little effect on resistance, except at m i d d l e and high
levels of political a w a r e n e s s , w h e r e the effect is large. This further u n d e r s c o r e s
the i m p o r t a n c e of political awareness as a resistance factor.
Finally, n o t e that the p a t t e r n s of defection roughly c o r r e s p o n d to the p a t t e r n s
of attitude c h a n g e that w o u l d be expected in r e s p o n s e to persuasive m e s s a g e s on
an " u n f a m i l i a r t o p i c , " as s h o w n in the top half of Figure 8.2. T h e efforts of a
t w o - y e a r i n c u m b e n t have the effect of a m o d e r a t e l y intense m e s s a g e , as in cell
B of the typology, w h i l e the efforts of a t e n - y e a r i n c u m b e n t s e e m to constitute
a high intensity m e s s a g e , as in cell C.
It is m i s l e a d i n g , however, to suppose that m a n y H o u s e e l e c t i o n s constitute
anything like a high-intensity m e s s a g e . Recall that Figure 10.1 depicts persua-
sion effects for p e r s o n s w h o report having voted in a congressional e l e c t i o n . If
t h e w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n were included in the d e n o m i n a t o r from which defection
rates were c a l c u l a t e d , both the low-seniority and high-seniority cases would
roughly r e s e m b l e cell B of t h e typology. T h u s , it is m o r e r e a s o n a b l e to maintain
that a typical i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n constitutes a " m o d e r a t e l y intense
m e s s a g e on an unfamiliar t o p i c . "
Before leaving the analysis of seniority effects in Figure 1 0 . 1 , I e m p h a s i z e
that the analysis h a s involved only low-intensity races. B e c a u s e of the interac-
tion b e t w e e n seniority and c a m p a i g n intensity, as s h o w n in Table 1 0 . 1 , the effect
of seniority is quite different in high-intensity races. I have not presented a
graphical analysis of this effect b e c a u s e there are t o o few races involving both
high seniority and high c a m p a i g n intensity to be confident what t h e visual pat-
tern of the effect is. But a l t h o u g h the visual form of the seniority effect in high-
Information flow and electoral choice 227
Pure seniority effect Pure campaign intensity effect
Percent
who defect
to incumbent
House
member
Political awareness
Figure 10.2. The effect of information flow on defections in 1978 House elections. Es-
timates are derived from coefficients in Table 10.1. Baseline is a race in which the in-
cumbent has two years of seniority and is involved in a very low-intensity reelection
campaign. Figures give estimates for modal outparty voters. Source: 1978 NES survey.
intensity races is u n c e r t a i n , its direction is not: H i g h seniority, in c o m b i n a t i o n
with high c a m p a i g n intensity, reduces t h e n u m b e r of defections that an i n c u m -
bent can expect from m e m b e r s of the o p p o s i t i o n party, as the Seniority x C h a l -
lenger spending interaction coefficient in Table 10.1 indicates.
T h e basic point in Figure 10.1 w a s that seniority brings with it increased pen-
etration of defection-inducing m e s s a g e s , thereby winning the i n c u m b e n t greater
support a m o n g voters w h o score m o d e r a t e to low on political awareness. Se-
niority - or rather, the c u m u l a t e d effects of cultivating a personal vote in o n e ' s
district - is n o t , of c o u r s e , the only source of defection-inducing m e s s a g e s . A
high-intensity r e e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n can a c c o m p l i s h roughly t h e s a m e e n d , a s
s h o w n in Figure 10.2. Let me explain h o w t h e figure w o r k s .
B a s e l i n e defection r a t e s , shown in identical form in both the left and right
panels of Figure 10.2, refer to defections by m o d a l o u t p a r t i s a n s to a two-year
i n c u m b e n t in a low-intensity c a m p a i g n , as these t e r m s were defined earlier. I
refer to these as baseline rates b e c a u s e they a r e what o c c u r w h e n the flow of
defection-inducing m e s s a g e s is at its m i n i m u m . (This minimal information flow
is not, however, an especially low m i n i m u m , since first-term legislators w o r k
extraordinarily h a r d to build up a personal following a m o n g their constituents;
F e n n o , 1978; H i b b i n g , 1991.)
In t h e left-hand p o r t i o n of Figure 10.2, we s e e , in relation to baseline
r a t e s , the effect of ten years of seniority on defection rates. If the d a t a in this
panel s e e m familiar, it is b e c a u s e they are a r e a r r a n g e m e n t of a p o r t i o n of t h e
d a t a in Figure 1 0 . 1 ; I include t h e m to facilitate certain c o m p a r i s o n s , as will b e -
come apparent.
T h e new information in Figure 10.2 involves t h e effects of a high-intensity
c a m p a i g n , s h o w n on t h e right. A high-intensity c a m p a i g n is defined as o n e in
228 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
which the i n c u m b e n t s p e n d s $ 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 , the c h a l l e n g e r spends $ 1 5 0 , 0 0 0 , and the
m e d i a c o v e r a g e variable is set to 1.25. T h e s e values constitute a race that falls
at about the 90th percentile of overall c a m p a i g n intensity.
B e c a u s e my idealized high-intensity race involves an i n c u m b e n t with exactly
t w o years of seniority, differences in defection rates from baseline levels are
purely the effects of the high-intensity c a m p a i g n . As can be s e e n , the high-
intensity c a m p a i g n p r o d u c e s cross-cutting effects: higher-than-baseline levels of
defection to the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g less a w a r e voters, and lower-than-baseline
levels of defection a m o n g the most aware voters.
T h e existence of these cross-cutting effects defies the logic of a o n e - m e s s a g e
m o d e l , which expects all c h a n g e to run in the direction of the d o m i n a n t m e s -
s a g e . W h a t has p r o d u c e d the pattern of cross-cutting effects s h o w n in Figure
10.2 is an interaction b e t w e e n a d o m i n a n t i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n and a less in-
t e n s e , or c o u n t e r v a i l i n g , challenger c a m p a i g n . T h a t interaction, as later analysis
will show, is as follows: T h e i n c u m b e n t ' s high-intensity c a m p a i g n m a n a g e s to
reach less aware v o t e r s , w h e r e a s the c h a l l e n g e r ' s less intense c a m p a i g n does
not. Therefore the i n c u m b e n t reaps big gains a m o n g the less a w a r e - gains
w h i c h , it a p p e a r s , are roughly equivalent to those w o n from ten years of senior-
ity, as shown on t h e left. But the c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n , a l t h o u g h t o o weak to
reach u n a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s , can reach the politically attentive. Highly attentive
o u t p a r t i s a n s a r e , of c o u r s e , also heavily e x p o s e d to the i n c u m b e n t ' s c a m p a i g n ,
but, as o u t p a r t i s a n s , they are more likely to accept the c h a l l e n g e r ' s m e s s a g e ,
thereby reducing their s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t to below baseline levels.
T h e difference b e t w e e n the left and right panels of Figure 10.2 is illuminating
on this point. A high level of seniority g e n e r a t e s no reduction in votes for
t h e i n c u m b e n t in any g r o u p b e c a u s e , in contrast to a high level of c a m p a i g n
intensity, it involves a m a i n l y one-sided m e s s a g e , n a m e l y the i n c u m b e n t ' s ef-
forts to build up a personal v o t e . This type of m e s s a g e p r o d u c e s only o n e -
directional c h a n g e , at least in low-intensity c a m p a i g n s . But a high-intensity
c a m p a i g n , b e c a u s e it c a r r i e s two-sided m e s s a g e s , can p r o d u c e cross-cutting pat-
t e r n s of c h a n g e .
T h e cross-cutting effects of c a m p a i g n intensity constitute a n o t h e r c a s e of dif-
ferential information flow. As in the early years of the V i e t n a m War, t w o m e s -
sages p r o d u c e different effects in different s e g m e n t s of the p u b l i c , d e p e n d i n g on
an interaction b e t w e e n the relative intensities of the m e s s a g e s and p e o p l e ' s lev-
els of political a w a r e n e s s .
C O U N T E R V A L E N T AND PARTISAN RESISTANCE TO
I N C U M B E N T - D O M I N A T E D H O U S E CAMPAIGNS
T h e analysis so far has relied on a single blunt indicator of c a m p a i g n influence:
w h e t h e r o u t p a r t i s a n s voted for the p a r t y of the i n c u m b e n t . T h e present section
e x p a n d s this analysis in t w o directions. First, it e x a m i n e s t h e effects of c a m -
paigns on p e o p l e ' s evaluations of H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s , both i n c u m b e n t and chal-
Information flow and electoral choice 229
lenger, and it d o e s so at the level of positive and n e g a t i v e " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s "
formed with respect to e a c h c a n d i d a t e . T h e greater information contained in
such c o m p a r a t i v e c a n d i d a t e evaluations allows us to gain a m u c h clearer idea of
how c a m p a i g n influence o c c u r s . A n d s e c o n d , b e c a u s e there is m e a s u r a b l e vari-
ation in evaluations of the c a n d i d a t e s a m o n g voters and n o n v o t e r s , and a m o n g
inpartisans and o u t p a r t i s a n s , the analysis in this section includes all respondents
living in a given district. T h i s greater inclusiveness greatly increases the n u m b e r
of c a s e s available for study and hence the p o w e r of the tests that can be under-
taken. T h i s s e c t i o n , like the previous o n e , c o n t i n u e s to e x a m i n e only districts in
which there w a s a d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a l e n t c a m p a i g n , that is, districts in
which an i n c u m b e n t sought reelection in a contested r a c e .
T h e 1978 N E S study c o n t a i n s excellent m e a s u r e s of c i t i z e n s ' e v a l u a t i o n s of
the H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s . All respondents w e r e a s k e d , with respect to e a c h candi-
d a t e , the following o p e n - e n d e d likes/dislikes probes:
Next I would like to ask you some questions about the candidates who ran in this district
for the U.S. House of Representatives. Was there anything in particular that you liked
about [name of candidate], the Democratic/Republican candidate for the U.S. House of
Representatives? What was that? Anything else? [Up to four responses were coded.]
Was there anything in particular that you didn't like about [ . . . ] . Anything else?
R e s p o n s e s to these q u e s t i o n s may be taken as indicators of the positive and
n e g a t i v e c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s that voters receive and accept as c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
W i t h respect to c h a l l e n g e r s , most of w h o m are n e o p h y t e s , almost all of these
m e s s a g e s will have reached voters d u r i n g the H o u s e c a m p a i g n itself. W i t h re-
spect to i n c u m b e n t s , s o m e information will represent the effects of i n c u m b e n t s '
interelection activities and s o m e will represent c a m p a i g n i n f o r m a t i o n . In both
c a s e s , however, differences between w h a t voters k n o w about c a n d i d a t e s in very-
low-intensity c a m p a i g n s and w h a t they k n o w in higher-intensity c a m p a i g n s can
be taken as e v i d e n c e of the effects of the c a m p a i g n s .
T h e r e is, of c o u r s e , s o m e reason to be w a r y of using the likes/dislikes d a t a as
m e a s u r e s of the c a n d i d a t e information in p e o p l e ' s heads. O b v i o u s l y these d a t a
do not constitute a one-to-one and exhaustive m a p p i n g of every c a n d i d a t e -
centered c o n s i d e r a t i o n in p e o p l e ' s heads. S o m e individuals may, for e x a m p l e ,
fail to r e m e m b e r s o m e p i e c e s of c a n d i d a t e information that have i m p o r t a n t l y af-
fected their votes ( L o d g e , M c G r a w , and S t r o h , 1989); others m a y offer a large
n u m b e r of c o m m e n t s simply b e c a u s e they find it easy to talk about politics.
T h e limitations of t h e d a t a should not be o v e r d r a w n , however. First, as will be
s h o w n , it is possible to control for individual differences in loquacity. M o r e im-
p o r t a n t , the v o l u m e of c a n d i d a t e r e m a r k s , as also d e m o n s t r a t e d below, varies
strongly across different c a m p a i g n c o n t e x t s , r a n g i n g from a simulated average of
about 2.5 discrete r e m a r k s per respondent in heavily contested races to less than
0 . 5 r e m a r k s per r e s p o n d e n t in low-intensity races. As long as o n e is willing to
a s s u m e that this cross-district variation reflects m o r e than individual-level dif-
ferences in propensity to talk, as it obviously m u s t , then it is possible to use the
230 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 231

Table 10.2. Awareness and acquisition of electoral considerations Table 10.3. The effect of party and candiate information
on vote for 1978 House incumbent among outpartisans
Level of political awareness
Intercept -.36
Low Middle Hieh
Net candidate likes and dislikes (candidate information) -1.14
Sum of all likes and dislikes 0.50 0.86 1.13 1.50 2.06
about two 1978 House candidates (311) (316) (305) (334) (302) (.19)
Net party likes and dislikes (party information) -0.29
Sum of all likes and dislikes 0.67 1.01 1.61 2.41 4.06 (.11)
about two parties in 197 8 (311) (316) (305) (334) (302) "Strongly" identified with party 1.11
(0-1) (.41)
Sum of all likes and dislikes 2.35 4.11 6.26 6.62 7.81 Political issues scale 0.06
about 1984 presidential candidates (518) (466) (398) (426) (434) (standardized) (.06)
N 277
Note: Cell entries are mean number of summed likes and dislikes. Data from
1978 are derived from cases in which there was both an incumbent and a
challenger. Number of cases is shown in parentheses. Note: Coefficients from maximum likelihood logistic regression in
which incumbent vote among outpartisans in contested races was the
Sources: 1978 and 1984 NES surveys. dependent variable.
Source: 1978 NES survey.
likes/dislikes d a t a to m e a s u r e the diffusion of c a m p a i g n information to different
types of voters in different electoral contexts. Finally, the likes/dislikes d a t a ap-
m e a s u r e s , u n d e r s t o o d as indicators of party c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and c a n d i d a t e con-
pear, on face i n s p e c t i o n , to m e a s u r e exactly w h a t , according to the R A S m o d e l ,
s i d e r a t i o n s , are used as independent variables. S u c h an analysis is r e p o r t e d in
we o u g h t to be m e a s u r i n g , namely the discrete bits of positive and n e g a t i v e can-
Table 10.3. Since my focus is still on resistance to i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m -
d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that have reached voters.
p a i g n s , the regression includes only p a r t i s a n s of the outparty. Party consider-
Despite s o m e r e a s o n for c o n c e r n , t h e n , I r e g a r d these d a t a as extremely well
ations are entered in the regression as the net of likes and dislikes, while
suited to the p r o b l e m at h a n d ; indeed, they constitute the best d a t a of w h i c h I am
c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are also entered as a net s c o r e , calculated as follows:
aware for investigating t h e microfoundations of attitude formation and c h a n g e in
a d y n a m i c political e n v i r o n m e n t .
Net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n = + ^ ( I n c u m b e n t c a n d i d a t e likes)
Table 10.2 gives us an initial look at these d a t a . In the top panel is the s u m
of H o u s e c a n d i d a t e likes and dislikes, b r o k e n d o w n by r e s p o n d e n t s ' level of - ( - ^ ( C h a l l e n g e r dislikes)
habitual political a w a r e n e s s . As w o u l d be e x p e c t e d , the p e o p l e w h o are m o r e
politically a w a r e are m o r e likely to acquire information about p a r t i c u l a r H o u s e — ^ ( I n c u m b e n t c a n d i d a t e dislikes)
c a n d i d a t e s . Politically a w a r e people are also m o r e likely to a m a s s large stores - ^ ( C h a l l e n g e r likes) 1 0
( - ) 2

of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about t h e t w o p a r t i e s , as s h o w n in the m i d d l e panel of the

t a b l e . For p u r p o s e of c o m p a r i s o n , Table 10.2 also contains d a t a on the total
n u m b e r of likes and dislikes about t h e i n c u m b e n t and c h a l l e n g e r in the 1984
presidential e l e c t i o n .
A salient feature of Table 10.2 is that voters have many m o r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
about the t w o p a r t i e s than about their t w o H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s . A n i m m e d i a t e
q u e s t i o n , therefore, is h o w m u c h impact each t y p e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n has on p e o -
p l e ' s votes. If the impact of p a r t y c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - the basis of the inertia vari-
able e x a m i n e d in the previous section - is sufficiently great relative to that of
c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , there m i g h t be no point in pursuing an investigation of
t h e origins of c a n d i d a t e information.
T h e simplest w a y to address this p r o b l e m is to perform a logistic regression
analysis in w h i c h vote c h o i c e is the d e p e n d e n t variable and the t w o likes/dislikes
T h e regression in Table 10.3 controls for strength of party a t t a c h m e n t ( " s t r o n g "
versus other) and position on a general m e a s u r e of l e f t - r i g h t issue o r i e n t a t i o n
(with high scores indicating greater ideological distance from the i n c u m b e n t ,
w h o is a s s u m e d to be liberal if a D e m o c r a t and c o n s e r v a t i v e if a R e p u b l i c a n ; this
m e a s u r e is described m o r e fully in the next s e c t i o n ) .
T h e logistic regression results indicate that c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are the
most i m p o r t a n t single d e t e r m i n a n t of H o u s e v o t i n g . O n e additional like or dis-
like of one of the c a n d i d a t e s has the s a m e effect as identification as a strong
m e m b e r of the outparty, and about four t i m e s the effect of each party like or
dislike. Ideological issue distance from the i n c u m b e n t - t h o u g h , as we shall see,
indirectly i m p o r t a n t as a d e t e r m i n a n t of the acquisition of c a n d i d a t e consider-
ations - seems to have virtually no direct effect on the v o t e .
232 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 233

Low-intensity races Higher-intensity races Partisans of inparty Partisans of outparty

Incumbent likes

Incumbent likes
Mean
number of
considerations
of each type Incumbent
dislikes ;
Challenger
Incumbent dislikes likes
Challenger
Challenger
dislikes dislikes
Challenger
0 likes

Political awareness Political awareness

N= 88 92 100 108 93 N= 43 43 56 67 69 N = 133 137 157 177 164 W= 78 99 98 128 125

29 49 45 66 76 45 47 48 61 49
f
Figure 10.3. Formation o considerations in 1978 House elections. Source: 1978 NES
survey.
T h e s e results p r o v i d e further e v i d e n c e that inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h i c h ex-
ist in v o t e r s ' m i n d s independently of any p a r t i c u l a r H o u s e c a m p a i g n , play a role
in preventing defections to i n c u m b e n t s , especially, as Figure 10.1 and Table 10.2
s h o w e d , a m o n g highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , w h o possess the largest stores of inertial
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . But the results also show that the m a i n action in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s
is in c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , which d o m i n a t e the other m e a s u r e s .
Let us therefore proceed with o u r analysis of how voters acquire c a n d i d a t e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s from political c a m p a i g n s . We can learn a fair a m o u n t about how
this occurs from s i m p l e graphical displays of the r a w d a t a , as s h o w n in Figure
1 0 . 3 . T h e figure presents s e p a r a t e s u m m a r i e s of net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for
lower-intensity and higher-intensity H o u s e r a c e s , with the cutpoint b e t w e e n the
t w o set at $ 4 0 , 0 0 0 . F o c u s i n g first on m e m b e r s of the i n c u m b e n t ' s party, d e -
scribed in the figure as " p a r t i s a n s of i n p a r t y , " we find, within both types of
r a c e s , a strong positive relationship b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and net con-
siderations. S i n c e the net c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m e a s u r e is scored in the direction of the
i n c u m b e n t , this indicates that, for i n p a r t i s a n s , greater exposure to t h e H o u s e
c a m p a i g n , as indexed by political a w a r e n e s s , is associated with steadily higher
levels of p r o i n c u m b e n t attitudes. Moreover, the positive trend lines contain no
hint of the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that arises from t h e resistance of t h e highly a w a r e .
T h e r e is little s u r p r i s e h e r e . Highly a w a r e i n p a r t i s a n s have no reason to resist
the p r o i n c u m b e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to w h i c h they have been e x p o s e d in the c a m -
paign a n d , as is a p p a r e n t , they do not.
Figure 10.4. Types of candidate considerations formed in 1978 House campaigns.
Source: 1978 NES survey.
For p a r t i s a n s w h o a r e not m e m b e r s of t h e i n c u m b e n t ' s party, however, there
exists a strong n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and net
c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . N o t e also that the c u r v e for highly a w a r e " o u t p a r t i -
s a n s " is offset d o w n w a r d in higher-intensity races (on r i g h t ) , an o c c u r r e n c e
which correctly indicates that their defections to the i n c u m b e n t are lower in
higher-intensity races. C l e a r l y , highly a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s , t h o u g h heavily ex-
posed to the c a m p a i g n , are m o r e resistant to t h e p r e d o m i n a n t l y p r o i n c u m b e n t
m e s s a g e than are m o d e r a t e l y aware o u t p a r t i s a n s , and they are especially resis-
tant to the i n c u m b e n t ' s efforts in higher-intensity races. W h y is this?
To find out, let us d i s a g g r e g a t e the net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n c u r v e s of out-
p a r t i s a n s into their c o m p o n e n t p a r t s , namely, the likes and dislikes of each can-
d i d a t e . W h e n we do t h i s , in Figure 10.4, we e n c o u n t e r a striking result: T h e r e
is only slight e v i d e n c e of t h e n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that arises from the heightened
p a r t i s a n resistance of the highly a w a r e . O n e sees a hint of it in o n e of the c u r v e s
(specifically, the i n c u m b e n t likes c u r v e of o u t p a r t i s a n s ) , but the m a i n m e s s a g e
in Figure 10.4 is that the h i g h e r a p e r s o n ' s level of political a w a r e n e s s , the m o r e
likely the person is to m e n t i o n things she or he likes and dislikes about both
c a n d i d a t e s - and to do so even when it goes against the partisan grain.
T h i s is a n o t a b l e but also s o m e w h a t puzzling finding. If increases in political
awareness are a s s o c i a t e d with increases in susceptibility to all types of influ-
e n c e , which is w h a t Figure 10.4 s e e m s to show, how does it o c c u r that, as shown
earlier, the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n a w a r e n e s s and vote defection is strongly
nonmonotonic?
234 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
T h e a n s w e r is close at h a n d . T h e first point to notice in Figure 10.4 is the
extent to which i n c u m b e n t likes o v e r w h e l m all o t h e r types of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
A m o n g the less a w a r e m e m b e r s of the inparty, incumbent likes are almost the
only type of r e s p o n s e given. A n d even a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s , reasons for liking
the incumbent are four t i m e s as n u m e r o u s as reasons for liking the challenger.
M a n y H o u s e c h a l l e n g e r s , it a p p e a r s , are all but invisible.
But c h a l l e n g e r s , t h o u g h invisible to m o s t , are visible to the highly a w a r e .
T h i s , it turns out, is the key to explaining how highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s resist
the d o m i n a n t p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e . R e c e p t i o n of countervailing consider-
ations from the c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n , which only the most aware voters are
able to a c h i e v e , gives highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s an informational basis for o p -
posing the i n c u m b e n t .
Highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s , it thus a p p e a r s , do not simply resist the incum-
bent; they acquire countervailing information that enables t h e m to positively
s u p p o r t the challenger.
In the s a m e vein, Figure 10.4 shows that the incidence of i n c u m b e n t dislikes
rises sharply with political a w a r e n e s s , especially a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s . T h i s gives
highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s - but almost no o n e else - a further informational ba-
sis for o p p o s i n g the i n c u m b e n t .
Highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s , t h u s , are the only g r o u p in t h e e l e c t o r a t e for
w h o m p r o i n c u m b e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s do not o v e r w h e l m all others - t h e only
g r o u p , that is, that pays 2nough attention to notice the relatively low-key c a m -
paigns of c h a l l e n g e r s and is also p r e d i s p o s e d , on p a r t i s a n g r o u n d s , to accept the
information that c h a l l e n g e r s purvey. T h u s , the capacity of highly aware outpar-
tisans to resist the i n c u m b e n t arises from their sensitivity to information flows
that are t o o weak to reach the m a s s of less a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s .
All of t h i s , of c o u r s e , a m o u n t s to a c l e a r and direct d e m o n s t r a t i o n of coun-
tervalent resistance. It is the same m e c h a n i s m that w a s invoked to explain the
i m p e r v i o u s n e s s of sophisticated liberals to t h e d o m i n a n t p r o w a r m e s s a g e of the
early V i e t n a m W a r period; the only difference is that here, o w i n g to the superior
data available for H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , we are able to o b s e r v e directly t h e effects of
the countervalent m e s s a g e at the level of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Focusing on partisan resistance
T h e analysis has so far focused on inertial and c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance to the
d o m i n a n t i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n , and has found e v i d e n c e that b o t h types of re-
sistance are m o r e c o m m o n a m o n g those w h o are m o r e politically a w a r e .
But what about p a r t i s a n resistance - that is, the tendency of p e o p l e to refuse
to accept c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are inconsistent with their political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s ?
A l t h o u g h I did not e m p h a s i z e it, we have already e n c o u n t e r e d e v i d e n c e of
p a r t i s a n resistance. It a p p e a r e d most clearly in Figure 1 0 . 3 , w h e r e we saw that
p a r t i s a n s of the i n c u m b e n t ' s party w e r e far m o r e likely than o u t p a r t i s a n s to
achieve p r o i n c u m b e n t scores on the m e a s u r e of net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
Information flow and electoral choice 235
T h i s o c c u r r e d b e c a u s e p a r t i s a n s selectively a c c e p t e d the congenial c a n d i d a t e in-
f o r m a t i o n to which they w e r e exposed while rejecting w h a t w a s u n c o n g e n i a l .
W h a t is not yet clear, however, is w h e t h e r political awareness e n h a n c e s par-
tisan resistance. W h e n we e x a m i n e d the relationship between a w a r e n e s s and
c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in Figure 10.4, we found only slight visual e v i d e n c e of
the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that arises from t h e greater p a r t i s a n resistance of the m o r e
politically a w a r e . T h i s initial e v i d e n c e needs to be m o r e rigorously tested.
I propose to do this by m a k i n g the likes and dislikes of each c a n d i d a t e the
d e p e n d e n t variable of its o w n r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . T h a t is, I will esti-
m a t e four m o d e l s having the general form of E q u a t i o n , 1 0 . 1 , each specifying
v a r i a t i o n s in o n e of t h e four c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m e a s u r e s as a function of
individual- and aggregate-level influences. If the c o n c l u s i o n s reached thus far
are c o r r e c t , we should find that a g g r e g a t e v a r i a t i o n in c a m p a i g n intensity, along
with individual-level differences in political a t t e n t i v e n e s s , have a major impact
on t h e reception of c a n d i d a t e information, but that habitual a w a r e n e s s h a s little
or no effect on a c c e p t a n c e rates. We should find, in o t h e r w o r d s , that awareness
affects the formation of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s mainly through its effect on the reception
p r o c e s s , as suggested by Figure 10.4.
T h e model to be e s t i m a t e d is as follows:
4
Net c a n d i d a t e considerations;; = ^ ( L i k e / D i s l i k e ) „
4
= 2 ((Recepty)(Acceptjj I Recepty))„ (10.3)
w h e r e the / subscript refers to individual-level differences, the j subscript refers
to district-level v a r i a b l e s , and n to t h e four s u m m a r y m e a s u r e s of consider-
ations. In e s t i m a t i n g this m o d e l , I will a s s u m e that t h e reception and a c c e p t a n c e
functions take t h e logistic f o r m , as in E q u a t i o n 1 0 . 1 .
M e a s u r e m e n t of the variables in this m o d e l is m o r e c o m p l i c a t e d than usual
and so requires s o m e extra attention.
Measuring reception of campaign information. The individual-level variables
affecting reception of c a m p a i g n information in E q u a t i o n 10.1 will be political
a w a r e n e s s , m e a s u r e d in the usual way, plus expressed levels of interest in p o -
litical c a m p a i g n s and w h e t h e r the person voted in the 1978 congressional e l e c -
tion. T h e reason for adding the latter t w o m e a s u r e s is that the 1978 N E S survey
c a r r i e d fewer and s o m e w h a t w e a k e r political k n o w l e d g e items than m o s t N E S
s u r v e y s , which m a k e s the use of s u p p l e m e n t s a d v i s a b l e .
T h e use of c a m p a i g n interest and vote t u r n o u t as reception m e a s u r e s raises a
subtle point. T h r o u g h o u t this b o o k , I a t t e m p t to m e a s u r e i n d i v i d u a l s ' habitual
levels of political a w a r e n e s s , by which I m e a n l o n g - t e r m a w a r e n e s s that is in-
d e p e n d e n t of the level of a w a r e n e s s of any p a r t i c u l a r c a m p a i g n or issue. T h e
reason for insisting on c h r o n i c , as against e p i s o d i c , a w a r e n e s s is that a person
stimulated to high levels of political a t t e n t i v e n e s s by a c a m p a i g n m a y exhibit
236 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
less p a r t i s a n or inertial resistance to persuasion than s o m e o n e w h o is habitually
attentive to politics, even if both are paying equal a m o u n t s of attention to the
c a m p a i g n at a given m o m e n t .
T h i s point is i m p o r t a n t b e c a u s e both expressed levels of political interest and
vote t u r n o u t are slightly higher in districts in which an intense H o u s e race has
o c c u r r e d . T h i s indicates that the c a m p a i g n has s t i m u l a t e d p e o p l e in these dis-
tricts to score higher on these m e a s u r e s than they normally w o u l d . T h i s diffi-
culty, however, is easily r e m e d i e d by p u r g i n g both variables of their correlation
with district-level m e a s u r e s of c a m p a i g n intensity, as m e a s u r e d by m e d i a cov-
e r a g e . W i t h this adjustment m a d e , each can be taken as a m e a s u r e of habitual
awareness that is independent of any p a r t i c u l a r c a m p a i g n .
T h e district-level variables affecting reception of c a m p a i g n information are
c a m p a i g n s p e n d i n g by the i n c u m b e n t and by the challenger, intensity of m e d i a
c o v e r a g e , and n u m b e r of years the i n c u m b e n t has served in the H o u s e . T h e
s p e n d i n g variables require a brief c o m m e n t .
As other research h a s s h o w n , s p e n d i n g by the incumbent is d e t e r m i n e d , in
p a r t , by the level of t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g and by how well the i n c u m b e n t
did in his or her previous r a c e . S p e n d i n g by c h a l l e n g e r s , for its p a r t , is deter-
mined in p a r t by t h e quality of the c h a l l e n g e r (as g a u g e d by political skills or
past e x p e r i e n c e , for e x a m p l e ) , in p a r t by how well the i n c u m b e n t did in the last
race (weak i n c u m b e n t s t e n d to attract s t r o n g , h e a v y - s p e n d i n g c h a l l e n g e r s ) , and
in p a r t by the i n c u m b e n t ' s record in office ( J a c o b s o n , 1980; J o h a n n e s and M c -
A d a m s , 1987). B e y o n d t h i s , n e w s p a p e r c o v e r a g e of congressional races varies
as a function of the c h a l l e n g e r ' s s p e n d i n g , i n c u m b e n t ' s s p e n d i n g , and quality of
the c a n d i d a t e s (Westlye, 1991).
No o n e has yet been able to disentangle h o w exactly these several variables
affect one another, and I cannot do so either. H e n c e in the analysis that follows,
I will include all of the m e a s u r e s in t h e m o d e l in o r d e r to capture their reduced-
form effects, but I will not attempt to d r a w c o n c l u s i o n s from the relative m a g -
nitude of p a r t i c u l a r coefficients. Instead, I will use the entire set of coefficients
to simulate the overall effects of certain types of races: higher-intensity races
(high spending by b o t h c a n d i d a t e s , with heavy n e w s p a p e r c o v e r a g e ) , and lower-
intensity races ( m o d e r a t e spending by the i n c u m b e n t , low s p e n d i n g by the chal-
lenger, with light n e w s c o v e r a g e ) .
Measuring acceptance of campaign information. I will use four individual-level
a c c e p t a n c e v a r i a b l e s , each m e a s u r i n g a theoretically distinct c o n c e p t . It is im-
p o r t a n t to m a k e c l e a r exactly w h a t these c o n c e p t s a r e .
T h e first a c c e p t a n c e variable is party identification, as m e a s u r e d by t h e tra-
ditional party identification m e a s u r e . A strong coefficient on this variable
w o u l d indicate a partisan bias in information processing — that is, a t e n d e n c y
for p a r t i s a n s , all else e q u a l , to accept favorable information about their p a r t y ' s
c a n d i d a t e and to resist favorable information about the o p p o s i t i o n ' s c a n d i d a t e .
As usual, this v a r i a b l e h a s been c o d e d to a five-point r a n g e , in w h i c h strong
Information flow and electoral choice 237
identifiers ( ± 2 ) are distinguished from weak identifiers and independent leaners
( ± 1 ) and pure i n d e p e n d e n t s (0). S c o r i n g is in the direction of t h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s
party.
T h e second a c c e p t a n c e variable is policy distance from i n c u m b e n t and chal-
lenger. T h e i n c u m b e n t policy distance variable captures the l e f t - r i g h t distance
b e t w e e n the i n d i v i d u a l ' s policy preferences (as m e a s u r e d by N E S issue q u e s -
tions) and the i n c u m b e n t ' s voting record (as m e a s u r e d by the roll call r a t i n g s of
A m e r i c a n s for D e m o c r a t i c Action and t h e A m e r i c a n C o n s e r v a t i v e U n i o n ) . A 8
large coefficient on this v a r i a b l e w o u l d c o n s t i t u t e a further indication of p a r t i -
san bias in the internalization of i n c o m i n g m e s s a g e s .
B e c a u s e d a t a on the policy o r i e n t a t i o n of challengers are unavailable, I w a s
u n a b l e to build as g o o d a m e a s u r e of policy d i s t a n c e from t h e m . S i n c e , however,
D e m o c r a t i c politicians t e n d to be to the left of Republican politicians, liberal
m e m b e r s of the public should tend to be closer to D e m o c r a t i c than Republican
c h a l l e n g e r s , while m a s s c o n s e r v a t i v e s should exhibit t h e o p p o s i t e tendency. O n
this r a t i o n a l e , I use a m e a s u r e of l e f t - r i g h t issue o r i e n t a t i o n , scored to reflect
w h e t h e r the c h a l l e n g e r is a D e m o c r a t or R e p u b l i c a n , to capture policy distance
from the challenger.
T h e third a c c e p t a n c e v a r i a b l e is inertia. T h i s v a r i a b l e , the net of p a r t y likes
and dislikes, m e a s u r e s an i n d i v i d u a l ' s m a s s of stored p a r t i s a n c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as
described earlier. A large coefficient on this variable would indicate that stored
p a r t i s a n information functions to fend off c a n d i d a t e information that is incon-
sistent with o n e ' s p a r t i s a n o r i e n t a t i o n . N o t e t h a t , within the R A S m o d e l frame-
w o r k , there is no e x p e c t a t i o n that preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s will affect
acquisition of n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; they are supposed to create only inertial re-
sistance, that i s , to dilute t h e effects of n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
T h e final a c c e p t a n c e variable is political awareness. In addition to being a
proxy for stored c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and r e c e p t i o n of c o u n t e r v a l e n t i n f o r m a t i o n ,
political a w a r e n e s s m a y e n h a n c e p a r t i s a n resistance t o d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e s b e -
cause it is associated with the possession of c u e i n g m e s s a g e s that e n a b l e indi-
viduals to see t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n persuasive m e s s a g e s and their values.
B e c a u s e inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and r e c e p t i o n of c o u n t e r v a l e n t information
are directly m e a s u r e d by other variables in the a c c e p t a n c e function, any r e m a i n -
ing effect of political a w a r e n e s s can be attributed to its effect in e n h a n c i n g par-
tisan resistance.
T h e r e is one other issue to be discussed. It is, as earlier indicated, unrealistic
to a s s u m e that an i n d i v i d u a l ' s volunteered likes and dislikes provide a c o m p l e t e
r e p o r t of the c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s he or she has internalized. O n e w o r r i s o m e
possibility is t h a t , all else e q u a l , s o m e individuals are m o r e talkative than
o t h e r s , perhaps b e c a u s e they are better able to search their m e m o r i e s for
8 This distance measure was created in the following steps: Build a measure of the left-right ori-
entation of each survey respondent; average the ADA and ACA ratings of the incumbent over the
previous two years; standardize both measures; subtract the two z-score scales; and take the ab-
solute value of the difference. See the Measures Appendix for further information.
238 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 239

relevant information or perhaps b e c a u s e they are simply loquacious. To control

for these individual differences, I t o o k each p e r s o n ' s total n u m b e r of volunteered Table 10.4. Coefficients for diffusion of likes and dislikes in
likes and dislikes (independent of directional thrust) about the political p a r t i e s contested 1978 House races
as a m e a s u r e of m e m o r y and/or loquacity and used it as a n u i s a n c e v a r i a b l e in
the a c c e p t a n c e function. P e o p l e w h o have a great deal to say about the p a r t i e s Incumbent Incumbent Challenger Challenger
likes dislikes likes dislikes
are e x p e c t e d , all else e q u a l , to have m o r e to say about the c a n d i d a t e s . ( L o q u a c -
Reception function
ity, as m e a s u r e d h e r e , is confounded with an individual's level of political
Intercept -4.43 -8.92 -7.90 -8.21
a w a r e n e s s , but since awareness is directly m e a s u r e d by other v a r i a b l e s , this is
Awareness 0.58 1.11 0.71 0.71
not a p r o b l e m . ) (standardized) (.08) (.29) (.18) (.34)
W i t h these v a r i a b l e s , we can m o d e l t h e diffusion of positive and n e g a t i v e General i n t e r e s t ^ 0.20 0.06 0.88 ' 0.43
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about each c a n d i d a t e as a function of several aggregate-level (range 1-3) (.07) (.15) (.14) (.14)
information flows - the c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n , the i n c u m b e n t ' s c a m p a i g n , Voted in 1978 0.85 0.74 0.28 1.05
(range 0 - 1 ) (.11) (.24) (.18) (.24)
m e d i a c o v e r a g e , and t h e a c c u m u l a t e d n e w s of the i n c u m b e n t ' s r e c o r d in office
Incumbent spending 0.86 2.36 1.10 1.54
(seniority). At the individual level, r e s p o n d e n t s m a y be m o r e or less heavily ex-
(in logged $ 10,000s) (.21) (.58) (.46) (.45)
posed to these c o m m u n i c a t i o n f l o w s , d e p e n d i n g on their levels of political
Challenger spending -0.11 0.25 1.61 1.61
a t t e n t i v e n e s s , and m o r e or less resistant to t h e m e s s a g e s they r e c e i v e , as deter- (in logged $10,000s) (.11) (.24) (.25) (.24)
m i n e d by their p a r t y identification, policy o r i e n t a t i o n , preexisting consider- News coverage 1.34 2.59 0.86 1.48
a t i o n s , and awareness. (range 0 . 6 - 1 . 9 ) (.19) (.69) (.26) (.31)
9
T h e results of t h e e s t i m a t i o n are s h o w n in Table 1 0 . 4 . As with o t h e r m o d e l s Seniority 0.42 2.02 - -
of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , a graphical analysis is n e c e s s a r y to convey (log of years in office) (.16) (.51)
Last victory margin 0.13 -.13 - -
the full significance of t h e coefficient e s t i m a t e s . S o m e i n f o r m a t i o n , however,
(log point difference) (.12) (.27)
can be gleaned from an e x a m i n a t i o n of the r a w coefficients, b e g i n n i n g with
Days since election -0.0024 0.004 -0.006 -0.008
1
those from the r e c e p t i o n f u n c t i o n . (range 1-75) (.0027) (.006) (.005) (.005)
9 The dependent variables of this analysis are the sum of all remarks of a given type, recoded to Acceptance function
a 0-1 scale. On the theory that the intervals between a person's first, second, third, or fourth 1.60 -2.26 0.07 -0.54
Intercept
remarks might be unequal, I experimented with various transformations of the dependent vari-
able, but this made no important difference in the results. Awareness -1.43 -0.25 -0.89 -0.04
10 I would like to make a few comments on two variables from the reception function, incumbents' (standardized) (.32) (.30) (.39) (.55)
margin of victory in their last race and the number of days that elapsed between the election and Loquacity 0.32 0.11 0.15 0.21
the NES interview of a given respondent. Although tangential to the main analysis, both vari- (Count of party remarks) (.08) (.03) (.07) (.09)
ables have intrinsic interest. Victory margin was included to pick up the reception effects of ear- 0.20 0.19 -0.14
Party attachment -0.45
lier, incumbent-dominated campaigns. The signs of this variable's coefficients indicate that it
(range -2 to +2) (.13) (.06) (.12) (.12)
performed as expected: Incumbents who won their previous race by large margins are more often
liked and less often disliked, all else equal, than incumbents who had a close race in their last Partisan inertia -0.00 0.07 0.27 0.20
outing. This effect, however, is statistically insignificant and substantively small. The implica- (Net party likes and dislikes) (.07) (.04) (.11) (.10)
tion of this essentially null result is that if a hard race in the previous election has any effect on Issue distance from incumbent -0.47 0.52
the current election, it is because of its indirect effect on challenger quality and spending rather - -
(.16) (.07)
than because of a direct lingering effect on candidate evaluations. This conclusion is similar to -0.47
Issue scale —
- 0.13
the Jacobson and Kernell (1981) argument that the effect of the economy on congressional out-
(standardized) (.12) (.19)
comes is largely mediated by its intervening effect on strategic politicians.
The other variable, days since election, was included to control for the possibility that the
passing of time might lessen people's ability or motivation to explain what they liked and disliked Note: Dependent variables are sum of all remarks of given type, recoded to 0 - 1
about the candidates. The negative sign for this variable indicates that the variable performed as range. Up to four remarks were counted in connection with each probe, except
it would be expected to perform in three of the four cases; its effects, however, are neither large the challenger-dislike probe, for which only two remarks were counted, since no
nor statistically significant. one made four remarks of this type and less than .5 percent made three. The
I also note that loquacity - the count of party likes and dislikes - performs as expected: The model is Equation 10.1, estimated by nonlinear least squares. Approximate
more a person has to say about the two political parties, the more he or she is likely to say about standard errors appear in parentheses. Number of cases, which include all cases
the two House candidates. This effect is moderately large and statistically significant, but the- in which an incumbent sought reelection in a contested race, is 1545.
oretically uninteresting. The ability to control for loquacity, however, improves the fit of the
model and hence the ability to estimate other effects. Source: 1978 NES survey.
240 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
N o t e , first of all, that seniority has significant coefficients in both the
incumbent-likes and the incumbent-dislikes m o d e l s , thereby indicating quite
unequivocally that seniority d o e s , as s u g g e s t e d earlier, g e n e r a t e cross-cutting
effects.
O n e ' s first suspicion is that these cross-cutting effects might be mutually can-
celing. But this is not generally t h e c a s e . B e c a u s e the intercept in the reception
function of the incumbent-dislikes model is low, seniority has sizable effects
only at high values of the o t h e r reception variables. T h u s , the n e g a t i v e effects of
seniority c o m e into play only in high-intensity c a m p a i g n s . M e a n w h i l e , the in-
tercept in the i n c u m b e n t - l i k e s m o d e l is higher - the highest, in fact, of the four
c a s e s ; this m e a n s that the positive effects of seniority can c o m e into play even at
low values of the o t h e r reception v a r i a b l e s , which is to say, even in low-intensity
c a m p a i g n s . (See C h a p t e r 7 at Figure 7.3 for an explanation of why the variables
in a logistic function automatically interact with o n e another.)
T h u s , a careful reading of Table 10.4 indicates that seniority h a s cross-cutting
effects that tend to be net positive for the i n c u m b e n t in low-intensity races and
net n e g a t i v e in h i g h e r s p e n d i n g races. T h i s c o n c l u s i o n , w h i c h is readily con-
firmed by graphical analysis (not s h o w n ) , c o n f i r m s my earlier analysis of voter
defection r a t e s , w h i c h also found seniority to be helpful in low-intensity races
and harmful in high-intensity ones (see Table 10.1).
S e n a t o r E d w a r d K e n n e d y of M a s s a c h u s e t t s m a y exemplify the kind of poli-
tician for w h o m seniority h a s cross-cutting effects. In a low-intensity r a c e , his
g l a m o u r and family b a c k g r o u n d are i m m e d i a t e selling points, helping h i m to roll
up large vote m a r g i n s . But in a high-intensity r a c e , a skilled c h a l l e n g e r m i g h t ,
even without raising issues from K e n n e d y ' s personal life, find m u c h useful a m -
m u n i t i o n in the s e n a t o r ' s long record as an u n a b a s h e d liberal. T h u s , the poten-
tially n e g a t i v e effects of K e n n e d y ' s long record might b e c o m e i m p o r t a n t only in
the presence of a p o t e n t c h a l l e n g e .
T h e present analysis of t h e cross-cutting effects of seniority is m o r e solidly
founded than the e a r l i e r o n e in these respects: It derives from coefficients that
are highly statistically significant and it is based on a s a m p l e that includes all
11
respondents r a t h e r than only o u t p a r t i s a n v o t e r s . T h e present analysis is also
m o r e theoretically i n f o r m a t i v e , since, by d e c o m p o s i n g the political c a m p a i g n
into its p a r t s and n o t i n g their differential i n t e n s i t i e s , it has been able to show
why seniority has the cross-cutting effects that it does.
T h e other point to notice about the variables in the reception function is that,
a l t h o u g h there are three individual-level m e a s u r e s of political attentiveness in
each m o d e l of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , they obtain correctly signed coeffi-
cients in all cases and achieve statistically significant effects in 10 of 12 trials.
T h i s , in c o m b i n a t i o n with the usually large m a g n i t u d e s of the coefficients, in-
11 It is possible that there is an endogenous interaction here, such that senior incumbents do not
normally encounter serious challenges unless there is a serious weakness in their record. An
analysis along the lines of Westlye (1991; ch. 8) would be needed to deal with this possibility.
Information flow and electoral choice 241
d i c a t e s that individual-level differences in a t t e n t i v e n e s s are a major d e t e r m i n a n t
of t h e acquisition of c a n d i d a t e information.
I turn now to coefficients from the a c c e p t a n c e function. T h e inertia v a r i a b l e ,
first of all, performs weakly. Its four coefficients r a n g e from m o d e r a t e l y large in
the e x p e c t e d direction to m o d e r a t e l y large in the unexpected d i r e c t i o n , with the
1 2
r e m a i n i n g t w o c a s e s close to z e r o . T h e s e results are a further indication of the
limits of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h i c h is w h a t the inertia v a r i a b l e is in-
tended to c a p t u r e , as a source of resistance to i n c o m i n g information from d o m -
inant political c a m p a i g n s . Inertia, as we saw in Tables 10.1 and 1 0 . 3 , is
i m p o r t a n t as a c o u n t e r w e i g h t to fresh c a m p a i g n information at the point of m a k -
ing vote d e c i s i o n s ; however, it s e e m s to have no consistent impact on the ac-
c e p t a n c e of n e w c a n d i d a t e information as positive or n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
T h e party a t t a c h m e n t and the issue distance v a r i a b l e s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , per-
form well, obtaining correctly signed coefficients in all e q u a t i o n s in which they
a p p e a r and achieving statistical significance in five of eight c a s e s . T h i s pattern
indicates the existence of a p a r t i s a n bias in c i t i z e n s ' processing of the c a n d i d a t e
information to w h i c h they are exposed: G i v e n reception of a r a n g e of c a m p a i g n
m e s s a g e s , p e o p l e t e n d to accept what is congenial to their p a r t i s a n values and to
reject w h a t is not. A l t h o u g h it is not a p p a r e n t from simple inspection of these
coefficients, their net impact on the f o r m a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , as
will be revealed shortly in graphical a n a l y s i s , is large.
T h i s brings us to the final i m p o r t a n t a c c e p t a n c e v a r i a b l e , political awareness.
H e r e the e v i d e n c e is m i x e d . A w a r e n e s s a p p e a r s to play a role in p r o m o t i n g par-
tisan resistance to positive c a n d i d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n - i n c u m b e n t and c h a l l e n g e r
likes - at the point of e n c o u n t e r i n g it, but d o e s not induce resistance to n e g a t i v e
information about the c a n d i d a t e s .
U n s u r e w h a t to m a k e of this mixed o u t c o m e , I c o n d u c t e d parallel inves-
t i g a t i o n s of t h e effect of a w a r e n e s s in inducing resistance to c a n d i d a t e con-
siderations in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s a n d . i n t h e 1984 presidential e l e c t i o n . W h a t I
found is that a w a r e n e s s is not i m p o r t a n t l y a s s o c i a t e d with resistance to likes/
dislikes information for either i n c u m b e n t s or challengers in either of these types
13
of e l e c t i o n .
Taking the three types of elections together, t h e n , the e v i d e n c e suggests that
awareness has relatively little effect in e n h a n c i n g p a r t i s a n resistance to persua-
sion at the level of i n c o m i n g c a n d i d a t e information - even t h o u g h , as we have
seen in Figure 1 0 . 1 , political awareness is strongly associated with resistance to
12 The one correctly signed and statistically significant coefficient involves the challenger-likes
model, where, as suggested a moment ago, my ability to measure ideological distance from the
challenger is marginal. It is a good bet, therefore, that inertia is functioning here more as a proxy
for ideological distance than as a measure of inertial resistance.
13 In particular, I have not found any cases in which awareness picks up a statistically significant
coefficient in the acceptance function of a reception-acceptance model of candidate likes or dis-
likes, except the two cases in Table 10.4.
 242 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n s at the level of s u m m a r y vote decisions in H o u s e elections.
(For c o m p a r a b l e e v i d e n c e on S e n a t e and presidential e l e c t i o n s , see Figure 10.6.)
T h e s e seemingly contradictory findings are possible b e c a u s e a w a r e n e s s -
e n h a n c e d p a r t i s a n resistance to c o m m u n i c a t i o n at the point of e n c o u n t e r i n g it is
only o n e of three w a y s in which awareness can induce resistance to a d o m i n a n t
c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e . T h e o t h e r t w o a w a r e n e s s - m e d i a t e d resistance m e c h a n i s m s ,
inertial and especially c o u n t e r v a l e n t r e s i s t a n c e , have large effects even t h o u g h
the first does not.
Still, however, it is natural to ask why, in contrast to what occurs in other
d o m a i n s , there is little or no resistance effect from awareness in the f o r m a t i o n of
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s about c a n d i d a t e s in p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s . Recall, in particular, that
political a w a r e n e s s w a s associated with resistance to ideologically inconsistent
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s involving controversial issues (job g u a r a n t e e s , g o v e r n m e n t ser-
v i c e s , aid to b l a c k s , and presidential p e r f o r m a n c e ; see Tables 8.2 and 8.3 and
Figure 8.7).
A l t h o u g h the a n s w e r to this question cannot be d e m o n s t r a t e d from the avail-
able d a t a , it is e a s y to infer w h a t is going o n . N o t e , first of all, that there is no
a b s e n c e of p a r t i s a n resistance in the f o r m a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
D e m o c r a t s and liberals differ sharply from R e p u b l i c a n s and c o n s e r v a t i v e s in the
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s they form (Table 10.4). W h a t is different for c a n d i d a t e consid-
e r a t i o n s , in c o m p a r i s o n with issue-relevant c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , is that the least p o -
litically a w a r e p e o p l e exhibit nearly as m u c h p a r t i s a n d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as the most
a w a r e . If the R A S m o d e l ;s c o r r e c t , this can only be b e c a u s e the c u e i n g infor-
m a t i o n n e c e s s a r y to achieve p a r t i s a n resistance is m u c h more w i d e l y available
in election c a m p a i g n s , especially in S e n a t e and presidential c a m p a i g n s , than in
o t h e r political contexts - so widely available that even the least politically aware
p e o p l e m a n a g e to acquire it.
It is quite plausible that this is the c a s e . C o n t e s t e d e l e c t i o n s are organized as
c o m p e t i t i o n s b e t w e e n o p p o s i n g p a r t i s a n g r o u p s . Reflecting t h i s , n e w s r e p o r t s
routinely identify the p a r t i s a n affiliations of t h e c o n t e n d i n g c a n d i d a t e s , as do
political a d v e r t i s e m e n t s , the other principal source of c a n d i d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n . As
a result, anyone e n c o u n t e r i n g c a n d i d a t e information can very easily r e c o g n i z e
its p a r t i s a n implications. T h e s a m e cannot be said for nonelectoral political
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . A l t h o u g h I am aware of no study of the subject, my o b s e r v a -
tion is that n e w s r e p o r t s on political issues only rarely c a r r y c l e a r p a r t i s a n c u e -
ing i n f o r m a t i o n .
If this impression is c o r r e c t , and if, as the R A S model c o n t e n d s , political
a w a r e n e s s induces p a r t i s a n resistance precisely by virtue of its association with
c u e i n g information that is o b s c u r e or e s o t e r i c , then it would follow that its a s -
sociation with p a r t i s a n resistance w o u l d be m a r k e d l y w e a k e r in p a r t i s a n e l e c -
tion c a m p a i g n s t h a n in o t h e r contexts.
Altogether, t h e n , political a t t e n t i v e n e s s , as m e a s u r e d by a w a r e n e s s , interest,
and vote turnout, h a s consistently large and usually significant effects on r e c e p -
tion of c a m p a i g n i n f o r m a t i o n , but a w a r e n e s s h a s only inconsistent effects on t h e
Information flow and electoral choice 243
a c c e p t a n c e process. Insofar as attentiveness affects the acquisition of c a m p a i g n
i n f o r m a t i o n , it appears therefore to be mainly via its effect on r e c e p t i o n .
Simulating the effects of campaign intensity
T h e coefficients in Table 10.4, in conjunction w i t h the e q u a t i o n s that g e n e r a t e d
t h e m , imply a c o m p r e h e n s i v e account of attitude f o r m a t i o n in H o u s e c a m p a i g n s .
By using the coefficients in graphical s i m u l a t i o n s , we can gain further insight
into the d y n a m i c s of resistance to p e r s u a s i o n .
Let me first use s i m u l a t i o n s to m a k e a m e t h o d o l o g i c a l point. In introducing
the likes/dislikes q u e s t i o n s as m e a s u r e s of the c a n d i d a t e information that has
reached voters, I noted a suspicion that m a y still linger in s o m e r e a d e r s ' m i n d s :
that these questions mainly m e a s u r e individual differences in m o t i v a t i o n to dis-
c u s s politics. T h e coefficients in Table 10.4 e n a b l e us to test this possibility. Let
us c o n s i d e r low-intensity and high-intensity r a c e s , as defined earlier. Let us also
a s s u m e that the first h a s a two-year i n c u m b e n t r u n n i n g for reelection and the
s e c o n d a ten-year i n c u m b e n t .
C a m p a i g n intensity, operationalized in this way, has a large impact on w h a t
citizens are able to learn about their H o u s e m e m b e r s . T h e average n u m b e r
of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s e x p e c t e d from a m o d a l o u t p a r t i s a n in low-intensity races is
0 . 2 7 ; in high-intensity r a c e s , it is 2 . 5 1 . T h i s average difference is entirely at-
tributable to differences in c a m p a i g n intensity. Moreover, the simulated n u m b e r
of r e m a r k s in a hypothetical race in which there is no c a m p a i g n - no s p e n d i n g
by either c a n d i d a t e , the lowest level of press c o v e r a g e , and no i n c u m b e n t se-
niority as a source of information - is 0 . 2 0 . A l m o s t all of these r e m a r k s c o m e
from m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e and especially highly a w a r e persons w h o give reasons
for liking the i n c u m b e n t , a result that is, if a n y t h i n g , a bit low in light of H o u s e
m e m b e r s ' c o n t i n u o u s efforts to build c o n s t i t u e n c y s u p p o r t d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d s
between elections.
T h e s e findings should resolve any doubts that the v o l u m e of likes/dislikes re-
m a r k s reflects to any i m p o r t a n t degree simple individual differences in willing-
ness to talk. T h e r e a r e , as there o u g h t to b e , large individual differences in
sensitivity to political c a m p a i g n s , but p e o p l e ' s ability to m a k e r e m a r k s about
c a n d i d a t e s d e p e n d s very heavily on the intensity of the c a m p a i g n s .
I turn now to m o r e substantive c o n c e r n s . We saw in Figure 10.2 that increases
in seniority and in c a m p a i g n intensity p r o d u c e distinctive c h a n g e s in the pattern
of defections to i n c u m b e n t H o u s e m e m b e r s , as m e a s u r e d against a baseline in-
volving a t w o - y e a r i n c u m b e n t in a low-intensity r a c e . Figure 10.5 depicts the
s a m e seniority and c a m p a i g n effects that w e r e s h o w n earlier, except at the level
of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h u s , on the left of Figure 10.5, we see that an increase in
i n c u m b e n t seniority from t w o years to ten years produces a slight increase in
net p r o i n c u m b e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h e r e the increase is m e a s u r e d against the
s a m e type of baseline race as in the e a r l i e r analysis. T h e effect is c o n c e n t r a t e d
 244
N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Information flow and electoral choice 245

Pure seniority effect Pure campaign intensity effect voters to recall the i n c u m b e n t ' s n a m e . But, they m a i n t a i n , i n c u m b e n c y advan-
+.75 +.751 tage d o e s not require recall ability; it requires only that the voter be able to rec-
o g n i z e the i n c u m b e n t ' s n a m e w h e n e n c o u n t e r i n g it in the voting b o o t h . H e n c e
+.50 +.50
Tenth-year incumbent the rise of the personal vote m a y rest on little m o r e than an increase in t h e ability
+ 2 5 of voters to r e c o g n i z e i n c u m b e n t s ' n a m e s .
Net - +.25
proincumbent "•"""""""""'S^eline ^"""^ T h e n u b of this a r g u m e n t is that i n c u m b e n c y a d v a n t a g e , which is large at the
considerations 0 0 level of the ballot b o x , d e p e n d s on cognitive u n d e r p i n n i n g s that are exceedingly
High- slight. A n d this is exactly the pattern I have found: T h e effect of seniority -
-.25 -.25 1
intensity w h i c h , I reiterate, is m e r e l y a proxy for t h e things that i n c u m b e n t s do to build
-.50 campaign a personal vote - is large at the level of vote defections in Figure 10.2 but small
-.50
1 5

Political awareness at the level of c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in Figure 1 0 . 5 .

partisans i n 197S^H , ™ , n f
" t M > f , o w
° " «he formation o f considerations among out-
part, ans in 1978 House elect.ons. Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 10 4
Baseline is a race ,n wh.ch the incumbent has two years of seniority and s invoWed ^n a
c a m p a i 8 n p , o t s 8ive estimates for
Z^S^ST - Before leaving Figure 1 0 . 5 , I want to return to the q u e s t i o n of w h y exactly
mainly a m o n g o u t p a r t i s a n s scoring m i d d l e to low on political a w a r e n e s s , which
is roughly the s a m e g r o u p that w a s most affected by seniority in t h e e a r l i e r anal-
ysis of v o t e defections. On t h e right of Figure 10.5, we see that an increase in
c a m p a i g n intensity from low to high p r o d u c e s higher than b a s e l i n e s u p p o r t for
the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g l e s ; a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s , and lower than baseline s u p p o r t
a m o n g t h e highly a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s . T h e s e results also m a t c h the effects of
c a m p a i g n intensity on o u t p a r t i s a n defections, as s h o w n in F i g u r e 1 0 . 2 . 1 4
G i v e n the differences in t h e m e t h o d s used to p r o d u c e Figures 10.2 a n d 10.5 -
t h e former involving the votes of 2 7 7 o u t p a r t i s a n s , the latter the net likes and
dislikes of the t w o c a n d i d a t e s by s o m e 1,500 respondents - t h e s u b s t a n t i v e cor-
r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n t h e t w o sets of e s t i m a t e s s e e m s quite impressive. A n d yet,
as can be seen, the m a g n i t u d e of the effect of seniority on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s e e m s
q u i t e small in relation to the m a g n i t u d e of t h e effect of defections, as s h o w n
earlier. W h a t is g o i n g o n ?
An explanation is s u g g e s t e d by an important analysis by M a n n and Wolfinger
(1980). T h e y n o t e that t h e rise of a personal v o t e for i n c u m b e n t H o u s e m e m b e r s
h a s not been a s s o c i a t e d with any d e t e c t a b l e increase over t i m e in the ability of
14 In these and subsequent simulations of candidate considerations, the effect of political awareness
is simulated by simultaneously manipulating scores on the three awareness measures: knowl-
edge, interest, and voting. Knowledge runs from - 1 . 8 SD to 1.5 SD, with the asymmetry re-
flecting the skew in the measure. In Figure 10.2, interest was included in the Awareness scale;
in the present analysis, it is entered as a separate variable in the reception function and, for pur-
poses of simulation, is manipulated over the range of 1.0 to 2.6 on the original three-point scale,
with an adjustment for purging. Vote turnout is manipulated over a range of 0 to 1, with an ad-
justment for purging. The loquacity variable, the sum of party likes and dislikes, was set to 2.0
in all cases, thereby eliminating its correlation with political awareness.
My c o n c l u s i o n , therefore, is that the m o d e s t m a g n i t u d e of the seniority effect
in Figure 10.5 is p r o b a b l y an accurate indication that the effect really is small,
but not so small that it c a n n o t m a k e a big difference in the voting b o o t h w h e n the
i n c u m b e n t is c o m p e t i n g against a c h a l l e n g e r w h o is all but invisible.
high c a m p a i g n intensity has the cross-cutting effects that it does. S i n c e Figure
10.5 has been p r o d u c e d by c o m p u t e r s i m u l a t i o n , it is possible to say exactly
what h a s g e n e r a t e d t h e cross-cutting effects.
T h e c a u s e of these cross-cutting effects, as I suggested earlier, is differential
information flow. S c o r e s on net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in t h e baseline race
have been produced by a d o m i n a n t but not very intense p r o i n c u m b e n t c o m m u -
nication flow, and a c o u n t e r v a l e n t p r o c h a l l e n g e r m e s s a g e that is extremely faint.
As c a m p a i g n intensity i n c r e a s e s , the d o m i n a n t p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e gains suf-
ficient p o w e r to reach low-awareness voters w h o could not pick it up in a b a s e -
line r a c e . H e n c e s u p p o r t for the i n c u m b e n t a m o n g t h e least a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s
increases a s c a m p a i g n intensity increases. T h e c o u n t e r v a l e n t c h a l l e n g e r m e s s a g e
also gains in intensity, but only e n o u g h to reach the most politically aware
p e o p l e , w h o , if they are o u t p a r t i s a n s , then b e c o m e less favorable toward the
incumbent.
T h e s e points are m a d e c l e a r in Table 1 0 . 5 , w h i c h shows the simulated n u m b e r
of d o m i n a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ( i n c u m b e n t likes plus c h a l l e n g e r dislikes) and c o u n -
tervalent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ( i n c u m b e n t dislikes plus c h a l l e n g e r likes) in both a low-
intensity and a high-intensity r a c e . T h e effects are shown separately for a high-
awareness o u t p a r t i s a n voter and a l o w - a w a r e n e s s o n e .
In the first row of the t a b l e , which depicts a low-intensity r a c e , neither high-
awareness nor l o w - a w a r e n e s s o u t p a r t i s a n s volunteer many c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , and
most of w h a t they do express involves information from the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n .
T h e c h a l l e n g e r ' s c a m p a i g n , t h u s , is almost invisible even to highly aware
outpartisans.
15 The effects are small in the sense that the net of positive and negative considerations that se-
niority can explain is small; the coefficients responsible for the separate positive and negative
effects, as shown in Table 10.4, are not small.
246 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 247

C o n v e r s e , in his study of information flow in p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s , proposed o n e

Table 10.5. Effect of campaign intensity on formation of considerations
among outpartisans m e c h a n i s m by w h i c h a w a r e n e s s induces resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . M o r e aware
p e o p l e , he a r g u e d , d e v e l o p larger stores of l o n g - t e r m p a r t i s a n i n f o r m a t i o n , and
this internalized ballast e n a b l e s t h e m to withstand the c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s they
High awareness outpartisan Low awareness outpartisan
encounter. T h e H o u s e d a t a produced s u p p o r t for this view. P e o p l e w h o are gen-
Proincumbent Prochallenger Proincumbent Prochallenger
erally attentive to politics do have larger stores of preexisting p a r t i s a n consid-
considerations considerations considerations considerations
e r a t i o n s (Table 10.2), and preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are a s s o c i a t e d with
Low-intensity campaign 0.24 0.07 0.16 0.01 resistance to i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d c a m p a i g n s (Tables 10.1 and 1 0 . 3 , and Figure
10.1). This type of resistance is w h a t I have t e r m e d inertial resistance.
High-intensity campaign 1.09 1.43 0.92 0.26
But political a w a r e n e s s r e m a i n s associated with resistance even after control-
ling for its intervening effect as a proxy for inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . O n e reason
Gain from campaign +0.85 +1.36 +0.76 +0.25
for this is that a w a r e n e s s also e n h a n c e s partisan resistance to political c o m m u -
Net gain/loss to incumbent -0.41 +0.51
nications at the point of e n c o u n t e r i n g and d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r to accept t h e m , as
Note: Cell entries are simulated mean number of considerations in each category for s h o w n in Table 10.4.
modal outpartisan voters, where simulations are based on coefficients in Table 10.4. Yet t h e effects of a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance to persuasion w e r e neither
Source: 1978 NES survey. large nor consistent. T h e y played a role in resistance to i n c u m b e n t - d o m i n a t e d
c a m p a i g n s , but not a large o n e .
T h i s b r i n g s us to the third form of resistance to d o m i n a n t political c a m p a i g n s ,
In a high-intensity r a c e , as s h o w n in the s e c o n d row of the t a b l e , highly a w a r e countervalent resistance. C o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance involves sensitivity to
voters acquire additional c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , but m o r e c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s sources of information o t h e r than the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n , w h i c h , in the present
than d o m i n a n t ones. ( T h e s e respondents were heavily exposed to b o t h c a m - c a s e , m e a n s sensitivity to the prochallenger and a n t i i n c u m b e n t information from
p a i g n s , but, as o u t p a r t i s a n s , they accept m a i n l y countervalent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . ) the c h a l l e n g e r c a m p a i g n .
As a result, their net evaluation of the i n c u m b e n t falls below the b a s e l i n e . T h e major finding in this area h a s been t h a t , as s h o w n most clearly in Figure
M e a n w h i l e , the effect of an intense c a m p a i g n on less a w a r e o u t p a r t i s a n s is 10.4, highly a w a r e p e r s o n s , but not most o t h e r p e o p l e , receive significant
quite different. T h e y a r e , as we have seen in Table 10.4, predisposed to accept a m o u n t s of information from the countervailing challenger c a m p a i g n . As a re-
c o u n t e r v a l e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , but most of w h a t reaches t h e m is i n f o r m a t i o n from sult, highly aware o u t p a r t i s a n s , but not m o s t o t h e r s , develop r e a s o n s for o p p o s -
t h e d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n . H e n c e , in contrast to h i g h - a w a r e n e s s o u t p a r t i s a n s , they ing the i n c u m b e n t and s u p p o r t i n g the challenger. T h i s , in t u r n , e n a b l e s highly
acquire m o r e d o m i n a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s than c o u n t e r v a l e n t o n e s , w h i c h leads aware o u t p a r t i s a n s to resist the d o m i n a n t i n c u m b e n t c a m p a i g n in the e l e m e n t a r y
t h e m to raise their net evaluations of the i n c u m b e n t above baseline levels. sense that, a l t h o u g h they m a y internalize s o m e p r o i n c u m b e n t m e s s a g e s , they d o
T h e s e d a t a on t h e effects of differential information flow offer a striking par- not e n d up s u p p o r t i n g the i n c u m b e n t .
allel to the n o t a b l e c a s e of c h a n g e s in public attitudes toward the V i e t n a m W a r It is w o r t h e m p h a s i z i n g that w h a t d r i v e s the c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance of t h e
b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966, w h e n less aware liberals b e c a m e m o r e s u p p o r t i v e of the politically aware is not resistance per s e , but t h e ability to pick up low-intensity
w a r while m o r e a w a r e liberals b e c a m e less so. T h e only difference is t h a t , in the c o m m u n i c a t i o n s from the political e n v i r o n m e n t . C o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance a p -
c a s e of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , we have been able to capture the effects of a two-sided pears to be the m o s t i m p o r t a n t source of resistance to d o m i n a n t political
information flow b o t h at the level of s u m m a r y s t a t e m e n t s of preference (that is, campaigns.
vote c h o i c e s , as in Figure 10.2) and at the m o r e basic level of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s It might be objected that w h a t I am calling c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance to a d o m -
u n d e r l y i n g s u m m a r y decisions. inant m e s s a g e is not really resistance at all, but merely susceptibility to alter-
native sources of p e r s u a s i o n . This objection m a y perhaps be r e a s o n a b l e in cases
in w h i c h the c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e is nearly as intense as the d o m i n a n t o n e . But
Summary on House elections
it should not be forgotten that c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance involves, most funda-
T h e analysis of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s h a s given us o u r best o p p o r t u n i t y to pick mentally, being e x p o s e d to t w o streams of influence and picking out the o n e that
a p a r t the d y n a m i c s of resistance to persuasion by a d o m i n a n t political m e s s a g e , is m o r e congenial w i t h o n e ' s values r a t h e r than simply the o n e that is louder. As
and especially the role of political a w a r e n e s s in such resistance. W h a t have long as this sort of a u t o n o m o u s choice is being m a d e , it m a k e s sense to say that
we learned? o n e m e s s a g e has been c h o s e n and the o t h e r resisted.
248 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 249

HOUSE E L E C T I O N S IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE Outpartisan Outpartisan Democratic

defections to defections to defections
M o s t analysis of electoral c h o i c e , as I indicated in C h a p t e r 1, focuses on a single
incumbent in incumbent in to Reagan in
type of e l e c t i o n . B e c a u s e t h e present analysis of H o u s e elections has been cast contested 1978 contested 1990 1984 presidential
in t e r m s of the general R A S m o d e l , however, there is every reason to try to ex- House elections Senate elections election
tend it to m o r e c a s e s . T h i s is what I u n d e r t a k e to do in this section.
O n e w o u l d not, of c o u r s e , expect identical patterns of electoral c h o i c e in
w i d e l y dissimilar c a s e s . O n e w o u l d , however, expect the basic processes of in- Low-
intensity Low-intensity
f o r m a t i o n diffusion and influence to be t h e s a m e . If s o , voting b e h a v i o r across
races
types of e l e c t i o n s should a p p e a r fundamentally similar, o n c e s y s t e m a t i c differ-
e n c e s in t h e flow of information are taken account of. Since H o u s e e l e c t i o n s
provide less information to voters than any other type of national e l e c t i o n , and
in this sense m a r k a sort of limiting c a s e , the o b v i o u s question b e c o m e s : W h a t
h a p p e n s to electoral c h o i c e as c a m p a i g n intensity increases, thereby providing
voters with larger a m o u n t s of c a n d i d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n ?
To a n s w e r this q u e s t i o n , I brought together d a t a on voter defection to the in-
c u m b e n t from three other types of races: low- and high-intensity S e n a t e c a m - Political awareness
p a i g n s , and the 1984 presidential r a c e . T h e s e d a t a are shown in Figure 10.6. Let Figure 10.6. Defections to incumbent party in U.S. national elections. House estimates
me briefly d e s c r i b e the p r o c e d u r e s used to g e n e r a t e these d a t a . are based on coefficients in Table 10.1; Senate estimates are based on coefficients in
Table 10.6; presidential data are based on a polynomial regression. Source: National
House elections. Defection patterns in low- and high-intensity H o u s e races are Election Study surveys.
the s a m e as in t h e r i g h t - h a n d panel of Figure 10.2. T h e s e p a t t e r n s , as m a y be
r e c a l l e d , depict the effects of c a m p a i g n intensity, net of the effect of seniority, Presidential elections. E s t i m a t i o n of defection rates to the i n c u m b e n t ' s p a r t y in
which is held at its m i n i m u m value. 1984 w a s sufficiently straightforward that it could be a c c o m p l i s h e d by a simple
p o l y n o m i a l regression.
Senate elections. Defection patterns in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s have been e s t i m a t e d
In e x a m i n i n g Figure 10.6, it is i m m e d i a t e l y a p p a r e n t that the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y
from t h e 1990 w a v e of the N E S Senate election study. T h e s e d a t a involve the
often associated with t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model shows up strongly in
twenty-five races in w h i c h an i n c u m b e n t sought reelection under c h a l l e n g e from
H o u s e elections but is essentially absent from the other c a s e s . As explained in
the opposition party. T h e m o d e l and p r o c e d u r e s used in e s t i m a t i n g defection
C h a p t e r 8, this is neither a p r o b l e m nor even a surprise for the R A S m o d e l , since
p a t t e r n s are exactly the s a m e as in the c a s e of H o u s e elections. T h e defection
n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y is only o n e of the possible o u t c o m e s of the r e c e p t i o n -
p a t t e r n s shown in the figure are e s t i m a t e s for m o d a l p a r t i s a n s , as d e s c r i b e d in
a c c e p t a n c e process. If t h e c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e is sufficiently intense to
A p p e n d i x A to this chapter. As in the c a s e of the H o u s e d a t a , low-intensity races
reach the least politically aware stratum of the e l e c t o r a t e , politically u n a w a r e
have been defined by scores on the three c a m p a i g n - i n t e n s i t y v a r i a b l e s and cor-
persons can be e x p e c t e d to be more susceptible to influence than a n y o n e else.
r e s p o n d to roughly the 10th percentile of overall c a m p a i g n intensity; high-
16 T h u s , D r y e r (1971) found that the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that C o n v e r s e discovered in
intensity races have been defined by scores at about the 90th p e r c e n t i l e . A l s o
t h e 1952 presidential e l e c t i o n did not show up in any s u b s e q u e n t presidential
as in the case of H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , the i n c u m b e n t is a s s u m e d to have j u s t c o m -
contest. Instead, there has been a m o n o t o n i c a l l y n e g a t i v e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n
pleted a first t e r m . Details of variable c o n s t r u c t i o n are found in A p p e n d i x A.
awareness and probability of vote defection. " T h e flow of s h o r t - t e r m s t i m u l i , "
as D r y e r explained, " h a s effectively p e n e t r a t e d all s e g m e n t s of the e l e c t o r a t e , "
thereby ironing out t h e n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y and p r o d u c i n g attitude c h a n g e even in
the least politically active stratum of the e l e c t o r a t e (Dryer, 1971: p. 5 3 3 ) .
W h a t Figure 10.6 adds to D r y e r ' s account is that even S e n a t e c a m p a i g n s now
16 To control for differences in state population, I divided campaign spending by the number of
congressional districts in the state. Low-intensity races were ones in which the total of the in- achieve sufficient intensity to penetrate to t h e least aware stratum of the e l e c -
cumbent's spending, including party and other sources, was $1.5 million per district, the total of t o r a t e , but that most H o u s e elections do not.
the challenger's spending was $500,000 per district, and the aggregate media intensity score was
T h e r e is, however, a p r o m i n e n t feature of Figure 10.6 that cannot be readily
near the bottom of its range at 0.05. High-intensity races were ones in which incumbent and
challenger spending were $10 million, and media intensity was .75.' a c c o m m o d a t e d within a o n e - m e s s a g e f r a m e w o r k . It is the fact that peak levels
250 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 251

of defection o c c u r in H o u s e elections and in low-intensity S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s ,

Net like/dislike Net like/dislike Net likeldislike
which have relatively low levels of c a m p a i g n intensity, while the lowest defec-
17 scores in scores in scores in
tion rates occur in a presidential e l e c t i o n , which h a s the highest i n t e n s i t y .
contested 1978 contested 1970 contested 1984
Nothing in my typology of attitude c h a n g e , as presented in Figure 8 . 2 , or any Presidential elections
House elections Senate elections
o t h e r m a n i p u l a t i o n of the logic of the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l , can explain this o c -
c u r r e n c e . T h e cross-cutting effects of c a m p a i g n intensity in the c a s e of H o u s e Pro-
Republicans
( incumbent
e l e c t i o n s likewise defy the logic of a o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l . In order to explain the
patterns of vote defection in Figure 10.6, w h i c h should be u n d e r s t o o d most gen-
erally as patterns of attitude c h a n g e , it is n e c e s s a r y to take account of both sides
of the c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow to which citizens have been e x p o s e d .
W i t h respect to H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , this task has already been a c c o m p l i s h e d by
my discussion of the effect of differential information flow on the f o r m a t i o n of
c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Figure 10.7 gives us the e v i d e n c e n e c e s s a r y to extend
this discussion to S e n a t e and presidential e l e c t i o n s .
Figure 10.7 displays s u m m a r y m e a s u r e s of c a n d i d a t e evaluations for all three
types of e l e c t i o n s , b a s e d on administration of the s a m e likes/dislikes q u e s t i o n s
in each c a s e . T h e d a t a on H o u s e e l e c t i o n s in the figure are derived from the Pro-
Challenger
coefficients presented in Table 10.4; the d a t a for S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s have been
simulated by the s a m e p r o c e d u r e s as used for H o u s e elections (see A p p e n d i x A Political awareness
to this c h a p t e r ) ; and the d a t a for the 1984 presidential election are simply plots
of the raw m e a n s for E^emocrats and R e p u b l i c a n s by levels of political KEY
awareness.
1. Members of inparty, high intensity race
T h e i m m e d i a t e l y evident pattern in these d a t a is that m o r e intense c a m p a i g n s ,
both across types of e l e c t i o n s and within t h e m , lead inpartisans and o u t p a r t i s a n s 2. Members of inparty, low intensity race
to d e v e l o p overall c a n d i d a t e evaluations - m e a s u r e d as the net of the four can- 3. Members of outparty, low intensity race
d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n m e a s u r e s — that are m o r e polarized along p a r t i s a n lines. 4. Members of outparty, high intensity race
G i v e n that, as we saw in Table 10.3, c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s powerfully affect
vote d e c i s i o n s , the effect of this polarization of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s along p a r t y lines Figure 10.7. Candidate evaluations in U.S. national elections. House estimates are based
is to g e n e r a t e m o r e party-line voting in the more intense races and h e n c e lower on Equation 10.1 and the coefficients in Table 10.4; Senate estimates are based on co-
defection rates. efficients in Table 10.7; presidential data depict raw data. Sources: National Election
Study surveys.
Since it has been p r o d u c e d by s i m u l a t i o n , the greater polarization of net can-
d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in high-intensity races is fully e x p l a i n a b l e . Two m a i n fac- and that R e p u b l i c a n s exhibit the reverse tendency. Let us a s s u m e , for the sake of
tors are at w o r k : M o r e intense races entail, in the construction of these figures a r g u m e n t , that t h e a c c e p t a n c e rate is 67 percent for congenial m e s s a g e s , but 33
as well as in actual p r a c t i c e , both more evenly balanced c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows percent for uncongenial ones. T h i s a m o u n t s to p a r t i s a n bias in information pro-
and a larger overall v o l u m e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . It is no m y s t e r y that a balanced cessing that is roughly in line with the rates implied for median respondents by
c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow c o n t r i b u t e s to p a r t y p o l a r i z a t i o n , since it gives e a c h side the coefficients in Table 10.4. If, t h e n , a D e m o c r a t is e x p o s e d to three pro-
the informational basis of a partisan evaluation of the c a n d i d a t e s , but sheer vol- D e m o c r a t i c m e s s a g e s and three pro-Republican o n e s , his expected net score will
u m e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n is also extremely i m p o r t a n t . Let us see why. be +1 in the D e m o c r a t i c direction (he will accept t w o of the first type and one
We have already seen that D e m o c r a t s tend to accept m o r e of the pro- of the s e c o n d , for a net score of + 1 ) . But if he is exposed to six m e s s a g e s of each
D e m o c r a t i c m e s s a g e s they e n c o u n t e r than they do of the p r o - R e p u b l i c a n o n e s , t y p e , his expected net score will increase to +2 (he will accept four congenial
m e s s a g e s and two u n c o n g e n i a l o n e s ) . In g e n e r a l , the larger the n u m b e r of m e s -
17 The 1984 presidential election, of course, produced higher levels of defection to the inparty than sages on which this or any consistent D e m o c r a t i c bias o p e r a t e s , the larger the
in most presidential elections, but is otherwise typical of other cases. Even among House elec-
tions, higher-intensity races produce lower overall levels of defection than low-intensity races expected net score in the D e m o c r a t i c d i r e c t i o n . T h e same p r o c e s s , of c o u r s e ,
(mean 41 percent vs. 59 percent, t = 2.87, p < .01). drives R e p u b l i c a n s to a higher net score in t h e Republican d i r e c t i o n .
 252 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
T h i s a r g u m e n t explains why, all else e q u a l , there is more p a r t y p o l a r i z a t i o n in
high-intensity (high-information) races. Since highly aware p a r t i s a n s ingest
m o r e c a m p a i g n information than less aware p a r t i s a n s , it also explains why
highly aware D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s are m o r e polarized in their net con-
s i d e r a t i o n s scores than are less a w a r e p a r t i s a n s of each stripe.
It is w o r t h e m p h a s i z i n g , t h e n , that the m a i n reason for the greater p a r t i s a n
p o l a r i z a t i o n of m o r e a w a r e voters - especially in presidential e l e c t i o n s , w h e r e
the flow of c a n d i d a t e information is essentially evenly balanced - is not that the
m o r e aware voters are m o r e selective in d e c i d i n g which c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to ac-
cept (though there m a y be s o m e t e n d e n c y for t h e m to be). It is, rather, that m o r e
a w a r e p a r t i s a n s , o w i n g to the effect of a w a r e n e s s on r e c e p t i o n , ingest m u c h
m o r e information than less aware p a r t i s a n s , and processing this greater volume
of information with (almost) the same partisan bias as e v e r y o n e else leads t h e m
to form net e v a l u a t i o n s that are m o r e highly p o l a r i z e d .
T h i s a r g u m e n t explains why there is m o r e party-line voting in e l e c t i o n s in
w h i c h information flow is m o r e intense, and why, within both presidential and
S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s , there tends to be m o r e p a r t y loyalty a m o n g m o r e a w a r e voters.
In H o u s e e l e c t i o n s there is a n o n m o n o t o n i c relationship between a w a r e n e s s and
defection, but the reason for the exceptional p a t t e r n is clear. T h e a m o u n t of in-
f o r m a t i o n about the c a n d i d a t e s reaching less a w a r e voters in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s is
lower than in any o t h e r t y p e of r a c e , an a m o u n t that is fairly close to n i l . Voters 1 8
w h o are undisturbed by any new information do not defect to t h e o p p o s i t i o n .
A modified form of C o n v e r s e ' s original information flow a r g u m e n t w o u l d , in
light of all t h i s , explain t h e cross-election p a t t e r n of defections in Figure 10.6 as
follows: Voters at the lowest awareness levels and in the lowest intensity e l e c -
tions r e m a i n loyal to their p a r t y b e c a u s e , as C o n v e r s e originally a r g u e d , they get
almost no new i n f o r m a t i o n . As the information reaching voters rises from nearly
nil to s o m e , p a r t i s a n instability shoots to its highest levels; these are the cases of
m i d d l e - a w a r e n e s s voters in low-intensity H o u s e r a c e s , and l o w - a w a r e n e s s voters
in low-intensity S e n a t e races. T h e reason for the m a r k e d instability of these vot-
ers is that most of the information they get is p r o i n c u m b e n t i n f o r m a t i o n , w h i c h
they have little inertial capacity to resist. As c a m p a i g n information reaching out-
p a r t i s a n voters c o n t i n u e s to r i s e , instability falls from its peak levels, reaching
a limit of almost no p a r t i s a n defection a m o n g highly aware voters in presidential
e l e c t i o n s . Inertial resistance is only a small p a r t of the explanation for the d e -
cline in instability from peak levels. T h e m a i n reason is that more attentive voters
are receiving higher volumes of more balanced c a n d i d a t e i n f o r m a t i o n , all of
w h i c h c o n d u c e toward greater party p o l a r i z a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e e v a l u a t i o n s and
h e n c e higher levels of p a r t i s a n loyalty.
T h i s analysis leads to an o b s e r v a t i o n of s o m e theoretical significance: Al-
t h o u g h resistance to d o m i n a n t political c a m p a i g n s d e p e n d s heavily on factors
that are internal to individuals - notably stored c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , political values
and a t t a c h m e n t s , and political awareness - intraindividual predispositions to-
18 The simulated mean number of remarks across both candidates for voters in the lowest awareness
category in a low-intensity, low-seniority House race is 0.13.
Information flow and electoral choice 253
w a r d resistance c a n n o t , by t h e m s e l v e s , explain very m u c h . In o r d e r to have real
effect, they must be n o u r i s h e d by exposure to a countervalent information flow.
W h e n people are e x p o s e d to two c o m p e t i n g sets of electoral i n f o r m a t i o n , they
are generally able to c h o o s e a m o n g t h e m on the basis of their p a r t i s a n s h i p and
values even w h e n they do not score especially well on tests of political aware-
ness. But w h e n individuals are exposed to a o n e - s i d e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n flow, as
in low-key H o u s e and S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s , their capacity for critical resistance ap-
pears quite limited.
T h e conclusion I d r a w from this is that the most i m p o r t a n t source of resistance
to d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n s - certainly in e l e c t i o n s a n d , as e v i d e n c e from t h e main-
stream model i n d i c a t e s , perhaps in other contexts as well - is c o u n t e r v a l e n t in-
formation c a r r i e d within the overall stream of political i n f o r m a t i o n .
Before I c o n c l u d e this a r g u m e n t , let us e x a m i n e one final c a s e of attitude for-
m a t i o n and c h a n g e .
T H E DYNAMICS OF P R E S I D E N T I A L PRIMARIES
O n e difficulty in studying attitude c h a n g e in t h e context of p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s is
that m o s t vote decisions are so strongly m o o r e d to stable p a r t y identifications
that there is little o p p o r t u n i t y to o b s e r v e c h a n g e . In e x a m i n i n g rates of defection
of voters in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , for e x a m p l e , it w a s n e c e s s a r y to set aside most
voters on the g r o u n d s that, as p a r t i s a n s of the inparty, they p r o d u c e d almost no
cases of defection from p a r t y v o t i n g . T h i s difficulty obviously d o e s not arise in
presidential p r i m a r y e l e c t i o n s . Indeed, the p r o b l e m is more nearly the opposite:
Preferences s o m e t i m e s shift so rapidly that it is impossible to get a g o o d fix on
t h e m . It is therefore interesting to see w h e t h e r the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of electoral
d y n a m i c s that w o r k s so well in the relatively stable context of p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s
applies to a m o r e free-wheeling e l e c t i o n as w e l l .
Background
In t h e first w e e k s of the 1984 D e m o c r a t i c n o m i n a t i o n contest, it a p p e a r e d that
a serious race m i g h t never d e v e l o p . J o h n G l e n n w a s m o u n t i n g an inept and fal-
tering c a m p a i g n , and this left Walter M o n d a l e almost u n o p p o s e d in a D e m o -
cratic pack c o n s i s t i n g , except for h i m , of u n k n o w n s . Shortly before the N e w
H a m p s h i r e p r i m a r y , t h e New York Times released a national poll s h o w i n g that
M o n d a l e w a s further a h e a d than any c a n d i d a t e had ever been at that point in the
n o m i n a t i o n contest.
But big things w e r e stirring in Iowa. In t h e w e e k prior to that s t a t e ' s c a u c u s e s ,
G a r y H a r t w a s m o v i n g up fast, and this b e g a n to be reflected in national n e w s -
weeklies. If Time or Newsweek included a picture of any c a n d i d a t e other than
M o n d a l e or G l e n n , it w a s likely to be H a r t . H a r t went on to place well in Iowa,
finishing s e c o n d t o M o n d a l e . T h e n , m o r e unexpectedly, H a r t t r o u n c e d M o n d a l e
in N e w H a m p s h i r e a n d , on the m a s s i v e t i d e of publicity that followed, s e e m e d
on t h e verge of k n o c k i n g M o n d a l e out of the r a c e . H a r t ' s p i c t u r e , of c o u r s e ,
254 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

graced the covers of the n e w s w e e k l i e s a n d , o v e r n i g h t , his n a m e b e c a m e a h o u s e -

hold w o r d . But a l t h o u g h performing very strongly in the S u p e r Tuesday p r i m a -
ries that followed t w o w e e k s after N e w H a m p s h i r e , H a r t c o u l d n ' t quite force
M o n d a l e from the r a c e . Instead, he suddenly found himself the butt of j o k e s
about his n a m e and his a g e , and trying to a n s w e r the question " W h e r e ' s the
b e e f ? " T h r o u g h late M a r c h , April, and May, H a r t and M o n d a l e e n g a g e d in
trench warfare, with M o n d a l e finally prevailing.
T h e s e e v e n t s , as c o m p l e x a stimulus to m a s s opinion as any e n c o u n t e r e d in
this b o o k , provide a final opportunity to o b s e r v e the effects of information flow
on the evolution of the p u b l i c ' s political preferences.

Data and model

D u r i n g the p r i m a r y p e r i o d , the N E S c o n d u c t e d a c o n t i n u o u s survey of attitudes

toward the c o n t e n d i n g c a n d i d a t e s . A l t h o u g h these surveys contacted only about
forty-five D e m o c r a t s a w e e k , they provide an extremely v a l u a b l e , if slightly
fuzzy, series of snapshots of the r a c e .
In analyzing these d a t a , I have broken t h e p r i m a r y season into p e r i o d s that
c o i n c i d e with the major s w i n g s in public attitudes. T h e first, c o v e r i n g J a n u a r y
and early February, is the t ime w h e n M o n d a l e s e e m e d to have the race locked up
and w h e n H a r t w a s a mefe blip in the national polls. T h e s e c o n d , covering, the
last t w o w e e k s of F e b r u a r y w a s the period w h e n M o n d a l e w a s widely c o n s i d e r e d
unstoppable but H a r t w a s beginning to build m o m e n t u m in the Iowa and N e w
H a m p s h i r e c a m p a i g n s . T h e third is the t h r e e - w e e k period from i m m e d i a t e l y after
N e w H a m p s h i r e to just before the Illinois p r i m a r y , the race in w h i c h H a r t suf-
fered his first serious defeat; this w a s the period in which H a r t enjoyed his a m a z -
ing surge in the polls, but also the period in which he began to e n c o u n t e r the first
questions about his c h a r a c t e r and his supposedly " n e w i s s u e s . " T h e fourth pe-
riod r u n s from late M a r c h through the end of the p r i m a r y s e a s o n , a period of
many m i n o r ups and d o w n s from which M o n d a l e eventually e m e r g e d the victor.
Figure 10.8 provides a b r e a k d o w n of m e a n s u p p o r t for each c a n d i d a t e a m o n g
D e m o c r a t s in each t i m e p e r i o d . Even from visual inspection, these d a t a tell an
o b v i o u s story of differential information flow - that is, a story of the differential
p e n e t r a t i o n of c a n d i d a t e m e s s a g e s of differing intensities. In the p e r i o d before
the Iowa p r i m a r i e s , higher levels of political awareness are associated with
steadily greater s u p p o r t for M o n d a l e , the c a n d i d a t e w h o , at that point, had no
debilitating w a r t s and w a s , according to the m e d i a , the D e m o c r a t with the best
c h a n c e of winning t h e n o m i n a t i o n (Brady and J o h n s t o n , 1987; Tables 7 and 8).
G a r y H a r t had minimal s u p p o r t , but w h a t little he had w a s c o n c e n t r a t e d a m o n g
the most politically aware m e m b e r s of the D e m o c r a t i c party, w h o were the only
people sufficiently attentive to politics to have b e c o m e aware of such a " s e c o n d
1 9
tier" candidate.

19 Thus, as Sam Popkin has noted, the politically aware are often "leading indicators" of future
change (oral remarks. Southern California Running Dog Seminar,,San Diego, February 1988).
 256 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
T h e finding that the most aware D e m o c r a t s w e r e most susceptible to influ-
e n c e by the d o m i n a n t M o n d a l e c a m p a i g n of this period m a y s e e m s u r p r i s i n g .
But it s h o u l d n ' t . If, as has been a r g u e d , a w a r e n e s s is associated with resistance
to persuasion b e c a u s e it proxies for r e c e p t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e information
sources - notably, the stored m a s s of previously formed c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , cueing
m e s s a g e s , and c o u n t e r v a l e n t information flows - there is no reason to expect
a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance effects in this p e r i o d . D e m o c r a t s had no m e m o r y
of bad e x p e r i e n c e s with M o n d a l e ; national elites largely s u p p o r t e d his candi-
dacy, or at any rate p r o v i d e d no opinion leadership against h i m ; and the H a r t
c a m p a i g n w a s t o o w e a k to be an effective source of c o u n t e r v a l e n t i n f o r m a t i o n .
In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , there w o u l d be no informational basis for resistance to
persuasion and no c u e i n g m e s s a g e s that w o u l d i m p e d e the internalization of pro-
M o n d a l e m e s s a g e s , so that influence should d e p e n d wholly on levels of r e c e p -
tion of the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e .
I n the t w o - w e e k period preceding the N e w H a m p s h i r e p r i m a r y , H a r t b e g a n
his r i s e . But at this e a r l y point, the esoteric H a r t m e s s a g e w a s still able to reach
only t h e most a w a r e q u a r t i l e of the D e m o c r a t i c rank-and-file. T h e r e w a s no re-
sistance to this m e s s a g e , b e c a u s e H a r t , like M o n d a l e , w a s getting one-sidedly
positive c o v e r a g e in the press and b e c a u s e D e m o c r a t s had no prior information
about H a r t that w o u l d give t h e m a basis for resistance. M e a n w h i l e , the M o n d a l e
m e s s a g e , which w a s still more intense than that of H a r t before the N e w H a m p -
shire p r i m a r y , w a s m a k i n g c o n v e r t s a m o n g t h e r a n k s of the m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e ,
w h o had not been paying sufficient attention to receive the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e in
the p r e c a m p a i g n p e r i o d and were now j u s t tuning in. But the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e
could m a k e n o m o r e c o n v e r t s a m o n g the m o s t a w a r e D e m o c r a t s b e c a u s e , within
this s e g m e n t of t h e D e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t y , it w a s in direct c o m p e t i t i o n with the
Hart campaign.
So in this p e r i o d , there w a s still no e v i d e n c e of resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . T h e
most a w a r e were clearly the most i n f l u e n c e a b l e , and by a very w i d e m a r g i n .
( T h e s h a r p n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y in net s u p p o r t for M o n d a l e in the s e c o n d period
w a s not e v i d e n c e of resistance to c h a n g e ; it w a s e v i d e n c e that the m o s t a w a r e
D e m o c r a t s were d e s e r t i n g M o n d a l e in o r d e r to follow H a r t , and that less a w a r e
o n e s had not yet gotten the n e w s about H a r t ' s rising star.)
Trends were m a r k e d l y different in the third t i m e p e r i o d . A l t h o u g h H a r t w a s
enjoying his p o s t - N e w H a m p s h i r e publicity s u r g e , he was unable to gain any
m o r e s u p p o r t a m o n g highly aware D e m o c r a t s . N o r did M o n d a l e lose any sup-
port in this g r o u p . T h u s , highly a w a r e persons had b e g u n to exhibit resistance to
the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e . T h e r e a s o n , presumably, w a s that they had
now acquired e n o u g h information about the t w o c a n d i d a t e s that they could no
longer be blown about by every n e w turn in the c a m p a i g n . M e a n w h i l e , H a r t ' s
p o s t - N e w H a m p s h i r e publicity binge w a s strong e n o u g h finally t o reach m o d -
erately aware D e m o c r a t s , w h o rapidly d e s e r t e d M o n d a l e and s w u n g to H a r t in
large n u m b e r s . T h e largest attitude s w i n g s in this period were clearly c o n c e n -
trated a m o n g p e r s o n s of m o d e r a t e political a w a r e n e s s . T h e m a g n i t u d e of this
Information flow and electoral choice 257
Proportion switching Proportion switching Proportion switching
to Hart after Iowa to Hart after New to Mondale in late
Hampshire campaign period
Political awareness
Figure 10.9. Estimated rates of preference change in Mondale vs. Hart contest. Note:
Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 10.8 and model in Appendix B to Chap-
ter 10. Estimates involve Democrats only.
p o p u l a r surge - to w h i c h t h e most aware and least aware D e m o c r a t s c o n t r i b u t e d
little - w a s what n e a r l y d r o v e M o n d a l e from the r a c e .
In the final p e r i o d , m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e D e m o c r a t s , following t h e n e w s of M o n -
d a y ' s increasing success i n t h e later p r i m a r i e s , s w u n g back t o M o n d a l e w h i l e
the most politically a w a r e D e m o c r a t s c o n t i n u e d largely to hold their g r o u n d .
A g a i n , t h e n , political a w a r e n e s s w a s associated with resistance to c h a n g e , pre-
s u m a b l y b e c a u s e highly a w a r e persons h a d , by this t i m e , been able to firmly
anchor their evaluations in an inertial m a s s of stored information about the t w o
c a n d i d a t e s . T h e least a w a r e D e m o c r a t s were also fairly s t a b l e , with most of
t h e m u n a b l e even to form a preference in the p r i m a r y contest. T h i s left m o d e r -
ately a w a r e persons m o s t susceptible to t h e c u r r e n t s of the t i m e . 2 0
Unfortunately, there are no data at the level of c a n d i d a t e likes and dislikes
with which to c h e c k this account of the m i c r o d y n a m i c s of attitude c h a n g e . It is,
however, possible to fit the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l to the d a t a s h o w n in Fig-
ure 10.8 in order to see w h e t h e r the story I h a v e j u s t told c a n , in a statistical
s e n s e , hold together. T h i s m o d e l i n g exercise is relegated to A p p e n d i x B of this
chapter. T h e only point that needs to be m a d e h e r e is that the m o d e l fits the d a t a
extremely well and c o n f i r m s my basic a c c o u n t in every i m p o r t a n t respect. For
e x a m p l e , Figure 10.9 gives the r a t e s of attitude c h a n g e toward H a r t and then
toward M o n d a l e in the final p h a s e s of t h e c a m p a i g n , as e s t i m a t e d from coeffi-
cients in the m o d e l .
Summary on primary elections
T h e s e findings, especially those from the e a r l y p h a s e s of the c a m p a i g n , under-
score a critical theoretical point: A w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance to d o m i n a n t
political c a m p a i g n s is not a u t o m a t i c . It d e p e n d s on access to a l t e r n a t i v e c o m -
20 From different perspectives, Bartels (1988) and Brady and Johnston (1987) also stress that voter
learning takes place over the course of the primary campaign.
 256 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
T h e finding that the m o s t a w a r e D e m o c r a t s were most s u s c e p t i b l e to influ-
e n c e by the d o m i n a n t M o n d a l e c a m p a i g n of this period may s e e m s u r p r i s i n g .
But it s h o u l d n ' t . If, as has been a r g u e d , a w a r e n e s s is associated with resistance
to persuasion b e c a u s e it proxies for r e c e p t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e information
sources - notably, the stored m a s s of previously formed c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , c u e i n g
m e s s a g e s , and c o u n t e r v a l e n t information flows - there is no reason to expect
a w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance effects in this p e r i o d . D e m o c r a t s had no m e m o r y
of bad e x p e r i e n c e s with M o n d a l e ; national elites largely s u p p o r t e d his candi-
dacy, or at any rate p r o v i d e d no opinion l e a d e r s h i p against h i m ; and the H a r t
c a m p a i g n w a s too w e a k to be an effective source of c o u n t e r v a l e n t i n f o r m a t i o n .
In such c i r c u m s t a n c e s , there w o u l d be no informational basis for resistance to
persuasion and no c u e i n g m e s s a g e s that w o u l d i m p e d e the internalization of pro-
M o n d a l e m e s s a g e s , so that influence should d e p e n d wholly on levels of r e c e p -
tion of the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e .
I n the t w o - w e e k period preceding the N e w H a m p s h i r e p r i m a r y , H a r t began
his r i s e . But at this e a r l y point, the esoteric H a r t m e s s a g e was still able to reach
only t h e most a w a r e q u a r t i l e of the D e m o c r a t i c rank-and-file. T h e r e w a s no re-
sistance to this m e s s a g e , b e c a u s e H a r t , like M o n d a l e , w a s getting one-sidedly
positive c o v e r a g e in the press and b e c a u s e D e m o c r a t s had no prior information
about H a r t that w o u l d give t h e m a basis for resistance. M e a n w h i l e , the M o n d a l e
m e s s a g e , which w a s still r i o r e intense than that of H a r t before the N e w H a m p -
shire p r i m a r y , w a s m a k i n g c o n v e r t s a m o n g the r a n k s o f the m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e ,
w h o had not been p a y i n g sufficient attention to receive the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e in
the p r e c a m p a i g n p e r i o d and were now j u s t tuning in. But the M o n d a l e m e s s a g e
could m a k e n o m o r e c o n v e r t s a m o n g the m o s t a w a r e D e m o c r a t s b e c a u s e , within
this s e g m e n t of the D e m o c r a t i c c o m m u n i t y , it w a s in direct c o m p e t i t i o n with the
Hart campaign.
So in this p e r i o d , there w a s still no e v i d e n c e of resistance to p e r s u a s i o n . T h e
most a w a r e were clearly the most i n f l u e n c e a b l e , and by a very w i d e m a r g i n .
( T h e s h a r p n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y in net s u p p o r t for M o n d a l e in the s e c o n d p e r i o d
w a s not e v i d e n c e of resistance to c h a n g e ; it w a s e v i d e n c e that the m o s t a w a r e
D e m o c r a t s were d e s e r t i n g M o n d a l e in o r d e r to follow H a r t , and that less a w a r e
o n e s had not yet gotten the n e w s about H a r t ' s rising star.)
Trends were m a r k e d l y different in the third t i m e p e r i o d . A l t h o u g h H a r t w a s
enjoying his p o s t - N e w H a m p s h i r e publicity s u r g e , he w a s u n a b l e to gain any
m o r e support a m o n g highly aware D e m o c r a t s . Nor did M o n d a l e lose any s u p -
p o r t in this g r o u p . T h u s , highly a w a r e p e r s o n s had b e g u n to exhibit resistance to
the d o m i n a n t c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e . T h e r e a s o n , presumably, w a s that they had
now acquired e n o u g h information about the t w o c a n d i d a t e s that they could no
longer be blown about by every new turn in the c a m p a i g n . M e a n w h i l e , H a r t ' s
p o s t - N e w H a m p s h i r e publicity b i n g e w a s strong e n o u g h finally t o reach m o d -
erately a w a r e D e m o c r a t s , w h o rapidly d e s e r t e d M o n d a l e and s w u n g t o H a r t i n
large n u m b e r s . T h e largest attitude s w i n g s in this period were c l e a r l y c o n c e n -
trated a m o n g p e r s o n s of m o d e r a t e political a w a r e n e s s . T h e m a g n i t u d e of this
Information flow and electoral choice 257
Proportion switching Proportion switching Proportion switching
to Hart after Iowa to Hart after New to Mondale in late
Hampshire campaign period
1.0
.8
.6
.4
.2 /
0 ] '
Political awareness
Figure 10.9. Estimated rates of preference change in Mondale vs. Hart contest. Note:
Estimates are derived from coefficients in Table 10.8 and model in Appendix B to Chap-
ter 10. Estimates involve Democrats only.
p o p u l a r surge - to w h i c h t h e most aware and least aware D e m o c r a t s c o n t r i b u t e d
little - w a s what n e a r l y d r o v e M o n d a l e from the r a c e .
In the final p e r i o d , m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e D e m o c r a t s , following t h e n e w s of M o n -
d a y ' s increasing success i n t h e later p r i m a r i e s , s w u n g back t o M o n d a l e w h i l e
t h e m o s t politically a w a r e D e m o c r a t s c o n t i n u e d largely to h o l d their g r o u n d .
A g a i n , t h e n , political a w a r e n e s s w a s associated with resistance t o c h a n g e , pre-
s u m a b l y b e c a u s e highly a w a r e persons h a d , by this t i m e , been able to firmly
a n c h o r their evaluations in an inertial m a s s of stored information about the t w o
c a n d i d a t e s . T h e least a w a r e D e m o c r a t s w e r e also fairly s t a b l e , with most of
t h e m u n a b l e even to form a preference in the p r i m a r y contest. T h i s left m o d e r -
2 0
ately aware p e r s o n s m o s t susceptible t o t h e c u r r e n t s o f the t i m e .
Unfortunately, there are no d a t a at t h e level of c a n d i d a t e likes and dislikes
with which to c h e c k this account of t h e m i c r o d y n a m i c s of attitude c h a n g e . It is,
however, possible to fit t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l to the d a t a s h o w n in Fig-
ure 10.8 in order to see w h e t h e r the story I have j u s t told c a n , in a statistical
s e n s e , h o l d together. T h i s m o d e l i n g exercise is relegated to A p p e n d i x B of this
chapter. T h e only point that needs to be m a d e here is that t h e m o d e l fits t h e d a t a
extremely well and c o n f i r m s my basic account in every i m p o r t a n t respect. For
e x a m p l e , Figure 10.9 gives the rates of attitude c h a n g e t o w a r d H a r t and then
toward M o n d a l e in the final p h a s e s of the c a m p a i g n , as e s t i m a t e d from coeffi-
cients in t h e m o d e l .
Summary on primary elections
T h e s e findings, especially those from the e a r l y p h a s e s of the c a m p a i g n , under-
score a critical theoretical point: A w a r e n e s s - i n d u c e d resistance to d o m i n a n t
political c a m p a i g n s is not a u t o m a t i c . It d e p e n d s on access to a l t e r n a t i v e c o m -
20 From different perspectives, Bartels (1988) and Brady and Johnston (1987) also stress that voter
learning takes place over the course of the primary campaign.
258 N A T U R E AND O R I G I N S OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 259

m u n i c a t i o n s - either in the form of stored c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and information from

past c a m p a i g n s or in t h e form of c u r r e n t reception of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i - Table 10.6. Coefficients predicting vote
c a t i o n s or cues. H e n c e w h e n , as in the early stages of the 1984 p r i m a r i e s , the for Senate incumbent among outpartisans
m o s t a w a r e persons have no informational basis for r e s i s t a n c e , they exhibit no
Reception function
hint of resistance. To the c o n t r a r y , they are m o r e reactive to c a m p a i g n s of the
Intercept 0.19
m o m e n t than any o t h e r s e g m e n t of the p u b l i c . O n l y in the later stages of the
Awareness 0.40
c a m p a i g n , by w h i c h t i m e there w a s a two-sided information flow and s o m e d e - (.39)
(standardized)
v e l o p m e n t of inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , do we find that the most a w a r e D e m o c r a t s 0.015
Incumbent spending
are most resistant to c h a n g e . (in $10 thousands per cong. district) (.008)
Challenger spending -.012
(in $10 thousands per cong. district) (.008)
CONCLUDING REMARKS Media coverage -2.65
(range 0 - .74) (1.42)
T h i s c h a p t e r has been only incidentally c o n c e r n e d with e l e c t i o n s . Its real aim
Seniority 1.14
has been t o s h o w h o w p e o p l e ' s s u m m a r y political d e c i s i o n s , w h e t h e r vote (logged) (1.41)
choices or r e s p o n s e s to c l o s e d - e n d e d survey i t e m s , are b a s e d on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s -0.0035
Seniority X Challenger spending
that form from the c o m p e t i n g influences to which they have been e x p o s e d . (.0031)
T h e a d v a n t a g e of this c h a p t e r over p r e c e d i n g ones is that it has h a d , for the Acceptance function
first t i m e , a b u n d a n t , m e a s u r a b l e variability in t h e intensities of t h e o p p o s i n g Intercept 4.05
m e s s a g e s to w h i c h individuals have been e x p o s e d , along with m e a s u r e s of the Awareness -1.31
(standardized) (.50)
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that u n d e r l i e s u m m a r y e x p r e s s i o n s of political preferences. This
Partisan strength -1.18
has m a d e it possible to directly o b s e r v e the effects of inertial resistance (in the (.57)
(range 1-2)
form of party likes and dislikes) a n d , m o r e i m p o r t a n t in the context of e l e c t i o n s , Policy distance -0.70
the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance (in the form of prochallenger and antiin- (see text) (.31)
c u m b e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n f l o w s ) . But the theoretical m a c h i n e r y u n d e r l y i n g these Challenger spending 0.001
o b s e r v a t i o n s has b e e n exactly the s a m e as in e a r l i e r analyses of attitude forma- (.001)
tion and c h a n g e . N 450

Note: Model is Equation 10.1, estimated by

APPENDIX A: D E F E C T I O N S IN S E N A T E E L E C T I O N S maximum likelihood. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Dependent variable is whether
T h e m o d e l used in e s t i m a t i n g defection to the i n c u m b e n t in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s w a s outpartisan voted for the incumbent.
the s a m e as for H o u s e defections. T h e variables used in the m o d e l are as follows: Source: 1990 NES Senate survey.

Political awareness. A l t h o u g h the S e n a t e election study contained an unusually

weak selection of a w a r e n e s s i t e m s , I built the best m e a s u r e I c o u l d , as d e s c r i b e d
in the M e a s u r e s A p p e n d i x .
Campaign intensity. T h e 1990 S e n a t e study a s k e d all respondents:
How many stories did you read, see or hear regarding the campaign in this state for the
U.S. Senate? Would you say that you read, saw, or heard a good many, just one or two,
or none?
As described in the c a s e of the H o u s e d a t a , I c o n v e r t e d responses to this ques-
21
tion to a state-level m e a s u r e of the intensity of m e d i a c o v e r a g e . T h e variable
r u n s from 0 to 0 . 7 4 scale units, as d e n o m i n a t e d by the original two-unit scale.
21 There may be some heteroskedasticity in measurement of the aggregate media variable, but it is
likely to be small since N's of the state-level means are approximately the same.
Political values. T h e S e n a t e study c a r r i e d the traditional party identification
m e a s u r e , scored in t h e usual way. It w a s also possible to m e a s u r e ideological or
policy distance from the i n c u m b e n t . T h e d i s t a n c e m e a s u r e w a s c o n s t r u c t e d by
s u m m i n g i n c u m b e n t s ' scores on the A m e r i c a n s for D e m o c r a t i c A c t i o n and
A m e r i c a n C o n s e r v a t i v e U n i o n r a t i n g scales from the year prior to the e l e c t i o n ,
standardizing the s c o r e s , and subtracting from a standardized m e a s u r e of re-
s p o n d e n t s ' ideological self-description. T h e v a r i a b l e has been c o d e d so that, if
the D e m o c r a t i c c a n d i d a t e is to the left of the Republican c a n d i d a t e , higher
scores indicate greater policy affinity to the challenger.
T h e coefficients for the S e n a t e defection m o d e l are s h o w n in Table 10.6. O n e
point of interest in t h e s e coefficients is t h a t , a l t h o u g h the seniority effects in
S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s a r e s m a l l e r than in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s (as s h o w n in Table 10.1)
260 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 261

I might add that the effects of the predispositions v a r i a b l e s , w h i c h are not

T a b l e 1 0 . 7 . Coefficients for diffusion of likes and dislikes in
displayed in Figure 10.6 b e c a u s e it shows trends only for modal o u t p a r t i s a n s , are
contested 1990 Senate races
substantial. A m o n g voters ideologically closest to the i n c u m b e n t , defection pat-
terns actually increase with political a w a r e n e s s ; a m o n g those most ideologically
Incumbent Incumbent Challenger Challenge
distant, the decline in defection associated with a w a r e n e s s is steeper than shown
likes dislikes likes dislikes
Reception function in Figure 10.6. T h u s , t h e pattern of defection for different types of p a r t i s a n s
Intercept -1.60 s o m e w h a t r e s e m b l e s the voter defection c u r v e s in Figure 1 0 . 1 , except for a m o r e
-2.96 -3.10 -2.20
Awareness 1.00 0.82 0.62 0.94 intense m e s s a g e .
(standardized) (.18) (.14) (.12) (.16)
Voted in 1978 1.20 0.35 0.71 0.94 My e s t i m a t e s of net c a n d i d a t e c o n s i d e r a t i o n scores for S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s in Fig-
(range 0-1) (.24) (.15) (.18) (.23) ure 10.7 were p r o d u c e d by the same general m e t h o d used in c r e a t i n g the H o u s e
Incumbent spending 5.11 5.37 2.91 -1.77 e s t i m a t e s , as r e p o r t e d in Table 10.4. In the reception function, I used political
(log $10,000s per cong. dist.) (2.23) (1.57) (1.51) (2.20)
a w a r e n e s s , voter t u r n o u t (purged of the effects of c a m p a i g n intensity), logged
Challenger spending -3.80 -4.99 -2.73 1.18
(2.02) (1-45) (1.37) (1.99) s p e n d i n g by the i n c u m b e n t , logged s p e n d i n g by the challenger, logged seniority,
News coverage -0.89 1.70 2.51 5.45 and m e d i a c o v e r a g e ; in t h e m o d e l s for c h a l l e n g e r likes and dislikes, I also used
(range 0 - .75) (.53) (.42) (.52) (.89) a v a r i a b l e m e a s u r i n g the previous electoral e x p e r i e n c e of the challenger. In the
Seniority 1.02 0.03 — — a c c e p t a n c e function, I used party a t t a c h m e n t and policy d i s t a n c e . I specified the
(log of years in office) (.36) (.20) distance v a r i a b l e in t h e a c c e p t a n c e e q u a t i o n as the absolute value of policy dis-
Prior elective office — — 0.12 0.27 tance (note, I a s s u m e that l e f t - r i g h t policy distance affects vote c h o i c e , as d e -
(0 or 1) (.07) (.09) scribed a m o m e n t a g o , but that absolute policy difference affects liking and
Acceptance function disliking, so that, for e x a m p l e , a c o n s e r v a t i v e voter to the right of a c o n s e r v a t i v e
Intercept -0.50 -1.32 -0.79 -1.32 S e n a t o r will not be led to vote against the i n c u m b e n t but may be led to dislike
Party attachment -0.21 0.30 0.43 -0.12
h i m or h e r ) . T h e survey also c a r r i e d a series of q u e s t i o n s on budget priorities.
(range -2 to +2) (.03) (.06) (.09) (.04)
I c o m b i n e d these items into a scale, s t a n d a r d i z e d the scale, and adjusted the
Issue distance from -0.12 0.38 _ _
Incumbent (.05) (.09) scoring so that low scores indicate affinity with t h e i n c u m b e n t . To m e a s u r e issue
Ideological identification - - 0.03 -0.29 distance from the challenger, I used r e s p o n d e n t s ' ideological self-identification,
(standardized) (.07) (.05) s t a n d a r d i z i n g and c o d i n g it to fit the p a r t y affiliation of the challenger.
Domestic spending attitudes -0.06 0.06 0.21 -0.13 N o t e that I did not use political a w a r e n e s s in the a c c e p t a n c e function of the
(standardized) (.04) (.06) (.08) (.05)
e s t i m a t e s of likes and dislikes for the S e n a t e c a n d i d a t e s . This is b e c a u s e , w h e n
it w a s included, it b e h a v e d oddly, picking up large positive coefficients (indi-
Note: Dependent variables are sums of all remarks of given type, recoded to 0 - 1 c a t i n g less resistance a m o n g the highly a w a r e ) , while causing the a w a r e n e s s
range. Up to five remarks were counted in conection with each probe. The
variable in the r e c e p t i o n function also to pick up n e g a t i v e coefficients (indicat-
model is Equation 10.1. Approximate standard errors are in parentheses. A' of
cases, which involve all states in which an incumbent sought reelection in a ing less reception a m o n g the m o r e a w a r e ) . I do not understand why E q u a t i o n
contested race in 1990, is 1866. 10.1 b e h a v e d nonsensically in this c a s e after it had w o r k e d well in so m a n y oth-
Source: 1990 NES Senate survey. e r s , but elimination of a w a r e n e s s from t h e a c c e p t a n c e function restored sense to
2 2
the e s t i m a t e s , as s h o w n in Table 1 0 . 7 .
and do not a p p r o a c h statistical significance, they follow the s a m e p a t t e r n as in T h e values used to c r e a t e the idealized o u t p a r t i s a n s in Figure 10.7 w e r e the
the H o u s e case: a positive m a i n effect for seniority and a n e g a t i v e interaction s a m e as those used in the H o u s e analysis of likes/dislikes: p a r t y d i s t a n c e scores
with c h a l l e n g e r s p e n d i n g . of 1.3 and — 1 . 3 , absolute policy distance scores of 2 and 0, budget attitude
T h e x-axis for S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s in Figure 10.6 m a n i p u l a t e s political awareness 22 There was a similar tendency in estimates of the House likes/dislikes data when the loquacity
over a r a n g e of — 1.9 SD to + 1 . 8 6 , w h i c h , as u s u a l , represents 98 percent of the measure (a count of all party likes and dislikes, regardless of direction) was left out of the House
total r a n g e of t h e s c a l e . T h e idealized o u t p a r t i s a n s used in the analysis in Figure model. The loquacity measure, which is, of course, positively correlated with awareness, was
not available in the Senate data. A possible explanation for this difficulty is that the model,
10.6 are p e o p l e having a p a r t y identification score of 1.3 and a policy distance which contains some of the same variables in both a reception and an acceptance function, is not
score o f + 2 . identified if the true value of the awareness coefficient in the acceptance function is zero.
262 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N Information flow and electoral choice 263

scores of 1 and — 1, and ideological distances from the challenger of 1 and — 1

for o u t p a r t i s a n s and i n p a r t i s a n s , respectively. Table 10.8. Coefficients for presidential primaries
model

A P P E N D I X B : MODELING T H E M O N D A L E - H A R T Reception function Acceptance function

PRIMARY C O N T E S T
Haiti intercept -4.92 a
To m o d e l trends in c a n d i d a t e support in the 1984 D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r i e s , we (2.12)
specify an initial s u p p o r t e q u a t i o n for H a r t and M o n d a l e , as follows:
Mondale i intercepts 1.17 -0.02
//, = P , (10.4o) (.64) (.27)
HC

Mi = P MCl (10.4ft) Hart2 intercept -2.59 a

(.50)
H e r e H and M, are levels of support for H a r t and M o n d a l e at t i m e 1, and P ,
x HC

and P are functions that specify this s u p p o r t , " H a r t c h a n g e " and " M o n d a l e
MC]
Hart3 intercepts 0.32 2.44
(.40) (1.46)
c h a n g e , " in relation to levels of political a w a r e n e s s . Each s u b s e q u e n t t i m e pe-
riod is then conceived as a " c a m p a i g n " that either adds to M o n d a l e ' s s u p p o r t by Mondale4 intercepts -0.44 2.41
subtracting from H a r t ' s or vice versa. (.41) (1.62)
D u r i n g the s e c o n d t i m e p e r i o d , a certain p r o p o r t i o n of D e m o c r a t s c o n v e r t to
Awareness 1.17 -2.87*
H a r t , as given by P , which is also a function of political a w a r e n e s s . T h e n ,
HC
(standardized) (0.80) (1.43)
following E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 , w e may w r i t e

H = Hi + P c * (1 - Hi) (10.4c) Note: The data for this model are the 40 aggregate means in
2 H 2
Figure 10.8. Standard errors appear in parentheses.
Mi = Mi - P HCi * Mi (10Ad) a
Acceptance function eliminated to conserve degrees of
freedom; see text.
T h a t is, H a r t s u p p o r t at t i m e 2 is equal to initial H a r t s u p p o r t plus the propor- * Coefficient applies to acceptance function only in third and
tion of initial n o n s u p p o r t e r s w h o c o n v e r t to H a r t . M o n d a l e s u p p o r t at t i m e 2 is fourth time periods.
equal to initial M o n d a l e s u p p o r t m i n u s the p r o p o r t i o n of initial s u p p o r t lost to Source: 1984 NES primary election survey.
H a r t . T h e r e m a i n i n g e q u a t i o n s are then

Hy = H 2 + P HCy * (1 - H ) 2 (\0Ae)
H 4 = [[P HCL + PHC, * (1 - P ,)]
HC

M 3 = M 2 - P *M HCi 2 (10.4/) + PHC, * (1 " [PHC, + PHC, * (1 - PHC,)])]

H 4 = /Y 3 - P *H MCi 3 (10.4g) ~ PMC, * [[PHC, + PHC, * (1 - PHC,)]
—
M 4 = M 3 + P MC) * (1 - M) 3 (10Ah) + PHC, * (1 [PHC, + PHC, * (1 ~~ PHC, I ) ] ) ]

w h e r e P and P HC} are the p r o p o r t i o n s c o n v e r t i n g to H a r t in period 3 and to

MC
w h e r e each of the P t e r m s represents a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process having
HC

M o n d a l e in period 4. T h e s e P t e r m s m o d e l the effect of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e

c
the form of E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 . T h e four M o n d a l e e q u a t i o n s have a c o m p a r a b l e form.
of each p e r i o d , and each is a form of the usual r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , as E a c h of t h e five P t e r m s in these e q u a t i o n s has four p a r a m e t e r s - an inter-
C

in E q u a t i o n 7.5 in the text. cept for the r e c e p t i o n and a c c e p t a n c e functions, and a coefficient on attentive-
E q u a t i o n s \0Aa-h represent a series of nested e q u a t i o n s , such that t e r m s ness in both functions - w h i c h add up to a total of twenty p a r a m e t e r s to be
from each earlier e q u a t i o n appear in later ones as well. After a p p r o p r i a t e sub- simultaneously estimated.
stitutions, for e x a m p l e , the four H a r t e q u a t i o n s b e c o m e In e s t i m a t i n g this c u m b e r s o m e m o d e l , I used the a g g r e g a t e d a t a s h o w n in Fig-
ure 10.8 - s o m e 40 d a t a points (4 p e r i o d s x 2 c a n d i d a t e s x 5 awareness
Hi = PHC, g r o u p s ) . To p r e s e r v e d e g r e e s of freedom, I simplified the m o d e l by constraining
H2 = [P HCL + PHC, * (1 - PHC,)] or e l i m i n a t i n g as m a n y p a r a m e t e r s as p o s s i b l e . First, I constrained a w a r e n e s s to
H3 = [[P , HC + PHC, * (1 - PHC,)] have the s a m e effect in t h e reception functions of all P t e r m s , leaving the in- c

+ PHC, * (1 " [PHC, + PHC * (1 - P ,)])]

HC
tercept t e r m s , a , to pick up differences in t h e intensities of t h e various
0
264 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
m e s s a g e s . This is a strong but not u n r e a s o n a b l e constraint: After controlling for
m e s s a g e intensity via intercept shifts, a w a r e n e s s ought to have the s a m e strength
of relationship with r e c e p t i o n in each c a m p a i g n in each t i m e p e r i o d . S e c o n d ,
since visual e x a m i n a t i o n of the d a t a and initial e s t i m a t e s indicated that the ac-
c e p t a n c e function m a d e no contribution to the e s t i m a t i o n of E q u a t i o n s 1 0 . 4 a - d ,
23
it w a s e l i m i n a t e d , w h i c h saved several p a r a m e t e r s . T h e a w a r e n e s s variable
w a s eliminated as an a c c e p t a n c e factor in E q u a t i o n 10.46 on the s a m e g r o u n d s .
Finally, I constrained a w a r e n e s s to have the s a m e effect in the a c c e p t a n c e func-
tions of E q u a t i o n s \0.4e-h; separate a w a r e n e s s coefficients w o u l d have been
preferable h e r e , but n o n e of the coefficients could have a p p r o a c h e d statistical
significance if e s t i m a t e d separately. T h e imposition of these constraints left ten
coefficients for t h e forty d a t a points. E q u a t i o n s 10.4a-/* were s i m u l t a n e o u s l y
e s t i m a t e d with a n o n l i n e a r regression p r o g r a m .
T h e coefficient e s t i m a t e s are s h o w n in Table 10.8. B e c a u s e most of the t e r m s
represent intercept shifts in the reception or a c c e p t a n c e functions and h e n c e in-
volve only five or ten d a t a points, it is not w o r r i s o m e that s o m e fall short of
statistical significance in this highly interactive m o d e l . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is that
coefficients d e n o t i n g t h e effects of a w a r e n e s s on reception and on a c c e p t a n c e
24
both achieve s o m e d e g r e e of statistical s i g n i f i c a n c e . As a further indication of
g o o d n e s s of fit, it m a y be noted that the c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n the y - e s t i m a t e s
2
from t h e model and the r a w d a t a is .92 ( r = . 8 4 ) . Given the s a m p l i n g e r r o r in
the r a w d a t a and t h e constraints on the m o d e l , this would s e e m to be as m u c h
a c c u r a c y as could be h o p e d for.
23 Coefficient estimates for b tended toward
0 indicating no resistance.
24 Because the model has been estimated from data aggregates derived from different cell sizes,
significance tests should be regarded as being only roughly suggestive.
11
Evaluating the model and
looking toward future research
" I f t h e public had an opinion and there w a s no pollster a r o u n d to m e a s u r e it,
w o u l d public opinion e x i s t ? " Like the old c o n u n d r u m about the tree falling in
the forest with no o n e to h e a r it, this q u e s t i o n is not c o m p l e t e l y v a c u o u s . T h e
a n s w e r d e p e n d s on w h a t o n e m e a n s by public o p i n i o n . If by public opinion one
m e a n s the h o p e s , fears, feelings, and reactions to events of o r d i n a r y citizens as
they go about their p r i v a t e lives, then certainly there is public opinion w h e t h e r
or not there is a pollster to m e a s u r e it. But if by public opinion o n e m e a n s or-
d i n a r y citizens w a l k i n g a r o u n d saying t o t h e m s e l v e s things like " I strongly a p -
prove o f the way G e o r g e Bush i s doing his j o b a s p r e s i d e n t " o r " I think w e
should take a stronger s t a n d , even if it m e a n s invading N o r t h V i e t n a m , " then
most of w h a t gets m e a s u r e d as public opinion d o e s not exist except in the pres-
ence of a pollster.
T h e R A S model has been about both k i n d s o f public o p i n i o n , the " c o n s i d -
e r a t i o n s " that p e o p l e form in r e s p o n s e to t h e flow of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,
and t h e process by w h i c h they translate typically disorganized c o n s i d e r a t i o n s
into the survey r e s p o n s e s that virtually e v e r y o n e now takes as constituting p u b -
1
lic o p i n i o n .
To t h e extent o n e evaluates t h e R A S m o d e l on the conventional criteria of
empirical breadth and theoretical parsimony, it l o o k s quite g o o d . Its four a x i o m s
can be used to explain a w i d e variety of p h e n o m e n a , including s o m e c o n c e r n i n g
attitude c h a n g e , that w o u l d be difficult to explain except by essentially similar
ideas.
T h e most i m p o r t a n t feature of t h e m o d e l is its m a r r i a g e of a t h e o r y of infor-
m a t i o n diffusion t h r o u g h a p o p u l a t i o n that is differentially attentive to politics
(axioms Al and A 2 ) , with a t h e o r y of h o w p e o p l e transform this information
into survey responses ( A 3 and A 4 ) . It is the union of these t w o p r o c e s s e s that
gives the m o d e l its breadth of c o v e r a g e , and that c r e a t e s the potential for further
extensions and a p p l i c a t i o n s of the m o d e l .
However, the model h a s t h e vice of its virtues: Breadth and p a r s i m o n y have
been achieved at the e x p e n s e of significant simplification and o m i s s i o n . H e n c e ,
1 An exception is Ginsberg, 1986. For an analysis of differing conceptions of public opinion, see
Price, 1992.
 268 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
W H O LEADS W H O M ?
A c c o r d i n g to an oft told t a l e , a n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y revolutionary w a s sipping
w i n e in a cafe o n e afternoon w h e n a m o b suddenly rushed past in t h e street.
" M o n D i e u ! " he c r i e d , " t h e p e o p l e are on the m o v e , I am their leader, I must
follow t h e m . " He then raced out into the street and to the head of t h e c r o w d .
A l t h o u g h the story is perhaps a p o c r y p h a l , the p r o b l e m it raises is real. O n e
regularly o b s e r v e s " l e a d e r s " at the head of m a s s m o v e m e n t s , but o n e cannot,
on this e v i d e n c e a l o n e , be certain that elites are actually leading. T h e y m i g h t , of
c o u r s e , be l e a d i n g , but they might also be following.
2
W i t h o n e e x c e p t i o n , this is not a p r o b l e m I have been able to deal with sys-
t e m a t i c a l l y in this study. I have taken the intensities of o p p o s i n g political c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n s to be e x o g e n o u s variables and have limited my analysis to the
s u p p o s e d effects of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s on public o p i n i o n . My w o r k i n g a s -
s u m p t i o n , t h u s , h a s been that elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s shape m a s s opinion r a t h e r
than vice versa.
I justify this w o r k i n g a s s u m p t i o n on two g r o u n d s . First, in several of the cases
e x a m i n e d , it is c l e a r from the nature of the p a r t i c u l a r cases that the elite stim-
ulus to m a s s attitude c h a n g e really w a s either mainly or wholly e x o g e n o u s . It is
p e r h a p s most c l e a r in the c a s e of the I r a n - C o n t r a scandal, w h i c h p r o d u c e d
c h a n g e in public attitudes toward presidential p e r f o r m a n c e and Central A m e r i c a
policy, as discussed in C h a p t e r s 7 and 8. At t h e t i m e the scandal b r o k e , Presi-
dent R e a g a n ' s popularity was high and he had no serious p r o b l e m s on the h o -
r i z o n . T h e congressional attacks on R e a g a n ' s role in the I r a n - C o n t r a e v e n t s ,
t h u s , must have o c c u r r e d in spite of his initial standing with t h e public rather
than b e c a u s e his p o p u l a r i t y w a s already low.
Similar a r g u m e n t s can be m a d e for four o t h e r c a s e s :
1. It is h a r d to a r g u e that the S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education w a s a r e s p o n s e to p o p u l a r pressure for an end to S o u t h e r n s c h o o l seg-
r e g a t i o n . Inside a c c o u n t s indicate that, on the contrary, the C o u r t perceived the
public as largely hostile to federal intervention on this issue. T h e C o u r t d i d in-
deed have a p r o b l e m with public o p i n i o n , but the p r o b l e m w a s not h o w far it
w o u l d be forced to go in o p p o s i n g d i s c r i m i n a t i o n but how far it could go without
p r o v o k i n g a political b a c k l a s h (Kluger, 1975). To be sure, the N a t i o n a l Associ-
ation for the A d v a n c e m e n t of Colored People w a s pressuring for a d e s e g r e g a t i o n
r u l i n g , but it h a d , at that point, minimal political clout. T h u s , the B r o w n d e c i -
sion appears to have b e e n m o t i v a t e d p r i m a r i l y by the m o r a l c o n v i c t i o n s of the
j u s t i c e s . H o w these c o n v i c t i o n s f o r m e d , and why they took the form they did in
the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , is o b v i o u s l y a d e e p and i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n , but it is not o n e that
2 In the analysis of campaign effects in House elections, I controlled for incumbents' prior victory
margins in order to find out whether the most intense campaigns were directed against incumbents
who were already weak. The evidence indicated essentially no reason for concern in this partic-
ular case. See footnote 10 in Chapter 10.
The model and future research 269
c r e a t e s p r o b l e m s for my a s s u m p t i o n that the c o u r t w a s p r e d o m i n a n t l y leading
r a t h e r than following m a s s opinion in the B r o w n c a s e .
2. T h e n u c l e a r freeze m o v e m e n t of the early 1980s involved a great deal of
g r a s s r o o t s public activity. A l m o s t certainly, m a n y politicians got on t h e freeze
b a n d w a g o n only b e c a u s e they perceived it to be an extremely p o p u l a r issue. T h e
i m p e t u s for the freeze m o v e m e n t , however, can be clearly traced to p e o p l e w h o
w o u l d have to be c o n s i d e r e d elites, n a m e l y m e m b e r s of the professional a r m s
control c o m m u n i t y w h o had been losing internal d e b a t e s and calculated that pol-
iticians w o u l d not pay any attention to t h e m until they mobilized public s u p p o r t
for their cause ( P r i n g l e , 1982). T h e impetus to the m a s s m o v e m e n t that led many
politicians to c l i m b on t h e freeze b a n d w a g o n w a s t h u s itself the product of other
elites w h o were quite self-consciously a t t e m p t i n g to lead o p i n i o n .
3. T h e bullish n e w s r e p o r t s that led to o p t i m i s t i c a s s e s s m e n t s of the U . S . e c o n -
o m y in late 1982 a m o n g s o m e m e m b e r s of the public w e r e no d o u b t s o m e c o m -
bination of hopeful p r o g n o s t i c a t i o n s by President R e a g a n and the b u s i n e s s
c o m m u n i t y , and technical e c o n o m i c r e p o r t s . In neither c a s e , and especially the
latter, could o n e say that these r e p o r t s were a r e s p o n s e to what t h e public already
believed.
4. T h e Bush a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s mobilization of public support for t h e Persian Gulf
W a r is o n e of the m o s t striking cases of elite opinion leadership e x a m i n e d in this
b o o k . W h e n Iraq invaded Kuwait in A u g u s t , 1990, only a small fraction of
A m e r i c a n s w a s aware that K u w a i t existed ( L a n g , L a n g , and L a r s o n , 1991). Yet
within two w e e k s , public s u p p o r t for the use of A m e r i c a n troops to prevent fur-
ther Iraqi aggression w a s t o p p i n g 80 percent in t h e polls, and this s u p p o r t even-
tually c a r r i e d over into solid backing for a w a r to liberate K u w a i t (Mueller,
1992). W h a t m a k e s this mobilization of m a s s opinion impressive is that it w a s
a c c o m p l i s h e d in the a b s e n c e of any c o m m u n i s t threat, which for 40 years had
been the standard justification for the use of A m e r i c a n troops a b r o a d , and d e -
spite the fact t h a t , before t h e w a r b e g a n , m o s t p e o p l e e x p e c t e d it to be costly in
A m e r i c a n lives. Since no polls were apparently taken in the period b e t w e e n the
initial Iraqi invasion and President B u s h ' s d e c l a r a t i o n that the aggression would
not be allowed to s t a n d , t h e r e is no e m p i r i c a l basis for ruling out the possibility
that Bush w a s simply r e s p o n d i n g to a g r o u n d s w e l l of public d e m a n d for a firm
A m e r i c a n r e s p o n s e . However, few informed o b s e r v e r s of these events are likely
to take this possibility seriously. T h e Persian G u l f W a r w a s , by all a p p e a r a n c e s ,
a c a s e in w h i c h a politically skilled p r e s i d e n t , with t h e s u p p o r t of the press and
m o s t other e l i t e s , handily s h a p e d m a s s o p i n i o n .
T h e general point here is t h a t , however difficult it m a y be to resolve the direc-
tion of e l i t e - m a s s influence in the abstract, it is often possible to m a k e plausible
j u d g m e n t s in p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s .
 270 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
S e c o n d , even w h e n politicians pursue a certain policy b e c a u s e of perceived
public pressure to do s o , it is often the anticipation of that p r e s s u r e , rather than
actual p r e s s u r e , that is critical. T h i s is a point that V. O. Key (1961) has e m -
p h a s i z e d . T h e public opinion to which elites try to be responsive is not the public
opinion that is reflected in polls at the point of m a k i n g d e c i s i o n s , but t h e public
opinion that an o p p o n e n t might be able to call into existence at the next e l e c t i o n .
Politicians w h o slavishly follow existing opinion a r e , as K e y a r g u e s , likely to
fare p o o r l y in the long r u n .
Let me take a s i m p l e c a s e of such a n t i c i p a t o r y influence, followed by a m o r e
c o m p l i c a t e d o n e . President N i x o n ' s surprise a n n o u n c e m e n t o f w a g e and price
controls in s u m m e r 1 9 7 1 , as described at the b e g i n n i n g of C h a p t e r 6, w a s surely
an act calculated to o b v i a t e criticism of his record on handling the e c o n o m y in
the u p c o m i n g presidential e l e c t i o n . In this sense N i x o n was r e s p o n d i n g to public
o p i n i o n . Yet he w a s also leading it, since, as we saw, his s p e e c h had a definite
impact in m o v i n g public opinion further in the direction of s u p p o r t for controls.
N o w consider the infinitely more c o m p l i c a t e d c a s e of the V i e t n a m War. F r o m
G e l b ' s account ( G e l b w i t h B e t t s , 1979), we k n o w that President J o h n s o n w a s
well advised on the difficulties of trying to use A m e r i c a n military force to sta-
bilize a n o n c o m m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t in South V i e t n a m . J o h n s o n w a s also well
a w a r e that there w a s no groundswell of p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for sending troops to
V i e t n a m . Yet J o h n s o n f e i r e d that if he p e r m i t t e d South V i e t n a m to fall to the
N o r t h V i e t n a m e s e , he w o u l d open himself to the c h a r g e of being " s o f t on c o m -
m u n i s m " and having " l o s t V i e t n a m " i n the s a m e way that President T r u m a n
had supposedly " l o s t C h i n a . " Q u i t e likely, J o h n s o n feared, this w o u l d d o o m his
G r e a t Society d o m e s t i c a g e n d a and set off a n e w round of M c C a r t h y i s t r e c r i m -
inations in which he w o u l d be the loser.
In this situation, J o h n s o n led as well as followed the public into a w a r that
neither he nor it w a s e a g e r to p r o s e c u t e . He w a s following public opinion in the
sense that he a n t i c i p a t e d a harsh retrospective j u d g m e n t if he allowed a c o m -
munist takeover, but leading public opinion in the sense that, in o r d e r to avoid
this j u d g m e n t , he had to mobilize public s u p p o r t for policies that w e r e by no
m e a n s i m m e d i a t e l y popular.
If, t h e n , J o h n s o n w a s , in a s e n s e , genuinely leading public opinion on the war,
perhaps a case can be m a d e that a n t i w a r politicians were the o n e s w h o were
following public opinion m o r e than leading it. T h o u g h m o r e p l a u s i b l e , t h i s , t o o ,
is a hard case to m a k e . For it w a s at the high tide of p o p u l a r support for the w a r
in 1966 that m a i n s t r e a m politicians began to o p p o s e the war. Further, the earliest
m a i n s t r e a m o p p o n e n t s of t h e war were from c o n s t i t u e n c i e s that could not be d e -
scribed as hotbeds of a n t i w a r feeling. Take the c a s e of S e n a t o r J. W i l l i a m Ful-
bright of A r k a n s a s , the earliest i m p o r t a n t political figure to turn against the war.
Fulbright must have m a d e a calculation that an a n t i w a r position w o u l d not lead
to i n s u r m o u n t a b l e p r o b l e m s with his constituents. Yet it is i m p l a u s i b l e to think
that Fulbright w a s in any m o r e direct way responding to a n t i w a r pressures back
The model and future research 271
h o m e in A r k a n s a s . In fact, the e v i d e n c e indicates that he t o o k his a n t i w a r p o -
sition in spite of the best advice of his political staff (but b e c a u s e of advice he
3
w a s getting from his foreign policy a d v i s o r y s t a f f ) . A n o t h e r early m a i n s t r e a m
o p p o n e n t of t h e war, R e p r e s e n t a t i v e Tip O ' N e i l l of M a s s a c h u s e t t s , likewise re-
lates that his e a r l y o p p o s i t i o n w a s a r e s p o n s e to w h a t military a u t h o r i t i e s pri-
vately told h i m about t h e futility of the war, and in spite of his belief that
opposition to t h e w a r w a s political suicide ( O ' N e i l l , 1987: p. 195).
T h e m e d i a w e r e , o f c o u r s e , another i m p o r t a n t source o f a n t i w a r c o m m u n i c a -
tions. To a very c o n s i d e r a b l e extent, however, m e d i a r e p o r t i n g reflected, as it
always d o e s , w h a t the m e d i a ' s sources w e r e saying. For e x a m p l e , C h a r l e s Mohr,
a c o r r e s p o n d e n t for Time and later for the New York Times, h a s written of t h e
a n t i w a r r e p o r t i n g that o r i g i n a t e d a m o n g r e p o r t e r s in South V i e t n a m :
The debate was not essentially, as some seem to believe, a quarrel between the press and
the U.S. officials in Vietnam. It was, rather, a quarrel between factions within the U.S.
Mission. For the most part, field advisers closest to the action and to the Vietnamese took
the pessimistic view. Some of the more senior officials in Saigon, who were reporting to
Washington on the progress of the programs they themselves were administering, were
publicly and persistently optimistic. The reporters quickly became aware of this dispute,
because brilliant young field officers, as exemplified by the late John Paul Vann, increas-
ingly turned to the journalists. The reporters did not invent the somber information that
sometimes appeared in their stories. (1983: p. 56)
Since these sources w e r e mostly in the military, the C I A , and t h e State D e p a r t -
m e n t (Hallin, 1986; M o h r 1983; H a l b e r s t a m , 1979), it seems unlikely that their
leaks of a n t i w a r i n f o r m a t i o n w e r e in any simple sense a response to c h a n g e s in
public o p i n i o n . 4
Perhaps the m o s t i m p o r t a n t exception to the claim that press r e p o r t i n g tends
to reflect press sources o c c u r r e d d u r i n g t h e Tet offensive in early 1968, w h e n the
press depicted w h a t w a s apparently a decisive A m e r i c a n military victory a s , in-
stead, a serious defeat ( B r a e s t r u p , 1979). T h i s apparent m i s r e p o r t i n g of the
n e w s in an a n t i w a r d i r e c t i o n d o e s not, however, a p p e a r to have been a r e s p o n s e
to public opinion in t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , which still largely s u p p o r t e d the war at
the t i m e of Tet. Rather, r e p o r t i n g a p p e a r s to have reflected the press c o r p s ' sur-
prise that t h e Viet C o n g were able to m o u n t an apparently credible n a t i o n w i d e
military offensive after A m e r i c a n officials had been saying that the Viet C o n g
were all but defeated. (It is c o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m in A m e r i c a n electoral politics
that any c o m p e t i t o r w h o d o e s " b e t t e r than e x p e c t e d " by the press finds h i m - or
herself t h e beneficiary of an excited o v e r r e a c t i o n by the press; see Polsby, 1983.)
N o n e of this is to deny a significant d e g r e e of elite responsiveness to m a s s
o p i n i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the later p h a s e s of t h e V i e t n a m War. Most likely, t h o u g h
it is difficult to i m a g i n e h o w anyone could rsally be sure, m a r g i n a l r e d u c t i o n s
in public s u p p o r t for the w a r m a d e it i n c r e m e n t a l l y safer for those politicians
3 Halberstam, 1972: p. 420.
4 For an account of the disdain with which the foreign policy elite regard public opinion, see Cohen,
1973.
 272 N A T U R E A N D ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
predisposed against t h e w a r to go public with their a n t i w a r sentiments. P r e s u m -
ably a similar interaction o c c u r r e d b e t w e e n press and public, t h o u g h it is again
i m p o r t a n t to note that the p r e s s , especially the elite p r e s s , w a s c a r r y i n g signif-
icant a m o u n t s of a n t i w a r information in 1965 and 1966, well before there w a s
any indication that d e c l i n i n g public s u p p o r t for t h e war was m a k i n g it safe to do
so. E a c h increment of additional elite opposition m a d e safe by c h a n g e s in public
opinion may then have p r o d u c e d an additional increment of c h a n g e in m a s s
o p i n i o n , which m a y have further e m b o l d e n e d t h e potential elite o p p o s i t i o n , and
so forth. T h e late entry of R o b e r t K e n n e d y as an a n t i w a r c a n d i d a t e in t h e 1968
D e m o c r a t i c presidential p r i m a r i e s m a y be an e x a m p l e of a politician w h o acted
only after p r e l i m i n a r y s o u n d i n g s of public opinion - in the form of E u g e n e M c -
C a r t h y ' s success in t h e N e w H a m p s h i r e p r i m a r y - signaled that an a n t i w a r p o -
sition w a s politically p r o m i s i n g .
S u c h e l i t e - m a s s d y n a m i c s are by no m e a n s inconsistent with an a s s u m p t i o n
of elite opinion l e a d e r s h i p . O n e a r g u m e n t m i g h t be that w e a k e n i n g public s u p -
port for the V i e t n a m W a r c r e a t e d discretion for elites to m o v e in a similar di-
rection. T h e elites w h o t o o k a d v a n t a g e of this discretion w o u l d have been those
predisposed by ideology or analysis to do so. T h u s , elites act a u t o n o m o u s l y to
shape o p i n i o n , but only after they calculate that it is safe to do s o . An a l t e r n a t i v e
a r g u m e n t for elite leadership would posit a differentially a u t o n o m o u s elite, s o m e
p a r t s o f w h i c h , p r i m a r i l y ncluding u p w a r d l y m o b i l e politicians, are s o m e w h a t
responsive to m a s s o p i n i o n , and other p a r t s of w h i c h , including m o s t foreign
policy e x p e r t s , military officers, and g o v e r n m e n t officials critical of the war, are
largely independent of public opinion. T h e m o r e a u t o n o m o u s s e g m e n t s of the
elite, by this a r g u m e n t , use the media to g e n e r a t e public pressure to w h i c h other,
m o r e responsive e l i t e s , the politicians, then a c c e d e . A weak form of t h e argu-
m e n t for elite opinion leadership - and o n e that s e e m s to me m u c h t o o weak -
w o u l d be that a n t i w a r elites were simply r e s p o n d i n g to m a s s o p i n i o n , but that
their responses t o o k t h e form of a n t i w a r m e s s a g e s , which diffused t h r o u g h t h e
m e d i a in a m a n n e r specified by the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s , thereby pro-
d u c i n g further m a s s c h a n g e , which in turn further pressured elites t o w a r d
c h a n g e . By this w e a k a r g u m e n t , it would be a n o n a u t o n o m o u s elite that w a s
influencing m a s s o p i n i o n .
It is i m p o r t a n t to r e c o g n i z e that, strictly s p e a k i n g , o n e cannot use the results
of my m o d e l i n g to s u p p o r t even a weak a r g u m e n t for elite influence. T h e reason
is that the R A S m o d e l , as f o r m u l a t e d , is entirely agnostic about the sources of
the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that m o v e public o p i n i o n . T h u s , it is consistent
with the model that e l i t e s , including even t h e m e d i a , have no influence w h a t -
soever on public o p i n i o n , and that all political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s diffuse t h r o u g h
the p o p u l a t i o n by personal c o n t a c t , like g e r m s . So long as political a w a r e n e s s is
positively associated w i t h reception of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and negatively
associated with a c c e p t a n c e - as it would be in either a g e r m or elite-driven sce-
n a r i o - the model applies. T h i s m a y be part of the reason the m o d e l p e r f o r m s so
well: B e c a u s e the diffusion process has t h e s a m e formal p r o p e r t i e s w h e t h e r it
The model and future research 273
p r o c e e d s via an e l i t e - d o m i n a t e d m e d i a or by h u m b l e w o r d - o f - m o u t h , the
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l can capture the joint effects of both m o d e s of
5
diffusion.
T h e allusion to g e r m s , incidentally, is not fanciful. T h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e
m o d e l , as formalized in this b o o k , is a g e n e r i c diffusion m o d e l . G i v e n a p p r o -
priate m e a s u r e s of e x p o s u r e and resistance, it m i g h t be used to d e s c r i b e the dif-
fusion of new fashions, religious beliefs, or even diseases. W i t h i n an adult
p o p u l a t i o n , for e x a m p l e , susceptibility to a socially transmitted d i s e a s e might be
n o n m o n o t o n i c with respect to age: Young adults m i g h t be high on the social in-
teractions associated with exposure to the d i s e a s e but also healthy e n o u g h to re-
sist it; the old might be v u l n e r a b l e but socially reclusive; and so the m i d d l e - a g e d
might be hardest hit. T h e incidence of A I D S m a y present an e x a m p l e of this sort
of interaction, since r a w d a t a published by t h e U . S . C e n t e r s for Disease Control
suggests that the incidence of A I D S w a s , at least for a t i m e , n o n m o n o t o n i c with
respect to age ( " F e d e r a l P l a n n i n g , " 1987).
W h a t all this indicates is that a close fit b e t w e e n the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e
m o d e l and d a t a on m a s s attitude c h a n g e d o e s not, by itself, indicate anything
about the extent of elite influence. T h e model is simply a m e a n s for specifying
the process of diffusion of elite influence, w h e r e the r e a s o n s for believing that
it is elite influence, r a t h e r than s o m e t h i n g e l s e , that is diffusing must be s u p -
plied independently of the m o d e l . (See the discussion on p p . 4 3 - 4 . )
T h e r e is, as I have b e e n arguing (and argued e a r l i e r in C h a p t e r 2 ) , an a m p l e
supply of such reasons. A n d yet, a fully a d e q u a t e account of elite opinion lead-
ership is not o n e that sees a public that responds to elite initiatives in a c o m -
pletely m e c h a n i c a l fashion, t h o u g h a positive r e s p o n s e by the public to well-
crafted initiatives can usually be c o u n t e d u p o n . Rather, it is an account in w h i c h
elites - always h a v i n g s o m e ideas that are a u t o n o m o u s l y their o w n , always p o -
tentially split a m o n g t h e m s e l v e s along p a r t i s a n lines and m a n e u v e r i n g for par-
tisan a d v a n t a g e , and a l w a y s looking over their shoulders to see w h a t the public
is thinking and might think in the future - a t t e m p t to lead and to follow at
the s a m e t i m e . Or, to put the point s o m e w h a t differently, the q u e s t i o n is not
w h e t h e r elites lead or follow, but how much and which elites lead r a t h e r than
follow m a s s o p i n i o n , and under what circumstances they do so. A full analysis
5 It should be noted, however, that the classic studies of personal influence provide no mechanism
for explaining how interpersonal communications could bring about systematic changes in the
distribution of mass opinion independently of elite influence. Rather, these studies have empha-
sized the role of personal discussion either as a conservatizing force that buttresses the individual
against external influence, as in the Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) study titled Voting,
or as a mediating force, as in the Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) study titled Personal Influence,
which shows how local opinion leaders pick up ideas in the media and pass them on to friends.
In the first case, no attitude change occurs, while in the second, opinion leaders may be said
merely to aid in the diffusion of elite-generated information. With respect to the second point,
MacKuen and Brown (1987) conclude that political discussion is basically another "information
channel" (p. 485): "[T]he social circle is not an active independent force in politics but instead
shapes the information that comes from outside. Thus it is proper to think of the social environ-
ment not as a source of influence but as an intervening mechanism in a larger communication
system" (p. 483).
 274 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
of these p r o b l e m s is well beyond the scope of this b o o k . My only aim in this
brief discussion h a s b e e n , first, to m a k e c l e a r w h a t exactly my formal m o d e l s of
attitude diffusion do and do not prove about elite opinion l e a d e r s h i p , and sec-
o n d , to m a k e it a p p e a r plausible that, in a broad r a n g e of c i r c u m s t a n c e s , the
a m o u n t of a u t o n o m o u s leadership exercised by elites is substantial. (I return to
this p r o b l e m in C h a p t e r 12.)
CRITICAL REVIEW OF BASIC AXIOMS
Critical evaluation of the R A S model m a y be o r g a n i z e d a r o u n d its defining ax-
i o m s , beginning with A l , the R e c e p t i o n A x i o m . T h e a s s e r t i o n i n A l i s that
greater attention to an issue is associated with greater reception of m e s s a g e s
c o n c e r n i n g that issue. T h i s claim would s e e m initially u n e x c e p t i o n a b l e .
Yet w h a t exactly is it that people receive? A l m o s t certainly, different people
can be exposed to t h e s a m e m e s s a g e and yet receive quite different m e s s a g e s , or
even no intelligible m e s s a g e , d e p e n d i n g on their prior k n o w l e d g e about the is-
s u e . T h e r e are at least t w o ways in which this can h a p p e n . First, as noted in
C h a p t e r 8, p e o p l e m a y better c o m p r e h e n d stories on subjects about which they
have m o r e initial familiarity. T h u s , for e x a m p l e , m o r e p e o p l e l e a r n e d about the
s e n t e n c i n g of the colorful M a r i n e , Oliver N o r t h , for his c o n v i c t i o n in t h e I r a n -
C o n t r a controversy than learned the reason for the resignation of the c o m p a r a -
tively bland H o u s e S p e a k e r Jim W r i g h t , even t h o u g h the latter story played out
o v e r a period of several m o n t h s and received far more extensive c o v e r a g e . (In
fact, o n e poll s u g g e s t e d that almost as m a n y p e o p l e k n e w the n a m e of Oliver
N o r t h ' s striking secretary, F a w n H a l l , as k n e w why W r i g h t resigned the speak-
e r s h i p . ) S e c o n d , and m o r e speculatively, individuals w h o are e x p o s e d to the
s a m e m e s s a g e may, if they take notice of it, perceive it differently. For e x a m p l e ,
the air force m a y stage an e l a b o r a t e spectacle for the maiden flight of the B 2 , its
n e w flying w i n g b o m b e r , to show that the plane really w o r k s . S o m e m e m b e r s of
the public m a y receive this as a p r o - B 2 m e s s a g e , but others may " s e e " in the
flight " a n o b v i o u s l y useless b a t m o b i l e . " In b o t h of these c a s e s , differences in
reception (given equal attentiveness to the s a m e m e s s a g e ) will d e p e n d on p e o -
p l e ' s previously existing ideas (or s c h e m a t a ) w h i c h m a y differ both in content
and degree of d e v e l o p m e n t across individuals (Fiske and Kinder, 1981). T h e
R A S m o d e l , as presently constituted, m a k e s no allowance for these w a y s in
w h i c h prior opinion m a y affect reception or p a r t i s a n perception of the c o m m u -
nications one e n c o u n t e r s .
C o n s i d e r next the Resistance A x i o m , A 2 , w h i c h claims that p e o p l e can resist
persuasion only to the extent that they have acquired an a p p r o p r i a t e c u e i n g m e s -
s a g e , w h e r e c u e i n g m e s s a g e s are a s s u m e d to have an origin that is, at least in
p r i n c i p l e , s e p a r a t e from the persuasive m e s s a g e itself.
T h i s specification of the Resistance A x i o m is intended to follow C o n v e r s e ' s
(1964) notion that p e o p l e need to acquire contextual k n o w l e d g e of " w h a t g o e s
with w h a t " in order to d e v e l o p conventionally l e f t - r i g h t belief s y s t e m s . W i t h
The model and future research 275
the inference (from A 1 ) that m o r e aware persons are m o r e likely to possess c u e -
ing i n f o r m a t i o n , this a x i o m played a crucial role in explaining attitude c h a n g e .
All else e q u a l , m o r e a w a r e persons are m o r e likely to resist m e s s a g e s , given re-
c e p t i o n of t h e m , that are inconsistent with their basic values - that is, to exhibit
p a r t i s a n resistance.
But how can we be certain that it is possession of relevant contextual infor-
m a t i o n , rather than s o m e t h i n g e l s e , that explains the greater critical resistance
of m o r e aware p e r s o n s ? As the reader may have n o t i c e d , I have been u n a b l e to
p r o d u c e any direct e v i d e n c e on this point, that is, any d a t a that credibly m e a s u r e
possession or n o n p o s s e s s i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r cueing m e s s a g e and link it to t h e
a c c e p t a n c e or n o n a c c e p t a n c e of a new c o n s i d e r a t i o n .
I h a v e , however, pointed to abundant e v i d e n c e of the i m p o r t a n c e of contextual
information about m e s s a g e sources in m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s - e v i d e n c e that in-
f o r m a t i o n or cues about t h e person providing a m e s s a g e greatly affects h o w p e o -
ple respond to it. So my e m p h a s i s on c u e i n g m e s s a g e s rests on a solid
foundation of past r e s e a r c h . I h a v e , moreover, been able to p r o d u c e a fair
a m o u n t of indirect e v i d e n c e of the i m p o r t a n c e of c u e i n g i n f o r m a t i o n .
An i m p o r t a n t piece of this e v i d e n c e c o m e s from the V i e t n a m War. W h e n a
m a i n s t r e a m elite c o n s e n s u s existed, exposure to the elite c o n s e n s u s , as m e a s u r e d
by i n d i v i d u a l s ' levels of political a w a r e n e s s , w a s associated with greater s u p p o r t
for the war, with no resistance a m o n g the m o s t politically a w a r e . W i t h the ap-
p e a r a n c e of elite ideological d i s a g r e e m e n t s in 1966, however, politically sophis-
ticated liberals b e g a n to resist prowar m e s s a g e s and to accept a n t i w a r ones.
T h u s , elite cues functioned to activate ideological predispositions a m o n g the p o -
litically a w a r e .
T h e e x a m i n a t i o n of the m a i n s t r e a m and p o l a r i z a t i o n m o d e l s in C h a p t e r 6 pro-
vided several other cases in which political a w a r e n e s s either w a s or w a s not a s -
sociated with political p o l a r i z a t i o n , d e p e n d i n g on the configuration of elite
c u e s . Perhaps the most striking of these c a s e s involved attitudes on r e c o g n i t i o n
of C o m m u n i s t C h i n a in 1972. Political a w a r e n e s s w a s not a s s o c i a t e d with re-
sistance to this policy, even t h o u g h it is e a s y to imagine that s o m e politically
sophisticated c o n s e r v a t i v e s w o u l d have eagerly resisted it if a p p r o p r i a t e ideo-
logical cues had been g i v e n . 6
T h u s , most of my e v i d e n c e for the i m p o r t a n c e of cueing m e s s a g e s derives
from e x a m i n a t i o n of the attitudes of the politically a w a r e , w h o are extremely
responsive to w h a t ideologically congenial elites urge t h e m to b e l i e v e . In one
type of c a s e , however, the entire m a s s public - and not j u s t t h e most politically
attentive s e g m e n t - relies heavily on p a r t i s a n cues. This is the c a s e of contested
e l e c t i o n s , w h e r e all citizens are about equally p a r t i s a n in their t e n d e n c y to ac-
cept t h e information supplied by their o w n p a r t y ' s c a n d i d a t e and to reject that of
the opposition p a r t y ' s c a n d i d a t e .
6 Congressional Quarterly reports "a rising chorus of praise" for establishing relations with China,
but also some criticism. Among the critics were John Ashbrook, an aspirant for the Republican
presidential nomination, and columnist William F. Buckley (March 4, 1972: 472-3).
276 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
It is t h u s clear that a w a r e n e s s is associated with resistance to persuasion in
s o m e cases but not others. If o n e rejects my explanation - that cueing m e s s a g e s
are subtle in s o m e cases (typical p a r t i s a n issues, such as j o b g u a r a n t e e s ) , c o m -
pletely o b v i o u s in others (partisan e l e c t i o n s ) , and nonexistent in still others
( m a i n s t r e a m issues), so as to m a k e highly a w a r e persons m o r e c a p a b l e of par-
tisan resistance in the first type of situation but not in the second or third - then
it b e c o m e s n e c e s s a r y to p r o p o s e s o m e other explanation for why a w a r e n e s s has
this pattern of resistance effects. S i n c e , for the m o m e n t , no a l t e r n a t i v e expla-
nation is a p p a r e n t , it is r e a s o n a b l e to accept the idea that, in m a n y but not all
situations, awareness brings with it esoteric k n o w l e d g e of " w h a t g o e s with
w h a t , " and that this contextual k n o w l e d g e is an i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t of resistance
to p e r s u a s i o n .
A m o r e serious c r i t i c i s m of the Resistance A x i o m can be m a d e on conceptual
g r o u n d s . Let us a s s u m e , as I suggested earlier, that s o m e people see in the
m a i d e n flight of t h e B2 a comical b a t m o b i l e - and see t h i s , I should a d d , pre-
cisely because they have e a r l i e r received a n d , as d o v e s , accepted stories about
p o o r p e r f o r m a n c e by h i g h - t e c h n o l o g y w e a p o n s - while others see in t h e flight a
magnificent flying m a c h i n e . People w h o s e p r e c o n c e p t i o n s so influence w h a t
they perceive do not then need to e n g a g e in a s e p a r a t e evaluation to see w h e t h e r
the m e s s a g e should be accepted as a p r o - B 2 c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Perception and eval-
u a t i o n constitute for t h e m a single, s c h e m a - d r i v e n s t e p . H e n c e , it m a y reason-
ably be objected that t h e R A S m o d e l , in s h a r p l y distinguishing the reception
step from the a c c e p t a n c e s t e p , is creating a purely theoretical d i s t i n c t i o n .
T h e a l t e r n a t i v e w o u l d be to design a theory in which the internalization of
prior, ideologically cued c o m m u n i c a t i o n s affects both the likelihood of receiv-
ing a m e s s a g e and the form in which the m e s s a g e will be perceived. T h u s , if
s o m e o n e hears from a trusted source that the B2 is a costly and useless c o l o s s u s ,
the person may be m o r e likely to notice future n e w s about the B2 and to interpret
that n e w s in w a y s consistent with this initial information bias.
T h e r e is m u c h research on mental o r g a n i z a t i o n in social p s y c h o l o g y indicat-
ing that perception is t h e o r y - l a d e n in this way. It w o u l d therefore be valuable to
graft a theory of perception o n t o the R A S m o d e l . T h e lack of such a t h e o r y is,
in my opinion, one of the greatest deficiencies of the present m o d e l .
T h e Accessibility A x i o m , A 3 , is perhaps the most defensible of the four ax-
ioms. T h e notion that ideas that have been used recently or frequently are m o r e
readily recalled from m e m o r y is extremely well s u p p o r t e d both by e x p e r i m e n t a l
p s y c h o l o g y (as in W y e r and Srull, 1989) and by research on political attitudes
(Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Iyengar, 1991), and the R A S m o d e l simply capital-
izes on this e v i d e n c e .
T h e r e must, however, be more to accessibility than recency of a c t i v a t i o n . For
e x a m p l e , the studies of Wilson et al. (for reviews see W i l s o n , Kraft, and D u n n ,
1989; Wilson et a l . , 1989) and Millar and Tesser (1986) clearly indicate that p e o -
ple call to mind different c o n s i d e r a t i o n s w h e n a s k e d to a r t i c u l a t e the r e a s o n s for
their attitudes than w h e n asked to think about their feelings on a subject. T h i s
The model and future research 211
w o u l d s e e m to indicate, unsurprisingly, that m e m o r y search d e p e n d s on subtle
features of the task in w h o s e service it is being p e r f o r m e d . It s e e m s likely that
m e m o r y search is also affected by such m a t t e r s as m o o d , social c o n t e x t , and
other recent activities, even if unrelated to the task at h a n d .
I have finessed these potential c o m p l i c a t i o n s by a s s u m i n g a large d e g r e e of
simple r a n d o m n e s s in t h e m e m o r y search process - or, as I have expressed it,
r a n d o m n e s s in " t h e ideas that happen to be at the top of o n e ' s head at a given
m o m e n t . " A l t h o u g h this s e e m s to me a c c e p t a b l e as an initial strategy, future
m o d e l builders might profitably pay more attention to how m e m o r y search o c -
curs. T h e expected payoff w o u l d be the ability to explain more of the instability
over t i m e that is associated with p e o p l e ' s survey responses.
A n o t h e r s h o r t c o m i n g of the Accessibility A x i o m is that, since it p e r m i t s the
activation of o n e idea to increase the accessibility of related or similar i d e a s , it
is natural to w o n d e r w h a t exactly it is that d e t e r m i n e s w h e n ideas are related or
similar. T h i s is s o m e t h i n g that the R A S m o d e l d o e s not currently a d d r e s s but
m i g h t , with greater attention to the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of ideas in the m i n d , even-
tually be able to address. It might well turn out t h a t , for e x a m p l e , w h i c h ideas
are related to one a n o t h e r is less a function of logic or linguistic similarity than
of elite cues and other features of the external e n v i r o n m e n t .
But since, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g these l i m i t a t i o n s , A3 s e e m s to a c c o m p l i s h its role
in t h e m o d e l quite adequately, there w o u l d s e e m less need to t a m p e r with it than
with s o m e of the o t h e r a x i o m s .
T h e R e s p o n s e A x i o m , w h i c h claims that individuals a n s w e r survey q u e s t i o n s
by averaging across the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that are most i m m e d i a t e l y accessible in
m e m o r y , is the most c o n t e s t a b l e of the four a x i o m s . O n e i m p o r t a n t s h o r t c o m i n g
is that it provides no m e a n s of taking into account either the " s t r e n g t h " or the
" e x t r e m i t y " of the attitude statements p e o p l e are willing to m a k e . T h a t i s , it
allows people to favor o n e or the other side of an issue, but not to take positions
that are m o r e or less s t r o n g , or m o r e or less e x t r e m e .
T h e r e is nothing inherently w r o n g with this b i n a r y a p p r o a c h . M u c h of the
t i m e w h e n public opinion enters into elite p o l i t i c s , it enters as a single number,
the p e r c e n t a g e w h o a p p r o v e of the p r e s i d e n t ' s h a n d l i n g of his j o b , or w h o s u p -
port b u s i n g to achieve racial i n t e g r a t i o n , or w h o want an i m m e d i a t e pullout
from V i e t n a m . E l e c t i o n s , as c o n d u c t e d in the United S t a t e s , are likewise ag-
g r e g a t i o n s o f 0 - 1 choices.
N o n e t h e l e s s , it w o u l d be valuable to take account of attitude strength and ex-
tremity within the R A S m o d e l . O n e a p p r o a c h w o u l d b e t o a s s u m e that the ex-
tremity or strength of an individual's attitude r e p o r t v a r i e s with t h e net
directional thrust of h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and t h e total n u m b e r of salient consid-
e r a t i o n s . " A p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f mutually consistent c o n s i d e r a t i o n s " w o u l d thus
be t h e c a u s e of e x t r e m e or strong attitude r e p o r t s .
I am aware of no d a t a for testing this idea in c o n n e c t i o n with political issues,
but it is readily tested in c o n n e c t i o n with e v a l u a t i o n s of politicians. In the 1984
N E S election study, for e x a m p l e , r e s p o n d e n t s w e r e asked their likes and dislikes
278 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N The model and future research 279

induce citizens to form c o h e r e n t impressions about political subjects ( s e e , for

Table 11.1. The relationship between evaluational extremity
e x a m p l e , L a n e , 1962; C o n v e r s e , 1964; H o c h s c h i l d , 1981: ch. 9 ) .
and underlying considerations
P a r k and H a s t i e do specify special c o n d i t i o n s in which p e o p l e m a k e evalua-
tions on the basis of ideas i m m e d i a t e l y available in m e m o r y , namely, w h e n p e o -
Rating of Reagan on 100-point scale
ple e n c o u n t e r information that is so u n i m p o r t a n t to t h e m that they d o n ' t b o t h e r
0=25. 26-35 3fr43 46-55 56-65 66-75 75-100
to k e e p u p d a t e d e v a l u a t i o n s but are then u n e x p e c t e d l y asked to state an o p i n i o n .
Average Net of
likes and dislikes -2.75 -2.09 -1.78 -0.91 -0.52 0.39 W h e n this h a p p e n s , p e o p l e are forced to rely on ideas recalled from m e m o r y as
1.90
Average Sum of the basis of attitude r e p o r t s . I suggest that these c o n d i t i o n s are t h e n o r m in p o -
likes and dislikes 3.02 2.97 2.68 1.76 2.69 2.98 3.14 litical information p r o c e s s i n g . In fact, the issues on which survey r e s p o n d e n t s
N 287 123 146 234 245 419 757 are invited to offer o p i n i o n s are simply t o o n u m e r o u s , t o o m u l t i d i m e n s i o n a l ,
a n d , taken as a g r o u p , t o o o b s c u r e for it to be feasible for t h e m to e n g a g e in
Source: 1984 NES survey. on-line processing of relevant information (see M c G r a w and Pinney, 1990).
T h e strongest e v i d e n c e that the on-line m o d e l is inappropriate in the d o m a i n
of political attitudes is that p e o p l e ' s attitude r e p o r t s exhibit so m u c h purely
about Ronald R e a g a n and then i m m e d i a t e l y afterward were asked to evaluate chance variation over t i m e and are systematically affected by t h i n g s , such as
h i m on a 100-point feeling t h e r m o m e t e r . R e s p o n s e s to the former q u e s t i o n can q u e s t i o n order, that o u g h t , by the logic of the on-line m o d e l , to be irrelevant.
be taken as a m e a s u r e of the n u m b e r and thrust of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s relating to E v e n attitude r e p o r t s c o n c e r n i n g w e l l - k n o w n politicians, as an e x p e r i m e n t by
R e a g a n that were i m m e d i a t e l y salient in the r e s p o n d e n t ' s m i n d , while r e s p o n s e s W i l s o n , Kraft, and D u n n (1989) h a s s h o w n , a p p e a r to d e p e n d on the ideas at t h e
to the latter can be used to m e a s u r e attitude extremity. top of the head at t h e m o m e n t of r e s p o n s e rather than any d e e p e r true attitude.
Table 11.1 presents the relevant data. As can be seen in the top p a n e l , there It t h u s a p p e a r s that t h e on-line m o d e l suffers from t h e s a m e w e a k n e s s e s as the
is a strong positive r e l a t i o n s h i p between net R e a g a n likes/dislikes and the overall c o n v e n t i o n a l " t r u e a t t i t u d e " m o d e l s discussed earlier. In fact, the on-line m o d e l
w a r m t h of feelings toward h i m . As the b o t t o m panel further s h o w s , the rela- is essentially j u s t a variant of the old notion that survey r e s p o n s e s represent rev-
tionship b e t w e e n total n u m b e r of Reagan c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and feelings scores is elations of preexisting states of o p i n i o n , a notion that, as I have argued at
strongly n o n m o n o t o n i c . T h u s , p e o p l e with the largest average n u m b e r of R e a g a n l e n g t h , fails to w o r k very well.
likes and dislikes evaluated h i m most extremely. H a v i n g now, I b e l i e v e , strongly defended t h e R e s p o n s e A x i o m from criticism
This little analysis raises the possibility that attitude extremity m i g h t be a rel- m o t i v a t e d by the on-line m o d e l , I w o u l d like to b a c k off a bit. For a l t h o u g h the
atively simple function of the n u m b e r and direction of accessible c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . m e m o r y - b a s e d j u d g m e n t p r o c e s s e m b o d i e d in A4 is defensible, it should be re-
A n o t h e r difficulty with my simple top-of-the-head response rule is that it is g a r d e d only as a r o u g h first a p p r o x i m a t i o n of w h a t must actually occur. It seems
o p e n l y at odds with a c o n s i d e r a b l e research literature which argues that, instead to me likely that p e o p l e do e n g a g e in w h a t might be called bounded on-line pro-
of m a k i n g " m e m o r y - b a s e d " j u d g m e n t s from accessible i d e a s , as in A 4 , p e o - cessing of political i n f o r m a t i o n . T h a t is, they m a y m a k e on-line e v a l u a t i o n s of
p l e ' s j u d g m e n t s are n o r m a l l y m a d e " o n - l i n e " at the point of initial p r o c e s s i n g p a r t i c u l a r subjects but then fail to integrate e a c h newly u p d a t e d evaluation into
of i n c o m i n g information ( H a s t i e and P a r k , 1986; Lichtenstein and S r u l l , 1987; a fresh global e v a l u a t i o n . So if, for e x a m p l e , p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r information
L o d g e , M c G r a w , and S t r o h , 1989; M c G r a w and Pinney, 1990). W h e n a s k e d to about t h i r d - g e n e r a t i o n welfare families, they m a k e an on-line u p d a t e of their
express an attitude, p e o p l e simply retrieve their current evaluation and r e p o r t it, j u d g m e n t of the value of social spending for the alleviation of poverty. If, s o m e -
rather t h a n , as I have c l a i m e d , construct their attitude reports on the basis of the t i m e later, they e n c o u n t e r information about the n e e d s of h o m e l e s s p e r s o n s , they
ideas most i m m e d i a t e l y salient to t h e m . u p d a t e their j u d g m e n t on t h e u n m e t welfare n e e d s of the n a t i o n . But w h a t they
T h e on-line m o d e l is obviously a plausible o n e , but not necessarily equally do not d o , unless called to do so by an unusual event such as a public opinion
plausible for every type of p r o b l e m . It is n o t a b l e , first of all, that m o s t of the survey, is to m a k e an u p d a t e of their global attitude toward the welfare s y s t e m .
e v i d e n c e H a s t i e and P a r k cite involves nonpolitical subjects, especially person- T h u s , if asked on a survey to m a k e a global statement on the p r o p e r level of
ality e v a l u a t i o n . As they point out, it is extremely difficult to prevent p e o p l e welfare s p e n d i n g , they will have no u p - t o - d a t e global evaluation to retrieve but
from forming integrated evaluations of other personalities as information c o m e s will instead have to m a k e an on-the-spot j u d g m e n t from w h a t e v e r ( u p d a t e d ) con-
in. A p p a r e n t l y this is s o m e t h i n g that people do naturally and effortlessly. s i d e r a t i o n s , w h e t h e r involving h o m e l e s s p e r s o n s o r s o m e t h i n g e l s e , c o m e most
It is by no m e a n s o b v i o u s , however, that the s a m e is true of political c o n t r o - readily to m i n d . By this a c c o u n t , A4 is not so m u c h w r o n g as underspecified:
versies. In fact, t h e o p p o s i t e may be nearer t h e truth. Indirect e v i d e n c e from a M e m o r y - b a s e d d e c i s i o n m a k i n g o c c u r s , but s o , at a n o t h e r level, d o e s on-line
variety of sources indicates that it is difficult u n d e r the best of c i r c u m s t a n c e s to processing.
280 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
T h i s limitation points to a more general w e a k n e s s of the entire R A S frame-
w o r k , namely its failure to p r o v i d e any m e c h a n i s m for integration of information
that h a s been acquired. By its a x i o m s , p e o p l e screen information at the point of
first e n c o u n t e r i n g it, but o n c e internalized, each bit of information b e c o m e s just
a n o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n in a mental " b i n " full of such atomized c o g n i t i o n s .
T h i s is obviously a d r a s t i c simplification. A l t h o u g h total d i s c o n n e c t e d n e s s
may, as Luskin (1987) skillfully a r g u e s , occur within certain s e g m e n t s of t h e
p u b l i c , it cannot be the w h o l e story. S o m e p e o p l e , and probably m o s t , surely do
build up c o m p l e x l y differentiated c o g n i t i o n s that cannot be a d e q u a t e l y captured
by my simple notion of a c o n s i d e r a t i o n . C o n t r a r y to the R A S m o d e l , these m e n -
tal structures u n d o u b t e d l y g r o w in size and subtlety as new information is en-
c o u n t e r e d and integrated, t h u s perhaps increasing their chronic accessibility and
h e n c e relative " i m p o r t a n c e " as d e t e r m i n a n t s of attitude r e p o r t s . I n t e g r a t e d in-
f o r m a t i o n structures might also play a major role in both the perception and crit-
ical scrutiny of i n c o m i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
A n o t h e r s h o r t c o m i n g in this s a m e vein is that the m o d e l m a k e s no provision
for m u l t i p l e reception of the s a m e m e s s a g e . D o e s a m e s s a g e that has b e e n ac-
cepted t w o or m o r e t i m e s then b e c o m e t w o or m o r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ? Or, m o r e in
the spirit of the R A S m o d e l , might re-reception of an idea increase its salience
and h e n c e its likelihood of use? Or finally, d o e s re-reception m a k e it m o r e likely
that an idea will be integrated within s o m e larger, m o r e c o m p l e x mental struc-
ture? Probably the answer to all of these q u e s t i o n s , each of which c h a l l e n g e s the
basic structure of the R A S m o d e l , is yes.
T h e reason that I have left so m u c h that I believe to be true out of the R A S
m o d e l is, quite simply, that there has been no pressing need to include it. T h e
m a c h i n e r y of the current m o d e l has been able to explain a large part of the vari-
a n c e in the existing survey e v i d e n c e that s e e m s presently a m e n a b l e to s y s t e m a t i c
e x p l a n a t i o n , and I have been loathe to m a k e the R A S model any m o r e e l a b o r a t e
than n e c e s s a r y to do this, v
In the longer r u n , however, greater e l a b o r a t i o n of the model will b e c o m e ap-
p r o p r i a t e . Perhaps a fifth a x i o m could specify that the effect of t h o u g h t about a
subject - perhaps even t h o u g h t that is independent of any elite influence (see
Tesser, 1978) - is to build up integrated c o g n i t i v e structures, p r e s u m a b l y sche-
m a t a . As these structures grow, they might c o l o n i z e or neutralize o p p o s i n g , less
developed c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , thereby reducing r e s p o n s e instability. T h e y m i g h t also
influence the interpretation and processing of new c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , thereby
preventing the future f o r m a t i o n of o p p o s i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .
It w o u l d be easy, however, to take the notion of integrated c o g n i t i v e structures
t o o far. O n e s h o u l d , in particular, never take this idea so far as to o v e r l o o k the
substantial extent to w h i c h most p e o p l e ' s political ideas are not integrated into
coherent mental s t r u c t u r e s , the extent to which o p p o s i n g ideas and feelings reg-
ularly coexist c o m f o r t a b l y within the s a m e b r a i n , and the large e l e m e n t of
c h a n c e in the process by which one rather than a n o t h e r idea c o m e s to the top of
the head and exerts m o m e n t a r y control over a b e h a v i o r or attitude s t a t e m e n t .
The model and future research 281
W h a t would be most d e s i r a b l e , t h e n , is not the R A S model I have p r o p o s e d ,
but a R e c e i v e - A c c e p t - / « / e ^ r a r e - S a m p l e M o d e l , in which the o u t c o m e of initial
information processing affects r e c e p t i o n , a c c e p t a n c e , and integration of subse-
q u e n t information.
I d o u b t , however, that theoretical e l a b o r a t i o n of the R A S model along these
lines will b e c o m e fruitful to analysts of public opinion until we learn how to
m e a s u r e more than the simple " l i k e s " and " d i s l i k e s " that have been featured in
my analysis. T h i s , in t u r n , will require s o m e way of m e a s u r i n g , a m o n g o t h e r
t h i n g s , the v o l u m e and c o m p l e x i t y of discrete c o g n i t i o n s , and w h e r e , in a stream
of verbal statements from a survey r e s p o n d e n t , t h o u g h t s o r g a n i z e d by o n e c o g -
nitive structure leave off and those associated with a n o t h e r begin. T h e s e sorts of
i m p r o v e m e n t s in m e a s u r e m e n t capacity in m a s s surveys are not, so far as I am
a w a r e , i m m e d i a t e l y in p r o s p e c t .
S o , a l t h o u g h I readily a c k n o w l e d g e p h e n o m e n a that the a x i o m s of t h e R A S
f r a m e w o r k cannot presently a c c o m m o d a t e , and can m a k e fairly specific sugges-
tions about how the f r a m e w o r k might be p a r s i m o n i o u s l y e l a b o r a t e d in o r d e r
to better a c c o m m o d a t e t h e m , I do not see any reason for opinion researchers
to m a k e these e l a b o r a t i o n s until the d a t a n e c e s s a r y for their testing b e c o m e
available.
MODELS OF T H E R E C E P T I O N - A C C E P T A N C E PROCESS
If t h e most general a c h i e v e m e n t of the R A S model is its integration of a w i d e
r a n g e of empirical regularities within a c o m p a c t m o d e l , its most p a r t i c u l a r suc-
cess centers on its treatment of attitude c h a n g e . T h e core idea here has been that
reception of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s increases with attentiveness to politics,
and that capacity for resistance to uncongenial c o m m u n i c a t i o n s also increases
with attentiveness. T h i s dual c l a i m , which o r i g i n a t e d in w o r k by Philip C o n -
verse and William M c G u i r e in the 1960s, h a s both m o t i v a t e d the discovery of
s o m e interesting patterns of attitude c h a n g e and provided a basis for organizing
t h e m , as in the typology proposed in C h a p t e r 8.
E v e n if, as will d o u b t l e s s occur, future research turns up cases of attitude
c h a n g e that are not i m m e d i a t e l y explicable within this typology, researchers
should be reluctant to discard either the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e d y n a m i c or the
role of political attentiveness in m e d i a t i n g it. As I have a t t e m p t e d to show, in-
dividual differences in propensity to receive political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are so
great and so c o n s e q u e n t i a l u n d e r a w i d e r a n g e of conditions that it is virtually
never safe to ignore t h e m . T h e effects of attentiveness on a c c e p t a n c e or n o n a c -
c e p t a n c e of persuasive m e s s a g e s , given r e c e p t i o n , are less universal - in par-
ticular, they s e e m to w a s h out in high-intensity p a r t i s a n e l e c t i o n s - but they a r e t
n o n e t h e l e s s extremely i m p o r t a n t in many types of s i t u a t i o n s , and therefore also
d a n g e r o u s to ignore.
But despite the general i m p o r t a n c e of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e d y n a m i c ,
there are a n u m b e r of q u e s t i o n s that may be raised about my d e v e l o p m e n t of
 282 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N The model and future research 283

p a r t i c u l a r r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e models. I g r o u p these questions u n d e r t w o ru-

b r i c s : general theoretical issues and m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issues. Table 11.2. Two measures of opinion
change on U.S. policy in Central America
Theoretical issues Level of political awareness
In my o p e n i n g discussion of attitude c h a n g e in C h a p t e r 7, I said that attitude Low High
c h a n g e cannot be u n d e r s t o o d within the R A S m o d e l as a conversion experi- Method one: Attitude change as difference of means
e n c e - the r e p l a c e m e n t of o n e crystallized belief by another. It must instead be Hawks
u n d e r s t o o d as a c h a n g e in the balance of positive and n e g a t i v e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s 1986 mean 3.67 a
3.65 4.23 5.26
relating to a given issue. O w i n g to the lack of a p p r o p r i a t e d a t a , I have been 1987 mean 4.28 4.15 4.59 5.60
u n a b l e to do full j u s t i c e to this theoretical p o s i t i o n . T h a t is, I have b e e n unable Mean difference 0.61 0.50 0.36 0.34
to show how c h a n g e s over t i m e in the b a l a n c e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in p e o p l e ' s N (18) (40) (44) (15)
h e a d s lead to g r a d u a t e d c h a n g e s in c l o s e d - e n d e d attitude r e p o r t s , such as a
Centrists
m o v e m e n t from " s t r o n g a g r e e m e n t " with a p a r t i c u l a r policy to " n o t so s t r o n g "
1986 mean 3.47 2.76 3.53 3.71
a g r e e m e n t . Rather, all of my analyses have dealt with the d i c h o t o m o u s c a s e : Ei-
1987 mean 4.07 3.95 4.05 3.71
ther people c h a n g e their initial position to the o p p o s i t e position or they r e m a i n
Mean difference 0.60 1.19 0.52 0.00
unchanged. v
(30) (37) (40) (14)
D i c h o t o m o u s scoring of attitude c h a n g e m e a s u r e s d o e s have technical advan-
tages: T h e 0 - 1 scoring m e t r i c , which distinguishes those w h o s u p p o r t a given Doves
position from all o t h e r s , including those w h o say " D o n ' t k n o w , " is the only 1986 mean 3.87 2.97 2.60 2.27
o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l metric hat avoids treating " D o n ' t k n o w " responses a s missing 1987 mean 4.07 3.16 3.00 3.19
d a t a . Since people w h o respond " D o n ' t k n o w " are less politically a w a r e than Mean difference 0.20 0.19 0.40 0.92
c o u n t e r p a r t s w h o d o a n s w e r survey q u e s t i o n s , their loss a s missing d a t a w o u l d
(15) (3D (50) (26)

introduce significant distortion into e s t i m a t e s of t h e effect of a w a r e n e s s on opin-

Method two: Attitude change as proportionate change
ion f o r m a t i o n and c h a n g e . For e x a m p l e , most of the attitude c h a n g e in the early
Hawks
stages of the V i e t n a m W a r consisted of the conversion of respondents without 0.18* 0.03 0.09 0.18
-opinions into s u p p o r t e r s of the war. (17) (37) (41) (13)
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g all t h i s , attitude scales that m e a s u r e strength or extremity of Centrists
-0.01 0.23 0.14 -0.19
attitude reports are c o n v e y i n g real information about p e o p l e ' s opinions. (29) (37) (37) (14)
C h a n g e s in the d e g r e e of strength or extremity of an attitude, even if they do not Doves
involve crossing t h e threshold to s u p p o r t a policy that w a s previously o p p o s e d , -0.09 0.03 0.05 0.16
(14) (30) (49) (26)
likewise convey i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m is h o w to use it.
T w 6 possibilities are s u g g e s t e d in Table 11.2. T h e issue is U . S . involvement a
Cell entry is mean score on 7-point scale.
in Central A m e r i c a , on w h i c h attitudes were m e a s u r e d on a seven-point scale at * Cell entry is proportionate change between
t w o t i m e points. In the top half of Table 1 1 . 2 , 1 simply t o o k the m e a n difference surveys, as described in text.
o v e r t i m e i n scores o n the seven-point scale, o m i t t i n g " D o n ' t k n o w " respon- Source: 1986 and 1987 NES surveys.
dents. As can be seen, these patterns of c h a n g e are radically different from those
found in the e a r l i e r analysis.
However, there is an o b v i o u s difficulty with this m e t h o d of m e a s u r i n g attitude w h i l e , highly aware d o v e s were c o n c e n t r a t e d at points 1 and 2, w h e r e there w a s
c h a n g e : M a n y highly aware h a w k s were at points 5 or 6 on the seven-point scale m u c h r o o m for r i g h t w a r d m o v e m e n t , including m o v e m e n t that did not require
at the first interview, so that little p r o i n v o l v e m e n t c h a n g e w a s possible for t h e m ; t h e m to cross the threshold into actual s u p p o r t for greater involvement in Central
s o m e were even at point 7, w h e r e no m o v e m e n t to the right w a s p o s s i b l e . In America.
g e n e r a l , the greater a r e s p o n d e n t ' s propensity to c h a n g e in the direction of a par- As a way of taking into account these floor and ceiling factors, I calculated
ticular m e s s a g e , the m o r e limited the r o o m for c h a n g e w a s likely to b e . M e a n - c h a n g e scores for each r e s p o n d e n t , as follows,
 284 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Time2 — T i m e i
Change = — — actly critical resistance to persuasion often increases with levels of political
7 — Time]
T h i s m e a s u r e , calculated from panel d a t a , scores each r e s p o n d e n t ' s c h a n g e as a
p r o p o r t i o n of his o p p o r t u n i t y for c h a n g e . S i n c e division by z e r o is i m p o s s i b l e ,
this a p p r o a c h requires the e l i m i n a t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s w h o were at point 7 at the
first i n t e r v i e w , a plausible r e q u i r e m e n t in v i e w of t h e impossibility of further
r i g h t w a r d m o v e m e n t by such persons.
T h e results of this maneuver, as s h o w n in t h e lower half of Table 11.2, are
s o m e w h a t closer to the results of my earlier a n a l y s i s , which also implicitly con-
7
trols for floors a n d c e i l i n g s . However, except for taking into account ceiling ef-
fects, this set of results has no m o r e theoretical w a r r a n t than the first. For like
the s i m p l e subtraction a p p r o a c h , it fails to link probability of switching sides on
an issue with g r a d u a t e d c h a n g e in the m i x of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in p e o p l e ' s h e a d s .
To see w h a t linkage m i g h t look like, c o n s i d e r an issue in which c o m m u n i c a -
t i o n s so strongly favor o n e side - say, t h e liberal side - that even c o n s e r v a t i v e s
take the liberal side of a d i c h o t o m o u s i t e m . But such c o n s e r v a t i v e s u p p o r t w o u l d
p r e s u m a b l y b e a m b i v a l e n t . H e n c e any intensification o f c o n s e r v a t i v e c o m m u -
n i c a t i o n s w o u l d tip the b a l a n c e of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s for many c o n s e r v a t i v e s , p r o -
d u c i n g heavy switching to the c o n s e r v a t i v e side of the d i c h o t o m y . L i b e r a l s ,
b e c a u s e initially less a m b i v a l e n t , would be less likely to cross the t h r e s h o l d .
T h u s , even if both g r o u p s formed exactly t h e s a m e n e w c o n s i d e r a t i o n s - and in
this sense exhibited equal c h a n g e - c o n s e r v a t i v e s w o u l d be m o r e apt to switch
s i d e s , with the most a w a r e most likely to do so o w i n g to heavier e x p o s u r e to n e w
ideas and ( m o s t likely) g r e a t e r initial a m b i v a l e n c e resulting from p r i o r r e c e p t i o n
of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n . This sort of a r g u m e n t c o u l d , I believe, m a k e
a useful s t a r t i n g point for future research in this a r e a . 8 C h a n g e in r e s p o n s e probability =
7 The pattern in Table 11.2 would be perfect, except for high-awareness doves, who show much
larger than expected change. I was naturally curious about this problem and so investigated it.
Virtually all of the difficulty is with two individuals (in a cell of 26) who shifted from 1 on the
seven-point Central America scale in 1986 to 7 in 1987, a maximal change in the wrong direction.
Immediately following this question in the 1987 survey was a question about whether aid to the
Contra guerrillas should be increased, decreased, or kept the same. Both of the problematic doves
responded by volunteering that aid to the Contras should be entirely cut off! Apparently, then,
their stated support for "much greater U.S. involvement in Central America" is misleading. One
possibility is that they wanted the United States to be more involved in development projects or
humanitarian relief. More likely, however, is that they simply made an error in using the seven-
point scale. This would have been easy since the 1987 survey was conducted by telephone. In this
mode, interviewers describe a seven-point scale to respondents rather than, as in a regular NES
survey, give respondents a show-card with a labeled seven-point scale. I monitored many of the
1987 telephone interviewers and heard one case in which I was certain that a respondent picked
the wrong number to describe her self-described position on Central America and another in
which I felt it was likely that an error had been made. The SRC interviewing staff is generally
reluctant to use seven-point scales over the telephone, and this case may illustrate why.
8 Because it is difficult to anticipate issues on which attitudes will change in the real world, it might
be necessary to pursue the relationship between considerations and susceptibility to change in a
laboratory setting. A type of opinion that is particularly suitable for use in examining attitude
change in a natural setting is presidential approval, which can be counted upon to exhibit rela-
tively large amounts of variation over time. s countervalent and partisan resistance, do have the expected signs.
The model and future research 285
A n o t h e r i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n about t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e p r o c e s s i s w h y ex-
a w a r e n e s s . I h a v e offered a t h r e e - p a r t e x p l a n a t i o n for this r e s i s t a n c e , c e n t e r i n g
on the m e c h a n i s m s of inertial r e s i s t a n c e , c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance, and p a r t i s a n
resistance.
Of t h e t h r e e , c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance - t h e c l a i m that better informed p e o p l e
are m o r e resistant to d o m i n a n t persuasive m e s s a g e s b e c a u s e they are m o r e likely
to b e c o m e a w a r e of low-intensity c o u n t e r v a l e n t information flows - s e e m s to
h a v e t h e strongest e m p i r i c a l support. It is h a r d to imagine how o n e m i g h t explain
the p e c u l i a r p a t t e r n s of c h a n g e that arose d u r i n g the V i e t n a m W a r and in voting
in c o n g r e s s i o n a l e l e c t i o n s w i t h o u t reference to the effects of c o u n t e r v a l e n t
communications.
P a r t i s a n r e s i s t a n c e , t h e c l a i m that p e o p l e reject i d e a s that they a r e a b l e t o r e c -
o g n i z e as being inconsistent with their v a l u e s , likewise s e e m s to be on a firm
f o u n d a t i o n , as j u s t i n d i c a t e d .
T h i s b r i n g s us to inertial r e s i s t a n c e , w h i c h is the idea that p e o p l e h a v i n g a
large store of initial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s on an issue a r e m o r e resistant to s u b s e q u e n t
c h a n g e . T h i s resistance m e c h a n i s m , a l t h o u g h d a t i n g t o C o n v e r s e ' s (1962) in-
troduction of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e d y n a m i c , is o p e n to q u e s t i o n . T h e prob-
l e m s are both theoretical and e m p i r i c a l . On t h e theoretical s i d e , s u p p o s e that C {
and Z), are c o u n t e r v a l e n t and d o m i n a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s in a p e r s o n ' s m i n d at an
initial point in t i m e , and that C and D are c o u n t e r v a l e n t and d o m i n a n t con-
2 2
s i d e r a t i o n s acquired o v e r a s u b s e q u e n t t i m e p e r i o d . T h e e x p e c t e d r e s p o n s e
c h a n g e o v e r t i m e is t h e n given by:
nu • , , ,
h (Ci + C ) 2
,
C,
(11.1)
C, + D ,
T h e claim of inertial resistance is that the larger C , , the greater the p e r s o n ' s
resistance to the effects of the d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e . If s o , the derivative of E q u a -
tion 7 . 1 w i t h respect t o C , o u g h t t o b e p o s i t i v e , w h i c h w o u l d indicate that
h i g h e r initial n u m b e r s of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a r e , all else e q u a l , asso-
ciated with higher levels of c o n t i n u e d s u p p o r t for the c o u n t e r v a l e n t position.
However, this d e r i v a t i v e turns out not to be p o s i t i v e ; it is a c o m p l i c a t e d function
that indicates no c l e a r r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n C { and resistance to a d o m i n a n t
9
message.
Despite t h i s , the notion of inertial resistance r e m a i n s an intuitively plausible
o n e . T h e r e w a s , moreover, s o m e c l e a r e m p i r i c a l s u p p o r t for it in the analysis of
v o t i n g in H o u s e e l e c t i o n s . O n e m i g h t , in a d d i t i o n , c o u n t t h e steadfast loyalty of
9 Numerical analysis of the derivative with plausible values for the key terms indicates that C, is,
as expected, often associated with resistance to a dominant message, but never very strongly.
Derivatives of Equation 7.1 testing for the effects of C and D , which are associated with
2 2
286 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
sophisticated older p a r t i s a n s to established ideas c o n c e r n i n g K o r e a and Viet-
n a m , as discussed in C h a p t e r 8, as e v i d e n c e for inertial resistance. T h e idea here
w o u l d be that old p a r t i s a n s have longer e x p e r i e n c e with these ideas and h e n c e
a greater store of inertial c o n s i d e r a t i o n s m a k i n g t h e m resistant to c h a n g e .
But there are also s o m e e m p i r i c a l p r o b l e m s . A p a r t i c u l a r l y troubling o n e in-
volved t h e p u b l i c ' s r e s p o n s e t o President N i x o n ' s initiatives toward the c o m -
m u n i s t g o v e r n m e n t of m a i n l a n d C h i n a , as discussed in C h a p t e r 6. T h i s w a s an
issue that had exercised c o n s e r v a t i v e s for t w o d e c a d e s , and so I e x p e c t e d that
sophisticated c o n s e r v a t i v e s , especially older o n e s , would exhibit s o m e inertial
resistance to a d m i s s i o n of " R e d C h i n a , " as the c o u n t r y w a s then called, to the
U n i t e d N a t i o n s . But I s e a r c h e d diligently for e v i d e n c e of such inertial resis-
t a n c e - w h i c h should have taken the form of a n o n m o n o t o n i c r e l a t i o n s h i p b e -
tween awareness and s u p p o r t for recognition of C h i n a - and could find n o n e .
T h e relationship to t h e n e w m a i n s t r e a m n o r m w a s , as reported in C h a p t e r 6, as
monotonically positive a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s a s a m o n g other types o f p e o p l e .
A n o t h e r d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , from the point of view of inertial resistance, w a s the
b r e a t h t a k i n g l y swift m o v e m e n t of Republican activists, individuals w h o w o u l d
u n d o u b t e d l y score at the top of m e a s u r e s of b o t h p a r t i s a n s h i p and political
a w a r e n e s s , toward w a g e and price controls o n c e N i x o n a n n o u n c e d his s u p p o r t of
t h e m in 1 9 7 1 , as also discussed in C h a p t e r 6. T h i s policy w a s as antithetical to
traditional Republican c o n s e r v a t i s m as any that o n e can i m a g i n e , but it p r o v o k e d
scarcely any resistance.
T h e s e t w o c a s e s , in c o m b i n a t i o n with the m o d e r a t e m a g n i t u d e s of t h e effect
of inertial resistance in congressional e l e c t i o n s , feed the impression that inertial
resistance is less i m p o r t a n t than either p a r t i s a n or c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance as a
source of resistance to d o m i n a n t political m e s s a g e s . T h e notion of inertial re-
sistance should certainly be kept alive, but it should also be treated with r e s e r v e
until a reformulated t h e o r y or better d a t a can p r o v i d e it with a stronger w a r r a n t .
O n e possibility is that .inertial r e s i s t a n c e , like the other t w o forms of resis-
t a n c e , d e p e n d s on n o u r i s h m e n t from c u r r e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . I suggest this be-
c a u s e in the two c a s e s in w h i c h there w a s s o m e t h i n g like inertial resistance to a
n e w idea - the c o n t r a s t i n g cases of sophisticated o l d e r c o n s e r v a t i v e s resisting
t h e K o r e a n W a r and of sophisticated older liberals resisting a n t i - V i e t n a m W a r
ideas - there w a s a m p l e reinforcement for preexisting attitudes in elite dis-
c o u r s e . In the c a s e in w h i c h , as it s e e m e d to m e , inertial resistance should have
been present but apparently w a s not - N i x o n ' s reversal of U . S . policy toward
c o m m u n i s t C h i n a - there w a s virtually no elite opposition to N i x o n ' s n e w pol-
icy and also no resistance a m o n g sophisticated c o n s e r v a t i v e s .
H e n c e w h a t I am calling inertial resistance m a y w o r k s o m e t h i n g like this:
P e o p l e with large stores of preexisting c o n s i d e r a t i o n s with respect to an issue
m a y exhibit unusual resistance to new ideas but only so long as elite discourse
gives s o m e indication of the c o n t i n u e d relevance of their old feelings. A b s e n t
m i n i m a l elite v a l i d a t i o n , old feelings m a y be s w a m p e d by ideas of the m o m e n t ,
as in N i x o n ' s policy reversal on C h i n a . Elite v a l i d a t i o n , on this view, m i g h t be
The model and future research 287
insufficient to implant a n e w idea in a n y o n e ' s h e a d , but a d e q u a t e to a w a k e n and
invigorate preexisting ideas.
It is useful to recall at this point that t w o of my three resistance m e c h a n i s m s ,
p a r t i s a n and c o u n t e r v a l e n t resistance, d e p e n d on n o u r i s h m e n t from elite dis-
c o u r s e (cueing m e s s a g e s in the first c a s e , c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the
s e c o n d ) . N o w it turns out that even inertial r e s i s t a n c e , already the least impor-
tant of t h e three m e c h a n i s m s , m a y also d e p e n d on elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e
implication of all this is painfully clear: T h e capacity of citizens for a u t o n o m o u s
resistance to d o m i n a n t elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s is very distinctly limited.
I t u r n , finally, to a large but almost invisible simplification in the reception-
a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , n a m e l y the implicit a s s u m p t i o n that individuals never think
for t h e m s e l v e s , but instead rely exclusively on the reception of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
reaching t h e m from t h e external e n v i r o n m e n t . Technically, this presupposition
m a y be stated as follows:
Prob(Attitude change) = Prob(Reception) x Prob(Acceptance I Reception)
+ P r o b ( A c c e p t a n c e I No reception)
w h e r e P r o b ( A c c e p t a n c e I No reception) is c o n s t r a i n e d always to be z e r o .
It is difficult to say h o w large a simplification is involved h e r e . But before
discussing that q u e s t i o n , I want to put t h e m o d e l ' s constraint c o n c e r n i n g inde-
p e n d e n t thought in p e r s p e c t i v e by noting w h a t t h e m o d e l does allow. It d o e s
allow p e o p l e to v a r y in their political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , so that citizens m a y be
m o r e or less strongly predisposed toward equality, hawkish military policies,
tolerance of dissent, and so forth. W h e t h e r these predispositions are p r o d u c t s of
socialization, adult e x p e r i e n c e , self-interest, inborn personality, or r e a s o n e d
c h o i c e , they represent c r i t i c a l , internally m o t i v a t e d influences on opinion
a n d , as s u c h , afford citizens an important d e g r e e of a u t o n o m y from elite infor-
m a t i o n flows.
To put the m a t t e r m o r e strongly: T h e m o d e l d o e s not c l a i m , as a reader of an
early draft of this b o o k c o m p l a i n e d , that individuals are the passive receptacles
of w h a t e v e r elites want t h e m to believe; the c l a i m , rather, is that citizens pick
and c h o o s e , on the basis of their predispositions, from the m e n u of elite-
sponsored a l t e r n a t i v e s to which they have b e e n e x p o s e d .
T h i s is still a strong c l a i m , but a less o u t r a g e o u s o n e . T h e a r g u m e n t is that
most c i t i z e n s , to the extent they are attentive to politics, align t h e m s e l v e s with
leaders or g r o u p s that share their predispositions and have m o r e information
t h a n they d o . In this way, they avoid the necessity - and perhaps t h e practical
impossibility - of really thinking about issues. (The n o r m a t i v e and research im-
plications of this claim are c o n s i d e r e d in C h a p t e r 12.)
Let me play out this logic as it applies to a c o n c r e t e c a s e that h a s been ex-
tensively e x a m i n e d in this b o o k , the V i e t n a m War. T h i s is an issue that is often
said to have b e e n agonizingly difficult for m a n y p e r s o n s , especially e d u c a t e d
liberals. T h e s e were p e o p l e w h o t e n d e d to be strong supporters of the w a r in its
 288 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
initial phase but found the w a r increasingly difficult to s u p p o r t and eventually
t u r n e d , a m i d m u c h d i s c o m f o r t , o v e r w h e l m i n g l y against it.
T h e m o d e l , of c o u r s e , explains both the initial s u p p o r t and s u b s e q u e n t o p p o -
sition of e d u c a t e d liberals as a response to the c u e s of liberal elites. If, as w a s the
c a s e , it proved difficult for many e d u c a t e d liberals to turn against t h e w a r as
liberal elite opinion leaders b e c a m e increasingly antiwar, this might simply be a
c a s e of a m b i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n o p p o s i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , w h e r e the a m b i v a l e n c e
has been brought about by " i n e r t i a l r e s i s t a n c e " to the new a n t i w a r m e s s a g e .
S u c h inertial resistance w a s , as the model w o u l d expect, m u c h stronger a m o n g
o l d e r liberals, w h o , in contrast to y o u n g e r o n e s , had built up large stores of anti-
c o m m u n i s m and o t h e r C o l d W a r - t y p e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . A l t h o u g h few e d u c a t e d
liberals may have consciously experienced t h e m s e l v e s as suffering t h e effects of
inertial resistance to a new elite n o r m , it does not s e e m to me that t h e m o d e l
d o e s an o b v i o u s injustice in claiming that this is w h a t q c c u r r e d .
I am less confident that the a r g u m e n t of this b o o k can capture the processes
by which the attitude r e p o r t s of less attentive p e o p l e are formed. T h e reason is
that, being less politically a t t e n t i v e , they are less influenced by the flow of p o -
litical c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that is at the h e a r t of the b o o k ' s a r g u m e n t .
H o w less attentive p e r s o n s respond to political issues in the absence of atten-
tion to or information about many of t h e m is a difficult q u e s t i o n . P a r t of the
answer, as we have s e e n , is that their attitude r e p o r t s tend to be u n r e l i a b l e , in
that they lack t e m p o r a l stability and are p o o r l y correlated with their political
predispositions. A n o t h e r p a r t of the a n s w e r is that politically inattentive p e o p l e
m a y often give " m i s t a k e n " attitude r e p o r t s , in t h e sense that they r e s p o n d on
the basis of an incorrect g u e s s about the m e a n i n g of the q u e s t i o n s they have been
a s k e d . I w a s able to report o n e clear c a s e of this in C h a p t e r 5, w h e r e it w a s
s h o w n that inattentive persons r e s p o n d e d to a sparely w o r d e d q u e s t i o n about
U . S . s p e n d i n g on aid to the C o n t r a rebels as if they were being asked about g o v -
e r n m e n t spending in g e n e r a l . T h e result w a s that social welfare liberals were
most s u p p o r t i v e of aid to" the C o n t r a s and social welfare c o n s e r v a t i v e s m o s t o p -
p o s e d . This w r o n g - w a y c o r r e l a t i o n with ideology d i s a p p e a r e d , however, w h e n a
m o r e e l a b o r a t e q u e s t i o n c o n v e y e d the information that the C o n t r a s w e r e o p p o -
nents of c o m m u n i s m .
T h e s e o b s e r v a t i o n s a c c e n t u a t e the n e g a t i v e , in that they stress w h a t is missing
from the attitude r e p o r t s of the politically inattentive. T h i s is not i n a p p r o p r i a t e ,
but there must be a positive s i d e , as well, to indicate what does occur.
It s e e m s likely that the s a m e predispositions that a n i m a t e the attitude r e p o r t s
of the politically a w a r e are present and influential a m o n g the less a w a r e . It is
j u s t that they m a y o p e r a t e m o r e directly on opinion - or at least o p e r a t e inde-
p e n d e n t l y of any m e d i a t i o n via the information and leadership c u e s c a r r i e d in
elite political discourse. T h u s , for e x a m p l e , S n i d e r m a n , Brody, and Tetlock
(1991) report t h a t , a m o n g p o o r l y e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s , feelings or affect toward
v a r i o u s political and social g r o u p s are a potent influence on attitude r e p o r t s ,
w h e r e a s , a m o n g better e d u c a t e d p e r s o n s , indicators of ideology are t h e d o m i -
nant influence.
The model and future research 289
However, the d y n a m i c s of a " p u b l i c opinion b a s e d on intergroup f e e l i n g s "
need not fundamentally differ from the d y n a m i c s of a public opinion b a s e d on
elite d i s c o u r s e , as p r o p o s e d in this b o o k . P e o p l e w h o pay little attention to elite
d i s c o u r s e would still need to acquire information about the w o r l d and to evaluate
it in light of s o m e u n d e r s t a n d i n g of w h a t the information m e a n s ; they w o u l d also
still formulate attitude r e p o r t s on the basis of top-of-the-head information (or
feelings), with all that follows from this. O n l y t h e sources of the leadership c u e s
and information flows n e e d be different: T h e y m i g h t originate in informal or
n e i g h b o r h o o d subcultures r a t h e r than in a m a i n s t r e a m elite, and might diffuse by
w o r d of m o u t h rather t h a n via t h e m e d i a . S u c h c o m m u n i c a t i o n flows m a y be as
likely to contradict as to c o r r o b o r a t e information from the elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n
c h a n n e l s , as an e x a m p l e from the former Soviet U n i o n will shortly illustrate, but
they n e e d not contradict any principles of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . As I
o b s e r v e d earlier, c o m m u n i c a t i o n s transmitted by face-to-face interaction in the
m a n n e r of g e r m s m a y obey the principles of t h e m o d e l to the same extent as elite
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that diffuse through the m a s s m e d i a .
But might not the ideas that o r i g i n a t e a m o n g the public and diffuse by word
of m o u t h be different from those that o r i g i n a t e a m o n g elites? I n d e e d , they
m i g h t . Taxpayer revolts and b a c k l a s h e s of v a r i o u s t y p e s , including w h i t e back-
lashes against federal efforts to p r o m o t e racial equality, are probably o n e type of
attitude that tends to o r i g i n a t e m o r e often a m o n g the public than a m o n g elites -
t h o u g h , even h e r e , there a r e cases in w h i c h politicians stir up b a c k l a s h e s and
voter revolts b e c a u s e they expect to profit politically by t h e m .
All this brings us b a c k to the q u e s t i o n discussed earlier: H o w often do elites
a u t o n o m o u s l y lead opinion and how often do they simply go along with a public
that o p e r a t e s on its o w n internal d y n a m i c ? A n d as in my e a r l i e r d i s c u s s i o n , I
have no general a n s w e r to this q u e s t i o n . I can only o b s e r v e that in the p a r t i c u l a r
cases e x a m i n e d in this b o o k , there is reason to believe that elites p r e d o m i n a t e l y
led rather than followed.
Methodological issues
T h e central effort of the latter half of this b o o k h a s been to show h o w public
opinion is formed from an interaction b e t w e e n aggregate-level variation in the
intensity of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s and individual-level differences in politi-
cal a w a r e n e s s and political values. Additional issues a r i s e in the statistical m o d -
eling of this interaction.
I have taken two general a p p r o a c h e s , o n e that a s s u m e s the diffusion of a sin-
gle m e s s a g e through the p u b l i c , and a n o t h e r that a s s u m e s t w o c o m p e t i n g m e s -
sages. T h e first a p p r o a c h , t h o u g h b a s e d on a simplification, yields surprisingly
a c c u r a t e predictions about w h a t should be e x p e c t e d u n d e r a r a n g e of p a r t i c u l a r
c o n d i t i o n s . But, as C h a p t e r s 9 and 10 have m a d e clear, there are i m p o r t a n t fea-
tures of m a s s opinion that cannot be explained by a o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l . In par-
ticular, the cross-cutting m o v e m e n t s of liberal opinion early in t h e V i e t n a m War,
and t h e inverse association b e t w e e n c a m p a i g n intensity and aggregate-level
290 N A T U R E A N D ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
defection to the o p p o s i t i o n party in e l e c t i o n s , require the explicit m o d e l i n g of a
t w o - m e s s a g e information flow.
I suspect that s o m e readers will e x p e r i e n c e t h e progression of my a r g u m e n t
from o n e - m e s s a g e to t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l s with a degree of frustration. T w o -
m e s s a g e m o d e l s are statistically c u m b e r s o m e , i m p o s e d a t a r e q u i r e m e n t s that
can rarely be m e t , and fail to yield c l e a r predictions about w h a t will h a p p e n
in a given situation. A n d if the predictions of the o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l - which
are not only c l e a r but aesthetically attractive - have only limited applicabil-
ity, these readers will w o n d e r w h a t , after all, a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is
really w o r t h .
I think, however, that any d i s p a r a g e m e n t of t w o - m e s s a g e variants of the
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is u n w a r r a n t e d . For although t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l s
c a n n o t readily be used deductively, they can certainly be used, as in t h e V i e t n a m
c a s e and the presidential p r i m a r i e s c a s e , as t h e basis for r i g o r o u s statistical
m o d e l i n g . Moreover, t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l s p e r f o r m t h e i m p o r t a n t service of ex-
plaining why the s i m p l e r o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l breaks d o w n in the cases in w h i c h
it d o e s break d o w n , and of d o i n g so in a way that vindicates the essential prin-
ciples of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e process.
If criticism is d u e the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l s I have d e v e l o p e d , it is that
there is t o o little c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the o n e - m e s s a g e and t w o - m e s s a g e versions
of t h e m . It w o u l d be preferable to have a single statistical m o d e l that w o u l d , by
m e a n s of explicit simplifying a s s u m p t i o n s , reduce to various s i m p l e r forms. But
I h a v e been unable to formulate such a m a s t e r r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l .
A n o t h e r c o n c e r n is statistical robustness. S o m e of my results, as has b e e n a p -
p a r e n t , are quite fragile. T h e fragility manifests itself in large s t a n d a r d e r r o r s for
coefficients and the need to constrain p a r a m e t e r s in m o d e l s in o r d e r to obtain
conventionally significant e s t i m a t e s . T h i s statistical imprecision h a s s o m e t i m e s
involved the two m o s t theoretically i m p o r t a n t effects in the R A S m o d e l , the ef-
fects of a w a r e n e s s on r e c e p t i o n and on resistance to p e r s u a s i o n , given r e c e p t i o n .
T w o r e m a r k s are in o r d e r h e r e . First, c o n t e m p o r a r y statistical theory, t h o u g h
not m o s t public opinion r e s e a r c h , tends to d o w n p l a y the i m p o r t a n c e of statistical
significance as e s t i m a t e d from a single test of a m o d e l on a single d a t a s e t . It
instead e m p h a s i z e s the stability of results o b t a i n e d across related p r o b l e m s and
d a t a s e t s , and e m p h a s i z e s , as w e l l , the substantive m a g n i t u d e of p a r t i c u l a r ef-
fects and the theoretical p a t t e r n into which they fit ( A c h e n , 1983). E v a l u a t e d in
light of these criteria, the results reported in C h a p t e r s 7 through 10 of this b o o k
are strong. Political a w a r e n e s s , in particular, h a s proven itself extremely impor-
tant, p r o d u c i n g l a r g e , theoretically intelligible and occasionally nonintuitive ef-
fects. W h e n the m a g n i t u d e s of these a w a r e n e s s effects have v a r i e d , the variation
h a s often been in conformity with theory (as in t h e lack of an awareness effect
on resistance in certain situations). T h e c o l l e c t i v e weight of this e v i d e n c e , in-
cluding the b a c k g r o u n d t h e o r y and research on w h i c h the R A S m o d e l is
founded, m a k e s it s e e m bootless to w o r r y about t h e s t a n d a r d errors of p a r t i c u l a r
coefficients.
The model and future research 291
A n d yet, the information conveyed by the frequently large standard e r r o r s and
loose statistical fits is real. E v e n with the constraints I have i m p o s e d on the R A S
m o d e l , it has often been u n a b l e to obtain statistically precise fits.
T h e r e appear to be three sources of the p r o b l e m . O n e is t h e highly interactive
nature of my o n e - m e s s a g e and t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l s . T h e o r y requires political
a w a r e n e s s to be entered into these m o d e l s several different times. T h u s , in the
o n e - m e s s a g e m o d e l in E q u a t i o n 7 . 7 , a w a r e n e s s must be entered in the reception
functions of both the baseline and c h a n g e m o d e l s , and in the a c c e p t a n c e func-
tions of both m o d e l s . In the t w o - m e s s a g e m o d e l proposed in C h a p t e r 9, aware-
ness a p p e a r s in the r e c e p t i o n function for both the liberal and c o n s e r v a t i v e
m e s s a g e s , in the a c c e p t a n c e function for both m e s s a g e s , and in the recall func-
tion. T h e predispositional variables are entered t w i c e . T h e net effect of all t h i s ,
even after s o m e constraints have been i m p o s e d , is to create a large a m o u n t of
multicollinearity, and thereby a loose statistical fit to the data.
A n o t h e r source of statistical imprecision is that m u c h of what the m o d e l is
trying to capture involves the b e h a v i o r of small subgroups of the overall s a m p l e .
In particular, the m o d e l ' s e s t i m a t e of the effect of a w a r e n e s s on resistance d e -
p e n d s heavily on the handful of persons w h o are both heavily exposed to a m e s -
sage and predisposed to resist it. S u c h p e o p l e m a y constitute about half of the
upper 10 percent of the s a m p l e on political a w a r e n e s s , which is to say, about five
percent of the s a m p l e - a s a m p l e that, in several of my cases of attitude c h a n g e ,
w a s quite small to begin w i t h . Multicollinearity in the p r e s e n c e of small c a s e
n u m b e r s in critical s u b g r o u p s can k n o c k the statistical precision out of any
m o d e l , no m a t t e r how well crafted it might b e .
In c o n s e q u e n c e of all t h i s , the difference b e t w e e n a fit in w h i c h political
awareness affects resistance to persuasion and o n e in which it has no such effect
m a y be small. This is a p p a r e n t in Figure 1 1 . 1 , which shows w h a t small differ-
e n c e is m a d e in e s t i m a t e d patterns of opinion c h a n g e on U . S . involvement in
10
Central A m e r i c a if a w a r e n e s s is deleted from the a c c e p t a n c e f u n c t i o n . (Note
that I have altered the scale of the y-axis in Figure 11.1 from the usual 0 - 1 r a n g e
in o r d e r to m a k e it easier to see what is h a p p e n i n g . ) Little wonder, in light of this
figure, that the effect of a w a r e n e s s on resistance is difficult to reliably detect.
E v e n the effect of a w a r e n e s s on r e c e p t i o n , which appears by my e s t i m a t e s to
be a highly reliable effect, m a y be difficult to detect in p a r t i c u l a r c a s e s . L o o k
b a c k , for e x a m p l e , at the patterns of voter defections to the R e p u b l i c a n presi-
dential c a n d i d a t e , as s h o w n in Figure 10.6. G r e a t e r a w a r e n e s s is associated with
greater resistance to the presidential c a m p a i g n , with no hint that political aware-
ness m a y have any positive effect on r e c e p t i o n . T h e r e is similarly little e v i d e n c e ,
either visual or statistical, of strong reception effects from political a w a r e n e s s
apparent in the d a t a on vote defection in S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s , as also s h o w n in Fig-
ure 10.6. Yet t h e m a s s of d a t a presented in the s e c o n d half of this b o o k , as well
10 In estimating the model on which Figure 11.1 is based, I fixed the coefficients in the baseline
function to be the same as in Table 7.4, thereby allowing only the coefficients in the change
function to freely vary.
292 NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION
.50-,
Political awareness
Figure 11.1. When awareness-induced resistance is set to zero. Solid black lines show
estimated probabilities of opinion change from standard model; gray lines show esti-
mated change when political awareness is omitted from the acceptance function. Source:
1986 and 1987 NES surveys.
as p a r t i c u l a r d a t a involving these e l e c t i o n s (as in Figure 10.7), m a k e it c l e a r that
a w a r e n e s s is associated with large individual-level differences in r e c e p t i o n in
these cases as in t h e o t h e r s we have e x a m i n e d .
In t h e face of these difficulties - multicollinearity, the d e p e n d e n c e of results
on relatively small s u b g r o u p s of the overall s a m p l e , and effects that m a y be ei-
ther subtle or invisible in p a r t i c u l a r contexts - w h a t can be d o n e ?
It is i m p o r t a n t , first of all, to be clear that n o n e of these difficulties is a dif-
ficulty of the R A S m o d e l itself. It is not, that is, a difficulty of the m o d e l that
political a w a r e n e s s h a s b o t h reception and a c c e p t a n c e effects, and that these ef-
fects may, u n d e r certain c o n d i t i o n s , interact in w a y s that p r o d u c e gentle non-
m o n o t o n i c curves that are h a r d to distinguish from negatively sloped straight
lines or almost flat lines. T h e difficulty, rather, is in finding w a y s to test the
m o d e l that give its e x p e c t e d effects a fair c h a n c e to show up in typically noisy
survey data.
1 of .87 and the P e f f l e y - H u r w i t z militarism i t e m s to which I just referred. D e s p i t e
T h e p r e c a u t i o n s n e c e s s a r y to conduct reliable tests of statistical m o d e l s are
generally w e l l - k n o w n , but let me add a few r e m a r k s relating to p e c u l i a r i t i e s of
the R A S m o d e l .
Reliable measures. I n a s m u c h as results often d e p e n d on the b e h a v i o r of rela-
tively small s u b g r o u p s at the extremes of high and low a w a r e n e s s , it is essential
to have m e a s u r e s of political awareness that can reliably distinguish those
subgroups.
As explained in C h a p t e r 2 and in the M e a s u r e s A p p e n d i x , simple tests of
political k n o w l e d g e s e e m to discharge this m e a s u r e m e n t function better than al-
t e r n a t i v e m e a s u r e s . In e v e r y c a s e in w h i c h I had an o p p o r t u n i t y to m a k e c o m -
p a r i s o n s , other types of m e a s u r e s did w o r s e in the sense that they showed
w e a k e r effects than m e a s u r e s of political k n o w l e d g e were able to detect. T h u s ,
The model and future research 293
if I had used variables o t h e r than political k n o w l e d g e in my tests of the
r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l , I would have obtained significantly w e a k e r results
than I did - and in s o m e c a s e s , nothing of interest at all.
It is an interesting oddity that different disciplines prefer different types of
items to m e a s u r e w h a t I have been calling political awareness. Political scientists
are partial to interest in politics, especially self-report m e a s u r e s of interest in
election c a m p a i g n s . " C o m m u n i c a t i o n specialists prefer self-reports of m e d i a
exposure (though see P r i c e and Zaller, 1990). Sociologists like to use e d u c a t i o n ,
which they see as a m e a s u r e of social stratification. O n l y p s y c h o l o g i s t s , for rea-
sons no less r o o t e d in disciplinary prejudice, m a k e w i d e s p r e a d use of political
k n o w l e d g e , w h i c h they take as a m e a s u r e of " e x p e r t i s e , " on which they have a
large literature.
It is, as a l w a y s , also i m p o r t a n t to use statistically reliable m e a s u r e s . T h r e e - or
four-item k n o w l e d g e s c a l e s , in which all of the items have roughly m i d d l i n g lev-
els of difficulty, will n o r m a l l y fail to provide g o o d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n in the critical
extremes of high and low political awareness. If a researcher can use only three
or four i t e m s , they should at least be k n o w l e d g e tests that v a r y in difficulty
1 2
from easy to h a r d .
T h e R A S m o d e l is no less sensitive to reliable m e a s u r e m e n t of political pre-
dispositions. For e x a m p l e , my findings on attitude c h a n g e on U . S . involvement
in Central A m e r i c a are entirely d e p e n d e n t on the availability of an eight-item
militarism scale, w h i c h , by pure luck, h a p p e n e d to be u n d e r g o i n g testing in a
study that spanned the I r a n - C o n t r a controversy.
Survey size. It s e e m s likely that the t w o - w a v e survey of 3 6 0 p e r s o n s , as used in
the e s t i m a t i o n of attitude c h a n g e on Central A m e r i c a , is near the m i n i m u m
n u m b e r of cases n e c e s s a r y to adequately test the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . I
say this b e c a u s e the a m o u n t and p a t t e r n of attitude c h a n g e , as apparent in the
raw d a t a , c o n f o r m well to theoretical e x p e c t a t i o n s , and the m e a s u r e s n e c e s s a r y
to capture this c h a n g e w e r e about as g o o d as they could reasonably have b e e n ,
including, as they d i d , b o t h a 22-item a w a r e n e s s scale with an alpha reliability
all t h i s , the R A S m o d e l p r o d u c e d coefficient e s t i m a t e s that, a l t h o u g h having
g o o d m a g n i t u d e s , w e r e barely able to achieve c o n v e n t i o n a l levels of statistical
significance, even after constraining the m o d e l .
It will, of c o u r s e , be quite difficult to achieve large s a m p l e sizes in surveys
designed to capture attitude c h a n g e , since it is rarely possible to anticipate in
a d v a n c e w h e n attitude c h a n g e will occur and w h a t q u e s t i o n s will be n e c e s s a r y to
c a p t u r e it.
U See pp. 235-6 in Chapter 10 for a discussion of the particular pitfalls of this measure.
12 Knowledge items that pose easy or hard tests tend, because of their limited variance, to produce
misleadingly low item-to-total correlations (see Zaller, 1985, for examples). Thus, researchers
wanting to build powerful measures of awareness need either to ignore the item-to-total corre-
lations of their easy and hard items, or use suitable nonlinear and nonstandardized measures of
statistical association (for example, item-to-total logit or probit coefficients).
294 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
Variance in information flow. L a r g e datasets and reliable m e a s u r e s , despite their
i m p o r t a n c e , m a y bring only m i n o r gains in testing of the R A S m o d e l . W h a t is
most essential is g o o d v a r i a n c e on the principal independent variable in the
m o d e l , namely, the aggregate-level flow of c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g persuasive c o m m u -
nications. To get this v a r i a n c e , it is n e c e s s a r y to m o v e away from s i m p l e cases
like those e x a m i n e d in C h a p t e r s 7 and 8, w h e r e t h e w h o l e public h a s b e e n ex-
p o s e d to t h e s a m e flow of persuasive c o m m u n i c a t i o n s between a single pair of
survey o b s e r v a t i o n s , and to try instead to locate cases in which there is usable
aggregate-level v a r i a t i o n in information flow. C h a p t e r 9, which analyzed atti-
t u d e c h a n g e on the V i e t n a m W a r over a six-year p e r i o d , and C h a p t e r 10, which
e x a m i n e d the effect of 77 different H o u s e c a m p a i g n s on voter a t t i t u d e s , showed
w h a t can be l e a r n e d from such c a s e s . T h e fine analyses of E r b r i n g , G o l d e n b e r g ,
and Miller (1980), M a c K u e n (1984), and B a r t e l s (1988) p r o v i d e further e x a m -
ples of the testing of sophisticated individual-level m o d e l s of attitude f o r m a t i o n
and c h a n g e by capitalizing on v a r i a n c e in the flow of political i n f o r m a t i o n .
Modeling technology. N o t h i n g in the four a x i o m s of the R A S m o d e l requires
that it be o p e r a t i o n a l i z e d and tested by m e a n s of t h e c o m p l i c a t e d nonlinear m o d -
els I have used in this b o o k . But given the inevitable limitations of the d a t a avail-
able for testing t h e m o d e l , it is essential to squeeze as m u c h m e a n i n g as possible
from t h e available e v i d e n c e . At least in the c a s e of the R A S m o d e l , this will
m e a n frequent resort to c o m p l i c a t e d n o n l i n e a r m o d e l s . My analysis of attitude
c h a n g e would have been m u c h less successful if it had relied on s t a n d a r d linear
regression m o d e l s , including interactive variants of these m o d e l s , instead of tak-
ing t h e path it h a s .
I certainly do not c l a i m that the o p e r a t i o n a l forms into which I have cast the
R A S m o d e l are ideal. But they do have t h e virtue of taking central a c c o u n t of the
c o m p l e x interaction that exists a m o n g political a w a r e n e s s , political predisposi-
t i o n s , and t h e flow of political i n f o r m a t i o n , and s o m e type of nonlinear m o d e l
that can efficiently do this is essential for testing the R A S m o d e l .
M o d e l i n g t e c h n o l o g y is t h e o n e factor in testing the R A S m o d e l that is fully
u n d e r the control of opinion researchers. T h e y should not fail to m a k e t h e most
of it.
A final m e t h o d o l o g i c a l issue is my m e a s u r e m e n t of aggregate-level information
flow. A l t h o u g h t h e flow of elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the m e d i a is a p r i m e inde-
p e n d e n t variable in my a n a l y s i s , I have m a d e no attempt to m e a s u r e it precisely.
T h i s is true even in my analysis of attitudes t o w a r d V i e t n a m , w h e r e I c o m m i s -
sioned counts of stories for and against the w a r in several n e w s m a g a z i n e s .
T h e difficulty is t h a t , as explained a few p a g e s a g o , m e s s a g e intensity in-
volves m o r e than just the n u m b e r and salience of stories that are c a r r i e d in the
m e d i a . It also involves characteristics of a m a s s a u d i e n c e that d o e s or d o e s not
find a story interesting. Ia the long r u n , it will be desirable to distinguish
sharply the s e p a r a t e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of m e d i a attention and m a s s receptivity to the
The model and future research 295
p e n e t r a t i n g power of a given m e s s a g e , which is h o w I defined m e s s a g e intensity.
P r o g r e s s on this p r o b l e m will involve m o r e than better s t o r y - c o u n t i n g tech-
niques. It will likely involve t h e union of a m o r e refined t h e o r y of the " m e s s a g e
r e c e i v e r ' ' with a closely allied t h e o r y of m e d i a c o n t e n t analysis.
In t h e m e a n t i m e , r e s e a r c h e r s c o m p a r i n g p a r t i c u l a r cases of m a s s attitude
c h a n g e will have to d e p e n d on their judgments of the intensities of the c o m m u -
nication flows that have b r o u g h t about c h a n g e , even w h e n they have m a d e pre-
cise c o u n t s of m e d i a r e p o r t a g e . A n d to this extent, their tests of the m o d e l will
be s o m e w h a t ad h o c .
H a v i n g now d o n e my best to evaluate my f o r m u l a t i o n and testing of the R A S
m o d e l , I wish to c o n s i d e r possible extensions.
PARSIMONY AS A V A L U E
T h e centrifugal urge in a c a d e m i c r e s e a r c h , by w h i c h I m e a n the t e n d e n c y to d e -
velop n e w c o n c e p t s and n e w theoretical m a c h i n e r y for each n e w substantive
p r o b l e m , is very strong in t h e political b e h a v i o r field. It a p p e a r s , moreover, that
the m o s t gifted r e s e a r c h e r s e x p e r i e n c e t h e urge most strongly. T h e result, as I
l a m e n t e d in the o p e n i n g of this b o o k , is that opinion research has b e c o m e deeply
and needlessly f r a g m e n t e d , almost c o m p l e t e l y lacking in theoretical c o h e r e n c e
as each n e w survey q u e s t i o n e m e r g e s as the object of its o w n specialized re-
search literature.
T h i s b o o k has been w r i t t e n in self-conscious opposition to this centrifugal
u r g e . T h e a i m h a s been to identify a c o m p a c t set of c o r e ideas and to tie as m a n y
p h e n o m e n a as possible to this c o r e . A l t h o u g h this effort might be unflatteringly
c h a r a c t e r i z e d as i m p e r i a l i s t i c , the a n i m a t i n g spirit has been that of p a r s i m o n i o u s
u n d e r s t a n d i n g . For, all else e q u a l , the m o r e c o n c e p t s and d i s t i n c t i o n s used to
account for a given set of p h e n o m e n a , t h e less well those p h e n o m e n a are
understood.
In the spirit of p a r s i m o n y rather than i m p e r i a l i s m , t h e n , I w o u l d like to sug-
gest s o m e additional p h e n o m e n a that currently exist as s e p a r a t e research topics
but t h a t , I b e l i e v e , can be fruitfully analyzed within the f r a m e w o r k of the R A S
m o d e l . T h e issues are evaluation of presidential character, trust in g o v e r n m e n t ,
and p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s .
Evaluation of presidential character
In a classic of the voting literature, S t o k e s (1966) argued that fluctuations in the
p u b l i c ' s a s s e s s m e n t s of the personal qualities of presidential c a n d i d a t e s are the
m o s t i m p o r t a n t factor in explaining interelection s w i n g s in the v o t e . R e c e n t re-
search has tried to specify m o r e precisely the nature of these c h a r a c t e r assess-
m e n t s . Two streams of analysis have e m e r g e d . O n e is c o n c e r n e d with e m o t i o n a l
reactions to the c a n d i d a t e s - feelings of fear, h o p e , p r i d e , and so forth. T h e
o t h e r focuses on the p u b l i c ' s e v a l u a t i o n s of presidential character, especially the
296 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
extent to which t h e c a n d i d a t e s s e e m to possess the traits of personal integrity and
competence.
Both streams of research have tended to focus on the factor structure of p o p -
ular reactions to presidential c h a r a c t e r - that is, the d i m e n s i o n s of j u d g m e n t that
u n d e r l i e p e o p l e ' s a s s e s s m e n t s ( s e e , for e x a m p l e , Kinder, 1986). It has not d e -
voted m u c h attention to how, and whether, p e o p l e form their a s s e s s m e n t s of
presidential character. T h e implicit a s s u m p t i o n in this area of opinion r e s e a r c h ,
as in most of the public opinion field, has been that all citizens pay e n o u g h at-
tention to politics to d e v e l o p structured reactions to the n a t i o n ' s leading political
figures.
T h e a p p r o a c h t a k e n h e r e , in contrast, is to c o n s i d e r " i n f o r m a t i o n " about a
p r e s i d e n t ' s c h a r a c t e r a " c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e " like other persuasive m e s s a g e s ,
and to use the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model to c a p t u r e the diffusion p a t t e r n s of
this m e s s a g e . T h e idea is that people w h o pay m o r e attention to politics receive
m o r e information relating to presidential c h a r a c t e r and that they r e s p o n d to this
information on t h e basis of their general levels of political a w a r e n e s s , their i d e o -
logical v a l u e s , a n d their p a r t i s a n s h i p . Less attentive citizens e n c o u n t e r less ev-
idence of presidential c h a r a c t e r and are less able to m a k e p a r t i s a n and
ideological evaluations of the e v i d e n c e they do c o m e across.
S u c h an a p p r o a c h s e e m s at least initially p l a u s i b l e . Presidential c a n d i d a t e s
always try in a general w a y to project sterling personal qualities and to k e e p their
w a r t s h i d d e n from view. Occasionally, their efforts m a y b e c o m e c o n s p i c u o u s , as
in J i m m y C a r t e r ' s a t t e m p t to d e m o n s t r a t e t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s in the 1976 c a m p a i g n
or R o n a l d R e a g a n ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n to d e m o n s t r a t e levelheadedness in t h e 1980
contest. But h o w e v e r subtle or o b v i o u s these c a m p a i g n m e s s a g e s , citizens m a y
still vary in both their attentiveness to and their disposition to accept t h e m .
Let u s , t h e n , turn to analysis of e v a l u a t i o n s of Reagan in the 1984 election
c a m p a i g n . R e a g a n w a s by this point as well k n o w n as most presidential candi-
dates are likely to get,. W i t h a strong e c o n o m y and a record u n b l e m i s h e d by per-
sonal s c a n d a l , o n e w o u l d expect h i m to have at least m o d e r a t e l y high r a t i n g s on
c o m p e t e n c e and, given his ability to project sincerity, perhaps even h i g h e r rat-
ings on personal integrity. To m e a s u r e a s s e s s m e n t s of R e a g a n on t h e s e t w o di-
m e n s i o n s , which fall on the two major d i m e n s i o n s on w h i c h A m e r i c a n s are said
to assess presidential c h a r a c t e r (Kinder, 1986), I rely on the following items
from the N E S battery:
Now I'd like to know your impressions of Ronald Reagan. I am going to read a list of
words and phrases people use to describe political figures. After each one I would like
you to tell me how much the word or phrase fits your impression of Ronald Reagan.
Moral
Knowledgeable
A c c o r d i n g to p o p u l a r lore, o n e of R e a g a n ' s principal a c h i e v e m e n t s as presi-
dent w a s to m a k e A m e r i c a feel g o o d about itself again. T h e idea that u n d e r Rea-
gan the United S t a t e s w a s " s t a n d i n g t a l l " in w o r l d affairs w a s a c o n t i n u i n g
The model and future research 297
refrain of his years in office. At the s a m e t i m e , m a n y liberals confessed to a p -
prehension; there w a s s o m e t h i n g about R e a g a n that s e e m e d t o scare t h e m . T h e
N E S study of the 1984 e l e c t i o n included q u e s t i o n s m e a s u r i n g v o t e r s ' e m o t i o n a l
reactions to R e a g a n on b o t h these d i m e n s i o n s :
Now we would like to know something about the feelings you have toward the candi-
dates for President. I am going to name a candidate, and I want you to tell me whether
something about the person, or something he has done, has made you have certain feel-
ings like anger or pride.
Think about Ronald Reagan. Now, has Reagan - because of the kind of person he is,
or because of something he has done - ever made your feel:
Angry
Proud
To g a u g e public r e s p o n s e s to these items I used the basic r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e
model as e m b o d i e d in E q u a t i o n 7 . 5 . T h e resulting e s t i m a t e s , s h o w n in Table
1 3
1 1 . 3 , are depicted graphically in Figure 1 1 . 2 . ( T h e r a w d a t a closely r e s e m b l e
the e s t i m a t e s in Figure 11.2 and so are not s h o w n . )
T h e s e results are n o t a b l e in several respects. T h e first is that A m e r i c a n s are
highly p a r t i s a n in their a s s e s s m e n t s of presidential character. T h i s , of c o u r s e , is
no longer n e w s at this point ( C a m p b e l l et a l . , 1960; C o n v e r s e and D e P e u x ,
1962). W h a t is n e w s , at least to the scholarly literature of this subject, is how
strongly individual differences in political a w a r e n e s s interact with p a r t i s a n s h i p
and ideology in the a s s e s s m e n t of presidential character. A m o n g less a w a r e cit-
izens, p a r t i s a n s h i p has less effect; a m o n g the highly informed, t h e effect of par-
tisanship is m o r e p r o n o u n c e d .
T h e third salient feature of these results is how differently t h e public
reacted to R e a g a n ' s knowledgeability than to his other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . By
these d a t a , R e a g a n w a s less successful in projecting c o m p e t e n c e t h a n in pro-
j e c t i n g morality, instilling p r i d e , and, in certain g r o u p s , p r o v o k i n g fear. Highly
aware Republican c o n s e r v a t i v e s , the g r o u p that most strongly s u p p o r t s R e a g a n
on other m a t t e r s , failed to rally behind h i m on this aspect of presidential per-
f o r m a n c e . Rather, it is m o d e r a t e l y a w a r e R e p u b l i c a n c o n s e r v a t i v e s w h o
were most likely to assert that R e a g a n w a s extremely k n o w l e d g e a b l e about pol-
itics. T h u s we h a v e , in this c a s e but no o t h e r s , a strong n o n m o n o t o n i c relation-
ship a m o n g R e p u b l i c a n s b e t w e e n political a w a r e n e s s and belief in R e a g a n ' s
good qualities.
T h i s pattern i s , I b e l i e v e , best explained in t e r m s of the differential intensities
of a d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a i l i n g m e s s a g e . T h e d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e is the c a r e -
fully crafted i m a g e of presidential m e d i a advisors w h o , by skilled scripting of
R e a g a n ' s public a p p e a r a n c e s , effectively project t h e idea that R e a g a n is the
c o m m a n d i n g leader of t h e national g o v e r n m e n t . T h i s is the m e s s a g e that most
p e o p l e e n c o u n t e r e d m o s t of the t i m e they received information about R e a g a n in
13 Although Figure 11.2 is based on Reagan evaluations in the postelection NES survey, highly
similar patterns appear in data in the preelection survey. In particular, awareness has a resistance
effect for knowledge but not for the other three ratings.
 r

298 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N The model and future research 299

Table 11.3. Coefficients for presidential evaluation Percent who see Reagan Percent who see Reagan
as "extremely moral" as "extremely knowledgeable"
Conservative strong
Traits Emotional reaction. Republicans
Knowledgeable Moral Pride Fear
Conservative strong
Reception function Republicans
Intercept 1.18 2.95 2.94 0.90
Awareness 0.74 1.59 1.52 0.96
(.28) (.75) (.36) (.35)
Acceptance function
Intercept 0.48 0.32 1.27 -0.72
Awareness -1.25 -0.17 -0.21 0.20 Democrats
(.24) (.17) (.13) (.21)
Party -0.56 -0.52 -0.88 0.66
(range -2 to +2) (.11) (.08) Political awareness
(.11) (.12)
Ideology self-id -0.37 -0.20 -0.34 0.30
Percent who say Reagan has Percent who say Reagan has
(range - 3 t o +3) (.10) (.07) (.07) (.09)
made them feel "proud" made them feel "afraid"
Race (1 if black, else 0) 0.11 -1.09 -1.47 0.05 IOOT
(.35) (.28) (.26) (.28) Conservative strong
N Republicans Liberal strong
1921 1923 1932 1987
Democrats.

Note: Model is equation 7.5, estimated by maximum likelihood.

Trait items coded 1 for "extremely," 0 otherwise; emotional reaction
items coded 1 ibi "yes," 0 otherwise. Other political variables
coded liberal high. Dependent variables are from postelection
survey. " N o o p i n i o n " respondents on ideology (V369 and Republicans
V370) were coded to middle position. Standard errors appear in
parentheses.
Source: 1984 NES survey. Political awareness

Figure 11.2. Partisan and ideological reactions to candidate Reagan in 1984. Estimates
the m e d i a . But there w a s also a countervailing m e s s a g e which a p p e a r e d , t h o u g h are derived from coefficients in Table 11.3. Awareness runs from —1.97 SD to + 2 . 0 2
m u c h less prominently, i n " o p - e d " and " n e w s a n a l y s i s " p i e c e s , and w h i c h d e - SD. Modal partisans have scores of ± 1 . 3 on the party measure and ± 1 on a 7-point
picted R e a g a n as u n i n f o r m e d and uninterested in the details of g o v e r n a n c e . T h i s measure of ideological self-location. Strong partisans have scores of ±2 on each of these
measures. Source: 1984 NES survey.
m e s s a g e , b e c a u s e less i n t e n s e , reached only t h e most politically a w a r e s e g m e n t s
of the p u b l i c . But within this g r o u p of p e o p l e , it c o u n t e r a c t e d the effects of the
nonetheless provide a new and, I h o p e , interesting slant on the p u b l i c ' s j u d g -
d o m i n a n t p r o - R e a g a n m e s s a g e , thereby p r o d u c i n g the n o n m o n o t o n i c i t y that is
ment of presidential character. T h i s a r g u m e n t , quite simply, is that the d y n a m i c s
a p p a r e n t in Figure 11.2.
of public opinion on this m a t t e r are m u c h the s a m e as on o t h e r s : Political c o m -
Note that political a w a r e n e s s has an i m p o r t a n t effect in the a c c e p t a n c e func-
m u n i c a t i o n s e m a n a t e from the elite centers of society, in this c a s e political c a m -
tion of t h e knowledgeability m o d e l in Table 1 1 . 3 , but in n o n e of the o t h e r m o d -
p a i g n s , m e d i a a d v i s o r s , a n d the p r e s i d e n t ' s record in office; the m a s s r e s p o n s e
els. T h i s is consistent with my a r g u m e n t , d e v e l o p e d in C h a p t e r 7, that one
to these m e s s a g e s d e p e n d s on individual differences in value o r i e n t a t i o n s and
reason that awareness is often associated with resistance to a d o m i n a n t m e s s a g e
attention to politics, and on the relative intensities of the v a r i o u s m e s s a g e s .
is that it is a proxy for exposure to c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that are in-
sufficiently intense to reach the w h o l e public.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to m a k e direct m e a s u r e m e n t s of t h e in- TRUST IN G O V E R N M E N T
tensity of the actual p r o - R e a g a n and a n t i - R e a g a n m e s s a g e s on each of t h e char-
acteristics e x a m i n e d in Figure 11.2, and h e n c e no way to c h e c k the validity of In t h e m i d - 1 9 6 0 s , as the United States w a s about to enter the w a r in V i e t n a m ,
this a r g u m e n t b e y o n d an appeal to the r e a d e r ' s intuition. My a r g u m e n t does p o p u l a r trust in g o v e r n m e n t appeared impressively high ( L a n e , 1965). But t h e n ,
 300 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
be g i n n i n g about 1965, c o n f i d e n c e b e g a n to e r o d e , a trend that soon affected at-
titudes not only toward g o v e r n m e n t but t o w a r d virtually the full r a n g e of A m e r -
ican institutions, including even the clergy (Miller, 1974; Citrin, 1974; U p s e t
and Schneider, 1982).
T h e reason for the d e c l i n e has never been entirely clear, but it has been widely
a r g u e d that the t u m u l t u o u s events of the 1960s, especially the u n p o p u l a r war in
V i e t n a m , the protest against it, and t h e black urban r i o t s , were at the root of the
phenomenon.
S h o u l d the w a v e of c y n i c i s m that swept over the c o u n t r y in this p e r i o d con-
form to the d y n a m i c s of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l ?
If one c o n c e i v e s of t h e decline in trust as a sort of m o o d c h a n g e , a h u m o r
reflecting the generally bad t i m e s on w h i c h the c o u n t r y had fallen, the a n s w e r
w o u l d probably be n o . T h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l is d e s i g n e d to capture
the diffusion of p a r t i c u l a r ideas and m e s s a g e s , not the spread of a m o r p h o u s
m o o d s and h u m o r s .
But if, on the o t h e r h a n d , o n e c o n c e i v e s of t h e decline in trust as the p u b l i c ' s
r e s p o n s e to attacks on national integrity by alienated protesters and leftist in-
tellectuals, then the a n s w e r w o u l d b e yes. T h e m e s s a g e o f " l i b e r a l a l i e n a t i o n "
should follow the s a m e diffusion path as any o t h e r type of m e s s a g e .
S i n c e I could never d e c i d e w h i c h of these c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n s w a s m o r e valid,
and since I feel o b l i g a t e d to report both the successes of the m o d e l and its fail-
u r e s , I w a s reluctant to subject the m o d e l to a test in this d o m a i n . Recently, h o w -
ever, Jack C i t r i n , w h o specializes in analysis of trust in g o v e r n m e n t , c o n c l u d e d
that t h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l might plausibly be applied to the p r o b l e m ,
and asked for my a d v i c e in building political a w a r e n e s s scales. I sent h i m copies
of these scales for all N E S surveys and waited for the results of his analysis.
S o m e of his results are s h o w n in Figure 1 1 . 3 . As can be s e e n , t h e increase in
g o v e r n m e n t a l distrust o v e r t h e p e r i o d of the V i e t n a m W a r appears to have fol-
lowed the p a t t e r n a s s o c i a t e d with the diffusion of liberal m e s s a g e s . A m o n g lib-
e r a l s , there is a r o u g h l y linear and positive r e l a t i o n s h i p between a w a r e n e s s and
c h a n g e in the direction of a liberal m e s s a g e ; a m o n g c o n s e r v a t i v e s , this relation-
ship is s h a r p l y n o n m o n o t o n i c . (Centrists, not s h o w n , follow an indistinct m i d d l e
p a t t e r n . ) Citrin, in e x a m i n i n g patterns of c h a n g e in trust in g o v e r n m e n t over sev-
eral o t h e r t i m e p e r i o d s , found little additional s u p p o r t for t h e reception-
1 4
a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l . O n e reason for t h i s , no d o u b t , is that fairly large a m o u n t s
of attitude c h a n g e are n e c e s s a r y before t h e patterns of c h a n g e begin to stand out
against b a c k g r o u n d levels of m e a s u r e m e n t error, and most c h a n g e s in trust levels
since 1972 have b e e n of m o d e s t m a g n i t u d e . Another, m o r e substantive reason
m a y be that n o n e of the c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g information flows had a c l e a r ideo-
logical v a l e n c e . It h a s n o t , in other w o r d s , a l w a y s been clear w h e t h e r liberals or
c o n s e r v a t i v e s or p e r h a p s even centrists should be most susceptible to t h e pre-
sumed change-inducing message.
14 Citrin's results are part of a book manuscript in progress: "Governing the Disenchanted," De-
partment of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley.
The model and future research 301
1.00-
Liberals
0.75-
Proportionate
u : > u
reduction in - "
trust in
government, o 25- Conservatives
1964-72
0.00 ^
-0.25-
Political awareness
Figure 11.3. Decline in trust in government. Data are from 1964 and 1972 CPS surveys,
as provided by Jack Citrin, University of California, Berkeley. Trust is measured by a
two-item index, whether government can be counted to do what is right, and whether
government is run by a few big interests.
C i t r i n ' s investigation of t h e p e r f o r m a n c e of the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l
in t h e d o m a i n of g o v e r n m e n t trust u n d e r s c o r e s a key theoretical point: T h e
model applies only to cases in which o n e can d e m o n s t r a t e or plausibly a s s u m e
the existence of p a r t i c u l a r c h a n g e - i n d u c i n g m e s s a g e s having distinct ideological
c o l o r a t i o n s . W h e n o n e cannot d o t h i s , the r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l d o e s not
perform, and should not be expected to p e r f o r m , in the m a n n e r suggested by my
analysis.
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR A U T H O R I T A R I A N REGIMES
T h e R A S model o r i g i n a t e d in studies of A m e r i c a n public opinion and A m e r i c a n
political psychology. T h e r e is, however, no reason to believe that it applies only
in the United States. It is an entirely general m o d e l a n d , as such, o u g h t to apply
in any situation in which public opinion forms and c h a n g e s in r e s p o n s e to the
diffusion of political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . In an effort to show t h i s , I c o l l a b o r a t e d
with B a r b a r a G e d d e s , a specialist in c o m p a r a t i v e politics, in an application of
1 5
the m o d e l to a less developed n a t i o n .
T h e p r o b l e m that G e d d e s and I e x a m i n e d w a s p o p u l a r support for authoritar-
ian r e g i m e s . E v e r y a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t a t t e m p t s to control the flow of
n e w s and information to t h e public - but with w h a t effect? T h e R A S m o d e l ,
with its e m p h a s i s on the diffusion of elite c o m m u n i c a t i o n , is ideally suited to
a n s w e r i n g this q u e s t i o n . P r e s u m a b l y the most politically aware m e m b e r s of the
public receive the largest a m o u n t s of g o v e r n m e n t p r o p a g a n d a , and are also most
15 The joint paper was proposed by Geddes, who, upon becoming familiar with the reception-
acceptance model, asserted that if it was as general as I claimed, it ought to be capable of ex-
plaining patterns of popular support for, and resistance to, the authoritarian regime then in power
in Brazil. This was the beginning of an extremely fruitful collaboration.
302 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
c a p a b l e of resisting it. H e n c e we should expect that p e o p l e in the broad m i d d l e
r a n g e s of political a w a r e n e s s are most likely to exhibit support for the policies of
authoritarian regimes.
W i t h o u t going into technical detail that is readily available e l s e w h e r e ( G e d d e s
and Zaller, 1989), this is exactly what we found. U s i n g opinion d a t a c o l l e c t e d in
Brazil at the height of its a u t h o r i t a r i a n period in the early 1970s, G e d d e s and I
show that s u p p o r t for the g o v e r n m e n t ' s a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies w a s greatest
a m o n g citizens exhibiting m o d e r a t e levels of political awareness. S u p p o r t for
a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies rises steadily with increases in political awareness (which
is m e a s u r e d , as in this b o o k , by simple tests of factual k n o w l e d g e about politics)
until about the 9 0 t h percentile on awareness. At that point, the trend flattens and
then reverses as s u p p o r t for g o v e r n m e n t policies begins to d e c l i n e .
T h i s n o n m o n o t o n i c p a t t e r n w a s not obtained for all policy i t e m s , however. For
policies in w h i c h the a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t simply c a r r i e d forward t h e main-
s t r e a m policies of t h e previous d e m o c r a t i c r e g i m e , there w a s no n o n m o n o t o n i c -
ity: T h e most a w a r e p e r s o n s w e r e most likely to support the g o v e r n m e n t ' s
m a i n s t r e a m line. H e n c e in Brazil as in the United S t a t e s , m a i n s t r e a m c o m m u -
n i c a t i o n s e n c o u n t e r e d n o resistance. N o n m o n o t o n i c patterns were o b t a i n e d only
in policy a r e a s , such as c e n s o r s h i p of the p r e s s , in w h i c h the military g o v e r n -
m e n t d e p a r t e d from policies of the previous r e g i m e .
T h e Brazilian d a t a were not strong e n o u g h to show why exactly m o r e aware
p e r s o n s w e r e less willing to accept a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies a n d , in particular,
w h e t h e r their unwillingness w a s r o o t e d in inertial, c o u n t e r v a l e n t , or p a r t i s a n re-
sistance. T h e Brazilian survey d i d , however, c o n t a i n an abbreviated version of
the classic F - s c a l e , and this e n a b l e d us to extend t h e m o d e l in a n o t h e r d i r e c t i o n .
T h e F - s c a l e , as readers m a y recall, w a s p r o p o s e d by the authors of The Au-
thoritarian Personality ( A d o r n o et a l . , 1950) as a m e a s u r e of predispositions to-
w a r d fascist ideologies. T h e items in the scale involve such matters as o b e d i e n c e
to p a r e n t s , respect for e l d e r s , and c o n t e m p t for w e a k n e s s . A l t h o u g h n o n e of the
i t e m s contains manifestly political c o n t e n t , they are nonetheless intended to
m e a s u r e deeply r o o t e d personality predispositions toward a u t h o r i t a r i a n political
policies and ideologies.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of this scale has never been fully tested in a
setting in which the m a s s e s of o r d i n a r y citizens w e r e being heavily e x p o s e d to
a d o m i n a n t a u t h o r i t a r i a n m e s s a g e . T h e Brazilian dataset therefore afforded a
v a l u a b l e o p p o r t u n i t y to see w h e t h e r the scale p e r f o r m s as e x p e c t e d .
As can be seen in F i g u r e 11.4, both the F - s c a l e and political a w a r e n e s s are
associated with s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n p o l i c i e s , but not in a straightforward
1 6
w a y . Persons w h o pay little attention to politics do not reliably s u p p o r t the
policies of the military g o v e r n m e n t even w h e n their personality d i s p o s i t i o n s , as
16 Both relationships are highly statistically significant in a fully specified model (p < .01) (see
Geddes and Zaller, 1989: table 3).
The model and future research 303
.60 High on F-scale
Net score 40
on index Low on F-scale
of support for
authoritarian
policies . 20
Political awareness
Figure 11.4. The F-scale and support for the authoritarian regime in Brazil. Dependent
variable is an 8-item scale indicating support for authoritarian policies, such as press
censorship and suppression of unions. The F-scale consists of five items, purged of the
effects of education, sex, race, and residential location. General procedures used in con-
structing the figure are the same as reported in figure 3 of Geddes and Zaller (1989).
Authoritarians and nonauthoritarians in the figure have been constructed from scores of
approximately ± 1 . 2 5 SDs on the F-scale; other background variables have been set to
their modal values. Source: 1972-73 survey by researchers at the Instituto Universitario
de Pesquisas do Rio de Janeiro and the University of Michigan.
m e a s u r e d by the F - s c a l e , indicate they ought to do s o . This is p r e s u m a b l y b e -
c a u s e they pay t o o little attention to politics to k n o w w h a t policies the author-
itarian g o v e r n m e n t stands for. (Note that persons scoring low on a w a r e n e s s in
Brazil w e r e , by U . S . s t a n d a r d s , extremely uninformed about politics; m a n y were
illiterates w h o did not even k n o w the n a m e of the c o u n t r y ' s president.) M o d e r -
ately a w a r e persons exhibit m o r e support for a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies, but not
m u c h m o r e e v i d e n c e of ideological a c u m e n . Like the p a r t i s a n defectors in
H o u s e e l e c t i o n s , they are simply responding uncritically to the d o m i n a n t polit-
ical m e s s a g e in the e n v i r o n m e n t . O n l y a m o n g highly aware persons is there an
important relationship b e t w e e n a u t h o r i t a r i a n predispositions and s u p p o r t for au-
thoritarian policies. This is b e c a u s e , in Brazil as in the United S t a t e s , highly
aware persons are the only o n e s c a p a b l e of r e s p o n d i n g in a consistently i d e o -
logical fashion to the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s they encounter.
T h e s e results represent an i m p o r t a n t qualification of the t h e o r y of the author-
itarian personality. T h e y s u g g e s t , first of all, that exposure to a u t h o r i t a r i a n pro-
p a g a n d a may be at least as i m p o r t a n t in a c c o u n t i n g for s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n
r e g i m e s as are a u t h o r i t a r i a n personality o r i e n t a t i o n s . T h e y further suggest that
personality predispositions are just that: predispositions. W h e t h e r , or to w h a t ex-
tent, a u t h o r i t a r i a n predispositions manifest t h e m s e l v e s in the form of s u p p o r t for
a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies d e p e n d s , as a l w a y s , on a critical interaction with political
awareness.
304 NATURE AND ORIGINS OF MASS OPINION The model and future research 305

Dispositions toward a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m are not, of c o u r s e , the only factor in- REGIME EFFORT TO MOBILIZE OPINION
fluencing s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies. E d u c a t i o n is also i m p o r t a n t . Better High effort Low effort
e d u c a t e d Brazilians, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e greater literacy increased their reception
Nazi Germany ? Authoritarian Brazil
of c o u n t e r v a l e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s that w e r e largely u n c e n s o r e d by t h e military,
were significantly m o r e resistant to a u t h o r i t a r i a n policies, given r e c e p t i o n of
t h e m , than were p o o r l y e d u c a t e d ones. T h e result w a s a pattern m u c h like that
s h o w n in Figure 11.4, except with e d u c a t i o n substituted for scores on the
F-scale.
O n e surprise in o u r analysis involved chronological a g e . We e x p e c t e d older,
politically a w a r e B r a z i l i a n s , b e c a u s e of their e x p e r i e n c e with the d e m o c r a t i c
n o r m s of the previous r e g i m e , to be m o r e resistant than their y o u n g c o u n t e r p a r t s
to the policies of the a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t . A g e , however, turned out to have
Political awareness
no d i s c e r n i b l e effect, p e r h a p s b e c a u s e it w a s a s s o c i a t e d with t w o mutually can-
celing effects, c o m m i t m e n t to the d e m o c r a t i c n o r m s of the previous r e g i m e and
North Korea? United States
a preference for the o r d e r and stability of a u t h o r i t a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t . (mainstream issues only)
O n e should not place t o o m u c h e m p h a s i s o n the p a r t i c u l a r patterns o f r e g i m e
s u p p o r t found in Brazil. T h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e model would lead o n e to
expect significant v a r i a t i o n in these p a t t e r n s from o n e country to another.
T h e s e e x p e c t a t i o n s are set out in Figure 1 1 . 5 , a typology c l a i m i n g that varia-
tions in r e g i m e s u p p o r t d e p e n d on how vigorously g o v e r n m e n t s seek to indoc- Citizens have no
access to alternative
trinate their citizens, and h o w m u c h access citizens have to c o u n t e r v a l e n t
political values
communication.
In c o u n t r i e s in which the g o v e r n m e n t m a k e s energetic efforts to indoctrinate
its citizens - t h e g o v e r n m e n t s of Nazi G e r m a n y and the now defunct Soviet Political awareness
1 7
U n i o n are e x a m p l e s - even the least politically informed m e m b e r s of society
m a y (in c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e least informed Brazilians) exhibit m o d e r a t e l y high Figure 11.5. A typology of support for government policies.
levels of s u p p o r t for r e g i m e n o r m s ( c o m p a r e the cases in the left-hand c o l u m n
of Figure 11.5 to those in t h e right-hand c o l u m n ) . A s e c o n d source of variation
in p o p u l a r s u p p o r t for a u t h o r i t a r i a n r e g i m e s is the access of citizens in different It is difficult to think of m o d e r n a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o u n t r i e s that fall clearly into
c o u n t r i e s to c o u n t e r v a l e n t sources of values. M a n y citizens in a u t h o r i t a r i a n Bra- the lower right cell of Figure 11.5. However, o n e might reasonably c o n s i d e r the
zil retained access to b o o k s and other small circulation publications that c a r r i e d United States an e x a m p l e of a n o n m o b i l i z i n g r e g i m e w h o s e elites have achieved
a l t e r n a t i v e values; s o m e also r e m e m b e r e d the d e m o c r a t i c n o r m s of the previous high levels of v o l u n t a r y a g r e e m e n t on certain n o r m s relating to c a p i t a l i s m , d e -
r e g i m e . In other a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o u n t r i e s , h o w e v e r - N o r t h K o r e a c o m e s to m o c r a c y , a n d , at t i m e s , foreign policy. T h e analysis of C h a p t e r 6 indicates that
w h e n such elite c o n s e n s u s exists, A m e r i c a n public opinion indeed c o n f o r m s to
m i n d - scarcely any s e g m e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n h a s either personal m e m o r y of,
the p a t t e r n in the lower right cell. (See Figure 6 . 5 . )
or access t o , sources of a n t i r e g i m e values. In c o n s e q u e n c e , the d e c l i n e in sup-
p o r t for r e g i m e policies that we found a m o n g the most aware Brazilians should In p r o p o s i n g this typology, G e d d e s and I had in m i n d cases in which t h e gov-
show up m o r e weakly, or p e r h a p s not at all, a m o n g the most aware citizens of e r n m e n t m a i n t a i n s at least t h e a p p e a r a n c e of c o m p e t e n c e and effectiveness. Cer-
c o u n t r i e s such as N o r t h K o r e a ( c o m p a r e cases in the top row of Figure 11.5 to tainly this w a s true of the Brazilian r e g i m e at the t i m e of o u r survey. For cases
those in the b o t t o m r o w ) . in w h i c h g o v e r n m e n t s are m a r k e d l y less effective (or less lucky with the e c o n -
o m y ) , o n e w o u l d expect m o r e resistance t o g o v e r n m e n t policies. T h e m o d e l
readily a c c o m m o d a t e s the effects of such h e i g h t e n e d resistance. R e t u r n i n g to
17 In developing this typology, we assume that authoritarian regimes espouse authoritarian policies.
The Gorbachev government in the Soviet Union, however, was a partial exception. Its glasnost Figures 8.2 and 8 . 3 , we see that as resistance i n c r e a s e s , p a t t e r n s of policy s u p -
and pereslroika policies must be viewed, in the context of Soviet history, as nonauthoritarian. port b e c o m e n o n m o n o t o n i c and perhaps n e g a t i v e . H e n c e for the c a s e of an in-
One would therefore expect patterns of support for these policies to differ from those forecast for
other cases. effective g o v e r n m e n t , we w o u l d expect, ceteris p a r i b u s , a gently n o n m o n o t o n i c
 306 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
p a t t e r n of support a m o n g the m o d e r a t e to poorly e d u c a t e d , and a n e a r l y flat or
n e g a t i v e relationship with awareness a m o n g the better e d u c a t e d . (It is straight-
1 8
forward to r e d r a w Figure 11.5 to illustrate such c a s e s . )
T h e r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l thus specifies the w a y s in which a variety of
factors - a n a t i o n ' s p r i o r e x p e r i e n c e with a l t e r n a t i v e i d e o l o g i e s , the intensity of
the r e g i m e ' s efforts at public m o b i l i z a t i o n , the access of citizens to a l t e r n a t i v e
sources of i d e a s , and the r e g i m e ' s p e r f o r m a n c e - interact to affect overall pat-
t e r n s of r e g i m e s u p p o r t .
A s m a t t e r i n g of e v i d e n c e from w h a t used to be k n o w n as E a s t e r n bloc c o m -
munist c o u n t r i e s in the p r e - G o r b a c h e v e r a provides additional s u p p o r t for the
R A S m o d e l . A 1984 study by Polish researchers at the University of W a r s a w
found that s u p p o r t for m a r t i a l law and o p p o s i t i o n to the union Solidarity were
greatest a m o n g p e o p l e at low-to-middle levels of e d u c a t i o n . In 1985, w h e n the
g o v e r n m e n t had b e g u n to p r o m o t e a return to n o r m a l c y , many p o o r l y e d u c a t e d
r e s p o n d e n t s had lapsed into no opinion, so that s u p p o r t for martial law w a s then
greatest a m o n g p e o p l e a t m i d d l e levels o f e d u c a t i o n ( R y s z k a , 1987: p . 2 5 3 ) .
T h e s e findings are readily intelligible if, as s e e m s r e a s o n a b l e , o n e is willing to
a s s u m e that e d u c a t i o n is positively associated with reception of p r o r e g i m e c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n s and negatively associated with a disposition toward uncritical ac-
c e p t a n c e of these c o m m u n i c a t i o n s .
Similar, t h o u g h s o m e w h a t sketchier e v i d e n c e is available from the f o r m e r S o -
viet U n i o n . Philip R o e d e r ( 1 9 8 5 , 1989) reviews studies s h o w i n g that, a l t h o u g h
o p p o s i t i o n to the Soviet r e g i m e was greatest within the best e d u c a t e d s e g m e n t s
of society, e d u c a t i o n w a s positively a s s o c i a t e d with individual susceptibility to
indoctrination p r o g r a m s in factory settings. In o t h e r w o r d s , s u p p o r t for the re-
g i m e s e e m e d to increase with e d u c a t i o n - except at the very highest levels of
e d u c a t i o n , w h e r e s u p p o r t declined s o m e w h a t . On the basis of this and o t h e r ev-
i d e n c e , R o e d e r suggests that " t h e relationship b e t w e e n dissent and social m o -
bilization is curvilinear, declining with early social mobilization u n d e r Party
t u t e l a g e , but rising as-education and urbanization b e c o m e still m o r e a d v a n c e d . "
T h e inverse of R o e d e r ' s dissent c u r v e is, of c o u r s e , a pattern in w h i c h support
for t h e r e g i m e increases as e d u c a t i o n i n c r e a s e s , but then declines at t h e highest
levels of e d u c a t i o n .
By far the most p r o v o c a t i v e e v i d e n c e from a former E a s t e r n block nation
involves c h a n g i n g p a t t e r n s of s u p p o r t for the Afghan W a r a m o n g the Soviet
p u b l i c . It seems that after an initial p e r i o d in the e a r l y 1980s in which the Soviet
m e d i a gave relatively little publicity to the war, the g o v e r n m e n t b e c a m e con-
c e r n e d about signs of public d i s q u i e t u d e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , it m a d e a " d e c i s i o n
to d e v e l o p ' i n f o r m a t i o n ' - p a r t i c u l a r l y on television - about the w a r . " T h e 2 0
18 It is interesting to note that when the Brazilian economy faltered, support for the regime col-
lapsed first in just those quarters in which our analysis would lead one to expect it: among the
most highly educated and politically involved segments of the population (Alves, 1984; Lamou-
nier, 1980).
19 I thank Stanislaw Gebethner for bringing these data to my attention.
20 Foreign Opinions (June 1987), Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision, Ministere des Affairs Etran-
gers. Number 4, Paris. I thank Chris Achen for bringing these data to my attention.
The model and future research 307
result, according to a R a d i o Free E u r o p e survey of Soviet citizens traveling in
the w e s t , w a s that b e t w e e n 1984 and 1986
approval increased among those who had so far proved hesitant, in particular young peo-
ple, uneducated, [and] central Asian citizens. On the other hand, opposition has devel-
oped in key sectors such as Moscow, Leningrad, among graduates and party members.
(Roeder, 1985)
In a d d i t i o n , no-opinion r a t e s , which had been high in 1984, fell d u r i n g this
p e r i o d of intensified p r o g o v e r n m e n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , and fell most of all in pro-
vincial areas. In S i b e r i a , t h e most peripheral region of the Soviet U n i o n , " D o n ' t
k n o w " r a t e s declined from 5 9 % t o 3 1 % b e t w e e n 1984 and 1986, while s u p p o r t
for the w a r rose from 2 4 % t o 5 1 % and o p p o s i t i o n rates r e m a i n e d u n c h a n g e d .
But in M o s c o w and L e n i n g r a d , the least peripheral r e g i o n s , the biggest c h a n g e
w a s an increase in o p p o s i t i o n from 2 0 % to 3 5 % .
T h e s e Soviet results present a striking parallel to c h a n g i n g patterns of s u p p o r t
1 9
for t h e V i e t n a m W a r in the United States b e t w e e n 1964 and 1966. It will be re-
called t h a t , in this p e r i o d , s u p p o r t for the w a r rose in the least aware s t r a t u m in
r e s p o n s e to an intensified p r o w a r c a m p a i g n by t h e g o v e r n m e n t , but that, at t h e
s a m e t i m e , it fell a m o n g the mostly highly a w a r e d o v e s , w h o were the only o n e s
likely b o t h to receive and to accept the a n t i w a r m e s s a g e .
O n e w o n d e r s about t h e source of the a n t i - A f g h a n W a r m e s s a g e in t h e Soviet
U n i o n . O u r only e v i d e n c e about it is that a n t i w a r Soviets were most likely to
m e n t i o n " w o r d of m o u t h " as their m a i n source of information about the war.
T h i s no doubt represents a g e n u i n e and i m p o r t a n t difference from the United
States. W h e r e the m e d i a are controlled by the g o v e r n m e n t , c o u n t e r v a l e n t
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s must diffuse through informal c h a n n e l s . But aside from t h i s ,
the effects of d o m i n a n t and c o u n t e r v a l e n t m e s s a g e s a r e , as far as one can tell
from the available d a t a , surprisingly similar in these two cases of u n p o p u l a r
foreign w a r s .
T h e r e is, however, an i m p o r t a n t caveat to all this. M u c h e v i d e n c e suggests
that p o p u l a r support that is built up by m e a n s of one-sided c o m m u n i c a t i o n s can
collapse virtually overnight w h e n t w o - s i d e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n s are allowed. A
d e m o n s t r a t i o n of this o c c u r r e d in a u t h o r i t a r i a n Brazil shortly after o u r d a t a were
c o l l e c t e d . In a highly controlled " e l e c t i o n c a m p a i g n " in which only g o v e r n -
m e n t approved c a n d i d a t e s w e r e allowed access t o t h e m a s s m e d i a , the g o v e r n -
ment c a n d i d a t e s were so far ahead of the opposition in the public opinion polls
that the g o v e r n m e n t felt it safe to permit the o p p o s i t i o n c a n d i d a t e s limited ac-
cess to the m e d i a a few w e e k s before t h e 1974 e l e c t i o n . W h e n it did s o , s u p p o r t
for t h e official c a n d i d a t e s p l u m m e t e d . M a n y found t h e m s e l v e s in suddenly close
r a c e s , and a n u m b e r were actually defeated ( L a m o u n i e r , 1980).
T h a t m a s s opinion m a y prove highly c h a n g e a b l e is by no m e a n s e v i d e n c e of
its insignificance. W e a k l y held or superficial o p i n i o n s that c o n d u c e toward
a c q u i e s c e n c e in a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s m or are the basis for choices b e t w e e n radically
different c a n d i d a t e s in e l e c t i o n s can be i m m e n s e l y c o n s e q u e n t i a l in spite of their
superficiality. M a s s opinion m a y b e , in m a n y c a s e s , an inherently superficial
308 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
force, but it is directly attached to the levers of g o v e r n m e n t , and this can m a k e
it extremely powerful.
It should also be noted t h a t , in s o m e a u t h o r i t a r i a n c o u n t r i e s , o p p o s i t i o n a c -
tivists d e v e l o p unofficial n e t w o r k s to challenge r e g i m e d o m i n a t i o n of political
ideas. T h i s h a p p e n e d in t h e Philippines d u r i n g the M a r c o s r e g i m e and recently
2 1
in S o u t h K o r e a . M o r e strikingly, as events in R o m a n i a showed in 1989, it is
possible for a citizenry to stage a s p o n t a n e o u s rebellion even in the a b s e n c e of
2 2
such c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n e t w o r k s . It is obviously important to understand how
such events occur. T h e d y n a m i c s of the R A S m o d e l , however, offer no c l e a r in-
sight to such p r o b l e m s .
CONCLUDING REMARKS
T h e c o m m o n f r a m e w o r k developed in this b o o k involves the interactive effects
of four types of variables: at the a g g r e g a t e level, variation in the intensity of
political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ; at the individual-level, variation in c i t i z e n s ' attention
to politics and in their political predispositions (especially values); a n d , again at
t h e a g g r e g a t e level, in t h e accidental factors that make considerations momen-
tarily salient to p e o p l e , such as n e w s reports or q u e s t i o n n a i r e c o n s t r u c t i o n .
T h e s e variables interact in a four-axiom m o d e l that specifies how individuals
acquire political c o n s i d e r a t i o n s from the political e n v i r o n m e n t and use t h e m to
formulate a n s w e r s to q u e s t i o n s about their political preferences. T h e general
m o d e l s e e m s to w o r k a p p r o x i m a t e l y equally well in a w i d e range of political
c o n t e x t s , from e l e c t i o n s to s u p p o r t for foreign wars to evaluation of presidential
character.
T h e four-axiom R A S m o d e l actually reduces to t w o main ideas. T h e first is
that individuals do not possess " t r u e a t t i t u d e s , " in the usual technical sense of
the t e r m , on most political issues, but a series of c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that a r e typi-
cally rather p o o r l y integrated. T h e c r u d e m o d e l I have proposed d o e s not begin
to do j u s t i c e to the process by which c o m p e t i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are f o r m e d , in-
teract with one another, and stochastically d e t e r m i n e p e o p l e ' s responses to par-
ticular survey questions. But the core claim of the R A S model that people do not
typically have " j u s t o n e a t t i t u d e " on issues is, as I have sought to show, essen-
tially c o r r e c t and d e s e r v e s , in o n e form or another, a central place in o u r un-
d e r s t a n d i n g of the nature of m a s s o p i n i o n .
T h e o t h e r m a i n idea in the R A S model is that an interaction between political
a w a r e n e s s and political predispositions is fundamental to the process by which
citizens use information from the political e n v i r o n m e n t to form opinions. T h i s
interaction w a s almost c o m p l e t e l y neglected in studies of political b e h a v i o r in
the 1960s and 1970s but s e e m s to be getting m o r e attention from attitude re-
21 In the latter case, the government, although authoritarian, allowed the mass media a fair amount
of latitude for criticizing its policies.
22 A report on National Public Radio, however, contended that the Romanian revolution began in
peripheral areas of the country because that was where access to alternative communications, in
the form of news reports from neighboring countries, was greatest.
The model and future research 309
searchers - t h o u g h not yet from many voting b e h a v i o r specialists - in recent
years (see E r b r i n g , G o l d e n b e r g , and Miller, 1980; M a c K u e n , 1984; Franklin and
K o s a k i , 1989; K r o s n i c k and Kinder, 1990; Stoker, 1990; Jacoby, 1991; Pollock,
L i s l e , and Vittes, 1991; S n i d e r m a n , Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; F r a n k l i n , 1992;
and H u r w i t z and Peffley, in p r e s s ) . But even s o , s t a n d a r d p r o c e d u r e in the m a -
jority of political b e h a v i o r studies is still to a s s u m e that citizens react to the
stimuli they e n c o u n t e r - w h e t h e r political c a m p a i g n s , presidential p e r f o r m a n c e ,
the state of the e c o n o m y , issues of war, p e a c e , or d o m e s t i c policy - solely on
the basis of their values and interests. T h e idea that, o w i n g to differences in p o -
litical a w a r e n e s s , citizens m a y vary substantially in their ability to act on their
values and interests is typically not r e c o g n i z e d .
T h e m o d e l I have p r o p o s e d is certainly not w i t h o u t w e a k n e s s e s . In view of
t h e m , especially the inability of the m o d e l in its present form to a c c o m m o d a t e
either the integration of discrete information into larger mental s t r u c t u r e s , or the
p r o c e s s by which political perception is influenced by past e x p e r i e n c e , the
m o d e l must be c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o x i m a t e and p r o v i s i o n a l .
It i s , I should also n o t e , very m u c h an o p e n q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r the p a r t i c u l a r
o p e r a t i o n a l m o d e l s by w h i c h I have sought to a c c o m m o d a t e the interactive ef-
fects of political a w a r e n e s s and political p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , especially as e m b o d i e d
in E q u a t i o n s 7.7 and 9 . 8 , a r e ideal. I certainly do not c l a i m that they a r e . My
c l a i m is only that r e s e a r c h e r s need to find s o m e way of taking these interactions
into central account in their o w n m o d e l b u i l d i n g , b e c a u s e these interactions are
both very c o m m o n and substantively i m p o r t a n t .
D e s p i t e its v a r i o u s l i m i t a t i o n s , the general R A S m o d e l h a s t h e virtue of pull-
ing t o g e t h e r within o n e theoretical s y s t e m a w i d e variety of empirical p h e n o m -
e n a , m a n y of w h i c h a r e analyzed by specialists w h o rarely or never
c o m m u n i c a t e with o n e another. T h e specialized division of labor is a strength of
scientific activity, but w h e n the vast majority of w o r k c o n c e n t r a t e s on issues of
topical i m p o r t a n c e - even great topical i m p o r t a n c e , such as racial a t t i t u d e s , or
s u p p o r t for U . S . intervention in foreign w a r s , or e l e c t i o n s - with little regard
for anything besides t h e inherent i m p o r t a n c e of the topic, specialization has
great costs. My feeling, as I have indicated, is that these costs have b e c o m e t o o
great, and that it is t i m e to start i n c u r r i n g a few costs on the o t h e r side of the
ledger. T h e R A S m o d e l , in a c c e p t i n g the costs of n o n s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , h a s been
able to m a k e c l e a r t h e g r e a t , presently largely u n t a p p e d potential for synthesis
within the public opinion field.
T h e R A S model also s w i m s d e t e r m i n e d l y against the current o f m u c h polit-
ical b e h a v i o r r e s e a r c h , w h i c h cheerfully e m p h a s i z e s the diversity of i n d i v i d u a l s '
r e s p o n s e s to politics. In so d o i n g , the m o d e l reflects my conviction that the a p -
p r o p r i a t e scientific r e s p o n s e to the diversity of nature is not to rejoice, but to
r e d o u b l e t h e effort to find strong m o d e l s and broad generalizations that will
fruitfully simplify t h e realities that we e x p e r i e n c e in daily life.

12
Epilogue: The question of
elite domination of public opinion
The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable
and invariable relation to the input. As candidates and parties clamor for attention and
vie for popular support, the people's verdict can be no more than a selective reflection
from the alternatives and outlooks presented to them (p. 2).
-V. O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate
In t h e 1930s and 1940s, m a n y o b s e r v e r s feared that the rise of the m o d e r n m a s s
m e d i a w o u l d b r i n g a n e w e r a of totalitarian d o m i n a t i o n . M a s s circulation n e w s -
p a p e r s , t h e newly invented r a d i o , and m o t i o n pictures s e e m e d ideal tools for
playing upon the fears of the n e w m a s s s o c i e t i e s , and the great t h o u g h t e m p o -
r a r y success of Hitler in G e r m a n y , Mussolini in Italy, and Stalin in the Soviet
U n i o n s e e m e d to confirm e v e r y o n e ' s worst fears.
G e o r g e O r w e l l ' s famous novel 1984 is p e r h a p s the best-known expression of
this foreboding over the d a r k potential of the m a s s m e d i a , but many social scien-
tists shared O r w e l l ' s a p p r e h e n s i o n . As a result, a t t e m p t s to m e a s u r e t h e effects
of the m a s s m e d i a on public opinion were a staple of early opinion r e s e a r c h .
T h i s early research t u r n e d out to be r e a s s u r i n g , however. C o m p a r e d to w h a t
m a n y feared the m e d i a m i g h t be able to a c c o m p l i s h , surveys found m e d i a effects
to be relatively small (Klapper, 1960). T h e m e d i a most often served to reinforce
and activate existing opinion rather than to c r e a t e it, and m u c h of the impact the
m e d i a did have w a s m e d i a t e d by c o m m u n i t y leaders in a kind of " t w o - s t e p
f l o w " (Lazarsfeld, B e r e l s o n , and G a u d e t , 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and
M c P h e e , 1954).
If m e d i a effects w e r e , as almost all research i n d i c a t e d , " m i n i m a l , " then the
d a n g e r from political elites w h o might exploit the m e d i a to m a n i p u l a t e m a s s
opinion must be m i n i m a l as well - or so it s e e m e d to the majority of m a i n s t r e a m
c o m m u n i c a t i o n researchers w h o , n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the i m p o r t u n i n g s of a handful
of identifiably leftist a c a d e m i c s (for e x a m p l e , M i l i b a n d , 1969), were content
to ignore the possibility of elite d o m i n a t i o n of m a s s opinion by m e a n s of the
mass media.
Recently, however, t h e s t a n d a r d belief in " m i n i m a l " effects has c o m e u n d e r
severe attack. U s i n g w i d e l y different m e t h o d o l o g i e s but converging on the s a m e
c o n c l u s i o n , several research g r o u p s have found e v i d e n c e of substantial m e d i a
Elite domination of public opinion 311
effects (Patterson and M c C l u r e , 1974; Patterson, 1980; Iyengar, Peters, and
Kinder, 1982; Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; B a r t e l s , 1988; F a n , 1988; Brody, 1991;
P a g e , S h a p i r o , and D e m p s e y , 1987; Page and S h a p i r o , in p r e s s ) . No single n e w s
story or broadcast may have great effect, but the c u m u l a t i v e effect of many sto-
ries over a period of m o n t h s or years may n o n e t h e l e s s be large (Iyengar, 1991).
T h u s , although the old m o d e l of the m e d i a as a " h y p o d e r m i c n e e d l e " that could
inject ideas into the b o d y politic on c o m m a n d h a s not been revived, m a i n s t r e a m
c o m m u n i c a t i o n research has now developed a healthy respect for w h a t the m e -
dia, and t h e politicians w h o use it, can a c c o m p l i s h .
If t h e theory of m i n i m a l m e d i a effects h a s lost its a c a d e m i c w a r r a n t , then so
has c o m p l a i s a n c e over the potential for elite m a n i p u l a t i o n of m a s s opinion
through use of the m e d i a . In this concluding s e c t i o n , I therefore turn to this is-
sue. My discussion will be heavily structured by the c a t e g o r i e s of my earlier,
empirical analyses.
DEFINING ELITE DOMINATION
T h e a r g u m e n t of this b o o k is, on first i n s p e c t i o n , scarcely e n c o u r a g i n g with re-
spect to d o m i n a t i o n of m a s s opinion by elites. M a n y c i t i z e n s , as w a s a r g u e d , pay
too little attention to public affairs to be able to respond critically to t h e political
c o m m u n i c a t i o n s they e n c o u n t e r ; rather, they are blown about by w h a t e v e r cur-
rent of information m a n a g e s to develop the greatest intensity. T h e m i n o r i t y of
citizens w h o are highly attentive to public affairs are scarcely m o r e critical:
They respond to new issues mainly on the basis of t h e p a r t i s a n s h i p and ideology
of the elite sources of t h e m e s s a g e s .
If m a n y citizens are largely uncritical in their response to political c o m m u -
nications as c a r r i e d in the m a s s m e d i a , and if most of the rest respond m e c h a n -
ically on the basis of p a r t i s a n c u e s , how can o n e deny t h e existence of a
substantial degree of elite d o m i n a t i o n of public o p i n i o n ?
It all d e p e n d s on how o n e defines elite d o m i n a t i o n . If one takes it to m e a n any
situation in which the public c h a n g e s its opinion in t h e direction of the " i n f o r -
m a t i o n " and leadership c u e s supplied to it by elites, indeed, there is not m u c h
to a r g u e about. Not only t h e present study, but several others provide a b u n d a n t
e v i d e n c e of this sort of elite d o m i n a t i o n (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; P a g e , Sha-
p i r o , and D e m p s e y , 1987; F a n , 1988).
Yet the matter cannot be d e c i d e d so easily. Of course the public r e s p o n d s to
elite-supplied information and leadership cues. H o w could it be o t h e r w i s e in a
w o r l d in which events are a m b i g u o u s and in w h i c h the public m u s t regularly
have opinions about m a t t e r s that a r e , to use Llippmann's p h r a s e a g a i n , " o u t of
reach, out of sight, out of m i n d " ( 1 9 2 2 , 1946: p. 21)?
P a g e and Shapiro (in p r e s s ) , recognizing an u n a v o i d a b l e d e p e n d e n c y of public
opinion on elite d i s c o u r s e , frame the p r o b l e m in t e r m s of the "quality of infor-
mation and interpretation [that] is conveyed to the p u b l i c . " T h e y c o n t i n u e ,
 312 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
To the extent that the public receives useful interpretations and correct and helpful in-
formation - information and interpretations that help it arrive at the policy choices it
would make if fully informed - the policy preferences it expresses can be considered
"authentic." . . . Individuals or institutions that influence public opinion by providing
correct, helpful political information can be said to educate the public.
On the other hand, to the extent that the public is given erroneous interpretations or
false, misleading, or biased information, people may make mistaken evaluations of pol-
icy alternatives and may express support for policies harmful to their own interests and
to values they cherish. An extreme result of such mistaken evaluations could be the sys-
tematic "false consciousness" or "hegemony" of which some Marxists and other the-
orists speak. . . .
Those who influence public opinion by providing incorrect, biased, or selective infor-
mation may be said to mislead the public. If they do so consciously, and deliberately, by
means of lies, falsehoods, deception, or concealment, they manipulate public opinion,
(ch. 9; emphasis in original)
T h e difficulty in this way of framing the p r o b l e m , as Page and Shapiro
a c k n o w l e d g e , is that it requires independent k n o w l e d g e of (or a s s u m p t i o n s
about) which interpretations and information are c o r r e c t , and such independent
k n o w l e d g e is largely unavailable. Despite this, however, Page and S h a p i r o at-
t e m p t to identify cases of elite m a n i p u l a t i o n . For e x a m p l e , they w r i t e that Pres-
ident Reagan
misled or manipulated the public on a variety of foreign policy matters. Calling the Soviet
Union an "evil empire," with leaders willing to " l i e , cheat, and steal" for their ends, he
made exaggerated charges that the Soviets had broken the SALT arms control treaties,
and he portrayed the U.S. as advocating arms control while he in fact resisted reaching
agreement, (ch. 9)
T h o u g h not wishing to defend either the R e a g a n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s policies or
its use of rhetoric in these instances, I would also be reluctant to cite t h e m as
cases of m a n i p u l a t i o n of public opinion. W h o , after all, can say that the Soviet
U n i o n w a s not, in s o m e s e n s e , an evil e m p i r e , or that it w a s truly the United
S t a t e s r a t h e r than the Soviet g o v e r n m e n t that w a s d r a g g i n g its feet on a r m s con-
trol? J u d g m e n t s on such m a t t e r s are inherently political - which often m e a n s
ideological - and it is a m i s t a k e , in my view, to u n d e r t a k e an evaluation of
e l i t e - m a s s relations on the a s s u m p t i o n that o n e ' s own j u d g m e n t s c a n , in gen-
e r a l , rise above p a r t i s a n s h i p .
Yet Page and S h a p i r o ' s notion of " i n f o r m a t i o n and interpretations that help
[the public] a r r i v e at the policy choices it w o u l d m a k e if fully i n f o r m e d " is, I
b e l i e v e , a conceptually useful o n e . For o n e t h i n g , " f u l l y i n f o r m e d " j u d g m e n t s ,
if they refer to all available information r a t h e r than to all possible i n f o r m a t i o n ,
need not always b e correct j u d g m e n t s . O n e can m a k e o n e ' s best decision o n the
basis of available information and still be dead w r o n g . Further, p e o p l e w h o are
" f u l l y i n f o r m e d " may n o n e t h e l e s s d i s a g r e e , a s e x p e r i e n c e regularly s h o w s . O n
these t w o c o u n t s , t h e n , there is latitude for o p p o s i n g groups to disagree radically
w i t h o u t each of t h e m risking a c h a r g e from the other that it is seeking to m a -
nipulate - or in my t e r m s , to d o m i n a t e - public o p i n i o n .
Elite domination of public opinion 313
W i t h this in m i n d , I define elite d o m i n a t i o n as a situation in which elites in-
duce citizens to hold opinions that they would not hold if aware of the best avail-
able information and analysis. T h i s c o n c e p t i o n is still p r o b l e m a t i c in that it
d e p e n d s on an a s s e s s m e n t of what the public w o u l d believe if it w e r e fully in-
formed. But this difficulty is not, I believe, an i n s u r m o u n t a b l e o n e , as the fol-
lowing p a r a b l e will suggest.
T H E PARABLE OF P U R P L E L A N D
O n c e there w a s a c o u n t r y that w a s inhabited by t w o kinds of p e o p l e , blues and
reds. Blues and reds shared m a n y v a l u e s , but they evaluated public policies dif-
ferently. Blue people preferred s h o r t , round policies expressed in strong c o l o r s ,
w h e r e a s the reds preferred tall, rectangular policies a r t i c u l a t e d in pastel colors.
In c o n s e q u e n c e of their ideological differences, w h i c h might or m i g h t not
have been rooted in differences of material interest, reds and blues w e r e in
constant political d i s a g r e e m e n t . But both sides valued reason and e v i d e n c e , and
so each c o m m i s s i o n e d e x p e r t s to advise t h e m . Of c o u r s e , blues hired blue per-
sons as experts and reds hired red persons as e x p e r t s , but they c h a r g e d their ex-
pert advisors to a r g u e , d i s c u s s , and d e b a t e with o n e a n o t h e r in an effort to
a c h i e v e , if at all p o s s i b l e , the best resolutions to policy p r o b l e m s . To e n c o u r a g e
experts to get the best a n s w e r s to policy d i l e m m a s , they offered very large
prizes - consisting of s t a t u s , research s u p p o r t , a n d , in a handful of c a s e s , public
recognition - to those e x p e r t s w h o were able to m a k e c o n v i n c i n g a r g u m e n t s to
other experts.
Like all free c o u n t r i e s , P u r p l e Land had professional politicians and political
activists to take the lead in public affairs. But the politicians and activists of
P u r p l e Land were p r a g m a t i c and p e o p l e - o r i e n t e d sorts w h o rarely c a m e u p with
ideas on their o w n . Rather, they looked to e x p e r t s of their o w n c o l o r a t i o n for
i d e a s , and w h e n a congenial expert g r o u p p r o p o s e d s o m e t h i n g new, t h e politi-
cians and activists d i d n ' t ask many h a r d q u e s t i o n s . T h e i r m a i n c o n c e r n s were the
readiness of t h e public to receive the idea, a d v a n t a g e o u s framing of t h e idea in
partisan d e b a t e , and other matters of effective m a r k e t i n g , l l e n c e , the politicians
rarely ventured beyond t h e p a r a m e t e r s of expert d i s c o u r s e .
N e i t h e r red nor blue citizens were especially interested in politics. T h e y pre-
ferred to devote their t i m e to their j o b s , their families, and to b a s e b a l l , the na-
tional p a s t i m e . So they d i d n ' t take t h e trouble to follow political d e b a t e very
carefully; rather, they c o m m i s s i o n e d c o m m u n i c a t i o n specialists to k e e p t h e m in-
f o r m e d , in general and easily c o m p r e h e n s i b l e t e r m s , of what each political
group thought.
Citizens were so apolitical that few paid attention to which e x p e r t s or politi-
cians e n d o r s e d which p a r t i c u l a r policies, but those w h o did notice w o u l d m e -
chanically adopt the o p i n i o n s of their o w n type of elite, as r e p o r t e d by
c o m m u n i c a t i o n specialists in the press. T h e r e m a i n d e r simply spouted w h a t e v e r
314 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
idea w a s at the top of their h e a d s , without attaching much significance to w h a t
they said. T h e one thing no citizen ever did w a s to think for himself or herself.
All simply selected from the m e n u of elite-supplied options.
If elite d o m i n a t i o n consists of elites inducing the public to hold attitudes that
it would not hold if fully informed, it may be said that the citizens of P u r p l e
L a n d entirely avoided elite d o m i n a t i o n . W h e n , despite differences in o u t l o o k ,
blue and red experts agreed with one a n o t h e r and got most politicians and cit-
izens to go along with t h e m , citizens could feel assured that, even if they d e -
voted their w h o l e lives to investigating the given policy p r o b l e m , they w o u l d not
reach conclusions m u c h different from the o n e s a d v o c a t e d by the e x p e r t s . For
the expert c o m m u n i t y included persons having the s a m e values as the c o m m u -
nity at large, and reached its conclusions after extensive analysis of the best
available information.
E v e n in cases of elite d i s a g r e e m e n t , in which each type of citizen m e c h a n i -
cally followed the advice of his or her o w n type of politician or e x p e r t , there
w a s no elite d o m i n a t i o n . For citizens could still be confident that, the m o r e
closely they looked into a subject, the m o r e likely they would be to reach the
s a m e conclusion reached by the expert s u b c o m m u n i t y sharing their o w n values.
This p a r a b l e shows that it is possible at least to imagine c o n d i t i o n s in w h i c h the
d e p e n d e n c e of m a s s op-nion on the information and analyses c a r r i e d in elite dis-
c o u r s e is great, and y e : in which elite d o m i n a t i o n of public o p i n i o n , by a plau-
sible construction of the t e r m , is unlikely to occur. T h e s e conditions are
1. predispositional differences among the experts paralleling those within the general
public, such that experts are motivated to examine issues from all viewpoints;
2. institutional incentives for experts to develop effective solutions to pressing problems;
3. a press that, whatever else it also does, provides ample coverage of all expert view-
points, where the term " e x p e r t " is broadly construed to include anyone having spe-
cialized knowledge of a problematic subject;
4. politicians and activists that keep within the parameters of expert opinion;
5. a citizenry that is capable, in cases of elite disagreement, of aligning itself with the
elite faction that shares its own predispositions.
A l t h o u g h one may be able to imagine better or stronger safeguards against
elite d o m i n a t i o n , the o n e s proposed here w o u l d be r e a s o n a b l y effective, and
they have the virtue of being researchable by s t a n d a r d empirical t e c h n i q u e s . T h e
researcher need have no special or suprapolitical insight into the " c o r r e c t n e s s "
of the leadership p r o v i d e d by elites. It is only n e c e s s a r y to e x a m i n e the processes
by which leadership cues are g e n e r a t e d and diffused.
T h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e c h a p t e r will use these c o n d i t i o n s as the basis for e x a m -
ining the degree of elite d o m i n a t i o n that exists in the United States. T h e a i m will
not be to settle the q u e s t i o n , which is obviously impossible in the few p a g e s that
r e m a i n in this study, but to show the kinds of issues that need to be discussed and
the kinds of additional e v i d e n c e n e c e s s a r y to reach a c o n v i n c i n g c o n c l u s i o n .
Elite domination of public opinion 315
T H E P O L I T I C A L C O M M U N I C A T I O N S SYSTEM
O F T H E U N I T E D STATES
The press
Scholars interested in the quality of information and analyses available to the
public have tended to focus on the press as the m o s t p r o x i m a t e source of that
i n f o r m a t i o n . H e n c e , a great deal of information about it is available.
O n e of the clearest findings to e m e r g e from the scholarly literature on the
press is that reporters will regard as n e w s w o r t h y that which their " l e g i t i m a t e "
sources say is n e w s w o r t h y ( C o h e n , 1963). As L e o n Sigal (1973) w r i t e s ,
Even when the journalist is in a position to observe an event directly, he remains reluctant
to offer interpretations of his own, preferring instead to rely on his news sources. For the
reporter, in short, most news is not what has happened, but what someone says has hap-
pened, (p. 69)
As o n e journalist put it: " W e d o n ' t deal in facts, but in attributed o p i n i o n s "
(cited in G a n s , 1980: p. 130). O n e reason for the well-established reliance of
reporters on their sources is that j o u r n a l i s t s have a tendency to " g o n a t i v e , "
identifying with the sources and w a n t i n g to p r o m o t e the s o u r c e ' s w o r l d view. As
Russell B a k e r has w r i t t e n ,
The State Department reporter quickly learns to talk like a fuddy-duddy and to look
grave, important, and inscrutable. The Pentagon man always looks like he has just come
in from maneuvers. The Capital Hill reporter . . . affects the hooded expression of a man
privy to many deals. Like the politicians he covers, he tends to garrulity, coarse jokes,
and bourbon and to hate reform, (cited in Sigal, 1973: p. 49)
A m o r e fundamental reason that r e p o r t e r s rely so heavily on sources is that
they have no real c h o i c e . R e p o r t e r s have neither the t i m e nor the training nor, in
most c a s e s , the inclination t o d o p r i m a r y investigations. A s David H a l b e r s t a m
has written in The Powers That Be (1979) of the j o u r n a l i s t s w h o cover foreign
affairs,
they had come to journalism through the traditional routes, they had written the requisite
police stories and chased fire engines and they had done all that a bit better than their
peers, moving ahead in their profession, and they had finally come to Washington. If
after their arrival in Washington they wrote stories about foreign policy, they did not dare
inject their own viewpoints, of which they had none, or their own expertise, of which
they also had none. Rather they relied almost exclusively on what some American or pos-
sibly British official told them at a briefing or at lunch. The closer journalists came to
great issues, the more vulnerable they felt. (pp. 517-18)
Journalists have r e p u t a t i o n s as s w a s h b u c k l i n g c h a r a c t e r s w h o are never afraid
to say w h a t they think is t r u e . It would be m o r e accurate to say that j o u r n a l i s t s
are never afraid to say w h a t other people think is t r u e . Yet in a w o r l d in which
there are e n o r m o u s pressures - s o m e political, s o m e e c o n o m i c , and s o m e a r i s -
ing from t h e prejudices of the populace - to suppress w h a t is t r u e , an intense
c o m m i t m e n t to publicizing the v i e w s of a w i d e r a n g e of sources can be an ex-
tremely valuable service.
 316 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
40
Count of
30
news stories
using civil
rights frame
on ABC, 20
CBS, and
NBC news
programs
10
69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79
Year
Figure 12.1. Number of stories using civil rights frame on network television news.
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archives.
It i s , however, a m i s t a k e to think of the relationship between the press and
its sources in m e c h a n i s t i c t e r m s . T h e sources responsible for a given story m a y
not be q u o t e d in it, c o n s u l t e d for it, or even personally familiar to the reporter.
T h i s is b e c a u s e , most generally, w h a t the press a t t e m p t s to do is to cover the
n e w s from " a l l l e g i t i m a t e points of v i e w , " w h e r e legitimacy is conferred not
only by g o v e r n m e n t a u t h o r i t i e s and interest g r o u p leaders, but also by subject
m a t t e r specialists w h o have b e e n , in effect, accredited by m a i n s t r e a m institu-
tions such as the g o v e r n m e n t , universities, r e s e a r c h institutes, or major b o o k
publishers. H e n c e , if there is a significant fraction of m a i n s t r e a m expert opinion
that h o l d s a p a r t i c u l a r v i e w , t h e press will l o o k for w a y s to use that v i e w as the
basis of n e w s r e p o r t s . W h e n , for e x a m p l e , C B S television n e w s c o r r e s p o n d e n t
M o r e l y Safer filed his famous story of a U . S . m a r i n e using his cigarette lighter
to b u r n a V i e t n a m e s e p e a s a n t ' s t h a t c h e d roof hut ( H a l b e r s t a m , 1979), a story
that w a s obviously a n t i w a r in its i m p l i c a t i o n s , it is doubtful that Safer c h e c k e d
with any p a r t i c u l a r source on how to frame t h e story. However, he w a s n o n e -
theless reflecting a view of t h e w a r that w a s held by a significant fraction of
foreign policy e x p e r t s .
In a s s e r t i n g such a broad d e p e n d e n c e of m e d i a r e p o r t i n g on expert o p i n i o n , I
am going beyond the existing literature on the p r e s s , w h i c h h a s formulated press
d e p e n d e n c y in t e r m s of d e p e n d e n c e on p a r t i c u l a r s o u r c e s , most often g o v e r n -
m e n t officials dealing with a foreign policy issue. However, there is no reason to
believe that a press w h i c h is congenitally d e p e n d e n t on g o v e r n m e n t sources for
a type of story that is d o m i n a t e d by the g o v e r n m e n t will shed that d e p e n d e n c e
in other types of situations. T h e b r o a d e r d e p e n d e n c e m a y be more difficult to
d o c u m e n t , but it is likely to be present nonetheless.
C o n s i d e r the treatment of homosexuality in the m e d i a . In the period in which
the A m e r i c a n Psychiatric Association ( A P A ) , as the most authoritative source of
Elite domination of public opinion 317
secular understanding of this subject, r e g a r d e d homosexuality as a d i s e a s e , press
c o v e r a g e of the issue w a s d o m i n a t e d by a n t i h o m o s e x u a l stereotypes. T h u s , if
o n e l o o k s up h o m o s e x u a l i t y in the New York Times Index of 1950, o n e finds a
request to see the perversion and scandal listings. But w h e n the A P A d e c l a r e d ,
by a poll of its m e m b e r s h i p in 1974, that h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s no longer to be
c o n s i d e r e d a d i s e a s e , the press began to e m p l o y a " c i v i l r i g h t s ' frame of refer-
e n c e alongside the old " v i c e " frame, thus offering the public an a l t e r n a t i v e way
of c o n c e p t u a l i z i n g the issue of homosexuality.
T h e c h a n g e in n e t w o r k television n e w s c o v e r a g e of homosexuality, in p a r t i c -
ular, o c c u r r e d quite suddenly at the t i m e of the A P A v o t e . In the five years prior
to the A P A vote in 1974, TV n e t w o r k n e w s devoted 14 m i n u t e s to stories that,
implicitly or explicitly, referred to h o m o s e x u a l s as a minority g r o u p seeking its
rights. In the next five y e a r s , the n e t w o r k s devoted 135 m i n u t e s to stories of this
1
k i n d , a nearly tenfold i n c r e a s e . T h e s a m e d a t a , a r r a y e d in t e r m s of story
c o u n t s , are shown in Figure 1 2 . 1 .
My e x a m i n a t i o n of this n e w civil rights c o v e r a g e , which w a s generally but not
2
always s y m p a t h e t i c to g a y s , indicates that most fell into one of three c a t e g o r i e s :
1. Coverage of a lawsuit by Air Force Lieutenant Leonard Matlovich, who was attempt-
ing to reverse the decision of the military to dismiss him for being homosexual. Over
several days, all three networks devoted significant attention to this story.
2. Coverage of state and local referenda on gay rights. Following the APA vote, the me-
dia regarded these referenda, beginning with one in Dade Country, Florida, as having
national political significance.
3. Human interest stories on gay and lesbian organizations, especially those forming on
college campuses. These stories examined the loneliness of homosexual students, and
their efforts to form support organizations, hold social events such as gay dances, and
oppose discriminatory rules.
It m i g h t be objected that n o n e of these stories had any direct c o n n e c t i o n with
the A P A v o t e , and that w h a t really c h a n g e d w a s t h e behavior of h o m o s e x u a l s ,
w h o were b e c o m i n g increasingly militant and increasingly effective in d e m a n d -
ing their rights.
C e r t a i n l y the increased militancy and visibility of h o m o s e x u a l s c o n t r i b u t e d to
the c h a n g e in press c o v e r a g e . But it w a s hardly the w h o l e e x p l a n a t i o n . For ex-
a m p l e , nothing in t h e gay rights m o v e m e n t c o m p e l l e d the spate of largely s y m -
pathetic stories about c a m p u s gay rights o r g a n i z a t i o n s . In one of these stories,
N B C r e p o r t e r Betty Rollins noted:
The question is, do homosexual organizations encourage homosexuality? Psychiatrists we
spoke to think not. They point out that in this society, no one wants to be a homosexual
who isn't one and that if a kid goes as far as joining a homosexual club, he is a homo-
sexual. All the club does is to make him feel less alone and less terrible about the sexual
3
feelings he has and can't help having.
1 Calculated from the Television News Archive of Vanderbilt University.
2 Some of news under the civil rights rubric included persons arguing against civil rights for gays,
as in the case of the well-publicized opposition of singer Anita Bryant to a Dade County, Florida
ordinance that outlawed discrimination on the basis of sexual preference.
3 NBC Evening News, April 13, 1973.
318 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
T h e explicit reference to expert opinion in this story is not, however, typical of
the new coverage of homosexuality. To the extent that expert opinion w a s im-
portant in most stories, it w a s as deep b a c k g r o u n d . For w h a t c h a n g e d in the
1970s w a s that the press w a s no longer seeing h o m o s e x u a l s as social d e v i a n t s ,
but as o r d i n a r y citizens suffering the effects of h o m o p h o b i c prejudice. Given
this c h a n g e of view, w h i c h as I show later o n , clearly originated a m o n g psy-
chiatric e x p e r t s , m u c h else followed more or less automatically.
C o n s i d e r the contrast b e t w e e n the last story dealing with gay rights on C B S
n e w s p r i o r to the A P A v o t e , and the first such story following t h e v o t e . In
the earlier story, gays had w o n a c o u r t victory p e r m i t t i n g t h e m to d e m o n s t r a t e
at the D e m o c r a t i c national c o n v e n t i o n in M i a m i in 1972. Walter C r o n k i t e , in
a slot often used for light n e w s at the end of his p r o g r a m , reported the victory
this way:
Miami Beach had laws against female impersonation. Today a federal judge in Miami
struck them down, saying they were too vague, and besides, discriminated against men.
The suit was brought by the Civil Liberties Union on complaint of gay activists who plan
to demonstrate at the Democratic convention next month. They'll apparently give the
fashion reporters something to contemplate. And that's the way it i s . 4
T h u s , gays were still fair target for mild ridicule on the national n e w s in 1972.
T h e next gay rights stor> on C B S o c c u r r e d shortly after the A P A vote and in-
volved the a t t e m p t s of gay activists in N e w York City to win passage of an anti-
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n law, an effort that had been u n d e r way for several years. C r o n k i t e
introduced the story as follows:
Part of the new morality of the 1960s and 70s is a new attitude toward homosexuals. The
homosexual men and women have organized to fight for acceptance and respectability.
They have succeeded in winning equal rights under the law in many communities, but in
s
the nation's biggest city, the fight goes o n .
C o v e r a g e of the M a t l o v i c h c a s e represents an equally significant c h a n g e in
press behavior. M a t l o v i c h w a s far from being the first h o m o s e x u a l to protest be-
ing d i s m i s s e d from a g o v e r n m e n t j o b b e c a u s e of his sexual o r i e n t a t i o n . He w a s ,
however, the first to get e x t e n s i v e , respectful c o v e r a g e on the evening TV n e w s
for doing s o . T h a t this coverage c a m e very soon after the A P A ' s d e c l a r a t i o n on
h o m o s e x u a l i t y s e e m s m o r e than c o i n c i d e n c e .
T h e point, t h e n , is that h o m o s e x u a l s had been seeking equal rights for s o m e
years w h e n , in the a f t e r m a t h of the A P A v o t e , t h e m a i n s t r e a m press began to
take a different view of their efforts. T h e c h a n g e in media r e p o r t i n g c a n n o t be
linked in a m e c h a n i c a l way to the A P A vote but is nonetheless best u n d e r s t o o d
as reflecting the p r e s s ' s general sensitivity to expert authority.
It w a s not, incidentally, only the p r e s s , but also m a n y m a i n s t r e a m politicians
w h o s e b e h a v i o r c h a n g e d in the aftermath of the A P A vote. T h u s , w h e n voters in
California w e r e asked in 1978 to d e c i d e on a.ballot initiative that w o u l d m a k e it
easier to fire h o m o s e x u a l s c h o o l t e a c h e r s , three nationally prominent politicians
4 June 22, 1972. 5 May 6, 1974.
Elite domination of public opinion 319
c a m e out in opposition to the m e a s u r e : California g o v e r n o r J e r r y B r o w n , former
g o v e r n o r and presidential aspirant R o n a l d R e a g a n , and President J i m m y Carter.
It is h a r d to imagine such b e h a v i o r on the p a r t of a m b i t i o u s politicians in an e r a
w h e n e x p e r t s were in u n a n i m o u s a g r e e m e n t that h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s a form of
m e n t a l illness and in w h i c h the press routinely c a t e g o r i z e d n e w s about h o m o -
sexuality u n d e r the r u b r i c of p e r v e r s i o n .
T h e r e is, in s u m , reason to believe that the press is to a c o n s i d e r a b l e d e g r e e
d e p e n d e n t on subject m a t t e r specialists, including g o v e r n m e n t officials a m o n g
m a n y o t h e r s , in framing and r e p o r t i n g the n e w s . I have a t t e m p t e d to s u m m a r i z e
the nature of this d e p e n d e n c e by a s s e r t i n g that t h e press u n d e r t a k e s , in g e n e r a l ,
to cover t h e n e w s from all legitimate points of view, w h e r e legitimacy is deter-
6
m i n e d by w h a t m a i n s t r e a m e x p e r t s take s e r i o u s l y .
Experts
T h e a r g u m e n t of the p r e c e d i n g s e c t i o n , if c o r r e c t , places the real responsibility
for selecting the ideas that reach the public with the p r e s s ' s sources. As V. O.
Key, Jr. (1961), c o n c l u d e d in this r e g a r d , " T h e picture of the press collectively
as the w i e l d e r of great p o w e r on its own initiative d o e s not fit the f a c t s " ( p .
394). The managers of the mass media, he continues,
should no more be held accountable for the materials that flow through their channels
than should the managers of transportation concerns be blamed for the quality of the
printed matter they transport from place to place. The tone and quality of the content of
the media tend to be mightily influenced, if not fixed, by those who manufacture news,
(p. 395)
T h i s in turn suggests that if we are interested in t h e quality of the information
reaching the public, we must understand how it is manufactured, w h i c h is to
say, we must understand t h e politics of expert c o m m u n i t i e s as they relate to the
g e n e r a t i o n and diffusion of k n o w l e d g e c l a i m s , policy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , and
general frames of reference. We especially need to k n o w the extent to which
these c o m m u n i t i e s are ideologically d i v e r s e , o p e n to c h a l l e n g e , and institution-
ally s u p p o r t i v e of s e r i o u s - m i n d e d a t t e m p t s to discover feasible solutions to
pressing p r o b l e m s .
T h e r e has b e e n , as far as I can tell, little scholarly attention to these q u e s -
tions. T h e r e a r e , to be s u r e , n u m e r o u s accounts of h o w p a r t i c u l a r g r o u p s of in-
dividuals have a t t e m p t e d to resolve p a r t i c u l a r policy d i l e m m a s . But a t t e m p t s to
generalize from these a c c o u n t s , or to a n s w e r s y s t e m a t i c a l l y questions of the type
just p o s e d , a p p e a r to be a l m o s t entirely lacking in the literature of political sci-
ence and c o m m u n i c a t i o n studies.
Let m e , t h e n , offer an anecdotal glimpse of the w o r k i n g s of the s u b c o m m u -
nity of persons specializing in questions of n u c l e a r strategy. It involves types of
personal interactions t h a t , as far as I have been able to tell, are o u t s i d e existing
6 This argument is similar to Bennett's (1990) indexing hypothesis, except that it refers to a broader
range of sources than Bennett considers to be influential.
320 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
studies of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , but that a r e , I b e l i e v e , of the utmost i m p o r t a n c e for
u n d e r s t a n d i n g the forces that u l t i m a t e l y shape public o p i n i o n .
A few years a g o , it w a s p r o p o s e d by a g r o u p of scientists that any significant
use of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s by either the United States or the former Soviet Union
w o u l d result in an e n v i r o n m e n t a l disaster of m o n u m e n t a l p r o p o r t i o n s . T h e idea
w a s that the explosion of large n u m b e r s of n u c l e a r b o m b s , possibly only a few
d o z e n , w o u l d throw up e n o r m o u s a m o u n t s of dust, d e b r i s , and s m o k e into the
a t m o s p h e r e , b l o c k i n g out t h e sun and c r e a t i n g a d e c a d e s long " n u c l e a r w i n t e r "
of near-total d a r k n e s s and freezing t e m p e r a t u r e s . As a result, the use of n u c l e a r
w e a p o n s , even in self-defense, w o u l d be suicidal not only for o n e ' s n a t i o n , but
for o n e ' s race and for all of t h e e a r t h ' s creatures (Schell, 1982).
T h e idea of n u c l e a r w i n t e r w a s , as would be e x p e c t e d , most p o p u l a r a m o n g lib-
e r a l s , w h o used it as an a r g u m e n t for restricting p r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r w e a p o n s .
At the t i m e w h e n these ideas were being d e b a t e d in the m e d i a , I w a s put in
c h a r g e of organizing a speaker p r o g r a m at my university on t h e subject of the
morality of n u c l e a r war. O n e of the people I invited w a s a well-known conser-
vative e x p e r t w h o had w r i t t e n extensively on n u c l e a r war, including strategies
for fighting n u c l e a r w a r s on a limited but, a c c o r d i n g to the theory of n u c l e a r
winter, potentially c a t a s t r o p h i c scale. W h e n I a s k e d a liberal nuclear w a r policy
expert to introduce this p e r s o n and to serve as m o d e r a t o r for the e n s u i n g dis-
c u s s i o n , he flatly and firmly refused. T h e ideas of the c o n s e r v a t i v e war e x p e r t
w e r e d e e p l y i m m o r a l , th? liberal expert said, and it w o u l d hardly be possible for
h i m to attend the talk, let alone serve as m o d e r a t o r for it. However, after m u c h
c o a x i n g - including my insistence that, as moderator, he would be in a better
position to o p p o s e the baleful influence of t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e expert - he agreed
to s e r v e as moderator.
On t h e day of t h e talk, I w a s chatting with the c o n s e r v a t i v e expert w h e n the
liberal d r o p p e d in. After s t a n d a r d introductions were m a d e , the liberal c a l m l y
a s k e d his fellow e x p e r t , " W e l l , w h a t are you w o r k i n g o n these d a y s ? " 7
" N u c l e a r w i n t e r , " replied the c o n s e r v a t i v e .
" T h a t ' s i n t e r e s t i n g , " said the liberal. " W h a t are you f i n d i n g ? "
" T h a t it's basically a n o n s t a r t e r , " replied the c o n s e r v a t i v e . - •
I stepped back and looked a r o u n d for shelter, fearing a nuclear explosion w a s
about to occur. But t h e w o r r y w a s unfounded.
" Y e a h , t h a t ' s pretty m u c h the way I see it, t o o , " said the liberal, w h o w a s a
physicist by training. " I ' v e d o n e an awful lot of calculations and I c a n ' t c o m e up
with any that m a k e n u c l e a r w i n t e r s e e m like a real possibility."
W i t h that, t h e t w o m e n launched into a discussion of exactly w h a t t h e incin-
e r a t i o n rates of various substances w e r e , h o w m u c h of what kinds of c o m b u s -
tible m a t e r i a l s are found in typical c i t i e s , and other technical p a r a m e t e r s of the
process by w h i c h n u c l e a r w i n t e r m i g h t or might not be created. T h e y a p p e a r e d
to agree on almost e v e r y t h i n g .
7 Quotations are approximate.
Elite domination of public opinion 321
S h o r t l y after these e v e n t s , discussion of n u c l e a r winter d i s a p p e a r e d from the
p o p u l a r m e d i a and the issue w a s seemingly forgotten.
T h i s a n e c d o t e , w h i c h is straight out of P u r p l e L a n d , suggests several impor-
tant points. First, despite a g r e e m e n t on n u c l e a r winter, there is clear e v i d e n c e of
ideological diversity of a sort that doubtless manifests itself in other situations.
S e c o n d , strong ideological differences are not an insuperable b a r r i e r to rational
discussion and to the a c h i e v e m e n t of a g r e e m e n t on p a r t i c u l a r issues. T h e key to
b r i d g i n g ideological differences appears to be the existence of a b o d y of con-
ventional scientific k n o w l e d g e , in this c a s e the laws of physics and chemistry,
w h i c h both experts a c c e p t e d . T h i s k n o w l e d g e is apparently sufficiently well d e -
veloped and routinized that it can lead its users to accept conclusions they are
p r e d i s p o s e d against. T h i r d , the press apparently lost interest in the issue after
relevant experts on both sides concluded that it w a s a nonstarter, and did so d e -
spite a c o n s u m e r m a r k e t for stories on n u c l e a r w i n t e r that w a s p r e s u m a b l y as
strong as it had ever b e e n .
H o w often these things are true of other issues and expert c o m m u n i t i e s is im-
possible to say. C e r t a i n l y o n e can readily i m a g i n e expert c o m m u n i t i e s that en-
force ideological h o m o g e n e i t y on their m e m b e r s , or t h a t , if they do permit
diversity, are so d e e p l y polarized that no rational discussion can occur, or that
have no c o n v e n t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e that is sufficiently strong to c o m p e l a c c e p t a n c e
a m o n g differently p r e d i s p o s e d users.
T h e s e issues, I m a i n t a i n , are i m p o r t a n t ones. T h e y go to the h e a r t of t h e func-
tioning of the political c o m m u n i c a t i o n s s y s t e m in the United S t a t e s , affecting
not only public opinion but g o v e r n m e n t a c t i o n . Yet, as I e m p h a s i z e , they s e e m
to be outside the s c o p e of current investigation.
By way of m a k i n g a p r e l i m i n a r y b u t , I h o p e , suggestive e x a m i n a t i o n of these
issues, let me return to t h e issue of homosexuality. I have already sketched an
a r g u m e n t about the effect of expert opinion on m e d i a treatment of this issue. I
will n o w l o o k briefly at h o w expert opinion on this issue d e v e l o p e d .
At m i d - t w e n t i e t h century, there had been a lengthy history of h o m o s e x u a l
rights g r o u p s seeking a c c e p t a n c e by society. But the g r o u p s had been small,
short-lived, and ineffective. A l t h o u g h s o m e of t h e early rights g r o u p s had be-
lieved that " t h e p e r i o d of passing over the m a t t e r [of h o m o s e x u a l i t y ] and dis-
8
r e g a r d i n g it is past, for g o o d , " Lauritsen and T h o r s t a d (1974) o b s e r v e d that
The early homosexual rights movement was cut short, in the 1930s, after 70 years of
existence, having achieved virtually no lasting breakthroughs. The small, isolated groups
that came into existence here and there during the next two decades could not even be
called holding actions, since there was little left to hold onto. (p. 71)
It s e e m s that h o m o s e x u a l s faced t w o p r o b l e m s . As a minority g r o u p almost
universally considered d e v i a n t , they were not able to m a k e h e a d w a y without
having at least a few allies inside the s y s t e m , and they had n o n e . A l s o , far from
w a n t i n g to challenge m a i n s t r e a m s o c i e t y ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of their plight, many
8 Cited in Lauritsen and Thorstad, 1974: p. 22.
322 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
h o m o s e x u a l s accepted and internalized it. As a h o m o s e x u a l rights activist w r o t e
in t h e 1960s:
The homosexual, whether born or bred (and the psychiatric argument is still raging) has
been conditioned to think of himself as . . . something to be despised. The minute he
discovers he's "different" he avidly reads anything he can on the subject. And what
does he find? More ammunition for his self-contempt. He's told by psychiatric "author-
ities" that he's " s i c k . " So he begins to tell himself not that " T h e psychiatrists say I'm
sick," but " I ' m sick." He programs himself into perpetual feelings of unworthiness."
(emphasis in the original) 9 w a s a d i s e a s e and to treat it as s u c h . But p s y c h i a t r y w a s no longer m o n o l i t h i c in
In the late 1940s, however, a handful of professional psychiatrists and psy-
chologists u n d e r t o o k research that placed h o m o s e x u a l i t y in a new light. T h e r e
h a d , to be s u r e , been p r i o r research and t h e o r i z i n g on the subject, but t h e n e w
research w a s , in a small but i m p o r t a n t way, m o r e r i g o r o u s than e a r l i e r efforts:
R a t h e r than study h o m o s e x u a l s w h o were either i m p r i s o n e d for s o m e c r i m e , of-
ten a sex c r i m e , or actively seeking psychiatric h e l p , the new studies found w a y s
of e x a m i n i n g h o m o s e x u a l s w h o were leading o r d i n a r y lives (Bayer, 1981). T h e
results were a surprise to almost e v e r y o n e . Alfred Kinsey, in his i n t e r v i e w - b a s e d
studies of m a l e sexuality, t u r n e d up evidence that, he said, indicated that a large
fraction of m a l e s w o u l d have a h o m o s e x u a l e x p e r i e n c e ending in o r g a s m at s o m e
point in their lives. As he further argued:
The opinion that homosexual activity in itself provides evidence of a psychopathic per-
sonality is materially challenged by these incidence and frequency data. Of the 40 or 50
percent of the male population which has had a homosexual experience, certainly a high
proportion would not be considered psychopathic personalities on the basis of anything
else in their histories. (1948: 659)
A n o t h e r researcher, E v e l y n H o o k e r o f U C L A , administered personality a s -
s e s s m e n t tests to m a t c h e d s a m p l e s of h o m o s e x u a l and n o n h o m o s e x u a l m e n in
the early 1950s and found no differences in their overall levels of personal ad-
j u s t m e n t . O t h e r researchers followed suit, and soon there w a s a c o n s i d e r a b l e
b o d y of psychiatric e v i d e n c e that raised serious q u e s t i o n about w h e t h e r h o m o -
sexuality w a s a form of mental illness.
It is n o t a b l e that Hooker, w h o s e research proved the most influential, used
s t a n d a r d social scientific research techniques. T h a t i s , she administered s t a n d a r d
tests of personal adjustment and interpreted their results in c o n v e n t i o n a l l y e s -
tablished ways. T h e s e tests, R o r s c h a c h inkblot tests interpreted by j u d g e s blind
to which had been provided by h o m o s e x u a l s , m a y not inspire great c o n f i d e n c e
a m o n g n o n p s y c h i a t r i s t s , but, with respect to the issue of homosexuality, they
constituted an application of neutral scientific k n o w l e d g e .
No d o u b t b e c a u s e of t h i s , the initial response of a significant fraction of the
psychiatric c o m m u n i t y w a s i m m e d i a t e l y favorable. H e r w o r k w a s q u i c k l y ac-
cepted for publication in an i m p o r t a n t j o u r n a l , and H o o k e r herself went on to a
distinguished career. S h e w a s even asked by t h e N i x o n administration to head a
1969 federal task force on homosexuality, and by the International Encyclopedia
9 Leo Martello, cited in Marotta, 1981: p. 103.
Elite domination of public opinion 323
of the Social Sciences to w r i t e its section on homosexuality. T h u s , far from p e -
nalizing H o o k e r for her i d e a s , the psychiatric and political c o m m u n i t i e s re-
w a r d e d her.
H o o k e r ' s research and follow-up studies gave homosexuality, for p e r h a p s the
first t i m e in A m e r i c a n history, a solid foundation of s y m p a t h e t i c opinion in a
m a i n s t r e a m institution. T h e n e w view w a s by no m e a n s universally held within
p s y c h i a t r y : Traditional p s y c h o t h e r a p i s t s c o n t i n u e d to a r g u e that h o m o s e x u a l i t y
its view of homosexuality, and if my general view of efforts by the m e d i a to
r e p o r t t h e n e w s from " a l l legitimate points of v i e w " is c o r r e c t , this w a s e n o u g h
to b r i n g about an i m p o r t a n t degree of c h a n g e in public discussion of t h e issue.
T h e earliest and most attentive a u d i e n c e for this n e w research consisted of
h o m o s e x u a l s . T h e i r r e s p o n s e w a s not only interesting - for it suggests that
the authority of e x p e r t i s e is accepted by g r o u p s o t h e r than t h e m e d i a - but
part of the story of h o w further c h a n g e o c c u r r e d within t h e psychiatric c o m m u -
nity. T h e initial r e s p o n s e , a c c o r d i n g to Bayer ( 1 9 8 1 ) , w a s o n e of keen but cau-
tious interest. H o m o s e x u a l s w a n t e d to k n o w m o r e about the n e w research but
d i d n ' t leap to any c o n c l u s i o n s about it. T h e i r m e e t i n g s and p u b l i c a t i o n s gave
roughly equal play to the n e w research and to representatives of the traditional
s c h o o l . " W h e r e medical m e n , p s y c h o a n a l y s t s , and social scientists fail to
a g r e e , " o n e contributor to a h o m o s e x u a l publication w r o t e , " l a y m e n can only
c o w e r in s i l e n c e . "1 0
Yet it w a s probably inevitable that h o m o s e x u a l s , having b e e n offered a choice
b e t w e e n seeing t h e m s e l v e s as mentally ill and seeing t h e m s e l v e s as n o r m a l and
healthy, would eventually g r a v i t a t e toward the latter view. As this o c c u r r e d , the
n e w e r psychiatric view of h o m o s e x u a l i t y t o o k on great i m p o r t a n c e in efforts by
h o m o s e x u a l s both to o r g a n i z e t h e m s e l v e s and to instigate social c h a n g e .
F r a n k K a m e n y , t h e l e a d e r of a g r o u p of W a s h i n g t o n , D . C . , g a y s , w a s a key
figure i n both respects. " T h e entire h o m o p h i l e m o v e m e n t , " h e said, " i s going
to rise or fall upon the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r h o m o s e x u a l i t y is a s i c k n e s s . " " K a -
m e n y personally rejected the authority of p s y c h i a t r y over the status of h o m o -
sexuality but n o n e t h e l e s s invoked scientific values and t h e new p s y c h i a t r i c
e v i d e n c e to p e r s u a d e m e m b e r s of his o r g a n i z a t i o n to proclaim publicly that their
sexual preferences w e r e n o r m a l and healthy. However, it w a s not until 1965 that
K a m e n y w a s able to win approval for such a s t a t e m e n t , and even t h e n , it w a s
carefully hedged: " i n t h e a b s e n c e of valid e v i d e n c e to the c o n t r a r y , " read the
resolution of the W a s h i n g t o n D . C . M a t t a c h i n e Society, " h o m o s e x u a l i t y is not a
sickness . . . but is merely a p r e f e r e n c e . " 12
In a still later p h a s e of its r e s p o n s e to the new psychiatric e v i d e n c e , h o m o -
sexuals b e g a n to publicly reject psychiatric authority. E v e n as this o c c u r r e d ,
however, friendly psychiatric experts r e m a i n e d w e l c o m e allies. T h e s e e x p e r t s ,
Bayer (1981) c o m m e n t s ,
10 Cited in Bayer, 1981: p. 74. 11 Cited ibid.: p. 82.
12 Cited in D'Emillio, 1983: p. 164.
324 N A T U R E A N D ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
provided homosexuals with evidence and with a vocabulary of criticism that were in-
valuable in the effort to tear the mantle of authority from those who claimed that science
itself had discovered the psychopathology inherent in homosexuality. The role of the ex-
pert at homophile meetings shifted from that of providing homosexuals with insight into
the etiology of their sexual preferences to that of providing insight into the illegitimate
power of psychiatry, (p. 86)
It is interesting to note that the behavior of h o m o s e x u a l s in this period con-
forms to the basic n o t i o n s of the m a i n s t r e a m and p o l a r i z a t i o n m o d e l s . W h e n
h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s c o n s i d e r e d by virtually all specialists and the press to be a
d i s e a s e , h o m o s e x u a l s largely accepted this m a i n s t r e a m n o r m by staying, as the
p h r a s e g o e s , " i n the c l o s e t . " This orientation w a s obviously sustained in p a r t by
realistic fears of w h a t w o u l d h a p p e n if they were discovered; but it is c l e a r that
in m a n y c a s e s , the m a i n s t r e a m n o r m against h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s to a significant
d e g r e e internalized. But t h e n , offered by s o m e psychiatric authorities a c h o i c e of
c o n s i d e r i n g t h e m s e l v e s sick or merely to have an a l t e r n a t i v e sexual preference,
h o m o s e x u a l s naturally allied t h e m s e l v e s with the friendlier view.
P a r t of t h e effort to o v e r c o m e s o c i e t y ' s prejudice against h o m o s e x u a l i t y w a s
a y e a r s ' long series of confrontations b e t w e e n militant gays and the A m e r i c a n
Psychiatric A s s o c i a t i o n , w h i c h c o n t i n u e d in its official publications to classify
h o m o s e x u a l i t y as d i s e a s e . T h u s w h e n the A P A met in W a s h i n g t o n in 1970,
F r a n k K a m e n y helped to lead the protest:
The planned disruption occurred on May 3, when gay and anti-war activists stormed the
prestigious Convocation oi Fellows. During the ensuing uproar, Kameny grabbed a mi-
crophone and denounced the right of psychiatrists to discuss the question of homosexu-
ality. Borrowing from the anti-war movement, he declared, "Psychiatry is the enemy
incarnate. Psychiatry has waged a relentless war of extermination against us. You may
take this as a declaration of war against you." Fist-shaking psychiatrists, infuriated by
the invaders, compared their tactics to that of Nazi storm troopers. (Bayer, 1981: p. 105)
S u c h d i s r u p t i o n s no d o u b t impelled the leaders of the A P A to think m o r e c a r e -
fully about the issue of h o m o s e x u a l i t y than they w o u l d o t h e r w i s e have d o n e . As
a result, w h e n the trustees of the A P A , and later a majority of the A P A m e m -
b e r s h i p in a referendum, voted to delete h o m o s e x u a l i t y from its official list of
m e n t a l d i s o r d e r s , both those w h o w o n the vote and those w h o lost felt.that the
action had involved a large political c o m p o n e n t - as obviously it h a d .
But equally obviously, there w a s m o r e to the politics of this expert c o m m u n i t y
than 1960s-style pressure tactics. As B a y e r o b s e r v e d , s o m e of the trustees vot-
ing for the c h a n g e w e r e genuinely c o n v i n c e d that homosexuality w a s not n e c -
essarily a d i s e a s e , while others " f e l t privately that homosexuality w a s indeed a
d i s o r d e r . . . [but] n e v e r t h e l e s s a c k n o w l e d g e d that the evidence required to s u b -
stantiate their position w a s l a c k i n g " (p. 136). In short, s t a n d a r d ' p s y c h i a t r i c ev-
i d e n c e , w h a t e v e r its intrinsic m e r i t , appeared to c o u n t .
If this s e e m s a naive v i e w , consider the significance of the psychiatric evi-
d e n c e in coldly political t e r m s . O n c e the findings of H o o k e r and others b e g a n to
a c c u m u l a t e , the psychiatric profession faced a g e n u i n e d i l e m m a , o n e that had
eventually to be faced w h e t h e r gay militants d e m a n d e d it or not. E i t h e r psychi-
atrists could r e m o v e h o m o s e x u a l i t y from the list of mental disorders on the
Elite domination of public opinion 325
g r o u n d s that the s t a n d a r d a s s e s s m e n t t e c h n i q u e s had failed to uncover e v i d e n c e
of p s y c h i c p r o b l e m s a m o n g h o m o s e x u a l s , or they could devalue the s t a n d a r d a s -
sessment t e c h n i q u e s - the basis for p s y c h i a t r y ' s authority in o t h e r d o m a i n s - on
the g r o u n d s that they had failed to uncover the p a t h o l o g y inherent in h o m o s e x -
uality. T h i s m u s t , in the e n d , have been an easy c h o i c e .
T h e reader should n o t i c e that n o w h e r e in this account have I evaluated the
c o r r e c t n e s s of the view of h o m o s e x u a l i t y taken by psychiatrists. T h i s is b e c a u s e
the c o r r e c t n e s s of elite v i e w s is, from the p e r s p e c t i v e I am p r o p o s i n g , irrelevant.
W h a t matters is, in effect, procedural c o r r e c t n e s s : w h e t h e r the relevant expert
c o m m u n i t i e s are ideologically diverse and w h e t h e r they have institutionalized
incentive structures that impel m e m b e r s to m a k e their best efforts to resolve
pressing p r o b l e m s .
W i t h respect to these q u e s t i o n s , the psychiatric profession appears to d e s e r v e
a favorable e v a l u a t i o n . A researcher of no initial standing in her field, an un-
tenured research a s s o c i a t e at what w a s then a m i n o r state university, w a s able to
o p e n the first i m p o r t a n t crack in a previously i m p r e g n a b l e p o w e r s t r u c t u r e , and
to do so in the m i d - 1 9 5 0 s , a t i m e not obviously propitious for such an under-
taking. T h i s is an impressive a c h i e v e m e n t not only for the individual, but for the
institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s that m a d e it possible. T h e most i m p o r t a n t of these
institutional a r r a n g e m e n t s , I have s u g g e s t e d , w a s the existence within t h e psy-
chiatric c o m m u n i t y of s t a n d a r d personality a s s e s s m e n t t e c h n i q u e s , w h i c h I have
referred to as c o n v e n t i o n a l scientific k n o w l e d g e .
T h e last few p a g e s have used a case study in o r d e r to e x a m i n e the politics of an
expert c o m m u n i t y . I do not b e l i e v e , however, that the u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the d y -
n a m i c s of expert c o m m u n i t i e s should be too heavily d e p e n d e n t on c a s e studies.
Rather, an a t t e m p t should be m a d e to d e v e l o p a general account of h o w expert
c o m m u n i t i e s g e n e r a t e ideas and h o w these ideas diffuse. T h e key issues in such
a general a c c o u n t , I b e l i e v e , should be possible bias in recruitment to the expert
c o m m u n i t i e s , professional incentive structures within the c o m m u n i t i e s , and the
d e v e l o p m e n t of a b o d y of c o n v e n t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e strong e n o u g h to c o m p e l
a g r e e m e n t a m o n g differently predisposed users.
T h e r e exists s o m e solid literature on the first q u e s t i o n . It indicates that per-
sons of different ideological o r i e n t a t i o n s are attracted to different a c a d e m i c dis-
ciplines (Lipset and L a d d , 1970) a n d , o n e a s s u m e s , to different o c c u p a t i o n a l
g r o u p i n g s as well. W h e t h e r this results in ideological h o m o g e n e i t y within
g r o u p s , or pressures that m a k e it difficult for the minority to do its w o r k , is an
i m p o r t a n t but presently u n a n s w e r e d q u e s t i o n . To the extent that r e c r u i t m e n t to
expert c o m m u n i t i e s , w h e t h e r by m e a n s of v o l u n t a r y self-selection or p u r p o s i v e
enforcement of ideological s t a n d a r d s , limits t h e types of persons w h o can be-
c o m e e x p e r t s , the r a n g e of elite discourse is restricted and the specter of elite
d o m i n a t i o n is raised.
W i t h respect to the s e c o n d q u e s t i o n , the existing literature is, if a n y t h i n g ,
even m o r e lacking. F r o m my previous d i s c u s s i o n s , it nonetheless s e e m s plausi-
b l e to maintain that at least s o m e e x p e r t s , professionals, and o t h e r types of
326 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
subject m a t t e r specialists do often have incentive structures that strongly e m -
p h a s i z e the a d v a n c e m e n t of k n o w l e d g e for the solution of pressing societal prob-
lems. A c o n s p i c u o u s e x a m p l e of t h e m may be found in the medical research
c o m m u n i t y , within which s t a t u s , research s u p p o r t , and salary all d e p e n d on the
practical or theoretical value of the research o n e has d o n e , as j u d g e d by peers in
the field. Similar incentive structures are in place in most a c a d e m i c disciplines -
or at least the individuals w h o serve on r e c r u i t m e n t and p r o m o t i o n c o m m i t t e e s
within universities devote a great deal of energy to trying to m a k e sure that they
a r e . T h u s , one need not posit experts and professionals w h o are altruistic in or-
d e r to believe that many of t h e m are genuinely interested in the discovery of
k n o w l e d g e of g o o d public policy. O n e need only posit incentive structures that
e n c o u r a g e t h e m to have such interests. Such incentive structures obviously can-
not e l i m i n a t e bias or g u a r a n t e e correct c o n c l u s i o n s . But they may n o n e t h e l e s s
serve as effective i n d u c e m e n t s to try to reach these goals.
T h e incentive structures prevalent in expert c o m m u n i t i e s , especially if inter-
nalized, may provide a strong influence on a p e r s o n ' s behavior. I o n c e s p o k e to
a sociologist doing research in association with medical scientists w h o , in the
early stages of the A I D S e p i d e m i c , were trying to isolate the A I D S virus and
d e t e r m i n e its m o d e of t r a n s m i s s i o n . M a n y of these r e s e a r c h e r s , the sociologist
told m e , w e r e either gay or s y m p a t h e t i c to g a y s , and so had a strong desire to
find that A I D S w a s not as readily transmissible as many viruses. For a short
initial p e r i o d , he said, trfss p r e c o n c e p t i o n s e e m e d to affect research p l a n s . But
very quickly, he said, all r e s e a r c h e r s , gay and n o n g a y alike, began to focus on
w i n n i n g " t h e big p r i z e " - that is, being the first to discover the true nature of
A I D S , r e g a r d l e s s of their personal interests or w i s h e s c o n c e r n i n g its n a t u r e .
It is, I reiterate, an open e m p i r i c a l question h o w strongly such incentives are
felt across w h a t r a n g e of expert and professional o c c u p a t i o n g r o u p s to which
r e p o r t e r s and politicians go for information - but an empirical q u e s t i o n well
worth investigating.
My notion of professional and expert c o m m u n i t i e s obviously d r a w s heavily
on t h e idealized c o n c e p t i o n of a scientific c o m m u n i t y (see M e r t o n , 1982; H a g -
s t r o m , 1965). T h i s should n o t , however, o b s c u r e the critically i m p o r t a n t fact
that, for m u c h of the subject m a t t e r that is relevant to politics, the personal and
political predispositions of experts and professionals can and regularly do influ-
e n c e t h e conclusions they reach (or at least try to r e a c h ) . I am aware of no re-
search on this point, but I d o u b t that many will d i s p u t e it. Certainly within any
subfield of social s c i e n c e , all of us k n o w studies w h i c h reflect the ideological
t e n d e n c i e s of researchers w h o c a n , on other g r o u n d s , be identified as m o r e or
less liberal or c o n s e r v a t i v e . It seems quite likely that this is true of o t h e r pro-
fessional and expert c o m m u n i t i e s as well. T h u s , to return to the A I D S e x a m p l e ,
it s e e m s likely that, if there were s o m e medical researchers w h o w a n t e d , for rea-
son of their predispositions or perceived interests, to be able to show that A I D S
could not be casually t r a n s m i t t e d , there were o t h e r researchers w h o s e p r e d i s p o -
sitions or perceived interests m o t i v a t e d the o p p o s i t e c o n c l u s i o n .
Elite domination of public opinion 327
I see no conflict in c o m p a r i n g professional and expert c o m m u n i t i e s to scien-
tific c o m m u n i t i e s , while also giving very w i d e scope to the o p e r a t i o n of ideo-
logically m o t i v a t e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . A s m y U C L A colleague Richard S k l a r has
o b s e r v e d , social science t h e o r i e s are often c o n c e i v e d in ideological sin rather
than scientific virtue. But, a l t h o u g h people may be m o t i v a t e d by various pre-
c o n c e p t i o n s , they m u s t , in order to maintain high standing in their specialized
c o m m u n i t i e s , justify their eventual conclusions in t e r m s of a r g u m e n t s that ev-
e r y o n e can accept, including persons w h o do not share their predispositions
or p r e c o n c e p t i o n s .
Moreover, a c a s e can be m a d e that ideological b i a s , so long as it is o p e r a t i n g
within pluralistic professional and expert c o m m u n i t i e s , has salutary effects. It
w o u l d tend to assure that every potentially controversial issue is scrutinized by
persons having a r a n g e of m o t i v a t e d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s . To the extent that such dif-
ferently m o t i v a t e d persons can agree on a c o m m o n answer, as very often they
d o , t h e rest of society w h o are not specialists can have s o m e confidence that the
a n s w e r p r o p o s e d by the e x p e r t s is sound - or if not s o u n d , the best that anyone
can do for the m o m e n t . A n d to the extent that differently m o t i v a t e d p e r s o n s can-
not a g r e e , they w o u l d , as sources for reporters and staff advisors to politicians,
air their d i s a g r e e m e n t s in p u b l i c , thereby a l e r t i n g o r d i n a r y citizens to t h e exis-
tence of uncertainty.
T h i s brings u s back t o o u r m a i n c o n c e r n about elite d o m i n a t i o n . W h e n , d e -
spite their divergent p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , all relevant specialists agree on a policy,
any source w h o m j o u r n a l i s t s consult will say roughly the s a m e t h i n g , with the
result that society will have " e l i t e c o n s e n s u s " and a " m a i n s t r e a m n o r m " that
will be m o s t strongly s u p p o r t e d by the most politically attentive m e m b e r s of so-
ciety. But w h e n predispositions induce relevant specialists to d i s a g r e e , j o u r n a l -
ists will publicize the d i s a g r e e m e n t , often in starkly ideological t e r m s that
invoke i m a g e s of g o o d and evil. Politicians and publicists, w h o maintain lines
13
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n s to like-minded specialists, will also d i s a g r e e . T h e result
will be a polarization of the general public along lines that m i r r o r the elite ideo-
logical conflict, with the most attentive m e m b e r s of the public most ideologi-
cally p o l a r i z e d .
Ideology, in this view, is a mechanism by which ordinary citizens make con-
tact with specialists who are knowledgeable on controversial issues and who
share the citizens' predispositions. As such, ideology can m a k e a valuable con-
tribution to d e m o c r a t i c politics in a society in w h i c h people are expected not
only to have opinions about a range of impossibly difficult issues, but to use
those opinions as the basis for c h o o s i n g leaders and h o l d i n g t h e m a c c o u n t a b l e .
Note that ideology, as t h e t e r m is being used h e r e , is not, as it is often taken
by opinion researchers to b e , the unified product of an individual creative ge-
n i u s , such as Karl M a r x or E d m u n d B u r k e or John L o c k e . Rather, it is an
13 Congressional committee and personal staffs, policy institutes and think tanks, and overlapping
parts of the federal bureaucracy often have distinct political colorations, thereby tying politicians
to members of specialist communities who share their values.
328 N A T U R E A N D ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
a g g l o m e r a t i o n of v i e w s of different specialists sharing a c o m m o n predisposi-
1 4
tional b e n t . T h u s , for e x a m p l e , w h a t passes for c o n s e r v a t i v e e c o n o m i c s o r
c o n s e r v a t i v e foreign policy will be w h a t most c o n s e r v a t i v e e c o n o m i s t s and con-
servative foreign policy e x p e r t s agree needs to be d o n e . W h e n the e x p e r t s
c h a n g e their v i e w s , as liberal experts c h a n g e d their opinion about V i e t n a m ,
m a s s belief s y s t e m s will, with the sorts of lags I have d o c u m e n t e d in earlier
c h a p t e r s , tend to follow the elite view. T h e r e is no p a r t i c u l a r need for m e m b e r s
of t h e general public to k n o w technical details of the expert d e b a t e on these is-
s u e s , or to k n o w why a given set of policies is c o n s e r v a t i v e or liberal, in order
to take positions on t h e m that are consistent with their ideological predisposi-
tions; they need only be able to r e c o g n i z e which elites share their predisposi-
tions and take cues from t h e m .
I have now sketched an idealized s y s t e m of public information in which political
ideas and perspectives d e v e l o p a m o n g various kinds of policy specialists and
diffuse d o w n w a r d to the public via politicians and the m a s s m e d i a . T h i s ideal-
ized s y s t e m is obviously not t h e w h o l e p i c t u r e , for it neglects the extremely im-
p o r t a n t role of political institutions, p a r t i s a n c o m p e t i t i o n , and political
c e n s o r s h i p in regulating t h e flow of information through society. But even s o ,
my account of this s y s t e m m a k e s two useful points. It sets o u t , first of all, a set
of idealized c o n d i t i o n s t h a t , if m e t , w o u l d greatly mitigate the n o r m a t i v e l y o b -
j e c t i o n a b l e effects of a heavy d e p e n d e n c e of m a s s opinion on elite d i s c o u r s e . It
further shows that, as an empirical matter, s o m e of these conditions - expert
c o m m u n i t i e s o p e r a t i n g at least s o m e of the t i m e within salutary incentive struc-
tures, and a press that is attentive to these c o m m u n i t i e s - are at least partially
met in the current information system of the United States.
I turn now to s o m e brief r e m a r k s about the effect of political factors on the
o p e r a t i o n of my idealized information s y s t e m .
POLITICS AND I N F O R M A T I O N
In leaving until now any discussion of the effects of " p o l i t i c s " on t h e flow
of i n f o r m a t i o n , I imply that the g e n e r a t i o n of information is p r i m a r y and that
political factors that regulate its d i s s e m i n a t i o n , including the activities of
g o v e r n m e n t officials, o t h e r politicians, and interest g r o u p s , a m o n g o t h e r s ,
are secondary.
T h e reason for this e m p h a s i s is, quite simply, that political information pre-
c e d e s political action. All political actors, including the g o v e r n m e n t , must form
s o m e view of w h a t is h a p p e n i n g in the w o r l d before u n d e r t a k i n g any a c t i o n ,
including action to c e n s o r or m a n i p u l a t e the flow of information to the p u b l i c ,
and this view is invariably a product of various kinds of policy and information
14 This common bent presumably involves non-issue specific predispositions toward order, stabil-
ity, and social control, among other things (for some empirically grounded conjectures, see Mc-
Closky and Zaller, 1985, ch. 7; Costantini and Craik, 1980).
Elite domination of public opinion 329
specialists. Moreover, since m u c h of the information s y s t e m exists o u t s i d e of the
g o v e r n m e n t , the ability of politicians to suppress or control information is,
t h o u g h i m p o r t a n t , limited. For any given issue, there are expert c o m m u n i t i e s in
p l a c e , each at least potentially divided along ideological lines, and each with
established lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n to g o v e r n m e n t decision m a k e r s , political o p -
positions a n d , via the p r e s s , to the public.
T h i s p e r s p e c t i v e on the flow of information in the United States is u n o r t h o -
d o x . M o s t a c c o u n t s , w h i c h are based on studies of the " s o u r c e s " that give in-
f o r m a t i o n to t h e p r e s s , e m p h a s i z e the role of g o v e r n m e n t in the g e n e r a t i o n of
information and its role in m a n i p u l a t i n g or c e n s o r i n g that information ( C o h e n ,
1963; Sigal, 1973, Hallin, 1986; B e n n e t t , 1990).
T h e s e a c c o u n t s , to the extent that they aspire to a n s w e r general q u e s t i o n s
about the sources of the information that reaches the p u b l i c , focus t o o n a r r o w l y
on w h a t is c o m p a r a t i v e l y easy to o b s e r v e and study. G o v e r n m e n t officials m a y
be the p r o x i m a t e source of m u c h of the information that reaches the p u b l i c , but
they are not necessarily the creators of the i n f o r m a t i o n , nor can they always con-
trol h o w information is framed by the press or w h a t the press is interested in, nor
are they equally i m p o r t a n t on all types of issues.
An illuminating c a s e of h o w m e m b e r s of the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l information
s y s t e m can exert influence independently of g o v e r n m e n t w a s described by
Washington Post r e p o r t e r D a v i d B r o d e r s o m e twenty years after it o c c u r r e d .
E a r l y in the V i e t n a m War, w h e n U . S . i n v o l v e m e n t still had the s u p p o r t of almost
all m a i n s t r e a m politicians and w h e n the g o v e r n m e n t w a s providing little a n t i w a r
i n f o r m a t i o n , S e n a t o r F r a n k C h u r c h , a y o u n g S e n a t o r from I d a h o with a strong
interest in foreign policy, a r r a n g e d a " d i n n e r s e m i n a r " for s o m e r e p o r t e r s on the
subject of V i e t n a m . As B r o d e r relates:
Church's guest at the dinner was Hans J. Morgenthau of the University of Chicago, an
authority on foreign policy. The two men tried their best to make a largely skeptical group
of reporters reexamine the prevailing assumptions about Vietnam. The struggle taking
place there, they asserted, was not aggression by proxy from China or Moscow but an
indigenous revolution, led by a man Ho Chi Minn - who appeared to be the only au-
thentic Vietnamese leader on the scene. . . .
If Americans . . . went down the path the French had followed, Church and Mor-
genthau said, then we would pay a terrible price.
I went home thoroughly unconvinced that night, but had many occasions in the next
dozen years to recollect the warning. (Broder, 1984)
T h e details of the discussion, even t h o u g h anticipating the line a n t i w a r lib-
erals w o u l d eventually t a k e , are u n i m p o r t a n t . W h a t is i m p o r t a n t is C h u r c h ' s -
or p e r h a p s M o r g a n t h a u ' s - apparently self-conscious effort to influence t h e re-
p o r t i n g of leading j o u r n a l i s t s by exposing t h e m to a c a d e m i c v i e w p o i n t s .
Informal discussions like t h e s e , w h i c h are by no m e a n s rare in j o u r n a l i s m ,
are o n e route by w h i c h t h e ideas of leading policy specialists reach and inform
the w o r k of practicing j o u r n a l i s t s . B o o k s are probably at least as i m p o r t a n t .
Bright y o u n g r e p o r t e r s a r r i v i n g on a beat about which they k n o w little routinely
seek out the leading b o o k s on their n e w subjects and use t h e m for intellectual
330 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N
o r i e n t a t i o n . In the c a s e of V i e t n a m , these b o o k s were the b o o k s of B e r n a r d
Fall, a historian w h o w a s apparently read by most of the journalists in V i e t n a m
( H a l b e r s t a m , 1979) and w h o s e t h e m e w a s that the V i e t n a m W a r should be un-
d e r s t o o d in light of a n t i i m p e r i a l i s m and V i e t n a m e s e nationalism rather t h a n , as
m o s t U . S . g o v e r n m e n t p o l i c y m a k e r s t h o u g h t , as a struggle b e t w e e n d e m o c r a c y
1 5
and c o m m u n i s m . If, after absorbing such i d e a s , reporters found it difficult to
be as staunchly a n t i c o m m u n i s t as many of their official sources, if they actively
sought out dissenting voices within the g o v e r n m e n t , if by the q u e s t i o n s they
asked at press conferences they constantly and impatiently pressured high offi-
cials to give e v i d e n c e of " r e s u l t s , " and if they often took the o p p o r t u n i t y to play
up e m b a r r a s s m e n t s to U . S . policy (such as c o r r u p t i o n within the S o u t h Viet-
n a m e s e g o v e r n m e n t or mistreatment of V i e t n a m e s e peasants by the m i l i t a r y ) , at
least part of the e x p l a n a t i o n should be laid to the influence of t h e extra-
g o v e r n m e n t a l experts w h o created the intellectual framework that helped m o t i -
vate such actions.
In stressing the n o n g o v e r n m e n t a l origins of m u c h official information, I by no
m e a n s deny that g o v e r n m e n t regularly uses w h a t influence it can m u s t e r to color
or to c e n s o r w h a t reaches the p u b l i c . It is also certainly true that " p o l i t i c s " -
the t e n d e n c y of p a r t i s a n elites to disagree with one another no m a t t e r what ex-
p e r t s m i g h t say, t h e t e n d e n c y of politicians to p a n d e r to w h a t e v e r interests can
help t h e m stay in office, and the t e n d e n c y of g o v e r n m e n t officials to suppress
and m a n i p u l a t e the flow of information - can easily o v e r r i d e the influence of
policy specialists and a c a d e m i c experts in the short r u n , w h e r e the short r u n m a y
be sufficiently long to c o m m i t the nation to an ill-advised course of a c t i o n .
But t h e c o r r u p t i n g influence of p a r t i s a n politics should not be e x a g g e r a t e d .
For e x a m p l e , fear of the A I D S virus and of the h o m o s e x u a l s and d r u g users w h o
were initially its principal c a r r i e r s w a s surely one of the most potentially ex-
plosive backlash issues of the 1980s. Yet a backlash political issue never
e m e r g e d . A national strategy of public e d u c a t i o n and intensive scientific re-
search c a m e to be accepted by both political p a r t i e s and virtually the entire p o -
litical elite as the best way of dealing with the p r o b l e m . Such d i s a g r e e m e n t as
o c c u r r e d centered almost exclusively on speed of the research r e s p o n s a and lev-
els of public funding rather than on the strategy itself. T h u s A I D S has r e m a i n e d
a m e d i c a l and public health issue - that is, an e x p e r t - d o m i n a t e d one - despite
having great potential as a p a r t i s a n political controversy (Colby and C o o k ,
1991). Yet can anyone d o u b t that, if medical e x p e r t s had disagreed on this fun-
d a m e n t a l strategy - if, for e x a m p l e , a significant n u m b e r had favored a quar-
a n t i n e policy - the issue w o u l d have b e c o m e instantly and bitterly p a r t i s a n and
ideological?
A similar a r g u m e n t can be m a d e with respect to r a c e . No issue in A m e r i c a n
society is m o r e deeply political than r a c e , and yet, a variety of e x p e r t s , most
15 It is not, I imagine, uncommon for politicians to look to expert opinion for orientation when they
take on a new subject. Thus, Fall's books were reputed also to have been a major influence on
Senator William Fulbright, an early critic of the Vietnam War.
Elite domination of public opinion 331
notably psychologists c o n c e r n e d with h u m a n intelligence and with the harmful
effects of racial s e g r e g a t i o n , have been active and seemingly influential on this
issue t h r o u g h o u t the twentieth century. Early in the century, the thrust of expert
opinion w a s p r e d o m i n a n t l y racist, as discussed in C h a p t e r 2. However, d u r i n g
the 1920s, a period that w a s , incidentally, widely r e g a r d e d as a t i m e of cultural
c o n s e r v a t i s m in the c o u n t r y as a w h o l e , expert opinion on g r o u p differences in
intelligence u n d e r w e n t a virtual revolution. By 1930 a new scholarly c o n s e n s u s ,
m i n i m i z i n g the existence and especially the significance of any possible g r o u p
differences in intelligence, had b e c o m e d o m i n a n t . It is at least a r g u a b l e that this
n e w expert c o n s e n s u s , w h i c h soon c a m e to be reflected in the opinions of ed-
u c a t e d w h i t e p e r s o n s , is the reason that the w h i t e power structure of the country,
after c e n t u r i e s of suppressing the efforts of blacks to gain equality, b e g a n at last
to see their point ( M y r d a l , 1944).
T h e r e a r e , without q u e s t i o n , m y r i a d ways in which political a u t h o r i t i e s and
o t h e r interests can short-circuit the idealized s y s t e m I have sketched and distort
the flow of information to the public. E x p e r t c o m m u n i t i e s are t h e m s e l v e s prey
to m y r i a d internally caused dysfunctions. T h e existing literature on the press and
m a s s c o m m u n i c a t i o n s h a s , to s o m e extent, focused on the b r e a k d o w n s . An un-
intended c o n s e q u e n c e of this e m p h a s i s is that we s o m e t i m e s get a better idea of
how t h e s y s t e m fails to w o r k than of how it w o r k s at all. In view of t h i s , my aim
in this c h a p t e r h a s been to direct attention toward a b r o a d e r range of factors than
is n o r m a l l y e x a m i n e d , especially the existence of policy specialists w h o are rel-
atively independent of political authority and other interests, w h o play a major
role in raising and framing issues, and w h o are linked to public o p i n i o n , via the
press and politicians, by shared ideological predispositions.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In any c o m p l e x society, as in P u r p l e L a n d , there must be a division of labor in
the c o n d u c t of politically relevant d e b a t e . This necessity suggests an objection
to my general a r g u m e n t . If, as I have i m p l i e d , only specialists are c o m p e t e n t to
c o n d u c t political d e b a t e , why bring the public into it at all? W h y not let gov-
e r n m e n t policy reflect the p r e p o n d e r a n t weight of expert o p i n i o n ?
T h e r e are several a n s w e r s . O n e is that, quite simply, it is the p e o p l e ' s right to
settle any d e b a t e they feel m o v e d to settle. A n o t h e r is t h a t , as J. S. Mill and
others have a r g u e d , political p a r t i c i p a t i o n is a value in itself, ennobling and self-
fulfilling to all w h o p a r t a k e of it. I, however, w o u l d not find either of these ar-
g u m e n t s very attractive if I believed that the p u b l i c , in exercising its u n d o u b t e d
rights and seeking its self-fulfillment, regularly m a d e decisions that I r e g a r d e d
as morally abhorrent or technically stupid. I therefore offer a third reason for
involving the public in political d e b a t e : T h a t g o v e r n m e n t , in the a b s e n c e of
c h e c k s , invariably g o e s astray and b e c o m e s o v e r b e a r i n g o r w o r s e .
A few specialists do not constitute a viable c h e c k on political authority. It is
too e a s y to i g n o r e , j a i l , kill, or o t h e r w i s e silence t h e m . T h e i r only h o p e of being
332 N A T U R E AND ORIGINS OF MASS O P I N I O N

effective is to publicize and politicize w h a t e v e r d i s a g r e e m e n t s a r i s e , so that the

m a s s e s of o r d i n a r y citizens can weigh into the d e b a t e . I do not see any o b v i o u s
reason to believe that the w h o l e citizenry will b e , in g e n e r a l , wiser t h a n spe-
cialists, so long as the specialists are broadly recruited and given freedom to
Measures appendix
o p e r a t e within a salutary s y s t e m of incentives. It is t h e collective ability of cit-
izens in a d e m o c r a c y to pressure leaders in useful d i r e c t i o n s and, w h e n n e c e s -
sary, to r e m o v e the l e a d e r s , m o r e than the collective w i s d o m of the p e o p l e , that
seems to me critical.
All of this a s s u m e s , of c o u r s e , that an independent public opinion can actually
c h e c k political authorities. G i v e n the c o n t i n u e d existence of c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g
partisan elites for public s u p p o r t in the current A m e r i c a n political s y s t e m , I
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE
do not see this a s s u m p t i o n as p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e real p r o b l e m is
g u a r a n t e e i n g the existence of an equally vigorous c o m p e t i t i o n a m o n g o p p o s - S i n c e political a w a r e n e s s is the key independent variable in this study, I have
ing ideas. extensively investigated how it may be most effectively m e a s u r e d (Zaller, 1985,
1986, 1990; P r i c e and Zaller, 1990). A l t h o u g h s o m e of this w o r k has involved
c o n c e p t u a l clarification, m o s t of it has been m u n d a n e l y e m p i r i c a l , as I have
painstakingly tested a l t e r n a t i v e m e a s u r e s across a variety of datasets and issues.
T h e routine empirical w o r k , however, has paid a useful dividend: It h a s s h o w n
that t h e effects o n e attributes to political a w a r e n e s s can d e p e n d greatly on how
one g o e s about m e a s u r i n g it.

How to measure political awareness

T h e surveys of the National E l e c t i o n Studies ( N E S ) , w h i c h provide the d a t a for

almost all of the n e w analyses r e p o r t e d in this b o o k , contain n u m e r o u s m e a s u r e s
that w o u l d seem suitable as m e a s u r e s of political a w a r e n e s s . T h e s e include level
of political p a r t i c i p a t i o n (such as e n g a g i n g in political discussions with friends,
giving m o n e y to c a n d i d a t e s ) , level of political interest, level of m e d i a u s e , ed-
ucational a t t a i n m e n t , and neutral factual k n o w l e d g e about politics.
T h e r e is no a g r e e m e n t in t h e existing scholarly literature about which of these
1
m e a s u r e s is b e s t . E v e n C o n v e r s e has given m i x e d signals on this q u e s t i o n . In
1 Some scholars use a single-item control, most commonly education or information, or, less com-
monly, interest (e.g., Dean and Moran, 1977; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Judd and
Milburn, 1980); sometimes they use up to five or six controls either simultaneously (Achen, 1975)
or combined into an index (Erikson, 1979); and sometimes they introduce a series of single-item
controls in bivariate form (Fiorina, 1981). In general, researchers seem simply to use whatever
measure of awareness is handy and permits them to get on with their main analysis.
These measures, all compounds of the same family of variables, are given a variety of names:
political interest and involvement (Converse, 1964, 1980); cognitive ability (Stimson, 1975); po-
litical sophistication (Chong, McClosky, and Zaller, 1984; Erikson, 1979; Neuman, 1986; Sida-
nius, 1988; Luskin, 1990); political expertise (Fiske and Kinder, 1981; Fiske, Lau, and Smith,
1990); ideological sophistication (Knight, 1985); and indicators of rational civic man (Fiorina,
1981; Key with Cummings, 1966). Judd, Krosnick, and Milburn (1981), having been criticized by
Converse (1980) for relying on education as their measure of awareness, show that their results
hold whether they use education, interest, or political activity; Luskin (1987) and Fiorina (1981)
also test several different measures across a limited range of criterion variables.
 334 Measures appendix
his classic 1964 study of m a s s belief s y s t e m s , he m a d e clear that there is a clus-
ter of variables - i n f o r m a t i o n , activity, s o p h i s t i c a t i o n , e d u c a t i o n , status as a
m e m b e r of the political elite, and political interest - that are associated with
constrained belief s y s t e m s ; of t h e s e , the latter t w o , and especially the last, seem
most central to his a r g u m e n t . Yet in a paper written a r o u n d the same t i m e , C o n -
verse (1962) e m p l o y s m e d i a u s a g e , a variable given little play in his belief sys-
t e m s paper, as the m e a s u r e of the extent to which individuals are both exposed
to p a r t i s a n election c a m p a i g n s and e n d o w e d with the capacity to resist their ap-
peals. In his 1975 a r t i c l e in the Handbook of Political Science, C o n v e r s e further
r e p o r t s that " a f t e r a long and rather u n r e w a r d i n g s e a r c h " he found that a m e a -
sure of " p a r t i s a n political i n v o l v e m e n t " functions as the most i m p o r t a n t deter-
m i n a n t of attitude stability, t h o u g h not necessarily of other p r o p e r t i e s of well-
d e v e l o p e d belief s y s t e m s (p. 104). He reiterates this position in 1980 in
c o m m e n t i n g on a paper that had used e d u c a t i o n as its control v a r i a b l e , here re-
ferring to t h e key variable m o r e simply as " p o l i t i c a l i n v o l v e m e n t . "
E v e n in the absence of empirical evidence on c o m p a r a t i v e p e r f o r m a n c e of the
v a r i o u s possible m e a s u r e s of a w a r e n e s s , o n e w o u l d find s o m e operational m e a -
sures m o r e attractive than others. For e x a m p l e , p e o p l e w h o d e v e l o p the abstract
learning skills that are supposedly i m p a r t e d by formal schooling w o u l d s e e m
likely, by that account, to be m o r e adept at the c o m p r e h e n s i o n of political ideas.
Yet e d u c a t i o n is only m o d e r a t e l y correlated with political interest and m e d i a ex-
p o s u r e . This suggests that m a n y e d u c a t e d p e o p l e , although having the cognitive
skill n e c e s s a r y to d e v e l o p political a w a r e n e s s , n o n e t h e l e s s lack the interest or
m o t i v a t i o n to k e e p abreast of political events ( L u s k i n , 1990).
S t a n d a r d m e a s u r e s of m e d i a exposure w o u l d appear, at first g l a n c e , excellent
c a n d i d a t e s for m e a s u r i n g a w a r e n e s s of political ideas. T h e y h a v e , however, im-
portant w e a k n e s s e s . O n e is that, as Price and I have argued (1990), it is p r o b -
ably n e c e s s a r y to distinguish between exposure to " l o w - b r o w " political m e d i a -
A c t i o n N e w s on TV, People m a g a z i n e , talk show r a d i o , local w e e k l y n e w s p a -
pers - and exposure to " h i g h - b r o w " m e d i a , such as the TV network n e w s , N a -
tional Public R a d i o , and the Wall Street Journal. O n l y the latter c a r r y the rich
diet of national and international n e w s n e c e s s a r y to create political a w a r e n e s s .
Yet the m e a s u r e s of m e d i a exposure on most existing surveys do not p e r m i t o n e
to distinguish b e t w e e n low-brow and high-brow m e d i a . S e c o n d , even if s e p a r a t e
m e a s u r e s were available, it would be difficult to k n o w how to calibrate t h e m ;
intermittent attention to N a t i o n a l Public R a d i o m i g h t , for e x a m p l e , c o n t r i b u t e
m o r e to political awareness than avid attention to local TV news. T h i r d , m e a -
sures of self-reported m e d i a exposure suffer from subjective differences in self-
rating s t a n d a r d s , and also s o c i a l - d e s i r a b i l i t y - i n d u c e d e x a g g e r a t i o n . For
e x a m p l e , P r i c e and I (1990) found that, according to survey self-reports, 40 per-
cent of the A m e r i c a n public listens to N a t i o n a l Public R a d i o several t i m e s a
w e e k , a level that is both implausibly high and a b o v e N P R ' s own internal esti-
m a t e s by a factor of about 10. In a n o t h e r e x a m p l e , s o m e r e s p o n d e n t s , h a v i n g
claimed to read the Wall Street Journal, responded to a follow-up that they nor-
Measures appendix 335
mally read the p a p e r seven d a y s a w e e k . This sort of m i s r e p o r t i n g , even if it
occurs fairly infrequently, can wreak havoc with m o d e l s that d e p e n d on t h e abil-
ity to d i s c r i m i n a t e accurately at the top levels of political awareness. A n d fi-
nally, m e d i a e x p o s u r e , even if well m e a s u r e d , is still only a m e a s u r e of e x p o s u r e
to politics rather t h a n , as required by the m o d e l , propensity for actual reception
of i n f o r m a t i o n .
Political p a r t i c i p a t i o n also h a s serious w e a k n e s s e s as a m e a s u r e of a w a r e n e s s .
For e x a m p l e , a city m a i n t e n a n c e w o r k e r w h o must c o n t r i b u t e w o r k or m o n e y to
the p a r t y m a c h i n e in o r d e r to k e e p his j o b w o u l d be indistinguishable on most
political p a r t i c i p a t i o n m e a s u r e s from an activist in an issue-oriented political
c l u b , even t h o u g h their differences in political a w a r e n e s s (as defined here) could
be very great. It i s , moreover, easily possible for a person to achieve very high
levels of political a w a r e n e s s without ever giving m o n e y to c a n d i d a t e s , w o r k i n g
for p a r t i e s , or o t h e r w i s e p a r t i c i p a t i n g in politics.
T h i s b r i n g s us to neutral factual k n o w l e d g e about politics, a type of m e a s u r e
that, to a greater extent than any of the o t h e r s , captures political l e a r n i n g that
h a s actually o c c u r r e d - political ideas that the individual h a s e n c o u n t e r e d , u n -
d e r s t o o d , and stored in his h e a d . T h i s is exactly w h a t we want to be m e a s u r i n g .
Factual k n o w l e d g e is preferable on other theoretical g r o u n d s . A l o n e a m o n g
the possible m e a s u r e s of a w a r e n e s s , tests of political k n o w l e d g e are relatively
i m m u n e to a social desirability r e s p o n s e set; that is, individuals cannot overstate
their levels of information h o l d i n g b e c a u s e they perceive that it is socially d e -
2
sirable to a p p e a r politically a w a r e . Tests of factual k n o w l e d g e are also rela-
tively i m m u n e to r e s p o n s e effects, such as B i s h o p et al.'s (1984) d e m o n s t r a t i o n
that expressed levels of political interest are readily affected by the context in
which interest q u e s t i o n s are a s k e d . Finally, unlike m e d i a exposure and political
interest, tests of k n o w l e d g e do not require r e s p o n d e n t s to e s t i m a t e subjective
behaviors or inner states; they either pass or fail p a r t i c u l a r tests.
In an a t t e m p t to settle the m e a s u r e m e n t p r o b l e m empirically, I tested t h e per-
formance of several a l t e r n a t i v e m e a s u r e s of political awareness in predicting a
variety of relevant criterion v a r i a b l e s (Zaller, 1986, 1990). T h e a w a r e n e s s m e a -
sures were e d u c a t i o n , m e d i a e x p o s u r e , p a r t i c i p a t i o n in politics ( d o n a t i n g
money, attending s p e e c h e s , e t c . ) , interest in politics, and political k n o w l e d g e .
T h e criterion variables included levels of o b s e r v e d attitude stability, attitude
consistency, and degree of c o r r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n vote choice and party attach-
m e n t . P r i c e and I (1990) also e x a m i n e d the c o m p a r a t i v e ability of political
k n o w l e d g e , e d u c a t i o n , and m e d i a exposure to specify individual-level reception
probabilities for p r o m i n e n t n e w s stories; we also tested the c o m p a r a t i v e perfor-
m a n c e of k n o w l e d g e and m e d i a use in a r e c e p t i o n - a c c e p t a n c e m o d e l of attitude
c h a n g e . T h e results of these tests were u n a m b i g u o u s : In each individual test,
neutral factual information w a s always a r e s p e c t a b l e c o m p e t i t o r and almost
2 Individuals can attempt to guess correct answers, but a guessing penalty can be introduced to cor-
rect for this. I have experimented with guessing penalties and found that they do not improve the
performance of information scales.
 336 Measures appendix
always the leading performer. No other m e a s u r e gave an overall p e r f o r m a n c e
that w a s nearly as g o o d . T h e s e results also agree with the s o m e w h a t n a r r o w e r
r a n g e of tests c o n d u c t e d by Luskin (1987).
Accordingly, neutral factual information is, on both theoretical and empirical
g r o u n d s , the preferred m e a s u r e of political a w a r e n e s s and is used as such
t h r o u g h o u t this b o o k . In t h e cases in which an insufficient n u m b e r of k n o w l e d g e
i t e m s is available, they are s u p p l e m e n t e d by m e a s u r e s of interest and e d u c a t i o n ,
as d e s c r i b e d below.
Issues in the measurement of political information
G r a n t i n g that political k n o w l e d g e is the best available m e a s u r e of political
a w a r e n e s s , there remain several questions about how k n o w l e d g e itself should
best be m e a s u r e d . O n e that has attracted interest is w h e t h e r information is best
m e a s u r e d globally by m e a n s of general tests of political k n o w l e d g e , or w h e t h e r
m e a s u r e s must be specific to the p a r t i c u l a r d o m a i n in which information effects
are e x p e c t e d (Iyengar, 1990).
F r o m a theoretical p e r s p e c t i v e , awareness clearly s h o u l d , to the extent p o s -
sible, be m e a s u r e d separately within each d o m a i n for w h i c h effects are ex-
p e c t e d . This follows from a x i o m A l , which claims that reception d e p e n d s not
on global a w a r e n e s s , but on attention to p a r t i c u l a r issues. Therefore, we should
expect to find stronger a w a r e n e s s effects for domain-specific m e a s u r e s of infor-
m a t i o n than for global m e a s u r e s .
T h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s this expectation (Iyengar, 1990; Zaller, 1986; M c G r a w
and Pinney, 1990). T h e r e i s , however, a serious difficulty in p r o d u c i n g d o m a i n -
specific effects. T h e difficulty is that, as a practical matter, p e o p l e w h o pay at-
tention to o n e facet of politics tend to pay attention to other facets as well. As
a result, it is difficult to build domain-specific scales that exhibit a satisfactory
d e g r e e of discriminant validity. Iyengar (1990) m a n a g e s to obtain such validity,
but only at the cost of e l i m i n a t i n g many face valid items that were t o o highly
c o r r e l a t e d with one a n o t h e r across d o m a i n s ; these exclusions significantly re-
d u c e the reliability of his scales. U s i n g the s a m e d a t a s e t , I built d o m a i n - s p e c i f i c
scales that included all face-valid items that were available (Zaller, 1986); w h e n
I did s o , I found that domain-specific k n o w l e d g e scales c o n c e r n i n g e c o n o m i c s ,
foreign policy, and minority relations were intercorrelated in the r a n g e of .70
(without c o r r e c t i n g for scale unreliabilities). T h e s e domain-specific k n o w l e d g e
scales outperformed a general k n o w l e d g e scale in predicting relevant criterion
v a r i a b l e s (such as attitude stability), but never by m a r g i n s that a p p r o a c h e d sta-
tistical or substantive significance. I therefore c o n c l u d e d
It is clear that the effects of political information on public opinion are, to some extent,
domain specific. . . . At the same time, the superiority of domain specific measures of
information is both modest and uneven. . . . Together, these results suggest that political
information is a relatively general trait that can be effectively measured with a general-
purpose information scale. (Zaller, 1986)
Measures appendix 337
A s u b s e q u e n t inquiry c o a u t h o r e d with Vincent P r i c e ( P r i c e and Zaller, 1990)
reached a similar c o n c l u s i o n .
F r o m necessity, this b o o k relies almost exclusively on g e n e r a l - p u r p o s e rather
than domain-specific m e a s u r e s of political awareness. A l t h o u g h domain-specific
m e a s u r e s w o u l d be preferable, the loss from not having t h e m is apparently
slight.
Types of information tests
T h e items available as m e a s u r e s of political information vary greatly in number,
quality, and format over the twenty-four I C P S R d a t a s e t s that have been used in
this b o o k . In a handful of c a s e s , notably the N E S studies of 1986 and 1988 and
the Brazilian public opinion survey, there is a g o o d selection of items which had
been consciously d e s i g n e d as tests of factual k n o w l e d g e . In a few other c a s e s ,
most seriously the 1978 N E S congressional study and the 1984 " r o l l i n g t h u n -
d e r " survey of presidential p r i m a r i e s and the 1990 N E S S e n a t e study, there
3
were few or no such i t e m s . A n d in the majority of c a s e s , there w a s a handful
of g o o d information t e s t s , but t o o few to p r o d u c e highly reliable a w a r e n e s s
scales, by w h i c h I m e a n scales with alpha reliabilities of 0 . 8 5 or h i g h e r . H e n c e4
it w a s n e c e s s a r y to locate i t e m s that, t h o u g h not direct m e a s u r e s of political
a w a r e n e s s , could be c o n v e r t e d to this u s e . In the course of this b o o k , I have
m a d e extensive use of t h e following three types of information tests:
1. T h e ability to m a k e " c o r r e c t " c o m p a r a t i v e p l a c e m e n t s of g r o u p s and can-
didates on issue d i m e n s i o n s , which I call " l o c a t i o n t e s t s . " S i n c e 1968, C P S /
N E S surveys have regularly asked respondents to place t h e m s e l v e s on an issue
d i m e n s i o n and also to place certain political objects - such as t h e presidential
n o m i n e e s , the p a r t i e s , and liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s - on these s a m e scales.
T h u s , for e x a m p l e , a respondent might have been asked to place herself on a
seven-point defense-spending scale ( w h e r e 1 is the most a n t i s p e n d i n g position
and 7 is the most p r o - s p e n d i n g p o s i t i o n ) , and then asked to place 1988 presi-
dential c a n d i d a t e s G e o r g e B u s h and Michael D u k a k i s on the s a m e scale. It is
very difficult to say exactly w h e r e B u s h ' s " t r u e " position on this scale m i g h t
b e , but it can be confidently asserted that Bush should be located to the pro-
3 The 1984 survey contains measures of citizen awareness of various presidential contenders, but
these are not well suited to my purposes. The difficulty is that such measures, as Bartels (1988)
has shown, register higher levels of awareness over the course of the primary campaign as people
learned more about the candidates. This is a difficulty because my theory holds that people who
are high on habitual awareness will react differently to the fresh information they encounter than
will people who are low on habitual awareness. Hence it is necessary to measure people's habitual
awareness, and measures that are reactive to the current campaign cannot do this.
4 A three- or four-item scale of the type used in many opinion studies will normally have a reliability
in the range of .65. Such a scale can easily fail to detect mild nonmonotonicity of the type shown
in Figure 8.2 or subtle features of attitude change curves, as depicted in Figure 8.5. For the pur-
poses of this book, much lengthier scales are needed.
338 Measures appendix
s p e n d i n g side of D u k a k i s . H e n c e a respondent w h o locates Bush to the right of
D u k a k i s on this scale can be c o u n t e d as having " c o r r e c t l y " a n s w e r e d a test of
political k n o w l e d g e .
T h e analyst must use j u d g m e n t in c o n v e r t i n g location items into k n o w l e d g e
tests since, for s o m e i t e m s , it is impossible to say that one c a n d i d a t e or party
differs from the other. For e x a m p l e , it is not at all o b v i o u s w h e t h e r J i m m y
C a r t e r or Gerald Ford w a s farther to the left on w o m e n ' s r i g h t s , which m a k e s
this issue unsuitable for use in m e a s u r i n g political k n o w l e d g e . But in m a n y
c a s e s , c o r r e c t relative p l a c e m e n t s are o b v i o u s to any informed o b s e r v e r of
5
American politics.
2. Willingness to rate c e r t a i n political figures on " f e e l i n g t h e r m o m e t e r s , "
which may b e referred t o a s " r e c o g n i t i o n i t e m s . " N E S surveys regularly ask
r e s p o n d e n t s to rate v a r i o u s political figures - including p r e s i d e n t s , s e n a t o r s ,
and political n o t a b l e s (such as Ralph Nader) - on 100-point " f e e l i n g t h e r m o m -
e t e r s . " R e s p o n d e n t s a r e , however, offered the o p t i o n of saying they are unfa-
miliar with the given political figure, and t h o s e taking this option may be
c o u n t e d as having failed a k n o w l e d g e test.
It is c o m m o n for researchers to use these items as k n o w l e d g e tests ( B a r t e l s ,
1988; M a n n and Wolfinger, 1980). N o n e t h e l e s s , b e c a u s e this type of k n o w l e d g e
test is highly susceptible to a social desirability r e s p o n s e set, I use it only spar-
ingly and only w h e n better a l t e r n a t i v e s are unavailable.
3 . M a n y C P S / N E S surveys require i n t e r v i e w e r s , upon c o m p l e t i n g e a c h inter-
v i e w , to rate each r e s p o n d e n t ' s apparent level of political information on a five-
point scale. I have extensively analyzed the p e r f o r m a n c e of these rating scales
and c o n c l u d e d that, at least in surveys involving face-to-face i n t e r v i e w s and
6
c o n s i d e r a b l e political c o n t e n t , they perform extremely well (Zaller, 1985). In
particular, a single five-point interviewer rating scale performs about as well as
a scale c o n s t r u c t e d from 10 to 15 direct k n o w l e d g e tests, w h e r e the m e a s u r e of
p e r f o r m a n c e is the ability to predict relevant c r i t e r i a .
A fear in relying upon such interviewer ratings is that they might be s y s t e m -
atically biased in favor of higher-status p e r s o n s , notably whites and m a l e s . H o w -
ever, I c h e c k e d carefully for e v i d e n c e of such bias and w a s able to find n o n e
(Zaller, 1985).
5 Prior to 1970, CPS surveys sometimes directly asked respondents which party was more likely to
favor a certain policy (e.g., Medicare for the elderly). 1 found that, in all years in which this type
of item was asked, it performed poorly as a knowledge test in the sense that item reliabilities were
relatively low. I suspect this is because these items are one-shot items, whereas the comparative
location items depend on three responses (self-rating, and ratings of each of two objects). The
multiple-step measures provide more opportunities to screen out guessers. In general, I discarded
items with low reliability, no matter their face validity, unless the low reliability was due to a
strong skew.
6 This qualification is important. One would not expect interviewer ratings of respondent awareness
to work unless the interviewer had ample opportunity to observe the respondent deal with political
matters.
Measures appendix 339
M o s t of the a w a r e n e s s scales used in this b o o k have been c o n s t r u c t e d from
these three types of items - especially the c o m p a r a t i v e location tests - and from
m o r e s t a n d a r d , direct tests of k n o w l e d g e (such a s , W h i c h party controls t h e
H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s ? W h a t is the t e r m of office of a U . S . senator?).
It is natural to w o n d e r w h e t h e r " c a t c h - a l l " scales of the type I use perform as
well as scales c o n s t r u c t e d from m o r e c o n v e n t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e tests. T h e 1985
N E S pilot study affords an o p p o r t u n i t y to investigate this question. It c a r r i e s
s o m e twenty-seven direct k n o w l e d g e tests, that is, questions w h i c h directly
asked r e s p o n d e n t s to supply the a n s w e r to a factual question about politics.
W h e n a scale c o n s t r u c t e d from these twenty-seven items w a s pitted against one
of my catch-all scales, there w a s essentially no difference in their ability to pre-
dict three criteria: attitude stability, attitude consistency, and issue salience (Zal-
7
ler, 1 9 8 6 ) .
Coding conventions
In c o n v e r t i n g a variety of i t e m s to tests of political i n f o r m a t i o n , I h a v e , with
exceptions explicitly noted below, adhered to t h e following coding c o n v e n t i o n s :
1. Each discrete test of information has been given equal weight. In cases in which a
single item could capture multiple bits of information, each bit was counted sepa-
rately. In 1966, for example, respondents were asked to name as many Supreme Court
justices as they could; I awarded one point for each justice they could name (up to four
names). For another example, the interviewer rating scale has five points; I awarded
respondents one point for each level above the lowest level.
2. In keeping with the previous point, I created simple additive scales, except in a few
8
cases as noted.
3. Persons who failed to give a correct answer because they responded "Don't know"
were counted as having given an incorrect response. This includes cases in which re-
spondents were not asked the comparative location of candidates on an issue scale
because they had no opinion on the issue itself. 9
4. Persons with missing data were not eliminated unless more than two-thirds of their
responses were missing. Instead, these persons were assigned the average score for the
items for which data were available.
All of the awareness scales I u s e , except the 1951 s c a l e , the 1978 H o u s e e l e c -
tions s c a l e , and the 1990 S e n a t e e l e c t i o n s s c a l e , have alpha reliabilities in the
7 The catch-all scale in this case was based on items culled from the 1984 NES study. It had twenty-
two items and an alpha reliability of .87. The twenty-seven-item scale had a reliability of .89.
8 I experimented with use of principal components analysis to extract the most important common
factor from a set of items. Although this made little difference for the results I obtained, I was
reluctant to use the technique because it gave small weights to items which, although strongly
skewed, had high discriminating power. Technically, the problem is that principal components
assume a linear relationship between items and the underlying awareness factor, and this assump-
tion is egregiously false for skewed items, as shown in Zaller, 1985. I regarded skewed items as
strong items, because they isolated respondents at the extremes of the awareness continuum; but
principal components regarded them as weak items, because they appeared to explain little vari-
ance in the underlying construct.
9 In the 1968 survey, respondents were asked to rate candidates even on issues on which they had
no opinion. It turned out that scarcely any people who had no opinion on an issue were willing to
estimate the positions of others on that issue.
 340 Measures appendix
r a n g e from about .80 to . 9 0 , with most having a l p h a reliabilities a r o u n d . 8 5 . T h e
three exceptions have reliabilities in the r a n g e of . 6 0 to . 7 0 . S i n c e , however, the
a s s u m p t i o n s u n d e r l y i n g the use of the alpha s t a t i s t i c , especially the a s s u m p t i o n
of equal item difficulty, a r e not met in the d a t a I u s e , and since other m e a s u r e s
of reliability are not readily available, there s e e m s no point in providing reli-
abilities for each scale. O t h e r detailed information about the m e a s u r e s of a w a r e -
ness I have used is given below.
Scale construction
Variable n u m b e r s refer to the relevant I C P S R c o d e b o o k . (The S P S S x c o d e for
building these scales is available via bitnet to any scholar wishing to use it.)
1951 CPS "minor election study." A w a r e n e s s is m e a s u r e d by a three-point in-
terviewer rating of the r e s p o n d e n t ' s apparent understanding of w o r l d affairs
(col. 6 5 ) , plus a one-point m e a s u r e indicating w h e t h e r the person specifically
mentioned D e a n Acheson in the course of the i n t e r v i e w (col. 6 7 ) .
1956 CPS election study. T h e r e were an insufficient n u m b e r of items to build an
information scale from the 1956 study alone. H e n c e I used twelve tests scattered
across all three waves of the 1 9 5 6 - 5 8 - 6 0 p a n e l , as follows: V 1 4 2 , V 1 4 5 , V 3 1 7 ,
V 3 1 8 , V 3 9 4 (two i t e m s ) , V 3 9 5 , V 6 0 8 , V 6 0 9 , V 6 1 1 , V 6 1 2 , V 6 1 3 , V 6 1 5 , V798.'
T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e h a s a m e a n of 7 . 8 and a standard deviation of 3 . 0 8 .
1964 CPS election study. A sixteen-point s c a l e , as follows: L . B . J . ' s and G o l d -
w a t e r ' s h o m e state and religion ( V 2 9 4 to V 2 9 7 ) ; which party is m o r e c o n s e r -
vative ( V 3 0 2 ) ; majority in C o n g r e s s ( V 3 0 5 , V 3 0 6 ) ; congressional c a n d i d a t e s '
n a m e s , i n c u m b e n c y status (three i t e m s , V 3 0 9 , V 3 1 2 ) ; which party favors g o v -
e r n m e n t utilities ( V 3 4 6 ) ; C h i n a ' s form of g o v e r n m e n t and U . N . status (two
i t e m s , V 3 5 2 ) ; form of C u b a ' s g o v e r n m e n t ( V 3 5 4 ) ; k n o w l e d g e of 1964 Civil
Rights Act ( V 4 0 6 , V 4 0 7 ) . T h e unstandardized m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 10.4 and
a s t a n d a r d deviation of 4 . 1 3 . - .
1966 CPS election study. A fifteen-point scale, as follows: congressional can-
d i d a t e s ' n a m e s and i n c u m b e n c y status (three i t e m s , V 9 0 , V 9 2 ) ; majority in
C o n g r e s s ( V 1 0 0 , V 1 0 1 ) ; n a m e s of U . S . S u p r e m e C o u r t j u s t i c e s (up to four
p o i n t s , V 1 6 7 ) ; interviewer rating of r e s p o n d e n t ' s information level (up to four
p o i n t s , V 2 4 2 ) . Since this scale w a s used to m e a s u r e exposure to n e w s about
V i e t n a m , I a w a r d e d up to t w o points for expression of interest in foreign affairs
( V 6 5 ) . T h e unstandardized m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 7 . 4 8 and a s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n
of 4 . 7 .
1968 CPS election study. A seventeen-point s c a l e , as follows: C h i n a ' s form of
g o v e r n m e n t and U . N . status (two i t e m s , V 1 0 7 ) ; form o f C u b a ' s g o v e r n m e n t
Measures appendix 341
(V109); which party is c o n s e r v a t i v e ( V 3 6 1 ) ; congressional c a n d i d a t e s ' n a m e s
and i n c u m b e n c y status (three i t e m s , V 3 8 6 , V 3 8 7 ) ; majority in C o n g r e s s ( V 3 0 5 ,
V 3 0 6 ) ; up to two points for expression of interest in foreign affairs ( V 1 0 2 ) . A l s o
t w o interviewer rating s c a l e s , V 2 6 9 on preelection and V531 on p o s t e l e c t i o n ,
w h i c h were averaged to yield a m a x i m u m of four points; and two tests of ability
to m a k e proper c o m p a r a t i v e p l a c e m e n t s of politicians on issue s c a l e s , as fol-
lows: J o h n s o n and Wallace o n V i e t n a m ( V 4 6 6 and V 4 6 9 ) ; H u m p h r e y and W a l -
lace on urban unrest (V461 and V 4 6 3 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e h a s a m e a n
of 11.39 and a s t a n d a r d deviation of 4 . 4 1 .
1970 CPS Awareness scale. An eighteen-point s c a l e , as follows: Attention to
V i e t n a m ( V 4 0 ) ; which p a r t y is m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e ( V 1 7 7 ) ; congressional candi-
date ( V 2 0 3 ) ; p e r c e n t a g e of tax dollar to defense ( V 2 5 6 ) ; w h o can c h a n g e law
( V 2 5 8 ) ; n u m b e r of allowable t e r m s as president ( V 2 5 9 ) ; t e r m of U . S . senator
( V 2 6 0 ) ; t e r m of congressional representative ( V 2 6 1 ) ; interviewer rating of re-
s p o n d e n t ' s information (up to four p o i n t s , V 3 9 6 ) . T h e r e were four c o m p a r a t i v e
location tests, as follows: D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on V i e t n a m ( V 9 3 and
V 9 4 ) ; M u s k i e and W a l l a c e o n aid t o m i n o r i t i e s ( V I 1 0 and V I 1 1 ) ; D e m o c r a t s
and Nixon on inflation ( V I 1 4 and V I 1 6 ) ; and M u s k i e and W a l l a c e on criminal
rights ( V 1 2 4 and V 1 2 5 ) ; also t w o 1-item location tests, Wallace on urban unrest
and V i e t n a m ( V 9 0 , V 9 7 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 9 . 5 4 and
a s t a n d a r d deviation of 4 . 4 4 .
1972-74-76 NES panel awareness scale. T h i s scale is described in Zaller, 1990.
1978 NES election awareness scale. An unusually diverse scale, as follows:
M e a n i n g of liberalism ( V 4 1 0 ) , m e a n i n g of c o n s e r v a t i v i s m ( V 4 1 3 ) , party control
of H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s before and after e l e c t i o n ( V 5 0 0 , V 5 0 1 ) . T h r e e rec-
ognition i t e m s , R o n a l d R e a g a n ( V 1 3 9 ) , J e r r y B r o w n ( V 1 4 1 ) , and Ralph N a d e r
( V 1 4 4 ) . Four c o m p a r a t i v e location items: D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s o n j o b
g u a r a n t e e s ( V 3 5 9 , V 3 6 0 ) , o n rights o f the accused ( V 3 7 5 , V 3 7 6 ) , o n g o v e r n -
ment medical insurance ( V 3 8 3 , V 3 8 4 ) , and o n liberalism and c o n s e r v a t i v i s m
( V 4 0 1 , V 4 0 2 ) . Political interest, V 4 3 ; and interviewer rated i n f o r m a t i o n , V 6 3 6 .
B e c a u s e I w a s unsure w h e t h e r these i t e m s d e s e r v e d equal w e i g h t i n g , I c o m b i n e d
t h e m into a scale by m e a n s of weights o b t a i n e d from a principal c o m p o n e n t s
analysis. B e c a u s e the political interest variable is correlated with the intensity of
p a r t i c u l a r H o u s e r a c e s , as m e a s u r e d by the media-intensity variable (see text of
C h a p t e r 10), I p u r g e d it of this influence before a d d i n g it to the a w a r e n e s s scale.
T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 7 . 4 and a s t a n d a r d deviation of 3 . 3 .
(In the analysis of likes/dislikes in C h a p t e r 10, the interest item is used as a s e p -
arate variable.)
1980 NES election awareness scale. A twenty-five-point s c a l e , as follows: ten
c o m p a r a t i v e location items: C a r t e r and R e a g a n o n ideology ( V 2 6 8 and V 2 6 9 ) ;
 342 Measures appendix
K e n n e d y and Connally on ideology ( V 2 7 0 and V 2 7 1 ) ; two p a r t i e s on ideology
( V 2 7 8 and V 2 7 9 ) ; C a r t e r and Reagan on defense spending ( V 2 8 2 and V 2 8 3 ) ;
p a r t i e s on g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 2 9 6 and V 2 9 7 ) ; p a r t i e s on j o b s and inflation
trade-off ( V 3 0 6 and V 3 0 7 ) ; C a r t e r and Reagan on a b o r t i o n (V312 and V 3 1 3 ) ;
C a r t e r and Reagan on c o o p e r a t i o n with Russia ( V 1 0 7 9 and V 1 0 8 0 ) ; p a r t i e s on
j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V I 1 2 1 and V I 1 2 2 ) ; Reagan and K e n n e d y on aid to m i n o r i t i e s
( V 1 0 6 4 and V 1 0 6 6 ) . T h e s e additional items: h e a r d poll results ( V 2 1 9 ) , ex-
presses opinion on tax cut proposal ( V 3 2 2 ) , n a m e and p a r t y of congressional
c a n d i d a t e s (four i t e m s , V 8 2 6 , V 8 2 9 ) , n a m e s of S e n a t e candidates (four i t e m s ,
w h e r e relevant, V 8 3 7 and V 8 4 0 ; respondents were not penalized for living in a
state without a Senate r a c e ) , p a r t y that s u p p o r t s stronger federal g o v e r n m e n t
( V I 1 3 1 ) . T h e r e were t w o interviewer rating s c a l e s , V 7 2 6 o n p r e e l e c t i o n and
V I 1 8 6 on p o s t e l e c t i o n , which were averaged to yield a m a x i m u m of four points.
T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 9 . 6 and a standard deviation of 5 . 7 .
1982 NES election awareness scale. A twenty-five-point scale, as follows:
T h r e e r e c o g n i t i o n items: J o h n A n d e r s o n , B u s h , and M o n d a l e ( V 1 2 5 , V 1 3 4 ,
V 1 3 5 ) . Five c o m p a r a t i v e location items: D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on ideol-
o g y scale ( V 4 0 4 , V 4 0 5 ) , o n defense spending scale ( V 4 0 9 , V 4 1 0 ) , o n j o b guar-
antees ( V 4 2 7 , V 4 2 8 ) , and o n g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 4 4 5 , V 4 4 6 ) ; liberals and
c o n s e r v a t i v e s on aid to rr.inorities ( V 4 2 2 and V 4 2 3 ) . A l s o t w o single object-
location tests: Ronald R e i g a n located right of c e n t e r on ideology ( V 3 9 4 ) and
defense spending ( V 4 0 8 ) . N a m e and p a r t y of congressional c a n d i d a t e s (four
i t e m s , V 1 0 2 , V 1 0 6 ) , n a m e and party of Senate c a n d i d a t e s (four i t e m s , w h e r e
relevant, V I 1 5 , V I 1 8 ) . Party control o f H o u s e and S e n a t e , party that elected
most n e w m e m b e r s to H o u s e ( V 5 2 3 to V 5 2 5 ) . I n t e r v i e w e r rating of r e s p o n d e n t
information (up to four p o i n t s , V 7 6 8 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n
of 11.7 and a standard deviation of 6 . 3 .
1984 NES Continuous Monitoring Study awareness scale. A twenty-four-point
s c a l e , a s follows: V 1 3 6 (three i t e m s ) , V 4 0 7 (four i t e m s ) , V 6 1 4 , V 6 2 2 , V 6 2 6 ,
805 ( t w o i t e m s ) , V 8 7 6 . Eleven recognition i t e m s , V 2 2 0 , V 2 2 2 t o V 2 3 1 .
B e c a u s e I w a s unsure w h e t h e r these items d e s e r v e d equal w e i g h t i n g , I c o m -
bined t h e m into a scale by m e a n s of weights o b t a i n e d from a principal c o m p o -
nents analysis.
1984 NES election awareness scale. A twenty-four-point scale, as follows:
T h e r e were eleven c o m p a r a t i v e location i t e m s , several of which required respon-
dents to place objects t w o or three points apart: R e a g a n and M o n d a l e on ideol-
o g y ( V 3 7 1 and V 3 7 2 , at least two points a p a r t ) , g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 3 7 6 and
V 3 7 7 , at least two points a p a r t ) , aid to m i n o r i t i e s ( V 3 8 3 and V 3 8 4 ) , U . S . in-
v o l v e m e n t in Central A m e r i c a ( V 3 8 9 and V 3 9 0 ) , defense spending ( V 3 9 6 and
V 3 9 7 ) , c o o p e r a t i o n with Russia ( V 4 0 9 and V 4 1 0 ) , j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 4 1 5 and
V 4 1 6 ) , R e a g a n and M o n d a l e on ideology (distance of three points required for
correct answer, V1017 and V1018); liberals and c o n s e r v a t i v e s on g o v e r n m e n t
Measures appendix 343
services ( V 1 0 3 4 and V 1 0 3 5 , three points a p a r t ) , involvement in Central A m e r -
ica ( V 1 0 4 5 and V 1 0 4 6 , three points a p a r t ) , j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 1 0 5 4 and V 1 0 5 5 ,
three points a p a r t ) . In addition: n a m e and p a r t y of congressional c a n d i d a t e s
(four i t e m s , V 7 4 1 , V 7 4 5 ) , which party i s more c o n s e r v a t i v e ( V 8 7 5 ) , which
p a r t y h a s m o r e m e m b e r s in H o u s e and S e n a t e before and after election ( V 1 0 0 6
to V 1 0 0 9 ) , r e c o g n i t i o n of Bush and F e r r a r o ( V 2 9 2 and V 3 0 4 ) . T h e r e w e r e t w o
interviewer rating scales, V 7 1 3 on preelection and V I 1 1 2 on p o s t e l e c t i o n ,
which w e r e averaged to yield a m a x i m u m of four points. T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d
m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 9.8 and a standard deviation of 5 . 9 .
1986 NES election and 1987 pilot awareness scale. A nineteen-point s c a l e , as
follows: ability to n a m e political offices held by B u s h , Weinberger, R e h n q u i s t ,
Volker, O ' N e i l l , D o l e ( V 6 3 5 t o V 6 4 2 ) , n a m e s o f H o u s e c a n d i d a t e s ( V 2 0 2 ,
V 2 0 6 ) , two r e c o g n i t i o n t e s t s , H a r t and J a c k s o n ( V 2 4 2 , V 2 4 4 ) . Four location
items: D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on ideology ( V 7 3 0 and V 7 3 1 ) , on defense
spending ( V 7 4 9 and V 7 5 0 ) , on involvement in Central A m e r i c a (V811 and
V 8 1 2 ) , and on g o v e r n m e n t services (V831 and V 8 3 2 ) ; c o m p a r a t i v e r a n k i n g s on
ideology, defense, and services had to be at least t w o points apart to get credit
for a c o r r e c t answer. An additional point w a s a w a r d e d for placing Reagan on the
c o n s e r v a t i v e side of the ideology scale, which is a n o n c o m p a r a t i v e location test
( V 7 2 3 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e , as used in the analysis of attitude c h a n g e
on Central A m e r i c a , h a s a m e a n of 7 . 9 and a standard deviation of 4 . 2 .
1989 NES pilot awareness scale. A twenty-two-point s c a l e , as follows: budget
k n o w l e d g e ( V 8 3 5 ) , w h i c h p a r t y is m o r e c o n s e r v a t i v e ( V 5 6 5 6 ) , the political of-
fices held by K e n n e d y , S c h u l t z , R e h n q u i s t , G o r b a c h e v , Thatcher, and Arafat
( V 5 8 2 7 to V 5 8 3 3 ) , p a r t y control of C o n g r e s s ( V 8 3 4 , V 8 3 5 ) , and n a m e s of con-
gressional c a n d i d a t e s ( V 5 1 0 6 ) . Seven location items: c o m p a r a t i v e p l a c e m e n t s of
the D e m o c r a t s and R e p u b l i c a n s on ideology ( V 4 2 1 and V 4 2 2 ) , g o v e r n m e n t ser-
vices ( V 6 0 6 and V 6 0 7 ) , defense spending ( V 6 1 0 and V 6 1 1 ) , medical insurance
( V 6 2 0 and V 6 2 1 ) , j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 6 2 7 and V 6 2 8 ) , and c o o p e r a t i o n with R u s -
sia ( V 7 1 2 and V 7 1 3 ) ; in a d d i t i o n , a point w a s given for r a n k i n g D u k a k i s t w o or
m o r e points to the left of Bush on ideology (V417 and V 4 1 8 ) . R e s p o n d e n t s could
also get up to four points from the interviewer rating of respondent information
( V 1 2 4 1 ) . T h e u n s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 10.5 and a standard devi-
ation of 5 . 7 .
1990 NES awareness scale. A fourteen-point scale consisting of tests of t h e abil-
ity to give the political office held by Q u a y l e , M i t c h e l l , R e h n q u i s t , Gorbachev,
Thatcher, M a n d e l l a , and Foley ( V 8 3 5 to V 8 4 1 ) ; plus p a r t y control of C o n g r e s s
( V 8 4 2 , V 8 4 3 ) and interviewer rating of respondent k n o w l e d g e ( V 1 2 3 1 ) . T h e un-
s t a n d a r d i z e d m e a s u r e has a m e a n of 4 . 9 5 and a standard deviation of 2 . 7 4 .
1990 NES Senate study awareness scale. T h e 1990 S e n a t e study contained only
five political k n o w l e d g e i t e m s - tests of r e s p o n d e n t ' s ability to locate G e o r g e
 344 Measures appendix Measures appendix 345

B u s h , the D e m o c r a t i c Party, and the Republican Party on a seven-point l i b e r a l - separately scaled by m e a n s of principal c o m p o n e n t s analysis. T h e items in t h e
c o n s e r v a t i v e scale ( V 5 1 7 , V 5 3 3 , V 5 3 4 ) , and the n a m e s of the c a n d i d a t e s in d o m e s t i c policy cluster w e r e V 3 2 , V 3 8 , V 5 3 , V 5 9 ; the items i n t h e foreign pol-
H o u s e e l e c t i o n s ( V 4 1 , V 4 5 ) . I c o m b i n e d these with tests of willingness to icy cluster were V 3 5 , V 5 0 , V 6 8 , V 7 1 .
evaluate B u s h ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e (V36) and to state an opinion on aid to m i n o r -
ities ( V 5 3 7 ) . This scale had a mean of 3 . 0 4 and a standard deviation of 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970 CPS election studies. See a p p e n d i x to C h a p t e r 9.
1.53. T h e purged interest item (see 1978 a w a r e n e s s scale) and the scale were
s t a n d a r d i z e d , c o m b i n e d , and restandardized, thereby giving equal weight to 1978 NES election study. T h e items used to m e a s u r e respondent attitudes are
each c o m p o n e n t in the final awareness scale. V 3 5 7 , V 3 6 5 , V 3 7 3 , V 3 9 9 , V 4 4 3 . See footnote 8 in C h a p t e r 10 for further
information.
POLITICAL PREDISPOSITIONS
1982 NES election study. For use in diffusion of e c o n o m i c n e w s , three e c o n o m i c
W i t h the exception of t h e 1951 and 1956 s t u d i e s , my m e a s u r e s of political policy items: j o b g u a r a n t e e s ( V 4 2 5 ) , g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 4 4 3 ) , regulation of
a w a r e n e s s are quite strong and essentially c o m p a r a b l e in all years. M e a s u r e m e n t
business ( V 4 5 9 ) . For use with n u c l e a r freeze issue, t w o defense spending items
of political predispositions is m u c h m o r e uneven a n d , on the w h o l e , m u c h less
(V317 and V 4 0 7 ) .
a d e q u a t e . Except in t w o studies - notably the 1987 N E S pilot study, which con-
tains t h e H u r w i t z - P e f f l e y (1988) m e a s u r e of foreign policy p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s , and 1984 NES election study. Four items: liberal-conservative self-identification
the 1989 pilot study, which contains an excellent selection of C o n o v e r - F e l d m a n
( V 3 6 9 ) , g o v e r n m e n t services ( V 3 7 5 ) , minority aid ( V 3 8 2 ) , and j o b g u a r a n t e e s
equality items - I w a s always dealing with m e a s u r e s that I felt were m o r e or less
(V414).
i n a d e q u a t e to the tasks to which I put t h e m . A l t h o u g h m a n y of the surveys con-
tained reasonably g o o d value m e a s u r e s , they did not contain value m e a s u r e s of 1987 NES pilot study. I t e m s from H u r w i t z - P e f f l e y foreign affairs battery c o m -
the particular dimensior on which public opinion w a s u n d e r g o i n g c h a n g e . bined into h a w k - d o v e s c a l e , a s follows: V 2 2 4 5 , V 5 2 3 3 , V 5 2 4 9 , V 5 2 5 1 ,
C h a p t e r 2 provides the theoretical justification for opportunistically using w h a t -
V 5 2 5 2 , V 5 2 5 3 , plus t w o additional items (Russia and Defense s p e n d i n g ) , V 7 4 2
ever m e a s u r e s are available.
and V 9 0 7 .
T h e least a d e q u a t e studies were the 1951 and 1956 studies. T h e only m e a s u r e
T h e social welfare ideology scale consists of fourteen C o n o v e r - F e l d m a n
of general p a r t i s a n o r i e n t a t i o n in the 1951 study w a s recalled vote in the 1948
items plus t w o m e a s u r e s of ideological self-designation, as follows: V 6 2 0 to
e l e c t i o n . A l t h o u g h this m e a s u r e served as the basis for the original s t a t e m e n t of
V 6 2 2 , V 6 2 4 , V 6 2 6 , V 7 0 1 t o V 7 0 6 , V 2 1 7 6 , V 2 1 7 8 , V 2 1 7 9 , plus V 7 2 2 and
the M i c h i g a n t h e o r y of p a r t y identification ( B e l k n a p and C a m p b e l l , 1 9 5 1 - 2 ) , the
V1010.
m e a s u r e leaves m u c h to be desired. T h e 1956 study c o n t a i n s a n u m b e r of g o o d
T h e g o v e r n m e n t s p e n d i n g scale consisted o f V 7 1 6 - V 7 2 5 .
preference q u e s t i o n s , but n o n e that s e e m well suited for capturing the predis-
positions that underlie racial attitudes. Since 1984, N E S surveys have c a r r i e d a
generally excellent selection of value m e a s u r e s .

Coding conventions

In building value scales, I m a d e full use of w h a t e v e r information w a s c o n t a i n e d

in an item (that is, I did not recode to a smaller n u m b e r of c a t e g o r i e s ) . T h e items
were c o m b i n e d into scales by m e a n s of weights obtained from principal c o m -
ponents a n a l y s i s , unless all items had the same r a n g e , in which c a s e simple ad-
ditive indices were c r e a t e d .

Scale construction

1956 CPS election study. T h e r e were t w o m a i n sets of i t e m s , o n e c o n c e r n i n g

d o m e s t i c politics and the o t h e r foreign politics. T h e items in each cluster were