Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon

Author(s): A. B. Bosworth
Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 106 (1986), pp. 1-12
Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies
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Journal of Hellenic Studies cvi (1986) I-12

ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE

DECLINE OF MACEDON

THE figure of Alexander inevitably dominates the history of his reig

are centrally focussed upon the king himself. Accordingly it is his own
receive the fullest documentation. Appointments to satrapies and satrap
noted because he made them, but the achievements of the appointees ar
The great victories of Antigonus which secured Asia Minor in 323 BC ar
casual references in Curtius Rufus,' and in general all the multifarious
disappear from recorded history except in so far as they impinge upon
reports to Alexander and administrative decisions made by him. Mo
possess originate either from high officers of Alexander's court, such as
or from Greek historians like Callisthenes and Cleitarchus, whose
propagandist and whose interests were firmly anchored in court life.
bestrides that narrow world like a colossus and monopolises the historic
figure of Alexander is far from fully fleshed. No contemporary histo
continuous narratives of the reign we are dependent upon late derivat
Alexander through the filter of centuries of rhetoric and philosophy. T
stock example of many contradictory traits; he was at once the conquer
tyrant and the enlightened king. Cicero and Seneca saw him as the ty
Arrian as the paradigm of moderation.2 The result is that the sour
irreconcilable caricatures of Alexander but no uniform or coherent pi
The bias of the sources has continued to the present day. Alexander is
for good or ill, and modern histories interpret his reign accordi
preconceptions of his character, discarding or explaining away any diver
in antiquity there are stock pictures which recur. Droysen's Alexan
propagandist of Hellenic culture, has become virtually the symb
nationalism. Tarn's visionary Alexander, with his dream of the brother
to be resuscitated in various metamorphoses.3 The multiplicity of pictu
fallibility of the method, and the concentration upon the person of Alex
distortion. Modern historians have been fascinated by Alexander the ma
material costs of his conquests. Tarn, for instance, was properly revolte
with 'its dreadful record of mere slaughter',4 but he rationalised the epi
not affect his concept of Alexander as a humanitarian. Similarly the s
reprisals in Sogdiana is explained from Alexander's side as a disciplinary
attempt to view the campaign from the Sogdian side. For them it
massacre of the male population of insurgent cities, the forced imposit
colonists, the permanent removal, in Alexander's army, of the prime o
men. After three campaigning seasons the native population was decima
foundation was laid for nearly three centuries of Greek domination. In

1 Curt. iv I.35, 5.13. On these eventsmodern

and the scholarship
source on Alexander are provid
tradition see W. W. Tarn, AlexanderSchachermeyr,
the Great ii Alexander der Grosse: das Proble
(Cambridge 1948) Iio f., 177; Errington,Pers6ilichkeit
CQ xix (1969)und seines Wirkens (SAWW
234 f.; P. Briant, Antigone le Borgne (Paris 1973)
(1973) 53-74. and E. Badian, 'Some recent i
609-651)
2 For the importance of Alexander as a literary
tations of Alexander', Fond. Hardt xxii (1976) 27
exemplum see A. Heuss, 'Alexander der Grosse und die
4 Alexander the Great i o103, reproduced verb
politische Ideologie des Altertums,' Antike
A. K. und Aben-
Narain, Greece & Rome xii (1965) 16o.
dland iv (1954) 65 ff., and (briefly) A. 5B.
CfBosworth,
(e.g.) Tarn i 68 ('a local revolt which s
might
Historical commentary on Arrian's History repress');
of Alexander i R. Lane Fox, Alexander th
(Oxford 1980) 12-14. (London 1973) 302 ('his garrisons had been mu
3 Convenient and differently pointed
so hedigests of compliment').
repaid the

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2 A. B. BOSWORTH

Alexander caused a profound cha

documented in the sources but o
spearheaded by Alexander and o
picture of what was happening t
references. The results are achiev
himself. The method can be ex
Alexander's campaigns upon hi
indispensable nucleus of his arm
The Macedonian army has nev
Berve have been supplemented an
in English.7 As a result we have
army, viewed from the stand
conquest, under the direction of
conquests on his men. How man
recruited from Macedon to fuel t
incessant overseas combat? These
nature of the available evidence, bu
that the numbers of Macedonian
have been consistently underest
population was taken away and n
strength of Macedon. Within a g
regained the military supremacy
hellenistic monarchies the homel
of Alexander's conquests was paid
by Rostovtzeff.8 But the implica
Alexander, nor, in my opinion, h
calculations have understated the
of reinforcements conveyed fro
In the spring of 334 Alexand
According to Diodorus, who give
and another i2,ooo were left beh
unspecified number of Macedon

6 For a brief
outline of Alexander's
les armees s
hellinistiqu
Sogdiana and
implications
9 Diod. xvii see its
Bosw
17.3, 5
and the Iranians', JHS c for
figures (1980)
the 10-Ii,
indiv
7J. G. Droysen,nian
'Alexanders
army, but des
theGri
Hermes xii (1877) consistent,
226-252= Kleine Sch
totallin
Geschichte ii (Leipzig
down to 1894) 208 ff.;
a round fig
Alexanderreich auf prosopographisch
historians, Anaximen
(Munich 1926) 103-217. Recent
tially higher researc
totals, 43
started from Tarn's modifications of Be
de Alex.fort. i. 3, 327
of the subject (Alexander the
are usually Great ii
thought t
particular P. A.operating
Brunt, 'Alexander
in Asia Min
cavalry', JHS
In. 7] 229; Brunt In.
lxxxiii (1963) 27-46;
modifications in 167).
his Loeb edition
In that of
case the
[1983] 483-90); R. D. Milns,
strong. 'The arm
Polyaenus v 4
the Great', Fond. as is sometimes
Hardt assum
xxii (1976) 87-
8 M. I. Rostovtzeff, A social
Attalus hadand economi
Io,ooo tro
Hellenistic world suspiciously
ii (Oxford 1941) 1136
rounde
adult male Macedonians
Memnon left their nativ
additional c
to return. A larger
thepart of army
entire the Maced
was n
never demobilised after Alexander'
commander, Calas, w
contrary it was from time to time
presumably rein
had forc
Macedonian recruits.' Cf. also M. Launey

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 ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE DECLINE OF MACEDON 3

Minor in 336 which was at least 0o,ooo strong.'0 The phalanx troops wou
been proportionally more numerous than in Alexander's own army at th
case we have a maximum of 3,000. The total of Macedonian infantry with
therefore around 15,ooo. Figures can be extrapolated for the army strengt
campaign ten years later. After the mutiny at Opis in 324 Alexander dis
Macedonian veterans, which all sources state to have been 1o,ooo strong."1
army has been variously estimated. Recently Milns has suggested that Alex
of 3,000 phalangites, while Schachermeyr would argue for up to 6,ooo.12
fall far short of the truth. Admittedly, no source gives a total for the phalanx
of Alexander's death, but there are several clear indications. Immediately
senior commander Peithon was sent to deal with a rebellion of Greek colon
are explicitly told that he chose by lot (iKAipo Ev) 3,00ooo Macedoni
presupposes a much larger pool of phalangites to be drawn upon. What is
absence,14 the regent Perdiccas launched his invasion of Asia Minor with
Macedonians. When he left the area in the spring of 321 he was able
Macedonians operating in Armenia under Neoptolemus; ' and his brother A
to pacify Pisidia, also had Macedonian troops.16 No numbers are given, b
clearly large. To match Neoptolemus' phalanx of Macedonians Eumenes ha
force of 6,300 cavalry (Plut. Eum. 4-4). Later in 321, when Neoptol
incorporated in his own army, its strong Macedonian complexion made i
acquisition for Alcetas. 17 These Macedonian forces commanded by Neopt
must have numbered thousands rather than hundreds, and Alcetas' army
them. Perdiccas then left very substantial Macedonian contingents in
invaded Egypt, and his own grand army cannot have been drained of nati
had rejoined him with his Macedonian forces (Diod. xviii 36.5), and
formidable body of Silver Shields (argyraspides), 3,000 strong. These
Alexander's foot guard and were retained by the regent as his headqu
certainly acted as a unit in the invasion of Egypt. The documentation is tan
but it seems clear that the Macedonian infantry with Alexander at the t
Babylon amounted to 8,000 and probably more. There is a rough check in
of the curious mixed phalanx established just before Alexander's death; M
were combined with 20,ooo native Persian recruits, so that in each file the

10 In 335 Calas was operating in the Troad with

16 Plut. Eum. a refused to help Eumenes in
5.2 (Alcetas
mixed force of Macedonians and mercenaries
321 on the grounds(Diod.that the Macedonians under him
xvii 7.1o). The Macedonian componentwould
was not evidently
fight against Craterus); cf. Diod. xviii 44.3-5.
significant, for when Memnon raided17Cyzicus This is revealedhe by a new fragment of Arrian's
History of the Successors
disguised his men with the typically Macedonian kausia Book X, preserved on two
(Polyaen. v 44-5). palimpsest folios in the University of Gothenburg: J.
Noret,
11 Arr. vii 12.1; Diod. xvii lo9. I, xviii 4. I, 'Un
12.fragment du dixieme livre de la Succession d'
I, 16.4;
Alexandrecavalry).
Justin xii 12.7 (I,ooo---probably including par Arrien', AC lii (1983) 235-42 (F 73r, lines
12 Milns (n. 7) 112; Schachermeyr, 9-I Alexander in 'AK'TOaS EV ITrpOTOIS KUai
: Ta-ra 6 E-rrpaoaav
Babylon (SAWW cclxviii (1970), 14 f., Alexander der
T1lv TrrO ToorTc, [sc. E0ipEvel] 8ivaplv MaKE8OVIK'V
Grosse (n. 3) 491.
"TTrv TrrhEioa-rv oio'av EOEXov EauTct -rrpoo-rrotijaooa).
13 Diod. xviii 7.3 (he was to receive Eumenes
o,ooo had mercen-
annexed Neoptolemus' forces on the
ary infantry from the upper satrapies). eve of the encounter with Craterus (Plut. Eum. 5-5: Arr.
14 Diodorus gives no impression how Succ.
long F I.Peithon's
27; cf. GRBS xix [1978] 235-36) and kept
them subsequently,
expedition lasted, but he had to concentrate an army diminished by the battle losses.
from a number of different satrapies andDespite
then his victory
face thehe acquired none of Craterus'
returning colonists somewhere to the east of theveterans,
Macedonian Iranian
who made their escape as a body
plateau. The operations presumably lasted and joinedwell into
Antipater's army (Diod. xviii 32.3-4; Arr.
322. Succ. F I.27fin.; Nepos Eum. 4.3).
is Plut. Eum. 4.3-4, cf. 5.5; Diod. xviii 29.5; PSI xii 18 Arr. Succ. F 1.35 (Roos). For the strength of the
1284 (on which see Bosworth, GRBS xix [1978] 227- argyraspides at this time see Diod. xviii 58.1, xix 28.1,
237). 30.6.

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4 A. B. BOSWORTH
to 12 Persians.19 In other words the Mac
6,70o--and there were presumably other,
should have maintained their corporat
infantry is indicated at the time of Alexa
The phalanx troops at Babylon were ess
Brunt has understandably argued that the
which arrived from Macedon in the last
movements, but, as we shall see, their sil
more decisive consideration. In 324 Antipa
army from Macedon to compensate for
obviously not been substantial reinforcem
Macedon before Alexander's death.21 He
recorded and Alexander's explicit instruct
in person. In any case the political situatio
revolt, and he is hardly likely to have sent a
their being used against him subsequen
Alexander before the Opis mutiny totalled
the original phalanx which had crossed t
That is the reverse of what one woul
campaigning, not only major battles and s
skirmishing in the countryside. There ha
to serve as garrisons (notably in Egypt), a
settled in the dozens of military settlemen
of nature also played a part. There are repea
the desert to the Oxus, the winter storm
across the Gedrosian desert; and there are su
surpassed any battle casualties.24 Finally the
sickness and accident. Even in the incomp
list of senior officers who died from disease

19 Arr. vii 23.3-4. Milns (n. 7)

groups, 127
the f., believing
Opis veterans,
maximum of 3,000 Macedonian infantry,
the garrison army of argues
Asia.
only c. 12,000 of the Persians
assigning were used
all or thein the
majori
phalanx. It is more likely (if the
force detail
which he is to benot
would cont
p
that the figurehard
total into avoid the conclusion is
Arrian that Curtius'
rounded source up
intended the total on
obviously cannot lay emphasis of 13,000 to include
this singlemercenaries
pass
isolation, but it does cohere with
(Berve, [n. the rest
7] i 134; Bosworth, of the
JHS c [1980] hist
I9; Brunt,
data for the phalanx infantry after
Arrian ii [n. 7] 489). Alexander's
There is a strong hint that that is so de
20 Brunt (n. 7) 38-39.in the words Alexander is made to utter a few lines later,
21 Arr. vii 12.4 (cf. when
Justin xii
he claims that the14.5; Curt.
soldiers with grounds for x 10
Metz Epitome 87). For the are
complaint political
the minority of background
the army, utpote cum
Badian,JHS lxxxi (1961)plures 36-37
dimiserim quam (the
retenturusobjections
sum (x 2.19). The troops of
retained were less
Griffith, PACA viii [19651 12 if. are not than those discharged, less than
convincin
Bosworth, CQ xxi [19711 125
0,000ooo, and f.;
Curtius' figureSchachermeyr
for the Asian army, if it is
516-5 518). The patterncorrectly transmitted, cannot comprise Macedonians
of reinforcements during
ander's reign is arguedalone.
in greater detail below (pp.
22 The number would 23 Arr.
be iv 4.I;
even cf. iv 22.5, 24.7, v 1.5, 27.5.
higher if Some
Cur
foundations such as
figure of 13,000 infantry and Nicaea and2,000
Alexandria Charax were
cavalry (
referred to the Macedonian forces
settled exclusively left (Arr.
by mercenaries after the
v 29.3, vii 21.7), dem
but it seems thatUnfortunately
sation of Craterus' veterans. when Macedonian disabled were the t
available Curtius
not sufficiently explicit. they were settled seems
in the colonies. to distin
between two groups of Macedonians,
24 Curt. those
vii 5.15; Arr. vi 24.I. H. Strasburger, Hermes de
lised and those retainedlxxx (1952)
by 470-473,
Alexander gives an impressive
(x 2.12, list of 16
'Strapazenberichte'.
there is a further assumption that the troops retaine
intended as a permanent garrison
25 Arr. iii 5.5 (Arrhybas), army in Asia
iii 25.4 (Nicanor), vi 2.I (
(Coenus),
12), and the figures given vi 27.Iexplicitly
are (Thoas), vii 14.1 (Hephaestion).
figures fo
permanent army. In other words there were

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 ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE DECLINE OF MACEDON 5

the common soldiers. The sources provide few details, but there are consis
Alexander's field hospital26 and one may assume that deaths there were f
interesting extract from the contemporary Nearchus describing Alexa
doctors to deal with cases of snake bite in India. He notes the relative abse
because of the lack of climatic variation27-a telling comment, since th
experienced all the rigours of the monsoon rains,28 and it suggests that losse
of climate in the Iranian plateau were very high. The potentialities for was
campaigns were truly immense, and there is an instructive parallel. In 48 B
Alexandria with two legions. They numbered a mere 3,200, less than half
could not follow, exhausted by wounds, by toil and by the immensity of
106.2). One of these legions (XXVII) had been recently levied29 and the rig
travel had reduced it to less than half its strength within a year. The press
army were at least as great as those experienced by Caesar's unfortunate r
continued for ten mortal years. Even if we posit exceptional toughnes
Alexander's veterans (which was surely the case), we can hardly suppose th
original expeditionary force survived the years of campaigning.30 The one s
that of Diodorus, who claims that 6,000 of the veterans with Craterus we
which crossed into Asia with Alexander, 4,000 were taken into the army d
(xviii 16.4). Unfortunately the precise nuances of the distinction cann
Diodorus distinguishes an earlier and a later group of Macedonians, but we c
the 6,ooo were all survivors from the group which crossed the Hellespont i
see, that original force was immensely supplemented by reinforceme
Alexander in Asia Minor over the next year. In a sense, all the infantry wh
could be classed as crossing with Alexander, at least in the eyes of an auth
who was writing explicitly from the standpoint of 322 BC.
The conclusion is now inevitable. If Alexander's phalanx infantry totalled
Opis in 324, there must have been enormous reinforcements drawn from M
some degree those reinforcements are documented in the sources, but
assuming that all the contingents are recorded. Our records are partial, ea
different selection of reports, as we should of course expect. All extant sources a
none have any reason to be exhaustive in recording routine detail. Even so, t
year after the crossing is impressive. In the spring of 333 the newly married sol
main army in Gordium after a winter in Macedon devoted to rest, recreatio
and with them was a newly levied contingent including 3,000 Macedonian in
A little later, at Ancyra, Curtius Rufus reports the arrival of an uns
reinforcements from Macedon (iii 1.24). This could be an entirely new levy
26 Arr. ii 7.1, iv 16.6, v 8.3, vi 25.2-3; cf. Berve
applies (n. 7) of Alexander's army, not merely
to the entirety
i 196 f. the Macedonians. In particular it is difficult to identify
27 Arr. Ind. Is.I1-I2 (cf Strabo xv 1.45 the sea referred to in the passage. Is it the Aegean (in
[706]) = FGrH 133 F I0o. which case the army of 334 is meant) or is it the
28 Diod. xvii 94.3 (70 days' rain); Strabo xv 1.27 Mediterranean (which Alexander left only in the
(698). summer of 33 I)? If the former were intended, one
29 It first served under L. Cassius Longinus (Caes. BC would expect an explicit reference to the Hellespont.
iii 34.2) and was then transferred to the command of Q. The balance of probability must tip in favour of the
Fufius Calenus (BC iii 56.2). In the interim it suffered second alternative.

defeat at the hands of Scipio (Dio. xli 51.2; cf. P. A.
Brunt, Italian manpower [Oxford 1971] 692).
30 Brunt (n. 7) 38 n. 35 takes a 5o% survival rate as a
maximum; Milns' estimate (In. 71 112) of 38% casualties
is unacceptably low.
31 Compare Arr. Ind. 19.5 (from Nearchus): a~vv o01
drr6 0ahaadorlS TE aGT6S vilyayE Ki a0I015 OV rri
o'AAoylv a rT( o-r OTpaTi&a - T"EppIOVTES i KOV EXov-
-rTE. This is a similar distinction between the original
force and later supplements, but it is much vaguer and
32 Brunt (n. 7) 38 n. 35 is inclined to distinguish
between the veterans of campaigns before Gaugamela
and those from later reinforcements. If we include the
expeditionary force of 336/5, Alexander's Macedonian
infantry may have totalled as much as 15,000 in 334
(above, pp. 2-3), and 6,000 of them may have survived
to Opis. Even so, the survivors from the veterans of the
crossing were not all discharged; some at least remained
to serve with the argyraspides (cf. Diod. xix 41.1-2).

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6 A. B. BOSWORTH

sure. It may be a variant report o

there are similar variations elsew
significant, however, is a report
when Alexander was on the point
Polybius (xiii 19.2), quoting Callis
witness of the event. The repo
disbelieved,34 but it is precise, deta
is yet another testimony to their f
further contingent of reinforcem
the battle was fought, around
'imaginative writing',35 but it rea
invented the detail, it is a very
problem in accepting that a conti
three and possibly four groups of
the campaigning season of 333; tw
the groups may not have been far s
surprising. Alexander knew that
Persian king had been systemati
knew that he was not the favour
would concentrate the maximu
coming battle, the most crucial
progressive wastage entail that th
should come as no surprise to find
After Issus the need for reinfor
seven month siege of Tyre and the
of Arrian with its propagandis
appalling.38 Accordingly a senior
triremes across the winter seas (
mission to Macedonia. He was acti
of whom were Macedonian phala
apparently plagued by draft dodg
and he rejoined Alexander in Si
year.41 It had been nearly two ye
33The clearest case is the arrival
of absentees from theof
reinforcements (below), 35 J. E. which is pla
Atkinson, A c
(iii 16.io) at Susa, Historiae
by Curtius (v 1.39) M
Alexandri a
by Diodorus (xvii 1980)65.1)
181. midway in Sit
34 Berve (n. 7) i 179 36 Arr. ii 2.1;suggested that th
Curt. iii 3.1. See further Bosworth (n.
conflation of all reports of reinforceme
2) I8I; Atkinson (n. 35) 115 f-
Hellespont and Issus; K.J.
37 Aeschin. iii 164; Diod.Beloch
xvii 32.4; Joseph. Aj xi (Griech
315
iii2. 2 [Berlin I923] 331 f.) that it was a g
f.

Arrian's Gordium 38reinforcements

Cf. Arr. ii 21.3, 22.6-7. The vulgate account is (so M
Neither view
cogent. is
vivid and explicit about casualties; seePolybius'
Bosworth, rep
giving precise numbers
'Arrian and the Alexander and axxiifairly prec
Vulgate', Fond. Hardt
(1976) 17-20.
it cannot be combined with any other
sources. He does not 39 For Amyntas' mention
mission see Diod. xvii 49.1; Curt.the iv rein
Gordium and Ancyra, but
6.30. The numbers of his reinforcements are provided that is im
purpose is to prove that the Macedonia
by the vulgate alone (Diod. xvii 65.I; Curt. v 1.40-42).
not be deployed in the
40 Curt. vii 1.37-40. terrain of Issus
The context is a forensic speech,
formation described
but the statementby is detailed, Callisthenes,
specifically naming three
erroneous assumption
reluctant conscripts. that There is no warrant the phalan
for dismissing
Alexander's infantry,
it as invention. it was easy to de
only needed Callisthenes'
41 This chronology figures at the c
has controversial implications
most recent reinforcements. It was no
for the interpretation of Agis' war (cf. Bosworth,
him to chase up each
Phoenix xix and[1975] 35-37; every Atkinson [n. 35] reinforc
483 f.), but
by Callisthenes (he is
they content
are fortunately irrelevant to with
the issue here. a theo

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 ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE DECLINE OF MACEDON 7

cannot exclude the possibility of smaller contingents having arrived in the interim.
had to meet the Persian army again, this time in Mesopotamia, and his need for pha
was undiminished. Antipater was still sending reinforcements, like the sma
mercenaries and Thracians whose arrival in Egypt is casually noted by Arrian (iii 5. I)
well have been some minor contingents of Macedonian infantry.
After 331 there is no record of further reinforcements of Macedonians. G
incomplete nature of our sources this might be fortuitous; but there is reason to
reinforcements of Macedonian infantry were in short supply in the latter part of th
sources continue to give a record of the arrival of fresh levies, but the vast majority reco
mercenaries.42 In the summer of 330 Alexander discharged his allied infantry and sent th
to the Cilician coast.43 The officer who accompanied them was Epocillus, son of Po
returned nearly two years later, in the early months of 328. With him were substant
mercenaries from the satrapies of Asia Minor.44 There was a large contingen
(including 600 cavalry) from Antipater, but Curtius is explicit that they were Greek
he clearly distinguishes Greeks from Macedonians in the reinforcements,45 and, un
totally careless, we can only assume that the bulk of the contingent sent by Antipater co
mercenaries from Greece proper. Two years before he had sent out a body of 3,00
(Curt. vi 6.35). It looks as though Antipater was conscribing levies from peoples w
potential enemies while retaining what remained of the Macedonian infantry.
apparently was not happy. In the spring of 327 Epocillus and two other officers returned
homeland with specific instructions 'to bring up the army from Macedonia' (A
Nothing more is heard of this commission and there is no record of any large Maced
joining Alexander after his return from India.46 Indeed the instructions received by
324, to replace Antipater and send him to Asia at the head of a fresh army of Macedonian
xii 12.9; Arr. vii 12.4), almost presupposes that there had been no large scale move
native Macedonians in the recent past. But the mission of Epocillus was pro
Alexander's first attempt at acquiring a new injection of phalanx soldiers. In the early
329 the king had sent home a small contingent of Macedonian veterans (Arr. iii 29.5
commanders were probably detailed to levy new forces, as was Epocillus two y
Whether or not they were sent to recruit, a very large body of reinforcements did
xvii 95.4 speaks of 30,000 foot and 6,ooo cavalry). It caught up with Alexander just
start of his Indus voyage late in 326. These reinforcements were evidently described
Cleitarchus, whose narrative is summarised by Diodorus and Curtius Rufus.47 Neith
extant reports speaks of Macedonians, and Diodorus analyses the reinforcements a

42 Berve (n. 7) i 184 gives a convenient summary army beforeof 327 and sent to Macedon with Epocillus-
the data.
there were two distinct individuals). The other Median
43 Arr. iii 19.5-6; Diod. xvii 74.3-4. commanders rejoined Alexander in Carmania, bringing
44 Curtius (vii 10.11-12) gives the only detailed the bulk of the holding army (Arr. vi 27-3). I suggest
report of figures. Arrian (iv 7.2) confirms the date and that Menidas was summoned later and brought with
agrees on the names of the principal commanders of him the residual force of mercenary cavalry. If so, he
contingents. was untainted by the accusations of corruption made
45 Cf Curt. v 1.4-41: Macedonum peditum VI against his colleagues, for he continued in favour at
milia . .. cum his DC Thracas, adiunctis peditibus eiusdem court (cf. Arr. vii 26.2).
generis III milibus D et ex Peloponneso mercennarius miles 47 Diod. xvii 95.4 (totals only: 30,000 infantry, 6,ooo
ad IIII milia advenerat.
cavalry, 25,000 infantry panoplies and ioo talents of
46 A certain Menidas arrived in Babylon in 323, medicine); Curt. ix 3.21 (Memnon brings 5,ooo cavalry
bringing his unit of cavalry (Arr. vii 23.1). He is usually from Thrace, 7,000 mercenary infantry from Harpalus
identified with the Menidas sent with Epocillus in 327, and 25,000 gold and silver panoplies). The original
and it is suggested that he brought one of several clearly gave a detailed list of contingents which Curtius
contingents from Macedon (Berve ii 257 no. 508; Brunt reproduced very partially while Diodorus recorded the
[n. 7] 39; Milns [n. 7] 10o9). But Arrian combines grand total alone. If there was a Macedonian contingent
Menidas' arrival with the arrival of the satraps of Caria as argued by Brunt (Arrian ii [n. 7] 488-89), it was not
and Lydia. He is, I think, the Menidas assigned to the particularly prominent, for it is excluded from both
garrison of Media in 330 (Arr. iii 26.3: pace Berve, there reports.
is no reason to think that he was recalled to the main

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 8 A. B. BOSWORTH

mercenaries from Greece'. That i

dogmatically that the reinforcem
the vast bulk comprised mercena
The evidence indicates that the
from Macedon before the end of
of seven years of campaigning in
and, if the phalanx at Opis was s
(perhaps nearer 40,000) were ta
figures given in our lacunose trad
Rufus records other contingents
Macedonian manpower, particular
effects are difficult to trace, as so
was seriously embarrassed by the
When the Spartan king Agis III w
(331/o), Antipater had difficulties
but we have no idea of their compo
allied Greek states.50 The proport
are better served for the Lami
Antipater was faced by an allianc
Aetolians. Trouble had been brewi
Antipater were surprisingly small
6oo cavalry. That was the entir
Macedonian phalanx men.51 Presu
later, used Paeonian and Illyrian
upon the contemporary Hieron
troops because of the bulk of rei
overwhelmingly implied by the at
could leave behind his lieutenant S
troops.52 But Antipater himself w
He was reinforced first by Leonn
with 20,000 foot and 1,500 horse
Macedon, but the bulk were prob
Craterus with his 10,000 veterans
40,000 for the decisive battle of
lack the key figure, the number
Alexander's death. I do not think

alternative, that he omitted

48 Note the comments of a non-Macedonian
Diodorus contin- (xv
Arrian (v 27.5-6: gent,
Coenus' speech).
is most improbable. If Antipater had far more than Even
pointed they represent
13,000 foot at the outset,the conventiona
it is hard to explain his later
quity. discomfiture, and the attested numbers at Crannon
49 Aeschin. iii 165 (1TioAv Xp6voV cuvViyE aTpa- appear surprisingly small.
T-6rES0v). I have argued elsewhere (Phoenix xix [19751
38 ff.) that this recruiting took place over the winter of 52 Diod. xviii 12.2: &TrAlTrrE ac-rparfyb6v liTrTrav,
S0 o-Y TpartrlcTas Troi iKavovS KTi WrapayyEicAa
331/o. The delay, however, is a fact and independent of aTpaToAoyElv cjs TrhAilTroUs.
the exact chronology. 53 Diod. xviii 14.5 Leonnatus seems to have
50 Diod. xvii 63.1. The allies are not named, but they modelled himself on Alexander, with a vanguard of
probably included Corinth, Argos and Messenia as well Nisaean horses and his own agema of Companions
as the northern members of the Corinthian League (cf. ('Suda' s.v. AE6vvaTros=Arr. Succ. F 12 [Roos]-
E. I. McQueen, Historia xxvii [1978] 40-5I). Antipater probably describing the advance through northern
had a large pool of allies antipathetic to Sparta. Greece). Unfortunately this permits no inference about
51 Diodorus (xviii 12.2) terms all Antipater's the proportion of Macedonians in his army.
infantry MaKE56VES, but the blanket designation means 54 Diod. xviii 16.4-5. Antipater and Craterus
very little. He probably inferred that all the troops on retained an army of 30,000 for the campaign against the
the Macedonian side were native Macedonian. The
Aetolians over the winter of 332/I (Diod. xviii 24-1).

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 ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE DECLINE OF MACEDON 9

combined with the new levies of Sippas will hardly have been greater than th
that Alexander took over the Hellespont in 334. In that case the reserve
manpower in 323 were less than a half, probably nearer a third, of what they had
nor surprising that Antipater was reluctant to release more phalanx troops f
after the shock of Agis' war, and his reluctance to send troops must have been
the deterioration of relations between the king and his regent.
The drain of reinforcements had a profound effect. Few of the men Alexa
him ever returned. An unspecified but small group of veterans and disabled we
the Oxus in 329,55 but that is the only recorded repatriation of Macedonians b
Craterus' Io,ooo in 324. Even these veterans, for all Alexander's promise
residence again in Macedonia. After fighting at Crannon they went on to ca
over the winter of 322/I and were immediately embroiled in the civil war a
which broke out in the spring of 321. Then both Craterus and Antipater led ex
into Asia Minor, and Craterus' infantry alone numbered 20,000, most of wh
hardened Macedonians (Diod. xviii 30.4). Craterus must have retained his veter
body. After their defeat at Eumenes' hands they made their way to Antipat
leadership reached the victory conference at Triparadeisus. The followin
returned home with what remained of the national levy (Diod. xviii 39-7), sadl
year's campaigning. It was weakened still further by the detachment of for
Perdiccan armies still operating in Asia Minor. Antigonus alone had 8,50
Antipater's invasion army, and even Arrhidaeus, the relatively humble satrap
Phrygia, is attested in command of I,ooo Macedonian troops in 319.5-6 The re
Alexander was split up among the Successors, all of whom placed a high pre
Macedonian troops. Many of these died on campaign, like the famous Silver S
their career of glory in 316, when they were dispersed, the most formidable
Arachosia to be deliberately decimated on suicide missions and the rest ordere
difficult garrison duty.57 Those who were discharged remained in Asia to for
the new settlements. Very few ever returned to Macedonia. I can find no record ex
mutinous soldiers of Antigonus who successfully forced their release in the w
The overwhelming majority lived and died outside the country of their bir
For Macedonia proper the generation of Alexander was literally a dead ge
three years the king had removed over 30,000 men in their prime and remove
breeding purposes they were gone forever. Alexander did once make the po
sending home the newly married men, but that affected a small number over
of winter 334/3 (Arr. i 24.1-2). And it was an unrepeatable concession. H
Macedonians would form liaisons with the women of Asia and their offs
children of the camp. This new generation had no domicile, and Alexander m
that they should remain in Asia. Even the families of Craterus' veterans we
retained with the main army at Opis.59 Back in Macedonia the birthrate
declined. For a time there was a respite as the children born towards the end
grew into manhood,60 but there was necessarily a deterioration with the gen

58 Polyaen.
55 Arr. iii 29-5: T" v Tr McaKEE56VCOV 1'-rlhAE? TroU' iv 6.6. The episode has been variou
rTrpEauvrdaTroU Kai 5rl wrTroPous...dated, but it took place when Antigonus was wint
.Tr" oiKou
a&rTo-rEIhEv. in Cappadocia. The best context seems to be
56 Arr. Succ. F. 1.43; Diod. xix 29.3 (Antigonus);
operations against Eumenes after Triparadeisus. T
Diod. xviii 5 .I (Arrhidaeus: I,ooo Macedonians
Antigonusto had only 5,000 of the Macedonians g
1o,ooo mercenaries and 500 Persian bowmenhim by and
Antipater (cf. Diod. xviii 40.7 with R. En
slingers). The latter may well have served with Craterus
MH xxxviii [1971] 228 f.). The mutineers may alr
(cf. Diod. xviii 16.4), to be transferred tohave been discharged.
Arrhidaeus'
command after Triparadeisus. 59 Arr. vii 12.2; cf. Justin xii 4.1-II.
57 Diod. xix 48.3-4; Polyaen. iv 6. 15; Plut.
60Eum. 19.BC Polyperchon was able to raise an arm
In 3 18
20,000of
For a survey of Macedonian troops in the armies Macedonian
the infantry and 4,ooo allies fo
Successors see Launey (n. 8) i 295-303. invasion of Attica (Diod. xviii 68.3) and in 321,

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 10 A. B. BOSWORTH

334 BC. The years after 320 would

teens. Yet me again we are at the
military forces of Macedon duri
302 BC. In that year Cassander, t
of Demetrius Poliorcetes, who
56,ooo strong. It was a desperate
his forces to meet the invading
is not broken down into conting
Macedonian phalanx formed.
Macedonian reserves at this peri
Asia Minor with Lysimachus62 a
outnumbered by Demetrius and
10,ooo less than those deployed b
the forces at Alexander's dispos
The Macedonian armies never re
Macedonian infantry comprised 1
was an army of the same dimen
intense, and Antigonus Doson ma
reserve.63 Twenty five years late
Cynoscephalae, his manpower re
enlisted sixteen year olds and tim
This was the nadir. Philip and
encouraging the procreation of c
war.65 Even so, the resources of
was the greatest led by any Mace
out of a total of 39,000 infantry
Macedonian infantry was 26,000
the product of years of peace and d
of Alexander's generation. The a
seen, Alexander could draw over
leaving reserves of manpower w
were ultimately fateful for the
brought the country to a positio
the lesson of Chaeronea had bee
supreme and invincible, her mil
not be remotely matched by an
been tipped. The actual armies o
them destroyed. In the opening

after the departure

Heracleia in 304.of
Once againthe
it is difficultexpeditio
to define what
Antipater and Craterus, he
is meant by 'Macedonians'. Theywas able
were presumably not to
all phalanx troops, for the total Macedonian component
Thessaly PIEr'& Suvd&Ecos,
of Demetrius' armyCRwas only lxiii
8,ooo (Diod. xx 110.4) &ioAh6y
38.6; cf. H. D. Westlake, [I949] 9
case no figure is given and he must have received athe
for substantial whole
nucleus of arm
native Macedonians, Macedonian and
troops from in the
his father Antigonus forme
(he had
likelihood that the forces from Macedon included commanded 5,ooo during the Babylonian campaign of
mercenaries as well as citizen troops. 312 [cf. Diod. xix Ioo.4]).
61 Diod. xx 110.4; cf. M. Fortina, Cassandro, re di 63 Plutarch (Arat. 43.1) claims that Doson deployed
Macedonia (Turin 1965) 102-5. 20,000 Macedonian infantry in 224 BC, but once again
62 Diod. xx 107.I: the majority of these forces may
there is no figure given for non-Macedonian troops.
have come from the Autariatae settled by Cassander Plutarch may have assumed that the army was wholly
around Mt. Orbelus-2,ooo of them are attested composed of native Macedonians.
serving with Lysimachus (Diod. xx 13.-3; cf. xix 19.1). 64 For Philip's levy and its results see Liv. xxxiii 3.1-5,
According to Plutarch (Demetr. 23.2) 6,ooo Macedo- 4.4-6.
nians had come over to Demetrius when he captured 65 Liv. xxxix 24.3; xlii I1.6.

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 ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE DECLINE OF MACEDON II
both outnumbered and defeated, and it was already obvious that the numerical superiority of
Philip's reign could not be recovered.
These stark facts explain Alexander's posthumous reputation in his own country. His
ultimate successor, Cassander, was able to execute his mother and imprison his wife and son
without apparent resistance from the commons.66 Whether he conducted a personal vendetta
may perhaps be doubted. He may well, as Plutarch reports, have been deeply affected by
Alexander's ferocious behaviour at Babylon, breaking into a sweating fit at the very sight of a
statue of the king,67 but personal hostility was an expensive luxury if it harmed him politically.
As a usurper he was bound to conciliate public opinion, not affront it directly. There was no
question of a damnatio memoriae of the late king. Cassander could himself commission a painting
of the combat between Alexander and Darius from the great Philoxenus of Eretria (Plin. NH
xxxv I Io), and that painting would commemorate the victory of the Macedonian army as much
as the victory of Alexander.68 What seems clear is that the memory of Alexander was
subordinated to that of his father. Cassander wooed Philip's daughter Cleopatra and eventually
married Thessalonice, another of his daughters. He also paid conspicuous honour to Philip III
and Eurydice, both progeny of Philip who had perished at Olympias' agency.69 On the other
hand Rhoxane and Alexander IV were immured in Amphipolis, deprived of their royal
accoutrements70 and eventually murdered. There was no popular protest. Some resentment
there may have been. In 294, when Demetrius seized the Macedonian throne, the sons of
Cassander suffered from their father's hostile attitude to Alexander, and Demetrius exploited the
theme in his propaganda.71 But it was a relatively unimportant issue. Demetrius' greatest asset
was not his championship of the dead Alexander but the fact that he was married to Phila, the
daughter of Antipater and ex-wife of Craterus, whose memory was cherished in Macedonia.72
By contrast there was little attempt, even by Cassander's enemies, to mobilise Alexander's
memory against him. When Antigonus attacked his policies at Tyre in 315, his speech (as
recorded by Diodorus) does not mention Alexander. Cassander's attacks on his mother, wife and
son are interpreted as a means to secure the throne, not as an affront to the late king, and the
restoration of Thebes is criticised as the rebuilding of a city destroyed by the Macedonians.73
Cassander's improper ambitions are the focus of the attack and his victim is not so much
Alexander as the Macedonian people as a whole. If anything, Antigonus is avoiding references to
Alexander. He is certainly not representing him as wronged by Cassander. The one attempt to

66 For details and sources see R. M. Errington, 67 Plut. Alex. 74.6. On this passage see G. Bendinelli,
'Alexander in the Hellenistic world', Fond. Hardt xxii RFIC xciii (1965) 150-64; Fortina (n. 61) io--I.
(1976) 146-52. P. Goukowsky, Essai sur les origines du 68 This is conceded by Goukowsky (n. 66)I io. The
mythe d'Alexandre i (Nancy 1978) Io5-II (see also his fact that Cassander called one of his sons Alexander is
Bude edition of Diodorus xvii, pp. xxiv-xxvi; F. immaterial: the name was common in the Argead house
Chamoux, in Ancient Macedonia iii [Thessaloniki 1983] and, for that matter, in Macedonia-it was not unique
57-66), dismisses the entire tradition of Cassander's to the son of Philip.
hostility to Alexander as a distorted echo of the 69 Diod. xx 37.4 (Cleopatra); xix 52.1, 61.2 (Thessa-
propaganda of Antigonus and Demetrius. It is true that lonice); xix 52.5 (Philip and Eurydice). Cf. Errington (n.
modern scholars have been too ready to infer a vendetta 64) 152: 'paradoxically his anti-Alexander policy relied
against the entire memory of Alexander. There must, very heavily on the reputation of Philip.'
however, have been some hostile acts, as Plutarch 70 Diod. xix 52.4 (cf. Justin xiv 6.13). This denial of
(Demetr. 37.3) emphasises when he describes as a matter royal privilege is a strong argument against Gouk-
of fact the Macedonians' hatred for what Cassander had owsky's thesis ([n. 66] 1o6) that Rhoxane and her son
done against the dead Alexander (& Kcaaav8pos eIs were merely kept in protective custody to prevent their
'AMcav8Spov rEeVTjK6Ta -rapEv6oIproEV). Demetrius being exploited by other contenders for power. Cas-
may have capitalised upon the hostility but he did not sander was deliberately treating the legitimate king as a
originate it. As for Antigonus, he was careful not to private individual.
invoke the memory of Alexander against Cassander (see 71 Plut. Demetr. 37.3; Justin xvi 1.15-17.
below). One cannot accredit him with the creation of a 72 Plut. Demetr. 37.4, cf. 14.2; Diod. xix 59.3-6.
myth. The verdict of Diod. xvii 117.2 is probably the 73 I)iod. xix 61.2: 'ri BE cOS 'OAwuviouo 6v-ras
standard reaction to Cassander's attested actions, not an
-TrOEaLpco-r6arovu MaKE86VCOV KaTCKI'EV... Kal
echo of propaganda. See also E. Mikrogiannakes, in
e ailSpc &voTTrlae T&s ovrrr' MaKES6VCo V KaT-rcKa-
Ancient Macedonia ii (Thessaloniki 1977) 225-36.
psicas. See also Justin xv 1.3.

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 12 A. B. BOSWORTH

capitalise on the memory of the

in 3 17, the army of her rival Eu
supposed benefits conferred by her
who had removed him by poi
surviving progeny of Philip, d
savagery provoked popular revul
besiege her in Pydna and final
Macedonians.75 Her cruelty and
of Alexander's name did nothi
ineffectual. It is easy to see why.
had left it at the age of 22 and n
populace at large would have bitt
He may have led his men to wea
lasting grief. The hero of Macedo
had squandered that inheritance
The view one takes of Alexande
The modern scholar has the ad
movement of population into As
his conquests. It is therefore easy
an intention may have been fro
leadership secured victory, glory
veterans who preserved his mem
the Egyptians and Babylonians h
Persians and imposed a r6gime of
encountered, particularly the Per
passed through the land with fir
was as a destroyer that Alexande
fighting men produced in the an
and die in the recesses of Asia
irreversible. From this perspecti
humanitarian Alexander dreamin
However, I concede that he did a
final scene of Ingmar Bergman's
differences at last reconciled, flo
Death triumphant. That was t
Macedonians, Medes and Persians
dance of death.

A. B. BOSWORTH
University of Western Australia

74Diod. xix 11.2 claims that the Macedonians

75 Diod. xix 35-36; Justin xiv 6. See Briant (n. I)
remembered the benefactions of Alexander and res- E. Levy, Ktema iii (1978) 208-9, and Errington,
297-99,
pected the axioma of Olympias. Her propaganda Chiron viii (1978) II8 If. for the constitutional signifi-
certainly stressed the achievements of her son,cance
but it
(or insignificance) of the trial of Olympias.
may have been her status as Philip's wife which tipped
the balance (cf. Justin xiv 5.Io: seu memoria mariti seu
magnitudine filii).

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