Alexander the Great and the Decline of Macedon

Author(s): A. B. Bosworth
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 106 (1986), pp. 1-12
Published by: The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies
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Journalof HellenicStudiescvi (1986) I-12

ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE

DECLINE OF MACEDON
THEfigureof Alexanderinevitablydominatesthe historyof his reign.Ourextantsources
arecentrallyfocusseduponthe king himself.Accordinglyit is his own militaryactionswhich
receivethe fullestdocumentation. Appointmentsto satrapiesandsatrapalarmiesarecarefully
notedbecausehe madethem,but the achievements of the appointeesarepassedoverin silence.
Thegreatvictoriesof AntigonuswhichsecuredAsiaMinorin 323BC areonlyknownfromtwo
casualreferencesin CurtiusRufus,'andin generalall the multifarious activitiesin the empire
disappear fromrecordedhistoryexceptin so farastheyimpingeuponcourtlifein the shapeof
reportsto Alexanderand administrative decisionsmadeby him. Moreover,the sourceswe
possessoriginate either from high officers
of Alexander's court,suchasPtolemyandNearchus,
or from Greek historianslike Callisthenesand Cleitarchus,whose aims were literaryor
propagandistand whose interestswere firmly anchoredin court life. InevitablyAlexander
bestridesthatnarrowworldlikea colossusandmonopolisesthehistoricalpicture.Buteventhe
figure of Alexanderis far from fully fleshed.No contemporaryhistorysurvives,and for
continuousnarrativesof the reign we are dependentupon late derivativewriterswho saw
Alexanderthroughthe filterof centuriesof rhetoricandphilosophy.The kinghadlong beena
stockexampleof manycontradictory traits;he wasat oncethe conquerorandthe civiliser,the
tyrant and the enlightenedking. Cicero and Senecasaw him as the type of unbridledlicense,
Arrianas the paradigmof moderation.2The resultis that the sourcespresenta seriesof
irreconcilable caricatures of Alexanderbut no uniformor coherentpicture.
The biasof the sourceshascontinuedto the presentday.Alexanderis stilla potentsymbol,
for good or ill, and modern historiesinterprethis reign accordingto their authors'
preconceptions of hischaracter, discarding or explainingawayanydivergentsourcematerial.As
in antiquitythereare stock pictureswhich recur.Droysen'sAlexander,the championand
propagandistof Hellenic culture, has become virtually the symbol of modern Greek
nationalism. Tarn'svisionaryAlexander,with his dreamof the brotherhoodof man,continues
to be resuscitated in variousmetamorphoses.3 The multiplicityof picturesis a measureof the
of
fallibility the method, and the concentration uponthepersonof Alexanderproducesa serious
distortion.Modernhistorians havebeenfascinated by Alexanderthemanandlargelyignorethe
materialcostsof hisconquests.Tarn,forinstance,wasproperlyrevoltedby theMallicampaign
with 'itsdreadfulrecordof mereslaughter',4 buthe rationalised the episodeasuniqueandit did
not affecthis conceptof Alexanderas a humanitarian. Similarlythe savageryof Alexander's
in is
reprisals Sogdiana explained from Alexander's side as a disciplinarymeasure.5Thereis no
attemptto view the campaignfrom the Sogdianside. For them it involved premeditated
massacre of themalepopulationof insurgentcities,theforcedimpositionof Greco-Macedonian
colonists,the permanentremoval,in Alexander'sarmy,of the primeof theiryoung fighting
men. After three campaigning seasons the native population was decimated and cowed, and the
foundation was laid for nearly three centuries of Greek domination. In Sogdiana the impact of

1 Curt. iv I.35, 5.13. On these events and the source
tradition see W. W. Tarn, Alexander the Great ii
(Cambridge 1948) Iio f., 177;Errington,CQ xix (1969)
234 f.; P. Briant, Antigonele Borgne(Paris 1973) 53-74.
2 For the
importance of Alexander as a literary
exemplumsee A. Heuss, 'Alexander der Grosse und die
politische Ideologie des Altertums,' Antike und Aben-
dland iv (1954) 65 ff., and (briefly) A. B. Bosworth,
Historicalcommentary on Arrian'sHistory of Alexanderi
(Oxford 1980) 12-14.
3 Convenient and differently pointed digests of
modern scholarshipon Alexander are provided by F.
Schachermeyr,Alexanderder Grosse:das Problemseiner
Pers6ilichkeit und seines Wirkens (SAWW cclxxxv
(1973) 609-651) and E. Badian, 'Some recent interpre-
tations of Alexander', Fond.Hardtxxii (1976) 279-31I1.
4 Alexanderthe Greati o103,reproducedverbatim by
A. K. Narain, Greece& Romexii (1965) 16o.
5
Cf (e.g.) Tarn i 68 ('a local revolt which severity
might repress'); R. Lane Fox, Alexander the Great
(London 1973) 302 ('his garrisonshad been murdered,
so he repaid the compliment').
2 A. B. BOSWORTH
Alexandercauseda profoundchangein the culturalpatternof the area.It is a changewhichis
documentedin the sourcesbut only peripherally.6Superficiallythe story is of epic sieges
spearheaded by Alexanderand of sporadicguerillafighting;the darkerand more interesting
pictureof whatwashappeningto the nativepopulationmustbe piecedtogetherfromisolated
references.The resultsareachievedby takingthe focusof investigationawayfromAlexander
himself.The method can be extended,and in this paperI wish to examinethe effect of
Alexander'scampaignsupon his own people,in particularupon the phalanxinfantry,that
indispensable nucleusof his army.
The Macedonianarmyhas neverlackeddiscussion.The classicanalysesof Droysenand
Bervehavebeensupplemented andmodifiedby a stringof recentcontributions, predominantly
in English.7As a resultwe havea reasonablygood ideaof the structureandorganisation of the
army, viewed from the standpointof Alexander. We know how it operated as a tool of
conquest,underthe directionof the greatcaptain.Whatis lessdocumentedis the effectof the
conquestson hismen.How manyof themwerekilledandmutilated? How manytroopswere
recruitedfromMacedonto fueltheconqueringarmies?Whatwasthedemographic effectof the
incessantoverseascombat?Thesequestionscanonlybe answeredin part,giventhefragmentary
natureof theavailableevidence,but,evenso, thepicturetheysuggestis sombre.Itcanbe shown
thatthe numbersof Macedonianreinforcements summonedto Asiain the courseof the reign
have been consistentlyunderestimated. A considerable proportionof the childbearingmale
population was taken away and never returned, with disastrousconsequences for the military
strength of Macedon. Within a her was
generation manpower perceptiblylower,andshenever
the
regained militarysupremacyenjoyedat the end of Philip'sreign. In the heydayof the
hellenisticmonarchies thehomelandof Macedonbecameincreasingly feeblerasthehumanprice
of Alexander's was
conquests paid. Thisis not a novelview. It was,forinstance,succinctlystated
by Rostovtzeff.8 But the implicationshave never been fullydrawn,certainlynot in historiesof
in
Alexander,nor, my opinion, hastheevidence beenadequately stated.Eventhemostgenerous
calculationshaveunderstated the wastageof phalanxinfantryduringthe reignandthe number
of reinforcements conveyedfrom Macedon.
In the springof 334 Alexandercrossedthe Hellespontwith his expeditionaryforce.
Accordingto Diodorus,who givesdetailedfigures,theMacedonian infantrywas 12,ooo strong
andanotheri2,ooo wereleft behindto serveasthehomearmyunderAntipater.9 Therewasan
unspecified number of Macedonian infantryoperatingwith the advanceforce sent to Asia

For a brief outline of Alexander's settlement of

6 lesarmeeshellinistiquesi (Paris1949)290.
Sogdianaand its implicationssee Bosworth, 'Alexander
and the Iranians', JHS c (1980) 10-Ii, 17-18.
7J. G. Droysen, 'Alexanders des Grossen Armee',
Hermesxii (1877) 226-252= Kleine Schriftenzur alten
Geschichteii (Leipzig 1894) 208 ff.; H. Berve, Das
Alexanderreich auf prosopographischerGrundlage i
(Munich 1926) 103-217. Recent researchin English has
startedfrom Tarn's modifications of Berve's treatment
of the subject (Alexanderthe Greatii 135-169). See in
particular P. A. Brunt, 'Alexander's Macedonian
cavalry', JHS lxxxiii (1963) 27-46; (additions and
modifications in his Loeb edition of Arrian, vol. ii
[1983] 483-90); R. D. Milns, 'The army of Alexander
the Great', Fond.Hardtxxii (1976) 87-136.
8 M. I. Rostovtzeff, A socialandeconomic
historyof the
Hellenisticworldii (Oxford 1941) 1136: 'Thousands of
adult male Macedoniansleft their native country never
to return. A larger part of the Macedonian army was
never demobilised after Alexander's death; on the
contrary it was from time to time reinforced by fresh
Macedonianrecruits.'Cf. also M. Launey, Recherches sur
9 Diod. xvii 17.3, 5. These are the only detailed
figuresfor the individualcontingentsof the Macedo-
nian army, but the infantrynumbersat leastare self-
consistent,totalling 32,000 (which Diodorus scales
down to a roundfigureof 30,000).The contemporary
historians,Anaximenesand Callisthenes, gavesubstan-
and40,000respectively(Plut.
tiallyhighertotals,43,00ooo
deAlex.fort.i. 3, 327E, Alex. 15.I;Plb.xii 19.1),which
are usuallythoughtto includethe expeditionaryforce
operatingin AsiaMinorunderParmenion(cf.Droysen
In. 7]In229; BruntIn. 7] 34; Milns,JHS lxxxvi [1966]
167). thatcasetheadvanceforcewasprobablyIo,ooo
strong.Polyaenusv 44.4is not suchdirectconfirmation
as is sometimesassumed.He statesthatParmenionand
Attalushad Io,oootroopsat Magnesia,but thefigureis
suspiciouslyrounded, perhapsexaggeratedto give
Memnonadditionalcreditfor his victory.In any case
the entirearmywasnot presentat Magnesia.The third
commander,Calas,was apparentlyelsewhere,and he
presumablyhadforcesof his own.
 ALEXANDERTHE GREAT AND THE DECLINEOF MACEDON 3
Minorin 336whichwasat least 0o,ooostrong.'0The phalanxtroopswould not, I think,have
beenproportionally morenumerousthanin Alexander'sown armyat the Hellespont;in that
casewe havea maximumof 3,000.Thetotalof Macedonian infantrywith Alexanderin 334was
thereforearound15,ooo.Figurescanbe extrapolatedfor the armystrengthat the end of the
campaignten yearslater.After the mutinyat Opis in 324 Alexanderdischargeda body of
Macedonian veterans,whichall sourcesstateto havebeen 1o,ooostrong."1The remnantof the
army hasbeen variouslyestimated.RecentlyMilnshassuggestedthatAlexanderretaineda total
of 3,000phalangites, while Schachermeyr would arguefor up to 6,ooo.12 Both seemto me to
fallfarshortof thetruth.Admittedly,no sourcegivesa totalforthephalanxinfantryat thetime
of Alexander'sdeath,but thereare severalclearindications.Immediatelyafterhis deaththe
seniorcommanderPeithonwassentto dealwitha rebellionof Greekcolonistsin Bactria,andwe
are explicitlytold that he chose by lot (iKAi•po Ev) 3,00ooo Macedonianinfantry.3 That
presupposes a much larger pool of phalangitesto be drawn upon. What is more, duringhis
absence,14 the regent Perdiccaslaunched his invasionof AsiaMinor with a strongnucleusof
Macedonians.When he left the areain the springof 321 he was able to leave an army of
Macedonians operatingin ArmeniaunderNeoptolemus; ' andhisbrotherAlcetas,who wasleft
to pacifyPisidia,alsohadMacedoniantroops.16 No numbersaregiven,but theseforceswere
clearlylarge.To matchNeoptolemus'phalanxof Macedonians Eumeneshadto raisea counter-
force of 6,300 cavalry(Plut. Eum. 4-4). Laterin 321, when Neoptolemus'men had been
incorporatedin his own army,its strongMacedoniancomplexionmadeit a very attractive
17
acquisitionforAlcetas. TheseMacedonian forcescommandedby NeoptolemusandEumenes
must have numberedthousandsratherthanhundreds,and Alcetas'armywill have balanced
them. Perdiccasthen left very substantialMacedoniancontingentsin Asia Minorwhen he
invadedEgypt,andhisown grandarmycannothavebeendrainedof nationalinfantry.Peithon
had rejoinedhim with his Macedonianforces (Diod. xviii 36.5), and there was also the
formidablebody of Silver Shields(argyraspides),3,000 strong. These men had servedas
Alexander'sfoot guardand were retainedby the regentas his headquarters corps.'8They
certainlyacted asa unitin theinvasionof Egypt. The documentation is tantalisingly
incomplete,
but it seemsclearthat the Macedonianinfantrywith Alexanderat the time of his deathin
Babylonamountedto 8,000andprobablymore.Thereis a roughcheckin Arrian'sdescription
of the curiousmixed phalanxestablished just beforeAlexander'sdeath;Macedonianinfantry
werecombinedwith20,ooo nativePersianrecruits,so thatin eachfiletherewere4 Macedonians

10 16 Plut.Eum.5.2 (Alcetasrefusedto
In 335 Calas was operating in the Troad with a helpEumenesin
mixed force of Macedoniansand mercenaries(Diod. 321 on the groundsthat the Macedoniansunderhim
xvii 7.1o). The Macedoniancomponentwas evidently wouldnotfightagainstCraterus); cf.Diod.xviii44.3-5.
significant,for when Memnon raided Cyzicus he 17 This is revealedby a new fragmentof Arrian's
disguisedhismenwith the typicallyMacedonian kausia History of the SuccessorsBook X, preserved on two
(Polyaen. v 44-5). palimpsestfolios in the Universityof Gothenburg: J.
11 Arr.vii 12.1;Diod.xvii lo9.I, xviii 4.I, 12.I, 16.4; Noret,'Un fragmentdudixiemelivrede la Succession d'
Justinxii 12.7 (I,ooo---probablyincludingcavalry). Alexandrepar Arrien', AC lii (1983) 235-42 (F 73r,lines
12 Milns (n. 7) 112; Schachermeyr, Alexander in 9-I : Ta-ra 6 E-rrpaoaav 'AK'TOaS EVITrpOTOIS KUai
Babylon (SAWW cclxviii (1970), 14 f., Alexanderder T1lv TrrO [sc. 8ivaplv MaKE8OVIK'V
Grosse(n. 3) 491. ToorTc, E0ipEvel]
EOEXov
TrrhEioa-rv
13Diod. xviii 7.3 (hewas to receive o,ooomercen- "TTrv oio'av EauTct -rrpoo-rrotijaooa).
Eumenes had annexed Neoptolemus' forces on the
ary infantry from the upper satrapies). eve of the encounterwith Craterus(Plut. Eum.5-5:Arr.
14Diodorusgivesno impressionhow long Peithon's Succ. F I. 27; cf. GRBS xix [1978] 235-36) and kept
expeditionlasted,but he had to concentratean army them subsequently, diminished by the battle losses.
from a numberof differentsatrapiesand then facethe Despite his victory he acquired none of Craterus'
returningcolonistssomewhereto theeastof the Iranian Macedonianveterans,who made their escape as a body
plateau.The operationspresumablylasted well into and joined Antipater's army (Diod. xviii 32.3-4; Arr.
322. Succ. F I.27fin.; Nepos Eum. 4.3).
is Plut. Eum.4.3-4, cf. 5.5; Diod. xviii 29.5; PSI xii 18 Arr. Succ. F 1.35 (Roos). For the strength of the
1284 (on which see Bosworth, GRBS xix [1978] 227- at this time see Diod. xviii 58.1, xix 28.1,
argyraspides
237). 30.6.
4 A. B. BOSWORTH
to 12 Persians.19 In otherwordsthe Macedonians assignedto thisbizarreamalgamnumbered
6,70o--and there were presumably other,whollyMacedonian, units.The SilverShieldsat least
should have maintained their corporateidentity.Again a minimum of 8,ooo Macedonian
infantryis indicatedat the time of Alexander'sdeath.
The phalanxtroopsat Babylonwere essentiallythe troopsretainedafterOpis. Professor
Brunthasunderstandably arguedthattheyhadbeensupplemented by largescalereinforcements
which arrivedfrom Macedonin the last periodof reign.20The sourcessay nothingof such
movements,but,aswe shallsee,theirsilenceis hardlyconclusive.Thesituationin Macedonis a
moredecisiveconsideration. In324Antipaterhadbeengivenspecificinstructions to bringa new
army from Macedon to compensate for the veteransdischarged with Craterus. Therehad
obviously not been substantialreinforcementsbeforehand, and Antipatercertainly not leave
did
MacedonbeforeAlexander's death.21He may havesentcontingentsin advance,but noneare
recordedandAlexander's explicitinstructionswerethathe shouldbringout thereinforcements
in person.In anycasethe politicalsituationwastense,with Antipaterwaveringon the brinkof
revolt,andheishardlylikelyto havesentawayprimephalanxmenif therewasanypossibilityof
their being used againsthim subsequently.I concludethat the Macedonianinfantrywith
Alexanderbeforethe Opismutinytotalledat least18,00022andwassignificantlystrongerthan
the originalphalanxwhichhadcrossedthe Hellespontin 334-
That is the reverseof what one would expect. The last ten yearshad seen continuous
campaigning, not only majorbattlesandsiegesbutalsoincessantguerillawarfarewith constant
in
skirmishing thecountryside. Therehadalsooccasionally beendetachments of phalanxtroops
to serveasgarrisons(notablyin Egypt),andfrom330disabledMacedonians hadregularlybeen
settledin thedozensof militarysettlementsestablished in theeastof theempire.23Thevagaries
of naturealsoplayeda part.Therearerepeatedreportsof naturaldisasters, suchasthecrossingof
the desertto the Oxus, the winterstormin Sogdiana,and,aboveall, the calamitouspassage
acrossthe Gedrosian desert;andtherearesuggestionsin thesourcesthatthelossestheyincurred
surpassed any battlecasualties.24
Finallytheremusthavebeenconstantattritionthroughfatigue,
sicknessandaccident.Evenin the incompleterecordprovidedby Arrianthereis animpressive
listof seniorofficerswho diedfromdisease,25 andthecasualtyratewill havebeenhigheramong

19 Arr.vii 23.3-4. Milns(n. 7) 127 f., believingin a
maximumof 3,000 Macedonianinfantry,arguesthat
only c. 12,000of the Persianswere usedin the mixed
phalanx.It is morelikely(if thedetailis to be contested)
that the total figure in Arrianis roundedup. One
obviouslycannotlay emphasison thissinglepassagein
isolation,butit doescoherewiththerestof thehistorical
datafor the phalanxinfantryafterAlexander'sdeath.
20 Brunt
(n. 7) 38-39.
21 Arr. vii 12.4
(cf. Justinxii 14.5; Curt. x 10.15;
Metz Epitome87). For the politicalbackgroundsee E.
Badian,JHSlxxxi (1961)36-37 (theobjectionsof G. T.
Griffith,PACAviii [1965112 if. arenot convincing;cf.
Bosworth,CQ xxi [19711125f.; Schachermeyr [n. 3]
516-5518).The patternof reinforcements duringAlex-
ander'sreignis arguedin greaterdetailbelow(pp.5-9).
22 The numberwould be even higherif Curtius'
figure of 13,000 infantryand 2,000 cavalry(x 2.8)
referredto theMacedonian forcesleftafterthedemobili-
sationof Craterus'veterans.Unfortunatelythe text is
not sufficientlyexplicit. Curtiusseems to distinguish
betweentwo groupsof Macedonians,those demobi-
lised and those retained by Alexander (x 2.12, 16). But
thereis a furtherassumptionthatthetroopsretainedare 'Strapazenberichte'.
intendedas a permanentgarrisonarmyin Asia(x 2.8, 25 Arr. iii 5.5
12),andthe figuresgivenareexplicitlyfiguresfor that (Coenus), vi 27.I (Thoas), vii 14.1 (Hephaestion).
permanentarmy. In other words there were three
groups, the Opis veterans, Alexander'sroyal army and
the garrisonarmy of Asia. One cannot imagine the king
assigning all or the majority of his Macedonians to a
force which he would not personallycommand, and it is
hard to avoid the conclusion that Curtius' source
intended the total of 13,000 to include mercenaries
(Berve, [n. 7] i 134; Bosworth, JHS c [1980] I9; Brunt,
Arrianii [n. 7] 489). There is a strong hint that that is so
in the words Alexanderis made to utter a few lines later,
when he claims that the soldiers with grounds for
complaint are the minority of the army, utpote cum
plures dimiserim quam retenturussum (x 2.19). The troops
retained were less than those discharged, less than
0,000ooo,and Curtius' figure for the Asian army, if it is
correctly transmitted, cannot comprise Macedonians
alone.
23 Arr. iv 4.I;
cf. iv 22.5, 24.7, v 1.5, 27.5. Some
foundationssuch as Nicaea and AlexandriaCharaxwere
settled exclusively by mercenaries (Arr. v 29.3, vii 21.7),
but it seems that when Macedonian disabled were
available they were settled in the colonies.
24 Curt. vii 5.15; Arr. vi 24.I. H. Strasburger, Hermes
lxxx (1952) 470-473, gives an impressive list of
(Arrhybas), iii 25.4 (Nicanor), vi 2.I
 ALEXANDERTHE GREAT AND THE DECLINEOF MACEDON 5
the commonsoldiers.The sourcesprovidefew details,but thereare consistentreferencesto
Alexander'sfieldhospital26andone may assumethatdeathstherewere frequent.Thereis an
interestingextractfrom the contemporaryNearchusdescribingAlexander'suse of native
doctorsto dealwith casesof snakebite in India.He notesthe relativeabsenceof diseasethere
becauseof the lack of climaticvariation27-a telling comment,sincethe Macedonians had
experienced all the rigours of the monsoon rains,28and it that
suggests losses
from the extremes
of climatein the Iranianplateauwerevery high. The potentialities for wastagein Alexander's
campaigns were trulyimmense, and thereis an instructiveparallel.In 48 Bc Caesararrivedin
Alexandriawith two legions.They numbereda mere 3,200, lessthanhalf strength:'the rest
couldnot follow, exhaustedby wounds,by toil andby the immensityof thejourney'(BCiii
106.2). One of theselegions(XXVII)hadbeenrecentlylevied29andthe rigoursof battleand
travelhadreducedit to lessthanhalfits strengthwithina year.The pressures on Alexander's
army were at least as great as those experiencedby Caesar'sunfortunaterecruits,and they
continuedfor ten mortalyears.Even if we posit exceptionaltoughnessand resiliencefor
Alexander's veterans(whichwassurelythe case),we canhardlysupposethateven 50%of the
originalexpeditionary forcesurvivedtheyearsof campaigning.30 Theonestatementwe haveis
thatof Diodorus,who claimsthat 6,000of the veteranswith Crateruswere from the group
which crossedinto Asiawith Alexander,4,000 were takeninto the armyduringthe passage
(xviii 16.4). Unfortunatelythe precisenuancesof the distinctioncannot be recovered.31
Diodorusdistinguishes an earlieranda latergroupof Macedonians, but we cannotassumethat
the 6,ooowereallsurvivorsfromthe groupwhichcrossedthe Hellespontin 334.32 As we shall
see, that original force was immenselysupplementedby reinforcementswhich reached
Alexanderin AsiaMinorover the next year.In a sense,all the infantrywhich foughtat Issus
couldbe classedas crossingwith Alexander,at leastin the eyesof an authorlike Hieronymus
who was writingexplicitlyfrom the standpointof 322 BC.
Theconclusionis now inevitable.If Alexander's phalanxinfantrytotalled18,oooor moreat
Opisin 324, theremusthavebeenenormousreinforcements drawnfromMacedoniaitself.To
some degreethose reinforcements are documentedin the sources,but we must bewareof
assumingthatall the contingentsarerecorded.Our recordsarepartial,eachauthorgiving a
differentselectionof reports,aswe shouldof courseexpect.All extantsourcesarederivativeand
nonehaveanyreasonto be exhaustivein recordingroutinedetail.Evenso, theevidencefor the
yearafterthecrossingis impressive.Inthe springof 333thenewlymarriedsoldiersrejoinedthe
mainarmyin Gordiumaftera winterin Macedondevotedto rest,recreation-andprocreation;
andwiththemwasa newlyleviedcontingentincluding3,000Macedonian infantry(Arr.i 29.4).
A little later, at Ancyra,CurtiusRufus reportsthe arrivalof an unspecifiednumberof
reinforcements fromMacedon(iii 1.24). Thiscouldbe an entirelynew levy, but we cannotbe
26
applies to the entirety of Alexander'sarmy, not merely
Arr. ii 7.1, iv 16.6, v 8.3, vi 25.2-3; cf. Berve (n. 7)
i 196 f. the Macedonians.In particularit is difficultto identify
27 Arr.
Ind. Is.I1-I2 (cf Strabo xv 1.45 the sea referred to in the passage. Is it the Aegean (in
[706])= FGrH 133 F I0o. which case the army of 334 is meant) or is it the
28 Diod. xvii 94.3 (70 days' rain);Straboxv 1.27 Mediterranean (which Alexander left only in the
(698). summer of 33I)? If the former were intended, one
29 ItfirstservedunderL. Cassius Longinus(Caes.BC would expect an explicit reference to the Hellespont.
iii 34.2) andwasthentransferred to thecommandof Q. The balance of probability must tip in favour of the
FufiusCalenus(BCiii 56.2). In the interimit suffered second alternative.
defeat at the hands of Scipio (Dio. xli 51.2; P. A. 32 Brunt (n.
7) 38 n. 35 is inclined to distinguish
Brunt, Italianmanpower[Oxford 1971] 692). cf. between the veterans of campaigns before Gaugamela
30 Brunt (n. 7) 38 n. 35 takesa 5o% survival rate as a and those from later reinforcements. If we include the
maximum; Milns' estimate (In. 71 112) of 38% casualties expeditionary force of 336/5, Alexander'sMacedonian
is unacceptably low. infantry may have totalled as much as 15,000 in 334
31 CompareArr.Ind.19.5(fromNearchus): a~vvo01 (above, pp. 2-3), and 6,000 of them may have survived
drr6 0ahaadorlS TEaGT6S vilyayE Ki a0I015 OV rri to Opis. Even so, the survivorsfrom the veteransof the
o'AAoylv
a rT( o-r
OTpaTi&a
-
T"EppIOVTESi KOV EXov- crossing were not all discharged;some at least remained
-rTE.This is a similar distinction between the original to serve with the argyraspides (cf. Diod. xix 41.1-2).
force and later supplements,but it is much vaguer and
6 A. B. BOSWORTH
sure. It may be a variant report of the reinforcements whose arrival Arrian places at Gordium-
there are similar variations elsewhere in the notices of arrivals of new contingents.33 More
significant, however, is a report of 5,ooo infantry and 8oo cavalry, who arrived from Macedon
when Alexander was on the point of invading Cilicia, in the late summer of 333. The source is
Polybius (xiii 19.2), quoting Callisthenes of Olynthus, Alexander's first historian and an eye-
witness of the event. The report does not recur elsewhere and it has been persistently
disbelieved,34 but it is precise, detailed and totally credible. If it is not repeated in other sources, it
is yet another testimony to their fragmentary nature. That is not all. Curtius (iii 7.8) notes that a
further contingent of reinforcements was on its way from Macedonia but had not arrived when
the battle was fought, around November 333. Again, the passage has been dismissed as
'imaginative writing',35 but it reads factually and there is no rhetorical pointing. If Curtius has
invented the detail, it is a very unobtrusive invention and immediately discarded. I see no
problem in accepting that a contingent was genuinely on its way from Macedon. If so, at least
three and possibly four groups of reinforcements were sent from the homeland in the course of
the campaigning season of 333; two of those groups totalled 8,ooo infantry and the sum total of
the groups may not have been far short of the phalanx numbers of the original army. That is not
surprising. Alexander knew that he had to meet the national army of Darius. He knew the
Persian king had been systematically amassing forces, in particular Greek mercenaries.36 He
knew that he was not the favourite to win the encounter.37 It was only to be expected that he
would concentrate the maximum possible number of Macedonian phalanx troops for this
coming battle, the most crucial and decisive of the reign. And, as we have seen, the facts of
progressive wastage entail that the original corps of phalanx troops was massively reinforced. It
should come as no surprise to find traces of those massive reinforcements in the source tradition.
After Issus the need for reinforcements continued. The following year, 332
Be, saw the epic
seven month siege of Tyre and the hardly less epic siege of Gaza. Even the official court tradition
of Arrian with its propagandist casualty figures cannot obscure the fact that losses were
appalling.38 Accordingly a senior officer, Amyntas son of Andromenes, was dispatched with ten
triremes across the winter seas (when shipping was normally closed) on an urgent recruiting
mission to Macedonia. He was active and rigorous, and he built up an army 15,000 strong,
6,000
of whom were Macedonian phalanx troops.39 This recruiting took some months and it was
apparently plagued by draft dodging,40 but Amyntas was on his way east by midsummer 331
and he rejoined Alexander in Sittacene (between Babylon and Susa) towards the end of the
year.41 It had been nearly two years since the last recorded Macedonian reinforcements, and we
33The clearest case is the arrival of Amyntas' of absenteesfrom the battle).
reinforcements (below), which is placed by Arrian 35 J. E. Atkinson,A commentary
onQ. CurtiusRufus'
(iii 16.io) at Susa, by Curtius (v 1.39) at Babylon, and HistoriaeAlexandriMagni:Books3 and4 (Amsterdam
by Diodorus (xvii 65.1) midway in Sittacene. 1980) 181.
34 Berve (n. 7) i 179 suggested that the total was a 36 Arr. ii 2.1; Curt. iii 3.1. See further Bosworth (n.
conflation of all reports of reinforcementsbetween the 2) I8I; Atkinson(n. 35) 115f-
Hellespont and Issus;K.J. Beloch (Griechische Geschichte 37 Aeschin.iii 164;Diod.xvii 32.4;Joseph.Aj xi 315
iii2. 2 [Berlin I923] 331 f.) that it was a garbledreportof f.
Arrian'sGordium reinforcements(so Milns [n. 7] 38 Cf. Arr.ii 21.3, 22.6-7. Thevulgate
accountis
Io6).
Neither view is cogent. Polybius' report is detailed, vivid and explicit about casualties;see Bosworth,
giving precisenumbersand a fairly preciselocation, and 'Arrianand the AlexanderVulgate',Fond.Hardtxxii
it cannot be combined with any other material in the (1976) 17-20.
sources. He does not mention the reinforcements at 39 ForAmyntas'missionseeDiod.xvii 49.1;Curt.iv
Gordium and Ancyra, but that is immaterial. His 6.30. The numbersof his reinforcements areprovided
purpose is to prove that the Macedonian forces could by thevulgatealone(Diod.xvii 65.I; Curt.v 1.40-42).
not be deployed in the terrain of Issus in the phalanx 40 Curt.vii 1.37-40.Thecontextis a forensicspeech,
formation described by Callisthenes, and, given his but the statementis detailed,specificallynamingthree
erroneous assumption that the phalanx comprised all reluctantconscripts.Thereis no warrantfor dismissing
Alexander's infantry, it was easy to demonstrate. He it as invention.
only needed Callisthenes'figures at the crossing and the 41 This chronologyhas controversialimplications
most recent reinforcements. It was not necessary for for the interpretationof Agis' war Bosworth,
him to chase up each and every reinforcementreported Phoenixxix 35-37; Atkinson (cf.483 but
[1975] [n. 35] f.),
by Callisthenes(he is content with a theoreticalestimate they are fortunately irrelevant to the issue here.
 ALEXANDERTHE GREAT AND THE DECLINEOF MACEDON 7
cannotexcludethe possibilityof smallercontingentshavingarrivedin the interim.Alexander
hadto meetthePersianarmyagain,thistimein Mesopotamia, andhisneedforphalanxtroops
was undiminished.Antipaterwas still sending reinforcements,like the small group of
mercenaries andThracians whosearrivalin Egyptis casuallynotedby Arrian(iii5.I). Theremay
well havebeensome minorcontingentsof Macedonianinfantry.
After 331 there is no record of furtherreinforcementsof Macedonians.Given the
incompletenatureof our sourcesthis might be fortuitous;but thereis reasonto thinkthat
reinforcements of Macedonian infantrywerein shortsupplyin the latterpartof the reign.The
sourcescontinueto give a recordof thearrivalof freshlevies,butthevastmajorityrecordedare
mercenaries.42 Inthesummerof 330Alexanderdischarged hisalliedinfantryandsentthemwest
to the Ciliciancoast.43The officerwho accompanied themwasEpocillus,sonof Polyeides.He
returnednearlytwo yearslater,in the earlymonthsof 328.Withhimweresubstantial forcesof
mercenariesfrom the satrapiesof Asia Minor.44There was a large contingentof 8,ooo
(including600cavalry)fromAntipater,butCurtiusis explicitthattheywereGreeks.Elsewhere
he clearlydistinguishes Greeksfrom Macedonians in the reinforcements,45 and,unlesshe was
we
totallycareless, can only assume thatthebulk of the sent
contingent by Antipaterconsistedof
mercenaries from Greeceproper.Two yearsbeforehe had sentout a body of 3,000Illyrians
(Curt.vi 6.35).It looksas thoughAntipaterwas conscribingleviesfrompeopleswho werehis
potentialenemieswhile retainingwhat remainedof the Macedonianinfantry.Alexander
apparently wasnot happy.Inthespringof 327Epocillusandtwo otherofficersreturnedto their
homelandwith specificinstructions'to bring up the army from Macedonia'(Arr.iv 18.3).
Nothingmoreis heardof thiscommissionandthereis no recordof anylargeMacedonian army
joiningAlexanderafterhisreturnfromIndia.46Indeedtheinstructions receivedby Craterusin
324,to replaceAntipaterandsendhimto Asiaat theheadof a fresharmyof Macedonians (Justin
xii 12.9; Arr. vii 12.4), almost presupposesthat there had been no large scale movements of
native Macedoniansin the recent past. But the mission of Epocilluswas probablynot
Alexander's firstattemptatacquiringa newinjectionof phalanxsoldiers.Intheearlysummerof
329the kinghadsenthomea smallcontingentof Macedonian veterans(Arr.iii 29.5), andtheir
commanderswere probablydetailedto levy new forces,as was Epocillustwo yearslater.
Whetheror not theyweresentto recruit,a verylargebodyof reinforcements didcome (Diod.
xvii 95.4 speaksof 30,000 foot and6,ooocavalry).It caughtup with Alexander just beforethe
startof hisIndusvoyagelatein 326. Thesereinforcements wereevidentlydescribedin detailby
Cleitarchus, whosenarrativeis summarised by DiodorusandCurtiusRufus.47Neitherof these
extantreportsspeaksof Macedonians, andDiodorusanalysesthe reinforcements as 'alliesand
42
Berve(n. 7) i 184 givesa convenientsummaryof armybefore327andsentto Macedonwith Epocillus-
the data. thereweretwo distinctindividuals). The otherMedian
43 Arr.iii 19.5-6;Diod. xvii 74.3-4. commanders rejoinedAlexanderin Carmania, bringing
44 Curtius (vii 10.11-12) gives the only detailed the bulk of the holdingarmy(Arr.vi 27-3). I
suggest
of
report figures. Arrian (iv 7.2) confirmsthe dateand that Menidaswas summonedlaterand broughtwith
agreeson the namesof the principalcommandersof him the residualforceof mercenarycavalry.If so, he
contingents. was untaintedby the accusationsof corruptionmade
45 Cf Curt. v 1.4-41: Macedonum peditumVI againsthis colleagues,for he continuedin favourat
milia. .. cumhisDC Thracas, adiunctis eiusdem court(cf.Arr.vii 26.2).
peditibus
generisIII milibusD et ex Peloponneso mercennarius
miles 47 Diod. xvii95.4 (totalsonly:30,000 infantry,6,ooo
adIIII miliaadvenerat. cavalry,25,000 infantrypanopliesand ioo talentsof
46 A certainMenidasarrivedin
Babylon in 323, medicine);Curt.ix 3.21 (Memnonbrings5,ooocavalry
bringinghisunitof cavalry(Arr.vii 23.1). He is usually from Thrace,7,000mercenaryinfantryfromHarpalus
identifiedwith the Menidassentwith Epocillusin 327, and 25,000 gold and silver panoplies). The
and it is suggestedthat he brought one of several clearlygavea detailedlist of contingentswhichoriginal
Curtius
contingents from Macedon (Berve ii 257 no. 508; Brunt reproduced verypartiallywhileDiodorusrecordedthe
[n. 7] 39; Milns [n. 7] 10o9).But Arriancombines grandtotalalone.If therewasa Macedonian
Menidas'arrivalwith the arrivalof the satrapsof Caria as arguedby Brunt(Arrianii [n. 7] 488-89),contingent
it wasnot
andLydia.He is, I think,the Menidasassignedto the particularlyprominent,for it is excludedfrom both
garrisonof Mediain 330 (Arr.iii 26.3:paceBerve,there reports.
is no reasonto thinkthathe was recalledto the main
8 A. B. BOSWORTH
mercenariesfrom Greece'. That implicitly excludes Macedonians,and, while one cannot state
dogmatically that the reinforcementsof 326 containedno Macedonianinfantry,it is clearthat
the vast bulk comprised mercenaries.
The evidence indicatesthat the great majority of Alexander'sphalanx infantrywas taken
from Macedonbefore the end of 331 BC. All of these men who survivedweathereda minimum
of seven yearsof campaigningin conditionsvirtually guaranteedto producea large wastage,48
and, if the phalanxat Opis was some I8,ooo strong, it follows that a minimum of 30,000 men
(perhapsnearer40,000) were taken out of Macedon between 334 and 331. The few explicit
figures given in our lacunosetraditioncome to a total of 26,000, and, as we have seen, Curtius
Rufus recordsother contingents of unspecifiedstrength. The patternis clear, and the drainon
Macedonianmanpower, particularlyin the year before Issus,must have been prodigious. The
effectsare difficultto trace,as so few precisefiguresare transmitted;but it is clearthat Antipater
was seriouslyembarrassedby the military emergenciesin the latter yearsof Alexander'sreign.
When the Spartanking Agis III went to war in the Peloponneseand laid siege to Megalopolis
(331/o), Antipaterhad difficultiesmobilisingan army.49Eventuallyhis forcesnumbered40,000,
but we have no idea of theircomposition except thattherewas a huge influxof mercenariesfrom
alliedGreekstates.50The proportionof native Macedoniansmay have been relativelysmall.We
are better served for the Lamian War of 323/2 BC. Immediately after Alexander's death
Antipaterwas faced by an allianceof the Greek states of the south, led by the Atheniansand
Aetolians.Trouble had been brewing for nearly two years,but even so the forces mobilisedby
Antipaterwere surprisinglysmall.The army he led into Thessalycomprised13,oooinfantryand
6oo cavalry. That was the entire force, and we cannot assume that all the infantry were
Macedonianphalanxmen.51 PresumablyAntipater,like Alexanderbefore him and Cassander
later, used Paeonianand Illyrianauxiliaries.Certainly Diodorus (xviii 12.2), who here draws
upon the contemporary Hieronymus of Cardia, notes that Macedon was drained of citizen
troops becauseof the bulk of reinforcementssent to Asia-welcome confirmationof what is
overwhelmingly implied by the attestedfigures.As yet Macedoniawas not exhausted.Antipater
could leave behindhis lieutenantSippaswith forcesof his own and a commissionto levy further
troops.52But Antipaterhimself was in desperatestraits,compelled to undergo a siege at Lamia.
He was reinforcedfirstby Leonnatus,the new satrapof HellespontinePhrygia,who joined him
with 20,000 foot and 1,500 horse. These forces included some of Sippas' new recruitsfrom
Macedon, but the bulk were probably mercenaries.53It was only the long delayed arrivalof
Crateruswith his 10,000 veteransof Alexander'scampaignswhich raisedAntipater'sforces to
40,000 for the decisive battle of Crannon.54The numbersare deceptively impressive,and we
lack the key figure, the number of phalanx infantry available to Antipater at the time of
Alexander'sdeath. I do not think that it was more than io,ooo, and the forces of Antipater

48 Note the comments of Diodorus (xvii 94.1-2) and alternative, thathe omitteda non-Macedonian contin-
Arrian (v 27.5-6: Coenus' speech). Even if rhetorically gent,is mostimprobable. IfAntipaterhadfarmorethan
pointed they represent the conventional view in anti- 13,000 foot at the outset,it is hardto explainhis later
quity. discomfiture,and the attestednumbersat Crannon
49 Aeschin. iii 165 Xp6voV cuvViyE aTpa- appearsurprisingly small.
(1TioAv
T-6rES0v). I have argued elsewhere (Phoenix xix [19751 52 Diod. xviii 12.2: &TrAlTrrE
ac-rparfyb6v liTrTrav,
38 ff.) that this recruitingtook place over the winter of S0 o-Y TpartrlcTas Troi iKavovS KTi WrapayyEicAa
331/o. The delay, however, is a fact and independent of aTpaToAoyElvcjs TrhAilTroUs.
the exact chronology. 53 Diod. xviii 14.5 Leonnatus seems to have
50 Diod. xvii 63.1. The alliesare not named, but they modelled himself on Alexander, with a vanguard of
probablyincluded Corinth, Argos and Messeniaas well Nisaean horses and his own agema of Companions
as the northern members of the Corinthian League (cf. ('Suda' s.v.
AE6vvaTros=Arr. Succ. F 12 [Roos]-
E. I. McQueen, Historia xxvii [1978] probably describing the advance through northern
40-5I). Antipater
had a large pool of allies antipatheticto Sparta. Greece). Unfortunately this permits no inference about
51 Diodorus (xviii 12.2) terms all Antipater's the proportion of Macedoniansin his army.
infantry MaKE56VES,but the blanket designationmeans 54 Diod. xviii 16.4-5. Antipater and Craterus
very little. He probably inferred that all the troops on retainedan army of 30,000 for the campaignagainstthe
the Macedonian side were native Macedonian. The Aetolians over the winter of
332/I (Diod. xviii 24-1).
 ALEXANDERTHE GREAT AND THE DECLINEOF MACEDON 9
combinedwith thenew leviesof Sippaswill hardlyhavebeengreaterthantheoriginalphalanx
that Alexandertook over the Hellespontin 334. In that case the reservesof Macedonian
manpowerin 323werelessthana half,probablynearera third,of whattheyhadbeenin 334.Itis
nor surprising thatAntipaterwas reluctantto releasemorephalanxtroopsfor the Asianfront
afterthe shockof Agis'war,andhisreluctanceto sendtroopsmusthavebeena majorfactorin
the deterioration of relationsbetweenthe king andhis regent.
The drainof reinforcements hada profoundeffect.Few of the men Alexandertook with
himeverreturned.An unspecified butsmallgroupof veteransanddisabledweresentbackfrom
theOxusin 329,55butthatis theonlyrecordedrepatriation of Macedoniansbeforethereleaseof
Craterus'Io,ooo in 324. Even these veterans,for all Alexander'spromises,never took up
residenceagainin Macedonia.Afterfightingat Crannontheywent on to campaignin Aetolia
over the winterof 322/I andwere immediatelyembroiledin the civil war againstPerdiccas
whichbrokeout in thespringof 321.ThenbothCraterus andAntipaterledexpeditionary forces
into AsiaMinor,and Craterus'infantryalonenumbered20,000,most of whom were battle
hardenedMacedonians (Diod.xviii 30.4). Craterusmusthaveretainedhisveteransasa fighting
body. After their defeat at Eumenes'handsthey madetheirway to Antipaterand underhis
leadership reached the victory conferenceat Triparadeisus. The following year Antipater
returnedhomewithwhatremainedof thenationallevy (Diod.xviii 39-7),sadlydepletedby the
year'scampaigning.It was weakenedstillfurtherby the detachmentof forcesto combatthe
Perdiccanarmiesstill operatingin Asia Minor. Antigonusalone had 8,500 infantryfrom
Antipater's invasionarmy,andeven Arrhidaeus, the relativelyhumblesatrapof Hellespontine
Phrygia, is attestedin command of I,ooo Macedonian troopsin 319.5-6Therestof the armyof
Alexanderwas splitup amongthe Successors, all of whom placeda high premiumon native
Macedonian troops.Many of thesedied on campaign,likethefamousSilverShieldswho ended
theircareerof gloryin 316,whentheyweredispersed,the mostformidableassignedto distant
Arachosiato be deliberatelydecimatedon suicidemissionsandthe restorderedto remoteand
difficultgarrisonduty.57Thosewho were discharged remainedin Asiato formthe nucleusof
thenew settlements. Veryfew everreturnedto Macedonia.I canfindno recordexceptfor3,o000
mutinoussoldiersof Antigonuswho successfully forcedtheirreleasein the winterof 321/20.58
The overwhelmingmajoritylived anddiedoutsidethe countryof theirbirth.
ForMacedoniaproperthe generationof Alexanderwasliterallya deadgeneration.Within
threeyearsthekinghadremovedover30,000menin theirprimeandremovedthemtotally.For
breedingpurposesthey were gone forever.Alexanderdid once makethe populargestureof
sendinghomethenewlymarriedmen,butthataffecteda smallnumberoverthe limitedperiod
of winter 334/3 (Arr.i 24.1-2). And it was an unrepeatable concession.Henceforwardthe
Macedonianswould form liaisonswith the women of Asia and theiroffspringbecamethe
childrenof thecamp.Thisnew generationhadno domicile,andAlexandermadeit hisbusiness
that they shouldremainin Asia.Eventhe familiesof Craterus'veteranswere separatedand
retainedwith the main army at Opis.59Back in Macedoniathe birthratecould only have
declined. For a time there was a respite as the children born towards the end of Philip's reign
grew into manhood,60 but there was necessarily a deterioration with the generation born after
55 Arr. iii 29-5:T" v Tr McaKE•E56VCOV 1'-rlhAE? TroU' 58 Polyaen. iv 6.6. The episode has been variously
rTrpEauvrdaTroU Kai 5rl .Tr" oiKou dated, but it took place when Antigonus was wintering
wrTroPous... in Cappadocia. The best context seems to be the
a&rTo-rEIhEv.
56 Arr. Succ. F. 1.43; Diod.
xix 29.3 (Antigonus); operations against Eumenes after Triparadeisus.Then
Diod. xviii 5 .I (Arrhidaeus: I,ooo Macedonians to Antigonus had only 5,000 of the Macedonians given
1o,ooo mercenaries and 500 Persian bowmen and him by Antipater (cf. Diod. xviii 40.7 with R. Engels,
slingers).The lattermay well have served with Craterus MH xxxviii [1971] 228 f.). The mutineers may already
Diod. xviii 16.4), to be transferredto Arrhidaeus' have been discharged.
(cf.
command after Triparadeisus. 59 Arr. vii 12.2; cf.Justinxii 4.1-II.
57 Diod. xix 48.3-4; Polyaen. iv 6. 15; Plut. Eum. 19. 60 In 3 18 BCPolyperchon was able to raisean army of
For a survey of Macedoniantroops in the armies of the 20,000 Macedonian infantry and 4,ooo allies for his
Successorssee Launey (n. 8) i 295-303. invasion of Attica (Diod. xviii 68.3) and in 321, even
10 A. B. BOSWORTH
334BC.Theyearsafter320 wouldhaveseenanabruptreductionof potentialrecruitsin theirlate
teens.Yet againwe areat themercyof oursources,whichgiveno comprehensive accountof the
militaryforcesof Macedonduringthisperiodof decline.Themosttellingepisodetookplacein
302 BC. InthatyearCassander, thekingof Macedon,facedaninvasionof Thessalyat thehands
of DemetriusPoliorcetes,who was moving northfrom Athenswith a massivearmy some
56,ooostrong.Itwasa desperate crisis,andwe areexplicitlytoldthatCassander concentrated all
hisforcesto meet the invadingarmy.Thesecomprised29,00o foot and2,000 horse.61 Thetotal
is not brokendown into contingents,and we cannottell what proportionof the whole the
Macedonianphalanxformed. What is more, these figuresdo not do full justice to the
Macedonianreservesat thisperiod,for a portionof the army(probablysmall)was servingin
AsiaMinorwith Lysimachus62 andwe haveno totalfor it. None the lessCassander wasvastly
outnumberedby Demetriusand the forceshe was able to muster,includinghis allies,were
10,ooolessthanthosedeployedby Antipaterat Crannontwentyyearsbefore.Comparedwith
the forcesat Alexander'sdisposalthey were almostnugatory.
TheMacedonian armiesneverregainedtheirnumbers.At thebattleof Sellasiain 222BCthe
Macedonian infantrycomprised13,000outof a totalinfantrylineof 27,600 (Plb.ii 65.2-6). This
was an armyof the samedimensionsas Cassander's forcesin Thessaly,but the crisiswas less
intense,andAntigonusDosonmayhavekepta substantial portionof hisMacedonian infantryin
reserve.63 five
Twenty years later,
however, PhilipV was in desperatestraits
before thebattleof
his
Cynoscephalae, manpower reduced by the extravantwars of his reign. Even thoughhe
enlistedsixteenyearoldsandtimeexpiredveterans,hisnativeinfantrynumberedonly 18,000.64
This was the nadir.Philipand his son Perseusspentthe next generationin peace,actively
encouraging theprocreation of children,andby 172thepopulationwasconsidered adequatefor
war.65Evenso, the resourcesof Perseuscouldnot matchthoseof Alexander.Hisarmyin 171
wasthegreatestledby anyMacedonian kingsinceAlexandercrossedinto Asia(Liv.xlii 51.11);
out of a total of 39,000infantryalmosthalf were phalangites,and the full complementof
Macedonian infantrywas26,000 (Liv.xlii 51.3-1 ). Thenumbersareimpressive,buttheywere
theproductof yearsof peaceanddeliberatestimulationof thebirthrate.Theystillfell farshort
of Alexander's generation.The armyat Gaugamelaalonetotalled40,000foot;and,aswe have
seen, Alexander could draw over 30,000infantryfrom Macedoniawithin threeyears,still
leaving reservesof manpowerwithinthe homeland.Alexander'sconquests,for all theirglory,
were ultimatelyfatefulfor the militaryand politicaldestinyof Macedon.Philip'sreignhad
broughtthe countryto a positionof overwhelmingsupremacyin the Greekworld.By 335BC
the lessonof Chaeroneahadbeenunderscored by the destructionof Thebes.Macedonwas the
and her
supreme invincible, military dominance basedon reservesof manpowerwhichcould
not be remotelymatchedby any otherstate.By the end of Alexander's reignthe balancehad
beentipped.The actualarmiesof Macedonweredepletedandthe potentialfor supplementing
themdestroyed.In the openingengagementsof the LamianWarthe Macedonianforceswere
after the departure of the expeditionary forces of Heracleiain 304. Once again it is difficultto define what
Antipaterand Craterus,he was able to crush a revolt in is meantby 'Macedonians'.They werepresumablynot
Thessaly PIEr'& &ioAh6you (Diod. xviii allphalanxtroops,forthetotalMacedonian
component
Suvd&Ecos,
38.6; cf.H. D. Westlake, CR lxiii of Demetrius'armywas only 8,ooo (Diod. xx 110.4)
[I949] 90). In the latter
case no figure is given for the whole army, let alone the and he must have receiveda substantialnucleusof
native Macedonians, and in the former there is every Macedoniantroopsfrom his fatherAntigonus(he had
likelihood that the forces from Macedon included commanded 5,ooo during the Babylonian campaign of
mercenariesas well as citizen troops. 312 [cf. Diod. xix Ioo.4]).
61 Diod. xx 110.4; M. Fortina, Cassandro,re di 63 Plutarch (Arat.43.1) claims that Doson deployed
Macedonia(Turin 1965)cf.102-5. 20,000Macedonianinfantryin 224 BC, but once again
62 Diod. xx 107.I: the majority of these forces may there is no figure given for non-Macedonian
troops.
have come from the Autariatae settled by Cassander Plutarchmay haveassumedthatthe armywas wholly
around Mt. Orbelus-2,ooo of them are attested composedof nativeMacedonians.
serving with Lysimachus(Diod. xx 13.-3;cf. xix 19.1). 64 ForPhilip'slevy andits resultssee Liv. xxxiii 3.1-5,
According to Plutarch (Demetr.23.2) 6,ooo Macedo- 4.4-6.
nians had come over to Demetrius when he captured 65 Liv. xxxix 24.3; xlii I1.6.
 ALEXANDER THE GREAT AND THE DECLINE OF MACEDON II
both outnumberedand defeated, and it was alreadyobvious that the numericalsuperiorityof
Philip's reign could not be recovered.
These stark facts explain Alexander's posthumous reputation in his own country. His
ultimate successor,Cassander,was able to execute his mother and imprison his wife and son
without apparentresistancefrom the commons.66 Whether he conducted a personalvendetta
may perhaps be doubted. He may well, as Plutarch reports, have been deeply affected by
Alexander'sferociousbehaviourat Babylon, breakinginto a sweating fit at the very sight of a
statueof the king,67 but personalhostility was an expensiveluxury if it harmedhim politically.
As a usurperhe was bound to conciliate public opinion, not affrontit directly. There was no
questionof a damnatiomemoriae of the late king. Cassandercould himself commissiona painting
of the combat between Alexanderand Darius from the great Philoxenus of Eretria(Plin. NH
xxxv I Io), and thatpaintingwould commemoratethe victory of the Macedonianarmy asmuch
as the victory of Alexander.68 What seems clear is that the memory of Alexander was
subordinatedto that of his father.Cassanderwooed Philip'sdaughterCleopatraand eventually
marriedThessalonice,another of his daughters.He also paid conspicuoushonour to Philip III
and Eurydice,both progeny of Philip who had perishedat Olympias' agency.69 On the other
hand Rhoxane and Alexander IV were immured in Amphipolis, deprived of their royal
accoutrements70 and eventually murdered. There was no popular protest. Some resentment
there may have been. In 294, when Demetrius seized the Macedonian throne, the sons of
Cassandersufferedfrom theirfather'shostile attitudeto Alexander,and Demetriusexploited the
theme in his propaganda.71But it was a relativelyunimportantissue. Demetrius'greatestasset
was not his championshipof the dead Alexanderbut the fact that he was marriedto Phila, the
daughterof Antipaterand ex-wife of Craterus,whose memory was cherishedin Macedonia.72
By contrastthere was little attempt, even by Cassander'senemies, to mobilise Alexander's
memory against him. When Antigonus attacked his policies at Tyre in 315, his speech (as
recordedby Diodorus)does not mention Alexander.Cassander'sattackson his mother, wife and
son are interpretedas a means to secure the throne, not as an affrontto the late king, and the
restorationof Thebes is criticisedas the rebuilding of a city destroyed by the Macedonians.73
Cassander'simproper ambitions are the focus of the attack and his victim is not so much
Alexanderas the Macedonianpeople as a whole. If anything,Antigonusis avoiding referencesto
Alexander.He is certainlynot representinghim as wronged by Cassander.The one attempt to

66 For details and sourcessee R. M. 67 Plut.Alex.

Errington, 74.6.On thispassageseeG. Bendinelli,
'Alexanderin the Hellenisticworld', Fond.Hardtxxii RFIC xciii (1965)150-64;Fortina(n. 61) io--I.
68 Thisis conceded
(1976) 146-52. P. Goukowsky, Essaisur les originesdu by Goukowsky(n. 66)I io. The
mythed'Alexandre i (Nancy 1978) Io5-II (seealso his fact thatCassander calledone of his sons Alexanderis
Bude edition of Diodorus xvii, pp. xxiv-xxvi; F. immaterial: thenamewascommonin theArgeadhouse
Chamoux,in AncientMacedonia iii [Thessaloniki1983] and,for thatmatter,in Macedonia-it was not unique
57-66), dismissesthe entire traditionof Cassander's to the son of Philip.
hostility to Alexanderas a distortedecho of the 69 Diod. xx 37.4(Cleopatra); xix 52.1, 61.2 (Thessa-
propaganda of AntigonusandDemetrius.It is truethat lonice);xix 52.5 (PhilipandEurydice).Cf.Errington(n.
modernscholarshavebeentoo readyto infera vendetta 64) 152: 'paradoxically hisanti-Alexander policyrelied
againstthe entirememoryof Alexander.Theremust, very heavilyon the reputationof Philip.'
however, have been some hostile acts, as Plutarch 70 Diod. xix 52.4 (cf.Justinxiv 6.13). Thisdenialof
(Demetr. 37.3)emphasiseswhenhe describesasa matter royal privilegeis a strong argumentagainstGouk-
of facttheMacedonians' hatredfor whatCassander had owsky'sthesis([n. 66]1o6) thatRhoxaneand her son
done againstthe deadAlexander(&Kcaaav8pos eIs weremerelykeptin protectivecustodyto preventtheir
'AMcav8SpovrEeVTjK6Ta -rapEv6oIproEV). Demetrius being exploitedby other contendersfor power. Cas-
may havecapitalisedupon the hostilitybut he did not sanderwasdeliberately treatingthelegitimatekingasa
originateit. As for Antigonus,he was carefulnot to privateindividual.
invokethememoryof AlexanderagainstCassander (see 71 Plut. Demetr.
37.3;Justinxvi 1.15-17.
72 Plut. Demetr.
below).One cannotaccredithim with thecreationof a 37.4, cf. 14.2; Diod. xix 59.3-6.
myth. The verdictof Diod. xvii 117.2 is probablythe 73 I)iod. xix 61.2: 'ri BE cOS 'OAwuviouo 6v-ras
standardreactionto Cassander'sattestedactions,not an -TrOEaLpco-r6arovu MaKE86VCOV Kal
echo of propaganda.See also E. Mikrogiannakes, KaTC•KI'EV...
in e ailSpc &voTTrlae T&s ovrrr' MaKES6VCo V
AncientMacedoniaii (Thessaloniki See alsoJustinxv 1.3. KaT-r•cKa-
1977) 225-36.
psic•as.
12 A. B. BOSWORTH
capitaliseon the memory of the conquerorwas made by Olympias. When she invadedMacedon
in 317, the army of her rival Eurydiceimmediately desertedto her cause.74She emphasisedthe
supposedbenefitsconferredby her son and tried to denigratethe family of Antipateras assassins
who had removed him by poison (Diod. xix I1.8-9). At the same time she attacked the
surviving progeny of Philip, driving Philip Arrhidaeusand Eurydice to their deaths. Her
savageryprovoked popularrevulsion,and within a year Cassanderwas ableto invade Macedon,
besiege her in Pydna and finally have her condemned in absentiaby a general assembly of
Macedonians.75Her cruelty and vindictivenesshad largely causedher downfall, but the magic
of Alexander's name did nothing to help her. The evocation of his memory was totally
ineffectual.It is easy to see why. Alexanderthe king was a distantmemory in his homeland. He
had left it at the age of 22 and never returned.With him had gone a generationof men, and the
populaceat largewould have bittermemoriesof fathers,sons and brotherswho had disappeared.
He may have led his men to wealth and glory, but those who remainedhad little profit and
lasting grief. The hero of Macedon was Philip, who had built his country'ssupremacy.His son
had squanderedthat inheritance-in the eyes of the Macedoniansat least.
The view one takesof Alexanderis necessarilydependenton one's perspectiveas observer.
The modern scholar has the advantage of hindsight. He can see the ultimate result of the
movement of populationinto Asia which Alexanderinitiatedand the political consequencesof
his conquests.It is thereforeeasy to see him as the championof Hellenism,however remote such
an intention may have been from his mind. For his soldiers he was the great captain whose
leadershipsecuredvictory, glory and (in some cases) wealth, and, not surprisingly,it was his
veteranswho preservedhis memory with most reverenceand enthusiasm.For nations such as
the Egyptians and Babylonians he was a liberator who ended centuriesof hated rule by the
Persiansand imposed a r6gime of his own which had yet to be hated. For most of the people he
encountered,particularlythe Persians,Bactrians,Sogdiansand Indians,he was a destroyerwho
passedthrough the land with fire and slaughterto impresshis own domination. Paradoxicallyit
was as a destroyerthat Alexanderimpinged most upon Macedonitself. The finest generationof
fighting men producedin the ancientworld was snatchedfrom its homelandand taken to fight
and die in the recessesof Asia; and the country was set on a path of decline that proved
irreversible.From this perspectiveit is hard to understandthe once fashionablepicture of the
humanitarianAlexanderdreamingof the brotherhoodof man underhis enlightenedmonarchy.
However, I concede that he did achieve a unity-of a kind. I am remindedof the unforgettable
final scene of Ingmar Bergman's film, The SeventhSeal, in which the disparatecast, their
differencesat last reconciled, float hand in hand over the horizon in an etherealdance led by
Death triumphant. That was the unity of Alexander-the whole of mankind, Greeks and
Macedonians,Medes and Persians,Bactriansand Indians,linked together in a never ending
dance of death.
A. B. BOSWORTH
University of WesternAustralia

74Diod. xix 11.2 claims that the Macedonians 75 Diod. xix 35-36; Justin xiv
6. See Briant (n. I)
remembered the benefactions of Alexander and res- 297-99, E. Levy, Ktemaiii (1978) 208-9, and Errington,
pected the axioma of Olympias. Her propaganda Chironviii (1978) II8 If. for the constitutional signifi-
certainly stressed the achievements of her son, but it cance (or insignificance)of the trial of Olympias.
may have been her statusas Philip's wife which tipped
the balance xiv 5.Io: seu memoriamaritiseu
(cf. Justin
magnitudine filii).