People vs Umali G.R. No.

L-5803
Narciso Umali, Epifanio Pasumbal, and Isidro Capino are appealing directly to this Tribunal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon province finding them guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and
robbery, and sentencing each of them to "life imprisonment, other accessories of the law, to indemnify jointly and severally Marcial
Punsalan in the amount of P24,023; Valentin Robles in the amount of P10,000; Yao Cabon in the amount of P700; Claro Robles in the
amount of P12,800; Pocho Guan in the amount of P600; the heirs of Domingo Pisigan in the amount of P6,000; the heirs of Locadio
Untalan in the amount of P6,000; Patrolman Pedro Lacorte in the amount of P500; Lazaro Ortega in the amount of P300; Hilarion Aselo
in the amount of P300; Calixto Rivano in the amount P50; Melecio Garcia in the amount of P60; and Juanito Lector in the amount of
P90, each to pay one fifteenth of the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency due to the nature of the principal
penalty that is imposed upon them."

The complex crime of which appellants were found guilty was said to have been committed during the raid staged in the town of Tiaong,
Quezon, between 8:00 and 9:00 in the evening of November 14, 1951, by armed men. It is not denied that such a raid took place
resulting in the burning down and complete destruction of the house of Mayor Marcial Punzalan including its content valued at P24,023;
the house of Valentin Robles valued at P10,000, and the house of one Mortega, the death of Patrolman Domingo Pisigan and civilians
Vicente Soriano and Leocadio Untalan, and the wounding of Patrolman Pedro Lacorte and five civilians; that during and after the
burning of the houses, some of the raiders engaged in looting, robbing one house and two Chinese stories; and that the raiders were
finally dispersed and driven from the town by the Philippine Army soldiers stationed in the town led by Captain Alzate.

To understand the reason for and object of the raid we have to go into the political situation in Tiaong not only shortly before that raid
but one year or two years before it. Narciso Umali and Marcial Punzalan were old time friends and belonged to the same political
faction. In the general elections of 1947 Umali campaigned for Punzalan who later was elected Mayor of Tiaong. In the elections of
1949 Punzalan in his turn campaigned and worked for Narciso Umali resulting in the latter's election as Congressman. However, these
friendly relations between the two did not endure. In the words of Punzalan, Narciso Umali who as Congressman regarded himself as
the political head and leader in that region including Tiaong, became jealous because of his (Punzalan's) fast growing popularity among
the people of Tiaong who looked to him instead of Umali for political guidance, leadership, and favors. In time the strain in their relations
became such that they ceased to have any dealings with each other and they even filed mutual accusations. According to Punzalan, in
May 1950, Umali induced about twenty-six special policemen of his (Punzalan's) to flee to the mountains with their arms and join the
Huks, this is in order to discredit Punzalan's administration; that he was later able to contact two of his twenty-six policemen and tried to
persuade them to return to the town and to the service, but they told him that they and their companions would not surrender except
and with through the intervention of Congressman Umali, and so Punzalan had to seek Umali's intervention which resulted in the
surrender of the 26 men with their firearms; that thereafter Umali wanted to have their firearms, claiming that they all belonged to him
from his guerrilla days when he was a colonel, and that after liberation he had merely loaned them to the municipal authorities of
Tiaong to help keep peace and order; and that the refusal of Punzalan to grant Umali's request further strained their relations, and
thereafter Umali would not speak to him even when they happened to meet at parties.

On September 19, 1951, the Chief of Police of Punzalan disarmed four of Umali's men, including his bodyguard Isidro Capino who were
then charged with illegal possession of firearms. Umali interceded for his men and Col. Gelveson, Provincial Commander, sent a
telegram stating that the firearms taken away from the men were licensed. As a result the complaint was dismissed. This incident was
naturally resented by Umali and spurred him to have a showdown with Punzalan.

Then the elections of 1951 (November 13) approached and Punzalan ran for reelection. To oppose him, and to clip his political wings
and definitely blast his ambition for continued power and influence in Tiaong, Umali picked Epifanio Pasumbal, his trusted leader.

The pre-election campaign and fight waged by both factions — Punzalan and Pasumbal, was intense and bitter, even ruthless. The
election was to be a test of political strength and would determine who was who in Tiaong, — Umali or Punzalan. Umali spoke at
political meetings, extolling the virtues of Pasumbal and the benefits and advantages that would accrue to the town if he was elected, at
the same time bitterly attacking Punzalan, accusing him of dishonesty, corruption in office, abuse of power, etc. At one of those
meetings he told the audience not to vote for Punzalan because he would not be elected and that even if he won the election, he would
not sit for blood will flow, and that he (Umali) had already prepared a golden coffin for him (Punzalan). After denying the charges, in
retort, Punzalan would say that Umali as a Congressman was useless, and that he did not even attend the sessions and that his chair
in Congress had gathered dust, even cobwebs.

To help in the Umali-Pasumbal campaign, Amado Mendoza who later was to play the role of star witness for the prosecution, was
drafted. He was a compadre of Pasumbal and had some experience in political campaigns, and although he was not exactly a model
citizen, being sometimes given to drunkenness, still, he had the gift of speech and persuasion. In various political meetings he delivered
speeches for Pasumbal. He was ever at the back and call of Umali and Pasumbal, and naturally he frequented the latter's houses or
headquarters. The result of the elections plainly showed that Punzalan was the political master and leader in Tiaong. He beat
Pasumbal by an overwhelming majority of 2,221 votes. Naturally, Umali and Pasumbal were keenly disappointed, and according to the
evidence, adopted measures calculated to frustrate Punzalan's victory, even as prophesied by Umali himself in one of his pre-election
speeches about blood flowing and gold coffin.

Going back to the raid staged in Tiaong on November 14, 1951, it is well to make a short narration of the happenings shortly before it,
established by the evidence, so as to ascertain and be informed of the reason or purpose of said raid, the persons, behind it, and those
who took part in it. According to the testimony of Amado Mendoza, in the morning of November 12th, that is, on the eve of the election,
at the house of Pasumbal's father, then being used as his electoral headquarters, he heard Umali instruct Pasumbal to contact the
Huks through Commander Abeng so that Punzalan will be killed, Pasumbal complying with the order of his Chief (Umali) went to the
mountains which were quite near the town and held a conference with Commander Abeng. It would seem that Umali and Pasumbal had
a feeling that Punzalan was going to win in the elections the next day, and that his death was the surest way to eliminate him from the
electoral fight.

The conference between Pasumbal and Commander Abeng on November 12th was witnessed and testified to by Nazario Anonuevo, a
Huk who was under Commander Abeng, and who later took an active part in the raid. In the evening of the same day, Mendoza heard
Pasumbal report to Umali about his conference with Commander Abeng, saying that the latter was agreeable to the proposition and
had even outlined the manner of attack, that the Huks would enter the town (Tiaong) under Commander Lucio and Aladin, the latter to
lead the sector towards the East; but that Commander Abeng had suggested that the raid be postponed because Pasumbal may yet
win the election the following day, thereby rendering unnecessary the raid and the killing of Punzalan.

Continuing with the testimony of Amado Mendoza, he told the court that as per instructions of Umali he went to the house of the latter,
in the evening of November 14th, the day following the election, with the result of the election already known, namely, the decisive
victory of Punzalan over Pasumbal. He was told by Umali to come with him, and Pasumbal and the three boarded a jeep with Pasumbal
at the wheel. They drove toward the Tiaong Elementary School and once there he (Mendoza) was left at the school premises with
instructions by Umali to wait for Commander Abeng and the Huks and point to them the house of Punzalan. After waiting for sometime,
Abeng and his troops numbering about fifty, armed with garands and carbines, arrived and after explaining his identity and his mission
to Abeng, he had led the dissidents or part of the contingent in the direction of Punzalan's house and on arriving in front of the bodega
of Robles, he pointed out Punzalan's house and then walked toward his home, leaving the Huks who proceeded to lie flat in a canal.
Before reaching his house, he already heard shots, so, he evacuated his family to their dugout in his yard. While doing so he and his
wife Catalina Tinapunan saw armed men in the lanzones grove just across the street from their house, belonging to the father of Umali,
and among those men they saw Congressman Umali holding a revolver, in the company of Huk Commander Torio and about 20 armed
men. Afterwards they saw Umali and his companions leave in the direction of Taguan, by way of the railroad tracks.

It would appear from the evidence that the raid was well-planned. As a diversionary measure, part of the attacking force was deployed
toward the camp or station of the Army (part of 8th B.C.T.) in the suburbs and the camp was fired upon, not exactly to destroy or drive
out that Army unit but to keep it from going to the rescue and aid of the main objective of the raid. The rest of the raiding party went
toward Punzalan's house and attacked it with automatic weapons, hand grenades, and even with bottles filled with gasoline (popularly
known as Molotov's cocktail). It was evident that the purpose of the attack on Punzalan's house was to kill him. Fortunately, however,
and apparently unknown to the attackers and those who designed the raid, at six o'clock that morning of November 14th Punzalan and
his Chief of Police had left Tiaong to go to Lucena, the capital, to report the results of the election to the Governor.

The attack on the house of Punzalan was witnessed and described by several persons, including policemen who happened to be near
the house. Policeman Tomas Maguare who was in front of the house saw Epifanio Pasumbal, Isidro Umali (brother of Congressman
Umali) and Moises Escueta enter the gate of Punzalan's house and take part in the firing. Policeman Pedro Lacorte who was stationed
as guard at the gate of Mayor Punzalan's house recognized defendant Isidro Capino as one of those firing at the house. Lacorte said
that he was guarding the house of Punzalan when he suddenly heard shots coming from the sides of the house and going over to the
place to investigate, he saw armed men in fatigue and shouting "burn the house of Mayor Punzalan"; that he was hit on the left check
and later Isidro Capino threw at him a hand grenade and he was hit in the right forearm and in the right eye and became permanently
blind in said eye. Mateo Galit, laundryman who was sitting inside a jeep parked in front of the house of Punzalan recognized defendant
Pasumbal as one of the attackers who, once in the yard said ina loud voice as though addressing somebody in the house "Pare, come
down." Mrs. Punzalan who was then inside the house related to the court that at about eight in the evening while she was resting she
heard shots and rapid firing. As a precaution she took her children to the bathroom. Then she noticed that her house was being fired at
because the glass window panes were being shattered and she heard the explosion of a hand grenade inside the house, followed by
flares in the sala and burning of blankets and mosquito nets in the bedrooms and she noticed the smell of smoke of gasoline. Realizing
the great danger, she and the children ran out of the house and went to hide in the house of a neighbor.

Nazario Añonuevo declared in court that he was a farmer and was picked up and seized by Huk Commander Tommy sometime in
August 1951, and was taken to Mt. Banahaw in Laguna and mustered in the ranks of the Huks; that just before the elections of
November 13, 1951, he saw Pasumbal come to the mountains near Tiaong and talk to Commander Abeng; that on November 14th by
order of Commander Abeng he with other Huks left Mt. Banahaw for Tiaong; that when they crossed the Osiw River already near
Tiaong, they were met by Pasumbal and Capino; that when they were at the outskirts of the town, he and the party were told by
Commander Tommy to attack the 8th BCT camp in Tiaong to prevent the sending of army help to the town proper; that he took part in
firing on the camp which returned the fire in the course of which he was wounded; and that because of his wound he could not escape
with his companions to the mountains when the Army soldiers dispersed and drove them out of the town and so he was finally captured
by said soldiers.

As to defendants Pasumbal and Capino, their participation in and responsibility for the raid was duly established not only by the going
of Pasumbal on November 12th to the mountains following instructions of Umali, and conferring with Commander Abeng asking him to
raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan, but also by the fact that Pasumbal and Capino in the afternoon or evening of November 14th met the
Huks at the Osiw River as the dissidents were on their way to Tiaong and later Pasumbal and Capino were seen in the yard of
Punzalan firing at the house with automatic weapons and hand grenades.

What about Umali? His criminal responsibility was also established, tho indirectly. We have the testimony of Amado Mendoza who
heard him instructing Pasumbal to contact Commander Abeng and ask him to raid Tiaong and kill Punzalan. The rest of the evidence is
more or less circumstantial, but nonetheless strong and convincing. No one saw him take part in the firing and attack on the house of
Punzalan; nor was he seen near or around said house. Because of his important position as Congressman, perchance he did not wish
to figure too prominently in the actual raid. Besides, he would seem to have already given out all the instructions necessary and he
could well stay in the background. However, during the raid, not very far from Punzalan's house he was seen in the lanzonesan of his
father, holding a revolver and in the company of about 20 armed men with Huk Commander Torio, evidently observing and waiting for
developments. Then he and his companions left in the direction of Taguan.

Umali and Pasumbal, however, claim that during the raid, they were in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, about seven kilometers away
from Tiaong where a consolation party was being held. There is ample evidence however to the effect that they arrived in Pasumbal's
home only around midnight. An Army soldier named Cabalona who happened to be in Pasumbal's home arriving there earlier in the
evening and who was invited to take some refreshments said that he did not see the two men until they arrived about midnight when
the Army reinforcements from Lucena passed by on their way to Tiaong. Thus, we have this chain of circumstances that does not
speak in favor of Umali, or Pasumbal for that matter. But this is not all. There is the rather strange and unexplained, at least not
satisfactorily, behaviour of Umali and Pasumbal that evening of November 14th. Assuming for a moment as they claim, that the two
were not in Tiaong at the commencement of the raid between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m., and during the whole time the raid lasted, and that
they were all that time in the home of Pasumbal in Taguan, still, according to their own evidence, they were informed by persons
coming or fleeing from Tiaong that there was a raid going on there, and that some houses were burning. As a matter of fact,
considering the promixity of Taguan to Tiaong, a distance of about seven kilometers and the stillness and darkness of the night, the fire
and the glow produced by the burning of three houses and the noise produced by the firing of automatic weapons and the explosion of
the hand grenades and bottles of gasoline, could and must have been seen and heard from Taguan. The natural and logical reaction
on the part of Umali and Pasumbal would have been to rush to Tiaong, see what had really happened and then render help and give
succor to the stricken residents, including their own relatives. It will be remembered that the houses of the fathers of Umali and
Pasumbal were in Tiaong and their parents and relatives were residing there. And yet, instead of following a natural impulse and urge
to go to Tiaong, they fled in the opposite direction towards Candelaria. And Umali instead of taking the road, purposely avoided the
same and preferred to hike through coconut groves so that upon arriving in Candelaria, he was wet, and spattered and very tired. Had
they wanted to render any help to Tiaong they could have asked the police authorities of Candelaria to send a rescue party to that
town. Or better still, when the army reinforcements from Lucena sent at the instance of Punzalan, who at about eight or nine that
evening was returning to Tiaong from Lucena, found at the barrio or sitio of Lusakan near Tiaong that there was fighting in the town, he
immediately returned to Lucena to get army reinforcements to relieve his town, was passing by Taguan, where they were, Umali and
Pasumbal could have joined said reinforcements and gone to Tiaong. Instead the two continued on their way to the capital (Lucena)
where before dawn, they went and contacted Provincial Fiscal Mayo, a first cousin of Umali, and Assistant Fiscal Reyes and later had
these two officials accompany them to the Army camp to see Col. Gelveson, not for the purpose of asking for the sending of aid or
reinforcement to Tiaong but presumably to show to the prosecution officials, specially the Army Commander that they (Umali and
Pasumbal) had nothing to do whatsoever with the raid. Umali said he was trying to avoid and keep clear of Tiaong because he might be
suspected of having had some connection with the raid and might be the object of reprisal. As a matter of fact, according to Umali
himself, while still in Taguan that evening and before he went to Candelaria, somebody had informed him that Col. Legaspi of the Army
was looking for him. Instead of seeking Col. Legaspi and find out what was wanted of him, he left in the opposite direction and fled to
Candelaria and later to Lucena, and the next day he took the train for Manila. This strange act and behaviour of the two men,
particularly Umali, all contrary to impulse and natural reaction, and what other people would ordinarily have done under the
circumstances, prompted the trial court in its decision to repeat the old saying "The guilty man flees even if no one pursues, but the
innocent stands bold as a lion." We might just as well reproduce that portion of the decision of the trial court, to wit:

. . . Considering the fact that Taguan is very near Tiaong so that even taking it for granted as true, for the sake of argument, that the
said accused were really at the party of Pasumbal on the night in question, that would not prevent them from being in Tiaong between 8
and 9. Besides, why was it that night the hasag lamp was replaced with candles when the reinforcements passed through Taguan
about midnight of November 14, 1951. Why did Congressman Umali and company instead of going to Tiaong which was the scene of
the attack hurried towards Candelaria, after the reinforcement has passed and went to the house of Felix Ona walking through a muddy
path under the coconut groves? Why was Umali afraid to pass through the provincial road and preferred a muddy road instead? Was
he trying to conceal himself? Why did Pasumbal and company also go to the house of Ona? Why did they go to the house of Felix Ona
instead of going to the house of Manalo who could have given them better protection? And again why did Congressman Umali and the
other co-accused repaired and sought the company of Fiscal Reyes in going at such an early hour to the Army authorities, did they fear
any reprisal? From whom? Why did Umali go to Manila from Lucena on November 16, 1951? "The guilty man flees even if no one
pursues, but the innocent stands bold as a lion."

At first blush it would appear rather unbelievable that Umali and Pasumbal, particularly the former should seek the aids of the Huks in
order to put down and eliminate their political enemy Punzalan. It would seem rather strange and anomalous that a member of
Congress should have friendly relations with this dissidents whom the Government had been fighting all these years. But if we study the
evidence, it will be found that the reason and the explanation are there. As already stated, during the Japanese occupation, to further
the resistance movement, guerillas were organized in different parts of the Philippines. One of these was the guerilla unit known as
President Quezon's Own Guerillas (PQOG) operating in the provinces of Tayabas (now Quezon) and Laguna. Umali, Pasumbal,
Commander Abeng and even Punzalan himself were officers in this guerilla unit, Umali attaining the rank of colonel, and Pasumbal and
Punzalan that of Lieutenant-colonel, Pasumbal then being known as "Panzer". After Liberation, Abeng joined the dissidents, and
became a Huk Commander. It was not unnatural that Umali and Pasumbal should continue their friendship and association with
Commander Abeng and seek his aid when convenient and necessary. Umali admitted that he knew Huk Commander Kasilag. Graciano
Ramos, one of the witnesses of the prosecution told the court that way back in May 1950, in a barrio of San Pablo City he saw Umali
confer with Commander Kasilag, which Commander after the conference told his soldiers including Ramos that Umali wanted the Huks
to raid Tiaong, burn the presidencia and kidnap Punzalan. Of course, the last part of the testimony may be regarded as hearsay, but
the fact is that Umali conferred with a Huk commander as early as 1950. Then we have the fact that on November 18 of the same year
Punzalan wrote to President Quirino denouncing the congressman Umali for fraternizing with the Huks and conducting a campaign
among them in preparation for the elections the following year. And we may also consider the fact that the town of Tiaong stands at the
foothills of Mt. Banahaw where the dissidents under Commander Abeng, Tommy, Lucio, Aladin, and others had their hideout, so that it
was not difficult for residents of Tiaong like Umali and Pasumbal to communicate and even associate with dissidents in that region.
After carefully considering all the evidence in the case, we are constrained to agree with the trial court that the three appellants are
guilty. Besides, the determination of this case, in great measure, hinges on the credibility of witnesses. The learned trial court which had
the opportunity of observing the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and gauging their sincerity and evaluating their testimony, decided
the Government witnesses, including Amado Mendoza, to be more credible and reliable. And we find nothing in the record to warrant
correction or reversal of the stand and finding of the trial court on the matter. We have not overlooked the rather belated retraction of
Amado Mendoza made on October 31, 1952, about a year and 9 months after he testified in court. Considering the circumstances
surrounding the making of this affidavit or retraction, the late date at which it was made, the reasons given by him for making it and the
fact that when he testified in court under the observation and scrutiny of the trial court bearing in mind that he was the star witness for
the prosecution and his testimony naturally extremely important, and the trial court after the opportunity given to it of observing his
demeanor while on the witness stand had regarded him as a witness, sincere, and his testimony truthful, and considering further the
case with which affidavits of retraction of this nature are obtained, we confess that we are not impressed with such retraction of
Mendoza.

The last point to be determined is the nature of the offense of offenses committed. Appellants were charged with and convicted of the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, frustrated murder, arson and robbery. Is there such a complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, etc? While the Solicitor General in his brief claims that appellants are guilty of said complex crime and in support of his
stand "asks for leave to incorporate by reference" his previous arguments in opposing Umali's petition for bail, counsel for appellants
considered it unnecessary to discuss the existence or non-existence of such complex crime, saying that the nature of the crime
committed "is of no moment to herein appellants because they had absolutely no part in it whatsoever". For that present, and with
respect to this particular case, we deem it unnecessary to decide this important and controversial question, its consideration and
determination to another case or occasion more opportune, when it is more directly and squarely raised and both parties given an
opportunity to discuss and argue the question more adequately and exhaustively. Considering that, assuming for the moment that there
is no such complex crime of rebellion with murder, etc., and that consequently appellants could not have been legally charged with,
much less convicted of said complex crime, and the information should therefore, be regarded as having charged more than one
offense, contrary to Rule 106, section 12 and Rule 113, section 2 (e), of the Rules of Court, but that appellants having interposed no
objection thereto, they were properly tried for and lawfully convicted if guilty of the several, separate crimes charged therein, we have
decided and we rule that the appellants may properly be convicted of said several and separate crimes, as hereinafter specified. We
feel particularly supported and justified in this stand that we take, by the result of the case, namely, that the prison sentence we impose
does not exceed, except perhaps in actual duration, that meted out by the Court below, which is life imprisonment.

We are convinced that the principal and main, tho not necessarily the most serious, crime committed here was not rebellion but rather
that of sedition. The purpose of the raid and the act of the raiders in rising publicly and taking up arms was not exactly against the
Government and for the purpose of doing the things defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal code under rebellion. The raiders did
not even attack the Presidencia, the seat of local Government. Rather, the object was to attain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one
object, to wit, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person or property of a public official, namely, Punzalan was then Mayor of
Tiaong. Under Article 139 of the same Code this was sufficient to constitute sedition. As regards the crime of robbery with which
appellants were charged and of which they were convicted, we are also of the opinion that it was not one of the purposes of the raid,
which was mainly to kidnap or kill Punzalan and destroy his house. The robberies were actually committed by only some of the raiders,
presumably dissidents, as an afterthought, because of the opportunity offered by the confusion and disorder resulting from the shooting
and the burning of the three houses, the articles being intended presumably to replenish the supplies of the dissidents in the mountains.
For these robberies, only those who actually took part therein are responsible, and not the three appellants herein. With respect to the
crime of multiple frustrated murder, while the assault upon policeman Pedro Lacorte with a hand grenade causing him injuries resulting
in his blindness in one eye, may be regarded as frustrated murder; the wounding of Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector should
be considered as mere physical injuries. The crimes committed are, therefore, those of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated
murder and physical injuries. The murders may not be qualified by evident premeditation because the premedition was for the killing of
Punzalan. The result was the killing of three others intended by the raiders (People vs. Guillen, 47 Off). The killing may, however, be
qualified by treachery, the raiders using firearms against which the victims were defenseless, with the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. The three murders may be punished with the penalty of death. However, because of lack of the necessary
votes, the penalty should be life imprisonment.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other points raised by the appellants in their brief.

In conclusion, we find appellants guilty of sedition, multiple murder, arson, frustrated murder and physical injuries. For the crime of
sedition each of the appellants is sentenced to 5 years of prision correctional and to pay a fine of P4,000; for each of the three murders,
each of the appellants is sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of each victim in the sum of P6,000; and for the
arson, for which we impose the maximum penalty provided in Article 321, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code, for the reason that
the raiders in setting fire to the buildings, particularly the house of Punzalan they knew that it was then occupied by one or more
persons, because they even and actually saw an old lady, the mother of Punzalan, at the window, and in view of the aggravating
circumstances of nighttime, each of the appellants is sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay the indemnities mentioned in the
decision of the lower court. It shall be understood, however, the pursuant to the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code the
duration of all penalties shall not exceed 40 years. In view of the heavy penalties already imposed and their long duration, we find it
unnecessary to fix and impose the prison sentences corresponding to frustrated murder and physical injuries; however, the sums
awarded the victims (Lacorte, Ortega, Anselo, Rivano, Garcia and Lector), by the court below will stand. With these modifications, the
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Enrile vs Salazar G.R. No. 92163
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the
focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the
intervening period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would
seem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate,
even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same
question.

The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State
Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly
committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none
fixed in the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City where
he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3

On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having
been:

(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;

(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;

(c) denied his right to bail; and

(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first having personally determined the
existence of probable cause. 4

The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the
Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile’s co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised
similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners’ case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it
very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime
(“delito complejo”) arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime (“delito compuesto”) arising from a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which
Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not apply.

The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date
8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or
surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was
issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was
not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and
two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.

The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile’s petition, G.R. No. 92163.

The parties’ oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:

(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with
common offenses, so-called; this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his written
pleadings;

(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but
not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also constitute “common” crimes of grave or less grave character;

(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine
should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood
all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw
fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez
by enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that “(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of
the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which graver
penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the
offender.”‘ 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by legislative fiat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the effect of law.
The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.

On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting
the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members
of the Court felt that the proponents’ arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to
overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in
its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that
case:

There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If
murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and
prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of
prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon
him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating
circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.

Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe
than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:

La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.’ (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)

We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article
48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:

Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.

En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los delitos.

Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)

and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of said
Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its
maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for
each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or more crimes
are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts.
Instead of sentencing him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the more serious
one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense. 12

The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.

This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner’s guilt or innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for
the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court’s ruling merely provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant
to the petitioner’s complaints about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.

The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding
the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants,
as means “necessary” (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended
information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in
conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13

The plaint of petitioner’s counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far
as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be
dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime
defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.

Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and
that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing
of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for
an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.

It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner’s arrest without first personally determining the
existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of
the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case
was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which
to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance
suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court’s reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to
petitioner’s case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as charging only the
crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting
a right to bail or vindicating its denial?

The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner’s right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of
the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.

Even acceptance of petitioner’s premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or, contrarily,
theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under
either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the respondent Judge.
18

There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went
into the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the
respondent Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should
have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.

There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the
respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to
be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short
that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our courts.
Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the
trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter, denied an
opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor’s recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the
better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the
accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or
weakness of the evidence against him.

It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently
taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The
proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court’s hand off
it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the
merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly progression
of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was denied by the
former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on review.

Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that
clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower
courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164)
which is virtually identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set
forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in
Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were
taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quintessentially quixotic quality that justifies the
relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust
for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in
the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings
and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by
and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause – and the Court is no exception – that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe
from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an
apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses
to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time,
and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information filed
against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only,
hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court’s earlier grant of bail to petitioners
being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the
amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail
bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.