Actions and Movements
D a v i d Israel John Perry
Artificial Intelligence Center Philosophy Department,
SRI International Stanford University
Abstract
We present an account of a c t i o n whose m a i n
features are t h a t actions are content, proper-
ties t h a t agents have in v i r t u e of (i) the bod-
ily movements they effect and (ii) the wider
circumstances in which those movements are
effected. 'The account includes definitions of
one action being a way oj d o i n g another, and
of p e r f o r m i n g one action by p e r f o r m i n g an-
other. A l t h o u g h this account is intended to
f o r m p a r t of a theory of intelligent a c t i o n , in-
c l u d i n g the deliberate and i n t e n t i o n a l actions of
h u m a n agents or of a u t o n o m o u s robots, in this
paper we abstract f r o m the i n f o r m a t i o n p r o -
cessing and c o g n i t i ve factors involved in such
actions.
1 Introduction
A c t i o n is the goal of p l a n n i n g , for p l a n n i n g is reasoning
a b o u t what actions to p e r f o r m , given certain c i r c u m -
stances, in order to achieve a goal. M o s t actions, perhaps
a l l , i n v o l v e movements of an a g e n t s body, or more gen
e r a l l y of its movable parts. W h a t is the relationship be-
tween actions and m o v e m e n t s 7 A r e actions movements
t h a t are caused in a special way, for example by way
of c e r t a i n aspects of the mental states of their agents—
t h e i r beliefs, desires, and intentions ? T h i s seems w r o n g ,
for o u r n o t i o n s of actions involve much more than mere
b o d i l y m o v e m e n t s , however caused. Consider a simpl e
e x a m p l e : m o v i n g a block f r o m one location to another.
First,, we must d e t e r m i n e whether we are t h i n k i n g of one
n o n r e p e a t a b l e p a r t i c u l a r or of the repeatable k i n d of ac-
t i o n : m o v i n g a block f r o m one l o c a t i o n to another. If
the l a t t e r , if is clear t h a t different kinds of b o d i l y move-
m e n t m i g h t be i n v o l v e d . M o v i n g a block f r o m one place
to a n o t h e r m a y be a k i n d of a c t i o n , b u t it is not one
k i n d of m o v e m e n t . Moreover, whether we have in m i n d
a single n o n r e p e a t a b le event or a repeatable k i n d , it is
*The research reported in this paper has been made pos-
sible by a gift from the System Development Foundation and
was conducted as part of a coordinated research effort with
the Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stan-
ford University.
1060 Philosophical Foundations
Syun Tutiya
Philosophy Department
Chiba University
also clear t h a t m o v i n g a block requires m o r e t h a n a b o d -
ily m o v e m e n t , however caused. It also requires a b l o c k ,
and ( r o u g h l y ) a p a t h t h r o u g h w h i c h the block can be
m o v e d . T h e a c t i o n of m o v i n g a block cannot be charac-
terized solely in t e r m s of the b o d i l y m o v e m e n t s of agents
t h a t p e r f o r m the a c t i o n ; o n the other h a n d , b o d i l y move-
ments can be characterized i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the actions
those m o v e m e n t s are associated w i t h when p e r f o r m e d in
given circumstances.
W h a t is the r e l a t i o n s h i p between actions and move-
m e n t s 7 On our theory, actions are not special k i n d s of
m o v e m e n t s , but content properties oj agents t h a t agents
have in v i r t u e of p e r f o r m i n g those m o v e m e n t s in c e r t a in
circumstances. We proceed to e x p l a i n t h i s idea and to
show how a theory based on it can be used to develop ac-
counts of r e l a t i o n s h i ps between actions t h a t are central
to a theory of i n t e l l i g e nt action
It w i l l be useful to begin by e x a m i n i n g a r e p o r t of an
a c t i o n . In the course of this brief e x a m i n a t i o n , we shall
i n t r o d u c e much of our theoretical v o c a b u l a r y , and some
of our theory.
Consider:
( 1 ) J o h n t u r n e d o n the l i g h t .
We take (1) to describe an act an u n r e p e a t a b l e event
in the past. Actions, on the other h a n d , are t e m p o r a l
properties of i n d i v i d u a l s (agents), in the sense of being
predicable of an i n d i v i d u a l at a t i m e . T u r n i n g on a light,
is an a c t i o n , as is t u r n i n g on some p a r t i c u l a r light 1.
Various people at various times have had the p r o p e r t y
of t u r n i n g on a l i g h t ; the same is t r u e or could be t r u e for
the p r o p e r t y of t u r n i n g on 1. T h e act described by (1 ) is
a m o v e m e n t of J o h n ' s t h a t has the p r o p e r t y of r e s u l t i n g
i n I s being t u r n e d o n . T h u s actions are n o t k i n ds o f
acts, b u t propertie s of i n d i v i d u a l s at t i m e s.
(1) does not m e n t i o n m o v e m e n t s , nor use the t e r m
" r e s u l t " . B u t there are movements and results involve d
in J o h n ' s a c t i o n , in his h a v i n g the p r o p e r t y of t u r n i n g on
the l i g h t t h e n , and we t h i n k these m o v e m e n t s a n d results
are the keys to developing a theor y of m o v e m e n t s , ac-
t i o n s and the relations a m o n g t h e m . W h e n J o h n t u r n e d
on t h e l i g h t a complex m o v e m e n t of his b o d y o c c u r r e d .
His elbow s t r a i g h t e n e d somewhat,; his u p p e r a r m r o t a t e d
f o r w a r d and u p w a r d at the shoulder. His right, index fin-
ger bent somewhat w h i l e the other fingers of his r i g h t
hand were bent mor e i n t o a fist (keeping t h e m o u t of the
w a y ) , a n d his b o d y r e m a i n e d stable a n d his feet s t a t i o n -
ary. G i v e n his p o s i t i o n i n f r o n t o f the l i g h t s w i t c h , the
movement, resulted in the s w i t c h being flipped to the on
p o s i t i o n , t h e a p p r o p r i a t e c i r c u i t closing, and the l i g h t
going o n . J o h n ' s t u r n i n g o n t h e l i g h t thus consisted i n
his effecting a m o v e m e n t w h i c h , given the circumstances
of the m o v e m e n t , had c e r t a i n results.
A c t i o n s are g r o u n d e d in m o v e m e n t s. Most of the
things we d o , we do by p r o d u c i n g effects on the objects
around us by m o v i n g our bodies. 1 We plan what, to do
in accord w i t h w h a t we k n o w a b o u t r e l a t i o n s a m o n g ac-
tions. I n t e n t i o n a l a c t i o n requires executing various types
of m o v e m e n t s , w i t h knowledge of w h i c h effects they w i l l
have. W h i c h effects are produced is not merely a m a t -
ter of w h i c h types of movement s are executed, how-
ever. T h e y also depend on the circumstances in w h i c h
the movement, occurs; n o t o n l y the. i m m e d i a t e circum-
stances, b u t ones t h a t are q u i t e r e m o t e . In the example
above these w o u l d i n c l u d e , for e x a m p l e , the continued
o p e r a t i o n of the electrical g e n e r a t i n g p l a n t that, supplied
the l i g h t s w i t h power. T h e t y p e of movement J o h n exe
cuted w i l l t u r n on a l i g h t in circumstances like the ones
he was i n — w h i c h l i g h t d e p e n d i n g on w h i c h l i g h t is con-
nected to the s w i t c h he is s t a n d i n g in f r o n t of; in other
circumstances it might, result in someone being tweaked
on the snout., or someone b e i n g i n s u l t e d , or a circus dog
being c o m m a n d e d to do a somersault .
Reasoning a b o u t a c t i o n , either i n p l a n n i n g / p r a c t i c a l
reasoning or in p l a n r e c o g n i t i o n , m u s t u l t i m a t e l y be
g r o u n d e d in reasoning a b o u t m o v e m e n t s. In designing
robots able to act effectively in a w i d e variety of enviro n
meuts, we must keep in m i n d t h a t the tiling s the robot
can d i r e c t l y c o n t r o l are the movements of its o w n effec-
tors; to k n o w how to do t h i n g s in any of a wide variety
of circumstances is to k n o w how to move one's body ap-
p r o p r i a t e l y in those circumstances . For any intelligent
agent, there w i l l be a r e p e r t o i re of types of movements
t h a t meet t w o c o n d i t i o n s :
( A ) T h e agent can p r o d u c e movements of these types in
a very barge range of circumstances.
(H) The agent knows w h a t effects m o v e m e n t s of these
types w i l l have in (at least, some o f ) the types of
circumstances it, encounters.
That, is, an i n t e l l i g e n t agent must, grasp at least part of
the causal role of the m o v e m e n t s it can produce in the
e n v i r o n m e n t s in w h i c h it is likely to find itself. It must
associate w i t h th e m o v e m e n t types a p a t t e r n or rela-
t i o n between types of e n v i r o n m e n t s and the effects move-
ments of that, t y p e w i l l have in these e n v i r o n m e n t s . We
call these r e l a t i o n s h i p s the meanings of types of move-
ments.
T h e t e r m " m e a n i n g " suggests the perspective t h a t un-
derlies o u r a p p r o a c h . We regard movements as h a v i n g
p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t s , a n d in thi s regard there is a struc-
t u r a l s i m i l a r i t y t o utterances . T h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l con-
1 3
We do not here address the issue of purely mental actions.
In the interests of simplicity, we shall be dealing only with
the kinematics of movenients, abstracting completely from
considerations of masses and forces. Finally, we shall not
consider actions of maintenance and/or prevention.
tent of an utterance what, is expressed—depends on t h e
type of sentence used and the c o n t e x t a n d w i d e r c i r c u m -
stances in w h i c h it occurs. T h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l c o n t e n t of
a movement w h a t it results i n — d e p e n d s on the t y p e
of movement and the context and w i d e r c i r c u m s t a n c es
in which it, occurs. T h e t e r m " m e a n i n g " has been used
for the r e l a t i on between circumstances and p r o p o s i t i o n a l
content associated w i t h sentences. Here we e x t e n d it to
types of movement and types of result. 2
O u r account is based on a good deal of o v e r s i m p l i f i c a -
t i o n and s t r e a m l i n i n g , b o t h w i t h respect to agents and
the language we use to describe t h e r n , and our goals are
s t r i c t l y l i m i t e d . We assume t h a t the agents in question
can be viewed as systems w i t h a set of effectors related
by an architecture ; the types of movement, of the w h o l e
system are s y s t e m a t i c a l l y d e t e r m i n e d by the types of
movements available to the effectors and the architec-
ture. These agents effect movements; m o v e m e n t s are
concrete, unrepeatable particular s t h a t belong to v a r i -
ous types A c t s , t h e n , are movements effected by agents.
An agent who effects a movement of a given t y p e is said
to execute t h a t t y p e . Such executions, w h i c h play the
role of basic actions in our theory, c o n s t i t u t e our first
category of actions.
W h e n an agent effects a movement, of a g i v e n t y p e in
certain definite circumstances, that, m o v e m e n t w i l l have
various results, p r o p o s i t i o n s made t r u e by the effects of
the movement. We say t h a t the agent, beings about these
results. T h i s is our second category of actions, w h i c h
we call accomplishments. 3 We consider o n l y these t w o
categories of actions in this paper a n d focus most of our
a t t e n t i o n on a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s.
A c t i o n s are m a i n l y of interest t.o people insofar as they
are done p u r p o s i v e l y , i n t e n t i o n a l l y , v i n d i c t i v e l y , and the
like. T h e part, of our theory t h a t we present here does
not touch any of these i n t e r e s t i ng features of a c t i o n . T h e
only reason it doesn't a p p l y to a tree f a l l i n g as well as
to a m a n s h o o t i n g is t h a t the forme r is n o t an a c t : frees
d o n ' t effect movements; they just. m o v e . N o t h i n g in o u r
theory explains the difference between acts and o t h e r
movements.
Before we can develop an account of the meanings of
movements, we need to develop some ideas a b o u t m o v e -
ments themselves. We t u r n to t h i s in the n e x t section,
and to the meanings of movements in §3. In §4, we
introduce actions and focus especially on those actions
(accomplishments) t h a t can be characterized in t e r m s of
the result b r o u g h t about We also define c e r t a i n centred
relations i n v o l v i n g actions and m o v e m e n t s . In §5, we
briefly discuss related work and the last section contains
some conclusions and a preview of f u r t h e r research.
2
We do not assume, however, that an act has a unique
content. In [Israel and Perry, 1989, Israel and Perry, 199l],
we develop a notion of content that allows an event (act,
utterance, etc.) to have multiple contents.
T h e result that is brought about need not be intended;
we are using the term "accomplishment" in what might be
called its wry sense, according to which one could focus on
a quite unintended result, of someone's endeavors, and say,
"That's quite an accomplishment".
Israel, Perry, a n d futiya 1061
2 Movements
We take m o v e m e n t s to be concrete p a r t i c u l a r s . T h e y
belong to various types, and are effected by agents at
p a r t i c u l a r t i m e s , in p a r t i c u l a r places, and in specific cir-
cumstances. T h e results of a m o v e m e n t depend on the
t y p e of movement- effected, the agent, t i m e , place and
circumstances. O u r e x a m p l e focuses on a a c e r t a in co-
o r d i n a t e d m o v e m e n t of a r m , h a n d and finger that, we
call shall " f l i c k i n g " . As we have n o t e d , the same type of
m o v e m e n t can be used to do different t h i n g s by differ-
ent agents, in different circumstances, at different times.
T h u s it is n a t u r a l to associate relations between circum-
stances and results w i t h types of m o v e m e n t s. We call
these relations the meanings of the m o v e m e n t types.
T h e movement types w i t h w h i c h we associate mean
nigs i n v o l ve the whole body and all its effectors. Con
sider again J o h n s f l i c k i n g in the i m m e d i a t e neighbor-
hood of the light, s w i t c h . W h e n we said that t h a t type of
a c t i o n in that, c i r c u m s t a n c e w o u l d have- as a result that
the l i g h t gets t u r n e d o n , we d i d i f t really just i m a g i n e
J o h n f l i c k i n g . W e i m a g i n e d h i m Nicking w h i l e s t a n d i n g
s t i l l . If he had moved his feet so as to take a f u l l step
b a c k w a r d , w h i l e his right, a r m went f o r w a r d s and up-
wards, he w o u l d not have t u r n e d the light o n , b u t would
merely have pawed the air ineffectuall y If he had moved
his feet so as to take a f u l l step f o r w a r d , he w o u l d not
have t u r n e d the l i g h t o n , b u t merely have hanged his
knuckle against the w a l l .
W h e n a person flicks, his a r m and hand move as a
p a r t of an ensemble of m o v e m e n ts and n o n - m o v e m e n t s
of other b o d i l y p a r t s. T h e m o v e m e n t s t h a t we deal w i t h
m this essay are complex m o v e m e n t s of the whole body
People often t h i n k o f p a r t i a l m o v e m e n t s ( a n d m o v e m e n t
t y p e s ) , and ' f l i c k i n g ' can be t h o u g h t of as a label for
such a p a r t i a l t y p e . In so t h i n k i n g , they are focusing
on a (perhaps) c o m p l e x p a r t i a l movement and i g n o r i n g
the m o v e m e n t s (or n o n - m o v e m e n t s ) of the rest of his
body These l a t t e r f o r m the movement contest for the
salient p a r t i a l m o v e m e n t . T h e f l i c k i n g is salient because
it c o n s t i t u t es the i n c r e m e n t , given the m o v e m e n t context
and the wider c i r c u m s t a n c e s , necessary for t u r n i n g on
the l i g h t . In a m o r e c o m p l e t e account , we w o u l d need to
be able to keep track of these o t h e r m o v e m e n t s ; to have
a theory of m o v e m e n t s of persons and o t h e r systems, we
need to relate it to a t h e o r y of the m o v e m e n t s of their
p a r t s . For our purpose in t h i s paper, however, a very
s i m p l e conception w i l l suffice.
3 Meanings
Let us suppose that, J o h n executed the f l i c k i n g movement
and t u r n e d on the light, i n t e n t i o n a l l y . We can i m a g i n e
h i m realizing that he was s t a n d i n g right in front of and
in easy a r m ' s reach of a s w i t c h that he believed was
connected in the a p p r o p r i a t e way to the l i g h t . W h y does
he effect the m o v e m e n t that, he does'/
We m i g h t represent w h a t J o h n knows a b o u t move-
ments t h a t e x p l a i n s his d o i n g what, he d i d , as a general-
i z a t i o n a b o u t ( i ) m o v e m e n t s o f the b o d y , ( i i ) complex
types o f m o v e m e n t ( i i i ) circumstances i n w h i c h those
movements occur, and ( i v ) results.
1062 Philosophical Foundations
(2) If J effect a movement of the flicking type, while oth-
erwise standing still, in circumstances in which I am
standing directly in front of and w i t h i n easy arm's
reach of a light switch of a certain kind that is in on
the 0/7 position and which is correctly connected up
to a functioning light, then a result of such a move-
ment will he that the light so connected will get
turned on. Moreover, if 1 simply stand s t i l l , then,
in those very same circumstances, the light w i ll not
get, turned on.
The second sentence should not. be interpreted as say-
ing that there is no other way, in those circumstances,
for John to bring it about that, the light is turned on. It
simply says that if John's total body movement is a suf-
ficient condition, in the circumstances, of the light, being
turned on, then his flicking movement, 111 particular, is
a necessary part of that sufficient condition.
bet us now attempt to generalize and abstract, by way
of the following generalization over movements (m) in-
volving parameters for total movement types ( M ) , cir
cumstanees (C, plus auxiliary parameters for objects and
relations involved in (7), and results (P, plus auxiliary
parameters).
(*) Any movement in that is of type A/, that is effected
in circumstances of type " will have
as a result that
(oven (*), we can associate a relation between (types
of) circumstance, and (types of) results with the move-
ment type M. We call this its meaning and denote it, as
Thus we say
4 Actions
We distinguish two categories of actions, executions and
accomplishments.
4.1 Executions
Executions are actions defined simply by the types of
movements executed. We use , as short for "executes
1 a executes m at /
2. m is of type M
We assume that the results of a movement of type A/
occurring are identical with that of an agent, executing a.
movement of type A/. Someone interested in the theory
of dance, for example, might he interested primarily in
executions; typically, however, both as agents and theo-
rists, we are not primarily interested in executions, but
in accomplishments.
4
Note that C is not quite a property or type of circum-
stance, and /' is not quite a proposition. They are what
might he called parametric properties and propositions.
4.2 Accomplishments
Accomplishments are a c t i o n s defined by results; they can
be r e p o r t e d by way of a c e r t a i n c a n o n i c al f o r m : brings
it about that P. We use BP as s h o r t for " b r i n g s it about
that L a t e r , in we shall i n t r o d u c e a f o r m a l lan-
guage w i t h i n w h i c h to m o d e l some of the logic of accom-
p l i s h m e n t s ; in t h i s s e c t i o n , as in the previous sections,
our t r e a t m e n t is i n f o r m a l .
4.3 T h e way o f r e l a t i o n
O u r account allows us to analyze various i m p o r t a n t re-
lations between actions.
Consider the f o l l o w i n g piece of p r a c t i c a l advice or ex-
pression of commonsense k n o w - h o w :
(3) F l i p p i n g t h e l i g h t s w i t c h to the on. p o s i t i o n is a way
of t u r n i n g on t h e l i g h t ( t o w h i c h the s w i t c h is con-
nected i n the a p p r o p r i a t e w a y ) .
W h a t , do we mean when we say that, f l i p p i n g the s w i t c h
to the on p o s i t i o n is a way of t u r n i n g on the l i g h t 7 T h e r e
is a r e l a t i v i t y to c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t is suppressed. We re
ally mean t h a t f l i p p i n g the s w i t c h to the on p o s i t i o n is a
way of t u r n i n g on t h e l i g h t in certain circumstances C
when t h e w i r i n g is i n s t a l l e d , the fuse is not b l o w n , the
power is o n , etc. On the view sketched so far, any case
(act,) in w h i c h an agent flips the s w i t c h w i l l i n v o l v e t h a t
agent's e x e c u t i n g a m o v e m e n t t y p e t h a t , in the given
circumstances, has as a result t h a t the s w i t c h is flipped.
T h e same is t r u e for any case of an agent's t u r n i n g on
the l i g h t . W h e n we say t h a t a c c o m p l i s h i n g the first is a
way of a c c o m p l i s h i n g the second, we are c l a i m i n g t h a t
however, in those fixed circumstances, you b r i n g about
the first, you w i l l have b r o u g h t a b o u t the second.
It w i l l help to i n t r o d u c e the concept of an e x e c u t i o n
being a mode of an a c c o m p l i s h m e n t in a c i r c u m s t a n c e :
Now let ( ' be fixed as above. In ( ' , b r i n g i n g it, a b o u t
that t h e s w i t c h is f l i p p e d to the on p o s i t i o n is a way
of b r i n g i n g it a b o u t t h a t th e light is on iff any t y p e of
( t o t a l b o d y ) m o v e m e n t M w h i c h is a m o d e of b r i n g i n g
it a b o u t t h a t the s w i t c h is f l i p p e d to the on p o s i t i o n is a
m o d e o f b r i n g i n g i t a b o u t t h e light ( t o w h i c h the s w i t c h
is connected) is t u r n e d o n . M o r e generally, we define
a. f a m i l y of t w o place way of ( W O ) r e l a t i o ns between
a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s p a r a m e t e r i z e d by C:
We have in mind cases in which the relevant causal chain
does not involve the beliefs, desires, and intentions of another
agent. We do ultimately intend to accomodate cases, e.g.,
in which one person brings something about hy convincing
another to perform do something, but the intuitions we rely
on here pertain to the simpler cases.
These relations are pre-orders; they are reflexive a n d
t r a n s i t i v e . R e f l e x i v i f y is a m i l d l y and i n n o c u o u s ly c o u n -
t e r i n t u i t i v e p r o p e r t y : in C, b r i n g i n g it a b o u t t h a t the
s w i t c h is Hipped is a way of b r i n g it about that s w i t c h is
f l i p p e d . T r a n s i t i v i t y is central to means end reasoning.
W h a t o f s y m m e t r y and a n t i s y m m e t r y ? I n the c i r c u m -
stances C, b r i n g i n g it, about that, the light is t u r n e d on is
not, a way of b r i n g i n g it about the s w i t c h is flipped to the
on p o s i t i o n , but n o t h i n g in our account, rules out cases
m w i n c h , relative to some circumstance C", b r i n g i n g it
a b o u t that, the light is turned on is a way of b r i n g i n g
it a b o u t t h a t s w i t c h is Hipped to the on p o s i t i o n and
vice-versa. Plausible examples of s y m m e t r y , t h o u g h , are
hard to come by. We p r e e m p t the search for such cases
by declaring in advance our readiness to accept, the a n t i -
s y m m e t r y o f the W O relations, and thus, our acceptance
of the c l a i m t h a t , given a jutd circumstance ( ', accom-
p l i s h m e n t s f o r m a p a r t i a l order.
4.4 T h e V O a n d PER r e l a t i o n s
In the foregoing, we defined two t e m p o r a l p r o p e r t i es of
agents, ( i) t h a t of an agent executing a movement, of a
t y p e at a t i m e , and ( i i ) that, of an agent b r i n g i n g it about
t h a t P at, a t i m e . We also i n t r o d u c e d relations a m o n g
a c t i o n properties and circumstances: (i) the r e l a t i o n of
a movement execution p r o p e r t y being a mode of accom-
p l i s h i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n in a type of circumstance and ( i i )
the r e l a t i o n of one a c c o m p l i s h m e n t p r o p e r t y being a way
of for another accomplishment, p r o p e r t y , in a t y p e of cir-
cumstance. We now b r i n g these together in an analysis
of the by r e l a t i o n . We do things by d o i n g other t h i n g s ;
t h a t is, we p e r f o r m some actions by p e r f o r m i n g others.
O u r analysis of actions involves t w o categories: execu-
tions and a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s . So, t o o our analysis of the
by r e l a t i on involves t w o s u b r e l a t i o n s . Consider:
( 4 ) J o h n f l i p p e d the s w i t c h to the on p o s i t i o n by m o v i n g
by flicking.
( 5 ) ."John t u r n e d on the light by flipping the s w i t c h to
the on p o s i t i o n .
We offer d e f i n i t i o n s of t w o relations i n v o l v i n g agents
and times, t h a t of an agent b r i n g i n g it about, t h a t P
by e x e c u t i n g a m o v e m e n t of a certain t y p e in a c i r c u m -
stance at a t i m e , and t h a t of an agent, at a t i m e , b r i n g i n g
if a b o u t t h a t P by b r i n g i n g it a b o u t t h a t Q, in a cir-
cumstance. These two relations together comprise our
analysis of the by r e l a t i o n We use the n o t a t i o n VO
( t o suggest, in virtue of) for the first and P E R . for the
second.
T h u s (4) is t r u e iff ( r o u g h l y ) :
( 4 ' ) J o h n effected a m o v e m e n t of the flicking t y p e , in cir-
cumstances such t h a t any m o v e m e nt of that, t y p e ,
in t h a t k i n d of circumstance , w o u l d have as a re-
sult t h a t the s w i t c h d i r e c t l y in front of w h i c h t h a t
Israel, Perry, a n d Tutiya 1063