Intro

On 2 January 2015, the Bahamas-flagged Bulk Jupiter, with 19 crew members onboard, was carrying 46,400 tonnes
of bauxite from Malaysia to Hong Kong.

Background

While off Vietnam on New Year’s Eve, the vessel received an email from their weather routing provider
highlighting adverse weather conditions expected in the region.

Cargo liquefaction occurs when dry bulk cargoes with high moisture contents start to behave like liquids when the
ship is moving. Such cargoes shift rapidly in the holds of a ship, resulting in the free surface effect, making the ship
unstable and leading it to capsize.

In the next day, the vessel started rolling more heavily as the weather started to deteriorate.

Evaluation of the case

The Bulk Jupiter’s Master and senior crew members were well versed in dry bulk cargo operations, while the
company’s management and SMS procedures were also adequate.

The Company provided adequate guidance and direction to the Master and maintained a level of management
enough to allow normal operations to be conducted safely.

However, three factors failed to raise adequate awareness or warning signs:

the uncharacteristic speed reduction en route,

the results of the requested ‘Can Test’ and

the incomplete noon reports that should have informed the Company on the condition of the cargo in the holds.

Proposed solution

Can test

This test should not be a substitute for proper laboratory testing using an appropriate methodology. However, if
can tests carried out on a cargo presented for loading indicate a propensity for liquefaction, this is a major warning
sign that the cargo as a whole may be unsafe for carriage.

If shippers present significant amounts of material that fails the can test, this is an indication that the cargo as a
whole is unsafe, and that documentation provided may be flawed. It should also be borne in mind that a negative
result from the can test (i.e. no free moisture or fluid condition is seen) does not necessarily mean that the cargo is
safe for shipment.

Recommendation

Although it is the shipper’s duty under SOLAS to test and certify that a cargo is safe to load experience has shown
that in some cases this does not always occur. Therefore, the actions of owners and masters before arrival and,
most importantly, at the load port are crucial in ensuring that a vessel is protected from loading a cargo that may
liquefy. Masters and ship operators should always bear in mind the possibility that the information contained
within the shipper’s declaration, for whatever reason, may not accurately reflect the true condition of the cargo.
At approximately 0640, the general alarm was sounded followed by an announcement by the Master
directing all crew to proceed to the bridge.

While in his cabin, the chief cook felt the vessel suddenly starting to roll more heavily, particularly to
starboard.

He left his cabin in order to make his way to the port side lifeboat, at this point the vessel suffered a
black out, emergency lights then came on, and the vessel stopped rolling and adopted approximately a
45o list to starboard.

Due to the angle of list, the Chief Cook was unable to make his way to the port side access door and
decided to utilize the internal staircase and proceed up to ‘C’ deck, where he met the Master.

He instructed the Chief Cook to follow him and together they exited the accommodation block via the
starboard side access door. No other crew were seen onboard after that time.

Having exited the accommodation area of the vessel, both men found themselves on a small platform
on the starboard side, aft external stairway with the waves washing over them.

The Master, wearing his lifejacket, jumped into the sea followed shortly after by the Chief Cook who at
this point had donned his lifejacket - neither were wearing an immersion suit.

The two men stayed together while swimming away from the vessel prior to it sinking.

As they looked back from a safe distance, despite the heavy seas, they could just see that the vessel had
almost disappeared beneath the waves.

At 1410, the good Samaritan container ship ‘Zim Asia’ reported sighting the two persons and believed
them both to be alive.

The tugboat ‘OLNG Muttrah’ headed to assist and by 1556 the two crew were recovered onboard, but
only the Chief Cook was alive. Two more crew members were recovered deceased.

A total of 9 vessels and 3 aircraft were assisting with the SAR operation to find the remaining crew.
Search and rescue efforts continued for a further 2-3 days, but no further crew were located.

Findings

The official investigation report underlines that:

1. The Bulk Jupiter’s Master and senior crew members were well versed in dry bulk cargo operations,
while the company’s management and SMS procedures were also adequate.

The Company provided adequate guidance and direction to the Master and maintained a level of
management enough to allow normal operations to be conducted safely.

However, three factors failed to raise adequate awareness or warning signs:

the uncharacteristic speed reduction en route,

the results of the requested ‘Can Test’ and

the incomplete noon reports that should have informed the Company on the condition of the cargo in
the holds.

2. Additionally, there was significant evidence to identify that the 46,400t of bauxite loaded over the
course of the 13-day period had an average moisture content of 21.3%.

Despite this, there is no physical evidence to confirm what caused the vessel to adopt an unrecoverable
list to starboard and subsequent capsize.

It was noted that a total of 186.55 hours of loading was lost due to rainfall - the equivalent of 7 days of
loading over the period. The infrastructure available to adequately store and transport bauxite in
Kuantan increased the exposure of the bauxite to the elements.

Despite the crew’s diligent response to the rain by continually opening and closing the hatch covers to
reduce the ingress of water, the cargo remained exposed whilst on the quay side, in stockpiles and in
the trucks.

An independent inspection was not requested by the Master to verify the properties of the cargo prior
to loading onboard. The absence of an independent inspection resulted in the cargo being loaded
without its physical properties and moisture content being verified against the parameters of the IMSBC
Code schedule or the cargo declaration form.

Considering the extreme weather conditions and storage facilities available it was acknowledged that
the cargo was very wet and that measures to protect the cargo on shore from further rain were not
effective in preventing further wetting.

3. The previous class and special survey inspections indicate no structural integrity failures, so the
possibility of a catastrophic structural failure is considered low.

Lessons learned

Although liquefaction could not be officially highlighted as the key cause of the accident, discussions
were brought in the spotlight regarding the dangers associated with bauxite cargo. Cargo liquefaction
remains a key area of concern for shipping safety, accounting for 101 losses of life and 9 losses of ships
for the years 2008-2017.

Cargo liquefaction occurs when dry bulk cargoes with high moisture contents start to behave like liquids
when the ship is moving. Such cargoes shift rapidly in the holds of a ship, resulting in the free surface
effect, making the ship unstable and leading it to capsize.

Background of the Case

On 2 January 2015 Bulk Jupiter sank off the coast of Vũng Tàu, Vietnam. She departed from Kuantan,
Malaysia on 30 December 2014 with a cargo of 46,400 tons of bauxite and a crew of 19 Filipinos.

Early reports indicated that the likely cause of the sinking was sudden loss of stability from the bauxite
cargo
Ship was loading bauxite in Kuantan port.

Bauxite was to be discharged at Qindao, China

Bauxite loaded had gone through liquifection and has led to the loss of stability of the ship.

Cargo loaded on the vessel was with a moisture content of about 21 % (Should be < 10 %)

Inro

Background set the scene, background info, relevant facts mast important issues) ( pano nagsimula yung
aksidente)

Evaluation of the case (outline possible alternatives)(explain alternatives were rejected)(reason of

tragedy)

Proposed solution (one specific and realistic solution)(explain why this solution chosen)(support solution
with solid evidence)

Recommendation

not to accept bauxite for carriage unless:

the moisture limit for the specific cargo is certified as less than the indicative moisture limit of 10% and
the particle size distribution as is detailed in the individual schedule for bauxite in the IMSBC Code; or

the cargo is declared as Group A (cargoes that may liquefy) and the shipper declares the transportable
moisture limit (TML) and moisture content; or

the cargo has been assessed as not presenting Group A properties.

— IMO, Briefing: 3818/09/2015