Chapter III

Types of Pratyaksa

(i) Nyaya classification of perception

While discussing the nature of perception, the Nyaya school has also mentioned the various

ways in which perception can be classified. Thus, one may classify perception in accordance

with the sense-organs producing perception. Thus, one can speak of visual perception (caksusa

pratyaksa), auditory perception (sravana pratyaksa) etc. One may also classify perception in
• • * V / ,l "
terms of the objects perceived, e. g. one may speak of perception of colour (rupapratyaksa),

, perception of sound (sabdapratyaksa) etc. Another way of classifying perception takes into

consideration whether the perception is determinate (savikalpaka) or not. Thus, we can

distinguish between determinate perception (savikalpaka pratyaksa) and indeterminate percep-.

tion (nirvikalpaka pratyaksa). Yet another way of classifying perception lays emphasis on the

type of sense-object relation that produces perception. Thus one may distinguish between

ordinary p|rcepfiph (laukika pratyksa) and extra-ordinary perception (alaukika pratyaksa).

\ " '; .J. JL

The pjd school of Nyaya did not explicity draw any distinction between ordinary' (laukika).

' perception and extra-ordinary (alaukika) perception. So, they did not classify perception into

ordinary (laukika) and extra-ordinary (alaukika). The modem Nyaya thinkers, however, from
Ganges'a onwards, have classified perception into two kinds (i) ordinary (laukika) and (ii)
x ,

extra-ordinary (alaukika). This classificaiton of perception is based on the manner in wheih the

sense-organ is related or connected with its object.

The modem Nyaya thinkers define ordinary perception (laukika pratyaksa) as that which

is prodded by ordinary sense object relation (laukika sannikarsa). In other words, ordinary

perception (laukika^ratyaksa^arises from the normal connection ofthe sense-organ with the,

objects which are present to the sense-organs. For example, when there is a contact of the

visual sense-organ with the object table, there is a perception of the table, which is known as

ordinary perception (laukika pratyaksa). According to the Naiyayikas, such ordinary sense-

object connection can be of six different kinds, namely (1) samyoga, (2) samyukta-samavaya,

62
(3) samyukta-samaveta-samavaya, (4) samavaya, (5) samaveta-samavaya and (6) visesanata.

In all these cases, the.object of the sense-organ is proximate and present.

According to the Nyaya thinkers, there are six sense-organs; or these five are called

external sense-organs (bahirindriya), namely, the olfactary (ghranendriya); the gustatory

(rasanendriya), the visual (caksuripdriya), the cutaneous (tvagindriya) and the auditory

(sravanendriya) and the sixth one is the Internal sense-organ, viz. the mind (manas). Among

these sense-organ, only the internal sense-organ viz. mind and the external yisual.and tactual

sense-organs cognise substances (dravya); hence, the other sense-organs are not capable of

cognising substances. ?

Thefirsf ordinary sense-object W. contact (samyoga) is necessary for the perception of

substances, the second stated about is required for perceiving the universals (jati), activities

(kriya) and qualities(guna)[.with the sole exception of sound] that inhere in substances. The

third is necessary for cognising the universals that inhere in the qualities or activities inhering in

substances. The fourth,is essential in the perception of sound; the fifth is necessary ofperceiving,

the uniyersal sabdafva that is inherent in sound, and the sixth is required for perceiving non­

existence (abhav a) ana inherence (samavaya).s

It should however, be stated here that the first and fourth sense-object relations viz.
* • . * _ '.

samyoga and-samavaya are considered as direct relations (saksat sambandha); buf the other
■'vT ,■ ■ '• *■■ ■ ' , ’ ’ •

four sense-object relations are indirect (parampara sambandha). They are so-called as they

do not constitute any direct relationship between the sense-organs and their objects. They

become indirectly related by virtue, of their relation to some other entities. Thus, if X and Y

are related by samyoga, while Y and Z are related by samavaya, then the relation between X
and Z would be samyukta-samavaya. 1

On the other hand, according to the Nyaya thinkers, extra-ordinary perception (alaukika

pratyaksa), is a perception which is brought about by an extra-ordianary sense-object relation

(alaukika sannikarsa) since in extra-ordinary perception, the object is not present to the sense-

organ in an ordinary way, but is related to the sense-organ by means of an unusuaj,medium,

and thus becomes an object of direct apprehension or sensory awareness. In such cases, even

l. Nyayavarttika of Uddyotakara, 1.1.4., Bhasapariccheda, Karika No. 59 and Tarkasamgraha, k 331.

63
objects that are past and future, separated, concealed or distant can be perceived. In some

cases, an object that is not supposed to be apprehended by a particular sense-organ can

nevertheless be apprehended by the latter. For example, the Nyaya thinkers believe that when

weperceive a particular 'cow', we also perceive the universal 'cowness' as its defining feature.'

The perceptual knowledge of the universal 'cowness' in the cow present before us acts as the

connection (asatti) between the visual sense-organ and all other cows not presnt before us. As

a result, we perceive all the cows, though they are not pesent before us. So, through the

knowledge of the universal acquired from perceiving a particular individual of a class, we come

to perceive all the members of that particular class, and this kind of perception is called

'samahyalaksana pratyaksa'.2 3 .

It may be mentioned here that the term 'samahya' generally means a universal (jati). This

universal is eternal and inherent in many individuals. But in the present case, the word. !samanyaK

stands for any common property (anugata dharma) whatsoever. Thus, instead of employing the

word 'samahya' in its technical sense, it is being used here in its etymological sense, viz.

'samapanainzbhavah samanyam.' This is due to the fact that universals, according to the Nyaya-

Vaisesika school, can belong to only substances, qualities and movements - others categories
'• y. .. .................... . *
like uniyersais,-particularities, inherence and negation are devoid of universals. But samanya-

laksana-pratyaksa is not confined to substances, qualities and movements alone. Moreover, in

some cases,^entities like substances etc. may also be grasped as a common property, and their

apprehensions can also serve the purpose of sense-object relation. For example, 'pot' is a

substances. If it is known that the pot exists in many substrata, then that 'pot' will also be
S ’

indicated or signified by the word 'universal'. Again, it may be mentioned here that a particular :

quality, viz. colour (rupa) generally inheres in one substance. If illusorily this cplour (rupa) is ’
cognised in another.different substance, than that colour whichjnfreres jn one substance only |

will be signified_in this case by. the word 'samanya'/ ‘v

- An objection, however, crops up here : if alll the particulars of a certain class are

apprehended by perceiving any one of the particulars belonging to that class, then we may

2. (a)"_ Tattvaciniamani, Anumana Khanda, pp 283-93

■(b) Bhasaparichheda, Karika No. 64.

3. Adhyapana commentary by N. C. Goswami, on Tarkasamgraha by Annambhatta, K 346-47.

64

V
 cognise all knowable entities when we perceive any entity of this universe as belonging to the

class of knowables. In other words, the perception of the particular virtually amounts to the

perception of all the particulars of a class. As a result, it may be remaked that samanyalaksana

perception will make every individual omniscient.

In reply, the'Nyaya thinkers point out that by 'samanyalaksana sannikarsa' we only perceive

the generic feature of all the members of a 'class'. In ordinary perception, both the generic and

specific properties of the particular are directly presented to the sense-organ, but the remaining

members of the class which are not so presented are perceived as having only the universal

character. So, it is not possible to have a full, detailed and comprehensive knowledge of all the

entities of the universe which is entailed by omniscience.4

/ It should be pointed out here that as to the nature of this 'samanyalasana-sarmikarsa', there

are three different views prevalent among the Nyaya thinkers.

(First, according to some Naiyayikas, the universal that is being cognised (jnayamana-

samapya) is regarded as the samanya-laksana-sannikarsa.

" ‘ *

. \ .

. Secondly, there are others who hold that the cognition in which the universal is revealed

, as qualifying some other object of that cognition (saminyaprakarakajnana) is the samanyalaksana-

. sannikarsa. * - -

v- Thirdly) there are again some Nyaya thinkers, who believe that the cognition in which the

universal occurs simply as an object (samanyavisayaka jnana) acts as the 'samanyalaksana

sannikarsa.5 «
' '

' In the present case, the universal that is being cognised (jnayamana samanya) is regarded

i - as the sense-object relation (sannikarsa). Now, the Naiyayikas state that the universal which

is being cognised (jnayamana samanaya) or the cognition of the universal (samanya-jnana) will

act as the sense-object relation only when we perceive a particular substratum of that
. universal.by ordinary sense-object relation (laukika sannikarsa). There will not be any sense-

object.relatiorvif the knowledge of the universal is attained by any means other than ordinary

,4. ibid, p. 351-52 .

5. Ibid, p 351

65
 sense-object relation (laukika sannikarsa). So, when the visusi sense-organ comes in contact

with the object 'pot', then like the perception of the presented pot, one also has the visual

perception of all pots whatsover. In this case, though all the distant pots are not presented before

the visual sense-organ even, then these pots are perceived just like the pot which is in contact

with the visual sense-organ.

The only difference between these two perceptions is this that the perception of the pot*
, which is connected with the visual sense-organ is called ordinary perception (laukika pratyaksa),

as it is produced by'samyogasannikarsa', which is an ordinary sense-object relation; but the

perception of all .other pots is termed as extra-ordinary (alaukika-sannikarsa). This extra­

ordinary sense-object relation is known as samanyalaksana sannikarsa. We have already stated

that there is some difference of opinion among the exponents of the Nyaya view about the nature

. of this sannikarsa. Some maintain that the unjyersal 'pothood' both is related to the visual

' sense-organ and all the pots; and hence, it can play the role of a sannikarsa. Pothood is related

to the visual sense-organ through the indirect relation known as 'sva-visayaka-jnana-visaya-

samyoga', because here, pothood is the object of the cognition where both pot and pothood

feature as objects, and among these two objects, the pot is relatedjo die visual sense-organ
through the relation of contact (samyoga). On the other hand, pothood is related to ail the pots

through the relation of.inherence (samavaya). Others mainiain that here, the samanyalaksana
sannikarsa is the cognition of pothood. This cognition of pothood is related to the visual sense-

organ through the indirect relation known as sva-visaya-vat-samyoga; since pothood, which is

; the object of the cognition ofpothood, characterizes the pot; which is, again, related to the visual
sense-organ through the relation of contact (samyoga). On the other hand, the cognition ofpothood
' - is linked to the pot through another indirect relation known as ’sva-visaya-samanya-asrayata’since

the object of this .cognition is the universal pothood, and the pot is the locus (asraya) ofthis universal.6

A question may arise here: what is the necessity of accepting 'samanyalaksana sannikarsa'?

■ The view that perception of one pot by odinary sense object relation (laukika sannikarsa) causes

the perception oTalljhe pots of the past, present and future is not supported by our mundane
^ experience (anubhava). Ts.it not then useless to regard the cognition ofthe universal (samanyajnana)

6. Ibid, '

' . 66
/ ' ' ' - '
 or-the, universal that is being cognised (jnayamanjia sltmanya) as the contact between the sense
orgaui and, the distant, past and future objects?

> . % In reply, the Naiyayikas state that, ifsamanyalaksanasannikarea is not admitted, then
there will be some difficulties (anupapatti) in explaining certain cognitive events, which are
perceptual phenomena7
) - .
y • Fjrst, an individual, after perceiving smoke in the hill, infers the existence of fire there. For
- . this inference, paramam jnana, i. e., the cognition that the smoke which is concomitant with fire
r. i : \ ' , _ ,
is present in the yonder hill (vahnivyapyadhumavan ayam parvatah) is necessary. The cognition
J' that the smoke which is present in the hill is concomitant with fire can be cause of the said
inference only if there is a previous cognition of the invariable compresence of smoke and fire
(viz, wherever there is smoke, there is also fire). This awareness of unvariable concomitance is not
’ due to inference (anumana), because that will lead to an infinite regress. It is not also due to
Comparison (upamana) or verbal testimony (s'abda). It is also not a case of memory (smarana).
4 ‘ r

■ Thus,by the method of residue, our awareness of universal concomitance must be perceptual,
> _ .y It. ' . •••

which takes plaice when its objects are grasped by the appropriate seense-organs. The cases of
smoke and fire that we perceive through ordinary sense-object relation (laukika sannikarsa)are
present andproximate, and perceptual cognition of them alone is not adequate for apprehending
invariable concomitance (\yapti), which pre-supposes the perceptual awareness of all fires
; and' all .smokes.

' If an individual perceives the co-existence of smoke and fire in only one or two places, then
he may have a doubt as to whether smoke is everywhere concomitant with fire as in the one or two
instances which he has perceived; or whether it is not so concomitant (dhumah vahnivyapyo
; na va). Thus, by merely perciving the co-existencee of smoke and fire in the kitchen and the
✓
sacrificial place, one cannot know with certainty the co-existence of all smokes and all fires of
the world. If it were possible, then there would have been no doubt as to their relationship. Again
so long as this doubt remains, inference of fire from smoke will never be free from doubt This
doubfccahnot be remoyed unless we know for certain that every smoke is accompanied by fire,
and for reasons stated earlier, such knowledge must be perceptual. We have also shown that

.7. Ibid, p. 352 - 55 Wr'—•v" 0 J'"' ?

67
this perception cannot be produced by ordinary sense-obj ect relation (laukika sannikarsa) alone.

In this wayj we acquire the perceptual knowledge of the invariable concomitance, Hence, unless

all the somkes and fifes which are not present in the hill are presented to the sense-organ through

some othefmeans, how does such a cognition of the universal concomitance (vyaptijnana) be­

tween the middle term smoke (hetu) and the major term (sadhya) fire arise? The Naiyayikas

assert that.for this perceptual awareness of vyapti, some extrarordinary sense-object relation

must be admitted, and this sense-object relation is nothing but the 'samanya-laksana sannikarsa.'
Wheftjan individual perceives smoke and fire in the kitchen, he also perceives 'smokehood' present

in smoke and 'firehood' present in fire through the ordinary sense-object relation (laukika sannikarsa)
known as 'sarhyukta samavaya sannikarsa'. Then the perceptions of the universal 'smokehood'

and .'firehood’'or else, the universals so perceived act is tHe sense-object relation (sannikarsa)

between the sense-organ and all smokes and all fires. This sense-object relation, as we already

know’ is the 'samanyalaksana sannikarsa'. The resulting perceptual cognition is the extra-ordinary

perception of the smokes and all fires, which is required for obtaining the 'vyapti-jnaha', and this

'vyapti-jnaha' is the very foundation of inference. Thus unless 'samanyalaksana sannikarsa’ is

admitted, inference, top, becomes impossible.

Secondly, 'samanyalaksana sannikarsa' is necessary for the perception of darkness (tamas), \

which is certainly a perceptible entity. According to the Nyaya-Vaisesikas, the generic

absence Of light (tejas) is called darkness. When darkness is said to be the generic absence

(sarnaijyabhava) of light, what is implied is that it is the absence of light as such. Thus, each and
eyery individual instance of light must be absent where darkness is present. Darkness cannot be

the asbence of this or that particular light, because darkness is removed by light, and hence, it

cannot co-exist with any individual light. Now, the perception of darkness depends on the per­

ceptual awareness of light (tejas), because the previous perceptual cognition of the counter-

positiye. (pratiyogin) of non-existence (abhava) is the cause of the perceptual cognition of that

non-existence,. So, perception of darkness is possible only when there is a previous percetual.

awareness of every individual instance of light (yavadvisesatejas), which is the counter-positive

(pratiyogin) of darkness (tamas).

But a question arises here: how is it possible to have the perceptual knowledge of all the .

individual instances of light (samagra-tejas) of this world ?

~~ ' 0 'S ?
68
 To this, the Naiyayikas reply that such a perception is possible through 'samanyalaksana

sannikarsa' alone, and hence, this particular sense-object relation must be admitted. Once we

admit it, we can claim that having peceived some individual instance of light and the universal
property of being a light (tejastva) through ordinary sense-object relafeons, we subsequently

have sense-object relation between the visual sense-organ and all the individual instances of light.

Here, either the cognised universal or the cognition of the universal will function as the required

sense-object relation. Hence, there is the requisite relation between the visual sense-organ and

all instances of light whether past, present or future. Consequently, visual perception of darkness

as the absence of all lights can occur without any hindrance. So, 'samanyalaksana sannikarsa' is

necessary for explaining properly the perceptual cognition of darkness.

Thirdly, it is also necessary to accept samanya-laksana sannikarsa for explaining the per-

ception of prior non-existence (prigabhava) of an effect. It has already been stated that the

perceptual knowledge of the counter-positive (pratiyogin) is the cause of the perceptual

knowledge of negation or non-existence (abhava). This rule, however, does not apply to the

perception of mutual difference (anyonyabhava). The rule applies only to the perception of

samsargabhava, and pragabhava is a variety of samsargabhava. The entity which has not yet been

produced is the counter-positive of its prior non-existence. Without the perceptual knowledge of

the yet unproduced entity, the percepton of its prior non-existence (pragabhava) is not possible.

Perceptual awareness of the counter-positive presupposes a sense-object relation. But there can
f

be no ordinary sense-object relation (laukika sannikarsa) with an effect which has not yet been

produced. In the case of such an unproduced effect, the sense-object relation should be

jnanalaksana. But if samanyalaksana sannikarsa is not admitted there, then the existence of

'jnanalaksana sannikarsa' also cannot be established. So, samanyalaksana sannikarsa has to be

admitted. When there is a perception of the 'pot' by ordinary sense-object contact, then by the

cognised universal 'pothood' or the universal knowledge 'pothood' results in the perception of all

pots - even the perception of the pots not yet produced or the pots which are destroyed. Once

such a perception occurs, jnanalaksana sannikarsa will also take place under suitable conditions.
■ • • • -0 , r

Fourthly, it is also held that the negative judgments of perception like 'this is not a dog' or u

'this pot is not a cloth' etc. cannot be explained without admitting samanayalakasana sannikarsa.

The perceptual awareness of the form 'this is not a dog' presupposes the perceptual awareness

69
 of the class 'dog* i.e., all dogs. This can be apprehended only if when perceiving one dog, we

perceive all other dogs through the universal 'dogness' as perceived to be present in the per­

ceived 'dog', and this knowledge of the universal 'dogness' is here the required 'samanyalaksana

sannikarsa'. We have already stated that some Naiyayikas would admit here the perceived

dogness as the requisite sannikarsa.

Finally, the voluntary attempt to acquire pleasure cannot be explained without the postulaiton

of samanyalaksana sannikarsa.' We strive to attain some pleasure which is not yet produced, and

is thus yet to be experienced in the normal course. But how is it possible for us to apprehend a

pleasure which has not yet come into existence? It is possible only when we accept that in per­

ceiving a particular pleasure in the past, we also perceived the whole classs of pleasures through

the universal pleasurableness (or alternatively, through the cognition of pleasurableness) that acts

as sense-obj ect relation, thereby also perceiving the future pleasure, which is a member of that class.

The Nyaya thinkers also hold that after perceiving a piece of sandalwood from a distance,

,, one may have the cogniton "I see the fragrant sandalwood", even when he has not actually smelt
the fragrance due to the distance. In this case, the fraTTgrance is not in ordinary contact with the

concerned sense-organ, viz. the olfactory sense-organ. Here the sight of the sandalwood revives

the memory of fragrance. This is due to the past association between our visual perception of

sandalwood and the olfactory perception of its fragrance. Here, the memory of fragrance is

certainly a cognition of fragrance (saurabhajnana). According to the Naiyayikas, this memory-

cognition of fragrance connects the visual sense-organ with fragrance. Thus, this perception is

produced by a certain cognition that functions as sense-object relation. For this reason, it is

called jnana-Iaksana sannikarsa.

It may be remarked here that in both these cases of extra-ordinary percepiton, i.e.,

samanyalaksana and jnanalaksana, some kind of knowlege acts as .the medium.of the sense-

object relatiqn f indriya sannikarsa). In the case of samanyalaksana, itisthememoryorrecolleciton

of an object that is due to the past experience (purvanubhava) of the same object, which brings

about the extra-ordinary perception (alaukika pratyaksa). These two kinds of extra-ordinary

perceptions, however, differ in one important respect. In the case of the samanyalaksana

perception, the present cognition of the universal (samanyajnana) causes the perception of all
/■w«“

the particulars in which the universal concerned inheres, whereas in the case of jnanalaksana

70
perception, a memory producal by past experience (purvanubhava-janya-smrti-jnana) produces

the present perception of its object (yad visayakam jnanam tasyaiva pratyasattih).8

The Nyaya thinkers state that 'jnanalaksana sannikarsa' is also necessary for explaining

certain epistemic.pheriomena.9

First, it is necessary for explaining a kind of knowledge called recognition (pratyabhijna),

Recognition is the perceptual knowledge of a present object which, at the same time, is also

cognised as something that was previously perceived. For example, the perceptual cognition 'this

is that Devadatta' is an instance of recognition. Here, both the properites stated by the expres­

sions 'this' and 'that' are apprehended by the visual sense-organ. The expressions 'this' and

'that'indicate presentness and pastness respectively. Now, 'this devadatta', i.e., Devadatta who

is present here and now is perceived by ordinary sense-object relation (laukika sannikarsa); but

'that Devadatta' existed at a distant place, and also at a particular time, which is now past.. So,

there cannot by any ordinary contact (laukika sannikarsa) of the visual sense-organ with it; and,
hence, in this case, 'jnanalaksana sannikarsa' is necessary for the connection between the sense-
* • 0

organ and the Devadatta who existed at some other point of time and also at some other place.

The memory of Devadatta, which is due to our precious perception of him, and which is occa-

sioned by the perception of the present Devadatta that revives the impression (sams. kara)
V—

produced by previous experience (purvanubhava), acts as the sense-object relation (sannikarsa)

and brings about the present perception of the form "this is that Devadatta".

Secondly, jnanalaksana sannikarsa is also necessary for explaining after-cognition

(anuvyavasaya). The first determinate cognition of any object is called 'vyavasaya'. This cogni­

tion,while revealing its object, itself remains unrevealed; since a cognition cannot reveal itself.

The Nyaya-Vaisesika school maintains that just as the visual sense-organ reveals its object with­

out revealing itself, a cognition, too, reveals only its object without revealing itself. Thus, the

Naiyayikas reject the view that like a lamp, a cognition is self-illuminating (svaprakasa). In order
✓
to be revealed, a cognition needs another piece of cognition. The pereptual cognition which has a

vyavasaya as its object is called anuvyavasaya. For example, when the pot comes in contact with
l

8. Siddhantamuktavali, p. 65
— *■* * * _ "7
9. ■ Adhyapana commentary by N. C. Goswami, on Tarkasangraba by Annambhatta, p. 356-60 , b. S 1 <

71
the visual sense-organ, indeterminate cognition ofthe pot arises. In this cognition, pot, pothood

and their relation are cognised as unrelated. After this, there arises the determinate cognition of

the pot. Perception of this determinate knowledge called 'vyavasaya' is 'anuvyavasaya*: For

example, the perceptional awareness of the form 'this is a pot' (ayam ghatah) is vyavasaya; while

the subsequent mental perception of the form 'I know that this is a pot' (ghatamaham janami) or 'I

possess the knowledge of a pot' (aham ghatajnahavan) is the relevent anuvyavasaya. In this

anuvyavasaya, the previous vyavasaya features as the object. All the entities featuring as objects

in a perception produced by a sense-organ must, as a rule, be grasped by that sense-organ.

Anuvyavasaya is not produced by external sense-organs, because even blind and deaf persons

can have anuvyavasaya. Hence, it must be produced by an internal sense-organ, which is known

as mind (manas). So, mind (manas), the internal sense-organ, is the karana (instrumental cause)

here. The mind (manas) is related here to the cognising self through the ordinary sense-object

relation (laukika sannikarsa) known as contact (samyoga), while the cognition that is perceived by

the mind is related to the cognising self through the relation called 'samyukta-samavaya' that

obtains between the mind and the cognition, becasue in anuvyavasaya or after-cognition, a cogni­

tion is grasped as the revealer of a specific object. In the expample cited by us, the object is the

pot, which also features as an adjective of the cognition grasped by the mind. In the expression

'ghatajnanavan aham', ghata qualifies jnana, and jnana qualifies aham. Hence, the pot, too, fea­

tures as an object in the anuvyayasaya or after-cognition. Now, unless an object is related to a

sense-organ through a sannikarsa, it cannot be grasped by that sense-organ. Hence, there must

be some sannikarsa that obtains between the mind and the pot. The pot, being an external object,

cannot normally be the object that is grasped directly by the internal sense-organ. In other words,

the mind cannot apprehend the external objects without the help of the external sense-organs.

Nor can any one of the six ordinary sense-object relations obtain between the pot and the internal

sense-organ. Hence, there must be some extra-ordinary or super-normal relation (alaukika

sannikarsa) between the internal organ and the pot in this case. But this cannot also be a case of

samanyalaksana sannikarsa, the extra-ordinary sense-object relation that has been already dis­

cussed. Consequently, a second type of extra-ordinary sense-object relation has to be admitted

a* ^ ^

here, and this is known as 'jnanalaksana sannikarsa. In other words, vyavasaya which has exter­

nal entities like pot etc. as its object, acts as the extra-ordinary relation which connects the mind

with the external object. Consequently, the external object like pot etc. that is the object of

72
 vyavasaya also becomes the object ofanuvyavasaya. So, 'anuvyavasaya', a mental perception of

cognition, can be explained only by the help ofjnanalaksana sannikarsa.

. Thirdly,, imthe case ofthe perception ofnon-existence (abhava-pratyaksa) also, jnanalaksana

sannikarsa must be admitted. For example, in the case ofperceptions like "there is no pot on the

floor", there is perception of the non-existence ofpot on the floor. In this visual perception, we

are aware of three things - (i) the floor, (ii) the absence of pot, which is an adjective of that floor

and (iii) the pot, which qualifies the absence that characterises the floor. Since all these three

entities feature as objects in a single piece of visual perception, each one of them must be grasped

by the visual sense-organ through some sannikarsa or other. In the case ofthe floor, this sannikarsa

is-contact (samyoga), which is an ordinary type of sannikarsa. The visual sense-organ is con­

nected with the non-existence of the pot (ghatabhava) on the floor by another ordinary sannikarsa
, ■ ’ ■' ‘ ” -

that is called 'samyukta-visesanata'. Now, it should be noted here that while the absence of pot

is the adjective of the floor which is connected with the visual sense-organ, the same is not true of
•V?* I r / ‘ *

tkpot, which is the counter-positive (pratiyogi) of the absence of the pot. The adjective or

qualifiying character (visesana) of the floor here is a certain non-existence (abhava), and the ad­

jective of that non-existence (abhava) is pot. As non-existence (abhava) is related to the pot by

the relation of pratiyogita i.e., counter positive-hood (pratiyogita sambandha), so the pot cannot

exist on the floor'which is the substratum of non-existence (abhava), since no non-existence can

co-exist with its counterpositive. Thus, the pot cannot be grasped in this case (brought the sannikarsa

known as contact (samyoga), as it is not present before the visual sense-organ. Nor can it be

grasped by samyukta-visesanata, as it does not qualify anything that is in contact with the visual

sense-organ. For obvious reasons, there cannot also be any of the other ordinary sense-object

relations between the pot and the visual sense-organ in this case. Here, too, there must be some

extra-ordinaiy relation at work, and this is not also a case of samanyalaksana sannikarsa. For the

Naiyayikas, here also we have a case ofjnanalaksana sannikarsa, since it has to be admitted that

the memory of the counter-positive (pratiyogi) cannects here the pot with the visual sense-organ.

In this way, too, the utility of admitting jnanalaksana as a distinct type of extra-ordinary sense-

object relation (alaukika sannikarsa) can be established.

» Finally, the Naiyayikas also expalin illusion by the help ofjnanalaksana sannikarsa. For

example, in illusion, we perceive a snake in the place of a rope. Now, the sight of the rope in

73 .
semidarkness clearly revives the memory of the concept of snakehood previously perceived in

real snakes at some other time and some other place. This distinct memory knowledge gives rise

to an immediate apprehension, which results in the illusion of the rope as a snake.

The complex and indirect relation between a sense-organ and the object that it grasps
through jnahalaksana sannikarsa cap be expressed as "sva-samyukta-manah-samyukta-atma-

samaveta-jnana-visayatva". Here, the word "sva" stands for the sense-organ concerned. The

relation known as contact (samyoga) obtains between this sense-organ and the mind, i.e. the

internal sense-organ. Thus, the 'indriya' is 'manahsamyukta'. This mind, again, is in contact with

th self (atman). Thus, 'manas' is 'atmasamyukta'. The memory that acts as sannikarsa is a cogni-
oar

tion (jnana) that is related to the self through the relation of inherence (samavaya) on one hand,

and to the object perceived though a svarupa-sambandha or self-linking relation known as visayata.

The third extra-ordinary sense-object relation (alaukika sannikarsa) is known as

yogaja sannikarsa. The meaning of 'yogaja sannikarsa' is 'yOgaja-dharma sannikarsa'. It is

* * »

stated in the Sastras :

"viprakrstam vyavahitam samyak pasyanti yoginah" - i. e., the yogi-s can pereive in a proper

manner ever those entities that are distant or concealed due to the obstruction caused by things

like walls, mountains, etc.10

Ordinary man can perceive only gross things which are near, present and in front of him.

But the yogi perceives all things including subtle and minute entities of the past,.present and the
future. YogajasannikarsaIS. accepted for explaing such perceptions of the yogis, it is stated that

when a main practice, yoga sincerely and rigorously for a long time, then a specific kind of merit
(dharma)arises;in his-self. ;it is thisjdharmk which acts as the sense-contact .(sannikarsa) between

him and all past, present and future objects,: and consequently, it gives rise to the perception of all

objects by the yogis, and this makes them omniscient in this sense. In this kind of perception,
*****

the six ordinary kinds of sense-object contacts or samanyalaksana sannikarsa or jnanalaksana

sannikarsa do not occur-but the yogajadharma of the yogi becomes the cause of the1 ,i/

sense-objeOt,contact. '

It may be aksed here: the yogaja dharina of the yogi exists only in his selfthrough the

relation ofsamavSya. If if is not related or connected with a different entity, then how can it be a
10. Ibid, p. 361

74
relaiton ? Unless it is a relation, how can it be regarded as a sannikarsa? So, the question is: can
■ s !>\ * ■

yogaja dharma be really called a sannikarsa ?

In reply, the Nyaya thinkers say that though the yogaja dharma resides injthe yogi's self by

the relation of samavaya, it can nevertheless act as the contact (sannikarsa) of the sense-organ of

the yogi with all objects. The indirect relation through which that dharma becomes the sannikarsa

in the perception of all objects is 'svasrayasamanakalikatva1;' The word 'sva' indicates the yogaja
dharma of the yogi, and his self is the substratum (asraya) pf that dharma. Now, all objects ofhe

world and.the self of the yogi are in the same temporal order, since the self is eternal, and hence,
co-present with all the things - past, present and future. Thus, the yogaja dharma is related to all

the entities through this indirect relaiton, which also holds between the yogaja dharma and the
sense-organs of the yogi. Hence, through the relation 'svisraya-samanakalikatva', the yogajadharma

acts as the sense-object relation (indriya sannikarsa) that gives rise to yogic perception.

' To the Naiyayikas, the above instances are all cases, of perceptionfor the -

following reasons: •

F irst, the Nyaya thinkers believe that the nature of a particular kind of cognition is ascer- .

tainedhya specific type of mental perception which is called after-cqgnition (anuvyavasaya).

- •. _ v ■ '

After - cognition is a kind ofmental percepiton ofvyavasaya. We have already discussed it in this
-i. ' \
chapter. While vyavasaya reveals its own object, it is revealed in its turn by another cognition,

and this second cogniton, whose object is vyavasaya, is termed as anuvyavasaya Anuvyavasaya

is expressed in such sentences as T know that this is apot1 (ghatamaham janami) etc. Now, in all V

the cases discussed above, the anuvyavasaya concerned is of the form "ahain pratyaksayami" (I
V •• *■'’ V ; •

perceive) andnoCahamahuminomi" (I infer). This fact clearly indicates that the vyavasayas in

these cases were perceptual in character.

Secondly, the Nyaya thinkers believe that except in the case of God's perception, there

must be some kind of sense-object relation in all cases ofperceptions that would account for their

immediacy. Now, the Naiyayikas argue that there must be some kinds of sense-object relation in

all the different kinds of extra-ordinary perception that have been discussed. In each of these

cases, it has been shown that some sort of relation exists between the sense-organ and the object .

grasped by it. Consequently, all these instances of cognition can be regarded as perceptual.

75
 A question, however, may arise : why are these kinds of perceptions called 'extra­

ordinary'? In other words, what constitutes the extra-ordinariness of such perceptions?

In reply, the Nyaya thinkers remark that this extra-ordinariness (alaukikatva) of perception

implies certain things, i.e., a particular class of perception is known as extra-ordinary for the

reasons stated below:

First, the Nyaya thinkers have accepted six ordinary sense-object relations (laukika

sannikarsa) which give rise to ordinary perception (laukika pratyaksa). There are, however, some

sense-object relations which give rise to perception, but, which at the same time, are different

from the recognised six ordinary sense-object relations accepted in Nyaya philosophy.11 In

other words, these sense-object relations are different from the generally accepted six kinds of

ordinary sense-object contacts accepted in the Nyaya system, and hence, cannot be included in

them. So, these sense-object relations are called extra-ordinary. Perception which is produced

by these extra-ordinary sense object relations are called extra-ordinary perception (alaukika

pratyaksa) i.e., as they are different from ordinary perception (laukika pratyaksa).

Secondly, the Naiyayikas define perception in two ways - (a) either in terms of sense

object relation, or (b) in terms of immediacy. In both these cases, the object of perception is

present before the sense-organs. There are, however, some cases of perception in which the

object is neither present nor proximate to the sene-organ concerned, but even then their percep­

tion takes place, i.e., the object being absent, is presented to the sense-organs in an extra-ordi­

nary (alaukika) way. So, in all such cases, there, is a special kind of sense-object. For this

reason, such perceptions are termed as extra-ordinary perceptions (alaukika pratyaksa).

If we consider these sannikarsas individually, samanyalaksana perception is called extra­

ordinary because in this case, all the individuals of a particular class are cognised by means of the

knowledge of the universal acquired from the perception of a particular of that class, even though

all the members are not present to the sense-organs in the same manner in which the one is present.

This fact of the perception of all members of a class, even when many of them are not present in

front of us, constitutes the extra-ordinariness of samanyalaksana pratyaksa. On the other hand,

jnanalaksana perception is known as extra-ordinary, because the perception of the fragrance of

11. Ibid, p. 345

76
sandalwood from a distance is generally not possible - this fragrance is the object ofthe olfactory

sense-organ which cannot function at a distance; and so, it is not smelt my the perceiver; hence it

is not related or connected with the sense of smell. Fragrance of sandalwood is the object of a

particular sense-organ, but instead of being perceived by the concerned sense-organ, it is being

perceived by a different sense-organ. In other words, perception of fragrance of sandalwood is

I

brought about in this case by a sense-organ which is usually not capable of perceiving it, and for

this reason, it is better to call it extra-ordinary. Finally, yogic perception is called extra-ordinary

as it is the intuitive percepiton of all entities, past, distant and future, remote and subtle, caused by

the extra-ordinary powers which arise in the minds of the yogins by deep meditation,

(yogabhyasajanito dharmavisesah). Ordinary persons are devoid of such special powers, and

they cannot also comprehend how the yogic powers produce such astonishing results.

(ii) Bhasaravajna's classification of perception into

'Y ogi-pratyaksa' and'Ayogi-pratyaksa'
* *

Bhasarvajna, the author of Nyayasara and its commentary Nyayabhusana,isaNaiyayika

from Kashmir, and he does not always follow the traditional tenets of the Nyaya or Vaisesika

school. On many occasions, he has departed from these tenets, and sometimes, he has even

sharply criticized them. He shows such an innovative spirit while proposing a classification of

perception. His manner of defining perception is also quite novel. He defines perception as the

means of obtaining veridical and immediate, i.e. direct experience (samyagaparoksa-

. nubhavasadhanam pratyaksam).12 In his opinion, this perception can be initially classified into

two types: (i) yogic perception (yogipratyaksa) and (ii) non-yogic perception (ayogi-pratyaksa).13

He then proceeds to disciss the nature of non-yogic perception, and closes this discussion by

analysing the nature of yogic perception. According fo him, non-yogic perception is the immedi­
ate or direct experience (i. e. cognition that is different from memory), which is produced when

our sense- organs are in appropriate relations with their respective objects. Non-yogic perception

takes place when gross (sthula) objects are related to the sense-organs. It also requires the pres-

12. Nyayasara, p. 84 and Nyayabhusana thereon.

13. Nyayasira, p. 101 and Nyayabhusaia thereon.

77
ence of accessories like the presence of light, time place etc.14 Following the earlier Naiyayikas
A/

like Uddyotakara, Bhasarvajna also admits six kinds of sense-object relations that are required in

non-yogic perception.15 In such perceptions, present and proximate entities can be known.

Yogic perception, on the other hand, is the direct or immediate cognition of past, future,

distant and subtle objects.16 As examples, Bhasarvajna cites the examples of the higher spheres

of existence (loka) that are not perceptible to us. According to Vedic cosmogony, there are seven

loka-s: (i) Bhu, (ii) Bhuva, (iii) Svah, (iv) Maha, (v)Jana, (vi) Tapas and (Vii) Satya, which are

arranged in a hierarchy. The bhu loka is the lowest, and the satya loka is the highest. Ordinary

human binges can perceive only the gross or perceptible objects that exist in the bhuloka - they

cannot perceive subtle things like atoms (paramanu) or ether (akasa) etc., even though they are

present in the 'Bhuloka'. Ordinary men cannot also perceive even perceptible things if they

happen to be distant, obstructed or concealed, past or future to them. But the yogins,by virtue of

their supernatural powers, can perceive all these entites.17 Bhasarvajna further classifies

yogipratyaksa into two further groups- (i) that which happens during yuktavastha, and (ii) that

which happen during ayuktavastha.18 The first of these happens when the internal sense-organ

is connected with the self in a special manner, and such perception, that grasps all the entities, is

also due to the merit gathered througth yogic practices. Only the yogins of the highest order can

have such perception. Ordinary practitioners of yoga cannot perceive all the entities in the world.19

i . - _> / - _ _ _ / ___
14. tatrayogipratyaksam trakasadesakaladharmadyanugrahad indriyarthasambandhavisesena sthularthagrahakam-

Nyayasara, p. 102 and Nyayabhusana thereon.

15. Nyayabhusana, p. 167

16. yogipratyaksam tu desalcalasvabhavaviprakrstarthagrahakam. Nyayasara, p. 170

17. desaviprakrstah satyalokadayo’tidurastha vyavahitas^ca nagabhuvanSdayah, kalaviprakretastvatitanigatah ,

svabhavaviprakrstah paramanvakas*adaya iti, tesam triprakaraham viprakrstariam' samastanam, vyastariafn va

grahakam pratyaksam yogipratyaksam ityucyate - Nyayabhusana, p. 170

18. "tad dvividham - yuktavasthayam ayuktavasthiyam ceti" - Nyayasara, p. 170

19. a) "tatra yuktavasthayam atmantahkaranasamyogadeva dhamiadisahitad asesarthagrahakam". Nyayasara, p. 170

b) "etacca paramayogivivaksayoktam,' na tu yogimatrasyasesarthasya grahanam bhavati, Nyayabhusana, p. 170

78
 The relation between sense-organs and objects is not required in this case.20 The yogins

who have not attained this supreme staues can also perceive the objects that are imperceptible,

but for this, they require sense-object relations also as a causal factor. Moreover, in such cases,

the self is connected with the internal sense-organ, the internal sense-organ is connected with the

external sense-organ, and the external sense-organ is connected with the external objects. The

yogins of the highest order require only the connection between self and the internal organ for

apprehending all things without remainder through such yogic perception.

The yogins can perceive the distant objects as we perceive the things which are near us. It
is said that perceptions of Vyasa etc. are of this kind. It is further stateithat nobody can be a

'yogi' unless he has some profound virtues. These profound virtues are acquired by those yogins

who properly perform the eight 'yogangas' i.e., eight 'angas' (parts) of yoga. So the perform­

ance of these 'yogangas' give rise to profound virtues (punya). On the other hand, yogins who do

not perform these'yogangas' can meditate only by 'tapasya' (austerities). In this way, they

attain the 'dharmas'. The Mimamsakas, - the karmakandavadins, however, hold that virtue can

be acquired only by performing vedic sacrifices (yajna).21

It is said that the yogins know everything - but what is the proof that the yogins have

knowledge of everything - past, present, future and subtle entities ?

In reply, it is said that such a view is proved by Sruti, Smrji, Itihasa etc. Inference also

proves yogin's existence.22

It may be stated here that perception may be divided from the stand point of different

stages. From this view-point, it is of two kinds- (a) propositional or determinate (savikalpaka)

and (b) non-propositional or indetetminate (nirvikalpaka). Propositional perception is that wihch

arises from its description through relation with names, classes etc. e.g. 'This Rama has a stick.'

20. atmantahkaranasaihyogadeva ityavadharanam arthasannikaisanisedhartham, na tu sahakannisedhartham,

dharmadisahitaditysiktatvat. Nyayabhusana, p.170

_____ _ . _u. _
21. vyasadinamapyevambhuta evanbhavah prakrstad dharmad bhavati. prakrstadharmastu yoganganusthanad va

bhavatu, tapahprakarsad va, yajnaaisadhanaprakarsad veti. Nyayabhusana, p. 171

22. yogisadbhavastu srutismrtipuranetihasahekayogasastresu prasiddhaiti.......... aunmanamapi

yogisadbhavavedakam......... Nyayabhusana, p. 171

79
 Non-propositional perception, on the other hand, involves the apprehension of the mere

nature (svarupa) of a thing; for example, a perception produced by the first contact of a sense-

organ with an object. Bhasarvajna believes that yogic perception of the disciplined state

(yuktavastha) is non-propositional.23 Non-propositional perception, however, is at the root of

all other cognitive states such as perception, inference etc. The yogins make attempt to acquire

the non-propositional kind of perception. Bhasarvajna has also discussed the different means

through which the yogins attain samadhi.24

(Hi) The Buddhist classification of perception

Having defined perception (pratyaksa) as free from imaginary constructions (kalpanapodha,

nirvikalpaka) and non-illsuory (abhranta), Dharmakirti has classified it into four types.25 This

classification has been discussed very briefly in his Nyayabindu, and these have been explained

by Vinitadeva and Dharmottara in their commentaries on Nyayabindu. Dharmakirti maintains

that these four types of perceptions are :

(i) indriyajanya, i,e., the perception produced by sense-organs,2ft

(ii) manovijnana or mental perception,27

(iii) sva-samvedana or 'self-perception,'28

(iv) yogijnana or the cognitions of the yogi.29.

23. a) vastumatravabhasakam nirvikalpakam, yatha prathamaksa-sannipatajam jnanam, yuktavasthayam yogi-

jnahanca. Nyayaslra, p. 176

b) yogah samadhih ekagratocyate, tatra sthitasya yogino nirvikalpakam eva pratyaksamiti, vikalpatayam

ekagratanupapatteh... Nyayabhusana, p. 176

24. Nyayasara, pp. 586 - 590, and Nyayabhusana thereon.

25. taccaturvidham - Nyayabindu, 1/7

26. indriyajanyam-op, cit. 1/8

_ - . •v-
27. svavisayanantaravisayasahakari^endriyajnanena samanantarapratyayena janitam tanmanovijnanam -

op. cit. 1/9

28. sarvacittacaittanam atmasamvedanam - op. cit. 1/10

29. bhutarthabhavanaprakarsaparyantam yogijnananceti - op. cit. 1/11

80
 Dharmakirti has discussed these classification also in Pramanavarttika, his magnum opus.

Here, indriyapratyaksa has been discussed in Chapter II, verse nos. 191 -207, manasapratyaksa

or manovijnana has been discussed in Chapter II, verse nos. 239-248, sva-samvedana has been

discussed in Chapter II, verse nos. 249-267, and yogipratyaksa has been discussed in Chapter

II, verse nos. 281-287, 532-535.

By inserting the expression 'kalpariapodham' in the definition of perception, Dharmakirti

has, by implication, rejected the classification ofperception into nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) and

savikalpaka (determinate), since the latter type of cognition, according to his definition, can not

be perceptual, and cannot thus be considered as a type of perception. While discussing the

four-fold classification of perception mentioned above, Dharmottara has indicated that these

four types of cognitions are regarded as perceptual since they are vivid (sphutabha), non-

judgemental (nirvikalpaka) and non-illusory (abhrahta).30 Thus, some discussion of the Buddhist

arguments for maintaining that perception must be indeterminate or non-judgemental is in order.

Dharmakirti has discussed this issue in a threadbare manner in his Pramanavarttika and

Pramanaviniscaya (a word whose Sanskrit original is lost, and which is extant only in its Tibetan'

version). Vacaspati Misra has summed up these arguments in an admirable maimer in his
\

Nyayavarttikatatparyatika before rejecting them, and we will more less follow this formulation
of Vacaspati Misra.

The Buddhists base their arguments for rejecting determinate perception on two main

reasons - (i) determinate cognition can be expressed or described through language, since in

such cognitions, their objects are revealed along with the respective words designating them,

and (ii) in determinate cognition, some entity or entities are revealed as qualificand (visesya),

while some other entities feature as qualifier (visesana) or as relation (sambandha) between the

qualificand and the qualifier. Here, the qualifiers can be either (i) name (riama), or (ii) universal

(jati), or (iii) quality (guna), or (iv) motion (kriya), or (v) substance (dravya). Thses facts

30. (a) tacc'ajnaharupavedanam atmanah saksatkari nirvikalpakam, abhrantam ca. tatah pratya ksam. -

NyayabindutikI 1/10

(b) karatalamalakavat bhavyamanasylrthasya yad darsanam tad yogino pratyaksam. taddhi sphutabham.

sphutlbhatvadeva ca nirvikalpakam...........pramanasuddharthagrahitvacca samvadakam. atah pratyaksam

f _
itarapratyaksavat. - Nyayabindutika 1/11.

81
 J

-are admitted unanimously. The Buddhists now proceed to argue that such cognitions cannot
be produced by the sense-organs or their objects; and if Such cognitions cannot be produced >
. by sense-organs or their objects, then they cannot be perceptual in nature. It now remains to
be shown as to why such cognitions cannot be produced by sense-organs.

The Buddhists begin their argument by stating the fact that the words designating objects
do not reside in those objects, nor do these words constitute the nature of those objects. \
Consequently, a sense-organ, while grasping its objects, can never grasp the word designating
it.. If the sense-organs could grasp the words, then one could learn a language without being J
taught.31 Under such circumstances, perception can never reveal words designating the objects
< of that perception - it can reveal only the object(s) that produce it. After all, a perceptual
cognition produced by colour (rupa) does not reveal the latter along with taste.32 It thus follows
'that determinate or judgemental cognition, which presents objects that are not reaily associated
with words in a manner that relates them with words, cannot be a cognition that is produced
/ by objects or sense-organs. It must, therefore, be produced.by imagination, but since it
immediately follows sensory cognition, we mistakenly consider it to be a case, of genuine
experience or perception,33 . . '
’ v * - I-

Those who admit determinate perception may point out here that perception is not pro­
duced by sense-object relation alone. Once an object is grasped by a sense-organ, an inde­
terminate cognition of that object is produced. This cognition revives the memory of the word
, -designating that object, because the relation or designator - designatum obtains between a word
/and the object meant by it, and the cognition of one if its relata - revives the memory of the

3-1.. na vyavasayatmakam pratyaksam bhavitum arhati, abhilapasartisargayogyapratibhasaiVi hi tat. na

cendriyarthabhyam labdhajanma vijnanam arthavabhasam sakyam abhilapenayojayitum. na hyarthe sabdah

santi, tadatmano va, tath^sati avyutpannasyapi vyutpannavad vyavaharah syat..........— "Nyayavarttikatat-

paryatika 1/1/4.

32, na cabhilapo’rthasamsparso samvedanadharmah, arthesu tanniyojanat. tasmad arthad upajayamanam jnanam

. _ /
artham evadarsayet nablilapam. na hi nipat jayamanam pratyaksam rasasahitam etadadarsayati. -

Nyayavaittikatatparyatika, 1/1/4

33. tasmadabhilapasams arganapeksam abhilapasamsarginam adarsayadvikalpa vijnanam vikalpavasano —

tthapitam aniyatarthagrahi manasam atmiyam utpreksalaksanam vyaparam tiraskrtyanubhavaprabhavataya'
___. / L '' * '**'
anubhavavyaparam darsanam puraskrtya pravartamanam anubhavataya abhimanyate pratipattarah. - Ibid.

82
 i i v r*. #

other relaturna rule stated as 'ekasambandhijnaham aparasambandhinam smarayati.' The sense-,

obje.ct relation persists while this memory takes glace. Subsequently, the sense-object relation,
with the help of memory, produces a determinate cognition; and since this cognition has sense-
^ object relation as one of its causes, it may veiy well be perceptual in nature'. Hence, perception
need not always be indeterminate.34
’ 1 t . *

Dharmakirti points out that this argument is ineffective. The argument given above at best
\ i

'shows that the awareness of a designatum leads to the memory of its designator. Those who
admit determinate perception (viz. the adherents of Nyaya, Vaisesika and Mimamsa schools)
Nalso^maintain that words like 'cow', 'horse' etc. primarily designate class essences or universals
like cowness, horseness, etc. These universals are, according to the Buddhists, imaginary
constructs,.and they cannot be perceived; because being unreal, they lack causal efficacy, and
since perception is produced by its object, such an object must be real, and not imaginary in
nature. The object of perception, in the opinion of the Buddhists, can be only momentary unique
particulars, which alone are real; and’which are ineffable, since they cannot be described by
Words. Thus, the entities that can be designated by words cannot be object ofperception, and the
entities that can be perceived'cannot be designated by words. Hence,-words can never feature as .
qualifiers or associates of objects,in a perceptual cognition. This effectively rules out the possibility
of a: perceptual cognition being effable, i.e. determinate or judgemental in character.35

So far, we have seen why according to Buddhists words cannot feature as objects in a
perceptual cognition. The same arguments serve to show why names cannot figure as qualifiers
in perceptual cognition: Here, we have to take into consideration the second fact pointed out
1 ' \ . VC , s'v<i
by the Buddhists that, in their opnion, proves that no perception can be qualificati: ., determinate ^1

orjudgemental. The four other entities that feature as qualifiers in such cognitions are universal,"
quality, motion and substance. Among these, the first three are never found apart from their
substrata, and they are supposed to qualify these very substrata. In determinate perceptions,
V ' r

two entities are joined by some relation as qualificand and qualifier. But two things can be joined
....... ■ .................................. ... ■ ....................... ............... — .................... . 1 - ■■—■■■... .............................. * 3
*'.................. --------- ^ ..................

JA. sanketavasat sabdanam arthasambandhenarthopalabdhau tatsmaranat tatsamsrstavedanam iti cet ? - Ibid.

35. yatra tarhi te krtasanketah tadeva smarayed etan. tatraiva te krtasamketah yadanugatam samahyam. sarvasa-
mart,hyarahitarn hi tat, alikatvat. tasmad yad drstam na tena sabdanam sambandhah, yena ca sambandho na
< taddrstam. - Nyayavarttikatatparyatika 1/1/4.
♦•» •

83
 /

orriijxed only when they are found separately; e.g. milk and water, which are found in different

. pots; can be mixed together. Since universal, quality or motion or their inherence with their

J substrata cannot exist or be cognised separately by themselves, they cannot also be mixed or

joined by us in any way. Thus, the 'joining' that is performed by our intellect cannot obtain

• in the real world. This, too, shows that the cognitions in which these three entities feature as

qualifiers (e.g. 'this is a cow', 'this pot is red', 'this man is running' etc.) are products of

imaginations, whence, they are not produced by objects, which shows that they are not

N perceptual in nature.36 Another objection can be raised against the suggestion that sense-organ,

along-with the memory evoked by indeterminate perception, can produce yet another perception

in which names can occur as qualifiers. First, we have to keep in mind that memory is not capab le

of being produced by sense-organs. Had they been so, a blind person would(not be capable

of remembering the things seen by him before he become blind. Thus, if memory intervenes

between indeterminate perception and the subsequent determinate cognition, then the operation

ofthe sense-organ is interrupted by the occurrence of memory, and as a consequence, deter­

minate cognition cannot also be perceptual in nature.37 The suggestion that memory assists the
\ i

sense-organ in producing determinate cognition cannot also be admitted. There could have been

some cooperation or mutual assistance between sense-organ and memory if they had been

directed towards the same object. This, however, cannot be the case. The objects that can

be grasped by sense-organ are present and proximate, while memory can reveal only what is

past and distant. There is no way in which sense-organ can be made to grasp a past object,

and similarly, memory cannot also be made to reveal a present object that has not been cognised

previously. Thus name, universal, quality and motion cannot figure as qualifiers in perceptual
t- ■

, - , S

36........... tanna, pindavivekena jatyader agrahanat." na hi jatijatimantau va kriyakriyavantau va gunaguninau va

tatsamavayo va vivekena cakasati. naca vivekenipratibhasamanah sakya mithoyojayitum ksirodakavad

atadvedina. tasmad ekam avibhagam svalaksanam anadivikalpavasanasamaropitajatyadibhedam tatha

vikalpyata iti yuktam utpasyamah.Ibid.

37. api calocite vastunindriyena tadanantarotpannam sabdasmaranavyavahitavyaparam indriyam arthas ca

savikalpikam api dhiyam upajanayitumn arhatah. yathaha,

arthopayoge'pi punah smartam sabdanuyojanam /

aksadhiryadyapekseta so'rtho vyavahito bhavet //

— Nyayavarttikatatparyatika 1/1/4'

84
 cognitions, This shows that determinate cognitions, in which these entities are revealed as

qualifiers, are not perceptual in character.38

One may point out that these considerations are not applicable to the cases where

substances feature as qualifiers. They can exist or be perceived in isolation from the entities

( that they qualify, and memory plays no role in the generation of the cognitions inwhich substances

figure ^qualifiers,. Hence, determinate cognitions in which the qualifiers happen to be substances

may very well be perceptual in nature. In that case, the Buddhist view that all perceptions are
V
indeterminate cannot be accepted. The Buddhists counter this argument by pointing out that

a determinate cognition like "fins person is carrying a stick" (ayam dandi), where a substance

(dravya) features as a qualifier, presupposes a number of preconditions. In order to have such

a perceptual cognition, one must perceive the qualificand, the qualifier and the relation between

them. Having perceived these’elements, one must also synthesize them in a particular manner

■‘in_accordance with mundane convention or linguistic usage. In the absence of any one of these

factors,"such a determinate cognition cannot take place. Such a series of complicated functions

* like apprehension and synthesis cannot be undertaken by sense-organ, which, being unconscious,

can be at best a passive receptor; because such functions can be discharged by some one who

is conscious and capable of forming judgements. Hence, such determinate cognitions cannot

be.produced by'Sense-organs; and consequently, they cannot also be perceptual in nature.39 ■

It has thus been demonstrated that all the five, types of determinate cognitions are non-sensuous,

whence it follows that perception must be indeterminate.

38. na ca yadevalocanam ajijanad indriyam tadeva smaranasahakari vikalpapratyayam adhatte........no khalvatitam

bhavati gocaro’ksasya^na cagocare sahasrenapyupayair etat pravartitum arhati; na ca smrtir atitavisaya
i riapubhutapurvam vartamanam gocarayitum arhati, tadgocaratve candhanam api rupasaksatkaraprasangah
...... tad evam jatigunakarmakalpanah pratyaksatvena parastah - Ibid.

39. dravyakalpana’pi danditi -

N /-,/*** , 71
1 visesanam visesyanca sambandham laukikim sthitim /

grhitva samkalayyaitat tatha pratyeti' nanyatha //

nacaitavantam vyaparakalapam vicarakanirvartaniyam indriyajnanam sahate, tasya

sannihitavisayabalenotpatter avicarakatvat'....... tasniat na tadviklpam pratyaksam iti. -
«. M «« m _
1 Nyayavaittikatatparyatika'1/1/4.
' * 1

85
 y
We now proceed to the discussion of the different types of perceptions admitted by the
. Buddhists. The first of thses types is the perception induced by sense-organs. Dharmakirti *
defines it as "indriyajanyam" or "indriyajnaham" in his Nyayabindu. The first reading is adopted „
by Vinitadeva, and the second one is adopted by Dharmottara, as is evident from their respective
commentaries on Nyayabundu.40 Both of them, however, arrive at the same meaning, viz. a
cognition that is dependent on the sense-organ is the first variety of perception admitted by
Dhanpakirti. This suggests that the other types of perception are not produced by sense-organ.
Thus, manovijnana, the second variety of perception is not due to sense-organ, since for the
.Buddhists, manas is not a sense-organ.41 Dharmakirti has raised an interesting question in this
connection in his Pramanavarttika. This first type of perception is no doubt produced by the.
sense-organ, but it is also produced by the object of that sense-organ. In that case, why fr­
it characterized only as ^pratyaksa" or 'indriyajanya', and not as 'prativisaya' or 'visayajanya'?
jnanswer to this, questions Dharmakirti and his commentators point outthabhere, common usage V
has to be taken into account. Common people employ the word 'pratyaksa' for referring to
perceptual cognition, and philosophers, while formulating their terminology, cannot ignore this.
This is why the term "pratyaksa" is applied to the three other types of perception, even though
they are not produced by any sense-organ.42' Besides, in Buddhfrtphilosophy, among the
different causal factors that produce perceptual cognition of the first variety, the sense-organ is
said be the dorqinant one (adhipati pratyaya);. The other factors are the object (known as
s ~ -' ’

"support" or iiambana pratyaya), the immediately preceding momentary cognition (known as the

• 40. (a) indriyajanyam iti.caksuradinipancendriyanyevaindriyatvenesyate... tasmatcaksuradindriyesuasritam

jnanameva indriyajanyam pratyaksam. - Nyayabinduvistaratika of Vinitadeva, 1/8.

„/ » mm “ M
(b) indriyasya jnaham indriyajnanam. indriyasritam yat tat pratyaksam - Nyayabindutika of Dharmottara, 1/8
- e.
41. manastu indriyam na, manasapratyaksasya prthan nirdesat. - Nyayabinduvistaratika of Vinitad/ya, 1/8.
« • '—, • /S

42. (a) saksaccajnahajananesamartho visayo'ksavat /

. . atha kasmad dvayadhinajanma tat tena nocyate //

samiksya gamakatvam hi vyapadeso niyujyate /

taccaksavyapadese'sti taddharmas'ca niyojyatam //

- - Pramanavarttioka, 2/191-192.

(b) aksasritatvam ca vyutpattinimittam sabdasya, na tu pravrttinimittam.

i - Dharmottara's commentary on Nyayabindu 1/3.

86
homogeneous cause or "samanantara pratyaya”) and other conducive factors (e.g. the presence
of light in the case of visual perception), which are known as ’accessory cause’ (sahakari 1

pratyaya). Among these four factors, the dominant one is mentioned while giving an account of
perceptual cognition. This does not mean that other causal factors do not have any role in the
production ofperceptual cognition.

After the first type of perception has taken place, it produces, in association of the object
that immediately succeeds its own object, another cognition - and this is known as ’mental
perception’ (manovijnana or mahasapratyaksa). Here, two points should be taken into con­
sideration. F irstjDharmakirti is assuming here the doctrine of universal momentariness admitted
in Buddhism. In common parlance, we speak of stable objects like chairs and tables that remain
unchanged during the perceptual process. For the Buddhists, however, the so-called stable
thing like a pot is only an unbroken series of momentary pots that are similar to one another,
and that follow in unbroken succession. The facts that they are similar and that there is no
temporal gap between one member of this series and its immediately succeeding member make
us think that there is one, identical, stable thing. Hence, the external object perceived by us
by sense-organ is immediately replaced by another similar object - which, in co-operation with
the perception produced by the sense-organ, gives rise to "mental perception". The perception
produced by sense-organ is the ’homogeneous cause’ (samanantarapratyaya) in relation to the
"mental perception". The notion of’homogeneous cause’ has been explained above.43 7, '

There is some dispute about the way in which the existence of this ’mental perception'
om

can be established. Buddhist logicians like Acarya Jnanagarbha maintain that the existence of
mental perception can be established by inference. Others like Dharmottara maintain that its
existence can be established on the basis of Buddhist scriptures alone. Dharmottara says in this
connection that Dharmakrrti has defined manovijnana to indicate that there is no harm in admitting
«
itjas a kind of perception, even though there is no_empirical evidence inits favour.44 Since

43. See the commentaries of Vinitadeva and Dharmottara on Nyayabindu 1/9.

44. (a) etacca siddhantaprasiddham manasam pratyaksam, na tvasya prasadhakam asti pramanam. evamjatiyakam

yadi syat, na kascid dosah syat - iti vaktum iaksanam akhyatam asyett - Dharmottara's commentary on

Nyayabindu, 1/9

(b) tadetad Dharmattorena agamasiddham darsjiayatam Acarya-Jnahagarbhaprabhrtinam manasasiddhaye

yat pramanam upanyastam 'vikalpodyat' iti tad bhangya'vadharanad eva dusitam. - Tippani on above.

87
this issue is not directly related to our main problem under discussion, we shall not pursue this

matter any further.

The third type of perception, viz. 'self-perception' or 'self awareness' happens in the case

of cognitions and other internal states like pleasure, pain etc. The Buddhists point out that we

are invariably aware of these states when they occur. In other words, such states cannot exist

without being revealed. The fact that they must necessarily be revealed can be explained only

under the assumptions that they reveal themselves. Under the opposite hypothesis that these

internal states are not self-revealing, one would have to admit the possibility that we can be

aware of some thing without knowing that we are aware of it; or, we could be happy without

knowing that we are happy. But this is not the case. Hence, all these internal states are directly

revealed to us even without the function of any sanse-organ, because had their perception been

dependent on the function of sense-organ, they could have remained unknown like external

objects. Since this is not the case, they must be self-revealing.45

The fourth type of perception admitted by Dharmakirti is yogic perception. In his opinion,

this is a sort of mystic intuition that is produced by the subculminational state of deep meditation

on some reality that has been established through valid or accredited means of knowledge, e.g.

the four Noble Turths realized by Buddha during his enlightenment. Dharmottara speaks of three

stages in the progress of the yogi who undertakes the yogic practices of meditation. At the

first stage, the image of the thing contemplated upon beings to gain clarity and vividness; at the

second stage the thing contemplated appears as if it were covered by a thin veil of cloud, while

at the third stage, it is perceived as clearly as a myrobalan fruit in one's hand. This ultimate stage

is perceptual, and it is also indeterminate.46

45. See Nyayabindu with commentaries of Vinitadeva and Dharmottara along with the Tippani of the unknown
• *

author, as also Pramanavarttika, 2/249-267 with the Vrtti of Manorathanandi.

46. See Nyayabindu 1/11 with the commentaries of Vinitadeva and Dharmottra along with Tippani, as also

Pramanavarttika 2/281 -287 and 2/532-535 with the Vrtti of Manorathanandi.

* «

88
 ywA r ^ 1 V~> /

\ - \ p-

riatyantikahhedah kiiitu purvapurvasya uttarottararupataya paririamadekatmakatvamiti").-50 The

, ' ' ' , - _ •j

former stage transforms itself into the latter one. The four stages are - (1) avagraha, (2) iha,
(3) avaya and (4) dharana.

/Avagraha,' the first stage, arisees as a result.of the sense-object contact. The nature of

ayagrahq has been explained in two ways by different Jaina thinkers. According to Umasvati,

it is indeterminate perception. The sense-object contact causes this indeterminate perception

which cognises the thing without cognising itsspecial characters. For example, when one has

a tactual sensation in darkness, he does not actually know with what he is in contact - he only
I
feels that there is something (yatkincit). This indeterminate congition without any specific name |

or character is known as avagraha.

. According to Akalanka, Hemacandra, Devanandi and other logicians, avagraha, though

an early stage of perception, is produced by a 'darsana' (merpsensation) of the thing. Pujyapada,

regards 'avagraha' as the first cognition which crops up as.a result of the contact of the sense-

organ with the object.51 For example, an individual's knowledge of a cloth along with its

whiteness (the general quality) arisesat once after the sense-contact with some object. So, this

cognition is determinate perception, and not mere sensation. For Akaianka also, ’avagraha1 is

determinate perceptual cognition, which iscalled the 'finrt apprehension' of a thing. To Hemacandra,

when the mere sensation (darsana) is modified into detemiinate perception, avagraha is produced
1' / ” _ t _aiv
by a contact of the sense-organ with the object ( aksarthayoge darsanantaram arthagrahanam

avargahah ).52 Ava aha further has two stages or levels, namely (1) vyanjanavagraha and

(2) arthavagraha.53 The vyanjanavagraha, the former level or state, consists in the 'contact
, , *
awamess' as in this stage, the sense-organs are related to the object, but the subject has no

sensation of it. But this state is not unconscious?as it causes the conscious cognition produced

in arthavagraha.54. In arthavagraha, the second stage, the object is perceived by. the perceiver,

and so it is conscious cognition. So, vyanjanavagraha necessarily precedes arthavagraha.

'50. Ibid.

51. Sarvarthasiddhi, (English Translation by S. A. Jaina) p. 29

\

52. Pramanamimamsa, I. 26.

53. Tattvartha-Bhasya, 1.18 . •

54. Tattvartha-sutra, (Hindi Translation by Pandit Sukhalalji) pp. 35-36.

'90
 Iha follows avagraha - it is termed as 'matehcesta'55 i.e. it is an investigation regarding

the character of the perceived object. For example, when we perceive a sound, we may have

a doubt about its source - the iha removes this veil of doubt. So, it is itself not doubt, but

it is a level which follows doubt. Umasvati states that there are various synomyms of iha, such

as uha, jijnasa and tarkavicarana.56

The third stage is called avaya. It reveals a distinct knowledge of the objects. It may

be called the "final determination" of the exclusive characater of the perceived thing. It is

expressed in the form "this is so and so and it does not belong to another kind." It may be

termed as the perceptual judgement. For instance, when an individual hears a sound, he

emphatically asserts that it is the sound of a horn, and not of a conchshell or any other thing,

as it is quite harsh. ~ '

The final stage, in the process is' 'dharana.' It causes memory, of the object cognised in
avaya. In other words, it is a state of retaining the past experiences. According to Akalanka,

'dharana' is really a factor of recollection. This factor is named as samskara (mental trace),

but itjs of the nature of a cognition.57 So, it causes memory as it is the mental trace which

is an important factor for the production of memory. It is a piece of knowledge, for otherwise

it could riot give rise nb any cognition. The Jainas believe avaya to be momentary, whereas
ou 1V ' ■
dharna exists for some period of.time. .

The Jaipa thinkers believe that though, the natures of thses stages are different, yet they

are not totally different from one another - there relation is one of bhedabheda, i.e., they differ

■ in one aspect and do not differ in another aspect. As they reveal the same object from various

points of view,58 they are different; on the other hand, as they are parts or stages of the same

whole process, so they are not different. In others words,.here the subject and the object are
«n»
idTical, but only the'action passesjhrough various statges like a man who remains the same

though he passes through different levels from birth to old age. Moreover, empirical knowledge

involves a process in which these four stages occur successively. At some time, this process

/ _____ - - _N - _
55. anvayavyatirekarapavisesaparyalocanarupamatehcestaiha, Pramana-Mimamsa, I, 1.17

'56. Tattvartha-Bhasya, I. 15.

57. smrtihetudharana samskarah, Akalankagranthatrayi, p.2-3.

58. "vastuno bhinnabhinnadharmasya prakasakatvat," Pramananayatattvaloka, p. 27

91
may come to a halt at the first or second stage, but the order,of the stages can never change, i.e.

avagraha,iha(:'avaya' and dharaha appear one after the other in the process of empirical perception.

To the Jainas, 'samvyavaharika pratyaksa' is of five kinds. This division is based on the
TV ' ' V>
nature and faction of the^ive different sense-organs, of each of whom constitutionally consists

of two parts, namely (1) the physical and (2) the psychical.59 The physical part is known as

the 'dravyendriya' and the psychical part is termed as 'bhavendriya.' The term 'dravyendriya'

implies the common eharcters of the sense-organs which possess specific forms, which may

be'both inner and outer. The outer aspect is known as njrvrtti while the inner part is called

upakarana.60 These two parts are constituted by 'pudgala' or matter. It may be pointed out

that the word 'dravya' may be employed to mean 'secondary thing,' In this sense, the term

'dravyendriya' signifies sense-organs which are secondary, as these are non-conscious. Moreover,

they yield knowledge only with the assistance of the 'bhavendriya' or psychical sense-organ

which is nothing but consciousness.

i

' ‘ ‘ - i

The psychical aspect of sense-organ or'bhavendriya' indicates two specific characters or

i ,

capacities ofthe sense-organ, namely 'labdhi' and 'upayoga'.61 The capacity of the sense-organ

which causes the apprehension of a thing is known as 'labdhi,'62 while the action ofconsciousness

directed to the thing is called 'upayoga.'63 So, a sense-organ fails to cognise an object in the

absence of'labdhi' and on the other hand* the thing cannot be cognised in the absence of any

action directed to that object. Hence, according to the Jainas, the sense-organs will be

materialistic inthe absence of the psychical factors, and consequently, they would be unable

to give rise to knowledge.64 In fact, the term 'bhava' is implied to signify importance or primacy.

In this sense, 'bhavendriya1.implies that which has the character or quality of being a sense organ

(indriyatva) not derivatively, but directly.

. * \

59. "spar^a^andharupasabdagrahanalaksanani sparearasanaghranacaksuhsrotrani indriyani

dravyabhavahhedani," Pramana-Mimamsa, 1.21.

60. "nirvrtti upakarane dravyendriyam," Tattvartha-sutra, II. 17

61. "bhavendriyam labdhyupayogaK" - Pramanamimimsa, 1.1.23.

62. "arthagrahanasaktirlabdhih," Nyayakumudacandra, p. 115.

63. "upayogah punah arthagrahanavyaparah", Ibid.

64. Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 229

92
 .r
- The second kind of perception accepted by the Jainas is 'muldiya pratyaksa.' It is direct
non-sensudus cognition, which crops up in the self directly;, sq,- it does not require the assistance
or mediation'of,the sense-organs and mind. For this reasorij itis also termed as ’super-sensuous
perception’ (atindriya pratyaksa). The removal of all the obstacles of dharma gives, rise to
4 4 • ‘ "t

th'is’mukhya pratyaksa.’ . . , ' - • /

' , . The Jaina thinkers point out that there are two different kinds of meaning of the term
'mukhya'. In the first sense, the word, 'mukhya' means superior. So, it follows that 'mukjhya ^

pratyaksa' signifies the superior or highest kind of cognition. According to the second inter­
pretation, the Jaina thinkers remark that asjhe face possesses a superior position with regard
to the othfer bodily parts, similarly 'mukhya pratyaksa' is of a higher status among all kinds of
•' ' -I

cognitions. ■

It should be pointed out here that the Agamika literature'regards only 'mukhya pratyaksa'
as 'pratyaksa.' It defines 'pratyaksa' as direct cognition which crops uii in the self in the absence p
of any mediation' or assistence of the sens_e-organs and the mind. After some time, however,
the epistemological literature divided pratyaksa into two kinds, namely (1) the samvyavaharika
and (2) the mukhya. t

‘Mukhya’ or transcendental perception, according to some thinkers, can be of two kinds,

'vikala' "(imperfect or deficient) and 'sakala' (perfect and complete). 'Vikala' (imperfect
transcendental prception) again is classified into two kinds, namely (1) clairvoyant perception
of spatial and temporal objects from a distance (avadhi) and (2) direct perception of other
peoples'*thought as is done by telepathic knowledge (manahparyayajnana). This knowledge is ^
known as ’kevalajnana’ (omniscience), i.e. perfect cognition of all worldly objects, which is
caused by the complete annihilation of karma particles that obstruct the attainment of perfect
■knowledge. So, to the Jainas, the last level of transcendental perception is omniscience \
(kevalajnana).

• In Jaina philosophy, ’mukhya pratyaksa’ is defined in different ways by different Jaina

thinkers, though the implications of these defiitions are not very different. To Akalanka, it is
"atindriyamjnanam,"65 that is, 'mukhya pratyksa ’is not produced by sense-organ—but it rises
' ■ Z , . r*L > :: ! : • ■
65. "mukyam atindriyamjnanam" - Akalakagranthatnayi, p. 2

93
in one's self. To Vadideva, it is "paramaitrii^am punarutpattavatmamatrapeksam,"^6 that is, it is

'paramarthika prdtyaksa' which crops up in the self without-any mediation or instrumentality of

4 J ' _ - '

other things. Manikyanandi and Prabhacandra also define it .as non-sensuous, veridical, distinct,

and infinite cognition whose obstacles are eradicated by some specific factors.67 A question,

however, may arise here : what is the speciality of such knowledge**?

In reply, Prabhacandra points out that its speciality lies in the fact that it originates only
—- ■ . - . ■ . A\
when all the coverings or veils of all karmas are eradicated totally in the presence of some specific
’ * 4 . „

factors (samagri-visesa). Of these specific factors, one.is internal and the other is external. The

inner factor is right faith (samyakdarsana) qnd time, space etc. are the outer factors. Karmas

are totally destroyed when these factors are favourable and consequently, ’mukhya pratyaksa’
takes place. The Jainas believe that the karmas can be totally rejected in the presence of some

specific factors. These specific factors are three, namely (1) right khoiwledge, (samyak jnana), -

(2) right faith, (samyakdarsana) arid right conduct (samyak caritra). These are really the three

methods by which karmas are eradicated.

• ‘ ■ - . ' x '

, Prabhacandra, however, remarks that there are two things, namely 'nirj ara* and 'samvara'

which make the self free by removing all karmas which obstructs the self.68

■ Samvara'i^ that which stops the inflow of karma-particles (asrava) to the self-

"asravanirodhah samvarah,"69 i. e., it involve the annihilation of asraVa. Samvara is possible by >
.. • t

the following ways : - (1) three kinds of restrictions of the body, mind and speech (kayagupti,

manogupti and vacanagupti) (2) by being kind to all living beings (dharma), (3) by performing

all duties properly (samiti), (4) by suffering Of privations (parisahajaya), (5) by penance

(tapasya), (6) by. meditation on the world's nature which is not satisfatory (anutpreksa) and

0) by good character (carit^).70 Nirjara^ on.the other hand, implies the destruction of the karma-
particles of the self -i.e. the karma particles previously collected in the self must be destroyed

in order .to acquire salvation which cannot be attained in the presence of karma particles.

66. Pramananayatattvaloka, II. 18

67. "samagrivisesavislesi takhil avaranam asesato mukhyam" - Prameyakamalamartanda, p. 241

* * » * » •

86., Ibid, pp. 241 - 246 . .

69.. Tattvarthasutra, IX, 1 * -

70. Ibid, IX, 2

94
\
 \

'* _*_ ***_

The Jaina thinkers classify 'mukhyapratyaksa' into three kinds namely (1) a.vadhijnana.

(2) manahparyay ajnaha arid (3)keyalajnaha. The first two kinds of 'mukhyapratyaksa’ are
known as 'desJipra'fyaksaV and the third or^e i? called 's^aryapratyakga.,71 ;These are also knwon

as 'yikalapratyaksa' and 'sarvapratyaksa.' It should be mentioned here that all these three

varieties of 'mubhyapratyaksa'/are ,nonrsensuous and directly originate in the self; but

’desapratyaksa’ gives rise to fractional cognitifm;-while 'sarvapratyaksa' signifies the cognition

of all; it is knowledge which is perfect and infinite. .

The Jaina view of non-sensuous perceptual knowledge is founded on their metaphysics.

^ ij * ;V* i’. ’
These thinkers believe that infinite:kn6wledge is the essential quality of the self; but this infinite

cognition is riot revealed because of the obstacles of the karmas - it reveals itself only when

this obstacle is removed. In conformity with the five kinds of knowledge (mati, Jruta, avadhi,
. manahparyaya and kevaia).mentioned the Jaina Agamas, there are five different varieties of

obstacles. Erich kind of cognition is veiled or covered by its particular obstcle or jnariivarana.72

. For example, Jmatijnariavarana’ prevents 'matijnaha', which comes into existence by destroying

and subsiding (ksayopasama) all its karmic covering (matijnariavarana). Similarly, by destroying
-1 ^ l' ’ ,M “ " '
^ and subsiding 'avadhijnanavarana', 'avadhijnana' arises. Abadhijnana is also a kind of non-

sensuous cognition (atindriya). That is, it originates in the self without the rnediation ofthe sense-
' - . ■ | ■ ■ ■

organs and,themind. Meaning of the word 'avadhi' is limitation, and so it is limited though non-
' Is* * , •

sensuous. An individual has the perception of the form or shape (rapin) of an object by means
of'avadhi'- but it'fails to reveal all the characters of the object.73 It cognises all past, future

and distant objects which have forms or shapes. It can also comprehend subtle things such

1 as atoms, karmic matter etc. which the self cognises immediately.

Avadhijnana can be of many kinds. But all the different kinds of avadhijnana fail to

Comprehend all the objects which are in time and space. This capacity or power varies from

than to man djue to the growth of their intellectual or spiritual power. 'Avadhijnana' of the

71. "tad dvedha desapratyaksam sarvapratyaksam ca’ desapratyaksamavadhimanahparyayajnane,

/ ♦ » * l

sarvapratyaksam kevalam" - PramanamirniamsaT IV, 1.20.15

»
72. . Karmagrantha I, p. 9

73. "urpisvavadKeh" - Tattvarthasurta, I, 28

95
highest kind is able to cognise.all temporal and spatial objects, whereas the lower kind cognises
only a small portion of it:

From the point of view of the subject who has 'avadhijnana,' it can be of two kinds,74
(1) 'bhavapratyaya' and (2) 'gunapratyaya.' The first kind of avadhijnana is acquired through
birth - for example, the residents of heaven and hell has this kind of knowledge (avadhijnana)
from their birth and so, it is their birthright.7S The 'gunapratyaya avadhijnana,' however, is of
a different kind. Its acquisition is the result of a special merit. Destruction of 'avadhijnahavarana'
Vi
by means of meditation and strict discipline resutls in its acquisition,

To the Janias, 'manahparyaya' is the changing mode of the mind, which is a material
■.substance. The cognition which reveals the different modes of thinking of other persons is
known as manahparyayajnaha.76 One who has 'manahparyayajnaha' directly cognises the mental
states of others without the assistance or mediation of the sense-organs and mind.

It should be stated here that 'manahparyayajnaha' is not to be taken as a kind of cognition

which follows from an analysis of the mind, as it is not a variety of mental perception. It is
rather non-sensuous cognition (atindriyajnanam) which crops up in the self witout any assistance
of the sense-organs or mind. Mind does not cause or produce this kind of cognition. On the •
other hand, it is the knowledge of some other's mental states which comes from the self itself.
Hence, it is not a kind of empirical cognition. Akaianka explains it by saying that mind is only
the 'apeksa'in this case of cognition, but not its cause. For instance, in the perception of the
moon, the sky is regarded as the 'apeksa' — but not its cause. Similarly, the Jainas do not regard
mind as the cause of manahparyayajnaha, but they consider it only as an 'apeksa1 or factor, on
which one is dependent to perceive others) mental states or conditions.77

The Jainas classify'mahahparyayajnaha'into two kinds, namely (1) 'rjumati' and (2)
'vipulamati.' These two kinds of'manahpaiyayajhana' differ in respect of duration and purity.78
Rjumati is not so pure or distict, and at certain times, it makes mistakes; vipulamati, on the other

74. "dvividhah avadhih," Ibid, 1.21

75. Ibid, I. 22

76. "parakyamanQgatarthajnanam manahparyayah," Tattvarthasutra. IV. I,. 9.4.

* « •

77. Tattvarthavarttika, 1.23.2

78. Tattvarthasutra and TattvarthabHasya, I. 24.25

96
 I

hand, is much more pure, more distinct and more lasting; in fact, it endures till the occurence 1

ofomniscience. The Jainas believe-that^-individual, after the attainment of spiritual excellence,

can acquire both these kinds of 'manahparyayajhana.'

*

.'Kevalajnana,' the third kind of mukhyapratyaksajs regarded by the Jaina thinkers as the

most perfect and infinite knowldge^can be named as omniscience. Omniscience is acquired

by the self only on the destruction of the obstacles of karma. In kevalajnana, there is'the

direct apprehension of all substances at once together with their properties without the assistance

or mediation ofthe sense-organs and the mind. At this stage, everything is known, and so nothing

remains to be known.79 It may be termed as cognition which is eternal and perfect.

i

' - /
(vi) Extra-ordinary Pramana of Advaita Saiva School
<£ *

/ <

It may be mentioned here that adherents of Advaita Saiva School have accepted an extra­

ordinary pramana for acquiring knowledge of extra-ordinary things like the self. The monistic
^aiva School of Kashmir attaches great importance to spiritual realisation in their works. So,

their metaphysical speculations centre around their view of the spiritual self. Their main interest

iis to.fin,d out the ways or methods of self-realisation, i.e., finding out the means for realising,

one'sown divine essence. They hold that the ordinary means of knowledge (laukika prairfanas)

are not Gapable of revealing extra-ordinary entities (alaukika vastu) like the spiritual self. It is

generally believed that ordinary 'pramanas' function in the midstof some restrictions, which arise

from the restricted character of the processes of ordinary cognition. Now, the spiritual self is

the percipient subject,and so, it can not be the object (visaya) of knowledge. Ordinary sense-

organs are incapable of cognising the self, which can be apprehended only by an extraordinary

method of knowldge (alaukika pramana).80

It may be pointed out here that Dharmaraja Adhvarindra, the well know exponent of
Advaita Vedanta has made an effort to state in his renowned 'Vedahta-paribhasa' that even the

ordinary (laukika) means of cognition can give us knowledge of Brahman (Brahma-jnana). The
r
Advaita Saiva writers, however, do not accept such aview.

79. Ibid, 1.30

- 80. Cosmogony and Prama in 'Trika Darsana of Kashmir3 - by Debabrata Sen Sharma, in Essays in Indian

Philosophy, Edited by Sukharanjan Saha, Calcutta, p. 112.

97
 \ f £

They emphasize the importance of Divine grace known ak ’saktipata', which alone has;

the capacity of producing the intuitive knowledge of the real self in the ordinary human being.
/
So, it seems that the Advaita Saiva school subscribes to the same view expressed by the
• s ,
renowned statement, which occur in the Kathopanisad,81 and the Mundakopainisad,82 and is as

follows :The real self cannot be realised by discussion (on the subject), nor through intellectual
ratiocination nor by study of scriptures (jfruti). It can be realised by those whom the self chooses
and reveals his nature before them/ / '

81. Kathopanisad, 1/2/23

82. Mundakopanisad, 3/2/3

98