MY REVIEWER IN REMEDIAL LAW_PARTITION (R69)

BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL’s SYLLABUS

Special Civil Actions (R-62-71)

PARTITION (R-69)
1. The Complaint (S-1) Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. —

A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so (as
provided in this Rule), setting forth in his complaint…
 the nature and extent of his title and
 an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded
and

joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (1a)

2. The Order (S-2) Section 2. Order for partition and partition by agreement thereunder. —

If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto,…

 it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in
interest.

Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree,…

 make the partition among themselves by proper instruments of

conveyance,…

and the court shall CONFIRM the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties, …

and such partition, + order of the court confirming the same,…

 shall be recorded in the REGISTRY OF DEEDS of the place in

which the property is situated. (2a)

A final order decreeing partition and accounting

 may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. (n)

3. Stages of Partition 1. Determination of the Existence of Co-Ownership (Absence of w/c, partition

is not available)
*Co-ownership= certain property is owned not just by one person but more
than one.

2. Determination of who are entitled and what properties are to be distributed.

*Determined by Commissioners
*Trial By Commissioner in Rule 67 and 69 are MANDATORY.

Illustration:
H&W are married w/ 5 Children: A,B,C,D,E
Upon H&W’s death, the property go now to the children in co-
ownership.
A suggested to divide the lot into 5. There is no unanimous decision to
divide the same.
Here, they cannot enter into extrajudicial settlement of estate.

A may file petition for partition (R69). The Court must convince the party
to enter to the Project of Partition.

Here, there is no issue of co-ownership. The court shall assign a

commissioner who will try to insist that the parties enter in the Project of
Partition.

If not successful, the next step= ASSIGNMENT- meaning buy-out the

other co-owners.
If the parties agree, the case is finish.
If there is opposition (even only 1)- Assignment is not property. If
assignment is not successful= next option is SALE. (Note: sale may be
objected to if it will not redound to the benefit of the co-owners.
 *Commissioners should give report (but the same is NOT binding upon the
court

NOTE: Each Stage is FINAL and APPEALABLE.

*Kind of Appeal= Record on Appeal (since an action calls for multiple appeals)
4. Rule of Commissioners (S-3 to Section 3. Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree. —
7)
If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition,…

 the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons as COMMISSIONERS to make the partition,
commanding them to set off to the plaintiff and to each party in interest
such part and proportion of the property as the court shall direct. (3a)

Section 4. Oath and duties of commissioners. —

Before making such partition; the commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath
that they will faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be
filed in court with the other proceedings in the case.

In making the partition, the commissioners…

 shall view and examine the real estate, after due notice to the parties to
attend at such view and examination, and

 shall hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the property to
be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof, and

 shall set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most
advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements,
situation and quality of the different parts thereof. (4a)

Section 5. Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners. —

When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real state, or a portion
thereof, cannot be divided without prejudice to the interests of the parties, the court
may…

 order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same, provided he
pays to the other parties such amount as the commissioners deem
equitable, UNLESS one of the interested parties asks that the property be
sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court…

 shall order the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale
under such conditions and within such time as the court may
determine. (5a)

Section 6. Report of commissioners; proceedings not binding until confirmed. —

The commissioners shall make…

 a full and accurate report to the court of all their proceedings as to the:

 partition, or

 the assignment of real estate to one of the parties, or

 the sale of the same.

Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall…

 serve copies thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are
allowed ...

= ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the report, if

5. The Judgment (S-11)
FROM VITO NOTES:
Objective of Partition
Nature of Partition
they so desire.
No proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners and
rendered judgment thereon. (6a)
Section 7. Action of the court upon commissioners report. —
 Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the preceding
section or
 even before the expiration of such period but after the interested parties have
filed their objections to the report or their statement of agreement therewith,
the court may,…
o upon hearing, accept the report and render judgment in accordance
therewith, or,
o for cause shown recommit the same to the commissioners for further
report of facts; or
o set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or
o accept the report in part and reject it in part;
and
may make such order and render such judgment as shall effectuate a fair
and just partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or sold as
above provided, between the several owners thereof. (7)
Section 11. The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds. —
If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state…
 definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate description, the particular
portion of the real estate assigned to each party, and …
the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the action in
severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him.
If the whole property is assigned to one of the parties upon his paying to the others
the sum or sums ordered by the court, the judgment shall state…
 the fact of such payment and of the assignment of the real estate to the
party making the payment, and
the effect of the judgment shall be to vest in the party making the payment
the whole of the real estate free from any interest on the part of the other
parties to the action.
If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the court, the judgment shall state…
 the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a definite description of the
parcels of real estate sold to each purchaser, and...
the effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the purchaser
or purchasers making the payment or payments, free from the claims of
any of the parties to the action.
A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in …
 the registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and
the expenses of such recording shall = be taxed as part of the costs of the
action. (11a)
To assign the property
Kind of Settlement of the Estate
*2 General Modes of Settlement of Estate:
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENTOF

i. Summary settlement of
estate
ii. Judicial partition
iii. Escheat (no heirs, so the
govt. will take the
property; Longest
Publication (1x6 in a
newspaper of general
circulation); Proceed
from Escheat
Proceedings= will be
given to the charitable
institutions, hospitals or
public schools)
iv. Conventional Mode of
Settlement of Estate
(Rules 75-90)
Jurisdiction over Partition Cases RTC (incapable of pecuniary estimation)
ESTATE
i. Extrajudicial Partition
ii. Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication (only 1 heir;
no debts; Apply w/ the
Register of Deeds if
dealing w/ Real Property;
Apply w/ Office of the
Civil Registrar if dealing
w/ personal property;
(certain requirements like
publication and affidavit
of self-adjudication is
needed for the properties
to be transferred to the
heir’s name , after
payment of certain fees.

Who prepares Project of Partition? Any of the Co-Owners

Parties in Partition Plaintiff (co-owner) vs. Defendant (all other co-owners as Indispensable Parties)

Judgement of Partition Includes payment of the cost of accounting and damages.

Prescription of action
Prescription in Partition after Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate
CASES:
1. Balus vs. Balus, 610 SCRA
Father of the Parties mortgaged parcel of
land as a security for his loan with Rural
Bank.
Hindi nabayadan kaya naforclosed yung
property (Bank is the sole bidder).
Hindi na din ito naredeem nung father.
- Does not run in favor of a co-owner of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owner/co-heirs as long as there is a recognition of the co-ownership
expressly/impliedly.
- The Action for Partition cannot be barred by prescription as long as the co-
ownership exists.
- But while the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not
prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription
where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership and the co-
owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.
It must be filed within 4 years from the date of discovery of fraud or within 10 years
from possession of the property (Feliciano v. Canosa Case).
Doctrine:
In partition case, the 1st thing to determine is W/N there is a co-ownership.
By the time the title was consolidated under the name of the bank, there is no co-
ownership anymore. Hence, partition is NOT applicable.
Brief Facts: Mr. Balus and his wife own a land. He secured a loan from the bank
with REM.
Mr. Balus forgot to pay the loan resulting in the foreclosure of the property.

Upon death of their parents, 3 siblings
(C,S,L) executed Extrajudicial Settlement
(ES) of Estate (adjudicating to each of
them specific 1/3 portion of the subject
property)
In that ES, they admitted knowledge of
fact that their father mortgaged the
subject property to the Bank, and they
intended to redeem the same ASAP.
After the foreclosure, it was the bank who was the buyer in the property in the
foreclosure sale. Afterwhich, it was consolidated.
The children of Balus entered into extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their
parents. The heirs know that the said property is with the bank without knowing that
the title is already consolidated with the bank.
After knowledge, one of the children bought the property and wanted to transfer the
title in his own name. However, during the pendency of the mortgage it is under the
possession of one of the children of Balus who is not the buyer.

3 yrs. after execution of ES, 2 of the
siblings (S,L) bought the subject property
from the Bank. TCT was issued in their
favor.
C maintained possession of the subject
property.
S&L filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Possession and Damages against C.
RTC
- ordered S and L to execute Deed
of Sale in favor of C, the 1/3 share
of the property in question,
possessed by him and described in
Partition was then filed based on extrajudicial settlement.
Issues? 1. Is partition applicable. No.
Celestino Balus vs. Saturnino Balus and Leonarda Balus, 610 SCRA
Rufo Balus (father of the parties herein) mortgaged a parcel of land, which he owns,
as security for a loan he obtained from the Rural Bank of Maigo, Lanao del Norte.
Rufo failed to pay.
The mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to the Bank as
the sole bidder at a public auction held for that purpose.
Rufo failed to redeem.
 the Deed of Partition.
- Held that C’s right to purchase from
the S&L his share in the disputed
property was recognized in the ES
(w/c the parties executed prior to
S&L’s purchase of the subject land).
S&L appealed to CA.
CA
- reversed RTC.
- Order C to immediately
surrender possession of the
subject property to S&L,
because property was not
redeemed within the redemption
period. Their co-ownership was
extinguished.
Does Co-ownership exist in this scenario
(where title over the lot was transferred to
bank’s name, then eventually bought it
back by the heir of mortgagor after the
redemption period from the bank).
 No. The right to a person’s
succession are transmitted from
the moment of his death.
Here, the deceased father lost ownership
of the subject property during his lifetime.
Thus, at the time of his death, the
disputed land no longer formed part of his
estate to which his heirs may claim.
C,S and L never inherited the subject lot
from their father. Therefore, they are
wrong in assuming that they become co-
owners of the subject lot.
Thus, the supposed right of C as co-
owner of the contested parcel of land is
negated.
C’s contention that they intended to
continue their supposed co-ownership
also contradicts their ES where they
clearly manifested their intention to have
the subject property divided or partitioned
(by assigning to each of them a
SPECIFIC 1/3 of the same)
Partition calls for severance of a
determinate portion of the property
owned in common. Purpose of partition is
to put an end to co-ownership, an
objective w/c negates C’s claims in the
present case.
Upon death of their parents, Celestino, Saturnino and Leornarda executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate adjudicating to each of them a specific one-third
portion of the subject property.
The Extrajudicial Settlement also contained provisions wherein the parties admitted
knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged the subject property to the Bank
and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible time.
Saturnino and Leonarda (3 years after execution of the Extrajudicial Settlement)
bought the subject property from the Bank.
TCT was issued in their favor.
Celestino maintained possession over the subject property. Saturnino and Leonarda
filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioner,
contending that they had already informed petitioner of the fact that they were the
new owners of the disputed property, but the petitioner still refused to surrender
possession of the same to them.
Respondents claimed that they had exhausted all remedies for the amicable
settlement of the case, but to no avail.
RTC ordered Saturnino and Leonarda to execute a Deed of Sale in favor of the
Celestino, the one-third share of the property in question, presently possessed by
him, and described in the deed of partition.
The RTC held that the right of petitioner to purchase from the respondents his share
in the disputed property was recognized by the provisions of the Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate, which the parties had executed before the respondents bought
the subject lot from the Bank.
Saturnino and Leonarda appealed to CA. CA reversed RTC (ordering petitioner to
immediately surrender possession of the subject property to the respondents, when
petitioner and respondents did not redeem the subject property within the
redemption period and allowed the consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a
new title in the name of the Bank, their co-ownership was extinguished).
Whether there was co-ownership between and among Celestino, Saturnino and
Leonarda over the property in that Celestino may only be ordered by the court to
deliver 2/3 of the subject lot to his two siblings – No]
Whether co-ownership by him and respondents over the subject property persisted
even after the lot was purchased by the Bank and title thereto transferred to its
name, and even after it was eventually bought back by the respondents from the
Bank –
No, the rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death.
In addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible
rights and obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those which have
accrued thereto since the opening of the succession.
In the present case, since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his
lifetime, it only follows that at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no
longer formed part of his estate to which his heirs may lay claim.
Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject lot from
their father.
Petitioner and respondents, therefore, were wrong in assuming that they became
co-owners of the subject lot.
Thus, any issue arising from the supposed right of petitioner as co-owner of the
contested parcel of land is negated by the fact that, in the eyes of the law, the
disputed lot did not pass into the hands of petitioner and respondents as
compulsory heirs of Rufo at any given point in time.
Furthermore, petitioner's contention that he and his siblings intended to continue
their supposed co-ownership of the subject property contradicts the provisions of
the subject Extrajudicial Settlement where they clearly manifested their intention of
having the subject property divided or partitioned by assigning to each of the
petitioner and respondents a specific 1/3 portion of the same.

2. Feliciano vs. Canosa, 629
SCRA
After Mr. Feliciano’s death, leaving a
parcel of Land, L,M,P,S (all named
Feliciano), declared themselves to be the
only surviving heirs of Mr. Feliciano (w/
the exception of S).
They executed extrajudicial settlement of
deceased Feliciano’s estate and
appropriate among themselves the said
parcel of land, to the exclusion of heirs E
and D, (deceased children of the
decedent Feliciano).
L,M,P,S executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property in favor of the late
Jacinto (P’s portion), Felisa(S’s portion)
and P. Canoza (L and M’s portions).
Jacinto applied for a free patent on the
portion of land he bought (11/28/77= a
patent was issued to him)
Felisa and P. Canoza also applied for
free patent (2/23/79= patent was issued)
Roughly 16 and 14 years after the
issuance of the foregoing patents,
respectively, the Surviving heirs of E and
D filed a complaint against S,Felisa, P.
Canoza and heirs of late Jacinto for the
declaration of Nullity of Documents and
Title, Recovery of Real Property and
Damages.
- Alleged that the settlement of
estate and sale were done w/o
their participation and consent
as heirs of E and D.
TC: In favor of surviving heirs of E and D;
ordered nullification of ES.
CA: set aside RTC (action is barred by
prescription)
W/N the filing of action by the heirs of E
and D are barred by prescription?
 Yes.
A deed of Extrajudicial Partition
executed w/o including some of the
heirs, who had no knowledge of and
consent to the same, is fraudulent.
As the records show, the heirs of E
and D did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition executed by S
w/ other Compulsory Heirs.
Thus, the said deed was fraudulently
obtained as it deprived the known
heirs of E and D of their shares in the
estate.
Hence, an action to set is aside on
Partition calls for the segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property owned in common.
It seeks a severance of the individual interests of each co-owner, vesting in each of
them a sole estate in a specific property and giving each one a right to enjoy his
estate without supervision or interference from the other. In other words, the
purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership, an objective which negates
petitioner's claims in the present case.
Feliciano vs. Canosa, 629 SCRA
Antonio Feliciano died leaving a parcel of land.
Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina, all surnamed Feliciano, declared themselves to be
the only surviving heirs of Antonio Feliciano, with the exception of Salina.
They executed an extrajudicial settlement of Antonio Feliciano’s estate and
appropriated among themselves the said parcel of land, to the exclusion of the heirs
of Esteban Feliciano and Doroteo Feliciano, deceased children of Antonio Feliciano.
On even date, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina executed a deed of absolute sale or
Kasulatan sa Ganap Na Bilihan over the property in favor of the late Jacinto
Feliciano (Pedro’s portion), Felisa Feliciano (Salina’s portion) and Pedro Canoza
(Leona and Maria’s portions).
Jacinto applied for a free patent over the portion of land he bought. On November
28, 1977, he was issued a free patent.
For his part, Felisa Feliciano and Pedro Canoza also applied for a free patent for the
land they bought and was issued the same on February 23, 1979.
On October 18, 1993, Eugenio Feliciano and Angelina Feliciano-de Leon, surviving
heirs of the late Esteban Feliciano, and Trinidad Feliciano-Valiente and Basilia
Feliciano-Trinidad, surviving children of the late Doroteo Feliciano, filed a complaint
against Salina Feliciano, Felisa Feliciano, Pedro Canoza and the heirs of the late
Jacinto Feliciano, namely Delia, Rosauro, Elsa, Nardo and Ponciano, all surnamed
Feliciano, for the Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title, Recovery of Real
Property and Damages.
They alleged that the settlement of the estate and sale were done without their
participation and consent as heirs of Esteban and Doroteo.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the nullification of the
extrajudicial settlement.
On appeal, the CA set aside the RTCs decision explaining that the action is barred
by prescription. A MR was filed but was denied. Hence, this petition.
[Whether the cause of action of Doroteo’s heirs has prescribed, considering that the
action was filed only 16 years and 14 years after Jacinto and Feliciano were issued
free patents respectively - Yes]
Whether or not the filing of the action is barred by prescription? Yes.
We affirm the ruling of the CA.
As the records show, the heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did not participate in the
extrajudicial partition executed by Salina with the other compulsory heirs, Leona,
Maria and Pedro.
Undeniably, the said deed was fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known heirs
of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the estate.
A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without including some of the heirs, who
had no knowledge of and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious.
Hence, an action to set it aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted.
Such action for the annulment of the said partition, however, must be brought within
four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
Evidently, the applicable prescriptive period to institute the action to annul the deed
of extrajudicial settlement was four (4) years counted from the discovery of fraud as
held in the case of Gerona v. De Guzman.
the ground of fraud could be However, the records show that petitioners’ complaint was filed only on October 18,
instituted. However, the action for 1993, or almost sixteen (16) years after Jacinto Feliciano was issued Free Patent
annulment of said partition must be No. (IV-4) 012293 on November 28, 1977, and almost fourteen (14) years from the
brought w/in 4 years from the time Pedro Canoza was issued OCT No. P-364 on November 28, 1979.
discovery of fraud.
As petitioners are deemed to have obtained constructive notice of the fraud upon
Petitioiners deemed to have obtained the registration of the Free Patent, they clearly failed to institute the present civil
constructive notice of fraud upon the action within the allowable period.
registration of Free Patent. But, they
clearly failed to institute the present The same result obtains even if their complaint is treated as one (1) essentially for
civil action w/in the allowable period. reconveyance as more than ten (10) years have passed since petitioners’ cause of
action accrued.
Even if their complaint is treated as
one of reconveyance, as more than
10 years have passed since
petitioner’s cause of action accrued,
still the same will not prosper.

3. Mangahas vs. Brobio, 634 Carmela Brobio Mangahas vs. Eufrocina A. Brobio, 634 SCRA Pacifico S. Brobio
SCRA (Pacifico) died intestate, leaving three parcels of land. He was survived by his wife,
respondent Eufrocina A. Brobio, and four legitimate and three illegitimate children;
petitioner Carmela Brobio Mangahas is one of the illegitimate children. The heirs of
the deceased executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of the Late
Pacifico Brobio with Waiver. In the Deed, petitioner and Pacifico’s other children, in
consideration of their love and affection for respondent and the sum of P150,000.00,
waived and ceded their respective shares over the three parcels of land in favor of
respondent. According to petitioner, respondent promised to give her an additional
amount for her share in her father’s estate. Thus, after the signing of the Deed,
petitioner demanded from respondent the promised additional amount, but
respondent refused to pay, claiming that she had no more money. While processing
her tax obligations with the BIR, respondent was required to submit an original copy
of the Deed. Left with no more original copy of the Deed, respondent summoned
petitioner to her office and asked her to countersign a copy of the Deed. Petitioner
refused to countersign the document, demanding that respondent first give her the
additional amount that she promised. Because respondent did not have the money
at that time and petitioner refused to countersign the Deed without any assurance
that the amount would be paid, respondent executed a promissory note promising to
pay the amount of P600,000.00. When the promissory note fell due, respondent
failed and refused to pay despite demand. Petitioner made several more demands
upon respondent but the latter kept on insisting that she had no money. Petitioner
filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages against respondent. In her
Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, respondent admitted that she signed the
promissory note but claimed that she was forced to do so. She also claimed that the
undertaking was not supported by any consideration. The RTC rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC’s decision and
dismissed the complaint. The CA said in its decision that petitioner should have filed
[an action] for partition instead of a case for specific performance. Whether
partition should have been filed? No, the foregoing discussion (as to whether the
Legal Wife’s consent is vitiated or not/W/N there was consideration in the issued
PN, etc.) renders the final issue insignificant. Be that as it may, we would like to
state that the remedy suggested by the CA is not the proper one under the
circumstances. An action for partition implies that the property is still owned in
common. Considering that the heirs had already executed a deed of extrajudicial
settlement and waived their shares in favor of respondent, the properties are no
longer under a state of co-ownership; there is nothing more to be partitioned, as
ownership had already been merged in one person.
4. Vda. De Figuracion vs. FIRST DIVISION
Figuracion- Gerilla, 690 SCRA
G.R. No. 151334               February 13, 2013

CAROLINA (CARLINA) VDA. DE FIGURACION, HEIRS OF ELENA FIGURACION-

ANCHETA, namely: LEONCIO ANCHETA, JR., and ROMULO ANCHETA, HEIRS
OF HILARIA A. FIGURACION, namely: FELIPA FIGURACION-MANUEL, MARY
FIGURACION-GINEZ, and EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, AND HEIRS OF
QUINTIN FIGURACION, namely: LINDA M. FIGURACION, LEANDRO M.
FIGURACION, II, and ALLAN M. FIGURACION, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Parties are heirs of certain Leandro (died
intestate on 1958)
Petitioner Carolina- SS
Other Petitioners: Hilaria, Felipa, et.al
(Carolina and Leandro’s children)
Dispute is about Lot 707.
Lot 707 is originally owned by Eulalio. He
has a daughter w/ his 1st wife Marcela,
(whom Eulalio survived) named Agripina.
nd
When Eulalio remarried to his 2 wife
Faustina, he had another daughter
(named: Carolina)
Agripina (child from 1st marriage)
executed a Deed and Quitclaim over the
eastern half of Lot 707, in favor of her
niece Emilia.
On the other hand, Carolina executed an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, on the
entire Lot 707 as sole and exclusive heir
of Eulalio and Faustina. Carolina also
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over
Lot 707 in favor of Hilaria and Felipa,
whom a TCT were registered in their
names.
The niece Emilia went to US and return to
Phils. 10 years after. Upon her return,
and relying on Deed of Quitclaim, she
built a house on eastern half of Lot 707.
It was in 1994, when Hilaria threatened to
demolish the house of Emilia who, in
retaliation, was prompted to seek partition
of Lot 707.
On May 1994, Emilia formally filed its
complaint for Partition of Lot 707, etc.,
She also seek annulment of Affidavit of
Self Adjudication, Deed of Sale and the
TCT, reconveyance of eastern half of Lot
707, quieting of title and damages.
Carolina, et.al. averred the ff. defenses:
- Emilia’s cause of action had
long been prescribed; she is
guilty of laches, now estopped
from bringing the suit.
- TCT in the name of Felipa and
Hilaria have already attained
indefeasibility and
conclusiveness as true owner of
Lot707.
RTC ruled:
- Complaint for Partition of Lot
707 is dismissed; affidavit of
self-adjudication, deed of sale
and TCT declared null and void.
- Carolina transferred only ½
Nature: Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the CA’s Decision (which reversed and set aside the RTC’s Decision- (1)
dismissed respondent Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla’s (Emilia) complaint for partition,
annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages, and (2)
annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by petitioner Carolina (Carlina)
Vda. De Figuracion (Carolina)).
The Facts
The parties are the heirs of Leandro Figuracion (Leandro) who died intestate in May
1958.
Petitioner Carolina is the surviving spouse.
The other petitioners – Elena Figuracion-Ancheta, Hilaria A. Figuracion (Hilaria),
Felipa Figuracion-Manuel (Felipa), Quintin Figuracion, and Mary Figuracion-Ginez –
and respondent Emilia were Carolina and Leandro’s children.
Subject of the dispute are two parcels of land both situated in Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, which were acquired by Leandro during his lifetime.
- These properties were:
(1) Lot No. 2299 with a land area of 7,547 square meters originally covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 4221-P;5 and
(2) Lot No. 705 measuring 2,900 square meters and covered by TCT No.
4220-P.
- Both lands were registered in the name of "Leandro Figuracion married to
Carolina Adviento".
Leandro executed a Deed of Quitclaim over the above real properties in
favor of his six (6) children on August 23, 1955. Their shares, however,
were not delineated with particularity because spouses Leandro and
Carolina reserved the lots and its fruits for their expenses.
Also involved in the controversy is Lot No. 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta,
Pangasinan, with an area of 3,164 square meters originally owned by Eulalio
Adviento (Eulalio), covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15867 issued
in his name on August 21, 1917.
Eulalio begot Agripina Adviento (Agripina) with his first wife Marcela Estioko
(Marcela), whom Eulalio survived.
When he remarried, Eulalio had another daughter, herein petitioner Carolina, with
his second wife, Faustina Escabesa (Faustina).6
On November 28, 1961, Agripina7 executed a Deed of Quitclaim8 over the eastern
half of Lot No. 707 in favor of her niece, herein respondent Emilia.
Soon thereafter or on December 11, 1962, petitioner Carolina executed an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication9 adjudicating unto herself the entire Lot No. 707 as the sole and
exclusive heir of her deceased parents, Eulalio and Faustina.10
On the same date, Carolina also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale11 over Lot No.
707 in favor of petitioners Hilaria and Felipa, who in turn immediately caused the
cancellation of OCT No. 15867 and the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in their names.12
In 1971, Emilia and her family went to the United States and returned to the
Philippines only in 1981. Upon her return and relying on the Deed of Quitclaim, she
built a house on the eastern half of Lot No. 707.13
The legal debacle of the Figuracions started in 1994 when Hilaria and her agents
threatened to demolish the house of Emilia who, in retaliation, was prompted to
 share to Felipa and Hilaria; any
conveyance of the other half
pertaining to Agripina is void.
- While it nullified Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, Deed of Absolute
Sale and TCT, it refused to
adjudicate the ownership on
Lot’s eastern half portion in favor
of Emilia since Eulalio’s
settlement of Estate is yet to be
taken.
CA
- RTC erred in refusing partition of
Lot 707
- No need for placing Lot 707
under judicial administration
since Carolina had long sold her
½ pro indiviso share to Felipa
and Hilaria. (sale affected only
her share and not that belong to
her co-owner, Agripina).
- Proper action is not nullification
of sale or recovery of
possession, but for a partition of
the entire lot.
- Emilia (1/2); Felipa (1/4); Hilaria
(1/4)
Will the subject lot be partitioned among
the parties considering that there is
already a TCT covering the same in the
name of Felipa and Hilaria; Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and Deed of Sale was
executed by Carolina, one of the co-
owner?
 YES.
Placing a parcel of land under the mantle
of the Torrens system does not mean that
ownership thereof can no longer be
disputed.
The certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of
ownership.37 In this case, co-ownership of
Lot No. 707 was precisely what
respondent Emilia was able to
successfully establish, as correctly found
by the RTC and affirmed by the CA.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
executed by Carolina did not prejudice
the share of Agripina because it is not
legally possible for one to adjudicate unto
himself an entire property he was not the
sole owner of.
A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of
her other co-owners.
Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of
Agripina and Carolina.
As co-owners, each of them had full
ownership of her part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them
also had the right to alienate the lot but
only in so far as the extent of her portion
was affected.
seek the partition of Lot No. 707 as well as Lot Nos. 2299 and 705.
The matter was initially brought before the Katarungang Pambarangay, but no
amicable settlement was reached by the parties.14
On May 23, 1994, respondent Emilia instituted the herein Complaint15 for the
partition of Lot Nos. 2299, 705 and 707, annulment of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication, Deed of Absolute Sale and TCT No. 42244, reconveyance of eastern
half portion of Lot No. 707, quieting of title and damages.
In opposition, the petitioners averred the following special and affirmative defenses:
- (1) the respondent’s cause of action had long prescribed and that she is
guilty of laches hence, now estopped from bringing the suit;
- (2) TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria have already attained
indefeasibility and conclusiveness as to the true owners of Lot No. 707;
and
- (3) an action for partition is no longer tenable because Felipa and Hilaria
have already acquired rights adverse to that claimed by respondent Emilia
and the same amount to a repudiation of the alleged co-ownership.16
During pre-trial conference, the issues were simplified into:
- (1) whether or not Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 are the exclusive properties of
Leandro; and
- (2) whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half of Lot
No. 707.17
On the basis of the evidence adduced by the parties, the RTC rendered its Decision
dated June 26, 1997 disposing as follows:
- WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for partition,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages is hereby ordered dismissed
whereas the affidavit of self-adjudication[,] deed of sale and the transfer
certificate of title involving Lot 707 are hereby declared null and void.
- The RTC ruled that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and 705 will be premature
since their ownership is yet to be transmitted from Leandro to his heirs
whose respective shares thereto must still be determined in estate
settlement proceedings.
- Anent Lot No. 707, the RTC held that petitioner Carolina transferred only
her one-half (½) share to Felipa and Hilaria and any conveyance of the
other half pertaining to Agripina was void.
- While the RTC nullified the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication, Deed of Absolute
Sale and TCT No. 42244, it refused to adjudicate the ownership of the lot’s
eastern half portion in favor of respondent Emilia since a settlement of the
estate of Eulalio is yet to be undertaken.19
Respondent Emilia appealed to the CA, which, in its Decision dated December 11,
2001,:
- ruled that the RTC erred in refusing to partition Lot No. 707.
- The CA explained that there is no necessity for placing Lot No. 707 under
judicial administration since Carolina had long sold her ½ pro indiviso
share to Felipa and Hilaria. Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No.
707 on December 11, 1962 as her own, the sale affected only her share
and not that belonging to her co-owner, Agripina.
- The proper action in such case is not the nullification of the sale, or for the
recovery of possession of the property owned in common from the third
person, but for a division or partition of the entire lot. Such partition should
A co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share; hence, a sale of the
entire property by one co-owner without
the consent of the other co-owners is not
null and void and only the rights of the co-
owner/seller are transferred, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.40
Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot
No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa without the
consent of her co-owner Agripina, the
disposition affected only Carolina’s pro
indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria
and Felipa, acquired only what
corresponds to Carolina’s share.
Hilaria and Felipa did not acquire the
undivided portion pertaining to Agripina,
which has already been effectively
bequeathed to respondent Emilia as early
as November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of
Quitclaim.
In turn, being the successor-in-interest of
Agripina’s share in Lot No. 707,
respondent Emilia took the former’s place
in the co-ownership and as such co-
owner, has the right to compel partition at
any time.42
Did Emilia’s cause of action to partition
the land already prescribed?
 No.
Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by
acquisitive prescription the share of the
other co-heirs or co-owners absent a
clear repudiation of the co ownership.43
The act of repudiation, as a mode of
terminating co-ownership, is subject to
certain conditions, to wit:
(1) a co-owner repudiates the co-
ownership;
(2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other
co-owners;
(3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and
(4) he has been in possession
through open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious
possession of the property for the
period required by law.
To sustain a plea of prescription, it must
always clearly appear that one who was
originally a joint owner has repudiated the
claims of his co-owners, and that his co-
owners were apprised or should have
been apprised of his claim of adverse and
exclusive ownership before the alleged
result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its delivery to
the buyer.
- The CA, however, agreed with the RTC that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299
and 705 is indeed premature considering that there is a pending legal
controversy with respect to Lot No. 705 and the accounting of the income
from Lot No. 2299 and of the expenses for the last illness and burial of
Leandro and Carolina, for which the lots appear to have been intended.
- Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
- *WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby
GRANTED and the decision appealed from in Civil Case No. U-5826 is
hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Lot No. 707 covered by TCT No. 42244 to be owned by appellant
Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla [herein respondent], ½ pro indiviso share,
appellee Felipa Figuracion [herein petitioner], ¼ pro indiviso share, and
appellee Hilaria Figuracion [herein petitioner], ¼ pro indiviso share, who
are hereby directed to partition the same and if they could not agree on a
partition, they may petition the trial court for the appointment of a
commissioner to prepare a project of partition, in accordance with the
procedure as provided in Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
Respondent Emilia appealed the CA’s decision to the Court, docketed as G.R. No.
154322.
- In a Decision promulgated on August 22, 2006, the Court denied the
appeal, concurring with the CA’s ruling that a partition of Lot Nos. 2299 and
705 would be inappropriate considering that:
(1) the ownership of Lot No. 705 is still in dispute; and
(2) there are still unresolved issues as to the expenses chargeable to the
estate of Leandro.
The present petition involves the appeal of the petitioners who attribute this sole
error committed by the CA:
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS
CONTRARY TO LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENTIAL DICTA LAID DOWN
BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.21
In view of the Court’s ruling in G.R. No. 154322, the ensuing discussion shall
concern only Lot No. 707.
The Arguments of the Parties
The petitioners argue:
- that respondent Emilia has no valid basis for her claim of ownership
because the Deed of Quitclaim executed in her favor by Agripina was in
fact a deed of donation that contained no acceptance and thus, void.
- The petitioners attached a copy of the Deed of Quitclaim and stressed on
the following portions, viz:
- *I, AGRIPINA ESTIOKO ADVIENTO, of le[ga]l age, Filipino citizen, single
and a resident [of] San Vicenter (sic), Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, for and
in consideration of the sum of ONE PESO ([P]1.00), Philippine Currency
and the services rendered by my niece EMILIA FIGURACION, 20 years
old, single, Filipino citizen and a resident of San Vicente, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan, do hereby by these presents (sic) RENOUNCE, RELEASE
and forever QUITCLAIM in favor of EMILIA FIGURACION, her heirs, and
assigns the ONE[-]HALF (1/2) eastern portion of the following parcel of
land more particularly described and bounded as follows to wit[.]22
prescriptive period began to run.
In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa
registered the lot in their names to the
exclusion of Emilia, an implied trust was
created by force of law and the two of
them were considered a trustee of the
respondent’s undivided share.
As trustees, they cannot be permitted to
repudiate the trust by relying on the
registration.
Prescription among co-owners cannot
take place when acts of ownership
exercised are vague or uncertain.
The express disavowal of the co-
ownership did not happen on December
11, 1962 when TCT No. 42244 was
issued but in 1994 when Hilaria
attempted to demolish Emilia’s house
thus explicitly excluding her from the co-
ownership.
It was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa
made known their denial of the co-
ownership. On the same year, the
respondent instituted the present
complaint for partition; hence, the period
required by law for acquisitive period to
set in was not met.
- They further aver that the Deed of Quitclaim is riddled with defects that
evoke questions of law, because: (a) it has not been registered with the
Register of Deeds, albeit, allegedly executed as early as 1961; (b) a
certification dated June 3, 2003 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC) of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, shows that it does not have a
copy of the Deed of Quitclaim; (c) the Office of the National Archives which
is the depository of old and new notarized documents has no record of the
Deed of Quitclaim as evidenced by a certification dated May 19, 2003;23
and (d) Atty. Felipe V. Abenojar, who supposedly notarized the Deed of
Quitclaim was not commissioned to notarize in 1961 per the certification
dated June 9, 2003 from the OCC of the RTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan.24
Respondent Emilia, on the other hand, contends:
- that the Deed of Quitclaim should be considered an onerous donation that
requires no acceptance as it is governed by the rules on contracts and not
by the formalities for a simple donation.25
The Court’s Ruling
Issues not raised before the courts a quo cannot be raised for the first time in a
petition filed under Rule 45
Records show that there is a palpable shift in the defense raised by the petitioners
before the RTC and the CA.
In the Pre-Trial Order26 of the RTC dated April 4, 1995, the parties agreed to limit
the issue with regard to Lot No. 707 as follows:
- whether or not respondent Emilia is the owner of the eastern half portion of
Lot No. 707.
The petitioners’ supporting theory for this issue was that "the Deed of
Quitclaim dated November 28, 1961 was rendered ineffective by the
issuance of [TCT No. 42244] in the name of Felipa and Hilaria."27
On appeal to the CA, however, the petitioners raised a new theory by
questioning the execution and enforceability of the Deed of Quitclaim.
They claimed that it is actually a donation that was not accepted in the
manner required by law.28
The inconsistent postures taken by the petitioners breach the basic procedural tenet
that a party cannot change his theory on appeal as expressly adopted in Rule 44,
Section 15 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
- Sec. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal.  Whether or not the
appellant has filed a motion for new trial in the court below, he may include
in his assignment of errors any question of law or fact that has been raised
in the court below and which is within the issues framed by the parties.
Fortifying the rule, the Court had repeatedly emphasized that defenses not pleaded
in the answer may not be raised for the first time on appeal.
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and the case is decided upon that
theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change the same on appeal,
because to permit him to do so would be unfair to the adverse party.29
The Court had likewise, in numerous times, affirmed that points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court need not be,
and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be
raised for the first time at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process
underlie this rule.
It would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present
further evidence material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been
aware of it at the time of the hearing before the trial court.30
While a party may change his theory on appeal when the factual bases thereof
would not require presentation of any further evidence by the adverse party in order
to enable it to properly meet the issue raised in the new theory,31 this exception
does not, however, obtain in the case at hand.

Contrary to the petitioners’ assertion, the Court finds that the issues on the
supposed defects and actual nature of the Deed of Quitclaim are questions of fact
that require not only a review or re-evaluation of the evidence already adduced by
the parties but also the reception of new evidence as the petitioners themselves
have acknowledged when they attached in the petition several certifications32 in
support of their new argument. It is settled that questions of fact are beyond the
province of a Rule 45 petition since the Court is not a trier of facts.33

Accordingly, the Court will not give due course to the new issues raised by the
petitioners involving the nature and execution of the Deed of Quitclaim. For their
failure to advance these questions during trial, the petitioners are now barred by
estoppel34 from imploring an examination of the same.

The respondent can compel the

partition of Lot No. 707

The first stage in an action for partition is the settlement of the issue of ownership.

Such an action will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest in the subject
property. In fact, the parties filing the action are required by the Rules of Court to set
forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property.

It would be premature to effect a partition until and unless the question of ownership
is first definitely resolved.35

Here, the respondent traces her ownership over the eastern half of Lot No. 707 from
the Deed of Quitclaim executed by Agripina, who in turn, was the co-owner thereof
being one of the legitimate heirs of Eulalio.

It is well to recall that the petitioners failed to categorically dispute the existence of
the Deed of Quitclaim. Instead, they averred that it has been rendered ineffective by
TCT No. 42244 in the name of Felipa and Hilaria―this contention is, of course,
flawed.

Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under coownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other
parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of
the certificate of title.36

Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed.

The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.37

In this case, co-ownership of Lot No. 707 was precisely what respondent Emilia was
able to successfully establish, as correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA.

The status of Agripina and Carolina as the legitimate heirs of Eulalio is an

undisputed fact. As such heirs, they became co-owners of Lot No. 707 upon the
death of Eulalio on July 20, 1930.

Since Faustina was predeceased by Eulalio, she likewise became a co-owner of the
lot upon Eulalio’s death. Faustina’s share, however, passed on to her daughter
Carolina when the former died on October 18, 1949.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Carolina did not prejudice the share
of Agripina because it is not legally possible for one to adjudicate unto himself an
entire property he was not the sole owner of.

A co-owner cannot alienate the shares of her other co-owners – nemo dat qui non
habet.38
Hence, Lot No. 707 was a co-owned property of Agripina and Carolina.

As co-owners, each of them had full ownership of her part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. Each of them also had the right to alienate the lot but
only in so far as the extent of her portion was affected.

Thus, when Carolina sold the entire Lot No. 707 on December 11, 1962 to Hilaria
and Felipa without the consent of her co-owner Agripina, the disposition affected
only Carolina’s pro indiviso share, and the vendees, Hilaria and Felipa, acquired
only what corresponds to Carolina’s share.

A co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share; hence, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void and only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.40

Accordingly, the deed of sale executed by Carolina in favor of Hilaria and Felipa
was a valid conveyance but only insofar as the share of Carolina in the co-
ownership is concerned.

As Carolina’s successors-in-interest to the property, Hilaria and Felipa could not

acquire any superior right in the property than what Carolina is entitled to or could
transfer or alienate after partition.

In a contract of sale of co-owned property, what the vendee obtains by virtue of

such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, and the vendee
merely steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner.41

Hilaria and Felipa did not acquire the undivided portion pertaining to Agripina, which
has already been effectively bequeathed to respondent Emilia as early as
November 28, 1961 thru the Deed of Quitclaim.

In turn, being the successor-in-interest of Agripina’s share in Lot No. 707,

respondent Emilia took the former’s place in the co-ownership and as such co-
owner, has the right to compel partition at any time.42

The respondent’s right to demand

for partition is not barred by
acquisitive prescription or laches

The petitioners posit that:

- the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in the name of Hilaria and Felipa over Lot
No. 707 on December 11, 1962 was an express repudiation of the co-
ownership with respondent Emilia. Considering the period of time that has
already lapsed since then, acquisitive prescription has already set in and
the respondent is now barred by laches from seeking a partition of the
subject lot.

The contention is specious.

Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire by acquisitive prescription the share of the

other co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation of the co ownership.43

The act of repudiation, as a mode of terminating co-ownership, is subject to certain

conditions, to wit:

(5) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership;

(6) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other co-owners;

(7) the evidence thereon is clear and conclusive; and

(8) he has been in possession through open, continuous, exclusive, and

notorious possession of the property for the period required by law.
The petitioners failed to comply with these conditions.

The act of Hilaria and Felipa in effecting the registration of the entire Lot No. 707 in
their names thru TCT No. 42244 did not serve to effectively repudiate the co-
ownership.

The respondent built her house on the eastern portion of the lot in 1981 without any
opposition from the petitioners.

Hilaria also paid realty taxes on the lot, in behalf of the respondent, for the years
1983-1987.45

These events indubitably show that Hilaria and Felipa failed to assert exclusive title
in themselves adversely to Emilia.

Their acts clearly manifest that they recognized the subsistence of their co-
ownership with respondent Emilia despite the issuance of TCT No. 42244 in 1962.

Their acts constitute an implied recognition of the co-ownership which in turn

negates the presence of a clear notice of repudiation to the respondent.

To sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly appear that one who was
originally a joint owner has repudiated the claims of his co-owners, and that his co-
owners were apprised or should have been apprised of his claim of adverse and
exclusive ownership before the alleged prescriptive period began to run.

In addition, when Hilaria and Felipa registered the lot in their names to the exclusion
of Emilia, an implied trust was created by force of law and the two of them were
considered a trustee of the respondent’s undivided share.

As trustees, they cannot be permitted to repudiate the trust by relying on the

registration.

In Ringor v. Ringor,48 the Court had the occasion to explain the reason for this rule:

- A trustee who obtains a Torrens title over a property held in trust for him by
another cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration. A Torrens
Certificate of Title in Jose’s name did not vest ownership of the land upon
him. The Torrens system does not create or vest title. It only confirms and
records title already existing and vested. It does not protect a usurper from
the true owner. The Torrens system was not intended to foment betrayal in
the performance of a trust. It does not permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of another. Where one does not have a rightful claim to the
property, the Torrens system of registration can confirm or record nothing.
Petitioners cannot rely on the registration of the lands in Jose’s name nor
in the name of the Heirs of Jose M. Ringor, Inc., for the wrong result they
seek. For Jose could not repudiate a trust by relying on a Torrens title he
held in trust for his co-heirs.1âwphi1 The beneficiaries are entitled to
enforce the trust, notwithstanding the irrevocability of the Torrens title. The
intended trust must be sustained.49 (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)

Further, records do not reflect conclusive evidence showing the manner of

occupation and possession exercised by Hilaria and Felipa over the lot from the
time it was registered in their names.

The only evidence of possession extant in the records dates back only to 1985
when Hilaria and Felipa declared the lot in their names for taxation purposes.

Prescription can only produce all its effects when acts of ownership, or in this case,
possession, do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-
owners.

Hence, prescription among co-owners cannot take place when acts of ownership
exercised are vague or uncertain.

Moreover, the evidence relative to the possession, as a fact upon which the alleged
prescription is based, must be clear, complete and conclusive in order to establish
said prescription without any shadow of doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown
that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to
the rights of the others, the case is not one of ownership, and partition will lie.52 The
petitioners failed to muster adequate evidence of possession essential for the
reckoning of the 10-year period for acquisitive prescription.

The express disavowal of the co-ownership did not happen on December 11, 1962
when TCT No. 42244 was issued but in 1994 when Hilaria attempted to demolish
Emilia’s house thus explicitly excluding her from the co-ownership.

It was the only time that Hilaria and Felipa made known their denial of the co-
ownership. On the same year, the respondent instituted the present complaint for
partition; hence, the period required by law for acquisitive period to set in was not
met.

Anent laches, the Court finds it unavailing in this case in view of the proximity of the
period when the co-ownership was expressly repudiated and when the herein
complaint was filed.

Laches is the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,

warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.

More so, laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetrate fraud and injustice.
Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property
from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in the name of another.54

Partition of Lot No. 707

Under the Old Civil Code55 which was then in force at the time of Eulalio and
Marcela’s marriage, Lot No. 707 was their conjugal property.

When Marcela died, one-half of the lot was automatically reserved to Eulalio, the
surviving spouse, as his share in the conjugal partnership.

Marcela’s rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted to her legitimate child,
Agripina and surviving spouse Eulalio.

- Under Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, Eulalio was entitled only to the
usufruct of the lot while the naked ownership belonged to Agripina.

- When he remarried, Eulalio’s one half portion of the lot representing his
share in the conjugal partnership and his usufructuary right over the other
half were brought into his second marriage with Faustina.59

When Eulalio died on July 20, 1930, …

- ¼ portion of the lot was reserved for Faustina as her share in the conjugal
partnership.60

- The remaining ¼ were transmitted equally to the widow Faustina and

Eulalio’s children, Carolina and Agripina.

- However, Faustina is only entitled to the usufruct of the third available for
betterment.62

The usufructuary of Eulalio over the ½ portion inherited by Agripina earlier was
merged with her naked ownership.

Upon the death of Faustina, the shares in Lot No. 707 which represents her share in
the conjugal partnership and her inheritance from Eulalio were in turn inherited by
Carolina including Faustina’s usufructuary rights which were merged with Carolina’s
naked ownership.

Consequently, Agripina is entitled to 5/8 portion of Lot No. 707 while the remaining

5. Agarrado vs. Librando-
Agarrado, 864 SCRA 582, June
6, 2018
Emilia and Rodrigo are spouses, they
begot 5 children. During their lifetime,
they acquired the subject parcel of land.
(Their children are the petitioners in this
case).
Unknown to petitioners, Rodrigo was
involved in an illicit affair w/ Respondent
Cristita, w/ whom they begot 1 child (Ana
Lou).
Ana Lou was born one month after the
dissolution of Rodrigo and Emilia’s
marriage due to latter’s death.
Eventually, Rodrigo married Cristita.
When Rodrigo died, he left Cristita, Ana
3/8 pertains to Carolina.
Thus, when Carolina sold Lot No. 707 to Hilaria and Felipa, the sale affected only
3/8 portion of the subject lot.
Since the Deed of Quitclaim, bequeathed only the ½ eastern portion of Lot No. 707
in favor of Emilia instead of Agripina’s entire 5/8 share thereof, the remaining 1/8
portion shall be inherited by Agripina’s nearest collateral relative, who, records
show, is her sister Carolina.
In sum, the CA committed no reversible error in holding that the respondent is
entitled to have Lot No. 707 partitioned.
The CA judgment must, however, be modified to conform to the above-discussed
apportionment of the lot among Carolina, Hilaria, Felipa and Emilia.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 58290 dated December 11, 2001, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
(1) 3/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain in equal shares to Hilaria Figuracion and
Felipa Figuracion-Manuel;
(2) ½ portion of Lot. No. 707 shall pertain to Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla; and
(3) 1/8 portion of Lot No. 707 shall pertain to the estate of Carolina (Carlina) Vda.
De Figuracion.
The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
Branch 49, who is directed to conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and
effect the actual physical partition of the subject property, as well as the
improvements that lie therein, in the foregoing manner.
The trial court is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and bounds of the
property and the proper share appertaining to each co-owner, including the
improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate, or a portion
thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the interest of the parties, the
court a quo may order it assigned to one of the parties willing to take the same,
provided he pays to the other parties such sum or sums of money as the
commissioners deem equitable, UNLESS one of the parties interested ask that the
property be sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order
the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the commissioners shall
sell the same accordingly, and thereafter distribute the proceeds of the sale
appertaining to the just share of each co-owner. No pronouncement as to costs.
[ G.R. No. 212413, June 06, 2018 ]
MA. ROSARIO AGARRADO, RUTH LIBRADA AGARRADO AND ROY
AGARRADO, FOR THEMSELVES AND FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR SIBLINGS
AND CO-OWNERS ROBERTO AGARRADO, REUEL ANDRES AGARRADO,
HEIRS OF THE LATE RODRIGO AGARRADO, JR., REX AGARRADO AND JUDY
AGARRADO, PETITIONERS, V. CRISTITA LIBRANDO-AGARRADO AND ANA
LOU AGARRADO-KING, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
REYES, JR., J:
An action for partition of real estate is at once an action for the determination of the
co-owners of the subject property and an action for the eventual conveyance of
specific portions thereof to the co-owners. While this subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the proper court which would have jurisdiction over the action
would still depend on the subject property's assessed values in accordance with
Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.[1]
The Case
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (assailing
CA’s Decision- which affirmed with modification RTC -Bacolod City Branch 44’s
Decision of Bacolod City in Civil Case.
Lou and his children w/ first marriage.
Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint w/
RTC for partition of the subject property,
w/ Rodrigo’s children w/ Emilia as
defendants.
RTC:
- Ordered partition
Aggrieved, Petitioners elevated the case
w/ CA.
CA:
- Affirmed RTC decision w/
modification.
- Declared the parties as co-
owner of the subject property.
- Judicial partition:
a. Cristita (2/9)
b. Children from Rodrigo’s
marriage w/ Emilia (6/9 +
¼, to be divided equally
among them)
c. Ana Lou (1/9)
Before the SC, one of the contention of
the petitioners is that the case should
have been dismissed because of the
failure of the Respondents to allege the
assessed value of the subject property
and thus, RTC has no jurisdiction in
deciding the case.
ISSUE:
W/N the failure of the Respondent to
alleged the assessed value of the subject
property denied the RTC jurisdiction over
this partition case and thus, its decision is
null and void.
 Yes.
An action for partition of real estate is at
once an action for the determination of
the co-owners of the subject property and
an action for the eventual conveyance of
specific portions thereof to the co-
owners.
While this subject matter is incapable of
pecuniary estimation, the proper court
which would have jurisdiction over the
action would still depend on the subject
property's assessed values in
accordance with Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended.
The provisions state that in all civil
actions which involve title to, or
possession of, real property, or any
interest therein, the RTC shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction where the
assessed value of the property exceeds
P20,000.00 or, for civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such value exceeds
P50,000.00.[24] For those below the
foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive
jurisdiction lies with the Metropolitan Trial
Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts
The Antecedent Facts
As borne by the records of the case, it appears that the petitioners Ma. Rosario
Agarrado (Ma. Rosario), Ruth Librada Agarrado (Ruth), and Roy Agarrado (Roy)
are children of the late spouses Rodrigo (Rodrigo) and Emilia (Emilia) Agarrado,
who, during their lifetime, acquired a 287-square meter land (subject property) in
Bacolod City, Negros Occidental.
The subject property was registered in the name of the spouses Rodrigo and Emilia
and was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29842-B.[5]
On August 18, 1978, Emilia died intestate, leaving Rodrigo and their children as her
compulsory heirs.
Meanwhile, unknown to the petitioners, Rodrigo was involved in an illicit affair with
respondent Cristita Librando-Agarrado (Cristita), with whom Rodrigo begot
respondent Ana Lou Agarrado-King (Ana Lou).
As it turned out, Ana Lou was conceived during the existence of the marriage
between Rodrigo and Emilia, but was born on September 27, 1978—one month after
the dissolution of Rodrigo and Emilia's marriage through the latter's death.
Eventually, Rodrigo married Cristita on July 6, 1981.
On December 8, 2000, Rodrigo also succumbed to mortality and died. He left his
surviving spouse, Cristita, his legitimate children by his marriage with Emilia, and
Ana Lou.
On January 23, 2003, Cristita and Ana Lou filed a complaint before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, of Bacolod City for the partition of the subject
property, with Ma. Rosario, Ruth, Roy, "and other heirs of Rodrigo Agarrado" [6] as
defendants.
None of the other heirs were however named in any pleading filed by either the
plaintiffs (now respondents) or defendants (now petitioners).
Eventually, the RTC rendered its January 17, 2007 Decision,
- which ordered the parties to partition the subject property "among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance or any other means or
method."[7] The fallo of the decision reads:
- *WHEREFORE, plaintiff Ana Lou Agarrado-King and the defendants
herein are ordered to partition the property subject of this case (Lot 10,
Block 6) among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance or any
other means or method after which the Court shall confirm the partition so
agreed upon by them, otherwise the Court will appoint commissioners to
effect partition at the expense of the parties.
Aggrieved, the petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, w/c:
- affirmed with modification the January 17, 2007 Decision of the RTC. The
fallo of the decision of the appellate court reads:
- *WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated January
17, 2007, of the Regional Trial Court, 6 th Judicial Region, Branch 44,
Bacolod City in Civil Case No. 03-11893 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that:
1. We declare plaintiffs-appellees Cristita Librando Agarrado and Ana
Lou Agarrado-King as well as defendants-appellants as co-owners
of the subject property;
2. We grant judicial partition in the following manner:
(a) Plaintiff-appellee Cristita Librando Agarrado is entitled to 2/9;
(b) Ma. Rosario, Ruth and Roy Agarrado are entitled to 6/9 plus ¼
to be divided equally among them unless they agree otherwise; and
(c) Ana Lou Agarrado-King is entitled to 1/9 of the property.
The partition and segregation of the subject property is hereby
ordered as outlined in Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court, as
amended.
Despite the petitioners' motion for reconsideration, the CA affirmed its April 19, 2013
(MTC), or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
(MCTC).[25]
Thus, the determination of the assessed
value of the property, which is the subject
matter of the partition, is essential. This,
the courts could identify through an
examination of the allegations of the
complaint.
Failure to allege the assessed value of a a.
real property in the complaint would result
to a dismissal of the case.
- Reason: absent any allegation in
the complaint of the assessed b.
value of the property, it cannot
be determined whether the RTC
or the MTC has original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the
petitioner's action. Indeed, the
courts cannot take judicial notice
of the assessed or market value c.
of the land.
Other Notes:
The rule on determining the assessed
value of a real property, insofar as the
identification of the jurisdiction of the first
and second level courts is concerned,
would be two-tiered:
- First, the general rule is that
jurisdiction is determined by the
assessed value of the real
property as alleged in the
complaint; and
- Second, the rule would be
liberally applied if the assessed
value of the property, while not
alleged in the complaint, could In sum, the submissions of the petitioners seek to determine the following: (1) the
still be identified through a facial compulsory heirs of the late Rodrigo; (2) the portion of the estate to which each of
examination of the documents the compulsory heirs are entitled; (3) the propriety of collating to the total estate the
already attached to the medical and burial expenses shouldered by the petitioners and the benefits (GSIS,
complaint.
Decision via the March 27, 2014 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
The petitioners anchor their prayer for the reversal of the April 19, 2013 Decision
and March 27, 2014 Resolution based on the following issues:
Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals erred in excluding the FIVE OTHER
heirs (children of the first marriage) of their inheritance by the alleged failure to
prove their filiation in the proceedings before the Honorable Regional Trial
Court;
Harmonizing substantive and procedural law, whether the Honorable Court
of Appeals erred in not appreciating Respondents' implied recognition or
"admission by silence" under Section 32 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as
evidence of the filiation of the five (5) other children of the late Rodrigo
Agarrado, Sr. (namely Reuel Andres Agarrado, Rodrigo Agarrado, Jr., Rex
Agarrado, Roberto Agarrado and Judy Agarrado);
Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals in its contested Decision,
mathematically MISAPPLIED the formula under the pertinent rules of
succession in the Family Code and/or Civil Code to determine the shares of
both Petitioners and Respondents to the subject house and lot;
d. Relatedly, whether the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that a
family home cannot be recognized as such simply because it was not registered
as such;
e. Whether all the GSIS, PHILHEALTH and other benefits all claimed, taken,
and received by the Respondents are to be charged against whatever share
they may have over the subject "house and lot" of the late Rodrigo Agarrado,
Sr., as well as the funeral expenses expended by the first family alone?
f. Whether the Hon. Court of Appeals was correct in not ordering the
dismissal of the case for failure of Plaintiffs-Respondents to allege the market
value and pay the right docket fees at the incipience of the Complaint.[10]
PHILHEALTH) received by the respondents; (4) the effect of the allegation that the
subject property is the petitioners' family home; and (5) the effect on jurisdiction of
the failure to indicate the market value of the subject property in the complaint filed
before the RTC.
The Court's Ruling
After a careful perusal of the arguments presented and the evidence submitted, the
Court finds merit in the petition.
For obvious reasons, the Court shall first consider the issue on jurisdiction.
The petitioners argue:
- that the complaint must be dismissed for the failure of the respondents to
allege the assessed value of the subject property.
- They said that the appellate court failed to appreciate this jurisdictional
requirement, which was indispensable in the determination of the
jurisdiction of the RTC. They further averred that the case should not have
proceeded in the first place.
The CA glossed over this issue by saying that the action for partition instituted by
the respondents in the RTC is one incapable of pecuniary estimation, which would
thus confer jurisdiction over the case to the RTC. In ruling thus, the appellate court
invoked the guidance of the case of Russel vs. Vestil,[12] and stated that:
- *We are guided by the ruling in Russel vs Vestil, 304 SCRA 739, March 17,
1999 wherein the Supreme Court considered petitioners' complaint
seeking the annulment of the document entitled "Declaration of Heirs and
Deed of Confirmation of Previous Oral Partition," as an action incapable of
pecuniary estimation, rationalizing that the resolution of the same
principally involved the determination of hereditary rights. In effect, the
 partition aspect is an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)[13]

This, however, is an error that must be reversed. The appellate court's reliance on
Russel is misplaced.

- The Court, in Russel, explained that the complaint filed by the plaintiff is
one incapable of pecuniary estimation because the subject matter of the
complaint is not one of partition, but one of the annulment of a document
denominated as a "Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of
Previous Oral Partition."
- Considering that the annulment of a document is the main subject matter,
and that the same is incapable of pecuniary estimation, then necessarily,
the RTC has jurisdiction.

This is not so in the present case.

In determining whether a case is incapable of pecuniary estimation, the case of

Cabrera vs. Francisco,[14] in reiterating the case of Singson vs. Isabela Sawmill,[15]
teaches that identifying the nature of the principal action or remedy sought is
primarily necessary. It states:

- In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not

capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first
ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. I
- f it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the
amount of the claim.
- However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or
a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of
First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts). [16] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

For actions on partition, the subject matter is two-phased.

- In Bagayas vs. Bagayas,[17] the Court ruled that partition is at once an

action (1) for declaration of co-ownership and (2) for segregation and
conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties involved.
- Thus, in a complaint for partition, the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that
he/she is a co-owner of the subject properties, and second, the
conveyance of his/her lawful share.

The case of Russel, the very same case cited by the Court of Appeals, determined
that while actions for partition are incapable of pecuniary estimation owing to its two-
phased subject matter, the determination of the court which will acquire jurisdiction
over the same must still conform to Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended.

- Russel said:
- While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by the
MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property
involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere.
- If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is
the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction under Sec. 19(2).
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

This is also the tenor of the case of Barrido vs. Nonato[19] where the Court upheld
the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 3, of Bacolod
City over the action for partition because the assessed value of the subject property
was only P8,080.00.

As basis, Barrido likewise cited Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129, as amended.

To be sure, according to the recent case of Foronda-Crystal vs. Son,[20] jurisdiction

is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case. To
exercise this, the court or adjudicative body must acquire, among others, jurisdiction
over the subject matter,[21] which is conferred by law and not by the consent or
acquiescence of any or all of the parties or by erroneous belief of the court that it
exists.

Jurisdiction over cases for partition of real properties therefore, like all others, is
determined by law. Particularly, the same is identified by Sections 19(2) and 33(3)
of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act 7691.[23]

The provisions state that in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, the RTC shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction where the assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00 or, for
civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds P50,000.00. [24] For those
below the foregoing threshold amounts, exclusive jurisdiction lies with the
Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTC), Municipal Trial Courts (MTC), or Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts (MCTC).[25]

Thus, the determination of the assessed value of the property, which is the subject
matter of the partition, is essential. This, the courts could identify through an
examination of the allegations of the complaint.

According to the case of Tumpag vs. Tumpag,[26] it is a hornbook doctrine that the
court should only look into the facts alleged in the complaint to determine whether a
suit is within its jurisdiction.[27]

According to the case of Spouses Cruz vs. Spouses Cruz, et al.,[28] only these facts
can be the basis of the court's competence to take cognizance of a case, and that
one cannot advert to anything not set forth in the complaint, such as evidence
adduced at the trial, to determine the nature of the action thereby initiated.[29]

According to Foronda-Crystal, failure to allege the assessed value of a real property

in the complaint would result to a dismissal of the case. The reason put forth by the
Court is that:

- x x x absent any allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the

property, it cannot be determined whether the RTC or the MTC has original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioner's action. Indeed, the courts
cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or market value of the land.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied, citations omitted)

This same ratio has been repeated in a number of cases, including the cases of
Spouses Cruz vs. Spouses Cruz, et al .[30] and Quinagoran vs. Court of Appeals,[31]
where the Court concluded that:

- Considering that the respondents failed to allege in their complaint the

assessed value of the subject property, the RTC seriously erred in denying
the motion to dismiss. Consequently, all proceedings in the RTC are null
and void, and the CA erred in affirming the RTC.[32]

Based on the foregoing, in Foronda-Crystal, the Court already established the rules
that have to be followed in determining the jurisdiction of the first and second level
courts. It said:

- A reading of the quoted cases would reveal a pattern which would

invariably guide both the bench and the bar in similar situations. Based on
the foregoing, the rule on determining the assessed value of a real
property, insofar as the identification of the jurisdiction of the first and
second level courts is concerned, would be two-tiered:
- First, the general rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the assessed
value of the real property as alleged in the complaint; and
- Second, the rule would be liberally applied if the assessed value of the
property, while not alleged in the complaint, could still be identified through
a facial examination of the documents already attached to the complaint.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On the basis of this most recent ruling, the Court is without any recourse but to
agree with the petitioners in dismissing the complaint filed before the RTC for lack of
jurisdiction.

A scouring of the records of this case revealed that the complaint did indeed lack
any indication as to the assessed value of the subject property. In fact, the only
reference to the same in the complaint are found in paragraphs six, seven, and
eight thereof, which state that:

- "6. Meanwhile, during the lifetime of Rodrigo Agarrado, he acquired certain

 real and personal properties due to his hard work, one of which is the
parcel of land with improvements standing thereon, located at Barangay
Villamonte, Bacolod City, more particularly described as follows, to wit:
- 7. RODRIGO AGARRADO died intestate and leaving no debts. Upon his
death, plaintiffs by operation of law, became co-owners of the afore-
described property jointly with the other heirs, the herein defendants;
- 8. Demand thru counsel has been made by the herein plaintiffs upon the
defendants for the partition of the subject property, but the same was
simply ignored. Copy of the Demand Letter is hereto attached and marked
as Annex 'D' and forming part hereof."[33]

None of these assertions indicate the assessed value of the property to be

partitioned that would invariably determine as to which court has the authority to
acquire jurisdiction. More, none of the documents annexed to the complaint and as
attached in the records of this case indicates any such amount Thus, the petitioners
are correct in restating their argument against the RTC's jurisdiction, for it has none
to exercise.

Clearly, therefore, jurisprudence has ruled that an action for partition, while one not
capable of pecuniary estimation, falls under the jurisdiction of either the first or
second level courts depending on the amounts specified in Secs. 19(2) and 33(3) of
B.P. 129, as amended. Consequently, a failure by the plaintiff to indicate the
assessed value of the subject property in his/her complaint, or at the very least, in
the attachments in the complaint as ruled in Foronda-Crystal, is dismissible
because the court which would exercise jurisdiction over the same could not be
identified.

Consequently, as the complaint in this case is dismissible for its failure to abide by
the rules in Foronda-Crystal, then the Court sees no further necessity to discuss the
other issues raised.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the April 19, 2013 Decision and March 27,
2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 02669, as well as the
January 17, 2007 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, of Bacolod City in
Civil Case No. 03-11893 are hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint is hereby
DISMISSED without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.
SO ORDERED.