MY REVIEWER IN REMEDIAL LAW_Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (R70)

BASED ON ATTY. BRONDIAL’s SYLLABUS

Special Civil Actions (R-62-71)

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer (R-70)
1. Parties (S-1) Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. —

Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section,…

 a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by FITSS
(force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth), or
 a LVVO (lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person) against whom the
possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or
 the legal representatives or assigns of any such LVVO (lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person),…
 may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession, = bring an action in the proper Municipal
Trial Court against:
 the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or
 any person or persons claiming under them,
- For the RESTITUTION of such possession, together with
damages and costs. (1a)

2. Procedure: Summary (S-3 to 15) Section 3. Summary procedure. —

 Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or

 when the law otherwise expressly provides,…
 all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be
governed by the SUMMARY PROCEDURE hereunder provided. (n)

Section 4. Pleadings allowed. —

The only pleadings allowed to be filed are:

 the complaint,
 compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and
 the answers thereto.

All pleadings shall be VERIFIED. (3a, RSP)

Section 5. Action on complaint. —

The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and such
evidence as may be attached thereto, …DISMISS the case outright on any of the
grounds for the dismissal of a civil action which are APPARENT therein.

If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue SUMMONS. (n)

Section 6. Answers. —

Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall…

 file his ANSWER to the complaint and

 serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff.

Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived,
except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims not asserted in the answer shall

be considered BARRED.

The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served and filed within…

 ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded. (5
 RSP)

Section 7. Effect of failure to answer. —

Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period above provided,
the court,…

 motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be

warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is
prayed for therein.

The court may in its discretion reduce the amount of damages and attorney's
fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable, without
prejudice to the applicability of section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more
defendants.
(6, RSP)

Section 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties. —

Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer is filed, a PRELIMINARY
CONFERENCE shall be held.

The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the preliminary

conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.

The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference …

 shall be cause for the dismissal of his complaint.

The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff …

 shall be entitled to judgment on his counterclaim in accordance with the

next preceding section.

All cross-claims shall be dismissed. (7, RSP)

If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff …

 shall likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with the next

preceding section.

This procedure shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued
under a common cause of action defense shall appear at the preliminary
conference.

No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly

meritorious grounds and without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the
exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant. (n)

Section 9. Record of preliminary conference. —

Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary conference, the court…

 shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not
limited to:
1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if
so, the terms thereof;
2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;
3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and
admission made by the parties, judgment may be rendered
without the need of further proceedings, in which event the
judgment shall be rendered within thirty (30) days from issuance
of the order;
4. A clear specification of material facts which remain converted;
and
5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the
 case. (8, RSP)

Section 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers. —

Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order mentioned in the next preceding
section, the parties shall…

 submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other evidence on the factual
issues defined in the order, together with their position papers (setting forth
the law and the facts relied upon by them). (9, RSP)

Section 11. Period for rendition of judgment. —

Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position papers, or the
expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.

However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, during
the said period, …

 issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and

 require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence on the said
matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order.

Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the
last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the
rendition of the judgment. (n)

Section 12. Referral for conciliation. —

Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of compliance

with such requirement,…

 shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and

 may be revived only after that requirement shall have been complied with.
(18a, RSP)

Section 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions. —

The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be allowed:

1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction over the subject matter, or failure to comply with section 12;

2. Motion for a bill of particulars;

3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for

reopening of trial;

4. Petition for relief from judgment;

5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other

paper;

6. Memoranda;

7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory

order issued by the court;

8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;

9. Dilatory motions for postponement;

10. Reply;
 11. Third-party complaints;

12. Interventions. (19a, RSP)

Section 14. Affidavits. —

The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only…

 facts of direct personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in

evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to the matters stated
therein.

A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the
same to disciplinary action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit
or portion thereof from the record. (20, RSP)

Section 15. Preliminary injunction. —

The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 58 hereof, to…

 prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession

against the plaintiff.

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible from the filing of the
complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for
the issuance of…

 a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession.

The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing
thereof. (3a)

3. Judgment (S-17) Section 17. Judgment. —

If after trial court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall…
 render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for :

 the restitution of the premises,

 the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,
attorney's fees and costs.

If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for…

4. Immediate Execution (S-19 vs.
S-21)
-Preliminary Injunction (S-20)
 the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice
requires. (6a)
Section 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. —
If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately
upon motion unless:

 an appeal has been perfected and

 the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond,
(approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff
to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the
judgment appealed from),
 and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the
appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract,
if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court.
 In the absence of a contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court
the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the
lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month or period.

The supersedeas bond shall be…

 transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the papers, to the clerk of the
 Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.

All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with:

o said court or
o authorized government depositary bank,

and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, UNLESS the court,…

 by agreement of the interested parties, or

 in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to
withdraw, or
 for justifiable reasons,
 shall decree otherwise.

Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to
time during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court,…

 upon motion of the plaintiff, and

 upon proof of such failure,
 shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect
to the restoration of possession,

but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course
until the final disposition thereof on the merits.

After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court
by the defendant for purposes of the stay of execution shall…

 be DISPOSED OF in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of

the Regional Trial Court.

In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful
possession of land or building pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the
judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, …

damages for such deprivation of possession and

restoration of possession
 may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
disposing of the appeal. (8a)

Section 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. —

Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10) days from the perfection of the appeal to
the Regional Trial Court, the latter may…

 issue a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff in

possession if the court is satisfied …
 that the defendant's appeal is frivolous or dilatory or
 that the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious. (9a)

Section 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.

— The judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the defendant shall be…

 IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY, without prejudice to a further appeal that

may be taken therefrom. (10a)

5. Appeals (see on the other page)

From Vito Notes (as supplemented):
Jurisdiction
1. MTC-governed by Rules on Summary Procedure
- No hearing (only submission of Position Paper)
- Preliminary Conference=Mandatory, even in Ejectment case.
- Go to Clerk of Court for marking of evidence; (after Pre-Trial Order ,

Venue
Subject Matter
3 Kinds of Recovery Action
Unlawful Detainer vs. Forcible Entry
Can Injunctive Relief Be availed?
Judgment
Supersedeas Bond
Appeal to RTC from MTC Judgment
submit Position Paper; Judge may issue clarificatory questions)
- Take note of Prohibited Pleading
- Period: Shorter (10 days to file Answer; 30 days to submit decision; 30
days to render judgment)
2. Once it reached RTC on appeal, it is no longer governed by Rules on
Summary Procedure but by Regular Procedure.
Where the property is located.
UD and FE= Quasi in Rem (subject matter is property)
GR: Possession De Facto Only over the Property (not Possession de Jure)
XPN: Issue of Ownership is Raised in the Pleading (here, the court is not divested in
its jurisdiction; court must resolve the issue on ownership for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession, hence, Res Judicata is NOT a defense).
Accion Reivindicatoria Accion Publiciana Accion Interdictal
Recovery of Ownership Recovery of PLENARY Ejectment case
of Property possession (> 1 year -recovery of possession
from accrual of cause of DE FACTO (filed w/in 1
action) (NOTE: year from accrual of
jurisdiction is not always cause of action)
the RTC but defending
on the assessed value of -where forcible and
the Property) unlawful detainer lies.
UNLAWFUL DETAINER FORCIBLE ENTRY
Possession was LAWFUL @ the start; Possession was UNLAWFUL from the
became unlawful Later very beginning.
DEMAND to pay and vacate= No need of demand.
MANDATORY
Prescriptive period is determined from
Last Demand (NOTE: must be within 1
year; otherwise it will be Accion
Publiciana)
Ground: (FISST)
a. Expiration of the Contract a. Force
(Written/Unwritten) b. Intimidation
b. Violation of any term or c. Threat
condition in the contract d. Strategy
c. Tolerance e. Stealth
*Note: Rent Control Law is also under Ejectment, hence, the grounds
enumerated above is not exclusive.
Plaintiff can immediately ask for injunction-he can require the defendant to vacate
(w/in 5 days from filing) (Sec. 15)
Plaintiff can still file Injunction before RTC (Sec. 20)
Immediately Executory.
- Appeal will NOT TOLL the execution in the judgment for unlawful
detainer
- XPN: If appeal is coupled w/ posting of SUPERSEDEAS BOND and if
the court so requires monthly payment of deposit for the use and
occupancy of the premises.
*Where to file Notice of Appeal and Supersedeas Bond= MTC
*Where to pay Regular Monthly Deposit- RTC (on or before 10th day of
every succeeding month) (Sec. 19)
- Note: MTC has 15 days to transmit record to RTC; thus,
defendant is given 25 days to pay deposit.
- Amount of Deposit: According to the judgment
Illustration:
A, lessee of B(lessor). Their lease contract is about to expire. A
informed B of the increase from P10k to P20K. B refused the
increase, but remained in the premises. B filed a case for Unlawful
Detainer.
In the decision of the court: it may state the reasonable monthly
deposit for the use of the premises. Deposit stated in the judgment
must be paid every month- even single non-payment constitute
failure to pay deposit.
-No Unpaid Rentals no Supersedeas Bond
If RTC affirmed MTC judgment, there is already execution since no appeal is
available but a Petition for Review before the CA.

Unlawful Detainer on the ground of
Expiration of Tolerance
CASES:
1. Prov. Of Cam. Sur vs. Bodega
Glassware, 821 SCRA (2017)
Remedy of Defendant: Obtain INJUNCTION only. ; He cannot bar the execution by
mere filing of petition for review.
(see the case of Zacarias vs. Anacay)
Illustration:
X sold his property to Y. Y saw B occupying the said property by tolerance of X.
My Y filed UD on the ground that Tolerance of X is already expired. Will the
ejectment case prosper?
 No. He can still file UD but not on the ground of expiration of tolerance,
but the tolerance of the new owner does not coincide/ w/ the possession
of B.
How can a new owner still file UD when the tolerance of the new owner does not
coincide w/ possession of the detainer? In other words how can one circumvent the
principle that tolerance must co-exist w/ possession?
 The new owner may enter into a contract of lease (say 1 year). If the
possessor refuse the one year period but instead the detainer wanted it to
be renewed for 5 years, the owner must insist on the 1-year period (he can
do so since he is the owner). After the 1 year, the owner can file the UD.
[ G.R. No. 194199, March 22, 2017 ]
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F.
VILLAFUERTE, JR., VS. PETITIONER, BODEGA GLASSWARE, REPRESENTED BY ITS
OWNER JOSEPH D. CABRAL, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
The Case
This is a verified petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
petitioner Province of Camarines Sur (petitioner) challenging the Decision [2] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) promulgated on May 31, 2010 (assailed Decision) and its Resolution[3] dated
October 12, 2010 (assailed Resolution). The assailed Decision affirmed the Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 26 (RTC Naga City), which in tum, reversed the
ruling[5] of the Municipal Trial Court of Naga City, Branch 2 (MTC Naga City) in the action for
ejectment filed by the petitioner against respondent Bodega Glassware (Bodega).
The Facts
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City under Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22.[6] On September 28, 1966, through then Provincial Governor
Apolonio G. Maleniza, petitioner donated around 600 square meters of this parcel of land to
the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through a Deed of Donation Inter
Vivos (Deed of Donation).[7] The Deed of Donation included an automatic revocation clause
which states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of
land subject of the present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building
to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be
used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions
under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the
DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all
improvements thereon in favor of any party and provided, lastly, that the construction of the
building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year
from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect. [8]
CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of law and complied with
the conditions stated in the deed. However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a
Contract of Lease with Bodega over the donated property.[9] Under the Contract of Lease,
CASTEA leased the property to Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing on September 1,
1995 and ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega took actual possession of the property on
September 1, 1995.[10]
Sometime in July 2005, the Office of the Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Camarines
Sur wrote Bodega regarding the building it built on the property. The Provincial Legal Officer
requested Bodega to show proof of ownership or any other legal document as legal basis for
his possession. Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega
undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession of the property.[11]
On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega dated October 4, 2007. [12] In this
letter, petitioner stated that Bodega's occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the
petitioner.[13] As it now intended to use the property for its developmental projects, petitioner
demanded that Bodega vacate the property and surrender its peaceful possession. Bodega
refused to comply with the demand. [14]

Petitioner, through its then Provincial Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., revoked its
donation through a Deed of Revocation of Donation [15] (Deed of Revocation) dated October 14,
2007. It asserted that CASTEA violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation when it leased
the property to Bodega. Thus, invoking the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of
Donation, petitioner revoked, annulled and declared void the Deed of Donation. [16] It appears
from the record that CASTEA never challenged this revocation.

On March 13, 2008, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega before the
MTC Naga City. It prayed that Bodega be ordered to vacate the property and surrender to
petitioner its peaceful possession. Petitioner also prayed for the payment of P15,000 a month
from October 2007 until Bodega vacates the land.[17]

In a Decision[18] dated December 11, 2008, the MTC Naga City ruled in favor of the petitioner.
It ordered Bodega to vacate the property and to pay P15,000 a month as reasonable
compensation.[19] The dispositive portion of this Decision states:

Wherefore, the foregoing premises considered, plaintiff having established by preponderance

of evidence its cause of action against the defendant, the latter is ordered:

1) To immediately vacate and surrender to plaintiff, Province of Camarines Sur, the peaceful
possession of the portion of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 22
registered in the name of the plaintiff with an area of Six Hundred (600) square meters
subject of the lease contract executed by CASTEA in favor of the herein defendant dated
7 September 1995 where the defendants (sic) building is constructed, and,
2) [T]o pay plaintiff the amount of Php15,000.00 a month from date of judicial demand until it
vacates the subject properties as reasonable compensation for the use of the same.

Defendant's counterclaim is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against defendant. [20]

Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which reversed it in a Decision [21] dated
May 13, 2009. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE premises considered, the decision of the court a quo is hereby reversed and
set aside and a new one entered DISMISSING the above case for failure of the plaintiff to
present evidence to sustain its cause of action[.] [22]

The petitioner then went up on appeal to the CA which rendered the now assailed Decision.
The CA disposed of the appeal thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated May
13, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City is hereby AFFIRMED.[23]

In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC Naga City that the petitioner
cannot demand that Bodega vacate the property. The CA explained that Bodega 's possession
of the property is based on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA, in tum, claims
ownership of the property by virtue of the Deed of Donation. According to the CA, while
petitioner alleges that CASTEA violated the conditions of the donation and thus, the automatic
revocation clause applies, it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property
against CASTEA. The CA theorized that judicial intervention is necessary to ascertain if the
automatic revocation clause suffices to declare the donation revoked. In support of its
argument, the CA cited the ruling of this Court in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v.
Court of Appeals.[24]

The CA also found that petitioner's action has already prescribed. According to it, Article
1144(1) of the Civil Code applies in this case. Thus, petitioner had 10 years to file an action for
reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation was violated. As the Contract of Lease was
entered into on September 1, 1995, petitioner, thus, had 10 years from this date to file the
action. Unfortunately, the action for unlawful detainer was filed more than 12 years later.
Further, the CA added that even the revocation of the donation was done beyond the 10-year
prescriptive period. The CA also denied petitioner ' s motion for reconsideration. [25]

Petitioner filed this verified petition for review on certiorari challenging the assailed Decision. It
argues that the CA wrongly applied the doctrine in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. It
asserts that the assailed Decision in fact categorically stated that in donations containing an
automatic revocation clause, judicial intervention is not necessary for the purpose of effectively
revoking the donation. Such a revocation is valid subject to judicial intervention only when its
propriety is challenged in court.[26]

In its comment, Bodega anchors its right of possession on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA.
It insists that the Contract of Lease is valid because CASTEA is the owner of the property. The
automatic revocation clause did not immediately revoke the donation in the absence of a
judicial declaration. It also agrees with the CA that the petitioner's action has already
prescribed.[27]

The Issues
The core issue in this case is who between petitioner and Bodega has the right to the actual
physical possession of the property.

The resolution of this issue requires us to look into the basis of their claims of possession.
Essential to this is the determination of the effect of the automatic revocation clause in the
Deed of Donation.

We note, however, that an action for unlawful detainer pertains only to the issue of possession
de facto or actual possession. Thus  while we may rule on the basis of the parties' claims of
possession—which, in the case of the petitioner, involves an assertion of ownership—this
determination is only provisional and done solely to settle the question of possession .

The Ruling of the Court

Rule 70 of the Rules of Court covers the ejectment cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer.

These actions are summary proceedings and are devised to provide for a particular remedy for
a very specific issue.

Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry involve only the question of actual possession.
[28]

In these actions, courts are asked to ascertain which between the parties has the right to the
possession de facto or physical possession of the property in question. [29]

Its purpose is to restore the aggrieved party to possession if he or she successfully

establishes his or her right to possess the property.

The essence of an ejectment suit is for the rightful possessor to lawfully recover the property
through lawful means instead of unlawfully wresting possession of the property from its current
occupant.[30]

Thus, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a summary proceeding and is an
expeditious means to recover possession.

If the parties raise the issue of ownership, courts may only pass upon that issue for the
purpose of ascertaining who has the better right of possession.[31]

- Any ruling involving ownership is not final and binding. It is merely provisional
and does not bar an action between the same parties regarding the title of the
property.[32]

An action for unlawful detainer, as in this case, pertains to specific circumstances of

dispossession. It refers to a situation where the current occupant of the property initially
obtained possession lawfully.[33] This possession only became unlawful due to the expiration of
the right to possess which may be a contract, express or implied, or by mere tolerance.[34]

An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key jurisdictional facts:

(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of
the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment. [35]

When in an unlawful detainer action, the party seeking recovery of possession alleges that the
opposing party occupied the subject property by mere tolerance, this must be alleged clearly
and the acts of tolerance established.[36] Further, the party seeking possession must identify
the source of his or her claim as well as satisfactorily present evidence establishing it.

In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of
its legal basis for occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For
several years, petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession by allowing it to continue using
its building and conducting business on the property. Petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate
the property in November 2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere
tolerance.

Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its ownership. This, in
turn, is hinged on its position that the property reverted back to the petitioner when the
donation was revoked as provided in the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation.

We shall rule on the effect of the automatic revocation clause for the purpose of ascertaining
who between petitioner and Bodega has the right to possess the property.

This Court has affirmed the validity of an automatic revocation clause in donations in the case
of De Luna v. Abrigo[37] promulgated in 1990.

- We explained the nature of automatic revocation clauses by first identifying the

three categories of donation.
- In De Luna, we said that a donation may be simple, remuneratory or onerous.

A donation is simple
 when the cause is the donor's pure liberality.

It is remuneratory

 when the donor "gives something to reward past or future services or

because of future charges or burdens, when the value of said services,
burdens or charges is less than the value of the donation."

A donation is onerous

 when it is "subject to burdens, charges, or future services equal (or

more) in value than that of the thing donated x x x."[39]

This Court found that the donation in De Luna was onerous as it required the donee to build a
chapel, a nursery, and a kindergarten.

We then went on to explain that an onerous donation is governed by the law on contracts and
not by the law on donations. It is within this context that this Court found an automatic
revocation clause as valid.

We explained in De Luna that Article 1306 of the Civil Code allows the parties "to establish
such stipulations, clauses , terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy." [40]

In contracts law, parties may agree to give one or both of them the right to rescind a contract
unilaterally.

This is akin to an automatic revocation clause in an onerous donation.

The jurisprudence on automatic rescission in the field of contracts law therefore applies in an
automatic revocation clause.

Hence, in De Luna, we applied our rulings in University of the Philippines v. De los Angeles[41]
and Angeles v. Calasanz[42] where we held that an automatic rescission clause effectively
rescinds the contract upon breach without need of any judicial declaration.

In University of the Philippines, this Court held that a party to a contract with an automatic
rescission clause, who believes that there has been a breach warranting rescission, may
consider the contract rescinded without previous court action. Speaking through Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, we said:

- x x x [T]he law definitely does not require that the contracting party who
believes itself injured must first file suit and wait for a judgment before taking
extrajudicial steps to protect its interest. Otherwise, the party injured by the
other's breach will have to passively sit and watch its damages accumulate
during the pendency of the suit until the final judgment of rescission is rendered
when the law itself requires that he should exercise due diligence to minimize
its own damages x x x.[43]

We, however, clarified that the other party may contest the extrajudicial rescission in court in
case of abuse or error by the rescinder. It is only in this case where a judicial resolution of the
issue becomes necessary.

Applying this to the automatic revocation clause, we ruled in De Luna that:

- It is clear, however, that judicial intervention is necessary not for purposes of

obtaining a judicial declaration rescinding a contract already deemed rescinded
by virtue of an agreement providing for rescission even without judicial
intervention, but in order to determine whether or not the rescission was
proper.[44]

While the ruling in De Luna applied specifically to onerous donations with an automatic
revocation clause, we extended this doctrine to apply to donations inter vivos in general in
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila.

- We explained in this case that Article 732 of the Civil Code states that the
 general provisions on obligations and contracts shall govern donations inter
vivos in all matters not determined in Title III, Book III on donations.

Title III has no explicit provisions for instances where a donation has an
automatic revocation clause.

Thus, the rules in contracts law regarding automatic rescission of contracts as

well as the jurisprudence explaining it find suppletory application.

We then reiterated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila that where a

donation has an automatic revocation clause, the occurrence of the condition
agreed to by the parties as to cause the revocation, is sufficient for a party to
consider the donation revoked without need of any judicial action.

A judicial finding that the revocation is proper is only necessary when the other
party actually goes to court for the specific purpose of challenging the propriety
of the revocation.

Nevertheless, even in such a case, "x x x the decision of the court will be
merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act."[45]

We also explained in this case that in ascertaining the prescription of actions

arising from an automatic revocation clause in donations, the general
provisions on prescription under the Civil Code apply. Article 764—which
provides for a four-year prescriptive period to file an action to revoke the
donation in case of breach of a condition—governs an instance where the deed
of donation does not contain an automatic revocation clause. [46]

We repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of
Dumangas.[47]

- We once again held that if a contract of donation provides for automatic

rescission or reversion in case of a breach of a condition and the donee
violates it or fails to comply with it, the property donated automatically reverts
back to the donor without need of any judicial declaration.
- It is onl y when the donee denies the rescission or challenges its propriety that
the court can intervene to conclusively settle whether the resolution was
proper.

This was also the import of our ruling in Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v.
Plagata.[48]

In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause. The clause
states:

- That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-
described portion of land subject of the present donation for no other purpose
except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the
above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines
Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its function s under its
charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association, PROVIDED
FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber the
property here in donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of
any party and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings
referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and
after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this donation shall be deemed
automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect. [49]

The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the property shall be used for
"no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by
the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers'
Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga
City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association," (2)
CASTEA shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and
all improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or
buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after
the execution." The last clause of this paragraph states that "otherwise, this donation shall be
deemed automatically revoked x x x."[50] We read the final clause of this provision as an
automatic revocation clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When
CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it breached the first and second conditions.

Accordingly, petitioner takes the position that when CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it
violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation and as such, the property automatically
reverted to it. It even executed a Deed of Revocation.

The records show that CASTEA never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the ruling in
De Luna, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders
Kilusang Bayan, Inc., petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the
automatic revocation clause, this revocation was automatic and immediate, without need of
judicial intervention.

Thus, the CA clearly erred in its finding that petitioner should have first filed an action for
reconveyance. This contradicts the doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and renders
nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation clause.

Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it,
the property donated effectively reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the
property, petitioner sources its right of possession on its ownership.

Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder and
possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its Contract of
Lease with CASTEA.

CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the Deed
of Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of the donation.

Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to

lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the property leased, he or she
must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out.[51] None exists in this case. Bodega
finds no basis for its continued possession of the property.

As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to file this ejectment suit
against Bodega has not prescribed.

First, we reiterate that jurisprudence has definitively declared that Article 764 on the
prescription of actions for the revocation of a donation does not apply in cases where the
donation has an automatic revocation clause.[52]

This is necessarily so because Article 764 speaks of a judicial action for the revocation of a
donation. It cannot govern cases where a breach of a condition automatically, and without
need of judicial intervention, revokes the donation.

Second, we cannot agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner should have first filed an
action for reconveyance of the property, and that petitioner's action has prescribed since it did
not file the action within 10 years. This reveals a failure to understand the nature of a donation
with an automatic revocation clause. At the risk of repetition, the breach of the condition in the
donation causes the automatic revocation. All the donor has to do is to formally inform the
donee of the revocation. Judicial intervention only becomes necessary if the donee questions
the propriety of the revocation. Even then, judicial intervention is required to merely confirm
and not order the revocation. Hence, there can be no 10-year prescriptive period to file an
action to speak of. When the donee does not contest the revocation, no court action is
necessary.

Third, as owner of the property in this case, the petitioner is entitled to its possession.

The petitioner's action for ejectment is anchored on this right to possess.

Under the Civil Code and the Rules of Court, a party seeking to eject another from a property
for unlawful detainer must file the action for ejectment within one year from the last demand to
vacate.This is the prescriptive period that the petitioner is bound to comply with in this case.
The records show that the petitioner served its last demand letter on November 11, 2007. It
filed the action for ejectment on March 13, 2008 or around four months from the last demand.
The action is clearly within the prescriptive period.

We also affirm the grant of damages in favor of the petitioner.

Section 17 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 17. Judgment. - If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it
shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly
due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
premises, attorney's fees and costs. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the rightful possessor in an unlawful detainer case is entitled to recover damages, which
refer to "rents" or "the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises,"
or "fair rental value of the property"[54] and attorney's fees and costs. More specifically,
recoverable damages are "those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor,
or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property."[55]

In this case, the petitioner prayed for the award of P15,000 monthly as damages. Petitioner
argued that considering that the Contract of Lease between CASTEA and Bodega shows that
the monthly rent for the property is P30,000, the amount of P15,000 which it prays for is fair
and reasonable.[56]

We agree with the petitioner's position. The amount of rent in the Contract of Lease is
evidence of the fair rental value of the property. That the petitioner asked for half of this
amount as damages is reasonable given the circumstances.
 WHEREFORE, the petltwn is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 31, 2010 which AFFIRMED the Decision of the RTC of Naga City Branch 26 dated
May 13, 2009 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the MTC Naga City is
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

2. Santiago vs. Northbay Knitting,

Inc., 842 SCRA (2017) [ GR No. 217296, Oct 11, 2017 ]
SPS. ERWIN C. SANTIAGO AND MARINELA A. SANTIAGO v. NORTHBAY KNITTING +
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review seeking to annul and set aside the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 26, 2014, as well as its Resolution [2] dated February
25, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 132962, reversing the Decision [3] of the Malabon Regional Trial
Court (RTC) dated May 29, 2013 in Civil Case No. ACV 12-008-MN.

The procedural and factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

Respondent Northbay Knitting, Inc. (NKI) filed a Complaint for Ejectment before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Navotas City against petitioners spouses Ramiro and Elva
Albaran (the Spouses Albaran) who were doing business under the name REA General
Marine Services (REA), spouses Gaudencio and Editha Manimtim (the Spouses Manimtim )
who were doing business under the name Junedith Brokerage Corporation ( JBC), spouses
Erwin and Marinela Santiago ( the Spouses Santiago) who were doing business under the
name Quick Care Cargo Handler (QCCH), and Cesar Odan who was doing business under
the name Transment Freight Forwarder ( TFF).

NKI alleged that it owns the subject property, a parcel of land in Phase I, North Side of the
Dagat-Dagatan Project in Navotas covered by Transfer Certificate of Title ( TCT) No. M-38092.
All petitioners were simply allowed to occupy said property by NKI and they were not paying
any rent. On March 5, 2009, NKI sent demand letters to petitioners asking them to vacate the
property within five (5) days from receipt and to pay rent in the event that they refuse to vacate
within the grace period given. However, despite receipt of said letters, petitioners refused to
vacate or pay the necessary rent. Thus, on April 14, 2009, NKI filed an ejectment complaint
against petitioners.

For their part, petitioners averred that NKI merely exists on paper as its certificate of
registration had already been revoked by the Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC) for
failure to operate. NKI only became the registered owner of the subject property on June 16,
2008, while petitioners came into possession of said property through their predecessor-in-
interest, Hermeginildo Odan, and have been continuously in possession since 1970. Odan had
leased the property from the family of the late Francisco Felipe Gonzales. Later, he subleased
the property to petitioners. The government likewise expropriated the subject property and
declared it as an Area for Priority Development or Urban Land Reform Zone under
Proclamation No. 3384 dated April 13, 1983. Being tenants and actual occupants of the place,
petitioners could not be evicted. Then a Conditional Contract to Sell was entered into between
NKI and National Housing Authority (NHA). NKI violated the terms of said contract, causing the
automatic cancellation of the same. Sometime in 2008, the NHA sold the property to NKI
without giving petitioners, as the actual occupants, the right of first refusal granted under the
law. Thus, petitioners filed a case questioning said sale which was docketed as Civil Case No.
06-11-MN. Petitioners contended that this case on the issue of their right of first refusal is a
prejudicial question that must be resolved first before the MeTC can take cognizance of the
ejectment case.

On June 11, 2012, the Navotas MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of NKI, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff

Northbay Knitting, Inc. and against defendants as follows:

1. ORDERING defendants-spouses Ramiro Albaran & Elva Albaran, spouses Gaudencio

Manimtim & Edith Manimtim, Junedith Brokerage Corporation, spouses Erwin Santiago &
Marinela Santiago, and Cesar Odan, and all persons claiming rights under them to remove the
improvements they introduced on the property located in Phase 1, North Side of the Dagat-
Dagatan Project in Navotas, Metro Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-
38092 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City in the name of the plaintiff Northbay
Knitting, Inc.;

2. ORDERING defendants-spouses Ramiro Albaran & Elva Albaran, spouses Gaudencio

Manimtim & Edith Manimtim, Junedith Brokerage Corporation, spouses Erwin Santiago &
Marinela Santiago, and Cesar Odan, and all persons claiming rights under them to
PEACEFULLY VACATE AND VOLUNTARILY SURRENDER to plaintiff Northbay Knitting, Inc.
the possession of the said lot situated in Phase 1, North Side of the Dagat-Dagatan Project in
Navotas, Metro Manila covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-38092 issued by
the Registry of Deeds of Malabon City in the name of the plaintiff Northbay Knitting, Inc.;

3. ORDERING each defendant named-above to each pay plaintiff the amount of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00) per month for the use and occupation of the above-
described property computed from May 4, 2009 until possession of said property is
surrendered and turned-over to plaintiff; and
4. ORDERING defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the amount of Php20,000.00, as
and by way of attorney's fees.

The Counterclaim of defendants-spouses Albaran, Santiago, and Odan is hereby DISMISSED

for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[4]
On May 29, 2013, however, the Malabon RTC set aside the MeTC Decision for lack of
jurisdiction, since NKI failed to show a case of Unlawful Detainer, to wit:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to Sec. 8 par. 2, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court, this Court hereby
assumes jurisdiction over this case.

In the meantime, let this case be set for preliminary conference on July 24, 2013 at 8:30
o'clock in the morning.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Upon appeal, the CA ruled:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 29, 2013 and Order dated October 29, 2013 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 170, Malabon City in Civil Case No. ACV 12-008-MN are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated June 11, 2012 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Branch 54, Navotas City is hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.[6]
Hence, this petition.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is devoid of merit.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the material allegations of the complaint. It cannot be acquired through, or
waived by, any act or omission of the parties, neither can it be cured by their silence,
acquiescence, or even express consent. [7]

In ejectment cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings
are summary in nature.

The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to
parol evidence.[8]

A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it states the following: 
 
possession of property by the defendant was initially by contract with or by tolerance of
1)
the plaintiff;
eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
2)
termination of the latter's right of possession;
thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the plaintiff
3)
of the enjoyment of the same; and
within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff
4)
instituted the complaint for ejectment. [9]

Here, as the CA aptly found, NKI's complaint sufficiently shows all the allegations required to
support a case for unlawful detainer, thereby vesting jurisdiction in the MeTC over the case.

NKI stated that it is the absolute owner of the subject property, as evidenced by TCT No. M-
38092, and supported by Tax Declaration No. C-002-08822-C and real property tax receipt for
the tax due in 2008.

Petitioners, who are the actual occupants of said property, never paid rent but continued to
possess the property upon NKI's mere tolerance. Despite receipt of NKI's demand letters to
vacate, petitioners refused and continued to occupy the property.

The statements in the complaint that petitioners' possession of the property in question was by
mere tolerance of NKI clearly make out a case for unlawful detainer.

Unlawful detainer involves the person's withholding from another of the possession of the real
property to which the latter is entitled, after the expiration or termination of the former's right to
hold possession under the contract, either expressed or implied.

A requisite for a valid cause of action in an unlawful detainer case is that possession must be
originally lawful, and such possession must have turned unlawful only upon the expiration of
the right to possess.
It must be shown that the possession was initially lawful; hence, the basis of such lawful
possession must be established. If, as in the instant case, the claim is that such possession is
by mere tolerance of the plaintiff, the acts of tolerance must be proved. [10]

Here, petitioners claim that NKI only became the registered owner of the subject property on
June 16, 2008. However, from that time when the title to the disputed property was registered
 in NKI's name on June 16, 2008 until the time when it sent the demand letters to vacate on
March 5, 2009, petitioners' possession had certainly been one upon mere tolerance of the
owner.

NKI's right to possess the property had then become absolute and undeniable. And when NKI
demanded that they leave the premises and petitioners refused to do so, their possession had
already become unlawful. As the registered owner, NKI had a right to the possession of the
property, which is one of the attributes of its ownership. [11]

Further, petitioners argue that there is a pending action questioning the validity of the sale of
the disputed property to NKI, consequently affecting the validity of its title to said property.

Such argument is clearly a collateral attack on NKI's title, which is not allowed in an unlawful
detainer case.

A certificate of title cannot be subject to a collateral attack and can be altered, modified, or
cancelled only in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.[12]

A Torrens Certificate of Title cannot be the subject of collateral attack.

Such attack must be direct and not by a collateral proceeding.

Considering that this is an unlawful detainer case wherein the sole issue to be decided is
possession de facto rather than possession de jure, a collateral attack by petitioners on NKI's
title is proscribed.

The present case only covers the issue of who has the better right of possession in relation to
the issue of disputed ownership of the subject properties. Questions as to the validity of NKI's
title can be ventilated in a proper suit instituted separately to directly attack its validity, an issue
that cannot be definitively resolved in the extant unlawful detainer case.[13]

It has been held time and gain that the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the premises, independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the party litigants.

Possession refers to possession de facto, and not possession de jure.

It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable.

Where the parties to an ejectment case raise he issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon
that issue to determine who between the parties has the better right to possess the property.
However, where the issue of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, as in this
case, adjudication of the ownership issue is not final and binding, but merely for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession.

The adjudication of the issue of ownership is only provisional, and not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property.[14]

An ejectment suit is likewise summary in nature and is not susceptible to circumvention by the
simple expedient of asserting ownership over the property.

In forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, even if the defendant raises the question of
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the lower courts and the CA, nonetheless, have the
undoubted competence to provisionally resolve the issue of ownership for the sole purpose of
determining the issue of possession. Such decision, however, does not bind the title or affect
the ownership of the land nor is conclusive of the facts found in said case between the same
parties but upon a separate cause of action involving possession. [15]

Therefore, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed rulings of the CA.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 26, 2014 as well as its Resolution dated
February 25, 2015 in CA-G.R. SP No. 132962.

SO ORDERED.

3. Regalado vs. De la Rama vda. FIRST DIVISION

De dela Pena, 848 SCRA (2017)
G.R. No. 202448, December 13, 2017

JOSEPH O. REGALADO, Petitioner, v. EMMA DE LA RAMA VDA. DE LA PENA,1 JESUSA2

DE LA PENA, JOHNNY DE LA PENA, JOHANNA DE LA PENA, JOSE DE LA PENA,
JESSICA DE LA PENA, AND JAIME ANTONIO DE LA PENA, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the May 28, 2012
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02994, which affirmed the January
20, 2009 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 42 in Civil Case
No. 98-10187 for "Recovery of Possession and Damages with Injunction."

Factual Antecedents

Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, Jose, Jessica, and Jaime Antonio (Jaime) all surnamed de
la Pena (respondents), are the registered owners of two parcels of land with a total area of 44
hectares located in Murcia, Negros Occidental. These properties are referred to as Lot Nos.
l38-D and 138-S, and are respectively covered by Transfer Certificates of Title No. T-103187
and T-1031895 (subject properties).

Purportedly, in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of respondents, Joseph Regalado
(petitioner) entered, took possession of, and planted sugar cane on the subject properties
without paying rent to respondents. In the crop year 1995-1996, respondents discovered such
illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally demand from petitioner to vacate the properties
but to no avail.6

Later, the parties appeared before the Barangay Office of Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros
Occidental but failed to arrive at any amicable settlement. On September 29, 1997, the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of said Barangay issued a Certificate to File Action; 7 and, on March 9, 1998,
respondents filed a Complaint 8 for recovery of possession and damages with injunction
against petitioner.

In his Answer,9 petitioner countered that in 1994, Emma, Jesusa, Johnny, Johanna, and
Jessica executed their separate Waivers of Undivided Share of Lands renouncing their rights
and interests over the subject properties in favor of Jaime. In turn, Jaime subsequently waived
his rights and interests on the same properties to petitioner. 10 Petitioner claimed that
respondents did not attempt to enter the properties as they already intentionally relinquished
their interests thereon.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss 11 on the ground, among others, that the RTC
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Petitioner posited that based on the
allegations in the Complaint, the action involved recovery of physical possession of the
properties in dispute; said Complaint was also filed within one year from the date the parties
had a confrontation before the Barangay; and thus, the case was one for Ejectment and must
be filed with the proper Municipal Trial Court (MTC).

In their Reply,12 respondents alleged that the waiver of rights in favor of Jaime was conditioned
on the payment of their P6.7 million loan with the Republic Planters Bank (RPB) and Philippine
National Bank (PNB); and, in case the subject properties would be sold, its proceeds shall be
equally distributed to respondents. They further stated that such waiver bestowed rights over
the properties solely upon Jaime. They added that the subsequent waiver executed by Jaime
to petitioner should have been with conformity of the banks where the properties were
mortgaged; and conditioned on the payment of the P6.7 million loan. They pointed out that
neither Jaime nor petitioner paid any amount to RPB or PNB; and as a result, the waivers of
rights in favor of Jaime, and later to petitioner, were void.

Subsequently, in their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, 13 respondents contended that the RTC
had jurisdiction over the case because their demand for petitioner to vacate the properties was
made during the crop year 1995-1996, which was earlier than the referral of the matter to
Barangay Cansilayan.

On July 31, 2000, the RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. It held that it had jurisdiction over the
case because the area of the subject properties was 44 hectares, more or less, and "it is safe
to presume that the value of the same is more than P20,000.00." 14

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 20, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision ordering petitioner to turn over the subject
properties to respondents and to pay them P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The RTC ratiocinated that the waiver of rights executed by Jaime to petitioner was coupled
with a consideration. However, petitioner failed to prove that he paid a consideration for such a
waiver; as such, petitioner was not entitled to possess the subject properties.

Both parties appealed to the CA.

On one hand, petitioner reiterated that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. He also
maintained that respondents already waived their shares and rights over the properties to
Jaime, who, in turn, renounced his rights to petitioner.

On the other hand, respondents assailed the RTC Decision in so far as it failed to award them
damages as a result of petitioner's purported illegal entry and possession of the subject
properties.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On May 28, 2012, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.

The CA dismissed respondents' appeal because they did not establish entitlement to
damages. It likewise dismissed the appeal interposed by petitioner for failing to establish that
he gave any consideration in relation to Jaime's waiver of rights in his (petitioner) favor.

In addition, the CA ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over this case considering that the
parties stipulated on the jurisdiction of the RTC but also because the assessed value of the
subject properties is presumed to have exceeded P20,000.00.

Issues

Hence, petitioner filed this Petition raising the issues as follows:

I. DID THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT
MATTER OF THE CASE?

II. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER SHOULD
RETURN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE TO
THE RESPONDENTS?

III. SHOULD THE PETITIONER BE AWARDED DAMAGES? 15

Petitioner's Arguments

Petitioner insists that respondents filed their Complaint for recovery of physical possession of
the subject properties on March 9, 1998 or within one year from the date the parties had their
confrontation before the Barangay of Cansilayan (September 29, 1997). As such, he maintains
that the RTC did not have jurisdiction over the case.

Petitioner also posits that even granting that this action is considered a plenary action to
recover right of possession, the RTC still had no jurisdiction because the tax declarations of
the properties were not submitted, and consequently, it cannot be determined whether it is the
MTC or RTC which has jurisdiction over the case.

Moreover, petitioner argues that Jaime's waiver in his (petitioner's) favor was coupled with the
following considerations: 1) P400,000.00 cash; 2) a car worth P350,000.00; and 3) a
convenience store worth P1,500,000.00. He adds that the delivery of the properties to him
confirms that he (petitioner) gave said considerations to Jaime.

Later, in his Manifestation and Motion, 16 petitioner points out that although the body of the
assailed CA Decision made reference to the January 20, 2009 RTC Decision, its dispositive
portion pertained to a different case, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the August 29, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 10 in Civil Case No. CEB-30866 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against both appellants.

SO ORDERED.17 (Underlining ours)

Consequently, petitioner prays that the dispositive portion of the CA Decision be rectified to
refer to the actual case subject of the appeal.

Respondents' Arguments

On the other hand, respondents contend that the CA did not commit any reversible error in
rendering the assailed Decision. They insist that petitioner's contentions are unsubstantial to
merit consideration.

Our Ruling

The Court grants the Petition.

In our jurisdiction, there are three kinds of action for recovery of possession of real property:

1) ejectment (either for unlawful detainer or forcible entry) in case the

dispossession has lasted for not more than a year;
2) accion publiciana or a plenary action for recovery of real right of
 possession when dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and,
3) accion reinvindicatoria or an action for recovery of ownership. 18

Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), 19 the proper Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC),
MTC, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction over ejectment
cases.

Moreover, jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil actions involving title to
or possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).20

On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to
or possession of real property, or any interest therein in case the assessed value of the
property exceeds P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).21

Jurisdiction is thus determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the assessed
value of the property. It follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed
value of the real property is a jurisdictional element to determine the court that can take
cognizance of the action.22

In this case, petitioner consistently insists that:

a) the Complaint is one for ejectment; or

b) if the same is deemed an accion publiciana, the RTC still lacks jurisdiction as the assessed
value of the subject properties was not alleged in the Complaint.

As such, to ascertain the proper court that has jurisdiction, reference must be made to the
averments in the complaint, and the law in force at the commencement of the action. This is
because only the facts alleged in the complaint can be the basis for determining the nature of
the action, and the court that can take cognizance of the case.23

Here, the pertinent portions of the Complaint read:

2. That plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the owners of two (2) parcels of land known as Lot.
No. 138-D with Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-103187 and Lot No. 138-S with Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T- 103189, with a total land area of 44 hectares, all of Murcia Cadastre x
x x;

3. That sometime in 1994, without the knowledge and consent of herein plaintiffs, the
defendant [herein petitioner] entered into and took possession of the aforementioned parcels
of land and planted sugar cane without paying any rental to herein plaintiffs;

4. That plaintiffs discovered the illegal entry and occupation by the defendant of the
aforementioned property and demand to vacate the property was made orally to the defendant
sometime in 1995-96 crop year but defendant refused and still refuses to vacate the premises;

5. A confrontation before the Brgy. Kapitan of Brgy[.] Cansilayan, Murcia, Negros Occidental,
and before the Pangkat Tagapag[ka]sundo between herein parties where plaintiffs again
demanded orally for the defendant to vacate the premises but defendant refused to vacate the
premises and no amicable settlement was reached during the confrontation of the parties, thus
a certificate to file action has been issued x x x;

6. That plaintiffs were barred by the defendant from entering the property of the plaintiffs for
the latter to take possession of the same and plant sugar cane thereby causing damages to
the plaintiffs;

7. That because of the refusal of the defendant to allow the plaintiffs to take possession and
control of their own property, plaintiffs were constrained to seek the aid of counsel and
consequently thereto this complaint. 24

Under Section 1,25 Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, there are special jurisdictional facts that must
be set forth in the complaint to make a case for ejectment, which, as mentioned, may either be
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.

In particular, a complaint for FORCIBLE ENTRY must allege the plaintiff's prior physical
possession of the property; the fact that plaintiff was deprived of its possession by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; and the action must be filed within one year from the
time the owner or the legal possessor learned of their dispossession.26

On the other hand, a complaint for UNLAWFUL DETAINER must state that the defendant is
unlawfully withholding possession of the real property after the expiration or termination of his
or her right to possess it; and the complaint is filed within a year from the time such possession

4. Ferrer vs. Rabaca, 632 SCRA
YMCA filed an ejectment suit against Mr.
Cano in MeTC, of w/c Judge Rabaca as
Presiding Judge.
The judge ruled in favor of YMCA , and it
ordered Cano to vacate the premises.
Cano filed a Notice of Appeal and Judge
Rabaca approved the same and ordered
it BCC to transmit the records to RTC
immediately.
YMCA filed a Motion for Immediate
Excution of judgment in its favor. But
Judge Rabaca denied the said motion on
the ground that Notice of Appeal has
been seasonably filed and it already lost
became unlawful.27
In the instant case, respondents only averred in the Complaint that they are registered owners
of the subject properties, and petitioner unlawfully deprived them of its possession. They did
not assert therein that they were dispossessed of the subject properties under the
circumstances necessary to make a case of either forcible entry or unlawful detainer. Hence,
in the absence of the required jurisdictional facts, the instant action is not one for ejectment. 28
Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion publiciana,
there was no clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it.
Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by law. It cannot be presumed or
implied, and must distinctly appear from the law. It cannot also be vested upon a court by the
agreement of the parties; or by the court's erroneous belief that it had jurisdiction over a
case.29
To emphasize, when respondents filed the Complaint in 1998, RA 7691 was already in force
as it was approved on March 25, 1994 and took effect on April 15, 1994. 30 As such, it is
necessary that the assessed value of the subject properties, or its adjacent lots (if the
properties are not declared for taxation purposes) 31 be alleged to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over the case.32
As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to specify the assessed value of the subject
properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC has
jurisdiction, over respondents' action.
Also worth noting is the fact that the RTC took cognizance of the Complaint only on the
presumption that the assessed value of the properties exceeds P20,000.00. Aside from
affirming such presumption, the CA, in turn, declared that the RTC had jurisdiction because
the parties stipulated on it. However, as discussed, jurisdiction cannot be presumed. It cannot
be conferred by the agreement of the parties, or on the erroneous belief of the court that it had
jurisdiction over a case.
Indeed, in the absence of any allegation in the Complaint of the assessed value of the subject
properties, it cannot be determined which court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
respondents' Complaint. Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of the assessed value, or
even market value of the land.33
Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all proceedings before the RTC, including its decision, are
void,34 which makes it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.
As a final note, while the modification of the clerical error in the dispositive portion of the CA
Decision is rendered irrelevant by the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction, the
Court, nonetheless, reminds the CA and all other courts to be more circumspect in rendering
their decision, including ensuring the correctness of the information in their issuances. After all,
courts are duty-bound to render accurate decisions, or that which clearly and distinctly express
the facts and the law on which the same is based. 35
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The May 28, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 02994 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 98-10187 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Doctrine: Execution pending appeal is allowed by the rules (as provided in Sec. 2,
Rule 39). (Exercise of Residual Jurisdiction). When Ferrer filed a motion for
execution pending appeal, the court should have not denied the said motion on the
ground that the court loses jurisdiction over the case.
Ferrer vs. Judge Rabaca (of MTC Manila), 632 SCRA
Complainants were the President and the Executive Director of the plaintiff in Civil
Case No. 176394-CV of the MeTC, an ejectment suit entitled Young Women’s
Christian Association, Inc. v. Conrado Cano pending before MTC Manila Br 25 with
Judge Rabaca as PJ.
Judge Rabaca ruled in favor of YMCA; ordered Cano to vacate, among others.
YMCA (JOV: ung sa SM Manila to diba? Ung badmintonan) filed a motion for
immediate execution, praying that a writ of execution be issued "for the immediate
execution of the aforesaid Judgment."
The plaintiff cited Section 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court as basis for its motion.
jurisdiction over the case.
Whether respondent Judge is guilty of
ignorance of the law when he denied
YMCA’s motion for the immediate
execution of judgement (pending appeal)
in an ejectment case (based on the
ground that notice of appeal has been
perfected by the defendant, even though
the latter did not file any supersedeas
bond ?
YES.
It is clear from the Rules of Court (Rule
70, Sec. 19) that the perfection of an
appeal by itself is not sufficient to stay the
execution of the judgment in an ejectment
case.
The losing party should likewise file a
supersedeas bond executed in favor of
the plaintiff to answer for rents, damages
and costs, and, if the judgment of the
court requires it, he should likewise
deposit the amount of the rent before the
appellate court from the time during the
pendency of the appeal.
Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial
and imperative. (Jurisprudence)
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably
filed his Notice of Appeal; he however
failed to file any supersedeas bond.
5. CGR Corp. vs. Treyes, 522
SCRA 765
CGR Corp., et.al., claimed to have
occupied more than 37 ha. of public land
in Negros Occidental.
They alleged that Respondent Treyes
forcibly and unlawfully entered the lease
premises ,wherein the latter harvested
several milkfish, fingerlings, etc. owned
Judge Rabaca denied the motion on the ground that a notice of appeal has been
seasonably filed.
Judge Rabaca allegedly advised the counsel for the plaintiff to file an MR. BUT he
denied the MR subsequently. The BCC (branch clerk of court?) was then ordered to
transmit the records to the RTC.
Complainants filed an administrative complaint against Judge Rabaca (alleging
refusal to perform an act mandated by the Rules of Court had given undue
advantage to the defendant to the plaintiff’s damage and prejudice).
Judge Rabaca filed comment (explaining that he honestly thought that his court had
lost jurisdiction over the case pursuant to the provision of Section 9, Rule 41 w/c
provides that the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the
appeals filed in due time xxx, that he had issued the orders in good faith and with no
malice.).
Complainants filed a reply (contending that Judge exhibited his ignorance of the law
and grossly neglected his duties. The complainants pointed out that respondent
Judge apparently did not know that appeal in forcible entry and detainer cases was
not perfected by the mere filing of a notice of appeal (as in ordinary actions) but by
filing of a notice of appeal and a sufficient supersedeas bond approved by the trial
judge executed to the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages and costs accruing down to
the time of the judgment appealed from.).
OCA Presbi Velasco recommended that the administrative complaint against
respondent Judge be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and that
respondent Judge be fined in the amount of P5,000.00 with warning that a repetition
of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely, based on an
evaluation of the charges.
Whether respondent Judge is guilty of ignorance of the law when he denied YMCA’s
motion for the immediate execution of judgement (pending appeal) in an ejectment
case (based on the ground that notice of appeal has been perfected by the
defendant, even though the latter did not file any supersedeas bond ?
YES.
It is clear from the Rules of Court (Rule 70, Sec. 19) that the perfection of an appeal
by itself is not sufficient to stay the execution of the judgment in an ejectment case.
The losing party should likewise file a supersedeas bond executed in favor of the
plaintiff to answer for rents, damages and costs, and, if the judgment of the court
requires it, he should likewise deposit the amount of the rent before the appellate
court from the time during the pendency of the appeal.
Otherwise, execution becomes ministerial and imperative. (Jurisprudence)
In the case at bar, defendant seasonably filed his Notice of Appeal; he however
failed to file any supersedeas bond.
Prior to the filing of such notice of appeal, complainants have already filed their
Motion for Execution. Instead of acting on the Motion for Execution, respondent
Judge Rabaca gave due course to the appeal and directed his Branch Clerk of
Court to elevate the records of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
Branch Clerk of Court however failed to forward the records to the RTC.
From the foregoing, it is clear that when the complainant moved for the immediate
execution of Judge Rabaca’s decision, the latter still had jurisdiction over the case.
He therefore clearly erred when he refused to act on the Motion for Execution.
It is basic rule in ejectment cases that the execution of judgment in favor of the
plaintiff is a matter of right and mandatory.
Doctrine: Litis pendentia in UD and FE is NOT a ground for Motion to Dismiss.
In UD and FE damages is NOT allowed. The only kind of damages acceptable in
UD and FE = Unpaid Rentals and Attorney’s Fees only. (no damages for actual,
moral, etc.)
Hence, filing of separate action for damages (Actual, Moral, Etc.) is VALID.
Brief facts: CGR has a fishpond w/c was entered forcibly by Treynes, wherein the
latter harvested fingerlings, etc. CGR immediately filed forcible entry case. After
several days, CGR also filed an action for damages against Treynes. Treynes filed
Motion to Dismiss on the ground of litis pendentia.
by CGR.
CGR filed w/ MTC separate complaints
for Forcible Entry w/ TRO and Preliminary
Injunction and Damages against Treyes.
CGR then filed w/ RTC Bacolod a
complaint for Damages against Treyes.
Treyes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
grounds of Litis Pendentia, Res Judicata
and Forum Shopping.
RTC granted such MD. CGR filed R45
before SC.
W/N a complainant in a forcible entry
case can file an independent action for
damages.
 YES.
The recoverable damages in forcible
entry and unlawful detainer cases refer to
“rents” or the “reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the
premises” or the “fair rental value of the
property” and “attorney’s fees and cost”.
Thus, other damages must be claimed in
an ordinary action.
Litis pendentia or Forum Shopping is not
present in this case because the two
pending actions are not identical with one
another in terms of rights asserted and
the relief prayed for and such that the
success of one case does not amount to
res judicata of the other.
Res Judicata is not also applicable
because the court in forcible entry case
has NO JURISDICTION over claims for
damages (other than the use and
occupation of the premises and attorney’s
fees).
6. Zacarias vs. Anacay, 736 SCRA
508, 9/24/14
Zacarias filed an Unlawful Detainer case
against Anacay.
CGR Corp. vs. Treyes, 522 SCRA 765
CGR Corporation, Herman M. Benedicto and Alberto R. Benedicto (petitioners)
claimed to have occupied 37.3033 hectares of public land in Barangay Bulanon,
Sagay City, Negros Occidental.
Ernesto L. Treyes, Jr. (respondent) allegedly forcibly and unlawfully entered the
leased properties and once inside barricaded the entrance to the fishponds, set up a
barbed wire fence along the road going to petitioners’ fishponds, and harvested
several tons of milkfish, fry and fingerlings owned by the CGR.
CGR promptly filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) in Sagay City separate
complaints for Forcible Entry With Temporary Restraining Order And/Or Preliminary
Injunction And Damages against Treyes.
CGR then filed with the Bacolod RTC a complaint for damages against Treyes.
Treyes filed an MD on three grounds – litis pendentia, res judicata and forum
shopping. The RTC granted MD and dismissed action. CGR filed a Rule 45 before
the SC.
Whether a complainant in a forcible entry case can file an independent action for
damages arising after the act of dispossession had occurred –
Yes, Section 17, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 17. Judgment. – If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint
are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the
premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs.
If it finds that said allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the
defendant to recover his costs.
If a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in
arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires. (Emphasis supplied).
The recoverable damages in forcible entry and detainer cases thus refer to "rents"
or "the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises" or
"fair rental value of the property" and attorney’s fees and cost.
The 2006 case of Dumo v. Espinas reiterates the long-established rule that the only
form of damages that may be recovered in an action for forcible entry is the fair
rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the
property [there is no basis for the MTC to award actual, moral, and exemplary
damages in view of the settled rule that in ejectment cases, the only damage that
can be recovered is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use
and occupation of the property].
Other damages must thus be claimed in an ordinary action.
Surely, one of the elements of litis pendentia - that the identity between the pending
actions, with respect to the parties, rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, is such
that any judgment rendered on one action will, regardless of which is successful,
amount to res judicata in the action under consideration - is not present, hence, it
may not be invoked to dismiss petitioners’ complaint for damages.
Res judicata may not apply because the court in a forcible entry case has no
jurisdiction over claims for damages other than the use and occupation of the
premises and attorney’s fees.
Neither may forum-shopping justify a dismissal of the complaint for damages, the
elements of litis pendentia not being present, or where a final judgment in the
forcible entry case will not amount to res judicata in the former.
Petitioners’ filing of an independent action for damages other than those sustained
as a result of their dispossession or those caused by the loss of their use and
occupation of their properties could not thus be considered as splitting of a cause of
action.
Doctrine: For Tolerance to be a valid ground for UD, it must be co-existent w/
possession. The act of tolerating must be together w/ the time of possession. If
Tolerance is thereafter, the Expiration of Tolerance as a ground for UD will NOT
apply.

MTC dismissed the complaint (held: it
failed to state the essential elements of
an action for UD)
RTC reversed MTC (Held: suit is one for
UD – because the respondents unlawfully
withheld the property from petitioner after
she allowed them to stay there for 1
year).
Because of Respondent’s failure to file
Notice of Appeal w/in the reglementary
period, the RTC decision became final
and executory.
Petitioner filed a motion for issuance of a
Writ of Execution.
During the hearing, Respondent informed
the court that it had filed a petition for
Certiorari w/ prayer of injunction before
CA.
CA ruled in favor of the Respondent.
(Held: Petitioner availed of wrong
remedy, nevertheless, she may still file
an accion publiciana or reivindicatoria w/
proper RTC).
W/N the case involved is that of Unlawful
Detainer or Forcible Entry and Whether
the same is properly dismissed by MTC?
 The case involve is Forcible
Entry and not an Unlawful
Detainer and considering such,
it is properly dismissed before
MTC.
This is not a case of unlawful detainer (as
alleged by the Petitioner) because the
possession of the Respondent is not
legal from the start as it is without
knowledge and consent of Zacharias.
When the entry is illegal from the very
start, the action that must be filed against
the intruder is forcible entry.
To justify an action for unlawful detainer,
it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present
right from the start of the possession (w/c
is not the factual circumstance here,
because at the very start of possession of
the Respondent Anacay, Zacarias did
not consented on the same) .
Since the complaint did not satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause
for unlawful detainer, MTC had no
jurisdiction over the case. [Also, the
action of forcible entry has already
expired – should be filed with one year
from the discovery of the alleged FISTS
entry]
XPN to this Doctrine: Relationship (Sanguinial or By Affinity, w/ the previous owner,
supposed the new owner is the heir of the original owner). (eg. His father is the
original owner. After the death of his father, the heir can file Unlawful Detainer).
(Note: Although he has inchoate right while his father is alive, the right of the father
over the property is passed on to the heir, hence the heir may invoke expiration of
tolerance to support UD case. (NOTE: This exception is not applicable if the
property was sold to 3rd parties, since the right of the father cannot be transferred to
3rd person buyer).
Zacarias vs. Anacay, 736 SCRA 508, 9/24/14
Zacarias filed a complaint for ejectment with damages/Unlawful Detainer against
Anacay (occupants of a land with an area of 769 square meters situated in Silang
Cavite and covered by Tax Dec in the name of Zacarias).
The MTC dismissed the complaint
- (and held that the allegations of the complaint failed to state the
essential elements of an action for unlawful detainer).
RTC reversed the decision of the MTC
- (RTC held that the suit is one for unlawful detainer because the
respondents unlawfully withheld the property from petitioner after she
allowed them to stay there for one year).
With the failure of respondents to file a notice of appeal within the reglementary
period, the above decision became final and executory.
Petitioner then filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution. During the hearing,
Anacay informed that court that it had filed a petition for certiorari with prayer of
injunction before the CA.
The CA ruled in favor of Anacay
- (held that while petitioner has shown that she is the lawful possessor
of the subject property, she availed of the wrong remedy to recover
possession but nevertheless may still file an accion publicianaor
accion reivindicatoria with the proper RTC.).
Hence this instant petition.
Whether or not the action is Unlawful Detainer or Forcible Entry
– Unlawful Detainer.
What determines the nature of the action, as well as the court which has jurisdiction
over the case, are the allegations in the complaint.
In forcible entry, the plaintiff is deprived of physical possession of his land or
building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth.
In illegal detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after the expiration
or termination of his right thereto under any contract, express or implied.
- Requisites - a complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract
with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff
to defendant of the termination of the latter’s right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the
property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment.
In Zacarias complaint, it was stated that: xxxx
- Plaintiff was in lawful possession and control over the subject
property. However, sometime in May, 2007, she discovered that the
defendants have entered the subject property and occupied the same.
Consequently, Plaintiff demanded that they leave the premises. The
defendants requested for time to leave and she acceded to said
request (kala ni RTC na-convert na sa UD dahil sa agreement na to).
The defendants committed to vacate the subject property by the end
of May, 2008 but still refused to vacate xxx.
- The possession could not have been legal from the start as it was
without the knowledge or consent ni Zacarias.
 To justify an action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed
acts of tolerance must have been present right from the start of the possession
which is later sought to be recovered (mula umpisa, tinotolerate mo na ang
possession ng respondent w/c is not present in this case).

The one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary nature of the
action (mabilisan sa UD and FE).

If the entry is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is
forcible entry. If, however, the entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes
illegal, the case is unlawful detainer. Admittedly, no express contract existed
between the parties.

W/N MTC has jurisdiction over the case?

 No, Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a
valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the case. [Also, the action of forcible entry has already
expired – should be filed with one year from the discovery of the alleged
FISTS entry]

W/N CA gravely erred in nullifying a final and executory judgment of the RTC?
 [No, dahil walang judgment to speak of dahil void ito for lack of jurisdiction
(can be raised at any state of the proceedings even on appeal), kaya wala
ring naging final and executory judgment]
 It is well-settled that a court's jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal.
- The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it affects
the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render
judgment on the action.
- Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All
acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no
legal effect. Hence, it can never become final and any writ of
execution based on it is void.

7. Supapo vs. De Jesus, 756 Supapo vs. De Jesus, 756 SCRA 211, 4/20/15 Spouses Supapo filed a complaint
SCRA 211, 4/20/15 for accion publiciana against Spouses de Jesus et al with the MTC. The complaint
sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches,
Quezon City which is registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo’s names. The
land has an assessed value of thirtynine thousand nine hundred eighty pesos
(P39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax declaration).
The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an
overseer but they made sure to visit at least twice a year. During one of their visits in
1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject lot. The houses were built
without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de
Jesus occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one. The Spouses
Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot
by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon
issued a Katibayan Upang Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action) for
failure of the parties to settle amicably. The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal
case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the
Anti-Squatting Law. The trial court convicted the respondents. The respondents
appealed their conviction to the CA. While the appeal was pending, Congress
enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing
Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the dismissal of the criminal case.
The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for accion publiciana. The MeTC
ruled in favor of Spouses Supapo. Because of this, the respondents filed a petition
for certiorari with the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor the respondents. Dissatisfied with
the RTC ruling, the Spouses Supapo appealed to the CA. The CA dismissed the
appeal hence this petition.

Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction – Yes, Since the assessed value of
the subject lot located in Metro Manila is P39,980.00 (proven by tax declaration w/c
is not disputed by the respondents) then the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana. Accion publiciana is an ordinary
civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independent of
title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the
accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty. The objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession
only, not ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon the issue to determine who between the parties has the right
to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue of
 ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the
issue of ownership is inseparably linked to the issue of possession. The
adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is
not conclusive on the issue of ownership.

Pursuant to (the amendment of) Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction over actions
involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed
value. The assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the
assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value. [JOV: hindi lahat ng cases of
recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts (dati-
OO), ngaun: dependa na sa assessed value [if 20k (outside MM)/50k (within MM) or
below = MTC, if above 20k (outside MM)/50k (within MM) = RTC]].

Whether the cause of action has prescribed – No, lands covered by a title cannot be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. The Spouses Supapo (as holders
of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under the Torrens system. Section 47.
Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation
of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title
over a land is also entitled to the possession thereof. The right to possess and
occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership. Corollary to
this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. Again, this right is imprescriptible. By respecting the
imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo’s TCT, this Court merely
recognizes the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate
transactions and integrity of land registration.

Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata – No Res
judicata embraces two concepts: (1) bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule
39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) conclusiveness of
judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c) The requisites for res judicata under the concept
of bar by prior judgment are: (1) The former judgment or order must be final; (2) It
must be a judgment on the merits; (3) It must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) There must be between
the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
[JOV: present ung items 1 to 3, pero absent ung item 4]. While requisites one to
three may be present, it is obvious that the there is no identity of subject matter,
parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-
Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject property. First,
there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the
Spouses Supapo, was prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The
accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by and in the name of the Spouses
Supapo. Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves
the prosecution of a crime under the Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana
is an action to recover possession of the subject property. And third, there is no
identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to
protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated
the statute. The Spouses Supapo filed the accion publiciana to protect their
proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its possession. Wala ring
conclusiveness of judgment - The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not
require that there is identity of causes of action provided that there is identity of
issue and identity of parties. There is no identity of parties and there is no identity of
issues (Criminal case: W/N the respondents committed the crime VS. Civil case:
W/N the Spouses Supapo have a better right of possession than the respondents).
8. De Guzman-Fuerte vs. Estomo, FATIMA O. DE GUZMAN-FUERTE v. SPS. SILVINO S.ESTOMO AND
862 SCRA (2018) CONCEPCION C. ESTOMO, GR No. 223399, 2018-04-23

Facts:

Complaint[4] for unlawful detainer dated August 10, 2009 filed by Fuerte against
respondents spouses Silvino S. Estomo (Silvino) and Concepcion C. Estomo
(Concepcion) (Spouses Estomo). The subject property is situated at Block 3, Lot 2,
Birmingham Homes, Dalig City 1, Antipolo City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. R-55253.

Fuerte alleged that Manuela Co (Co) executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
over the subject property in her favor. Upon Co's failure to pay the loan, Fuerte
caused the foreclosure proceedings and eventually obtained ownership of the
property. However, the writ of possession was returned unsatisfied since Co was no
longer residing at the property and that the Spouses Estomo and their family
occupied the same. It was only after the said return that Fuerte discovered and
verified that the Spouses Estomo were in possession of the property. In a letter[5]
dated December 1, 2008, she demanded them to vacate and surrender posession
of the subject property and pay the corresponding compensation. The Spouses
Estomo refused to heed to her demands.

Spouses Estomo denied that they illegally occupied the subject property. They also
denied the existence of the December 1, 2008 letter.

acquired the property from the Homeowners Development Corporation on February

15, 1999 through a Contract to Sell, registered it under their names, covered by
TCT No. 407613, and had been their family home since 2000.

Sometime in 2006, Concepcion sought the services of Co, a real estate broker, to
assist her in securing a loan. Co obtained the certificate of title to be shown to
potential creditors, however, she never returned it. The TCT was cancelled by an
alleged Absolute Sale of Real Property executed on June 22,2006, when Silvino
was out of the country as a seaman, and then TCT No. R-39632 was issued under
Co's name. On July 13, 2006, Co mortgaged the subject property in the amount of
P800,000.00. Consequently, the Spouses Estomo filed an annulment case against
Co and Fuerte on January 30, 2007.

the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Antipolo City, Branch 1 dismissed the
complaint without prejudice finding that Fuerte failed to attach in the complaint a
copy of the demand letter and establish that the same was duly received by the
spouses

On appeal... t held that Fuerte established the existence of the December 1, 2008
demand letter, which was sent through registered mail under Registry Receipt No.
5209 of the Antipolo City Post Office... t... hrough registered mail is a substantial
compliance with the modes of service under Section 2,[8] Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court... the CA reversed and set aside the ruling of the RTC... the complaint in
ejectment cases should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly
within the class of cases for which Section 1,[10] Rule 70 of the Rules of Court
provides a summary remedy, and must show enough on its face to give the court
jurisdiction without resort to parole evidence.

complaint failed to describe that the possession by the Spouses Estomo was initially
legal or tolerated and became illegal upon termination of lawful possession.

Issues:

he only issue to be determined is who between the contending parties has better
possession of the contested property

Ruling:

A requisite for a valid cause of action of unlawful detainer is that the possession was
originally lawful, but turned unlawful only upon the expiration of the right to possess.
To show that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful possession
must then be established.[19] Paragraphs 2 and 3 make it clear that Spouses
Estomo's occupancy was illegal and without Fuerte's consent. Likewise, the
Complaint did not contain an allegation that Fuerte or her predecessor-in-interest
tolerated the spouses' possession on account of an express or implied contract
between them. Neither was there any averment which shows any overt act on
Fuerte's part indicatiye of her permission to occupy the land.

Acts of tolerance must be proved showing the overt acts indicative of his or his
predecessor's tolerance or permission for them to occupy the disputed property.[20]
There should be any supporting evidence on record that would show when the
respondents entered the properties or who had granted them to enter the same and
how the entry was effected.[21] Without these allegations and evidence, the bare
claim regarding "tolerance" cannot be upheld... this Court finds that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Since the complaint fell short
of the jurisdictional facts to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of
respondent, the MTCC failed to acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of Fuerte's
complaint and the CA correctly dismissed the unlawful detainer case against the
Spouses Estomo.

It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred

only by law and it is "not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves
determine or conveniently set aside." Neither would the active participation of the
parties nor estoppel operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the
court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case

Without a doubt, the registered owner of real property is entitled to its possession.
However, the registered owner cannot simply wrest possession thereof from
whoever is in actual occupation of the property. To recover possession, he must
resort to the proper remedy, and once he chooses what action to file, he is required
to satisfy the conditions necessary for such action to prosper.[30] In this case,
Fuerte chose the remedy of unlawful detainer to eject the Spouses Estomo, but,
 failed to sufficiently allege the facts which are necessary to vest jurisdiction to
MTCC over an unlawful detainer case. In fine, the CA did not commit reversible
error in dismissing Fuerte's complaint for unlawful detainer

WHEREFORE, the instant petition filed by petitioner Fatima 0. De Guzman-Fuerte

assailing the Decision dated October 6, 2015 and Resolution dated February 16,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 138513 is hereby DENIED.

Principles:

jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by
the allegations in the complaint which comprise a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.

The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones
to be consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also
remains vested irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon
all or some of the claims asserted therein

Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who
illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold
possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession of the
defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess.

(a) Initially, the possession of the property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff;(b) Eventually, such possession became illegal upon
notice by the plaintiff to the defendant about the termination of the latter's right of
possession;(c) Thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property
and deprived the plaintiff of its enjoyment; and(d) Within one year from the making
of the last demand to vacate the property on the defendant, the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment.

What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action
(accion publiciana) and from a reivindicatory action (accion reivindicatoria) is that
the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits
(accion interdictal), together with forcible entry, are the two forms of ejectment suit
that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary
action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of
possession and accion reivindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also
includes recovery of possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially
recover possession.

9. Iglesia de Jesuristo Jerusalem FIRST DIVISION

Nueva of Manila, Phil. Inc. vs.
De La Cruz, 862 SCRA (2018) [ G.R. No. 208284, April 23, 2018 ]

THE IGLESIA DE JESUCRISTO JERUSALEM NUEVA OF MANILA, PHILIPPINES,

INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, FRANCISCO GALVEZ, PETITIONER,
V. LOIDA DELA CRUZ USING THE NAME CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW
JERUSALEM" AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari [1]are the January 22, 2013
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its July 17, 2013 Resolution[3] in CA-
G.R. SP No. 118132, both of which affirmed the January 19, 2011 Decision[4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon City, Branch 74 in Appealed Case No. A9-
001-MN. The RTC Decision upheld the November 7, 2008 Decision[5] of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Malabon City, Branch 56, in Civil Case No. JL00-
891.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner's version

On March 26, 2007, the Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila,

Philippines, Inc. (petitioner), represented by Francisco Galvez (Galvez), filed before
the MeTC of Malabon City a Complaint[6] for unlawful detainer with damages
(Complaint) against respondent Loida Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), using the name
CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM" and all persons claiming rights
under her (collectively, respondents). Docketed as Civil Case No. JL00-891, said
Complaint contained the following allegations:

I. [Petitioner] is a [r]eligious [c]orporation x x x with office address at #29 Interior

Leono St., Tanong, Malabon City represented by its president, [Galvez]. x x x

2. [Dela Cruz] is of legal age, Filipino[,] with office address at #27 Leono St.,
Tanong, Malabon City. x x x

3. [Petitioner] is the owner of certain parcels of land consisting of an area of TWO

HUNDRED FOUR (204) SQUARE METERS and SEVENTY[-]ONE (71) SQUARE
METERS [both] covered by Original Certificate of Title [(OCT)] No. 35266 and [the
corresponding] Tax Declaration [(TD)] [No.] 06223 [(subject lot)]. xxx

4. [Galvez], x x x is the nephew of Rosendo Gatchalian (Rosendo), the founder and

the leader of [petitioner] way back [in] 1940 who organized the said religious
corporation and built a chapel within the [subject lot];

5. Since 1940, Miguela Gatchalian [Miguela], the late mother of [Galvez] and her
family used to occupy [and] possess and [likewise] built a house of their own in the
concept of an owner [with] uninterrupted, peaceful[,] and physical possession [on a]
certain portion of the [subject lot] as they were relatives and [long-time] member[s]
of [petitioner] and were allowed by the founder [Rosendo] to occupy the same;

6. During the lifetime of x x x [Rosendo], the chapel [inside the subject lot] was used
exclusively by the members of [petitioner] for worship x x x every Sunday;

7. [Dela Cruz] used to be a member of the [petitioner] x x x. However, when

[Rosendo] died, x x x the members [became] disorganized x x x. Since then,
members who x x x come and visit the chapel were allowed to enter the chapel and
conduct their meetings and worship therein;

8. Surprisingly[,] sometime [in] 1998, without the knowledge and consent of all [the]
members and officers of [petitioner], [Dela Cruz] xxx formed, organized[,] and
created the name of CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST, "NEW JERUSALEM";

9. The organization formed by [Dela Cruz] was used by her as an instrument in

claiming that she is the representative of the said religious organization and had the
right over the [subject lot]. x x x

10. The occupation and possession of [Dela Cruz] over the [subject lot] of
[petitioner] was merely tolerated because they were former members of [petitioner]
xxx

11. On 12 February 2007, a demand was sent to [respondents] to vacate and

surrender the peaceful possession of the chapel and to stop using the [subject lot]
of [petitioner] but the [respondents] failed and refused xxx to vacate the same x x x.
The demand letter was personally served[,] but [Dela Cruz] refused to sign [the
same]. x x x ;

xxxx

13. [Thus, petitioner] was constrained to institute the instant suit

x x x x[7]

In the Position Paper it filed with the MeTC,[8] petitioner referred to its pieces of
evidence, viz. Secretary's Certificate dated March 27, 2007 signed by Lourdes Co
(Co) and Atty. Gerardo Cruz, OCT No. (8257) M-35266, TD No. 06223, Decision in
Appealed Case No. 1064-MN dated January 17, 2000 issued by RTC-Branch 169,
demand letter dated February 12, 2007 and the corresponding affidavit of Co, its
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Certificate of Incorporation dated
August 4, 1999 with Articles of Incorporation (AOI), Order in Civil Case No, 1853-98
issued by the MeTC-Branch 55, and Temporary Receipt issued by the MeTC-
Branch 55 in Civil Case No. 1853-98.
 Respondents' version

In her Answer,[9] Dela Cruz countered with the following averments:

1. x x x She is an Officer of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni

Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.[10] [Her] authority to represent said religious
organization before [the MeTC] is embodied in a board resolution and outlined in the
Secretary's Certificate hereto attached x x x;

2. On April 25, 2007[,] [she,] through a member of their church[,] received a copy of
the Complaint and the Summons from [the MeTC] directing [her] to file her Answer x
x x;

3. [She] denies the allegation in paragraph 1 of the Complaint for lack of knowledge
to form a reasonable belief as to the truth thereof. As per inquiry on-line with the
[SEC,] no such corporation or entity exist[s] as [such]. xxx

4. Paragraph 2 of the Complaint is likewise denied by [her] insofar as the allegation

that No. 27 Leono St. x x x is being used by her as her office. In truth[,] the said
place is the site of the church of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia
ni Jesu Kristo '"Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.;

5. [She] denies the allegation in paragraph 3 of the [C]omplaint for being false and
misleading. [Galvez deviously acquired] a new [title] by declaring the previous one
as struck by flood x x x. [OCT] No. 8257 (owner's copy) was never lost [as such and]
is still in [the] possession of the Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia
ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. xxx;

6. x x x [T]he TDs of the [subject lot] x x x already bore the name of ["]New
Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ" as owner thereof, xxx;

7. In [TD] No. B-001-04457[,] [Galvez] declared the improvement (house) in his

name x x x. However, the same document on the dorsal portion [thereof showed
that the] improvement was described as situated "x x x on the land of New
Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ". x x x;

8. [She claims that in] 1914, the [c]hurch was founded [and had] its principal office
at 797 Dagupan Ext., Solis, Tondo, Manila. The bishop then was Rev. Ildefonso
Agulo. The church was known then, as it was now, as the following:

"Church of Jesus Christ New Jerusalem" (English)

"Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo Bagong Jerusalem" (Tagalog)

"Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva" (Spanish)

These three (3) nomenclatures were registered at the Department of Instruction,

National Library, Manila[,] Philippines.

It can be gleaned from the [OCT] No. 8257 x x x that the owner-organization was
incorporated xxx only after September 3, 1955 when it was registered as a
corporation sole before the [SEC]. In [its AOI] it was mentioned that Felicisima
Pineda (Pineda) is the Bishop Representative and General Pastor of the church
known to the public as[:]

"Church of Jesus Christ New Jerusalem" (English)

"Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo Bagong Jerusalem" (Tagalog)

"Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva" (Spanish)

... And that it desires to become [a] corporation sole under the name and style:
Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong
Jerusalem" Inc.

Further, it was also stated that said entity shall administer and manage the
temporalities of the estates and properties of the church, ["]Church of Jesus Christ
New Jerusalem", "Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo Bagong Jerusalem", "Iglesia De Jesucristo
Jerusalem Nueva" within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. xxx;

This is the reason why the TDs mentioned earlier x x x [bore] the name of Pineda as
Administrator of the subject property;

9. Paragraph 5 of the Complaint is likewise denied. The church, in Tanong[,]

Malabon was named "Templo Angeles" after one of the bishops[,] Rev. Pedro
Angeles[,] who died x x x on March 30, 1930. [Miguela] built a shanty upon
tolerance by [Pineda] upon the prodding of one of its member[s] Feliza Bravo;

10. [Galvez] or any of his relative[s] was not and never became a member of the
church. xxx;

11. That [Dela Cruz] remain[ed] an active member of the Obispo Representante at
Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.

12. [She] denies the allegations in paragraph 9 of the Complaint insofar as she
allegedly formed the organization as an instrument to claim the [subject lot].
However, she admits filing an ejectment case and the consequent dismissal thereof
on appeal. The reason for the dismissal being that [said] ejectment case has
become "moot and academic" by [therein defendants', including Galvez's, act of]
voluntarily vacating the [subject lot]. Said act of [Galvez] is an indication that he
does not have any right over the [subject lot]. In fact[,] during the proceedings
before the Lupon Tagapamayapa[,] [Galvez] offered to leave the [subject Jot]
provided [that] he would be paid a reasonable sum for the house built thereon. x x x

13. Paragraph 10 is likewise denied because respondents have in [act the right over
the [subject lot] being the ADMINISTRATOR thereof;

14. x x x There was [neither a] demand that came to her attention [nor] was there an
occasion that she refuse[d] to sign [the same]. x x x This is fatal to the cause of
[petitioner or Galvez] and warrants the outright dismissal of the [C]omplaint;

15. [Galvez] x x x was using the church premises to gain profit by offering for lease
the portion occupied by his house to other persons. [Dela Cruz] with the consent of
the church filed a complaint on February 20, 2007 before the Office of the Mayor [of]
Malabon City. x x x This is the very reason why [Galvez] filed this case to harass
and intimidate [her] and the church she represents;

16. Prior to the filing of [said] ejectment case [by respondents] against [Galvez,] the
latter has been offering for lease the said portion of the [subject lot] and collecting
rent [thereon] without the consent of [respondents]. After the decision [in the said
ejectment] case on appeal[,] [Galvez] again surreptitiously entered the premises of
the [subject lot] and offered the same for lease anew. x x x[11]

Respondent Dela Cruz thus prayed that the Complaint be dismissed; that the
petitioner's claims for damages and attorney's fees be denied and that judgment be
rendered ordering petitioner, represented by Galvez, to vacate the premises and to
remove the structures that petitioner thereon erected, and that petitioner be also
directed to pay her (respondent Dela Cruz) attorney's fees, monthly rent with legal
interest from the time of occupation up to the present, plus exemplary damages.

In the Position Paper that she filed with the MeTC,[12] respondent referred to her
pieces of evidence, viz.: Secretary's Certificate dated April 30, 2007 signed by Josie
Sengco and notarized by Atty. Mamaril, a copy of OCT No. 8257,[13] TD No. 16094,
TD No. B-001-04457, a copy of SEC Certificate of Registration dated September 3,
1955 with AOI, Minutes of Lupon Proceedings dated June 4, 1998, Complaint filed
on February 20, 2007 with the Office of the Malabon City Mayor, and Certification
from the then Punong Barangay dated February 2, 1999. What is more, Dela Cruz
therein emphasized that the reconstituted title granted to Galvez was irregular and
invalid because the alleged corporation represented by Galvez was not yet existing
when the reconstituted title was issued; and that Galvez moreover did not have any
authority to institute the instant proceedings in behalf of fee existing corporation, the
Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong
Jerusalem" Inc.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court

In its Decision dated November 7, 2008,[14] the MeTC dismissed petitioner's

Complaint for lack of evidence.[15] The MeTC held that petitioner had failed to
establish by preponderant evidence that it had a better right of possession over the
disputed property arising from its claim of ownership.

The MeTC found that petitioner was organized as a religious corporation only on
June 15, 1999, and was registered only on August 4, 1999, per its SEC Certificate
of Incorporation; that petitioner did not own any real property per the List of
Properties that it submitted to the SEC; that petitioner, which was organized only in
1990, made the claim that it lost the owner's copy of OCT No. 8257, which explains
why it prayed for the issuance of a new owner's copy; that TD No. B-001-06214
covering the disputed property as shown in OCT No. 8257 in the name of New
Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ c/o Pineda of No. 171 Solis St., Tondo,
Manila was cancelled by way of correction of name by TD No. B-001-06223 in the
name of petitioner, with Galvez as administrator; that Galvez's house was indicated
as an improvement in said TD No. B-001-06214; and that TD No. B-001-04457
beginning the year 1994 in Galvez's name indicated that his house is on the
property of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ with OCT No. 8257. The
MeTC also found that TD No. B-001-06223 in the name of petitioner and Galvez as
administrator which referred to the disputed property as covered by said OCT No.
(8257) M-35266 is a corrected one, as regards the owner's name; and that said TD
No. B-001-06223 cancelled TD No. B-001-06214 in the name of New Jerusalem,
New Church of Jesus Christ c/o Pineda.

Upon the other hand, the MeTC found that Dela Cruz had successfully proven that
she was the authorized representative of the Obispo Representante at Pastor
General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.; and that this corporation
sole is the owner of the disputed property as shown by OCT No. (8257) M-35266
and TD No. B-001-06214 in the name of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus
Christ beginning the year 1993.

The MeTC stressed that Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu
Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. was registered with the SEC as a corporation sole
on September 3, 1955; that this denomination is also known as "Church of Jesus
Christ, New Jerusalem." "Iglesia ni Jesu-Kristo, Bagong. Jerusalem," and "Iglesia de
Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva" per its AOI; that this denomination was established
way back in 1914 under a succession of bishops until its incorporation as a
corporation sole in 1955. The MeTC further found that the Obispo Representante at
Pastor General ng Iglesia ni Jesu Kristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. is in actual
possession of the original owner's copy of OCT No. 8257 that was issued in 1940
when the religious denomination was not yet a corporation.

On November 26, 2008, petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal to the RTC,[16] which
was given due course by the MeTC on November 28, 2008.[17]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On January 19, 2011, the RTC rendered its Decision[18] upholding the MeTC
Decision.[19] The RTC held that the disputed property which is covered by OCT No.
(8257) M-35266 is registered in the name of "The Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem
Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc."; and that the only issue to be resolved is who as
between the parties is authorized to represent the registered owner of the disputed
property.

The RTC pointed out that although petitioner claimed that the religious corporation it
represented was organized in 1940, the same was allegedly registered only in 1999,
as compared to the earlier registration in 1955 of the religious corporation
represented by Dela Cruz, and which entity has the words "Bagong Jerusalem" in
its name, besides bearing the translated names "New Jerusalem" in English and
"Jerusalem Nueva" in Spanish.

The RTC noted that the disputed property was declared in TD No. 06214 dated
January 23, 1967 under the name of "New Jerusalem, New [Christ] of Jesus Christ"
with Pineda as administrator, and that Galvez's house was declared therein only as
part of the improvements; that Galvez's house was shown in TD No. B-001-6214
dated October 29, 1993 and in TD No. B-001-6214 dated January 11, 2007, as
situated on the land of New Jerusalem, New Church of Jesus Christ; and that it was
only on January 30, 2007 that the disputed property was declared in the name of
"The Iglesia De Jesucristo Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc." under TD
No. B-001-06223 with Galvez as administrator; however, this contained a notation
at the back page stating that it was a correction of the owner's name.

Based on the foregoing findings, the RTC concluded that "The Iglesia De Jesucristo
Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc." appearing as registered owner of the
disputed property, and that respondent, with the registered name of Bagong
Jerusalem, also known as New Jerusalem in its English translation, are one and the
same, and that Dela Cruz was properly authorized to represent the same as
evidenced by a Secretary's Certificate; that respondent's pieces of evidence are
more preponderant as these are consistent hence, more credible. It further ruled
that petitioner's alleged possession of the original owner's duplicate of OCT No.
(8257) M-35266 was to no avail, because it has been adequately explained that
petitioner merely filed a petition for the issuance of the duplicate owner's copy
alleging loss of the original title, but it utterly failed to establish its legal right over the
disputed property.

Petitioner thereafter filed a Petition for Review with the CA.[20]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision[21] dated January 22, 2013, the CA denied the Petition for Review,
viz.:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 19, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, Malabon City, which affirmed the Decision dated
November 7, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Malabon City, Branch 56 is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[22]

The CA rejected petitioner's claim that it was the true owner of the disputed
property, based on OCT No. (8257) M-35266 and TD No. 06223. It found no merit in
petitioner's contention that he had a better right than respondent over the disputed
property, upon the ground that the latter had allegedly failed to present the originals
of the documents attached to the Answer and merely submitted unreadable
photocopies thereof. The CA pointed out that while Dela Cruz failed to present the
duplicate original copy of the title which was allegedly still in the possession of the
Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong
Jerusalem" Inc., the fact nonetheless remained that the title in petitioner's
possession was issued only after a petition for the issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy was granted by Branch 170 of the RTC in LRC Case No. 958-MN.

The CA likewise upheld the RTC's finding that the disputed property is clearly
registered in the name of "The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila,
Philippines" in 1940; that the only issue to be resolved in the case was who as
between Galvez and Dela Cruz was authorized to represent the registered owner of
the disputed property; that notwithstanding Dela Cruz's failure to produce the
original copy of the subject title, the MeTC's finding, i.e. that "The Iglesia de
Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines" appearing as the registered
owner of the disputed property and "Bagong Jerusalem", which is the registered
name of the religious corporation of Dela Cruz that is also known as "New
Jerusalem" in its English translation, are one and the same organization, was
properly based on the totality of evidence presented by the parties, taking into
consideration such facts as admissibility, credibility and plausibility, vis-a-vis the
respective legal theories of the contending parties; that petitioner's failure to explain
why the religious denomination was registered with the SEC only in 1999, even
though it alleged in its Complaint that it was organized way back in 1940, as
compared to the registration in 1955 of the Obispo Representante at Pastor General
ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. with Rev. Pineda as Bishop
Representative and General Pastor, can only mean that petitioner's evidence lacked
credence; and that in fine, Dela Cruz's pieces of evidence were more consistent,
more credible, and more trustworthy as compared to the pieces of evidence
adduced by petitioner, which were remarkable for their lack of consistency, as well
as their utter unreliability.

The CA also highlighted the fact that, notwithstanding petitioner's claim of a better
right over the disputed property, Galvez and the latter's sub-lessees had, in fact,
vacated the same.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration[23] of the CA's Decision, but this was denied by
the CA in its Resolution of July 17, 2013.[24]

Issues

Before this Court, petitioner instituted the present Petition[25] where it raised the
following issues:

[WHETHER] THE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL

DESPITE (1) CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER [;
AND] (2) FAILURE OF THE RESPONDENT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE ON THEIR
CLAM THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT RELIGIOUS CORPORATION IS
ONE [AND] THE SAME ORGANIZATION [.]

[WHETHER] THE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL

CONTRARY TO THE WELL[-]SETTLED RULE THAT A VALIDLY ISSUED
TORRENS CERTIFICATE OF TITLE CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF
COLLATERAL ATTACK[.]

[WHETHER] THE [CA] SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION THAT

[GALVEZ] (REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PETITIONER) [VOLUNTARILY]
VACATED THE [SUBJECT LOT] WHEN RESPONDENT FILED AN EJECTMENT
[CASE] X X X[26]

Petitioner's Arguments

In its Petition,[27] Reply,[28] and Memorandum,[29] petitioner argues that it is the true,
absolute, and registered owner of the disputed property which is covered by OCT
No. (8257) M-35266 and TD No. 06223; that its President, Galvez, is in possession
of the owner's duplicate copy of OCT (8257) M-35266; that being the registered
owner of the disputed property, it has the right to possess, enjoy, dispose of the
same, and to initiate the appropriate action to recover the same under Article 428 of
the Civil Code, as in the instant case; that it filed the action for unlawful detainer
against respondents in accordance with Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court; that respondents' right to the possession of the disputed property, was
through mere tolerance, and expired upon receipt of its demand for them to vacate
the same through a letter dated February 12, 2007; that the date of unlawful
deprivation is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate; that
respondents' continued possession of the disputed property has become unlawful,
warranting their ejectment therefrom; that Dela Cruz's failure to present the original
duplicate copy of the title which she alleged to be in respondents' possession,
negated such claim; that Dela Cruz's allegation that petitioner is the same as
Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong
Jerusalem" Inc. is false, because the latter's SEC Certificate of Incorporation clearly
showed that it was another entity; that it could not comprehend why the RTC
mentioned that the originals of the SEC Certificate of Incorporation and AOI of
Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong
Jerusalem" Inc. as well as the original copy of the title in respondents' possession
were presented before the MeTC, although these were not in fact presented before
the court; and that despite respondents' failure to present the original documents to
prove that the Church of Jesus Christ and the Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong
Jerusalem" Inc. were one and the same organization, the MeTC, RTC, and CA all
still erroneously found that they are one and the same organization.

Petitioner further contends that respondents can be prosecuted for perjury for
falsely claiming that the ejectment case was dismissed because Galvez in point of
fact voluntarily vacated the disputed property; that Dela Cruz even paid attorney's
fees to Galvez pursuant to said judgment; that while it may be true that some of the
defendants in the ejectment case vacated the disputed property, Galvez did not
vacate the disputed property, and in fact still resides there, hence, the CA's finding
that Galvez vacated the disputed property is contrary to the evidence; that petitioner
even filed a motion for execution with respect to the award of costs of suit in the
amount of P10,000.00 and Dela Cruz even paid that award, as evidenced by a
temporary receipt; and that what was merely stated in the MeTC Decision in the
ejectment case was that the demand letter by registered mail to Galvez was
returned to sender "with the notation that the addressee had moved already."

Petitioner moreover insists that as the instant case is only for unlawful detainer, it
follows that the only issue to be resolved pertains to who has a better right to the
possession of the disputed property, independent of any claim of ownership or
possession de jure; that in view of the existence of the validly issued title in its
name, there is no need to determine the issue of ownership at all; that it is settled
that a person who has a Torrens Title over the property is entitled to the possession
thereof; that it had complied with all the requirements for the institution of an
unlawful detainer case under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; that
the date of the filing of the Complaint on March 28, 2007 is within one year from the
date of the final demand letter dated February 12, 2007; that respondents
obstinately refused to surrender the possession of the disputed property, despite its
demand; that Galvez was in peaceful possession of the disputed property until Dela
Cruz filed the ejectment case, hence he was prompted to "fix" the documentation in
1999; and that he (Galvez) is now 94 years old, and has been residing at the
disputed property since birth, hence its late registration should not be adjudged
against him (Galvez).

Petitioner likewise argues that Del a Cruz's defense, which was upheld by the CA,
mat the petitioner and the Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni
JesuKristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. are one and the same organization, is a
collateral attack upon the title validly issued to it, which is proscribed by Section 48
of Presidential Decree No. 1529; that respondents did not resort to any legal action
to annul or cancel the title issued to it; and that it was error for the CA to conclude
that respondents' claim of ownership is better than petitioner's title.

Petitioner thus prays that the CA Decision and Resolution be set aside, and that
judgment be rendered ordering Dela Cruz and all persons claiming rights under her
to vacate the subject property; to pay petitioner monthly rent of P20,000.00 or
reasonable compensation therefor as well as P50,000.00 in exemplary damages;
P50,000.00 in attorney's fees plus P3,000.00 per hearing; and to pay the costs of
suit.

Respondents' Arguments

In her Comment[30] and Memorandum,[31] Dela Cruz counters that the records before
the MeTC clearly showed that the original AOI was presented and marked; that if
she and her co-respondents indeed failed to present the original AOI of the religious
corporation that they belonged to, then petitioner should have made a comment
thereon or requested for the correction of the Preliminary Conference Order to
reflect such facts; and, that both the MeTC and the RTC made the finding that Dela
Cruz presented the original document.

More than these, Dela Cruz argues that petitioner's title was obtained only because
Dela Cruz filed an action or motion for the issuance of a reconstituted copy allegedly
because the original title had been lost although it was not in fact lost; and that
above all the MeTC itself adverted to petitioner's declaration before the SEC that it
does not in fact own any real property, whether land or building.

Our Ruling

This Court finds no merit in the present Petition.

We start off with, the basic postulate that the present case was a complaint for
unlawful detainer and damages by petitioner against respondents. The
requirements for such an ejectment suit are fundamental, thus: xxx

Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended x x x states:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. — Subject to the provisions
of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession,
by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns
of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1)
year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully
withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under
them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.

xxxx
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the
following: (1) the defendant's initial possession of the property was lawful, either by
contact with or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became
illegal upon the plaintiff’s notice to the defendant of the termination of the latter's
right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession and
deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment of the property; and (4) the plaintiff instituted
the complaint for ejectment within one (1) year from the last demand to vacate the
property.[32]

In this case, the MeTC, the RTC, and the CA ruled for respondents, by uniformly
holding that Dela Cruz was able to show by convincing evidence that she is the duly
authorized representative of the registered owner of the disputed property. Quoting
the RTC, the CA agreed that it is beyond doubt or dispute that the disputed property
is registered in the name of "The Iglesia de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila,
Philippines, Inc." and that the sole issue for resolution in the case is which party was
authorized to represent the registered owner of the disputed property, viz.:

Indeed, the totality of evidence presented by the parties tilts in favor of [Dela Cruz].
We quote with approval the [RTC's] ratiocinations x x x:

xxxx

There is no question that the subject [lot] is registered in the name of 'Iglesia cle
Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines', ([']Nueva do Manila' for brevity)
in 1940, [Galvez] argued that he is the president of 'Nueva de Manila' hence,
authorized to represent the same; likewise, [Dela Cruz] as an officer of Church of
Jesus Christ, 'New Jerusalem' ('New Jerusalem' for brevity) claims the same
representation as 'Nueva de Manila' and 'New Jerusalem' are one and the same
entity.

The only issue to be resolved is who as between [Galvez] and [Dela Cruz] is
authorized to represent the registered owner of the subject property. x x x

The Court notes that as stated in [Galvez's] [C]omplaint (par. 4) Iris religious
organization, 'Nueva [de] Manila', of which he represents was organized way back
in 1940; but why is it that [Galvez] registered it only in 1999? On die other hand[,]
'Bagong Jerusalem' which also bears the name of 'New Jerusalem' in its English
[t]ranslation and 'Jerusalem Nueva' in its Spanish translation was registered in 1955
as a corporation sole with Rev. Pineda as the Bishop Representative and General
Pastor of the church and not [Rosendo], the founder as [Galvez] claimed x x x.
[Galvez] failed to explain this glaring inconsistency, which render[ed] his evidence
not worthy of credence.

xxxx

x x x [T]he Court finds that 'Nueva de Manila' appearing as the registered owner of
the subject property and 'Bagong Jerusalem’, the registered name of the religious
organization of [Dela Cruz] which is also known, as 'New Jerusalem' in its English
translation are one and the same organization; and [Dela Cruz], as evidenced by a
Secretary's Certificate xxx was authorized to represent [the same]. The [pieces of]
evidence of [Dela Cruz,] are found to be more preponderant, the same being
consistent and more credible and therefore, more plausible than that of [Galvez's
pieces of] evidence which are inconsistent, doubtful[,] and implausible.[33]

It is beyond cavil that the disputed property is registered in the name of "The Iglesia
de Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of Manila, Philippines, Inc." as stated in both the
reconstituted title[34] attached to the Complaint submitted by petitioner, as
represented by Galvez, as well as in the copy of the original title[35] thereof attached
to the Position Paper filed by Dela Cruz, which as claimed by the latter is in the
possession of Obispo Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo
"Bagong Jerusalem" Inc. We note that this name is actually the name of petitioner
verbatim. Moreover, it is indicated in the dorsal portion of the reconstituted title that
Galvez had been authorized to prosecute the action to reconstitute the title, to wit:

Entry No. 77467/OCT (8257)35266-AFFIDAVIT OF LOSS-Executed by [Galvez] in

his capacity as the president of the Iglesia De Jesucristo, Jerusalem Nueva of
Manila, Philippines, Inc., that the Certificate of Owners [D]uplicate of Title No. 8257
had been lost, misplaced, struck by flood unknown to him.
Date of Instrument: 06-08-06
Date of Inscription: 06-09-06

(SGD) JOSEPHINE H. PONCIANO

Actg. Reg. of Deeds

Entry No. 79998-99/T-No. (8257)M-35266: COURT ORDER ISSUANCE OF NEW

OWNERS CERT. OF TITLE:
ISSUING AUTHORITY: Branch 170/City of Malabon
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: LRC CASE NO. 958-MN
Date of Instrument: Sept. 30, [2]006
Date of Inscription: Oct. 20, 2006 at 10:45 a.m.
This Cert. of Title is issued in lieu of the lost/destroyed first copy of the same
previously declared null and void.

[Illegible Signature]
JOSEPHINE H. PONCIANO
Actg. Reg. of Deeds[36]

Stock must be taken, too, of Dela Cruz's insistence that Galvez succeeded in
obtaining a new title to the disputed property based on the latter's untruthful claim
that the original thereof was destroyed by a flood, (even though the said original
title, OCT No. 8257, was never in fact lost) and was still in the possession of Obispo
Representante at Pastor General ng Iglesia ni JesuKristo "Bagong Jerusalem" Inc.
Hence, the issuance of the reconstituted title was irregular and improper because
the alleged corporation which owned the disputed property was not yet in existence
when the alleged original title was issued.

"When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in [her] pleadings and the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession."[37] in other words, "[w]here the parties to an ejectment case raise the
issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon that issue to determine who between
the parties has the better right, to possess the property. However, where the issue
of ownership is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the
ownership issue is not final and binding, but only for the purpose of resolving the
issue or possession."[38]

We need not repeatedly belabor the issue in an ejectment case:

x x x The principal issue must be possession de facto, or actual possession, and

ownership is merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the
proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of possession de facto in the
interest of preserving the peace of the community, but the summary proceedings
may not be proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently, any issue on
ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful detainer is resolved only provisionally
for the purpose of determining the principal issue of possession. x x x[39]

"Indeed, a title issued under the Torrens system, is entitled to all the attributes of
property ownership, which necessarily includes possession."[40] Nevertheless, "an
ejectment case will not necessarily be decided in favor of one who has presented
proof of ownership of the subject property. Key jurisdictional facts constitutive of the
particular ejectment case filed must be averred in the complaint and sufficiently
proven."[41]

Quite independently of the foregoing, what further strengthens herein respondents'

posture was petitioner's utter failure to adduce proof that he merely tolerated
respondents' possession of the disputed property. In Corpuz v. Spouses Agustin,[42]
this Court recognized that even as the registered owner generally has the right of
possession as an attribute of: ownership, nevertheless the dismissal of the
complaint for unlawful detainer is justified where proof of preponderant evidence of
material possession of the disputed premises has not been convincingly adduced —

x x x Petitioner is correct that as a Torrens title holder over the subject properties,
he is the rightful owner and is entitled to possession thereof. However, the lower
courts and the appellate court consistently found that possession of the disputed
properties by respondents was in the nature of ownership, and not by mere
tolerance of the elder Corpuz. In fact, they have been in continuous, open and
notorious possession of the property for more than 30 years up to this day.
xxxx

The pronouncement in Co v. Militar was later reiterated in Spouses Pascual v.

Spouses Coronel and in Spouses Barias v. Heirs of Bartolome Boneo, et al.,
wherein we consistently held the age-old rule 'that the person who has a Torrens
Title over a land is entitled to possession thereof.’

However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the present petitioner has instituted
an unlawful, detainer case against respondents. It is an established fact that for
more than three decades, the latter have been in continuous possession of the
subject property, which, as such, is in the concept of ownership and not by mere
tolerance of petitioner's father. Under these circumstances, petitioner cannot simply
oust respondents from possession through the summary procedure of an ejectment
proceeding.[43]

In the case at bench, petitioner miserably failed to substantiate its claim that it
merely tolerated respondents' possession of the disputed property. Indeed, "[w]ith
the averment here that the respondent[s'] possession was by mere tolerance of the
petitioner, the acts of tolerance must be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did
not suffice. At least, the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of [its] or
[its] predecessor's tolerance x x x But [it] did not adduce such evidence,"[44] as in this
case. It is thus quite evident from the allegations and evidence presented by
petitioner that its claim that it merely tolerated respondents' entry into and
possession of the disputed property, is baseless and unsubstantiated. Furthermore,
while possession is a question of fact which is generally not allowed to be raised in
a Rule 45 petition, the MeTC, RTC, and CA made no finding in respect to the
question of tolerance as discussed above.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.