Evidence – Quicho

Rule 128, Sec. 1 – Definition

Rico Rommel Atienza V. Board of Medicine and Editha Sioson GR No. 177407, February 9, 2011

Facts: Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for
check-up on February 4, 1995. She was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC, for the same problem in
1999. It was ascertained that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent
kidney operation in September, 1999.

On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint
for gross negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly
participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr.
Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza. The gross negligence and/or
incompetence consists of the removal of private respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the
left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.

The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence,
private respondent Editha Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of
documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her Exhibits A to D,
which are the certified photocopies of X-ray request forms at various dates.

Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal offer of exhibits.
He alleged that said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly
identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the
exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.

BOM admitted the formal offer of documentary evidence and denied the motion for recon filed by
Atienza. Atienza then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing BOMs order. The CA dismissed
the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.

Issue: WON the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha are inadmissible evidence

Held: No. Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best
evidence rule; (2) have not been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and
(4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible
evidence. We disagree.

To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before
administrative bodies such as the BOM. Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement
of the rules of evidence, in connection with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy,
incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:

 [I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting
them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places
them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the
other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be
remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.

1
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the
probative weight to be accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation v. Court of Appeals teaches:

Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to
be considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of
whether or not it proves an issue.

The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30,
1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Edithas medical case. The documents
contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually
attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the
doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her
case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time of her operation.

The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys were both in
their proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by
mandatory judicial notice.

Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a
matter of fact. Thus, they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved,
such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and discretionary. Laws of nature involving the
physical sciences, specifically biology, include the structural make-up and composition of living things
such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the
time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.

Also, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130
provides:

 1. Best Evidence Rule

 Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of
a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:

 (a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on
the part of the offeror;

2
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;

 (c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in
court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general
result of the whole; and

 (d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.

 The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross
negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney,
not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical
locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only
through the exhibits offered in evidence.

 Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys.
To further drive home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and
the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her
abdominal area.

 In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. Witness Dr.
Nancy Aquino testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits
because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new building. Ultimately, since the
originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and,
thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.

3
Rule 128, Sec 2 and 4 – Scope

Rolando Sasan Sr. V. NLRC GR No. 176240 October 17, 2008

Facts: Respondent Equitable-PCI Bank entered into a Contract of Services with Helpmate Inc., a domestic
corporation primarily engaged in the business of providing janitorial and messengerial services.
Petitioners were among those hired and assigned to E-PCIBank. Petitioners filed with the NLRC separate
complaints against E-PCIBank and HI for illegal dismissal. The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter Gutierrez.

The parties ailed to arrive at a mutually beneficial settlement; hence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez ordered
that they submit their respective position papers.

 In their position papers, petitioners claimed that they had become regular employees of E-PCIBank with
respect to the activities for which they were employed, having continuously rendered janitorial and
messengerial services to the bank for more than one year; that E-PCIBank had direct control and
supervision over the means and methods by which they were to perform their jobs; and that their
dismissal by HI was null and void because the latter had no power to do so since they had become
regular employees of E-PCIBank.

E-PCIBank averred that it entered into a Contract for Services with HI; that it was HI that paid petitioners
wages, monitored petitioners daily time records (DTR) and uniforms, and exercised direct control and
supervision over the petitioners and that therefore HI has every right to terminate their services
legally. E-PCIBank could not be held liable for whatever misdeed HI had committed against its
employees.

HI, on the other hand, asserted that it was an independent job contractor engaged in the business of
providing janitorial and related services to business establishments, and E-PCIBank was one of its clients.
The Contract for Services between HI and E-PCIBank expired on 15 July 2000. E-PCIBank no longer
renewed said contract with HI. That petitioners were not dismissed by HI, whether actually or
constructively, thus, petitioners complaints before the NLRC were without basis.

On he basis of the parties position papers and documentary evidence, Labor Arbiter Gutierrez rendered
a Decision finding that HI was not a legitimate job contractor on the ground that it did not possess the
required substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work, or service under its own
account and responsibility as required under the Labor Code. HI is therefore a labor-only contractor and
the real employer of petitioners is E-PCIBank which is held liable to petitioners. According to him,
petitioners were made to perform not only as janitors but also as messengers, drivers and one of them
even worked as an electrician. For us, these jobs are not only directly related to the main business of the
principal but are, likewise deemed necessary in the conduct of respondent Equitable-PCI Banks principal
business. Thus, they are deemed regular employees.

E-PCI Bank and HI appealed to the NLRC. HI, in support of its allegation that it was a legitimate job
contractor, submitted several documents which it did not present before Labor Arbiter Gutierrez, which
includes: Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock, Certificate of Filing Amended

4
Articles of Incorporation, and General Information Sheet Stock Corporation, Audited Financial Statement
and Tax Declaration.

NLRC modified the ruling of Labor Arbiter, taking into consideration the documentary evidence
presented by HI for the first time on appeal and, on the basis thereof, declared HI as a highly capitalized
venture with sufficient capitalization, which cannot be considered engaged in labor-only contracting,
and ruled that the complaint for illegal dismissal was prematurely filed.

Petitioners sought recourse with the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. CA
affirmed the findings of the NLRC that HI was a legitimate job contractor and that it did not illegally
dismiss petitioners.

Issue: WON CA erred in accepting and appreciating the pieces of evidence submitted by respondents
during appeal.

Held: No. Technical rules of evidence are not binding in labor cases. The submission of additional
evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure. After all, rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. The NLRC and labor arbiters are
directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial
justice. In keeping with this directive, it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence, such as
documents and affidavits, submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. The submission of
additional evidence on appeal does not prejudice the other party for the latter could submit counter-
evidence.

For the same reasons, we cannot find merit in petitioners protestations against the documentary
evidence submitted by HI because they were mere photocopies. Evidently, petitioners are invoking the
best evidence rule, espoused in Section 3, Rule130 of the Rules of Court. It provides that:

Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself x x x.

The above provision explicitly mandates that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Notably, certified true copies of
these documents, acceptable under the Rules of Court were furnished to the petitioners. Even assuming
that petitioners were given mere photocopies, again, we stress that proceedings before the NLRC are
not covered by the technical rules of evidence and procedure as observed in the regular courts.Technical
rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant the petition proceeds from an examination of its
sufficiency as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position papers and other
documents.

The Court found that HI is a legitimate job contractor and that petiitoners ere not illegally dismissed by
HI. Upon the termination of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank, petitioners cannot insist

5
to continue to work for the latter. Their pull-out from E-PCIBank did not constitute illegal dismissal
since, first, petitioners were not employees of E-PCIBank; and second, they were pulled out from said
assignment due to the non-renewal of the Contract of Service between HI and E-PCIBank. At the time
they filed their complaints with the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not even dismissed by HI; they were
only off-detail pending their re-assignment by HI to another client. And when they were actually given
new assignments by HI with other clients, petitioners even refused the same. As the NLRC pronounced,
petitioners complaint for illegal dismissal is apparently premature.

6
Rule 128, Section 3 – Admissibility

People V. Gilbert Reyes Wagas GR No. 157943 September 4, 2013

Facts: Wagas was charged with estafa. The information allegd that the accused, knowing that he did not
have sufficient funds deposited with the Bank of Philippine Islands, and without informing Alberto
Ligaray, issued a BPI check dated May 8, 1997 in the amount of P200,000. Upon presentment for
payment of such check, it was dishonored for the reason "drawn against insufficient funds" and inspite
of notice and several demands made upon said accused to make good said check or replace the same
with cash, he had failed and refused.

Alberto Ligaray testified that Wagas placed an order for 200 bags of rice over the telephone; that
because of Wagas’ assurance that he would not disappoint them and that he had the means to pay
them, they relented and accepted the order. On cross-examination, Ligaray admitted that he did not
personally meet Wagas because they transacted through telephone only; that he released the 200 bags
of rice directly to Robert Cañada, the brother-in-law of Wagas, who signed the delivery receipt upon
receiving the rice.

Wagas admitted having issued the BPI check to Cañada, his brother-in-law, not to Ligaray. He denied
having any telephone conversation or any dealings with Ligaray. He explained that the check was
intended as payment for a portion of Cañada’s property that he wanted to buy, but when the sale did
not push through, he did not anymore fund the check.

The Prosecution confronted Wagas with a letter apparently signed by him and addressed to Ligaray’s
counsel, wherein he admitted owing Ligaray ₱200,000.00 for goods received. Wagas admitted the letter,
but insisted that it was Cañada who had transacted with Ligaray, and that he had signed the letter only
because his sister and her husband (Cañada) had begged him to assume the responsibility.

RTC convicted Wagas of Estafa. Wagas appealed to CA by notice of appeal. Wagas insists that he and
Ligaray were neither friends nor personally known to one other; that it was highly incredible that
Ligaray, a businessman, would have entered into a transaction with him involving a huge amount of
money only over the telephone; that on the contrary, the evidence pointed to Cañada as the person
with whom Ligaray had transacted, considering that the delivery receipt, which had been signed by
Cañada, indicated that the goods had been "Ordered by ROBERT CAÑADA," that the goods had been
received by Cañada in good order and condition, and that there was no showing that Cañada had been
acting on behalf of Wagas; that he had issued the check to Cañada upon a different transaction; that
Cañada had negotiated the check to Ligaray; and that the element of deceit had not been established
because it had not been proved with certainty that it was him who had transacted with Ligaray over the
telephone.

Issue: Did he Prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all the elements of the
crime of estafa as charged, as well as the identity of the perpetrator of the crime

Held: No. Appeal is meritorious. In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of
postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the
defraudation. This means that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the
offended party by reason of the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the

7
Prosecution must show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with
his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender.

In every criminal prosecution, however, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In that regard, the Prosecution did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that it was Wagas who had defrauded Ligaray by issuing the check.

Firstly, Ligaray expressly admitted that he did not personally meet the person with whom he was
transacting over the telephone. Secondly, the check delivered to Ligaray was made payable to cash. his
rendered it highly probable that Wagas had issued the check not to Ligaray, but to somebody else like
Cañada, his brother-in-law, who then negotiated it to Ligaray. Thirdly, Ligaray admitted that it was
Cañada who received the rice from him and who delivered the check to him. Finally, Ligaray’s
declaration that it was Wagas who had transacted with him over the telephone was not reliable because
he did not explain how he determined that the person with whom he had the telephone conversation
was really Wagas whom he had not yet met or known before then.

We deem it essential for purposes of reliability and trustworthiness that a telephone conversation like
that one Ligaray supposedly had with the buyer of rice to be first authenticated before it could be
received in evidence. Among others, the person with whom the witness conversed by telephone should
be first satisfactorily identified by voice recognition or any other means. Without the authentication,
incriminating another person just by adverting to the telephone conversation with him would be all too
easy. In this respect, an identification based on familiarity with the voice of the caller, or because of
clearly recognizable peculiarities of the caller would have sufficed.

Communications by telephone are admissible in evidence where they are relevant to the fact or facts
in issue, and admissibility is governed by the same rules of evidence concerning face-to-face
conversations except the party against whom the conversations are sought to be used must ordinarily
be identified. It is not necessary that the witness be able, at the time of the conversation, to identify
the person with whom the conversation was had, provided subsequent identification is proved by
direct or circumstantial evidence somewhere in the development of the case. The mere statement of
his identity by the party calling is not in itself sufficient proof of such identity, in the absence of
corroborating circumstances so as to render the conversation admissible. However, circumstances
preceding or following the conversation may serve to sufficiently identify the caller. The completeness
of the identification goes to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and the
responsibility lies in the first instance with the district court to determine within its sound discretion
whether the threshold of admissibility has been met.

The Prosecution did not show through Ligaray during the trial as to how he had determined that his
caller was Wagas. Ligaray’s statement that he could tell that it was Wagas who had ordered the rice
because he "know[s]" him was still vague and unreliable for not assuring the certainty of the
identification, and should not support a finding of Ligaray’s familiarity with Wagas as the caller by his
voice.

The letter of Wagas did not competently establish that he was the person who had conversed with
Ligaray by telephone to place the order for the rice. The letter was admitted exclusively as the State’s
rebuttal evidence to controvert or impeach the denial of Wagas of entering into any transaction with
Ligaray on the rice; hence, it could be considered and appreciated only for that purpose. Under the law

8
of evidence, the court shall consider evidence solely for the purpose for which it is offered, not for any
other purpose. Fairness to the adverse party demands such exclusivity. Moreover, the high plausibility
of the explanation of Wagas that he had signed the letter only because his sister and her husband had
pleaded with him to do so could not be taken for granted.

9
People VS Antonio Lauga GR No. 186228 March 15, 2010

Facts: Appellant was accused of qualified rape, the victim being his own 13-year old daughter – AAA. On
trial, three witnesses testified for the prosecution: victim AAA, her brother BBB and one Moises Boy
Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay.

Their testimonies revealed that AAA was left alone at home. AAAs father was having a drinking spree at
the neighbors place. Her mother decided to leave because when appellant gets drunk, he has the habit
of mauling AAAs mother. Her only brother BBB also went out in the company of some neighbors.

At around 10:00 oclock in the evening, appellant woke AAA up and raped her. Soon after, BBB arrived
and found AAA crying. BBB decided to take AAA with him. While on their way to their maternal
grandmothers house, AAA told her brother about the incident. Upon reaching their grandmothers
house, they told their grandmother and uncle of the incident, after which, they sought the assistance
of Moises Boy Banting.

Moises Boy Banting found appellant in his house wearing only his underwear. He invited appellant to
the police station, to which appellant obliged. At the police outpost, he admitted to him that he raped
AAA because he was unable to control himself.

Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that that the charge against him was ill-motivated because he
sometimes physically abuses his wife and beats the children as a disciplinary measure. He narrated that
he was awakened by the members of the Bantay Bayan headed by Moises Boy Banting. They asked him
to go with them to discuss some matters. He later learned that he was under detention because AAA
charged him of rape.

RTC found appellant guilty of rape. CA affirmed. Appellant argues that his extrajudicial confession before
Moises Boy Banting is inadmissible evidence.

Issue: WON the extrajudicial confession is inadmissible evidence.

Held: Appellant argues that even if he, indeed, confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan, the
confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by a lawyer and there was no valid
waiver of such requirement.

This Court is convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in
the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the local government unit to perform functions relating
to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling on the legality of the
actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to
a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes
has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his
constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as
the Miranda Rights, is concerned.

We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel,
inadmissible in evidence.

10
Appellant assails the inconsistencies in the testimonies of AAA and her brother BBB. AAA testified that
BBB accompanied her to the house of their grandmother. Thereafter, they, together with her relatives,
proceeded to look for a bantay bayan. On the other hand, BBB testified that he brought her sister to the
house of their bantay bayan after he learned of the incident.

Citing Bartocillo v. Court of Appeals, appellant argues that where the testimonies of two key witnesses
cannot stand together, the inevitable conclusion is that one or both must be telling a lie, and their
story a mere concoction.

Here, the testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified that they sought the
help of a bantay bayan. Their respective testimonies differ only as to when the help was sought for,
which this Court could well attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs
testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident.

The presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship with the offender in the
instant case has likewise been adequately established. Both qualifying circumstances were specifically
alleged in the Information, stipulated on and admitted during the pre-trial conference, and testified to
by both parties in their respective testimonies. Also, such stipulation and admission, as correctly pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court because they are judicial admissions within the
contemplation of Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court. It provides:

Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

11
Nena Lazalita-Tating V. Felicidad Tating Macella GR No. 155208 March 27, 2007

Facts: The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land owned by Daniela Solano Vda. De Tating. On
October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the property to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita
Tating. Subsequently, title over the subject property was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared
the property in her name for tax purposes and paid real estate taxes, but the land remained in the
possession of Daniela.

Thereafter, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling
the property; the true agreement between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject
property in favor of the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the
purpose of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any
loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject
property reconveyed to her. Then, Daniela died.

In a letter, Carlos, one of the children of Daniela, informed Nena that they discovered the sworn
statement executed by Daniela and that they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful
shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela.

Respondents then filed a complaint against Nena, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale and
cancellation of the TCT.

Nena denied hat any fraud or misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale. She also denied having received the letter of her uncle, Carlos.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents and declared the deed of sale as null and void. CA
affirmed. Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the ground that the CA has decided the
instant case without due regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions of this
Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not
supported by and is even against the evidence on record.

Issue: WON CA erred in affirming the decision of the trial court

Held: Yes. Private respondents contend that petitioner failed to show that the CA or the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their assailed judgments; that Danielas Sworn Statement is
sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of sale by and between her and petitioner was merely
simulated; and that, in effect, the agreement between petitioner and Daniela created a trust
relationship between them.

The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A
contract is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all (absolutely simulated) or if the
parties conceal their true agreement (relatively simulated).

There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement. However, the admissibility of
evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its
relevance and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its
evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence. It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally

12
prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse
party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the affiant. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed on the witness stand to
testify thereon. The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn
statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she is
already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Danielas sworn statement
for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated and that, as
a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them.

Private respondents should have presented other evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that
Daniela, in fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she executed the subject deed of
sale in favor of petitioner. As in all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the material
allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of
the evidence of the defendant. Aside from Danielas sworn statement, private respondents failed to
present any other documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the testimonies of their witnesses
failed to establish that Daniela had a different intention when she entered into a contract of sale with
petitioner.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really
reflect the real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent until her death; she never told any
of her relatives regarding her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply chose to make
known her true intentions through the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the
existence of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her declaration therein that she is
appealing for help in order to get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete step to recover the
subject property from petitioner until her death more than ten years later.

However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is disregarded, the fact remains that private
respondents failed to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond mere preponderance of
evidence that the contract of sale between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal presumption
is in favor of the validity of contractsand the party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving
its simulation.

13
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation VS CA GR No. 107518. October 8, 1998

Facts: This is a civil case for damages when the vessel owned by private respondent Maria Efigenia
Fishing Corporation collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation.
Petitioner PNOC sought to be substituted in place of LSC as it had already acquired ownership of
the Petroparcel.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent on the basis of documentary exhibits
presented, mainly the price quotations. These price quotations  were issued personally to Del Rosario,
the general manager and sole witness of respondent, who requested for them from dealers of
equipment similar to the ones lost at the collision of the two vessels. However, these are not published
in any list, register, periodical or other compilation nor containing data of everyday professional need
and relied upon in the work of the occupation.

On the other hand, the lower court noted that petitioner only presented Lorenzo Lazaro, senior
estimator at PNOC Dockyard & Engineering Corporation, as sole witness and it did not bother at all to
offer any documentary evidence to support its position. Lazaro testified that the price quotations
submitted by private respondent were excessive and that as an expert witness, he used the quotations
of his suppliers in making his estimates. However, he failed to present such quotations of prices from his
suppliers, saying that he could not produce a breakdown of the costs of his estimates as it was a sort of
secret scheme.

CA ruled that that it was not necessary to qualify Del Rosario as an expert witness because as the owner
of the lost vessel, it was well within his knowledge and competency to identify and determine the
equipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel.

Issue: WON price quotations are admissible evidence

Held: No. The price quotations presented as exhibits partake of the nature of hearsay evidence
considering that the persons who issued them were not presented as witnesses. Any evidence,
whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge
of the witness but on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that the
evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.

It is true that one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule pertains to commercial lists and the like under
Section 45, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

Price quotations are not within the purview of commercial lists as these are not standard handbooks
or periodicals, containing data of everyday professional need and relied upon in the work of the
occupation. These are simply letters responding to the queries of Del Rosario. 

The price quotations are ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should have
been proffered along with the testimony of the authors thereof. Del Rosario could not have testified on
the veracity of the contents of the writings even though he was the seasoned owner of a fishing fleet
because he was not the one who issued the price quotations.

A document is a commercial list if: 

14
(1) it is a statement of matters of interest to persons engaged in an occupation; 
(2) such statement is contained in a list, register, periodical or other published compilation; (3) said
compilation is published for the use of persons engaged in that occupation, and 
(4) it is generally used and relied upon by persons in the same occupation.

15
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4200 – ANTI WIRETAPPING LAW

AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY
OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other
person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in Sec. 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any of
the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding Sec. or who violates the provisions of the following
Sec. or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public
official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to
deportation proceedings. chan robles virtual law library

Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace
officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the two preceding Sec.s in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war
and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by theRevised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other offenses against national security:Provided, That such written order shall
only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is
about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of
sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the
solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.  chan robles virtual law library

16
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or
recorded and, in the case of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the
telephone number involved and its location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear,
intercept, or record the communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or
offenses committed or sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The
authorization shall be effective for the period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60)
days from the date of issuance of the order, unless extended or renewed by the court upon being
satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest.

All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the
period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall
be accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of
recordings made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records
included in the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have
been made, or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package
deposited with the court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings
replayed, or used in evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall
not be granted except upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or
persons whose conversation or communications have been recorded. chan robles virtual law library

The court referred to in this Sec. shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose
territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding Sec.s of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.

Sec. 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly
amended. chan robles virtual law library

Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Approved: June 19, 1965

17
Cases on Anti Wiretapping

Socorro Ramirez V. CA and Ester Garcia GR No. 93833 September 28, 1995

Facts: Petitioner Ramirez filed a civil case for damages against private respondent Garcia, alleging that
private respondent, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her
in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which
the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case for violation of Republic Act 4200, Anti
Wire-tapping.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. The trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that, the
violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a
participant to the communication.

CA declared that the trial court’s order is null and void, holding that the allegations sufficiently
constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

Issue: WON “private conversation” is not penalized by RA 4200.

Held: No. Petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a
"private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her conversation with private
respondent was not illegal under the said act. We disagree.

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement,
to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device
commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by
all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a
tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. 

The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of
a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.

Petitioner’s contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not
include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or

18
to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation,  or signifies
the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system
of symbols (as language signs or gestures)"  These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or
non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to
include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

19
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez V. CA GR No. 110662 August 4, 1994

Facts: Private respondent Rafael Ortanez filed with the RTC a complaint for annulment of marriage
against petitioner Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological
incapacity of petitioner. Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes
of alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons. The trial court
admitted all of private respondent's offered evidence.

A petition for certiorari was then filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals assailing the admission in
evidence of the aforementioned cassette tapes. CA dismissed the petition, stating that: Tape recordings
are not inadmissible per se. They and any other variant thereof can be admitted in evidence for certain
purposes, depending on how they are presented and offered and on how the trial judge utilizes them in
the interest of truth and fairness and the even handed administration of justice.

Hence, this petition for review.

Issue: WON the tape recordings are admissible in evidence

Held: No. The tape recordings were made and obtained when private respondent allowed his friends
from the military to wire tap his home telephone.

Sec. 4 of RA No. 4200 provides: Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained,
obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or
investigation.

Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed the recording of the
same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.

20
Edgardo Ganaan V. IAC GR No. L-69809 Oct. 16, 1986

Facts: On October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in the living
room of complainant’s residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo
Laconico. Complainant, then made a telephone call to Laconico.

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office because his
regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. When complainant called up, Laconico
requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so
as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement.

The withdrawal was offered for P8,000 pesos. Laconico agreed to the settlement.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant
to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to
the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and
Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

The lower court found both Ganaan and Laconico guilty of violating Sec. 1 of RA No. 4200. IAC affirmed.

Issue: whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under
Rep. Act No. 4200

Held: No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or
the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed
for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory
construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and
phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and
every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.

The phrase  "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that
enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature,
that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It
refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being
overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely
for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit
does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place
within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at
the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party
listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.

The mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated
devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is
not among such devices or arrangements.

21
Arrests, Searches and Seizures Orders

Briccio Ricky Pollo V. Chairperson Karina Constantino-David, et al. GR No. 181881 Oct 18, 2011

Facts: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist and the Officer-in-charge of the Public
Assistance and Liaison Division under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program of the CSC.

On January 3, 2007, CSC Chairperson Constantino-David received an unsigned letter-complaint, sent thru
LBC, from a certain Alan San Pascual. The letter alleged that the Chief of the the Mamamayan Muna
Hindi Mamaya Na have been lawyering an accused government employee having a pending case in the
CSC.

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information
technology (IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back
up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.

Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers
were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office
for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from
the computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were
draft pleadings or lettersin connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the
basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had
gone on extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.

In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations against him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing
expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his computer.

He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to
Dismiss and/or to Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having proceeded from an illegal
search which is beyond the authority of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the court.

The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In
view of the absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of the prosecution, petitioner
was deemed to have waived his right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.

The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition to the CA which was dismissed by the
latter on the ground that it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents. He filed a
motion for reconsideration which was further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON the search conducted by the CSC on the computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal
search and was a violation of his constitutional right to privacy

Held: No. Sec. 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

22
The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of unreasonable
searches and seizures.

In the case of Katz V. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), The concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan
noted that the existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold requirement: first,
that a person has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees
may have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by police.”

O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose
Fourth Amendment rights merely because they work for the government instead of a private employer.”
In O’Connor the Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless searches involving public
employees for work-related reasons. The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which government
interests are weighed against the employee’s reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness
test implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement, which are related to law
enforcement.

Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November
3, 2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141,
169),recognized the fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the workplace.

The Court ruled that Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
either in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did
not allege that he had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office
was always locked and not open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used
passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees from accessing his computer files.
Moreover, even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he
claims, such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers, as in Simons.
The policy provides that The Computer Resources are the property of the Civil Service Commission
and may be used only for legitimate business purposes. And that there is no expectation of privacy.

The CSC in this case had implemented a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no
expectation of privacy in anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that
the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both automated or human means. This
implies that on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the computer resources were used
only for such legitimate business purposes.

One of the factors stated in OConnor which are relevant in determining whether an employees
expectation of privacy in the workplace is reasonable is the existence of a workplace privacy policy.

23
A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct.

24
People V. Idel Amminudin GR No. 74869 July 6, 1988

Facts: The Philippine Constabulary officers received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-
appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, Idel
Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 in Iloilo
City. The PC officers inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later
taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.

Amminudin alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and that his bag was confiscated without a search
warrant.

Issue: Whether or not accused constitutional right against unreasonable serach and seizure is violated

Held: Yes. The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

The PC officers received the tip 2 days before the arrest, it is clear that they had at least two days within
which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on
the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain.
And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was
probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest.

The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the
warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

25
People V. Rogelio Mengote y Tejas GR No. 87059 June 22, 1992

Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A
surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. They approached these
persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable
to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of
them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a
fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and
Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

Mengote was charged with illegal possession of firearms. One witness presented by the prosecution was
Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during
the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers.

Mengote pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been
illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree.

Issue: Whether or not the accused constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure is
violated

Held: Yes. There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section
3(2), of the Constitution.

Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.

Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution
when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under
either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.

26
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.

These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question,
the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to
the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was
being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.

These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might
have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had
no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the
morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He
was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine
about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.

27
People V. Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio GR No. 128587 March 16, 2007

Facts: On May 16, 1996, police operatives of DILG arrested three persons for unlawful possession of
shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and
Joseph Junio were identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was then set after the
three were prevailed upon to call their source and pretend to order another supply of shabu. On the
same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were arrested. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed
the police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of
Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio did not disclose
their source of shabu but admitted that they were working for Wang. They also disclosed that they knew
of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May 1996, and that their employer
(Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided
to look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio.

Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that Wang came out of the apartment and
walked towards a parked BMW car. The police officers introduced themselves, asked his name and,
upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked him to open the back
compartment of the BMW car. When frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and
confiscated from him an unlicensed firearm. At the same time, the other officers searched the BMW Car
where shabu was found.

Three separate informations were file against Lawrence Wang for violation of Dangerous Drugs Act,
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban.

Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3)
cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the
prosecution’s evidence against him. Respondent judge Laguio issued a Resolution granting Wang’s
Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence. Hence, this petition.

Issue: whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite
the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant. Held:

Held: No. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person
without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be
valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating
that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious behavior on
the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the police.
He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car

28
when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open
the compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not
committing any visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante
delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt
act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is
not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

29
People V. Carlos Dela Cruz GR No. 182348 Nov. 20, 2008

Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision of the RTC finding the accused- appellant Carlos Dela Cruz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11(2) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or The
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for having in his possession, direct custody and control
one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag weighing 49.84 grams of white crystalline substance, which
gave positive results for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Accused-appellant entered a not guilty plea and trial ensued.

The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of October 20, 2002, an informant
tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police Station that wanted drug pusher Wifredo
Loilo alias “Boy Bicol” was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team was organized to arrest
Boy Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted “Boy
Bicol sumuko ka na may warrant of arrest ka.” Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a shootout
and was fatally shot.

Accused-appellant was seen holding a shotgun through a window. He dropped his shotgun when a
police officer pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-
appellant. They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia,
ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the markings “CVDC,” the initials of
accused-appellant, on the bag containing the seized drug. Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested.
The substance seized from the hideout was sent to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for
examination and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus separately
indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal possession of firearm.

The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted him
of possession of dangerous drugs.

 ISSUE: Is accused-appellant Carlos De la Cruz guilty of violation of Sec. 11(2) of RA 9165?

 Held: The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. On the third element, we have
held that the possession must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed
with the possession or control of said articles. Considering that as to this knowledge, a person’s mental
state of awareness of a fact is involved, we have ruled that:

Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with
certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be
determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of
the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred
from the attendant events in each particular case.

The prior or contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant show that: he was inside the nipa hut at the
time the buy-bust operation was taking place; he was talking to Boy Bicol inside the nipa hut; he was
seen holding a shotgun; when PO1 Calanoga, Jr. pointed his firearm at accused-appellant, the latter
dropped his shotgun; and when apprehended, he was in a room which had the seized shabu, digital

30
weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines. Accused-appellant later admitted that
he knew what the content of the seized plastic bag was.

Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu,
whether in its actual or constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant.

The two buy-bust team members corroborated each other’s testimonies on how they saw Boy Bicol
talking to accused-appellant by a table inside the nipa hut. That table, they testified, was the same table
where they saw the shabu once inside the nipa hut. This fact was used by the prosecution to show that
accused-appellant exercised dominion and control over the shabu on the table. We, however, find this
too broad an application of the concept of constructive possession.

In the instant case, however, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa
hut that was subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have dominion or control over the nipa hut.
Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the
prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy
Bicol. But in spite of the lack of evidence pinning accused-appellant to illegal possession of drugs, the
trial court declared the following:

It cannot be denied that when the accused was talking with Boy Bicol he knew that the shabu was on
the table with other items that were confiscated by the police operatives. The court [surmises] that the
accused and boy Bicol were members of a gang hiding in that nipa hut where they were caught red-
handed with prohibited items and dangerous [drugs].

The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecution’s evidence, that accused-appellant was part of
a gang dealing in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in Boy Bicol’s nipa hut, the prosecution was
not able to show his participation in any drug-dealing. He was not even in possession of drugs in his
person. He was merely found inside a room with shabu, not as the room’s owner or occupant but as a
guest. While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the buy-bust team, the prosecution curiously failed to
produce the firearm that accused-appellant supposedly used.

The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of
either actual or constructive possession by the accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant Carlos Dela Cruz is ACQUITTED of violation of Sec. 11(2) of RA 9165

31
Republic Act No. 9372             March 6, 2007

AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM

Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall henceforth be known as the "Human Security Act of 2007."

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, and property
from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the
country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people,
against humanity, and against the law of nations.

In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic rights and
fundamental liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.

The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach, comprising
political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the root causes of
terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such
measures shall include conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, addressing the roots of
conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development.

Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally

recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is to be understood, however that the
exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers of the executive department of the government shall
not prejudice respect for human rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.

SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of
the Revised Penal Code:

a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);

b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);

c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;

d. Article 248 (Murder);

e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);

f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under

1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);

2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);

3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);

4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);

5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,

32
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful
Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the
crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit
of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.

SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire to commit the crime of terrorism shall
suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the
crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same.

SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code
or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of
from seventeen (17) years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 6. Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having participated therein, either as principal or
accomplice under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission
in any of the following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects
of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principal or conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.

Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed
upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural,
and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single
exception of accessories falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a).

SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. -The provisions of

Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals,
listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other
surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways
and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or
written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization,
association, or group of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.

Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients,
doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not
be authorized.

33
SEC. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. - The written order of the authorizing division of
the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law enforcement
official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of
this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (b) that
there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence,
which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or
prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means readily
available for acquiring such evidence.

SEC. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. - The written order granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the
original application of the applicant, including his application to extend or renew, if any, and the written
authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified
information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters, papers,
messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been monitored,
listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts
done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so,
the legality of the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued the written order. The written
order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following: (a) the identity, such
as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to,
intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or
otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the
electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to,
intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject to continuous
surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the
police or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official, including the
individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members
of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words; (c) the offense or offenses
committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of time within which the
authorization shall be used or carried out.

SEC. 10. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. - Any authorization granted by the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall only be effective for the length of time
specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not exceed
a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.

34
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said authorization for another
non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period:
Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or
renewal is in the public interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte application for extension or
renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-
Terrorism Council.

In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the application for
extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the team
named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the
application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or
law enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement official
shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as
provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public
Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.

If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall
immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance, interception and recording of the termination
of the said surveillance, interception and recording. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve
(12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official who
fails to notify the person subject of the surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording as specified
above.

SEC. 11. Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications. - All tapes, discs, and recordings made
pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, including all excerpts
and summaries thereof as well as all written notes or memoranda made in connection therewith, shall,
within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any
extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be deposited with the
authorizing Division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be,
and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the
members of his team.

In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to execute the required affidavit, the
one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the team named in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the members of the team that required
affidavit.

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs and recording, and
their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove,
delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in
part under any pretext whatsoever.

Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items enumerated
above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

35
SEC. 12. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit of the police or of the law enforcement official
and the individual members of his team shall state: (a) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings that
have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written
notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by each of
such tapes, discs, and recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as the number
of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda made in
connection therewith that have been included in the deposit; and (d) the date of the original written
authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to
conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or
renewal of the original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.

The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of
any of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of any
of such excerpts, summaries, written notes, and memoranda, have been made, or, if made, that all such
duplicates and copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be,
deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.

It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit or exclude from the joint
affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this Section.

Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts prescribed in the preceding
paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less than ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

SEC. 13. Disposition of Deposited Material. -The sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents
thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and
are hereby declared classified information, and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be
opened and its contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries
thereof and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed,
read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted only upon a written application of the
Department of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a
showing that the Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council to file the application with proper written notice the person whose conversation,
communication, message discussion or spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance,
monitoring, recording and interception to open, reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed
envelope or sealed package as evidence.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing the
persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to
eight years of imprisonment.

SEC. 14. Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed Package. - The written application
with notice to the party concerned to open the deposited sealed envelope or sealed package shall
clearly state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for
revealing or disclosing its classified contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the
listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken

36
or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or
memoranda made in connection therewith); [ and, (d) for using any of said listened to, intercepted, and
recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including
any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection
therewith) as evidence.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify as defined
above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.

SEC. 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part or parts
thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their existence, content, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act,
shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.

SEC. 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings. - Any police or law
enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form any
communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with
or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of
an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty
of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment and the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any police or law
enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down,
tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message,
conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act,
the party aggrieved by such authorization shall be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed
package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement
personnel who maliciously procured said authorization.

SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons. - Any organization,

association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although
not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and
create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of
Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to
the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed
organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.

SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who,
having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person

37
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper
judicial authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a
period of three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been
apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement
personnel: Provided, That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits
under Section 27 of this Act.

The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the
place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge,
among other things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person
or persons they have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they
have arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the
suspect has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge
shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before
him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall
forthwith submit his/her report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to
his/her residence or office.

Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the
judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made
during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the
residence of the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon
the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding
paragraph.

SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In the event of an
actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the
written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or
judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals
nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office
hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the
residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was
arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law
enforcement personnel concerned within five days after the date of the detention of the persons
concerned: Provided, however, That within three days after the detention the suspects, whose
connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately.

SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority within Three Days. - The
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any
police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of
a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails

38
to deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three
days.

SEC. 21. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. - The moment a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or
arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting police or law enforcement
officers or by the police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought,
of his or her right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel of his or her choice, the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact
the free legal assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO). It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus contacted to
immediately visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her with legal assistance. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; (b) informed of the
cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely
with his legal counsel and to confer with them at any time without restriction; (d) allowed to
communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the members of his family or with his nearest
relatives and to be visited by them; and, (e) allowed freely to avail of the service of a physician or
physicians of choice.

SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. - Any police or law enforcement personnel, or
any personnel of the police or other law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid
rights of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day
to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or detainees as
stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the police officer or hear or leader
of the law enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.

SEC. 23. Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its Contents. - The police or other law
enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has been placed under custodial arrest and
detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official logbook, which is hereby declared as a
public document and opened to and made available for .the inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or
lawyers of the person under custody or any member of his or her family or relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree or his or her physician at any time of the day or night without any
form of restriction. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of: (a) the name, description,
and address of the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial
arrest and detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or physicians who examined him
physically and medically; (d) the state of his health and physical condition at the time of his initial
admission for custodial detention; (e) the date and time of each removal of the detained person from
his cell for interrogation or for any purpose; (f) the date and time of his return to his cell; (g) the name
and address of the physician or physicians who physically and medically examined him after each
interrogation; (h) a summary of the physical and medical findings on the detained person after each of
such interrogation; (i) the names and addresses of his family members and nearest relatives, if any and if

39
available; (j) the names and addresses of persons, who visit the detained person; (k) the date and time
of each of such visits; (1) the date and time of each request of the detained person to communicate and
confer with his legal counsel or counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and date and time of each
departure of his legal counsel or counsels; and, (n) all other important events bearing on and all relevant
details regarding the treatment of the detained person while under custodial arrest and detention.

The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon demand of the aforementioned lawyer or
lawyers or members of the family or relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
of the person under custody or his or her physician issue a certified true copy of the entries of the
logbook relative to the concerned detained person without delay or restriction or requiring any fees
whatsoever including documentary stamp tax, notarial fees, and the like. This certified true copy may be
attested by the person who has custody of the logbook or who allowed the party concerned to scrutinize
it at the time the demand for the certified true copy is made.

The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the preceding paragraph to
keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

SEC. 24. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. - No threat, intimidation, or coercion,
and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological
pressure, on the detained person, which shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in his investigation
and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; otherwise,
the evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such threat, intimidation, or coercion,
or from such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, shall be, in
its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.

SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the Investigation and Interrogation of a
Detained Person. - Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict
physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of
a charged or suspected person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the
crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of
twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.

When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs as a consequence of the use
of such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of such physical
pain or torment, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of such mental, moral, or psychological
pressure, the penalty shall be twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged
with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same,
the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the
municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security
and public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said
municipality or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and
conditions of his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.

40
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of
residence.

While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the
internet or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered
by the court.

The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the
dismissal of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the
prosecutor or of the accused.

SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices of the
Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves
of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) of a member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any
police or law enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the
anti-terrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the gathering of
any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a
bank or financial institution. The bank or financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow such
examination or to provide the desired information, when so, ordered by and served with the written
order of the Court of Appeals.

SEC. 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order of the Court
of Appeals authorizing the examination of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records: (1) of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) of any judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons in a bank or
financial institution, and the gathering of any relevant information about the same from said bank or
financial institution, shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex
parte application to that effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized
in writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act
to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and,
the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining
and freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of the person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of persons; or (3) of any member of
such organization, association, or group of persons.

SEC. 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing the Examination of Bank Deposits,
Accounts, and Records. - The written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as
well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the original ex parte application of the applicant,
including his ex parte application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the Anti-
Terrorism Council, shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided, That the

41
person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records have been examined,
frozen, sequestered and seized by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts
done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so,
the legality of the interference. The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify: (a) the identify of the said: (1) person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such
judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case may be.
whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the information
to be gathered; (b) the identity of the bank or financial Institution where such deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons who will
conduct the said examination and the gathering of the desired information; and, (d) the length of time
the authorization shall be carried out.

SEC. 30. Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and Obtain Information on Bank Deposits,
Accounts, and Records. - The authorization issued or granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals to examine or cause the examination of and to freeze bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records, or to gather information about the same, shall be effective for the length
of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not
exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.

The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said authorization for another
period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days renewable to another thirty (30) days from the expiration
of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that
such extension or renewal is in the public interest: and, Provided, further, That the application for
extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing
by the Anti-Terrorism Council.

In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the application for
extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the ream
named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the
application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or
law enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement official
shall have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as
provided in the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public
Prosecutor's Office for any violation of this Act.

If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall
immediately notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official who fails
to notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as
defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.

42
SEC. 31. Custody of Bank Data and Information Obtained after Examination of Deposits, Placements,
Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda,
working sheets, reports, and other documents obtained from the examination of the bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of any such organization,
association, or group of persons shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period
fixed in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48)
hours after the expiration of the extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or
sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police
or law enforcement official and the persons who actually conducted the examination of said bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records.

SEC. 32. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit shall state: (a) the identifying marks, numbers, or
symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records examined; (b) the identity and
address of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records are held and maintained; (c) the number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets,
and records discovered, examined, and frozen; (d) the outstanding balances of each of such deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets; (e) all information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda,
working sheets, reports, documents, records examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed
package deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; (f) the date of the original
written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte
Application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets
and records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authorization granted
by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; and (g) that the items Enumerated were all that were
found in the bank or financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination.

The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the information, data,
excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents acquired from the
examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records have been made, or, if
made, that all such duplicates and copies are placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and information obtained
after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records to copy, to remove,
delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in
part under any pretext whatsoever,

Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items
enumerated above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

SEC. 33. Disposition of Bank Materials. - The sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents
thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and
are hereby declared classified information and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be
opened and its contents shall not be divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a

43
written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted
only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the Department of Justice has been duly authorized in
writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application, with notice in writing to the party
concerned not later than three days before the scheduled opening, to open, reveal, divulge, and use the
contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as
defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.

SEC. 34. Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. - The written application, with notice in writing
to the party concerned not later than three days of the scheduled opening, to open the sealed envelope
or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose and reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or
sealed package; (b) for revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and, (c) for using the classified
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents as
evidence.

SEC. 35. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. - Any information, data, excerpts, summaries,
notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports, or documents acquired from the examination of the bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization,
association, or group of persons, which have been secured in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall
absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.

SEC. 36. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Examination of a Bank or a Financial Institution. - Any
person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization,
association, or group of persons, without being authorized to do so by the Court of Appeals, shall be
guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty
of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or
law enforcement personnel, who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to
examine the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of:
(1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a
judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a
member of such organization, association, or group of persons: Provided, That notwithstanding Section
33 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such authorization shall upon motion duly filed be allowed access
to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution of
any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said authorization.

44
SEC. 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court Authorization. - An employee, official,
or a member of the board of directors of a bank or financial institution, who refuses to allow the
examination of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records of: (1) a person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a
judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such
judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons in said bank or financial
institution, when duly served with the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals,
shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.

SEC. 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or Misrepresentation of Material Fact in Joint
Affidavits. - Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact in the joint affidavits
required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the
affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.

SEC. 39. Seizure and Sequestration. - The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and
communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature
belonging: (1) to any person suspected of or charged before a competent Regional Trial Court for the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a member of such organization,
association, or group of persons shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use,
transfer, or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or
injurious to the interest of the State.

The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be reasonably needed by the
monthly needs of his family including the services of his or her counsel and his or her family's medical
needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or
sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any
legitimate reason.

Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the Court of Appeals
to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism
to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records as may be necessary for the regular sustenance of his/her family or to use any of his/her
property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his/her case is
pending shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 40. Nature of Seized. Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets
and Records. - The seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall be deemed as property held in trust by the bank or financial institution for such
person and the government during the pendency of the investigation of the person suspected of or
during the pendency of the trial of the person charged with any of the said crimes, as the case may be
and their use or disposition while the case is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before
which the case or cases are pending.

45
SEC. 41. Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts,
Assets and Record. - If the person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism is found, after his investigation, to be innocent by the investigating body, or is
acquitted, after his arraignment or his case is dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court,
the seizure, sequestration and freezing of his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records shall forthwith be deemed lifted by the investigating body or by the competent court, as the
case may be, and his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be deemed
released from such seizure, sequestration and freezing, and shall be restored to him without any delay
by the bank or financial institution concerned without any further action on his part. The filing of any
appeal on motion for reconsideration shall not state the release of said funds from seizure,
sequestration and freezing.

If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is convicted by a
final judgment of a competent trial court, his seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records shall be automatically forfeited in favor of the government.

Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him or her, the amount of Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500.000.00) a day for the period in which his properties, assets or funds were seized
shall be paid to him on the concept of liquidated damages. The amount shall be taken from the
appropriations of the police or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the enumerated
charges against him/her.

SEC. 42. Penalty for Unjustified Refusal to Restore or Delay in Restoring Seized, Sequestered and Frozen
Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any person who unjustifiably refuses
to restore or delays the restoration of seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found innocent by the
investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been dismissed or after he is
acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment.

SEC. 43. Penalty for the Loss, Misuse, Diversion or Dissipation of Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank
Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any person who is responsible for the loss,
misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole or any part of the seized, sequestered and frozen bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one
day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

SEC. 44. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. - Any public officer who has direct custody of a
detained person or under the provisions of this Act and who by his deliberate act, misconduct, or
inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall be guilty of an offense
and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if
the detained person has already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent
court; and (b) six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has not
been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court.

46
SEC. 45. Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. - The provisions of Republic Act No. 6981
(Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act) to the contrary notwithstanding, the immunity of
government witnesses testifying under this Act shall be governed by Sections 17 and 18 of Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court: Provided, however, That said witnesses shall be entitled to benefits granted to
witnesses under said Republic Act No.6981.

SEC. 46. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials. - The penalty of ten (10) years and
one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person, police or law
enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to
do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified information under this Act.

SEC. 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious Evidence. - The penalty of
twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person
who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any investigation or
hearing under this Act.

SEC. 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the judge shall set
the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to
ensure speedy trial.

SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another Prosecution under the Revised Penal Code
or any Special Penal Laws. - When a person has been prosecuted under a provision of this Act, upon a
valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included
in the offense charged under this Act.

SEC. 50. Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. - Upon acquittal, any person who is accused of
terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained or deprived of liberty or arrested without
a warrant as a result of such an accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically charged
against the appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or sanctioned
the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released within fifteen (15) days from the
date of the acquittal of the accused. The award of damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice
to the right of the acquitted accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible
for charging him with the case of terrorism.

Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release or refuses to release the amounts
awarded to the individual acquitted of the crime of terrorism as directed in the paragraph immediately
preceding shall suffer the penalty of six months of imprisonment.

If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained persons, the amount needed to
complete the compensation shall be taken from the current appropriations for intelligence, emergency,
social or other funds of the Office of the President.

In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current budget of the police or law enforcement
agency concerned, the amount shall be automatically included in the appropriations of the said agency
for the coming year.

47
SEC. 51. Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the Informant. - The police or law
enforcement officers to whom the name or a suspect in the crime of terrorism was first revealed shall
record the real name and the specific address of the informant.

The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the informant's name and address to
their superior officer who shall transmit the information to the Congressional Oversight Committee or to
the proper court within five days after the suspect was placed under arrest or his properties were
sequestered, seized or frozen.

The name and address of the informant shall be considered confidential and shall not be unnecessarily
revealed until after the proceedings against the suspect shall have been terminated.

SEC. 52. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of Book I of the Revised Penal Code
shall be applicable to this Act.

SEC. 53. Anti-Terrorism Council. - An Anti-Terrorism Council, hereinafter referred to, for brevity, as the
"Council," is hereby created. The members of the Council are: (1) the Executive Secretary, who shall be
its Chairperson; (2) the Secretary of Justice, who shall be its Vice Chairperson; and (3) the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs; (4) the Secretary of National Defense; (5) the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government; (6) the Secretary of Finance; and (7) the National Security Advisor, as its other members.

The Council shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility for the proper and effective
implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the country. The Council shall keep records of its
proceedings and decisions. All records of the Council shall be subject to such security classifications as
the Council may, in its judgment and discretion, decide to adopt to safeguard the safety of the people,
the security of the Republic, and the welfare of the nation.

The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency shall be the Secretariat of the Council. The Council shall
define the powers, duties, and functions of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as Secretariat
of the Council. The National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Office of Civil
Defense, the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Anti-Money Laundering
Council, the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the Philippine National Police intelligence
and investigative elements shall serve as support agencies for the Council.

The Council shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and effective anti-terrorism
plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and eradicate terrorism in the country and to
protect the people from acts of terrorism. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the Anti-
Terrorism Council to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority.

SEC. 54. Functions of the Council. - In pursuit of its mandate in the previous Section, the Council shall
have the following functions with due regard for the rights of the people as mandated by the
Constitution and pertinent laws:

1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against terrorists and acts of terrorism in
the country;

2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism in the country and mobilize
the entire nation against terrorism prescribed in this Act;

48
3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons accused or detained for the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and other offenses punishable under this Act, and monitor
the progress of their cases;

4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information system on terrorism, terrorist activities,
and counter-terrorism operations;

5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records belonging to
a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9160, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as
amended;

6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital information leading to the
apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction of person or persons who are liable for the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;

7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of other nations in the
struggle against international terrorism; and

8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, as the case may be, to handle all cases involving
the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and all matters incident to said crimes. The
Secretary of Justice shall assign a team of prosecutors from: (a) Luzon to handle terrorism cases filed in
the Regional Trial Court in Manila; (b) from the Visayas to handle cases filed in Cebu City; and (c) from
Mindanao to handle cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City.

SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human Rights shall give the
highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights of persons in
relation to the implementation of this Act; and for this purpose, the Commission shall have the
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who may have
violated the civil and political rights of persons suspected of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism.

SEC. 56. Creation of a Grievance Committee. - There is hereby created a Grievance Committee

composed of the Ombudsman, as chair, and the Solicitor General, and an undersecretary from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), as members, to receive and evaluate complaints against the actuations of
the police and law enforcement officials in the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall hold
office in Manila. The Committee shall have three subcommittees that will be respectively headed by the
Deputy Ombudsmen in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. The subcommittees shall respectively hold
office at the Offices of Deputy Ombudsman. Three Assistant Solicitors General designated by the
Solicitor General, and the regional prosecutors of the DOJ assigned to the regions where the Deputy
Ombudsmen hold office shall be members thereof. The three subcommittees shall assist the Grievance
Committee in receiving, investigating and evaluating complaints against the police and other law
enforcement officers in the implementation of this Act. If the evidence warrants it, they may file the
appropriate cases against the erring police and law enforcement officers. Unless seasonably disowned or
denounced by the complainants, decisions or judgments in the said cases shall preclude the filing of

49
other cases based on the same cause or causes of action as those that were filed with the Grievance
Committee or its branches.

SEC. 57. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. - No person suspected or convicted of the crime of terrorism
shall be subjected to extraordinary rendition to any country unless his or her testimony is needed for
terrorist related police investigations or judicial trials in the said country and unless his or her human
rights, including the right against torture, and right to counsel, are officially assured by the requesting
country and transmitted accordingly and approved by the Department of Justice.

SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing treaty of which
the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential application, the
provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in this Act within the terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the
Philippines; (2) to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act inside
the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine
airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or
diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official capacity; (5) to
individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said
crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity
was a factor in the commission of the crime; and (6) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Philippine
government.

SEC. 59. Joint Oversight Committee. - There is hereby created a Joint Oversight Committee to oversee
the implementation of this Act. The Oversight Committee shall be composed of five members each from
the Senate and the House in addition to the Chairs of the Committees of Public Order of both Houses
who shall also Chair the Oversight Committee in the order specified herein. The membership of the
Committee for every House shall at least have two opposition or minority members. The Joint Oversight
Committee shall have its own independent counsel. The Chair of the Committee shall rotate every six
months with the Senate chairing it for the first six months and the House for the next six months. In
every case, the ranking opposition or minority member of the Committee shall be the Vice Chair. Upon
the expiration of one year after this Act is approved by the President, the Committee shall review the
Act particularly the provision that authorize the surveillance of suspects of or persons charged with the
crime of terrorism. To that end, the Committee shall summon the police and law enforcement officers
and the members of the Anti-Terrorism Council and require them to answer questions from the
members of Congress and to submit a written report of the acts they have done in the implementation
of the law including the manner in which the persons suspected of or charged with the crime of
terrorism have been dealt with in their custody and from the date when the movements of the latter
were subjected to surveillance and his or her correspondences, messages, conversations and the like
were listened to or subjected to monitoring, recording and tapping. Without prejudice to its submitting
other reports, the Committee shall render a semiannual report to both Houses of Congress. The report
may include where necessary a recommendation to reassess the effects of globalization on terrorist
activities on the people, provide a sunset clause to or amend any portion of the Act or to repeal the Act
in its entirety. The courts dealing with anti-terrorism cases shall submit to Congress and the President a

50
report every six months of the status of anti-terrorism cases that have been filed with them starting
from the date this Act is implemented.

SEC. 60. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
remain and continue to be in full force and effect.

SEC. 61. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or regulations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.

SEC. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. - After the bill shall have been signed into law by the President, the
Act shall be published in three newspapers of national circulation; three newspapers of local circulation,
one each in llocos Norte, Baguio City and Pampanga; three newspapers of local circulation, one each in
Cebu, lloilo and Tacloban; and three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cagayan de Oro, Davao
and General Santos city.

51
Case on Human Security Act

Republic V. Herminio Harry Roque GR No. 204603 Sep. 24, 2013

Facts: On July 17, 2007, private respondents filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC,
assailing the constitutionality of the following sections of RA 9372: (a) Section 3, for being void for
vagueness; (b) Section 7, or violating the right to privacy of communication and due process and the
privileged nature of priest-penitent relationships; (c)Section 18, for violating due process, the
prohibition against ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as for contradicting Article 125  of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended; (d) Section 26, for violating the right to travel; and (e) Section 27,
for violating the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss contending that private respondents failed to satisfy the requisites
for declaratory relief. Likewise, they averred that the constitutionality of RA 9372 had already been
upheld by the Court in the Southern Hemisphere cases.

The RTC issued an Order which denied the subject motion to dismiss, finding that the Court did not pass
upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 and that private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief was
properly filed.

Issue: whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the subject motion to
dismiss.

Held: Yes. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when
such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
It is well-settled that the abuse of discretion to be qualified as "grave" must be so patent or gross as to
constitute an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty or to act at all in
contemplation of law.

The Court observes that while no grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed on the part of the RTC
when it found that the Court did not pass upon the constitutionality of RA 9372 in the Southern
Hemisphere cases, it, however, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled that private respondents’ petition
had met all the requisites for an action for declaratory relief. Consequently, its denial of the subject
motion to dismiss was altogether improper.

The Court, in Southern Hemisphere, did not make any definitive ruling on the constitutionality of RA
9372. The certiorari petitions in those consolidated cases were dismissed based solely on procedural
grounds, namely: (a) the remedy of certiorari was improper; (b) petitioners therein lack locus standi; and
(c) petitioners therein failed to present an actual case or controversy. Therefore, there was no grave
abuse of discretion.

Case law states that the following are the requisites for an action for declaratory relief:

first , the subject matter of the controversy must be a deed, will, contract or other written instrument,
statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; second , the terms of said documents and the
validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; third , there must have been no breach
of the documents in question; fourth , there must be an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one between persons whose interests are adverse; fifth , the issue must be ripe for judicial

52
determination; and sixth , adequate relief is not available through other means or other forms of
action or proceeding.

The Court observes that while the first, second, and third requirements appear to exist in this case, the
fourth, fifth, and sixth requirements, however, remain wanting.

As to the fourth requisite, there is serious doubt that an actual justiciable controversy or the "ripening
seeds" of one exists in this case.

Pertinently, a justiciable controversy refers to an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory. Corollary thereto, by
"ripening seeds" it is meant, not that sufficient accrued facts may be dispensed with, but that a dispute
may be tried at its inception before it has accumulated the asperity, distemper, animosity, passion, and
violence of a full blown battle that looms ahead. The concept describes a state of facts indicating
imminent and inevitable litigation provided that the issue is not settled and stabilized by tranquilizing
declaration.

A perusal of private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief would show that they have failed to
demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to sustain some direct injury as a
result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of RA 9372. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents’ fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government officials which
were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show how these remarks tended towards
any prosecutorial or governmental action geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them.
In other words, there was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. It is well to note that
private respondents also lack the required locus standi to mount their constitutional challenge against
the implementation of the above-stated provisions of RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and
personal interest in the case. While it has been previously held that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering
direct and personal injury, it must be stressed that cases involving the constitutionality of penal
legislation belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Towards this end,
compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct necessitate a closer
judicial scrutiny of locus standi, as in this case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled
doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.

As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that the controversy
at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on the above-discussed allegations
in private respondents’ petition, remain highly-speculative and merely theorized.1âwphi1 It is well-
settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it. This private respondents failed to demonstrate in the case at bar.

Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a discussion on the
availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to the private respondents exists in
the first place.

All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for declaratory relief, as
well as the irrelevance of the sixth requisite, private respondents’ petition for declaratory relief should

53
have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion.

54