HR – Chapter 1

Simon VS CHR

Facts: Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case" on
vendors of North EDSA.

Constitutional Issue :

Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.

Ruling :

Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall
within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights".

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all parts of the
world.

Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion,
academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect public officials, to be
elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education,
employment and social services.

Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity...Because
they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.

Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right,
innate and inalienable.

CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or administration
of the government.

POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the
government.
Soriao VS Pineda

Facts: Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan, Aurora (S.Y.1993 to 1994). Due to
his reputation of talking back to school authority during the past years, he was refused readmission to complete
his fourth and final year of high school through a verbal notice not to readmit. Soriao questioned the notice,
averring that he was deprived of a hearing on the matter and thus

the verbal notice was a denial of his right to due process. The administration ignored the student’s

 plea to reconsider its

decision to deny him readmission claiming, “it was their prerogative.”

Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to the CA.

Issue: WON the petitioner was denied of his right to education

Held: YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C. Angara Memorial High School to
allow Soriao to enroll and study after he was meted out a disciplinary action without due process. The Court of
Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2
and Article II, Sections 13and 17 of the 1987 Constitution provide: Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such
education accessible to all.
Oposa VS Factoran

Facts: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was
filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion
and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. 

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. 

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing
the action.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.

RULING: First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint
focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in
Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the
environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural
resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases
for policy formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all
those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the
said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or
respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon
the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.

Baldoza VS Dimaano

Facts: In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal, Batangas, charges
Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse of authority in refusing to allow
employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in
connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality.

Respondent answered that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court records but that the
same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He
further asserted that a court has the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and furnishing
copies may be refuse when the motivation is not serious and legitimate interest, out of whim or fancy or mere
curiosity or to gratify private site or promote public scandal.

The case was thereupon referred to Judge Francisco Mat. Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary
hearing on October 16, 1975, Taal Mayor Corazon A. Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint but the motion
was denied by the Investigating Judge. After formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of
respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rules and conditions imposed by Judge Dimaano on the inspection of the docket books
infringe upon the right of individuals to information.

RULING: No. As found by the Investigating Judge, the respondent allowed the complainant to open and view the
docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that
the rules and conditions imposed by the respondent were unreasonable. The access to public records predicated
on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern.

The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for
both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably
ceases.”  However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions
imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger
that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.
David VS PGMA

Facts: President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a state of national emergency. This case covers the seven
consolidated petitions for cetiorari assailing the constitutionality of PP1017 and General Order No. 5 implementing
the former. it is alleged that in doing so, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse  of discretion
and that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic
institutions are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the constitution. 

ISSUE:
Whether or not PP1017 and GO No. 5 are constitutional

HELD:
The assailed PP1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees.
legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature, Section 1, Article VI categorically states that
"the legislative power shall be vested  in the Congress of the Philippines, which shall consist of a Senate and a
House of Representatives". To be sure, neither martial law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can
justify President Arroyo's exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. It follows that these decrees are void
and, therefore, cannot be enforced. With respect to "laws", she cannot call the military to enforce or implement
certain laws such as customs laws, laws governing family and property relations, laws on obligations and contracts,
and the like. She can only order the military under PP1017, to enforce laws pertinent to its duty to suppress lawless
violence.

Almario VS Exec. Secretary

Facts: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the NCCA decided to team up and jointly administer the
National Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining the nominees and on the final deliberation,
a final list of four names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico
Aguilar-Alcuaz.

They submitted this recommendation to the President. According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was
referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President
allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private
respondents.

Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-
Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.

Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the Order of National
Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation
of the right to equal protection

RULING: Yes. It should be recalled that one of the respondents was disqualified to be nominated for being the
Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Masa and Caparas did not make it to the
preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist.

Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the
rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists.
The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Masa and Moreno fails to pass rational
scrutiny. No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would
justify deviating from the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional
position.

In view of the foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abads right to equal protection, an interest that is
substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.

Vivares VS St. Theresa’s College

Facts: In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook
several pictures of her and her classmates (Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.

Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through
her students, viewed and downloaded said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for
appropriate action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their
graduation ceremonies scheduled in March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the
school from barring the students in the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ
of habeas data against the school. They argued, among others, that:

1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a
reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.

2.  The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent.
Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them
to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the children were intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images
happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject
data and have such data be declared illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy.

The Cebu RTC eventually denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas data is proper.

HELD: Yes, it is proper but in this case, it will not prosper.

Contrary to the arguments of STC, the Supreme Court ruled that:

1. The petition for writ of habeas data can be availed of even if this is not a case of extralegal killing or enforced
disappearance; and
2. The writ of habeas data can be availed of against STC even if it is not an entity engaged in the business of
“gathering, collecting, or storing data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of
the aggrieved party”.

First, the Rule on Habeas Data does not state that it can be applied only in cases of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances. Second, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data.

Right to Privacy on Social Media (Online Networking Sites)

The Supreme Court ruled that if an online networking site (ONS) like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user
makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she has a reasonable expectation of privacy (right to informational
privacy, that is). Thus, such privacy must be respected and protected.

In this case, however, there is no showing that the students concerned made use of such privacy tools. Evidence
would show that that their post (status) on Facebook were published as “Public”.

Facebook has the following settings to control as to who can view a user’s posts on his “wall” (profile page):

(a) Public – the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;

(b) Friends of Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;

(c) Friends – only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;

(d) Custom – the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook user; and

(e) Only Me – the digital image can be viewed only by the user.

The default setting is “Public” and if a user wants to have some privacy, then he must choose any setting other
than “Public”. If it is true that the students concerned did set the posts subject of this case so much so that only
five people can see them (as they claim), then how come most of their classmates were able to view them. This
fact was not refuted by them. In fact, it was their classmates who informed and showed their teacher, Escudero, of
the said pictures. Therefore, it appears that Tan et al never use the privacy settings of Facebook hence, they have
no reasonable expectation of privacy on the pictures of them scantily clad.

STC did not violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner which the school gathered the pictures cannot be
considered illegal. As it appears, it was the classmates of the students who showed the picture to their teacher and
the latter, being the recipient of said pictures, merely delivered them to the proper school authority and it was for
a legal purpose, that is, to discipline their students according to the standards of the school (to which the students
and their parents agreed to in the first place because of the fact that they enrolled their children there).
Pestilos VS Genoroso

Facts: FACTS:
The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary
Investigation on the ground that there no valid warrantless took place. The RTC denied the motion and the CA
affirmed the denial.
Records show that an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. The latter called
the Central Police District to report the incident and acting on this report, SPO1 Monsalve dispatched SPO2 Javier
to go to the scene of the crime and render assistance. SPO2, together with augmentation personnel arrived at the
scene of the crime less than one hour after the alleged altercation and saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten.
 
Atty. Generoso then pointed the petitioners as those who mauled him which prompted the police officers to
“invite” the petitioners to go to the police station for investigation. At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor
found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon who fortunately survived the
attack. Petitioners aver that they were not validly arrested without a warrant.
 

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners validly arrested without warrant when the police officers did not witness the crime and arrived
only less than an hour after the alleged altercation?
 
HELD:
YES, the petitioners were validly arrested without warrant. Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that: When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
 
The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just
been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.
 
The Court's appreciation of the elements that "the offense has just been committed" and ''personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it" depended on the particular circumstances of
the case. The element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances", however, under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires clarification. Circumstances may pertain to events or actions
within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime.
Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest
if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the
existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime.
 
However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made
immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy. In other words,
the clincher in the element of ''personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of
immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered.
 With the facts and circumstances of the case at bar that the police officers gathered and which they have
personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime, it is
reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances justifying
the petitioners’ warrantless arrests.
 Hence, the petitioners were validly arrested and the subsequent inquest proceeding was likewise appropriate
Sen. Jinggoy Estrada VS Ombudsman

Facts: Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal
complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed
their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.

On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other
Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made
“[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not
have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).”

The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

ISSUE: WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law

HELD: NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process. First. There is no law or rule
which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.

The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II
of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.

Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his
constitutional right to due process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a
compulsory requirement of due process in a preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent
with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section 3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman supports Sen.
Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the Ombudsman to
furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the
order to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules
of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his
witnesses] have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the
affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to submit, within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted by any respondent.
Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of
the complainant. No grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27
March 2014 Order which denied Sen. Estrada’s Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand
the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his
innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by
procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of
evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief”
as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation
is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists
prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by
the evidence presented and the facts obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the
accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as
laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in
GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish
the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than
evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of
probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not
technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men,
not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting
the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because
such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However,
in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial
evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as
substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include
hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability
of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.

Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-
affidavits of his co-respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-
respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions
for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen. Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint
Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The Ombudsman faithfully complied with the
existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond what the Rules required.
Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.

The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to
preliminary investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can
abolish preliminary investigations without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as
prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply
and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. Preliminary investigations do not
adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed by Ang Tibay,
as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision
against the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of
guilt is required. To apply Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of
evidence required to establish probable cause. The respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as
amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary
investigations, the respondent has no such rights.

Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial
and cannot be the fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the
same public officer may be the investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator
and hearing officer may be under the control and supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or
Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, does not apply to preliminary investigations.
To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental and essential requirements
in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation of
constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts
throughout the country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer,
outside of the prosecution service, to determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final
judgment would have to be released from prison because their conviction violated constitutional due process.

Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.