1.

Villanueva vs Castaneda, 154 SCRA 142 – Bea Isabelita Guevara

G.R. No. L-61311 September 2l, 1987

FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, FERNANDO CAISIP, ANTONIO LIANG, FELINA MIRANDA, RICARDO PUNO,
FLORENCIO LAXA, and RENE OCAMPO, petitioners, vs. HON. MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR., Presiding Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch III, VICENTE A. MACALINO, Officer-in-Charge, Office of
the Mayor, San Fernando, Pampanga, respondents.

Facts: There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, a strip of
land measuring 12 by 77 meters on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is
commonly known as a talipapa. This is the subject of the herein petition. The petitioners claim they have a right to
remain in and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the municipal
government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as illegal constructions on public
property. At the petitioners' behest, we have issued a temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo
between the parties pending our decision.

This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No.
218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to construct
permanent stags and sell in the above-mentioned place. The action was protested on November 10, 1961, where
the Court of First Instance of issued a writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from constructing
the said stalls until final resolution of the controversy. On January 18, 1964, while this case was pending, the
municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking
place and as the public plaza of the municipality, 4 thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961.
Four years later, on November 2, 1968, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land
occupied by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could not be
the subject of private occupancy.

The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were not evicted from the place; in fact, according to
then they and the 128 other persons were in 1971 assigned specific areas or space allotments therein for which
they paid daily fees to the municipal government. Then, on January 12, 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens
and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for the immediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore
the subject property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza

Acting thereon after an investigation conducted by the municipal attorney, respondent Vicente A. Macalino, as
officer-in-charge of the office of the mayor of San Fernando, issued on June 14, 1982, a resolution requiring the
municipal treasurer and the municipal engineer to demolish the stalls in the subject place beginning July 1, 1982

Issue/s: Whether or not the resolution in 1961 conferred contractual rights to the stall owners making them lawful
lessees of the land

Ruling: The petition must be DISMISSED

There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a
public plaza, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. 2040. This finding was made after consideration of the
antecedent facts as especially established by the testimony of former San Fernando Mayor Rodolfo Hizon, who later
became governor of Pampanga, that the National Planning Commission had reserved the area for a public plaza as
early as 1951. This intention was reiterated in 1964 through the adoption of Resolution No. 29.
 The basic contention of the petitioners is that the disputed area is under lease to them by virtue of contracts they
had entered into with the municipal government, first in 1961 insofar as the original occupants were concerned, and
later with them and the other petitioners by virtue of the space allocations made in their favor in 1971 for which they
saw they are paying daily fees. However, the parties belabor this argument needlessly.

Exactly in point is Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, where the Supreme Court declared:

There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially
of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement according to law. Town plazas
are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general They
are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.

Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed
premises and cannot insist in remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should
have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was decided, the
municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the
parking place and public plaza of the municipality.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the
agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a
contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied
reservation of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to
change the provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general
welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to and limited by the paramount
police power.
2. Republic vs Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 639 – Jomilkevin Torne
Republic of the Philippines (Director of Lands) v. Court of Appeals
Court of First Instance- found that Lots 1 and 2 are accretion of the land covered by TCT No. 89709 and ordered
their registration in the names of the private respondents
Court of Appeals- affirmed the decision

Doctrine- Art. 457 of the NCC

 To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current waters.
This requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is
said to n place.
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water
3. That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
 The riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or
designed to bring about accretion.
Facts:
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Bario Ubihan, Meycauayan, bulacan nordering on the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property- Lot
1, 2 and 3 PSU 131892. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands
filled a written opposition to the application of registration. Private respondents filled a partial withdrawal of the
application and Lot 3 was withdrawn from the application. The lower court rendered decision granting the application
on the findings that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondent’s fishponds covered by TCT No.
89709. The Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the lower
court. The petitioner sublits that there is no accretion to speak of under Art. 457 of the NCC because what actually
happened is that the private respondent simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan
River, and thus, if there is an accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. On the other hand, private respondents rely on the testimony
of Mrs. Viriginia Acuna regarding the Lots 1 & 2.
Issue: Whether or not Lots 1 & 2 are accretion which belong to the private respondents and thus can be registrated
under their name.
Ruling:
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the NCC all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work
of nature. There is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually
through the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The court agree with the observation of SolGen that it is
preposterous to believe that almost 4 hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the rivers. The lone
witness of the respondents who happens to be their overseer noticed only the accretion sometime in 1939, thus,
their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual increase to their land in the years before 1939. There is
evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of
the rivers. The alluvial deposit came into being not because of the sole effect of the river’s current but as a result of
the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry
land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river’s current on the fishpond adjoining it. The lots in question were not
included in the survey of their adjacent property on 1940, it was also declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or
33 years after it has supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas
could not have been there in 1939, they existed only after the respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of
the Meycauayan river. What respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation. Wherefore, instant petition is granted.
4. MIAA vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100709 – Ken Lennart Millar
5. Lanzar vs Director of Lands, 78 SCRA 130 – Thea Elea Jimenez

G.R. No. L-31934 July 29, 1977

RAMON LANZAR, petitioner

vs.

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and CITY OF ILOILO, Respondents.

FACTS:

Ramon Lanzar filed an application for registration a parcel of land alleging that he is the owner in fee simple
of such land. The Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo filed an opposition to the application on the ground that the
land in question is a foreshore land which forms part of the public domain and is needed by the City as a road right
of way of the Molo Arevalo Boulevard.

The trial court ruled in favour of Lanzar holding that the property in question had been possessed by the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest, publicly, continuously and adversely for more than 30 years and that the City failed
to show proof that said land is necessary for public utility or establishment of special industries.

The Director of Lands and the City of Iloilo appealed to the CA which reversed the trial court’s decision, hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE: Is the land in question part of public domain?

RULING: Yes. The land in question is an accretion of Lot No. 1899, it having formed by the gradual action of
the sea before 1922. Under Article 4 of the Law of Waters, it is stated that “Lands added to the shores by accretions
and alluvium deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer
washed by the waters of the sea, and are not necessary for the purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners
of the estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof.”

NOTES:

Article 341 of the Civil Code (Article 422 of the NCC) states that, “Property of public ownership, when no longer
devoted to general uses or to the requirements of the defense of the territory, shall become a part of the State
property.”

The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant
whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are for
public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State, such lands, thrown up by the action
of the sea, and the shores adjacent thereto, are not susceptible of prescription, inasmuch as, being dedicated to the
public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance of Article 1936 of the Civil Code.
6. Villarico vs Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 193 – Jomil Kevin Torne

FACTS:

Spouses Teofilo and Maxima Villarico, filed an application for confirmation of the title over a parcel of land in
Ubihan,Meycauyan,Bulacan. Spouses Villarico alleged that they are the absolute owners of subject property, having
bought the same from the spouses, Segundo Villarico (Teofilo's father) and Mercedes Cardenas, that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession thereof for more than thirty
(30) years, that they are not aware of any mortgage or encumbrance thereon nor of any person having an estate or
interest therein, and that the land involved is not within the forest zone or government reservation.

Said application was opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms part of the
public domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan, Bulacan and is not available for private
appropriation.

The CFI dismissed the case since the property forms part of the public domain therefore the certificate of
title is void. CFI stated that in accordance to past jurisprudence if the land in question still forms part of the public
forest, then, possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under
the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648).

The CA affirmed the findings of the Trial Court, thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

Whether the disputed land still forms part of the public domain?

HELD:

Yes

As determined by the Lower Courts, no evidence of Declassification was made by the Director of Forestry declaring
that land is alienable and disposable. This scenario makes land incapable for private appropriation. This is even if
the alleged owner is in possession of land for more than 30 years.

Indeed, forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long, does not ripen
into a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title or confirmation of an
imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain.
7. Ignacio vs. Director of Lands, 108 Phil 335 – CH RD

TOPIC: Powers of the Court to reclassify a land; Acquisitive Prescription

G.R. No. L-12958 May 30, 1960

FAUSTINO IGNACIO, applicant-appellant,

vs.

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and LAUREANO VALERIANO,oppositors-appellees.

DOCTRINE:

· Courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to determine whether any public
land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters. Only the executive and
possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any
land so gained by the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of
special industries, on for coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by said
departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain

· The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without
previous permission from the proper authorities, regardless of the years he held the same as the owner
and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such land is outside
of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain as it is intended for public uses and for the
benefit of those who live nearby.

PROCEDURE:

1. RTC dismissed the application of Ignacio holding that the parcel of land in question, although an
accretion to the land of the applicant-appellant, does not belong to him but forms part of the public
domain without declaring the same to be the necessary for any public use or purpose and in not ordering
in the present registration proceedings

FACTS:

On January 25, 1950, Ignacio filed an application for the registration of a parcel of land (mangrove), situated in
barrio Gasac, Navotas, Rizal. He claimed that he owned the parcel applied for by right of accretion. To the
application, the Director of Lands, Laureano Valeriano and Domingo Gutierrez filed oppositions, where the latter
withdrew his’. The Director of Lands claimed the parcel applied for as a portion of the public domain, for the reason
that neither the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interest possessed sufficient title thereto, not having acquired it
either by composition title from the Spanish government or by possessory information title under the Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894, and that he had not possessed the same openly, continuously and adversely under a bona
fide claim of ownership since July 26, 1894. In his turn, Valeriano alleged he was holding the land by virtue of a
permit granted him by the Bureau of Fisheries, issued on January 13, 1947, and approved by the President.

It is not disputed that the land applied for adjoins a parcel owned by the applicant which he had acquired from the
Government by virtue of a free patent title in 1936. It has also been established that the parcel in question was
formed by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the Manila Bay which boarders it on the
southwest. Applicant Ignacio claims that he had occupied the land since 1935, planting it with api-api trees, and that
his possession thereof had been continuous, adverse and public for a period of twenty years until said possession
was distributed by oppositor Valeriano.
On the other hand, the Director of Lands sought to prove that the parcel is foreshore land, covered by the ebb and
flow of the tide and, therefore, formed part of the public domain.

Appellant contends that the court could have declared the land not to be part of public domain such that the land
having ceased to be a public domain, became private and patrimonial property of the State. And that the parcel
belongs to him by law of accretion, stating Article 456 of the New Civil Code and he acquired the land through
acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioner’s contentions are tenable.

HELD:

NO. Courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called upon to determine whether a
land is to be used for public purposes. However, it is only limited there. A formal declaration of reclassification of
land should come from the government, specifically from the executive department or the legislature. These bodies
have the power to declare that a land in question is no longer needed for public use, some public use, or for the
improvement of national wealth.

Article 457 cited by the appellant is inapplicable as it refers only to accretion or deposits on the bank of rivers.
Moreover, petitioner’s occupation to the said land formed upon by accretion is illegal and is a mere detainer as it is
regardless of how many years he had already occupied or possessed such, without previous permission from
proper authority.

REASONING:

Under Article 4 of the Law of Waters it provides that, “ Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial
deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries,
or for the coastguard service, the Government shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates
adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.”

Article 457 of the New Civil Code (Article 366, Old Civil Code), which provides that, “To the owners of lands
adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the
waters.”

APPLICATION:

Interpreting Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866, in the case of Natividad vs. Director of Lands, (CA) 37 Off.
Gaz., 2905, it was there held that:

Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore is no longer washed by the
waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for coastguard service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the executive and possibly the
legislative departments have the authority and the power to make the declaration that any land so gained by
the sea, is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, on for
coast-guard service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms
part of the public domain. (Natividad vs. Director of Lands, supra.)

According to this Tribunal in the case of Vicente Joven y Monteverde vs. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134, (cited
in Velayo's Digest, VI. I, p. 52).
 . . . it is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in a position to determine
whether any public land are to be used for the purposes specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.

As applied in the case at bar, the government, particularly the executive and legislative branch, made no declaration
that the land in question already ceased to be a public domain.

The petitioner’s contention that said land belongs to him under Article 457 of NCC is without merit because it refers
to accretion or deposits on the banks of rivers, while the accretion in the present case was caused by action of the
Manila Bay:

Bay. — An opening into the land where the water is shut in on all sides except at the entrance; an
inlet of the sea; an arm of the sea, distinct from a river, a bending or curbing of the shore of the sea or of a
lake. 7 C.J. 1013-1014 (Cited in Francisco, Philippine Law of Waters and Water Rights p. 6)

Also, having possessed the same for over ten years, is not plausible because it is sufficient to say that land of the
public domain is not subject to ordinary prescription. In the case of Insular Government vs. Aldecoa & Co.,
19 Phil., 505 this Court said:

The occupation or material possession of any land formed upon the shore by accretion, without previous
permission from the proper authorities, although the occupant may have held the same as owner for
seventeen years and constructed a wharf on the land, is illegal and is a mere detainer, inasmuch as such
land is outside of the sphere of commerce; it pertains to the national domain; it is intended for public uses
and for the benefit of those who live nearby.

CONCLUSION:

Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the Legislature, to the
effect that the land in question is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries,
they continue to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership. Hence, the
mangrove land claimed by the petitioner is still deemed to be part of public domain.
8. Dacanay Jr. vs Asistio Jr, 208 SCRA 404 – Akiko Alfad

G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992

FRANCISCO U. DACANAY, petitioner,

vs.

MAYOR MACARIO ASISTIO, JR., CITY ENGR. LUCIANO SARNE, JR. of Kalookan City, Metro Manila, MILA
PASTRANA AND/OR RODOLFO TEOFE, STALLHOLDERS AND REPRESENTING CO-STALLHOLDERS,
respondents.

Doctrine: A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code).
Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.

Facts:
On January 5, 1979, MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Commission,
designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant,
thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea markets in that city. One of those streets was the
"Heroes del '96" where the petitioner lives.

In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market stalls on
Heroes del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets.

To stop Mayor Martinez' efforts to clear the city streets, herein respondents and other stallowners filed an
action for prohibition against the City of Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City Engineer and/or their
deputies (Civil Case No. C-12921) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 122, praying the court to
issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to discontinue the demolition of their stalls
during the pendency of the action.

Initially, the court issued the writ. But eventually it dismissed and lifted the writ it had earlier issued. The
court found that Heroes del ’96, Gozon and Gonzales streets are of public dominion, hence, outside the
commerce of men.

However, shortly after the decision in Civil Case No. C-12921, Mayor Martinez’s successor, respondent
Mayor Asistio Jr., did not pursue Mayor Martinez’s policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets.

Invoking the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. C-12921, Francisco U. Dacanay, a concerned citizen,
taxpayer and registered voter of Barangay 74, Zone 7, District II of Caloocan City, who resides on Heroes del
'96 Street, one of the affected streets, wrote a letter dated March 7, 1988 to Mayor Asistio, Jr., calling his
attention to the illegally-constructed stalls on Heroes del '96 Street and asked for their demolition.

Dacanay followed up that letter with another one dated April 7, 1988 addressed to the mayor and the city
engineer, Luciano Sarne, Jr. (who replaced Engineer Arturo Samonte), inviting their attention to the Regional
Trial Court's decision in Civil Case No. 12921. There was still no response.

Dacanay sought President Corazon C. Aquino's intervention by writing her a letter on the matter. His
letter was referred to the city mayor for appropriate action. The acting Caloocan City secretary, Asuncion
 Manalo, in a letter dated August 1, 1988, informed the Presidential Staff Director that the city officials were still
studying the issue of whether or not to proceed with the demolition of the market stalls.

Dacanay filed a complaint against Mayor Asistio and Engineer Sarne (OMB-0-89-0146) in the Office of
the OMBUDSMAN. In their letter-comment dated April 3, 1989, said city officials explained that in view of the
huge number of stallholders involved, not to mention their dependents, it would be harsh and inhuman to eject
them from the area in question, for their relocation would not be an easy task.

As the stallholders continued to occupy Heroes del '96 Street, through the tolerance of the public
respondents, and in clear violation of the decision it Civil Case No. C-12921, Dacanay filed the present
petition for mandamus on June 19, 1990, praying that the public respondents be ordered to enforce the final
decision in Civil Case No. C-12921.

Issue:

WN public streets or thoroughfares can be leased or licensed to market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or
resolution of the Metro Manila Commission.

Ruling:

No, the court ruled that the disputed areas are from which the private respondents' market stalls are
sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is
property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the
commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva et al. vs. Castañeda and
Macalino, 15 SCRA 142, citing the Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu vs. Municipal Council
of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; and Muyot vs. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860).

The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of Heroes del '96 Street as a
vending area for stallholders who were granted licenses by the city government contravenes the general law
that reserves city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may not infringe upon the
vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel
for vehicles and pedestrians. As early as 1989, the public respondents bad started to look for feasible alternative
sites for flea markets. They have had more than ample time to relocate the street vendors.

WHEREFORE, it having been established that the petitioner and the general public have a legal right to
the relief demanded and that the public respondents have the corresponding duty, arising from public office, to
clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public purpose (Enriquez vs. Bidin, 47 SCRA 183; City of
Manila vs. Garcia et al., 19 SCRA, 413 citing Unson vs. Lacson, 100 Phil. 695), the respondents City Mayor and
City Engineer of Caloocan City or their successors in office are hereby ordered to immediately enforce and
implement the decision in Civil Case No. C-1292 declaring that Heroes del '96, V. Gozon, and Gonzales Streets
are public streets for public use, and they are ordered to remove or demolish, or cause to be removed or
demolished, the market stalls occupying said city streets with utmost dispatch within thirty (30)days from notice
of this decision. This decision is immediately executory.
9. Laurel vs Garcia, 187 SCRA 797 – Francis Owen Yongco-Raymundo

DOCTRINE: A property belonging to the State and intended for some public service Continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such. Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct
legal premises.

PROCEDURE:

1. Two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their representatives and agents from
proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome
Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan on Feb 20 1990

2. SC granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order effective February 20, 1990.

3. Petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus

4. The two petitions were consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of the parties in the
Laurel case were deliberated upon.

5. Respondents filed a motion for an extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047,
followed by a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8,
1990

6. A third motion for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time
which we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the respondents to the length of time the
petitions have been pending.

7. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply.
We noted his motion and resolved to decide the two (2) cases.

FACTS:

These two (2) petitions for prohibition seek to enjoin respondents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of
the 3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chrome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan. The latter case also, prays
for a writ of mandamus to fully disclose to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the
Roppongi property. The said property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government
under the Reparation Agreement entered into with Japan as part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for
their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II. The other three (3) properties include
Nampeidai Property (present site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery), Kobe Commercial Property (commercial lot
being used as a warehouse and parking lot for consulate staff) and Kobe Residential Property (resident lot which is
now vacant).

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550M would be payable in twenty (20) years in
accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments. The
procurements are to be divided into government sector and those for private parties in projects, the latter shall be
made available only to Filipino citizens or to 100% Filipino-owned entities in national development projects.

The Roppongi property was acquired under the heading “Government Sector” for the Chancery of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeida due to the need for major repairs. However, the Roppongi
property has remained underdeveloped since that time.
Although there was a proposal to lease the property with the provision to have buildings built at the expense of the
lessee, the same was not acted favorably upon by the government. Instead, President Aquino issued EO No. 296
entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations’ capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease
or dispositions. Thereafter, amidst the oppositions by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government
pushed for the sale of reparation properties, starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for
bidding at a minimum floor price of $225M. The first was a failure, while the second has been postponed and later
restrained by the SC.

Amongst the arguments of the respondents is that the subject property is not governed by our Civil Code, but rather
by the laws of Japan where the property is located. They relied upon the rule of lex situs which is used in
determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the Philippine
Government?;

2. Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell
the Roppongi property

HELD:

1. NO. There can be no doubt that the property is of public dominion and the respondents have failed to
show that it has become patrimonial. The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is
expressly spelled out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding
contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government. As
property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. Its
ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and enjoyment, an application to the
satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as
a juridical person, but the citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the
object of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).

Even though the respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property by
insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply, we see no reason why a conflict of law rule
should apply when no conflict of law situation exists.

2. NO. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole
will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the Congress. It
requires executive and legislative concurrence. A law or a formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the sale of
the property is needed. None has been enacted for this purpose.

REASONING:

FIRST ISSUE: The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.

ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of similar character;
 (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.

ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property.

The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil Code as property
belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such
that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of
the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private
International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted
to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

SECOND ISSUE: Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides

Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. — In cases in which
the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any deed or other instrument
conveying the title to real estate or to any other property the value of which is in excess of one
hundred thousand pesos, the respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers
which, together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the
Philippines for approval by the same. . . “ (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292).

SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. — Whenever real property of the Government
is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the
government by the following:

(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, by the
President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by law in another officer.

(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the name of any political
subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or
instrumentality. (Emphasis supplilkNL ed)

APPLICATION:

FIRST ISSUE: The property is correctly classified under Art 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State
and intended for some public service. The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. A property continues to be part of the
public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of
the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).

Respondents enumerated various pronouncements by concerned public officials insinuating a change of intention.
Court emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service
and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite Abandonment cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and
indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v.
Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988])Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
Mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property's
original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as
earlier stated, there simply was a shortage of government funds.

With regard to the conflict of laws, both elements do not exist in the case. The issues are not concerned with the
validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the government officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the state and the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect the sale, which should be governed by Philippine law The rule of lex situs does not
apply.

SECOND ISSUE:

There is no law authorizing its conveyance. It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the
government on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted
by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. The sale of the said property may be authorized
only by Congress through a duly enacted statute, and there is no such law.

Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property
does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a
formal declaration abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy considerations
and calls for a fact-finding investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine government
properties in Japan.

CONCLUSION:

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that the Roppongi property is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. Any such conversion happens only if the property is
withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property
continues to be part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]).

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued
enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February
20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.
10. Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. vs Bercilles, 66 SCRA 431 – Yumi Camba

Facts:

On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces
Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as an abandoned road and was thereafter excluded in the City Development Plan.
Subsequently, another resolution was passed authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public
bidding. The lot was awarded to petitioner Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene and the Acting City Mayor executed a deed of
absolute sale. Petitioner then filed an application for registration of title over the land with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the
property sought to be registered is considered as part of the public domain being a public road intended for public
use. Thus, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual. After hearing the parties, the trial court
issued an order dismissing the petitioner’s application for registration of title.

Issues:

(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph 34, give the
City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned?

(2) Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu
which may be the object of a common contract?

Ruling:

(1) Yes. The City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. The Revised Charter of Cebu City
provides that one of the legislative powers of the City Council is “to close any city road, street, or alley,
boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or
conveyed”.

(2) Yes. The portion of the city street subject of petitioner’s application for registration of title was withdrawn
from public use, hence, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can
be the object of an ordinary contract. Article 422 of the New Civil Code provides that “property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State”. Accordingly, the Court held that the withdrawal of the property in question from
public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner can register title over
the lot in question.
11. Rabuco vs Villegas, G.R. No. L-24661 – Jek Davila
Case Title: Rabuco v. Villegas

FACTS:

RA3120 was enacted on June 17, 1961 converting certain parcels of land in the City of Manila which are reserved
as communal property into disposable or alienable lands of the state and providing for their subdivision and sale. It
includes a lot located in San Andres, Malate, which was occupied by petitioners (illegal settlers). However, what is
sought by the respondent City Mayor and City Engineer of Manila was not only the demolition of the petitioners'
houses in the premises in controversy, but their ejectment as well. Subsequently, a large fire gutted the Malate area,
which includes said property. City officials then took over the lot and kept petitioners reconstructing or repairing their
burned dwellings. The petitioners insisted that RA 3120 should be implemented to them as the tenants and bona
fide occupants thereof. RA 3120 does intend not only the dismissal of the ejectment proceedings against the
petitioners from the land in controversy upon their motion, but as well that any demolition order issued against them
shall also have to be dismissed.

The appellate court, finding that the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 was "the dominant and inextricable issue
in the appeal" over which it had no jurisdiction and that the trial court incorrectly "sidetracked" the issue, thereafter
certified the said cases to this Court.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the RA 3120 is constitutional? 2) Whether or not the properties in dispute may be disposed
without paying just compensation to the City of Manila?

RULINGS:

1) The Court herein upholds the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 on the strength of the established doctrine
that the subdivision of communal land of the State (although titled in the name of the municipal corporation) and
conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots by sale on installment basis to bona fide occupants by Congressional
authorization and disposition does not constitute infringements of the due process clause or the eminent domain
provisions of the Constitution but operates simply as a manifestation of the legislature's right of control and power to
deal with State property.

2) The lots in question are owned by the City of Manila in its public and governmental capacity and are therefore
public property over which Congress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it
which cannot be deprived from the City without just compensation and without due process. RA 3120 expressly
provides that the properties are reserved for the purpose of communal property and ordered its conversion into
disposable and alienable lands of the state to be sold to its bona fide occupants. It has been an established doctrine
that the state reserves its rights to classify its property under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere
on such power of the state.

Since the challenge of respondents city officials against the constitutionality of Republic Act 3120 must fail as the
City was not deprived thereby of anything it owns by acquisition with its private or corporate funds either under the
due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of the Constitution, the provisions of said Act must be
enforced and petitioners are entitled to the injunction as prayed for implementing the Act's prohibition against their
ejectment and demolition of their houses.
The appealed decision of the lower court (in Case No. L-24916) is hereby set aside, and the preliminary injunction
heretofore issued on August 17, 1965 is hereby made permanent. The respondent Secretary of Agrarian Reform as
successor agency of the Land Tenure Administration may now proceed with the due implementation of Republic Act
3120 in accordance with its terms and provisions
12. Macasiano vs Diokno, G.R. No. 97764 – Janine Jacob

EN BANC
G.R. No. 97764 August 10, 1992
LEVY D. MACASIANO v. HONORABLE ROBERTO C. DIOKNO

Respondents:
The respondent municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz,
Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council authorizing and
regulating the use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within Metropolitan Manila as
sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain terms and conditions.
The municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution authorizing Parañaque Mayor Ferrer to enter into contract
with any service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and management of flea markets and/or
vending areas.
Respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the
latter shall operate, maintain and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit
dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque. Consequently, market stalls were put up by
respondent Palanyag on the said streets.
Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and
confiscation of stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned to respondent
Palanyag. He wrote a letter to respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market;
otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.

Petitioner:
The Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner, contends that municipal roads are used for public service and are
therefore public properties; that as such, they cannot be subject to private appropriation or private contract by any
person, even by the respondent Municipality of Parañaque. Petitioner submits that a property already dedicated to
public use cannot be used for another public purpose and that absent a clear showing that the Municipality of
Parañaque has been granted by the legislature specific authority to convert a property already in public use to
another public use, respondent municipality is, therefore, bereft of any authority to close municipal roads for the
establishment of a flea market. Petitioner also submits that assuming that the respondent municipality is authorized
to close streets, it failed to comply with the conditions set forth by the Metropolitan Manila Authority for the approval
of the ordinance providing for the establishment of flea markets on public streets. Lastly, petitioner contends that by
allowing the municipal streets to be used by market vendors the municipal council of respondent municipality
violated its duty under the Local Government Code to promote the general welfare of the residents of the
municipality.

RTC: Upheld the legality of the disputed ordinance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the Municipal Council of Parañaque authorizing the lease and
use of public streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid?
RULING: NO.
The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property for public use and patrimonial property
(Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states:
Art. 424. Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists of the provincial roads, city
streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said
provinces, cities or municipalities.
All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to
the provisions of special laws.
Based on the foregoing, J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are local roads
used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the
local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of this authority given by
Congress to the local governments is the power to close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the Local
Government Code.
However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to local government units to close roads and other
similar public places should be read and interpreted in accordance with basic principles already established by law.
These basic principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or municipality to close a public
street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion
devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process
which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of
withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no
longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the
property then becomes patrimonial property of the local government unit concerned It is only then that the
respondent municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in accordance with the last sentence of Section 10,
Chapter II of Blg. 337, known as Local Government Code. Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property
which can be the object of an ordinary contract. However, those roads and streets which are available to the public
in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such
case, the local government has no power to use it for another purpose or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
This limitation on the authority of the local government over public properties has been discussed and settled by this
Court en banc in Dacanay v. Mayor Asistio, Jr., et al
There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted
are public streets. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil
Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or others contract.
As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City
Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and
void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through
contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose
health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to
protect.
The Mayor’s Executive Order may not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the purpose
they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles and pedestrians.
Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are congested with people, houses and traffic
brought about by the proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the establishment of a flea
market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help
in solving the problem of congestion. We take note of the other observations of the Solicitor General when he said:
. . . There have been many instances of emergencies and fires where ambulances and fire engines, instead of using
the roads for a more direct access to the fire area, have to maneuver and look for other streets which are not
occupied by stalls and vendors thereby losing valuable time which could, otherwise, have been spent in saving
properties and lives.
Along G.G. Cruz Street is a hospital, the St. Rita Hospital. However, its ambulances and the people rushing their
patients to the hospital cannot pass through G.G. Cruz because of the stalls and the vendors. One can only imagine
the tragedy of losing a life just because of a few seconds delay brought about by the inaccessibility of the streets
leading to the hospital.
The children, too, suffer. In view of the occupancy of the roads by stalls and vendors, normal transportation flow is
disrupted and school children have to get off at a distance still far from their schools and walk, rain or shine.
Indeed one can only imagine the garbage and litter left by vendors on the streets at the end of the day. Needless to
say, these cause further pollution, sickness and deterioration of health of the residents therein.
Verily, the powers of a local government unit are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid down by the
Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover, the exercise of such powers should be subservient to
paramount considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community. Every local government unit
has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance the public health, safety and convenience, maintain
peace and order, and promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based on this objective,
the local government should refrain from acting towards that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general
welfare.
As what we have said in the Dacanay case, the general public has a legal right to demand the demolition of the
illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and the officials of respondent municipality have the
corresponding duty arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their specific public
purpose.
13. Palanca vs Commonwealth, G.R. No. 46373 – Jerrof Carjiel Mallorca

Carlos Palanca v Commonwealth of the Philippines

January 29, 1940, G.R. No. 46373

FACTS:
On July 17, 1919, Carlos Palanca obtained a judgment from the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
registration of four plots of land, adjoining each other and separated only by certain waterways called estuaries.
Before the decision was rendered and after the evidence was presented, the Government, through the Attorney
General, filed a request to reopen the proceedings to prove the existence of waterways and rivers within the land.
The Court denied this request as it considers it unnecessary to reopen the case for that purpose, since even on that
ground, the registration of this would not affect the property rights of the Government and the public use of such
means of transportation, which would always remain under Article 39 of the Land Registration Act.
Later, the government instituted this present action against Carlos Palanca, claiming it is illegally occupying potions
of the Viray River and the Sapang Sedaria Estero, which are navigable, and asks that he be forced to open them.
The Trial Court dismissed this petition but when it was appealed to the Court of Appeals, such decision was
reversed and declared that Viray River and Estero Sapang Sedaria are of public domain and use and that the right
acquired by Carlos Palanca by virtue of its location cannot affect the rights of the State since such rivers are
intended for public use.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Viray River and Estero Sapang Sedaria are of public domain.

RULING:
Yes. “The River Viray and the Estero Sapang Sedaria, being navigable, useful for commerce, for navigation, and
fishing, have the character of public domain (or ownership)”.The Supreme Court did not agree with the petitioner’s
contention that the decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on July 17, 1919 and the Torrens title
issued, consequently, in favor of Carlos Palanca establishes the non existence of the river and whether or not it is
navigable. In that decision, while it was said that the terrain was crossed by a waterway called estuaries, there is no
statement that these estuaries were not navigable.
14. City of Pasig vs Republic, G.R. No. 185023 – Kathleen Taninas

G.R. No. 185023, August 24, 2011, CITY OF PASIG vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation (MPLDC) owned two parcels of land in Pasig City. Portions of the
properties are leased to different business establishments. In 1986, the registered owner of MPLDC, Jose Y.
Campos (Campos), voluntarily surrendered MPLDC to the Republic of the Philippines.

On 30 September 2002, the Pasig City Assessor’s Office sent MPLDC two notices of tax delinquency for its failure
to pay real property tax on the properties for the period 1979 to 2001. In a letter, Independent Realty Corporation
(IRC) President Ernesto R. Jalandoni (Jalandoni) and Treasurer Rosario Razon informed the Pasig City Treasurer
that the tax for the period 1979 to 1986 had been paid, and that the properties were exempt from tax beginning
1987.

On 20 October 2005, the Pasig City Assessor’s Office sent MPLDC a notice of final demand for payment of tax for
the period 1987 to 2005. On the same day, MPLDC paid payment under protest.

On 9 November 2005, MPLDC received two warrants of levy on the properties. On 1 December 2005, respondent
Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed with the RTC
a petition to enjoin petitioner Pasig City from auctioning the properties and from collecting real property tax.

On 2 December 2005, the Pasig City Treasurer offered the properties for sale at public auction. Since there was no
other bidder, Pasig City bought the properties and was issued the corresponding certificates of sale.

On 19 December 2005, PCGG filed with the RTC an amended petition and prayed that the public auction be
declared void and Pasig City be prohibited from assessing and collecting from MPLDC real property tax and penalty.

The RTC held that the acts of respondent in assessing real property taxes on properties owned and controlled by
the Republic of the Philippines, in collecting taxes from Mid-Pasig in lieu of the actual occupants or beneficial users
of certain portions thereof, and in auctioning said properties in favor of respondent, followed by the corresponding
certificate of sale, are all unequivocally tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC’s decision. It ruled that the fact that Mid-Pasig and its properties have not
been validly declared by the Sandiganbayan as "ill-gotten" wealth, the same are not yet public properties. Thus,
Pasig City through its City Assessor and City Treasurer did not act with grave abuse of discretion when it issued real
property tax assessment on the subject parcels of land.

Issue:

Who owns the properties? Was the assessment of taxes upon the said properties by City of Pasig invalid? Was the
sale on public auction of these properties valid?

Ruling:

The Republic of the Philippines owns the properties which are surrendered ill-gotten wealth of former President
Marcos. As such, the same assumes a public character and thus belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. In
Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, the Court stated that Jose Y. Campos, "a confessed crony of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos," voluntarily surrendered or turned over to the PCGG the properties, assets and
corporations he held in trust for the deposed President. Among the corporations he surrendered were the
Independent Realty Corporation and the Mid-Pasig Land Development Corporation.

Article 420 of the Civil Code classifies as properties of public dominion those that are "intended for public use, such
as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads" and those
that "are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth." Properties of public
dominion are not only exempt from real estate tax, they are exempt from sale at public auction. Property of public
dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be subject of the commerce of man. The
Supreme Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion are not subject to execution or
foreclosure sale.

In the present case, the parcels of land are not properties of public dominion because they are not "intended for
public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores,
roadsteads." Neither are they "intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth."
MPLDC leases portions of the properties to different business establishments. Thus, the portions of the properties
leased to taxable entities are not only subject to real estate tax, they can also be sold at public auction to satisfy the
tax delinquency.

Section 234(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 states that properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt
from real property tax "except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person." Thus, the portions of the properties not leased to taxable entities are exempt from
real estate tax while the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real estate tax. The law
imposes the liability to pay real estate tax on the Republic of the Philippines for the portions of the properties leased
to taxable entities. It is, of course, assumed that the Republic of the Philippines passes on the real estate tax as part
of the rent to the lessees.

In sum, only those portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real estate tax for the period of
such leases. Pasig City must, therefore, issue to respondent new real property tax assessments covering the
portions of the properties leased to taxable entities. If the Republic of the Philippines fails to pay the real property
tax on the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities, then such portions may be sold at public auction to
satisfy the tax delinquency.
15. MIAA vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155650 – Bernadette Pamintuan
TOPIC: lands devoted for public use; government instrumentality vs. not a government-owned or controlled
corporation

Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE:

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State
or the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code provides: ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or
of private ownership. ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion: (1) Those intended
for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks,
shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; (2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public
use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)
ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property. ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for
public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for
international and domestic travel and transportation; The charging of fees to the public does not determine the
character of the property whether it is of public dominion or not.
Property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale; Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for being contrary to
public policy.

FACTS:
Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
Complex in Parañaque City under Executive Order No. 903, otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the Manila
International Airport Authority (“MIAA Charter”). Executive Order No. 903 was issued on 21 July 1983 by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Subsequently, Executive Order Nos. 909 and 298amended the MIAA Charter.
As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA
Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the runways and
buildings (“Airport Lands and Buildings”) then under the Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further
provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless
specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
On 21 March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061. The OGCC
opined that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under
Section 21 of the MIAA Charter. Thus, MIAA negotiated with respondent City of Parañaque to pay the real estate tax
imposed by the City. MIAA then paid some of the real estate tax already due.
On 28 June 2001, MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of Parañaque for the
taxable years 1992 to 2001.
The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands
and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and
Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency.
MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real
estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings.
Paranaque’s Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code.
Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing,
or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the
Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA admits that the MIAA Charter has placed the title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in the name of MIAA.
However, MIAA points out that it cannot claim ownership over these properties since the real owner of the Airport
Lands and Buildings is the Republic of the Philippines. The MIAA Charter mandates MIAA to devote the Airport
Lands and Buildings for the benefit of the general public. Since the Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to
public use and public service, the ownership of these properties remains with the State. The Airport Lands and
Buildings are thus inalienable and are not subject to real estate tax by local governments.
MIAA also points out that Section 21 of the MIAA Charter specifically exempts MIAA from the payment of real estate
tax. MIAA insists that it is also exempt from real estate tax under Section 234 of the Local Government Code
because the Airport Lands and Buildings
Respondents invoke Section 193 of the Local Government Code, which expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of “government-owned-and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the Local Government Code.
Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express mention of one person, thing,
or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the
Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under existing laws.
If so exempt, then the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all proceedings taken
pursuant to such assessments, are void. In such event, the other issues raised in this petition become moot.

HELD:

MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation

There is no dispute that a government-owned or controlled corporation is not exempt from real estate tax.
However, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of
the Administrative Code of 1987 defines a government-owned or controlled corporation as follows:
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined.—x x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and
owned by the Government directly or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case
of stock corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of its capital stock: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
A government-owned or controlled corporation must be “organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.” MIAA is not
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no capital stock
divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.
Likewise, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the instrumentality
remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated with the department framework. The
MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA into a “separate and autonomous body” will make its
operation more “financially viable.”
A government instrumentality like MIAA falls under Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code, which states:
SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units.—Unless otherwise provided
herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays shall not extend
to the levy of the following:
xxxx
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities
and local government units. (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Section 133(o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, which
historically merely delegated to local governments the power to tax. While the 1987 Constitution now includes
taxation as one of the powers of local governments, local governments may only exercise such power “subject to
such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.”
When local governments invoke the power to tax on national government instrumentalities, such power is
construed strictly against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never presumed and there must be clear
language in the law imposing the tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable is resolved against
taxation. This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities.
There is also no reason for local governments to tax national government instrumentalities for rendering essential
public services to inhabitants of local governments. The only exception is when the legislature clearly intended to
tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public services for sound and compelling policy
considerations. There must be express language in the law empowering local governments to tax national
government instrumentalities. Any doubt whether such power exists is resolved against local governments.
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by the State or
the Republic of the Philippines. The Civil Code provides:
ARTICLE 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
ARTICLE 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

1. (1)Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

2. (2)Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth. (Emphasis supplied)

ARTICLE 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property.
ARTICLE 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by the public for international
and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the
public does not remove the character of the Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use. The operation
by the government of a tollway does not change the character of the road as one for public use. Someone must pay
for the maintenance of the road, either the public indirectly through the taxes they pay the government, or only those
among the public who actually use the road through the toll fees they pay upon using the road. The tollway system
is even a more efficient and equitable manner of taxing the public for the maintenance of public roads.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is of public
dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion as one “intended for public use.”
Even if the government collects toll fees, the road is still “intended for public use” if anyone can use the road under
the same terms and conditions as the rest of the public. The charging of fees, the limitation on the kind of vehicles
that can use the road, the speed restrictions and other conditions for the use of the road do not affect the public
character of the road.
The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the
bulk of the income that maintains the operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character
of MIAA as an airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing those among the
public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those who never use the particular
public facility.

REASONING

The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are devoted to public use and thus are properties of public
dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and Buildings are outside the commerce of man. The
Court has ruled repeatedly that properties of public dominion are outside the commerce of man. As early as 1915,
this Court already ruled in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas that properties devoted to public use are outside the
commerce of man, thus:
“According to article 344 of the Civil Code: “Property for public use in provinces and in towns comprises the
provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and public waters, the promenades, and public works of
general service supported by said towns or provinces.”
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of man, cannot be
the subject of an auction sale.
Properties of public dominion, being for public use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition
through public or private sale. Any encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion is void for being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public dominion
are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the City of Parañaque can foreclose
and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.

CONCLUSION

Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, which governs the
legal relation and status of government units, agencies and offices within the entire government machinery, MIAA is
a government instrumentality and not a government-owned or controlled corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the
Local Government Code, MIAA as a government instrumentality is not a taxable person because it is not subject to
“[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind” by local governments. The only exception is when MIAA leases its real
property to a “taxable person” as provided in Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, in which case the
specific real property leased becomes subject to real estate tax. Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and
Buildings leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque.
16. Manila Lodge No. 76 vs Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 162 – Marvin Nino

Manila Lodge 761 vs Court of Appeals

GR No. L-41001, September 30, 1976
Castro, C.J.;

Procedural Overview:

RTC: TDC filed an ordinary civil action for damages and cancellation of annotation. The court dismissed and ruled
that the property is public dominion

Court of Appeals: TDC and BPOE appealed. The appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the court below.

Doctrines: Act 1360, as amended intended the reclaimed land as an extension of the Luneta Park. As such, it
cannot be denied that it is a property of public dominion, contrary to the claim of TDC and Manila Lodge that it is a
patrimonial property of the City of Manila.

Facts: Tarlac Development Corporation filed an ordinary civil action against the City of Manila and Manila Lodge
761,BPOE for damages and cancellation of annotation of the right to repurchase by the City of Manila. The trial
court dismissed the complaint and declared that the subject land, south wing portion of the Luneta extension, is
public land. As such, the sales between BPOE and TDC is null and void. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the
court below.

Issue: whether or not the property sold to TDC is a patrimonial property of the City of Manila?

Ruling: The Court ruled that south portion of the Luneta extension is not a patrimonial property of the City of Manila,
but a plaza extension of the Luneta Park; hence, it is a property of the public dominion. The Court disposed the
petition by resorting to interpretation of Act 1360, as amended. Such that, insofar as Act 1360, as amended is
concerned, the intent of the then Insular Government was to authorize the City of Manila to develop the reclaimed
land as an extension of the Luneta Park by constructing bulkhead and seawall on the reclaimed land, and to sell or
lease the north portion-not the south, for hotel site. This disquisition, as held by the Court, showed that the property
subject of this petition is not patrimonial property, but a property of the public dominion. The Court said that had the
property been a patrimonial property of the City of Manila, the Insular Government would not have been enacted a
law authorizing it to dispose the same because that is superfluous. All the words, clauses and phrases should be
given its effect, said by the Court. Finally, the Court concluded that the sale is null and void because the property is
part of the public domain, and advanced that Government is not estopped to validate an act by its agent, which is
prohibited by law. As such, the TDC cannot claim that it bought the property in good faith and for value because
there is no right of estoppel against the government.
17. Heirs of Malabanan vs Republic, 587 SCRA 172 – Jerica Alcantara
FACTS:

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering the property he purchased from Eduardo
Velazco, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that
he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession
and occupation of the land for more than 30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.

The application was granted by the RTC. However, the OSG for the Republic appealed the judgment to the CA,
which reversed the RTC Judgment.

Due to Malabanan’s intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the said decision to this
Court through a petition for review on certiorari.

The petition was denied.

Petitioners and the Republic filed Motions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

What are the classifications of public lands?

Whether or not petitioners were able to prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain.

RULING:

1. Classifications of land according to ownership.

Land, which is an immovable property, may be classified as either of public dominion or of private ownership. Land
is considered of public dominion if it either:

(a) is intended for public use; or

(b) belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the development
of the national wealth.

Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or although of such character but no longer intended for
public use or for public service forms part of the patrimonial property of the State. Land that is other than part of the
patrimonial property of the State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private
individual.

Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country from the West by
Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, all lands of the public domain belong to the State. This
means that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation
of such patrimony.

All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Also, public lands
remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown to have reclassified or alienated
them to private persons.
A positive act of the Government is necessary to enable such reclassification, and the exclusive prerogative to
classify public lands under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts. If, however, public
land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public land is no
longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby effectively removing the
land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion must be made in the form of a law duly
enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to
that effect. Thus, until the Executive Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until
Congress or the President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.

2. Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of
possession – possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12,
1945, or earlier – the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even upon the
subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.

Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained ineligible for registration under
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a
proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national
wealth.

Possession, Property Registration Decree, Regalian Doctrine

18. People vs Narvaez, 121 SCRA 389 – Antonio Ines Jr.

People vs Narvaez
121 SCRA 389

Doctrine: Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to
appellant’s house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk
things over with him. The assault on appellant’s property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as
contemplated by law. In the case at bar, there was an actual physical invasion of appellant’s property which he had
the right to resist, pursuant to Art. 429 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Facts:
Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibañez, together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano
Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer, father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the
boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by George Fleischer. At the place of the fencing is the house and
rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez. At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when he heard that the walls
of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If the fencing would go on,
appellant would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his ricemill. So he addressed the group,
saying—‘Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we will talk it over—what is good,’
addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant’s compadre. The deceased Fleischer, however, answered: ‘No,
gademit, proceed, go ahead.’ Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting
him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at
Rubia, likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a result of the shotting.
It appears, however, that this incident is intertwined with the long drawn out legal battle between the Fleischer and
Co., Inc. and residents of Maitum, South Cotabato in which Appelant Narvaez was part of.
Both parties claims that they were the lawful owners of the land Appellant was among those persons from northern
and central Luzon who went to Mindanao in 1937 and settled in Maitum, a former sitio of Kiamba, and now a
separate municipality of South Cotabato. He established his residence therein, built his house, cultivated the area,
and was among those who petitioned then President Manuel L. Quezon to order the subdivision of the defunct
Celebes Plantation and nearby Kalaong Plantation totalling about 2,000 hectares, for distribution among the settlers.
Shortly thereafter, Fleischer and Company, headed by George W. Fleischer, an American landowner in Negros
Oriental, filed sales application over the same area formerly leased and later abandoned by Celebes Plantation
Company, covering 1,017.2234 hectares.
Considering the abovestated facts, the conflict between Fleisher Company and the settlers became the very root of
the issue which led to the death of Fleisher and Rubio.
Narvaez raised that he used self-defense in protecting his person.

Issue:
Whether or not the there was a lawful aggression which would justify the crime committed?
Held:
This was indeed aggression, not on the person of appellant, but on his property rights. The question is, was the
aggression unlawful or lawful? Did the victims have a right to fence off the contested property, to destroy appellant’s
house and to shut off his ingress and egress to his residence and the highway? Article 30 of the Civil Code
recognizes the right of every owner to enclose or fence his land or tenements.
In any case, Fleischer had given him up to December 31, 1968 within which to vacate the land. He should have
allowed appellant the peaceful enjoyment of his properties up to that time, instead of chiselling the walls of his
house and closing appellant’s entrance and exit to the highway. The following provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines are in point:
“Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a
possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing.”
 “Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein
he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules
of Court” (Articles 536 and 539, Civil Code of the Philippines).
Conformably to the foregoing provisions, the deceased had no right to destroy or cause damage to appellant’s
house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with
him. The assault on appellant’s property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law.
19. National Power Corp. vs Ibrahim, 526 SCRA 149 (2007) – Joy Olegario

G.R. No. 168732              June 29, 2007

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
LUCMAN G. IBRAHIM, OMAR G. MARUHOM, ELIAS G.MARUHOM, BUCAY G. MARUHOM, FAROUK G.
MARUHOM, HIDJARA G. MARUHOM, ROCANIA G. MARUHOM, POTRISAM G. MARUHOM, LUMBA G.
MARUHOM, SINAB G. MARUHOM, ACMAD G. MARUHOM, SOLAYMAN G. MARUHOM, MOHAMAD M.
IBRAHIM, and CAIRONESA M. IBRAHIM, respondents.

Facts:
On November 23, 1994, respondent Lucman G. Ibrahim, in his personal capacity and in behalf of his co-heir,
instituted an action against petitioner National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) for recovery of possession of land
and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur.

In their complaint, Ibrahim and his co-heirs claimed that they were owners of several parcels of land described in
Survey Plan FP (VII-5) 2278 consisting of 70,000 square meters, divided into three (3) lots. Sometime in 1978,
NAPOCOR, through alleged stealth and without respondents’ knowledge and prior consent, took possession of the
sub-terrain area of their lands and constructed therein underground tunnels. The existence of the tunnels was only
discovered sometime in July 1992 by respondents and then later confirmed on November 13, 1992 by NAPOCOR
itself through a memorandum issued by the latter’s Acting Assistant Project Manager. The tunnels were apparently
being used by NAPOCOR in siphoning the water of Lake Lanao and in the operation of NAPOCOR’s Agus II, III, IV,
V, VI, VII projects located in Saguiran, Lanao del Sur; Nangca and Balo-i in Lanao del Norte; and Ditucalan and
Fuentes in Iligan City.

On September 19, 1992, respondent Omar G. Maruhom requested the Marawi City Water District for a permit to
construct and/or install a motorized deep well in Lot 3 located in Saduc, Marawi City but his request was turned
down because the construction of the deep well would cause danger to lives and property. On October 7, 1992,
respondents demanded that NAPOCOR pay damages and vacate the sub-terrain portion of their lands but the latter
refused to vacate much less pay damages. Respondents further averred that the construction of the underground
tunnels has endangered their lives and properties as Marawi City lies in an area of local volcanic and tectonic
activity. Further, these illegally constructed tunnels caused them sleepless nights, serious anxiety and shock thereby
entitling them to recover moral damages and that by way of example for the public good, NAPOCOR must be held
liable for exemplary damages.

Disputing respondents’ claim, NAPOCOR filed an answer with counterclaim denying the material allegations of the
complaint and interposing affirmative and special defenses, namely that (1) there is a failure to state a cause of
action since respondents seek possession of the sub-terrain portion when they were never in possession of the
same, (2) respondents have no cause of action because they failed to show proof that they were the owners of the
property, and (3) the tunnels are a government project for the benefit of all and all private lands are subject to such
easement as may be necessary for the same

Issue:
Whether respondents are entitled to just compensation hinges upon who owns the sub-terrain area occupied by
petitioner.
Held:

Yes. In the present case, petitioner failed to point to any evidence demonstrating grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the CA or to any other circumstances which would call for the application of the exceptions to the above rule.
Consequently, the CA’s findings which upheld those of the trial court that respondents owned and possessed the
property and that its substrata was possessed by petitioner since 1978 for the underground tunnels, cannot be
disturbed. Moreover, the Court sustains the finding of the lower courts that the sub-terrain portion of the property
similarly belongs to respondents. This conclusion is drawn from Article 437 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 437. The owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its surface and of everything under it, and he can construct
thereon any works or make any plantations and excavations which he may deem proper, without detriment to
servitudes and subject to special laws and ordinances. He cannot complain of the reasonable requirements of aerial
navigation.
20. U.S. vs Causby, 328 US 256 (1946) – Lois Camacho
U.S. v. Causby
328 U.S. 256 (1946)

Facts:
Thomas Lee Causby bought 2.8 acres of land outside of Greensboro, North Carolina, intending to raise a chicken
farm. The fact that the land was just one third of a mile from an airport didn’t concern them, as it was a small,
municipal airport that was little used. But several years later, the Government leased the use of the airport and the
U.S. military began using it. Army bombers and transports would fly sixty feet over their house, skimming just
eighteen feet above the tallest trees. The roar and glare of the planes disturbed Causby’s sleep. Even worse, the
noise was so startling that it frightened the animals on his farm, resulting in the deaths of several chickens. The
problem became so severe that Causby was forced to abandon his business.

The farmer decided to sue the US government for trespass. At that time, US jurisdictions followed the old common
law rule that landowner owns all of the land beneath their property and all of the sky above their property “into the
periphery of the universe”—in Latin: Cujusest solum ejus est usque ad coelum.

Causby believed that their Fifth Amendment rights had been violated. The Fifth Amendment says in part, “Nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” Though government had not physically taken
the Causby’s property from them, they believed they were entitled to compensation because the government’s
actions had made it impossible for them to use their property as a chicken farm.

The government argued that the Causbys’ property had not been taken, as the government had not physically
intruded on their land. Furthermore, people could not be said to own all the air above their land, because this would
make it impossible for the United States to control its own airspace.

The United States Court of Claims agreed with Causby's argument, finding that the government’s actions amounted
to what is called a “partial taking, and therefore ordered the government to pay compensation.

The case eventually went to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the flying of planes by the United States military over Causby's farm constitute a violation of the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and therefore entitling the latter to just compensation.
Ruling:
Yes, to an extent.

The Court concluded that the ancient common law doctrine of ownership of land extending to the space above the
land "has no place in the modern world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the Court to accept the doctrine as valid,
"every transcontinental flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the
idea."
However, while The Court rejected the unlimited reach above and below the earth described in the common law
doctrine and found it inapplicable in the case, it also ruled that, "if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the
land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise buildings
could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and even fences could not be run. . . . The landowner owns at
least as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy or use in connection with the land.” (enveloping
atmosphere rule)

The airspace, apart from the immediate reaches above the land, is part of the public domain. The court does not set
the precise limits of the line of demarcation. Flights over private land are not a taking, unless, like in this case, they
are so low and frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment of the land.

Given the damage caused by the particularly low, frequent flights over his farm, the Court determined that the
government had violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled to compensation.
23. Heirs of Emiliano Navarro vs IAC, 268 SCRA 74 (1997) – Shierlyn Cabug

G.R. No. 68166 February 12, 1997

HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.

Facts:
The case is a petition for review of the decision and two subsequent resolutions of the Intermediate Appellate Court
in Land Registration Case No. N-84, the application over which was filed by private respondents’ predecessor-in-
interest, Sinforoso Pascual,now deceased of Balanga, Bataan. The applicant owns the property immediately
adjoining the land sought to be registered. His registered property is bounded on the east by the Talisay River, on
the west by the Bulacan River, and on the north by the Manila Bay. The Talisay River and the Bulacan River flow
down towards the Manila Bay and act as boundaries of the applicant's registered land on the east and on the west.
Mr Emiliano Navarro jumped into the fray opposing the same application, stating the he leased part of the property
sought to be registered. He sought to protect his fishpond that rested on the same property. Sinforoso was not
amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro, claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy to occupy a
portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal, his original land
registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took over the case.

Issue/s: Whether or not the accretion taking place on property adjacent to the sea can be registered under the
Torrens system.

Decision:

The petition is hereby granted and the decision of the IAC dated Nov 1978 is reversed and set aside. And the
decision of the Court of First Instance is hereby ordered reinstated. The decision assails that it cannot be registered.
This is land of Public domain. Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil Code saying that the
disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan. Rivers Art 457:
Accretion as a mode of acquiring property and requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of
the river; and (3) that the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based on Art 457 is misplaced. If there’s any land to be
claimed, it should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan. The law is clear on this. Accretion of land
along the river bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of land on the property adjacent to Manila
Bay.

Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art 457
but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old, holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be
registered as it remains public domain unless abandoned by government for public use and declared as private
property capable of alienation.

Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 provides as follows:

Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the
public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government shall
declare them to be the property of the owners of the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
24. Republic vs CA, 132 SCRA 514 (1984) – Pearl Frances Vitug
Republic of the Philippines (Director of Lands) v. Court of Appeals
Court of First Instance- found that Lots 1 and 2 are accretion of the land covered by TCT No. 89709 and ordered
their registration in the names of the private respondents
Court of Appeals- affirmed the decision
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------
Doctrine- Art. 457 of the NCC
 To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from
the effects of the current waters.
This requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to n
place.
1. That the deposit be gradual and imperceptible
2. That it be made through the effects of the current of the water
3. That the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.
 The riparian owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or
designed to bring about accretion.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------
Facts:
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Maria Tancinco Imperial and Mario Tancinco are
registered owners of a parcel of land situated in Bario Ubihan, Meycauayan, bulacan nordering on the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their fishpond property- Lot
1, 2 and 3 PSU 131892. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando Vicente, in representation of the Bureau of Lands
filled a written opposition to the application of registration. Private respondents filled a partial withdrawal of the
application and Lot 3 was withdrawn from the application. The lower court rendered decision granting the application
on the findings that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondent’s fishponds covered by TCT No.
89709. The Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the lower
court. The petitioner sublits that there is no accretion to speak of under Art. 457 of the NCC because what actually
happened is that the private respondent simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan
River, and thus, if there is an accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of gradual and
imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river. On the other hand, private respondents rely on the testimony
of Mrs. Viriginia Acuna regarding the Lots 1 & 2.
Issue: Whether or not Lots 1 & 2 are accretion which belong to the private respondents and thus can be registrated
under their name.
Ruling:
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the NCC all deposits caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work
of nature. There is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made gradually
through the effects of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. The court agree with the observation of SolGen that it is
preposterous to believe that almost 4 hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the rivers. The lone
witness of the respondents who happens to be their overseer noticed only the accretion sometime in 1939, thus,
their witness was incompetent to testify to a gradual increase to their land in the years before 1939. There is
evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of
the rivers. The alluvial deposit came into being not because of the sole effect of the river’s current but as a result of
the transfer of the dike towards the river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry
land cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river’s current on the fishpond adjoining it. The lots in question were not
included in the survey of their adjacent property on 1940, it was also declared for taxation purposes only in 1972 or
33 years after it has supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion therefore is that the said areas
could not have been there in 1939, they existed only after the respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of
the Meycauayan river. What respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion of the
Meycauayan river by reclamation. Wherefore, instant petition is granted.
25. Tiongco vs Director of Lands, et al., 16 CA Rep 211 – Darwin Vergel Molina

// This case made reference to Tiongco vs Director of Lands, 16 CA Rep 211, which was the assigned case
given by atty.

GR No. 98045 Nazareno vs CA June 26, 1996

Facts: A parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City is said to have been formed as a result
of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan river. Jose Salasalan
and Leo Rabaya leased the subject lots on which their houses stood from one Antonio Nazareno, petitioners‘
predecessor-in-interest. Salasalan and Rabaya allegedly stopped paying rentals.
As a result, Antonio Nazareno and petitioners filed a case for ejectment with the MTC. A decision was
rendered against Salasalan and Rabaya, which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The decision of the lower court
was finally enforced with the private respondents being ejected from portions of the subject lots they occupied.
Before he died, Antonio Nazareno caused the approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan
designated with a view to perfecting his title over the accretion area being claimed by him. Before the approved
survey plan could be released to the applicant, however, it was protested by private respondents before the Bureau
of Lands. The report of the Land Investigator, made in compliance with the order of the District Land Officer,
recommended the survey plan in the name of Antonio Nazareno be cancelled and that private respondents be
directed to file appropriate public application. Based on the report, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands
rendered a decision ordering an amendment to the survey plain of Nazareno by segregating therefrom the areas
occupied by the private respondents. Antonio Nazareno filed a motion for reconsideration with the Undersecretary of
Natural Resources and OIC of the Bureau of Lands; which was denied.
The petitioners Desamparada vda. De Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazero filed a case before the RTC for
the annulment of the decision and order of the Bureau of Lands regarding the parcel of land. The trial court
dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, resulting to the finality of the administrative
decision of the Bureau of Lands. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC dismissing the
complaint. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not accretion belongs to the riparian owners

HELD: No. Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that ―”to the owners of land adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.” In the case of Meneses v. CA, it
was held that accretion, as a mode of acquiring property under Article 457 of the Civil Code, requires the
concurrence of these requisites: (1) that the deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it
be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is
adjacent to the banks or rivers (or the sea coast). These are called the rules on alluvion which if present in a case,
give to the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers or streams any accretion gradually received from the effects
of the current of waters.
The application of the rules on alluvion cannot be made in the present case as the first and second
requirements of the rules were not met. Thus, the Nazarenos cannot claim the rights of a riparian owner. By their
own admission, the accretion was formed by the dumping of boulders, soil and other filling materials on portions of
the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River bounding their land. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the
accumulation of such boulders, soil and other filling materials was gradual and imperceptible, resulting from the
action of the waters or the current of the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan River.
In Hilario v. City of Manila, it was held that the word “current” indicate the participation of the body of water in
the ebb and flow of waters due to high and low tide.
Petitioners are estopped from denying the public character of the subject land, as well as the jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Lands when the late Antonio Nazareno filed his Miscellaneous Sales Application. The mere filing of
said Application constituted an admission that the land being applied for was public land, having been the subject of
survey plan which was conducted as a consequence of Antonio Nazareno‘s Miscellaneous Sales Application
wherein said land was described as an orchard. Said description by Antonio Nazareno was controverted by the
findings of the ocular inspection that said land actually covers a dry portion of Balacanas Creek and a swampy
portion of Cagayan River.
The Bureau of Lands classified the subject land as an accretion area which was formed by deposits of
sawdust in the Balacanas Creek and the Cagayan river, in accordance with the ocular inspection conducted by the
Bureau of Lands. It has often enough held that findings of administrative agencies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but even finality.
Again, when said factual findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the same are conclusive on the parties and
not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
In Republic v. CA, it was ruled that the requirement that the deposit should due to the effect of the current of
the river is indispensable. This excludes from Article 457 of the Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Putting it differently, alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. Thus, in Tiongco v. Director of
Lands, et al., where the land was not formed solely by the natural effect of the water current of the river
bordering said land but is also the consequence of the direct and deliberate intervention of man, it was
deemed a man-made accretion and, as such, part of the public domain. In the present case, the subject land
was the direct result of the dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co. consequent to its sawmill operations.
As the accretion site was the result of the late Antonio Nazareno‘s labor consisting in the dumping of boulders, soil
and other filling materials into the Balacanas Creek and Cagayan River bounding his land, the same would still be
part of the public domain.
26. Erlinda Delos Santos vs. Abejon, et al., G.R. No. 215820, March 20, 2017 – Viannae Bagasbas

FACTS:
The case arose from a complaint for cancellation of title with collection of sum of money.
1. Erlinda and her late husband Pedro delos Santos borrowed the amount of P100,000 from her sister, Teresita.
As security for the loan, Erlinda and Pedro mortgaged their land property covered by TCT No. 131753 which
mortgage was annotated on the title.
2. After Pedro died, Erlinda was unable to pay the loan and agreed to sell the land to Teresita for P150,000
(amount of the loan plus P50,000). They executed a Deed of Sale and a Release of Mortgage, and eventually
TCT No, 131753 was cancelled and TCTNo. 180286 was issued in the name of Teresita Abejon, married to
Alberto Abejon.
3. Respondents, Alberto and Teresita constructed a 3-storey bldg worth P2,000,000 on the subject land. The
petitioners (Erlinda and daughters) refused to acknowledge the sale, pointing out that Pedro had died in 1989,
and therefore the signature in the Deed of Sale executed in 1992 is forged.
4. The respondents, Alberto and Teresita demand the amount of P150,000, the consideration for the sale of the
land and P2,000,000 for the construction cost of the 3-storey building but to no avail.
5. RTC Ruling
- declared the Deed of Sale NULL AND VOID (due to the forged Deed of Sale)
- Ordered the cancellation of TCT 180286 (issued in the name of Teresita and Alberto) and reinstatement
of TCT 1317573
- Petitioners to pay: P100,000 plus 12% interest per annum, P2,000,000 construction of the house,
P100,000 for attorney's fees
6. CA Ruling
- affirmed RTC’s ruling with modifications
- Cancel of the Release of Mortgage
- Adjusted legal interest
- Imposing 6% per annum on the construction cost of the building
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly held that the petitioners are liable to the respondents for the loan obligation, the
construction of the building and the attorney's fees

Ruling:
The petition is partially meritorious. The law on accessions apply.
1. The loan was contracted by Erlinda and her late husband, and so it is only chargeable to Erlinda and Pedro's
conjugal partnership (they were married before the effectivity of the Family Code and in the absence of any
prenuptial agreement) and if insufficient, the Erlinda and Pedro's estate shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid
balance.
● Respondents may also foreclose the mortgage to secure the loan, alternative to demanding the payment of
the loan.
2. The contract is null and void ab initio, so the parties are restored to the state they were found before the sale.
● Erlinda and the petitioners must return the subject land. The Register of Deeds should cancel TCT No.
180286 issued in the name of Teresita and reinstate TCT 131753 in the name of Pedro and Erlinda with the
mortgage annotated (must be restored to its state before cancellation).
● Respondents (Teresita) are entitled to the refund of the additional P50,000 as consideration of the Deed of
sale, subject to legal interest of 6% per annum
3. Art. 448, CC: Builder, planter, planter, or sower in good faith - one who, not being the owner of the land, builds,
plants or sows on the land believing himself to be its owner and unaware of the defect in his title or mode of
acquisition
● The essence of good faith lies in the honest belief in the validity of one's right, ignorance of a superior claim,
or absence of intention to overreach another
● Bad faith may only be attributed to the land owner when the act of building, planting, sowing was done with
knowledge and without opposition on his part
● The Deed of Sale was executed in 1992, 3 years after the death of Pedro. Teresita knew that the Deed of
Sale was void because of the forged signature of Pedro and would not operate to transfer rights over
the subject land to her name. Despite awareness of the defect, Teresita still proceeded to construct the 3-
storey building.
● Respondents are builders in bad faith
 ● On the other hand, the petitioners knew defect in the Deed of Sale from the start but nonetheless still
acquiesced to the construction of the 3-storey building thereon.
● Petitioners are landowners in bad faith
● Art. 453, CC: where both landowner and the builder, planter, or sower acted in bad faith, they shall be
treated as if both of them were in good faith.
● When both the landowner and the seller are in good faith, the landowner has two options under Art. 448,
CC:
a.) he may appropriate the improvements for himself and reimburse the buyer (builder in good faith) the
necessary and useful expenses under Art. 546 and 548 of the Civil Code
b.) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is considerably more than the improvements, in which
case , the buyer shall pay reasonable rent.
● Under the first option, the petitioner may appropriate the 3-storey building for themselves, but the
respondent has a right of retention over the building until the petitioners complete reimbursement
● Under the second option, the petitioners may sell the land to the respondents at a price equivalent to the
current market value, but if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the building, the
respondents cannot be compelled to purchase the land, but may only be obliged to pay rent
● The court remanded the case to the lower court for the determination of the proper application of the
provisions
4. The reward for attorney’s fees must be deleted. No premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
5. Wherefore, the petition is partially granted
a) The Deed of Sale and Release Mortgage is nullified
b) The Register of Deeds is to cancel TCT 180826 and reinstate TCT 131753
c) 1.) P100,000 – the loan obligation is the liability of Erlinda and Pedro’s estate
2.) Erlinda is ordered to return the P50,000 consideration for the sale of the land with legal interest
3.) The case is remanded to the RTC for the proper application of the provisions
29. Velez vs. Velez, G.R. No. 187987, November 26, 2014 – Jan Micheal Cloa

G.R. No. 187987               November 26, 2014

VICENTE TORRES, JR., CARLOS VELEZ, AND THE HEIRS OF MARIANO VELEZ, NAMELY: ANITA CHIONG
VELEZ, ROBERT OSCAR CHIONG VELEZ, SARAH JEAN CHIONG VELEZ AND TED CHIONG
VELEZ, Petitioners,
vs.
LORENZO LAPINID AND JESUS VELEZ, Respondents.

Facts:
 Vicente Torres, et al. (petitioners) including Jesus Velez (respondent) are co-owners of several parcels of lands
(Lot No. 4389) in Carcar, Cebu. Jesus filed an action for partition of the parcels of land against the petitioners
and other co-owners before the RTC Cebu City. A judgment was rendered based on a compromise agreement
signed by the parties wherein they agreed that Jesus, Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell
the said properties and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to all the co-owners. The agreement
was later amended to exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. The petitioners discovered that Lapinid was
already occupying a portion of the 3000 square meters of Lot No. 4389 by virtue of a deed of sale
executed by Jesus in favor of Lapinid. A forcible entry case was filed against Lapinid.

 The petitioners prayed that the deed of sale be declared null and void arguing that the sale of a definite portion
of a co-owned property without notice to the other co-owners is without force and effect and they Lapinid pay a
rental fee of ₱1,000.00 per month from January 2004 or from the time of deprivation of property.

 Jesus asserted that, because of the previous arraignments that the land is adjudication to the co-owners the
group of Velez and Jesus and that several co-owners already sold their land to Jesus, he is a majority co-
owner and that it was unnecessary to give notice of the sale as the lot was already adjudicated in his favor.
Lapinid admitted that he entered into a deed of sale with Jesus covering the 3000 sq. meters land. Lapinid avers
that he believed that Jesus was the majority owner of the land when the latter showed several titles in support of
his claim. He further denied that he acquired a specific and definite portion of the questioned property, citing as
evidence the deed of sale which does not mention any boundaries or specific portion. He explained that Jesus
permitted him to occupy a portion not exceeding 3000 square meters conditioned on the result of the partition of
the co-owners.
The RTC Ruling
 The RTC dismissed the complaint for forcible entry. But also annulled the site assignment by Jesus Velez in the
Deed of Sale to Lorenzo Lapinid because of the lack of exact location of which still has to be determined either
by agreement of the co-owners or by the Court in proper proceedings.

 Aggrieved, petitioners filed their partial motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thereafter, they filed a
notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The CA Ruling
 The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. It validated the sale and ruled that the compromise
agreement did not affect the validity of the sale previously executed by Jesus and Lapinid. It likewise dismissed
the claim for rental payments, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses of the petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not a co-owner (Jesus Velez) can validly sell a portion of land he co-owns in favor of another favor.
Whether or not Lapinid must pay rental payments to the other co-owners.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Jesus Velez and Lorenzo Lapinid and denied the petition on the grounds that:
 On the First Issue
 A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. He has
the right to alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting a third person in its enjoyment
provided that no personal rightswill be affected. This is evident from the provision of the Art. 493 of the Civil
Code:
Article 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
 A co-owner is an owner of the whole and over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the
same time the owner of a portion which is truly abstract. Hence, his co-owners have no right to enjoin a co-
owner who intends to alienate or substitute his abstract portion or substitute a third person in its enjoyment.

 In this case, Jesus can validly alienate his co-owned property in favor of Lapinid, free from any opposition from
the co-owners. Lapinid, as a transferee, validly obtained the same rights of Jesus from the date of the execution
of a valid sale. Absent any proof that the sale was not perfected, the validity of sale subsists. In essence, Lapinid
steps into the shoes of Jesus as co-owner of an ideal and proportionate share in the property held in common.
Thus, from the perfection of contract, Lapinid eventually became a co-owner of the property.

 Even assuming that the petitioners are correct in their allegation that the disposition in favor of Lapinid before
partition was a concrete or definite portion, the validity of sale still prevails. The Supreme Court had repeatedly
held that no individual can claim title to a definite or concrete portion before partition of co-owned property. Each
co-owner only possesses a right to sell or alienate his ideal share after partition. However, in case he disposes
his share before partition, such disposition does not make the sale or alienation null and void. What will be
affected on the sale is only his proportionate share, subject to the results of the partition. The co-owners who did
not give their consent to the sale stand to be unaffected by the alienation. The validity of sale being settled, it
follows that the subsequent compromise agreement between the other co-owners did not affect the rights of
Lapinid as a co-owner.

 It was ruled that Jesus Velez, Mariano Velez and Vicente Torres, Jr. are currently authorized to sell said
properties, receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them to the parties. Be that as it may, the compromise
agreement failed to defeat the already accrued right of ownership of Lapinid over the share sold by Jesus. As
early as 9 November 1997, Lapinid already became a co-owner of the property and thus, vested with all the
rights enjoyed by the other co-owners. The judgment based on the compromise agreement, which is to have the
covered properties sold, is valid and effectual provided as it does not affect the proportionate share of the non-
consenting party. Accordingly, when the compromise agreement was executed without Lapinid’s consent, said
agreement could not have affected his ideal and undivided share. Petitioners cannot sell Lapinid’s share absent
his consent. Nemo dat quod non habet – "no one can give what he does not have."

 The Supreme Court has ruled in many cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because
the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what
would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.
On the Second Issue:
 As previously discussed, Lapinid, from the execution of sale, became a co-owner vested with rights to enjoy
the property held in common.

 The Court cited, in support of its ruling, Art. 486 and 493 of the Civil Code which provide that:

Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance
with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the interest of the co-
 ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their rights. The purpose of the
co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

 Each co-owner of property held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy
the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the reason being
that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises,
together with his co-participants joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and
enjoyment of the same.

 From the foregoing, it is absurd to rule that Lapinid, who is already a co-owner, be ordered to pay rental
payments to his other co-owners. Lapinid’s right of enjoyment over the property owned in common must be
respected despite opposition and may notbe limited as long he uses the property to the purpose for which it
isintended and he does not injure the interest of the co-ownership.

31. Magsano, et al. vs. Pangasinan Savings and Loan Bank, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 215038, October 17, 2016 –
Stephen Binag Ramos and Justice Pajarillo

Facts:
On July 1, 1991, spouses Roque and Susana (collectively, mortgagors), the parents of petitioners, purportedly
executed in favor of respondent bank a Real Estate Mortgage over a 418 square-meter parcel of land located in
Dagupan City, covered by TCT No. 48754, as well as the improvements thereon (subject property), as security for
the payment of their P35,000.00 loan.
The mortgagors, however, defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation when it fell due, causing respondent
bank to extra-judicially foreclose the mortgaged property, with notice to the mortgagors,and, in the process,
respondent bank emerged as the highest bidder in the public auction sale held on March 21, 1994 for a total bid
price of P65,826.69. The mortgagors then failed to redeem the property within the redemption period. Respondent
bank subsequently sold the same to Sps. Manuel.
Despite repeated demands, the mortgagors refused to vacate the premises; hence, respondent bank applied for
and was granted a writ of possession over the subject property and, thereafter, a writ of demolition, resulting in the
demolition of petitioners' houses.
Consequently, on September 6, 2004, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of Real Estate Mortgage,
Certificate of Sale, Sheriff's Final Sale, Deed of Sale, and TCT No. 4875425 against respondent bank, Sps. Manuel,
and Sheriff Daroy (defendants) before the RTC, which they amended on September 3, 2007. They averred that
Roque had already passed away prior to the execution of the Real Estate Mortgage; hence, the said mortgage was
null and void. They further claimed that the said property is their family home, but the consent of the majority of the
beneficiaries had not been secured. They likewise asserted that Sps. Manuel were aware that: (a) the foreclosure
proceedings were invalid; and (b) petitioners were in possession of the subject property, hence, purchasers in bad
faith.
For their part, defendants denied knowledge of the death of Roque, and averred that petitioners have no cause of
action to seek the annulment of the Real Estate Mortgage since they were not parties thereto. They contended that
assuming that the latter have a cause of action, the same had prescribed.
RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It declared that petitioners have no cause of action against the
defendants, holding them bound by the misrepresentation of their mother who signed the Real Estate Mortgage, the
authenticity of whose signature they never contested. And even assuming that petitioners have a cause of action,
the RTC ruled that the same is barred by prescription, considering that the action to annul the Real Estate Mortgage
and the foreclosure sale was filed beyond the prescriptive period from the time their causes of action accrued.
CA affirmed RTC's findings.

Issue:
W/N (a) the Real Estate Mortgage was void; and (b) Sps. Manuel were purchasers in good faith.

Ruling:
(a) Conjugal partnership between spouse was dissolved pursuant to Article 126 (1) of the Family Code, and an
implied ordinary co-ownership arose among Susana and the other heirs of Roque with respect to his share in the
assets of the conjugal partnership pending liquidation.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto,
and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except
when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
Thus, although Susana is a co-owner with her children with respect to Roque's share in the conjugal partnership,
she could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. While she herself as co-owner had the right to mortgage or
even sell her undivided interest in the subject property, she could not mortgage or otherwise dispose of the same in
its entirety without the consent of the other co-owners.
(b) The Court finds that Sps. Manuel are not innocent purchasers for value who can acquire title to the subject
entire property.
While the rule is that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate
of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of
the property, where the land sold is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, as in this case, the
purchaser must go beyond the certificate of title and make inquiries concerning the actual possessor.
Here, petitioners were in possession of the subject property when Sps. Manuel bought the same. However, the
records do not show that Sps. Manuel inspected the property and inquired into the nature of petitioners' possession
and/or the extent of their possessory rights as a measure of precaution which may reasonably be required of a
prudent man in a similar situation, and thereby discover the irregularity in the acquisition of title by the respondent
bank. Sps. Manuel, therefore, failed to exercise the diligence required in protecting their rights; as such, the Court
cannot ascribe good faith to them.
32. Arsenio Tabasondra, et al. vs. Sps. Constatino, et al., G.R. No. 196403, December 7, 2016 – Francis Victor
and Laiza Angelica

Article 493 of the Civil Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect
to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of
the co-ownership."

*Plaintiffs-Appellees- respondents

Defendants-Appellants- petitioners

The Case

Under appeal is the adverse decision promulgated on November 30, 2010 [1] whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) modified the judgment rendered on September 22, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, in
Tarlac City ordering the partition of all the three parcels of land owned in common among the parties. [2] The
modification by the CA, which expressly recognized the alienation by the two co-owners of their shares, consisted in
limiting the partition of the property owned in common to only the unsold portion with an area of 33,450.66 square
meters.

Facts:

The parties herein were the children of the late Cornelio Tabasondra from two marriages. Where the
respondents were the children of Cornelio by his first wife, Severina namely: Tarcila Tabasondra-Constantino and
the late Sebastian Tabasondra. While the petitioners were the children of Cornelio by his second wife, Sotera;
namely: Arsenio Tabasondra, Cornelio Tabasondra, Jr., Fausta Tabasondra-Tapacio, Fernando Tabasondra,
Guillermo Tabasondra, Mirasol Tabasondra-Mariano, Myrasol Tabasondra-Romero, and Marlene Tabasondra-
Maniquil.

Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana, all surnamed Tabasondra. were siblings. They were also the registered
owners of the three (3) parcels of land located at Dalayap, Tarlac City, identified as Lot No. 2536, containing an
area of seventy-seven thousand one hundred and forty-seven (77,147) sq. m.; Lot No. 3155, with an area of thirteen
thousand six hundred fifty-nine (13,659) sq. m.; and, Lot No. 3159, with an area of nine thousand five hundred forty-
six (9,546) sq. m., covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 106012.

Cornelio died on March 15, 1991, while Valentina and Valeriana both died single on August 19, 1990 and
August 4, 1998, respectively. They all died intestate and without partitioning the property covered by TCT No.
106012. Thus, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, as descendants of Cornelio, possessed and
occupied the property.

On August 2002, the controversy arose when the Plaintiffs-Appellees filed the complaint below against the
Defendants-Appellant claiming that the parcels of land are owned in common by them and the Defendants-
Appellants but the latter does not give them any share in the fruits thereof. Hence, they asked for partition but the
Defendants-Appellants refused without valid reasons.

In their Answer, the Defendants-Appellants averred that they do not object to a partition provided that the
same should be made only with respect to Cornelio's share. They contended that they already own the shares of
Valentina and Valeriana in the subject land by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale that the said sisters executed in
their favor on August 18, 1982.
 The RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the partition of the three (3) parcels of land
covered by TCT No. 16012 among the compulsory and legal heirs of Cornelio, Valentina and Valeriana all
surnamed Tabasondra.

The CA promulgated the decision affirming the RTC with modification in that the partition and the
accounting is ordered to be made only with respect to a thirty-three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six
(33,450.66) sq.m. portion of the property.

Issue:

Whether the CA correctly ordered the partition and accounting with respect to only 33,450.66 square meters of the
property registered under TCT No. 10612.

Ruling:

Yes. There is no question that the total area of the three lots owned in common by Cornelio, Valentina and
Valeriana was 100,352 square meters; and that each of the co-owners had the right to one-third of such total area. It
was established that Valentina and Valeriana executed the Deed of Absolute Sale, whereby they specifically
disposed of their shares in the property registered under TCT No. 10612 in favor of Sebastian Tabasondra and
Tarcila Tabasondra.

The Court upheld the right of Valentina and Valeriana to thereby alienate .. their pro indiviso shares to
Sebastian and Tarcila even without the knowledge or consent of their co-owner Cornelio because the alienation
covered the disposition of only their respective interests in the common property. According to Article 493 of the Civil
Code, each co-owner "shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved," but "the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership." Hence, the petitioners as the successors-in-interest of Cornelio could
not validly assail the alienation by Valentina and Valeriana of their shares in favor of the respondents.

The SC affirmed the CA's ruling that there is no denying that the RTC erred in granting the complaint and
ordering a partition without qualifying that such should not include the shares previously pertaining to Valeria and
Valentina. Simply put, since the aggregate area of the subject property is one hundred thousand three hundred fifty-
two (100,352) sq.m., it follows that Cornelio, Valentina, and Valeriana each has a share equivalent to thirty-three
thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66) sq. m. portion thereof. Accordingly, when Valentina and
Valeriana sold their shares, the Defendants-Appellants became co-owners with Cornelio. Perforce, upon Cornelia's
death, the only area that his heirs, that is, the Plaintiffs-Appellees and the Defendants-Appellants, are entitled to and
which may be made subject of partition is only a thirty three thousand four hundred fifty point sixty-six (33,450.66)
sq.m. portion of the property.

As a result of Valentina and Valeriana's alienation in favor of Sebastian and Tarcila of their pro indiviso
shares in the three lots, Sebastian and Tarcila became co-owners of the 100,352-square meter property with
Cornelio (later on, with the petitioners who were the successors-in-interest of Cornelio). In effect, Sebastian and
Tarcila were co-owners of two-thirds of the property, with each of them having one-third pro indiviso share in the
three lots, while the remaining one-third was co-owned by the heirs of Cornelio, namely, Sebastian, Tarcila and the
petitioners.
 Although the CA correctly identified the co-owners of the three lots, it did not segregate the 100,352-square
meter property into determinate portions among the several co-owners.

Accordingly, there is a need to remand the case to the court of origin for the purpose of identifying and
segregating, by metes and bounds, the specific portions of the three lots assigned to the co-owners, and to effect
the physical partition of the property in the following proportions: Tarcila, one-,, third; the heirs of Sebastian, one-
third; and the petitioners (individually), along with Tarcila and the heirs of Sebastian (collectively), one-third. That
physical partition was required, but the RTC and the CA uncharacteristically did not require it. Upon remand,
therefore, the RTC should comply with the express terms of Section 2, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.

Should the parties be unable to agree on the partition, the next step for the RTC will be to appoint not more
than three competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to make the partition, and to command such
commissioners to set off to each party in interest the part and proportion of the property as directed in this decision.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
November 30, 2010 in CA-G.R. CV No. 92920 in that the accounting is to be made only with respect to the fruits of
the one-third portion of the property still under the co-ownership of all the parties; REMANDS the case to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, in Tarlac City for further proceedings in accordance with •this decision, and to
determine the technical metes and bounds and description of the proper share of each co-owner of the property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10612, including the improvements thereon, in accordance with the Civil
Code and Rule 69 of the Rules of Court; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
33. Roxas vs. Tuason, 9 Phil. 408. – Bernadette Sandoval and Annabelle Talens

Roxas v. Tuason
G.R. No. L-3788. December 21, 1907.
First Division, Torres (J): 4 concur
Doctrine:
Facts:
On 19 February 1906, attorneys Rosado, Sanz & Opisso, on behalf of Pedro P. Roxas, applied for the
registration of the estate owned by Roxas (Hacienda de San Pedro Macati) in accordance with the provisions of the
Land Registration Act. Said hacienda was acquired by Roxas by inheritance under the will of his late father, Jose
Bonifacio Roxas, y Ubaldo. The property consists of 4 parcels of land, irregular shape, designated on the
accompanying plan under the letters “A” to “D”, containing a total area of 1,761 hectares 51 ares and 5 centares,
equivalent to 17,615,105 sq.m., and assessed at P415,221.34, of which P59,904 corresponded to the portion of
said hacienda included within the limits of the city of Manila and P256,769 corresponded to that portion situated in
the Province of Rizal. The building constructed of strong materials, called the “CasaQuinta” or “Casa de Ingenieros,”
belonging also to Roxas, is erected within parcel “C,” occupying, together with its appurtenances, an area of 8,430
sq.m., and was assessed at P98,557.34. The hacienda was not mortgaged nor that any person has any right to or
any interest therein; and it is almost wholly occupied, under lease, by about 429 tenants whose names, residences,
and postal addresses, as well as the residence of the owner of the property and of his attorney in fact, are stated in
the application.
On 24 April, Roxas requested the summoning of the persons therein named, and stated in addition that the total
area of the hacienda is 17,613,595.91 sq.ms., as specified in the corrections made to the technical description. On
24 July 1906, Roxas amended his application and gave the postal address and names of several occupants of the
property; and by other amendments to his original petition dated 30 August and 25 September 1906, rectifications
are made in the boundaries of the hacienda, the last of which represents a decrease of 1,446.70 sq.ms., or 14 ares
and 46.70 centares which must be deducted from the original description.
The owners of the adjoining properties having been summoned and notified by means of subpoenas and notices
published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia Tuason, appeared and by a document dated 10 September 1906,
set forth her opposition to the registration and authentication of the title of Roxas, as regards the parcel marked “C,”
for the reason that two old monuments which had separated their respective properties had been pulled down and
new ones erected without her consent, and in her opinion the latter included a considerable portion of the land
owned by her. The municipality of San Pedro Macati also filed opposition to the requested registration, alleging that
the land occupied by the municipal building and the public school had been in the possession of the town from time
immemorial, and that all the land occupied by roads, highways, lanes, and public landing places belonged to the
public domain and should be excluded from registration in favor of Roxas. On 18 September 1906, the attorney for
Alejandro Aguirre and Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition to said application for registration alleging that the 2
parcels of land owned by them had been improperly included within the bounds of said hacienda in the parcel
marked “C,” the second said parcels, which is the only subject of the respective bill of exceptions and appeal
interposed by them, consists of a building lot situated in Calle San Pedro, opposite the first parcel of land, which was
the subject of another bill of exceptions and appeal by the Roxas; said second parcels measures 10 meters and 87
centimeters on its front and rear, and 9 meters and 20 centimeters along each of its sides, its boundaries being
stated.
On 17 October 1906, the court rendered decision, overruling the opposition made by Julia Tuason, by the
municipality of San Pedro Macati, and by Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre as to the second parcel, and ordered
the registration of the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati in favor of Pedro Roxas excluding the parcel of land with a
frontage of 23 Spanish yards and a depth of 24 Spanish yards occupied by the municipal building, which the
government has the right to use without the payment of rent therefor, so long as the same is occupied by the said
building or by another in substitution thereof and used for the public good and for official purposes. Julia Tuason, the
municipality of San Pedro Macati, and Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre, excepted to said judgment and moved
for a new trial on the ground that the same was contrary to law and to the weight of the evidence; said motion was
overruled, Tuason, Aguirre and the municipality of San Pedro Macati again excepting. The respective bills of
exceptions having been presented, the same were forwarded in the ordinary manner to the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed from as regards Julia Tuason and the municipality of San
Pedro Macati, declared the appeal of Alejandro and Consolacion Aguirre to be abandoned, and ordered Tuason, the
Aguirres and the municipality of San Pedro to pay their respective share of the costs.
ISSUE:

HELD:
1. No evidence showing Julia Tuason owns the strip of land on the bank of the creek; Relief is application of
survey

The record does not show that the boundary of the land of Julia Tuason was inclosed by monuments
belonging to her or that the creek which divides the sitio or Island of Suavoy from the land of the said
hacienda is included within the Tuason’s land, since in the bill of sale executed by the procurador general of
the Augustinian friars on 28 March 1893, to Julia Tuason, no mention is made of monuments erected
thereon nor of any creek existing in the large tract of land purchased by her, except that the land is situated
in the barrio of Suavoy and that it is bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati. Nor does
the record show that there was more land on the side of the hacienda, forming part of the barrio or sitio of
Suavoy, not included in the tract acquired by Tuason from the Augustinian Fathers, and that said creek
traversed said barrio from one end to the other, or the Tuason’s land, in order to affirm on good grounds that
her land extended to the opposite bank of the aforesaid creek. Thus, from the fact that the land of Julia
Tuason was bounded on two sides by the Hacienda of San Pedro Macati it does not follow that the strip of a
few meters in width on the bank of the creek belonged to her, there being no evidence in support thereof,
and if her statement were true, she would have applied for a survey and demarcation of her property in
accordance with the area of the same stated in her title deed; and if she did not do so it must be because
she renounces its verification in this manner or for some other reason. Strip of land occupied by tenants of
the hacienda The strip of land, irregular in shape, running parallel to the creek and forming a portion of its
bank, has always been occupied by tenants of the hacienda as being an integral portion thereof, even at the
time when the land owned by Julia Tuason belonged to the Augustinian Fathers, the original owners thereof.
The hacienda’s tenants were never molested or interfered with by the Augustinian Fathers or their tenants,
nor later by Julia Tuason or her tenants when cultivating the strip of land. Said tenants when cultivating the
land did not cross the creek, it being recognized as the boundary line between both properties.

2. No legal reason for Tuason to own strip of land No legal reason whatever exists why the slow increase
which has taken place on the hacienda’s side should be considered as belonging to Tuason, inasmuch as
the latter does not own the bed of the creek and because it may be assumed that the slow decrease in the
width thereof benefited both properties equally since Tuason has not been able to show or prove that her
land has been thereby reduced. 5. Accretions belong to riparian owners Article 366 of the Civil Code in
dealing with the right of accession to real property provides that “rhe accretions which banks of rivers may
gradually receive from the effects of the currents belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.”
The provision is perfectly applicable to the strip of land, which, on account of the accretion, has come to be
undeniable increase in the land of the hacienda inasmuch as it has increased all along the bank of the
creek, the gradual effect of the currents; and even though the law does not require an express act of
possession of the accretion which has enlarged the estate, it is certain that the owner of the hacienda has
possessed it for more than 30 years through his tenants, who have been cultivating their respective parcels
of land together with the corresponding portion of the said strip down to the bank of said creek.
.
NOTES/RATIO:
6. Municipality of San Pedro Macati merely enjoys usufruct of the plots occupied by the municipal building and town
cemetery Roxas is the owner of the building lots and portions of land to which the opposition of the municipality of
San Pedro Macati refers; the latter has only the usufruct of the plot occupied by the municipal building as long as
the same or any other building of a public and official nature is erected thereon; the municipality can not dispose of
it as a property of its own because, according to the documents offered in evidence by Roxas, the Spanish
Government had recognized the dominion of Roxas’ predecessor over the land occupied by said municipal building
and by the town cemetery, and the grant made by the owner was ever understood to be only of the usufruct thereof
so long as used for public purposes, the same being returnable to him upon ceasing to be used for such purpose. 8.
Prescription unavailing to plot occupied by public school In connection with the land occupied by the public school
of said town, no opposition based on ordinary or on extraordinary prescription may be made by the municipality
because the plot was granted only for the purpose of erecting thereon a public school, and the possession thereof,
on the part of the municipality, was simply usufructuary, the government of the Province of Manila having
recognized the title thereto which pertained to Roxas, owner of the hacienda, whereof the said plot forms a part.
The possession thereof by the municipality has been but for a few years only. When the school building having been
destroyed, the land was abandoned. Prescription thus can not be invoked because the possession thereof was
interrupted and ceased many years since. 9. Aguirres’ appeal abandoned The attorney for Alejandro and
Consolacion Aguirre excepted to the decision of 17 October 1906, whereby their claim to the second parcel of land
was dismissed. Their bill of exceptions, entered in the general register under 3788, was duly forwarded.
Notwithstanding the fact that the time prescribed has been exceeded, the Aguirres have not filed their brief nor
notified Roxas regarding the same. Roxas requested in a petition on 26 June 1907 that the Aguirres’ appeal be
considered as having been abandoned. Said request is held to be well based and in accordance with the law
DIGEST AUTHOR: Sandoval, B.C. & Talens, A.
34. Reynante vs CA, 207 SCRA 794 – Yuj Ramos and John Mark Besana

G.R. No. 95907 April 8, 1992

JOSE REYNANTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. VALENTIN CRUZ, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan, Branch VIII, and the HEIRS OF LEONCIO CARLOS and DOLORES A. CARLOS, and HEIRS
OF GORGONIO CARLOS and CONCEPCION CARLOS, respondents.

Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive
from the effects of the current of the waters.
Accretion noun – the process of growth or increase, typically by the gradual accumulation of additional layers or
matter.
"the accretion of sediments in coastal mangroves"

Facts:
The petitioner was a tenant of the late Don Cosme Carlos, owner of the fishpond situated in Meycauayan
Bulacan. During his tenancy he built a hut near the fishpond where he and his family lived, and planted nipa palms
and harvested them as his own without interference or prohibition from Don Carlos.
When Don Carlos dies, his heirs and the petitioner entered into an agreement to surrender all the rights of
the fishpond he was tenanting and received P200,000 in consideration. Pursuant to the agreement petitioner
surrendered the fishpond and the 2 huts he built therein while he continued to live in the hut near the fishpond and
take care of the nipa hut constructed therein. The respondent, meanwhile, leased the fishpond to a certain Carlos
dela Cruz.
The respondent, on February 17 1988, formally demanded that the petitioner vacate the place as he was
already indemnified according to them with respect to their prior agreement while the petitioner refused to relinquish
possession of the said lot.
The respondent later filed a Case before the Municipal Trial Court for forcible entry with preliminary
mandatory injunction against petitioner alleging that the latter by means of strategy and stealth, took over the
physical, actual and material possession of lots 1 and 2 by residing in one of the huts bordering the Liputan River
and cutting off and/or disposing of the sasa or nipa palms adjacent thereto.

Issue:
W/N the owners of the land automatically owns the accretion without registering them.

MTC Ruling:
Dismissed the case filed by the heirs as the Jose Reynante was found to have previous possession of the
said lot.

RTC Ruling:
Reversed the decision of the MTC in favor of the heirs and ordered Jose Reynante to restore possession of
the land together with nipa palms planted thereon.

CA Ruling:
Affirmed the decision of RTC in toto and denied the motion for reconsideration submitted by Jose Reynante
after.

SC Ruling:
While it is true that alluvial deposits shall belong to the owner of the lot adjoining the accretion it is still
subject to prescription. The petitioner, as proven by affidavits executed by disinterested parties, was in possession
of the land for more than 50 years. Since the owner of the land did not register the accretion, the land will be subject
to acquisition by prescription.
Wherefore, he decision of the CA is reversed and set aside and the decision of MTC is hereby reinstated.