Table of Contents

Foreword 5
Ernst M. Felberbauer and Frederic Labarre

Abstract 11

Disarmament and Confidence-Building in the South Caucasus 13

Peggy Mason

PART I:
INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENCE AND THE STATE: 25
ESTABLISHING TRUST TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE SOCIAL
CONTRACT
Military Expenditures and Spending on Socio-economic 27
Development in the South Caucasus
Gary Milante

A Frozen Peace Process, not a Frozen Conflict 45

Diana Asatryan

NATO Partnerships post-ISAF and after the Ukraine Crisis 51

Heidi Reisinger

PART II:
SECURITY IN THE BREAK-AWAY REGIONS: HOW MUCH OF 63
A MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF FORCE?

The Implementation of Functional Models of a Decentralized 65

National Security System in the South Caucasus
Hrachya Arzumanian

National Interests and Perspectives of International Recognition of the 71

Republic of Abkhazia
Astanda Pataraya

The Trajectory of Russian–Georgian Relations after the Sochi Olympics 79

Bogdan Catalin Udriste

3
The Monopoly on the Use of Force in South Ossetia 97
Zarina Sanakoeva

PART III:
SECURITY COMPETITION AMONG THE SOUTH CAUCASUS 103
STATES: RACING TOWARDS DISASTER?

The Russian-Georgian August War of 2008 in the Context of 105

Georgia’s External Security
David Matsaberidze

De-escalating Conflicts and Creating Conditions for Peace Process 123

in the South Caucasus
Elkhan Nuriyev

PART IV:
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AS NEXUS OF LARGE POWERS’ 133
SECURITY DILEMMA

Arms Control as Panacea for Russia and the South Caucasus 135
Marcel de Haas

The Fate of the CFE Treaty: A Russian Perception 147

Sergei Denisentsev

The Shape of the Great Powers’ Relations in the South Caucasus: 153
A View from Ankara
Burcu Gültekin Punsmann

PART V:
EPILOGUE AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 157

Epilogue 159
Frederic Labarre

Policy Recommendations 163

Study Group Regional Stability in the South Caucasus

List of Authors and Editors 169

4
Foreword
Ernst M. Felberbauer and Frederic Labarre

The 9th Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group workshop
opened on the background of the crisis in Ukraine. In fact the only re-
deeming value of the crisis has been to stimulate thinking and refresh our
memories about the events that, twenty years ago already, have shaped to-
day’s South Caucasus. In fact, the crisis prompted many of our Armenian
and Azerbaijani colleagues preferred to direct their attention homeward
and consider the implication of the events in Crimea for their own coun-
tries (including Nagorno-Karabakh). It could be said, in that sense, that this
crisis, happening so close to European shores, has had the effect of ‘reach-
ing out’ to the South Caucasus so that this region too has become ‘closer’
to Europe – if not regionally, at least philosophically.

The 9th RSSC SG workshop was held from 20-22 March 2014, in Istanbul,
and aimed at discussing the concept of security as seen from the de-
militarization or disarmament point of view, juxtaposed against the South
Caucasus countries’ socio-economic policies. In short, this workshop
aimed at discussing not the balance of power between the actors, but the
balance of spending between guns and butter. The events in Ukraine had a
stark warning for the South Caucasus; failure to address pressing socio-
economic issues could haunt the regimes in place. Already the Study Group
had resolved in past workshops not to tackle the issue of regime character-
istics, democratization or regime change. In the 8th workshop, in particular,
it was resolved that security and domestic stability could be guaranteed by
the regimes in place. The Study Group focused instead on the need to raise
awareness on leveraging political stability to enhance living standards.
Therefore, human security is very much at the basis of the Study Group’s
thinking on national security.

As always, the workshop began by giving proper place to the examination

of the facts. What is the impact of over-spending in defence for the na-
tional constituency? The first panel offers an in-depth analysis by Gary
Milante from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
on the impact of defence spending as national goals, while Heidi Reisinger

5
and Diane Asatryan provide insights on extra-regional and intra-regional
developments as pertaining to the South Caucasus. Milante’s presentation,
reproduced here, shows a new image of the South Caucasus countries. His
analysis reveals Azerbaijan and Armenia, in particular, to be in a league of
their own when it comes to military expenditures (milex). On the other
hand, the same analysis shows Georgia much more within the ‘mainstream’
of comparable countries.

Clearly, the tensions that remain at work in the region are pressuring the
countries to attend to hard security issues out of proportion to other na-
tional obligations. Milante’s contribution gives added insight to our keynote
speaker’s own analysis on the need to pursue balanced spending not in
opposition to adversaries real or perceived, but in relation to domestic
needs as well. The point is that un-addressed human needs tend, sooner or
later, to degenerate into domestic unrest not unlike the kind witnessed in
the streets of Kiev.

Diana Asatryan’s contribution refers therefore to a failure to unlock the

peace process as a result. Protagonists of the South Caucasus have a ten-
dency to blame each other for the choices that are made domestically. In-
stead of looking at tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan as a frozen
conflict, she argues that it is the peace process that is frozen. It is that
process that needs to be incentivized and made more dynamic. There is, in
this affirmation, the comforting impression that neither Armenia nor Azer-
baijan actually want to come to blows over Nagorno-Karabakh. But that
doesn’t propel the process any further, despite the meeting between Presi-
dents Sargsyan and Aliyev in the Fall of 2013.

Heidi Reisinger’s contribution also fits the deepening rift in the South Cau-
casus, but calls into question NATO’s ability to influence events positively
in the region. NATO’s partnerships are still active, most notably through
the Partnership for Peace, but also through a variety of mechanisms aimed
specifically at Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. These partnerships, many
in the region may think, are tantamount to deepening integration of the
South Caucasus with Euro-Atlantic structures. In fact, Reisinger’s contribu-
tion seems to suggest that the prospect of integration may be farther than
ever, owing to the Alliance’s enlargement fatigue, exhaustion after Afghani-
stan, or difficulties in dealing with the Ukraine crisis.

6
The 9th workshop aimed at confronting the negative consequences of arms
racing and militarization. As an advocate for stability, which is not the same
thing as stagnation, the Study Group has an interest in exploring ways to
avoid stagnation leading to reckless impatience. This impatience can be
exploited by spoilers who can derail peaceful initiatives. One of the interim
conclusions that can be offered for the contributions of the first panel is
that the time has come to move, and to move quickly. Move to offset the
public discontent that can affect domestic stability, move to avoid domestic
instability’s search for foreign scapegoats, and move, whenever possible,
quickly on peace initiatives, precisely when they come from the region.

But as we’ve suggested many times before, one solution cannot fit all con-
flicts in the region. Therefore, stability and stagnation become values that
differ from case to case. Quite evidently, the Abkhaz and South Ossetian
perspectives of stability involve the sense of security afforded by Russian
political and military involvement. Tbilisi, for its part, continues to see
Moscow’s intervention and presence as a factor of regional instability.
There too, there is significant stagnation, even with the arrival of Tbilisi’s
political scene of a government more open to dialogue with Moscow, Suk-
hum and Tskhinval. Astanda Pataraya’s contribution clearly shows that
there is a difficult acknowledgement that Abkhazia’s security can only be
guaranteed against a corresponding loss of independence to Russia’s mili-
tary presence. We are in the presence of a redefinition of sovereignty in the
South Caucasus, one which is subordinated to human security and prosper-
ity. Since Abkhazia’s security is dependent on Russia, the usual dilemma of
government spending is less acute than for Armenia or even Georgia.
Abkhazia does not need to spend as much in military expenditures, and is
therefore more free to consider its population’s well-being from a social
point of view. Still the impression that Georgia is a threat remains. Essen-
tially, this conception of security versus sovereignty also operates in South
Ossetia. There, the memories of Georgia’s aggression are more acute be-
cause they are more recent. It will be some time, says Zarina Sanakoeva,
before relations between Tskhinval and Tbilisi are untainted by the mem-
ory of the ‘888’ war.

This contrasts with the Nagorno-Karabakh conception of security which

tends to rely on an ‘autonomous’ capacity, even if neighbouring Armenia,
with which some in Nagorno-Karabakh would like to reunite, is closely

7
aligned with Moscow. Nagorno-Karabakh wants to things by itself, accord-
ing to Arzumanyan. So there are two approaches to security in the break-
away regions; one autonomous, the other dependent. The consequences of
that choice lend credence to a concept of sovereignty explored during the
8th workshop, in November 2013; that of ‘shared sovereignty’ especially in
the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. How ‘sovereign’ that sharing is
can only be measured when Abkhazia and South Ossetia will feel capable
enough to ask Russian troops to leave. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh,
the ability to fend for oneself would perhaps irritate the powers-that-be in
Yerevan, not to mention Baku. In the current situation, the development of
security apparatus in Nagorno-Karabakh may suggest a desire for the
breakaway region to be viable independently from either Armenia or Azer-
baijan. In other words, the destiny of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Arme-
nia or as an independent political entity (unless a formula can be found
with Baku to resolve the many-sided disputes on Nagorno-Karabakh),
would entail a sovereign choice from Nagorno-Karabakh, rather than from
Yerevan or Baku.

From this, it is easy to extend the analysis to the arms racing that takes
place within the region. David Matsaberidze recounts how the security di-
lemma became so acute in the months prior to the August 2008 War that
Georgia had no choice but to build up a huge inventory. Here we see a
question of context, but the context itself is controversial, and the editors
of this publication hereby acknowledge it. Nuriyev’s article, by contrast,
focuses on a strengthened OSCE to relieve the pressures of arms racing,
something that is echoed in Marcel de Haas’ text. The time has come, ac-
cording to Nuriyev, for the OSCE to fulfil the promise of its mission, and
to engage the parties more proactively. In particular the parties should not
expect progress in the Geneva talks when at the same time they are engag-
ing in ruinous arms races. The first test of good will, in this view, would be
to declare a cessation of the arms build-up to give a chance for talks to take
place. In the view of the editors of this publication, and also in the view of
many of the participants of the 9th RSSC Study Group, this would also pro-
vide a respite to the governments of the region who need to address crucial
social issues.

Marcel de Haas’ text, as we’ve intimated above, echoes Elkhan Nuriyev’s

feelings. He suggests abandoning the Conventional Forces in Europe Trea-

8
ty (CFE) approach to disarmament, and rather focusing on Vienna Docu-
ment verification schedules. These can still offer the transparency that trust
requires, without putting stress on the parties to abide by a moribund CFE
Treaty. Also, it is unlikely that Russia will lift the moratorium on the CFE
Treaty anytime soon, so it is safe to say that the CFE Treaty is dead. What
matters is salvaging whatever inspection mechanisms that still exist to offer
a form of security in the South Caucasus.

That point of view is also reflected in Sergei Denisentsev’s contribution,

which relates to the history of Russia and the CFE Treaty. The CFE Treaty
was almost doomed from the start, since the conditions that gave it rise
changed so quickly; first with the collapse of the prime signatory, the Soviet
Union, the dissolution of the Union and the creation of new signatories
nine years later, but the retention of limits that were suddenly completely
asymmetrical due to the enlargement of NATO in 1999 and 2004, espe-
cially.

In other words, the Russian Federation itself had caused to call for a mora-
torium on CFE Treaty inspections in 2007, not only because of the appar-
ently provocative American moves to deploy missile defence systems, but
because no more security could be obtained from the CFE Treaty. One
question remains; why did Russia wait so long to abandon the CFE Treaty?
Denisentsev does not address this, but one must consider that arms control
mechanisms provide some sort of security even to large powers like Russia.
And so, while we may lament Russia’s abandonment of the CFE Treaty,
perhaps we should look more closely at her proposal for revamping the
trans-European security architecture, one that more adequately reflects the
current balance of power and strategic environment.

The 9th RSSC SG has been convened as a way to expand and explore the
concept of the non-use of force, through disarmament and arms control.
In a certain way, the Study Group has been blessed by a variety of sophisti-
cated arguments, and it can be proud of bringing together such experts
from such a variety of disciplines and backgrounds. By the nature of the
conflicts that animate the region under its purview, the Study Group can-
not hope to achieve success every time in terms of content control, or out-
put. However, the exercise of hosting the workshop is hardly wasted, as it
is one of the few that reunites actors from all sides of the divide, and which

9
bring out policy recommendations (reproduced here at the end of this vol-
ume) for Western consumption. We hope that the reader will find the con-
tributions herein equally useful.

Special thanks go to Ms. Edith Stifter, who supported this publication as

facilitating editor and to Mr. Benedikt Hensellek for his stout support to
the Study Group.

10
Abstract

The 9th Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group Workshop
aimed at exploring ways and means to develop confidence building meas-
ures between protagonists of frozen conflicts in the region. In particular,
the Study Group explored the role of disarmament and arms control at the
individual, regional and international level in lowering tensions. The Study
Group concluded that breakaway regions needed Russia’s protection, but
that this protection was somehow detrimental to their national aspirations.
It also saw the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as moribund,
and advocated more focus on the Vienna Document verification scheme to
sustain arms control efforts.

Zusammenfassung

Der 9. Workshop der Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study

Group zielte darauf ab, Wege und Mittel zu erkunden, vertrauensbildende
Maßnahmen zwischen den Protagonisten der eingefrorenen Konflikte im
Südkaukasus aufzubauen. Der Workshop untersuchte die Rolle von Abrüs-
tung und Waffenkontrolle auf individueller, regionaler und internationaler
Ebene. Die Studiengruppe diskutierte, dass völkerrechtlich umstrittene
Regionen Russlands Schutz brauchten, aber dass dieser Schutz oft im Wi-
derspruch zu nationalen Zielen steht. Ebenso sah sie den Vertrag über
Konventionelle Streitkräfte in Europa (KSE-Vertag) an Bedeutung verlie-
rend und plädiert dafür, dem Verifikationsregime des Wiener Dokuments
für nachhaltige Waffenkontrolle mehr Aufmerksamkeit zu geben.

11
Disarmament and Confidence-Building in the
South Caucasus

Peggy Mason

The title of the Workshop is From Self-defence to Regional Disarmament: Reduc-

ing tensions and stabilising the South Caucasus. The UN Office for Disarmament
Affairs (UNODA) posts its purpose on its website: ‘strengthening peace
and security through disarmament.’1 Clearly the underlying premise is that
disarmament and arms control measures promote peace and security. Of
course we understand that this is not an absolute, unqualified statement.
Not all arms control and disarmament is stabilizing. Generally, but not
always, reciprocal rather than unilateral measures work best because the
underlying principle is one of a stable balance.

The UN Charter in Chapter V, Article 262 sets out the global objective of
promoting the establishment and maintenance of international peace and
security ‘with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and
economic resources.’ This goal has been refined further in the work of the
UN First Committee, a deliberative body of the UN General Assembly,
which is open to all member states and which has as its focus – ‘Disarma-
ment and International Security.’ The objective is to seek the lowest level
of military expenditures consistent with legitimate self-defence needs, and
bearing in mind two other relevant Charter provisions – the inherent right
of self-defence on the one hand and the obligation of all UN member
states, on the other, to pursue the peaceful resolution of disputes.

These principles and obligations represent the wisdom of a world that had
suffered two unimaginably horrific global wars and, I respectfully suggest,
are a very good starting point for considering how disarmament might help
stabilize the South Caucasus.

1 UNODA; http://www.un.org/disarmament/
2 Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V; https://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter/chapter5.shtml.

13
The UN First Committee (Disarmament and International Security) and
the UN Disarmament Commission (another UN, global deliberative body)
and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (the multilateral disarmament
negotiating body)3 are dedicated to developing and promoting arms control
and disarmament measures that will enhance and promote international
peace and security. This huge international effort has been going on since
the creation of the United Nations in 1945.

The area of arms control and disarmament breaks down into two very
broad categories, measures relating to weapons of mass destruction (nu-
clear, chemical and biological weapons) and those relating to everything
else. We are concerned with the second category which, in turn, encom-
passes everything from basic information sharing in the military sphere to
formal arms control treaties such as the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). An extremely important aspect of all arms
control measures is how to verify compliance and what to do in the case of
non-compliance.

Going back to the UN website, there is an entire section devoted to trans-

parency measures in relation to conventional disarmament,4 including the
oldest UN military information reporting mechanism, the Global Exchange
of Military Expenditures (GEMI), the more recent UN Register of Con-
ventional Arms and the Reporting on Information Exchanges and Inspec-
tions under the OSCE Mechanism (Vienna 99 Document).5

3 Issues are raised and common ground enlarged through discussion and adoption of
resolutions in the deliberative bodies, along with supporting work such as expert studies.
When the issue is ripe for negotiation, a resolution to that effect transmits the work to
the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
4 Conventional disarmament has until recently focused on the following major weapons
systems: battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large-calibre artillery systems, combat
aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles and missile launchers. Since the mid-1990s
the attention of UN member states has also increasingly turned to the control of small
arms and light weapons, comprising all the rest of conventional armaments outside the
seven major weapons systems.
5 The OSCE mechanism is not a global but a regional mechanism, agreed in 1999 and
representing the culmination of negotiations begun in the darkest days of the Cold War
to help ward off surprise attacks and war through misunderstanding and miscalculation
through a series of agreed exchanges of military information and onsite inspections of
military exercises and other routine manoeuvres.

14
Armenia in its last UN report stated that ‘the conventional arms control
and confidence and security building regimes remain major instruments for
ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency.’ 6

Azerbaijan too cited in its filing the importance of transparency in interna-

tional arms transfers and the need to stem illicit flows undermining regional
security.7

The most recent relevant treaty is the 2013 Arms Trade Treaty on the regu-
lation of the international trade in conventional armaments from small
arms to battle tanks, to combat aircraft and warships. This has been a long
time coming. It has been an unsettling anomaly until now that the trade in
virtually everything is regulated but not the deadly implements of war. The
treaty sets out a series of objectives:

• To foster peace and security by putting a stop to destabilizing arms

flows to conflict regions;
• To prevent human rights abusers from being supplied with arms;
and
• To help keep pirates, warlords and gangs from acquiring arms.

In sum, the goal is robust standards for responsible transfers. As well as

engendering more responsible behaviour in state to state transfers, the
hope is that control of the legal trade will also help states get a better handle
on illicit trafficking. More on this later.

Back to Chapter V, Article 26 of the UN Charter and the principle of the

‘least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic re-
sources’. From the perspective of this global goal, arms racing would ap-
pear to be the opposite behaviour, leading to potentially ‘excessive and
destabilizing accumulations’ of armaments and significant diversion of hu-

6 Report of the Republic of Armenia, Information on Confidence-Building Measures in the Field of

Conventional Arms; http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/infoCBM/docs/
CBM/CBM_2011/2011-04-19-Armenia.pdf.
7 Republic of Azerbaijan, Information on confidence-building measures in the field of conventional
arms (Resolution 63/57); http://www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/infoCBM/
docs/CBM/CBM_2011/2011-06-02-Azerbaijan.pdf.

15
man and economic resources, or to use the words of our Co-Chair,
Frederic Labarre in his Purpose Document, leading to ‘disproportionate
spending.’

What are the costs in human security terms of the apparent arms race in
the South Caucasus between Armenia and Azerbaijan? Is there a national
security pay-off for either or both states? How much more or less secure is
each country after all this spending?

According to the internationally respected defence publication, IHS Jane’s

360, Azerbaijan’s steadily growing defence budget, went from USD 175
million in 2004 to a goal of USD 3.75 billion in 2014, including advanced
weaponry from Russia and South Korea.8 For its part, the International
Crisis Group, which tracks conflicts around the world, describes a ‘dra-
matic acceleration of what had already been a growing arms race and inten-
sifying strident rhetoric between Azerbaijan and Armenia.’9

As a major exporter of Caspian Sea oil, it would seem at first glance that
Azerbaijan can afford the 3 percent of GDP that it is now spending on its
military budget. But it is a dramatically different story for Armenia, spend-
ing 4 percent of its GDP (up from 2.7 in 2006) in an economy where re-
mittances from Armenians working abroad play a key role and where the
percentage of the population who are undernourished is above 20 percent.

Real deprivation of this magnitude provides a fertile ground for internal

political instability, a situation that can only be exacerbated by the stark

8 IHS Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, Planned highway, increasing ceasefire violation heighten war risks
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh; http://www.janes.com/article/
35155/planned-highway-increasing-ceasefire-violations-heighten-war-risks-between-
azerbaijan-and-armenia-over-nagorno-karabakh; Weaponry from Russia included artil-
lery units, main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, multiple rocket launchers and
Mi35 attack helicopters. The procurements from South Korea seem mainly, although
not exclusively, focused on enhancing Azerbaijan’s naval capacity in light of its dispute
with Iran over oil in the Caspian Sea, but also included self-propelled howitzers, un-
manned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and helicopters.
9 International Crisis Group (ICG), Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks;
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/b071-armenia-and-
azerbaijan-a-season-of-risks.aspx; p. 1.

16
contrast in living standards with adjacent Azerbaijan.10 And it is not just in
economic terms that Armenian defence spending has had negative conse-
quences. That country is located in an earthquake-prone region where the
risk of earthquakes is higher than ever before, in part due to the link be-
tween man-made seismic tremors and the hydraulic fracturing used in oil
and gas extraction by Azerbaijan. Scarce resources that could have been
allocated to natural disaster preparedness instead have gone to ever increas-
ing defence spending.

So it would certainly seem that the human security costs to Armenia of its
arms race with Azerbaijan are exceedingly high, with ‘[P]recious revenue …
diverted away from poverty mitigation and natural and man-made disaster
mitigation…’11 not to mention economic development. And what of the
security benefits where, despite all of the military spending by Armenia, its
neighbour’s military budget dwarfs Armenia’s entire national budget of US
$2.8 billion? 12

But how much better does Azerbaijan really fare? It apparently can well
afford its current military spending, given its oil wealth. But closer scrutiny
suggests that a figure of 10 percent of the population suffering from mal-
nutrition is a troubling one in an ‘upper mid-level’ economy. And is time
on Azerbaijan’s side? With the vast majority of state revenues coming from
energy exports, any significant drop off in output will affect those revenues.
Analysts believe that the drop is indeed coming after 2015 and that natural
gas exports and revenues from energy transit projects will not compensate
for the resulting revenue gap.13

One cannot help but wonder what the situation would be like had Azerbai-
jan invested more in economic diversification through a sovereign wealth

10 See for example the discussion of internal political pressures in Armenia beginning on
page 8 of the ICG report, cited above. On the issue of actual and perceived deprivation,
see the Case Study: Conflict and Structural Undernourishment in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in
Study for Global Assessment Report 2013, United Nations Hyogo Framework for Ac-
tion, by Frederic Labarre, p. 23.
11 Labarre, op.cit., p. 28.
12 ICG, op cit., p. 3.
13 ICG, op.cit., p. 4.

17
fund such as that of Norway14 so that declining oil output did not signifi-
cantly impair state revenues – investments in other words in building a
sustainable future economy. And a scenario of declining revenues and po-
tentially declining living standards also raises the issue of potential internal
political instability for Azerbaijan.15

This brief analysis suggests that in both Armenia and Azerbaijan there are
human security costs of their arms competition which, in turn, have negative
national security implications.

The rate of Azerbaijan’s military expenditures raises a further question

about the absorptive capacity of its military. Quite aside from the corrosive
effect of entrenched corruption on its arms procurement, there is also the
issue of the ability of the Azerbaijani military to absorb and train effectively
in relation to the sheer amount of new equipment. Jane’s assessment is that
the capacity of the Azerbaijani military lags far behind the equipment ac-
quisition.16 This is to say that national security is not necessarily being en-
hanced by the rate of military expenditure – quite the contrary.

Given the very mixed results likely to flow from Azerbaijan’s extraordinary
arms acquisition process, is there room here for unilateral steps that would
both de-escalate tensions with its neighbour and improve human and na-
tional security within its own borders? And would such unilateral steps, in
turn, encourage Armenia to decrease its military expenditures?

If both sides were to reach some type of agreement regarding military ex-
penditures, which in turn might open the way for other reciprocal arms

14 See for example the extraordinary Reuters story of January 8, 2014 stating that everyone
in Norway became a theoretical crown millionaire on that day in a milestone for the
world’s biggest sovereign wealth fund that has ballooned thanks to high oil and gas pric-
es. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/08/us-norway-millionaires-idUSBREA0
710U20140108.
15 Given the ongoing unrest in the North Caucuses, this potential for internal insecurity in

Azerbaijan should give Russia pause as well.

16 See also the analysis by an independent Baku researcher at http://www.tol.org/client/

article/23254-azerbaijan-military-spending.html and http://iwpr.net/print/report-news

/neighbourhood-watches-azerbaijan-arms.

18
control measures, then the suggestion of the workshop has outlined possi-
ble initial steps to de-escalate the tense situation:

• Reciprocal withdrawal back from the Line of Contact (CL);

• Adaptation of the 1994 Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) to include
sniper fire; and
• Prohibition of certain types of weapons.

And if agreed, all of this would require some kind of verification mecha-
nism, ideally involving both the parties and an international component.
Without independent verification, neither side will trust that the other will
implement the agreements and they will undermine, not build, confidence.
At the same time, it is vitally important that the parties are also involved in
the verification process to build ‘ownership’ in the process and in keeping
with their responsibilities as primary actors in this conflict. A joint mecha-
nism of the parties and international monitors is an ideal mechanism to
allow the parties to participate directly in the de-escalation process, with the
international component providing the necessary ‘buffering’ until trust is
gradually established across the Line of Contact.

Russia, as the most directly engaged of the Minsk co-chairs17 has an espe-
cially pivotal role to play. First and foremost Russia could lead the way in
ending the arms race by suspending arms sales to both sides and encourag-
ing other suppliers to do the same. Russia should then work hard to broker
a meaningful agreement to de-escalate tensions, with Turkey playing a po-
tentially facilitating role.18

The 2013 Arms Trade Treaty to which I referred earlier provides that Par-
ties should not transfer arms where such transfers would ‘undermine inter-
national peace and security.’ There are 118 signatories to this Treaty includ-
ing leading arms suppliers like the USA and the UK, all other NATO
members but Canada, EU member states, Japan and South Korea. But
Russia, the countries of the South Caucasus and Israel (another arms sup-
plier to Azerbaijan) are not yet parties to this vitally important treaty. More

17 The fact that Russia is a party to the conflict and a co-chair of the mediation team has
been frequently cited as a serious weakness of the Minsk process.
18 Armenia is militarily aligned to Russia and Azerbaijan to Turkey.

19
encouragingly however, in the General Assembly vote to adopt the Treaty
(the first step before it is open for signature), among the countries voting in
favour were Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Israel.19

Turning now to Georgia and the breakaway entities of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. Georgia has seen the consequences of earlier disproportionate
arms spending in the twin disasters of underdevelopment and lack of mili-
tary success. The government has ended its ‘arms spree’20 and is now pur-
suing a more constructive approach21 to its relations with Russia and the
authorities of the breakaway entities.

2012 saw a smooth transition of power following the Georgian parliamen-

tary elections and the 2013 Presidential elections ended the period of ‘co-
habitation’ between longstanding political rivals, giving the Georgian Presi-
dent full scope for further constructive action in relation to the breakaway
entities. The time may now be propitious for all sides to consider concrete
steps to de-escalate tensions across the Administrative Boundary Line be-
tween Abkhazia and Georgia as well as within Abkhazia itself, particularly
the Gali region, which has been a scene of violence since the 1992-1993
war and never fully under the control of the Abkhaz authorities.22

Is there a practical way to get beyond the sterile discussions on the non-use
of force that yielded no concrete results in the Geneva Discussions to
date?23

19 No vote is registered at all by Armenia, whether yes, no or an abstention. This may

mean they missed the vote for some unrelated reason or simply found it too difficult to
take any decision.
20 In 2007, Georgia spent 9.2 percent of GDP on its military and had the highest average

growth rate of military spending in the world. See SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2012+v2.xlsx.
21 See for example the discussion for improving relations in the ICG Report,

http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/georgia/224-abkhazia-
the-long-road-to-reconciliation.aspx at pp. 12-13. For an interesting recent article on the
situation: http://america.aljazeera.com/features/2014/3/dispatch-from-abkhazia.html
22 ICG, ibid., pp. 18-21.
23 The Geneva International Discussions have been held regularly since the 2008 war.

Chaired by the UN, EU and OSCE representatives with USA and Russian presence, the
talks have not produced any major agreements and are further complicated by Russian
insistence that it is not a party to the conflict. To get around debates about status , the
negotiators attend as ‘experts’ rather than ‘delegations’. ICG, ibid., p. 13.

20
Can a dialogue at the expert level yield agreement on a possible menu of
de-escalation options? As the RSSC co-chair has reminded us, reductions in
forces and equipment, limits on certain types of military equipment and on
locations of forces and equipment can give credibility to the non-use of
force obligation24 by removing, or reducing, the means to use force.

What forum might be appropriate for Russia, Georgia and the breakaway
entities, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to discuss mutual reductions in forces
to a level of ‘structural sufficiency’ – that is, the minimum necessary to
ensure security in the breakaway regions? Might the Geneva Discussions
not provide a venue for meetings at the expert/technical level,25 to explore
options, with political decisions to follow at the appropriate time?

But in the meantime there is an urgent need to prevent military misunder-

standings and miscalculations that could lead to escalation. In this regard I
would like to recall two recommendations from preceding workshops of
the RSSC Study Group. The first, from the seventh workshop, recom-
mended a focus on ‘cold cooperation.’ And the second, from the eighth
workshop, called for the development of practical measures supporting the
non-use of force – measures to prevent pre-emption and surprise attack.
The term ‘cold cooperation’ when applied to the security field is, in my
view, a very good way of describing confidence and security building meas-
ures, first developed in the heart of the Cold War through the Stockholm
Conference process, begun in January 1984 and culminating in the Vienna
Document 99.26 They were designed precisely to operate in conditions of
deep mistrust and the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in
Georgia builds on these key principles of confidence building through in-
dependent monitoring and reporting to the parties and a joint investigative
mechanism.27

24 It is too often forgotten that the UN Charter places an obligation on Member States to
resolve their disputes peacefully. Thus, individual pledges to do so in particular circum-
stances are really a reaffirmation of an existing Charter obligation.
25 For this mechanism to have a chance to work, the participants would need to have a

demonstrated technical expertise, and not just be diplomats wearing a different ‘hat.’
26 Initially the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, this process eventually

led to the creation of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
See http://www.osce.org.
27 The EUMM was established by the European Union in 2008. See http://www.eumm.eu

21
The EUMM is an indispensable means for the parties to respond to viola-
tions of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) based on facts, not allegations.
Georgia’s new administration has vowed to crack down on armed groups
in the Gali district and has pledged an end to any official ties.28 This could
pave the way for all parties to resume full participation in the Gali Incident
Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) at the expert level and, when
violent incidents occur, in its joint fact-finding missions. And surely the
time is long overdue that the EUMM be given access to the territory of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in accordance with its mandate, especially in
light of the change in the leadership of the Mission.29

Full participation in the Gali IPRM will enable the parties to have a clear
picture of alleged violent incidents and other events impinging on public
security. But the local population also needs to know what is going on.
Given the reluctance of the EUMM to publicise the results of its investiga-
tions, the international community should consider how it might assist,
possibly through a public information capacity.

The Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism is particularly im-

portant for responding to armed groups and individuals at the local level.
This brings me to that last part of my comments today which relate to
promoting the disarmament of informal groups and individuals at the local
level. Here the UN has considerable experience in post-conflict zones,
through its involvement in the planning and implementation of pro-
grammes for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former
fighters (DDR).

There are many requirements for such programmes to succeed, including

agreement among the parties on what types of weapons to control and
how, and ensuring there are adequate measures in place to address local
public security needs, which in turn often requires police training. Another
important area relates to weapons disposition. Appropriate storage and
disposal procedures are essential to prevent weapons collected in the dis-
armament process from becoming yet another source of insecurity.

28 ICG Report on Abkhazia, op.cit. p. 19.

29 For a discussion of the objections raised by Abkhazia to the previous Head of Mission,
see ICG, ibid., p. 18.

22
But the best practice I want to particularly emphasize relates to the need
for community involvement in such programmes. What level of disarma-
ment at the local level do the parties feel they need? What types of weapons
are to be proscribed and what types will individuals still be permitted to
retain and under what circumstances? Is there an economic dimension to
the possession of weapons by individuals? If lack of alternative livelihoods
is an issue, then local disarmament will not be sustainable without careful
attention to job creation and retraining programmes at the community lev-
el. And the overarching requirement is the rule of law, including a legal
framework for the regulation of arms possession.

Here again, the public information dimension is critical to successful dis-

armament at the local level so that the public understands and, ideally,
agrees with the measures being taken.

For all of this to work, resources are required and incentives, both positive
and negative, need to be developed. The UN Development Programme30
has a potentially important role to play as well as other actors like the
European Union. The International Crisis Group has drawn attention to an
international cooperative effort that is working well in the field of improv-
ing public security. It relates to EU police liaison officers based in Zugdidi
(on the Georgian side of the ABL) and a UN police liaison who travel
regularly together to Abkhazia for meetings with local law enforcement and
to provide some basic training.

They urge that the international community build on this cooperation by

deploying a police liaison officer to Gali and Sukhumi to conduct courses
on international policing standards, community policing techniques and
measures to address violence against women.31

Lest anyone doubt that there is an urgency to finding practical ways for-
ward, consider this sentence from the UNICEF Mid-Year Situation Report
on Georgia:

30 For the UNDP role in DDR, see http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home

/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/livelihoods_and_economicrecover
y/disarmament-demobilization-reintegration.html.
31 ICG Report on Abkhazia., op.cit., p. 25.

23
 As a result of continuous isolation and the sensitive political context, children in
Abkhazia today receive a version of basic services inferior to the one their parents’
generation received a few decades ago.32
I have no doubt that the participants in the Regional Stability in South
Caucasus Study Group will continue to search for practical steps to begin
to rebuild trust and cooperation in this region. This is the indispensable
foundation for improving the political, social and economic prospects of all
the peoples of the region.

32 UNICEF Georgia, Mid-year Situation Report, http://www.unicef.org/appeals/files/

UNICEF_Georgia_Midyear_Sitrep_July_9Aug2013.pdf.

24
PART I:

INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENCE AND THE

STATE: ESTABLISHING TRUST TOWARDS AN
EFFECTIVE SOCIAL CONTRACT

25
Military Expenditures and Spending on Socio-economic
Development in the South Caucasus

Gary Milante

A statistical snapshot of trends in Armenia, Azerbaijan

and Georgia with global comparators, 2014

Military expenditures in the South Caucasus: how much is too much?

Of all of the policy levers that policymakers have at their disposal, expendi-
tures on security are one of the most (if not the most) challenging to prop-
erly calibrate. If security expenditures are set too low, the country or the
government risk violence from internal or external threats. But each dollar
spent on security could, alternatively, be spent on socio-economic devel-
opment in health or education, better governance, investments in infra-
structure or returned to the citizens through lower taxes. As countries em-
bark on increased militarization, they can risk ‘crowding out’ social spend-
ing.

Calibration of security expenditures (including right-sizing militaries and

security sector reform, hereafter referred to under the blanket term military
expenditures or milex) is further complicated by uncertainty in assessing
risks and the lack of counterfactuals in past performance (it is often un-
known: would less security expenditure in the past have resulted in the
same or similar security outcomes?). What’s more, many of these threats
are unknown or intangible, and the costs of losses are immeasurable. The
field of defence economics focuses on the complexities of these issues and
how policymakers can properly calibrate their response to these complex
challenges (see Sandler and Hartley, 2012). 1

This paper examinees the level of military expenditures for the three coun-
tries in the South Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan). Because of
the complexities described above, it is not possible to say categorically

1 Sandler, Todd and Keith Hartley, 2007. Handbook of Defense Economics: Defense in a
Globalized World. Elsevier: Amsterdam, the Netherlands.

27
whether expenditures on security in a given country is ‘too much’. Rather,
this paper approaches the problem by looking at military expenditure in
similar countries (in terms of size of population and level of development),
from within the region and around the world. This comparator approach
remains agnostic about how much milex is too much, but the results sec-
tion does raise questions about current levels in all three countries in the
South Caucasus. Milex in all three countries is above average vis-à-vis their
global comparator cohorts and milex has been increasing in all three at a
rate faster than most of their counterparts. Thus, these countries are out-
liers on military expenditure, vis-à-vis other countries at similar level of
development, both in terms of economic and social development.

Comparator approach

Military expenditures may vary across countries and for good reasons.
Countries may be responding to different threats, both domestic and inter-
national, with a variety of security responses and mechanisms. Additionally,
countries may vary on expenditures due to operations and maintenance
costs, as well as training, all of which are affected by current and expected
future hardware expenditures as well as current human capital and standing
or planned capacities.

Additionally, countries at lower levels of development may have lower mili-

tary expenditures because they have limited capacity to mobilize tax reve-
nues and thereby implement their target levels of milex. For these reasons,
a ‘broad brush’ comparison of military expenditures across countries may
provide little or no insight. For example, figure 1 shows little or no rela-
tionship between military expenditures as a percentage of gross national
income (GNI) and the level of development.

Note that the three countries of the South Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia
and Georgia, are outliers, with values of military expenditure above the
average for other countries with similar levels of human development.

28
 Figure 1: Human Development Index and Military Expenditures as % of GNI2
Two trend lines are shown for a variety of countries used for comparison
(described in further detail below). The lower line represents the fitted line
when the three countries of the South Caucasus are excluded from the
sample.

Milex in lower-income countries typically ranges from 1 to 3 percent of

gross domestic product (GDP) but there are countries (South Sudan, Eri-
trea, Algeria, Syria) with military expenditure at or above 4 percent of
GDP. The average low-income country spends around $25 per capita on
the military each year, while average annual gross national income (GNI)
per capita for this group of countries is around $900. In middle-income
2 Source: HDI 2012 from UNDP, accessed online at https://data.undp.org/, Military
expenditures (2013) data comes from the Stockholm International Peace Research Insti-
tute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.

29
countries (with an average per capita income over $1300 per year), average
military expenditure is about $86 per person. In the three countries of the
South Caucasus, expenditures are $220 per capita per annum, driven by
Azerbaijan (see table 1).

Military ex- % Annual Military Per capita

penditures change expenditures military ex-
2013 in military as a % of penditures
expenditures GNI
(2004 to 2013)

Armenia 427 million 12.8 3.8 142.33

Azerbaijan 3440 million 54.8 5.9 414.46
Georgia 443 million 25.6 3.0 103.02

Table 1: Military Expenditures in the South Caucasus3

On an aggregate level, there may be little relationship between development
and military expenditure, however, information about military and security
expenditures do point to revealed priorities of policymakers. Global mili-
tary expenditure alone accounts for $1.7 trillion annually and this number
does not include expenditure on much of the police and justice system,
local security and expenditure by non-state armed actors and private secu-
rity.

It is true that as most countries develop, they spend more on their militar-
ies and that the most developed countries in the world have the highest
military expenditures. Thus, the level of military expenditure is often less
informative than the rate at which military expenditure is changing. In light
of this, in the comparator approach below, we use change in military ex-
penditure over the past decade to compare trends among like countries.

To avoid over-generalizing for the highly context specific issues around

military expenditures, this paper uses a comparator analysis approach, fol-

3 Source: Population and GNI from the World Development Indicators (WDI), accessed
online at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators, Mili-
tary expenditures (2013) data comes from the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.

30
lowing event study approach undertaken in Chen and Loayza (2008),4 fur-
ther expanded to explore relevant experiences for Afghanistan’s post-
conflict transition in Byrd, Milante and Anye (2013).5 In the latter paper,
rather than running large sample country regressions which aggregate
across countries and risk losing important and informative differences,
countries at similar levels of development and similar on other dimensions
(population, composition of the economy, landlocked, etc) over the past 30
years were compared to current Afghanistan to extract country specific and
relevant lessons that might inform the current development trajectory for
Afghanistan. This is the comparator approach used in the next section.

Defining the comparators

Like the Afghanistan paper described above, this paper looks for countries
similar to the countries of interest (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in
2004), in terms of level of income and population with a six or more years
of military expenditure data. We want to know what paths other countries,
like our countries of interest in the South Caucasus, have taken in terms of
setting their levels of military expenditures.

By comparing these countries to a small cohort of more similar countries

(approximately the same size and level of development), we might expect
that military expenditure and the change in military expenditure would be
similar to that of our comparison countries. Where differences exist, they
may be informative. A number of relevant comparators and the years most
similar to our cases are identified in Table 2.

Two relevant comparator countries with insufficient data on military ex-

penditure and other indicators were excluded from this analysis, Turkmeni-
stan (2002, comparator for Georgia) and West Bank and Gaza (2001, com-
parator for Armenia).

4 Chen, Siyan, Norman Loayza and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2008. ‘The Aftermath of Civil
War,’ World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 22(1), pages 63-85, Feb-
ruary
5 Byrd, William, Gary Milante and Kenneth Anye. 2013. ‘A new approach to understand-
ing Afghanistan’s transition.’ United States Institute of Peace Peaceworks #87.

31
Countries Countries Countries Countries Countries
similar to similar to similar to similar to similar to
Armenia Armenia and Georgia Georgia and Azerbaijan
Georgia Azerbaijan

Republic of Albania (2000) Jordan (2000) Benin (2001) Belarus

Congo (2000) (2001)

Macedonia, Bosnia and Kyrgyz Repub- Honduras Bolivia (2004)

FYR (2000) Herzegovina lic (2008) (2001)
(2000)

Mongolia Moldova (2006) Lao PDR Papua New Bulgaria

(2005) (2006) Guinea (2007) (2000)

Namibia Nicaragua Serbia (2000)

(2002) (2005)

Paraguay Zambia
(2002) (2000)

Table 2: Relevant comparators on population size and income level

Note that country (years) are included here as a comparator when they
have the smallest distance between them and the country of interest (in
terms of standard deviations of the relevant measures, in this analysis these
measures are population and per capita income level, from the World De-
velopment Indicators).

For the analysis that follows, these 20 countries are shown with their rele-
vant comparator countries in the South Caucasus in terms of military ex-
penditure, change in military expenditure, economic growth and change in
health and education spending. Comparison with these country cohorts
shows that the three countries of the South Caucasus are outliers in terms
of military expenditures and that military expenditure may be crowding out
social investment in health and education in these countries. Additional

32
analysis was undertaken on change output indicators including change in an
infrastructure index and inputs, including official development assistance,
however, in the interest of space these results are not included here.

Data sources and issues

The SIPRI Military Expenditure Database provides consistent time series

on the military spending of 171 countries since 1988. It provides military
expenditure data by country in US dollars, at constant (2011) prices and
exchange rates, 1988-2013, and in current (2013) US$b. for 2013. Where
possible, SIPRI military expenditure include all current and capital expendi-
ture on the armed forces, including peace keeping forces, defence minis-
tries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects, paramili-
tary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military
operations and military space activities.

Socio-economic development data is from the World Development Indica-

tors (WDI), published by the World Bank annually. For the present analy-
sis, this includes gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, the change in
GDP per capita over time (economic growth), the annual change in health
and education spending, from the WDI online database, accessed in March
2014. These indicators are included for the countries of interest and
grouped with their comparators in Annex table 1. Note that for each coun-
try, the ‘start year’ is the relevant comparison year for the respective coun-
try of interest. The statistics that follow on change in milex, economic
growth, and change in health and education spending are averages for
those countries for the decade that followed the ‘start year’ (or for as long
as data is available). This data is used for the analysis in the next section.

Results

The analysis is divided into two sections. First, each of the countries of
interest is compared to the relevant cohorts in terms of change in military
expenditure over the last decade and annual economic growth. Second, the
countries of interest are compared to their cohorts in terms of change in
military expenditure and change in social spending (expenditures on health
and education). Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan are clearly outliers to
their relevant comparator cohorts in both dimensions.

33
Change in Milex and Economic Growth

Military expenditure increases in countries with higher economic growth,

this is well known. Figure 2a demonstrates that for the cohort of countries
similar to Armenia, this holds true – generally economic growth is accom-
panied by an increase in military expenditure. However, Armenia is clearly
an outlier, as the percentage change in military expenditures over the last
decade is higher than every other country in the cohort, with the exception
of Mongolia, which has experienced much higher economic growth.

While economic growth was similar in Namibia and Albania to that of Ar-
menia, military expenditure did not increase by as much in these countries
(see the annex table). In addition, to the change in military expenditure, the
level of military expenditure is also significantly higher as represented by
the size of the bubble. Among the cohort, military expenditures in Armenia
($427 million in 2013) are higher than all other countries, with the excep-
tion of Namibia ($465 million in 2013).

The results for Georgia and its cohort are similar to those of Armenia (see
figure 2b). Levels of income in Georgia are similar to those of Armenia,
however, the population of Georgia in 2004 was about 50% greater than
that of Armenia (4.3 million versus 3 million, respectively). As the figure
shows, Georgia would be a significant outlier as well, compared to its co-
hort (which overlaps with that of Armenia). Countries with similar levels of
growth over the decade of comparison had much lower rates of increase in
military expenditure. Paraguay, Papua New Guinea and Lao PDR all had
similar levels of economic growth, but significantly lower increases in mili-
tary expenditures (indeed, milex in Lao PDR decreased by 1.6% per annum
from 2006 to 2013).

34
 Figure 2a: Armenia and relevant comparators
Change in milex and economic growth
Also, relative to the rest of the cohort, the level of military expenditures in
Georgia in 2013 ($443 million) represented by the size of the bubble is
much higher than all other countries except Paraguay ($458 million) and
Jordan ($1.1 billion). Note that the population of Paraguay is roughly 25%
greater than that of Georgia and while the population of Jordan is only
nominally higher than Georgia, the per capita income levels of Jordan are
50% higher than those of Georgia.

35
 Figure 2b: Georgia and relevant comparators
Change in milex and economic growth
Unlike Armenia and Georgia, Azerbaijan is not an outlier relative to its
cohort in terms of the change in military expenditure since 2004. The
change in military expenditure has been approximately equal to the average
of the comparator countries and the group as a whole exhibits little rela-
tionship between economic growth and change in military expenditure (if
anything, there is a negative relationship, driven largely by Benin).

However, the size of the bubble, representing the current level of military
expenditure in 2013 clearly shows Azerbaijan to be an outlier. Indeed, total
military expenditures in Azerbaijan ($3.4 billion) are greater than the com-
bined expenditures of the next three countries with highest military expen-
diture in the cohort, Belarus ($921 million), Serbia ($919 million) and Bul-
garia ($841 million). This suggests that the relatively low percentage
changes in military expenditure over the decade were largely a result of high
military expenditure in Azerbaijan at the beginning of the period.

36
 Figure 2c: Azerbaijan and relevant comparators
Change in milex and economic growth

Change in Milex and change in social spending (education and

health expenditures)

Social spending on health and education often accompanies economic

growth. When military expenditure increases at a rate faster than social
spending, military expenditure may ‘crowd out’ social spending, particularly
if government revenues and budgets are not increasing at the same rates as
military expenditures. In the analysis below, the change in military expendi-
tures is plotted against the change in social spending, represented by the
average annual change in health and education spending over the period of
interest.

37
Armenia remains a strong outlier, with significant increases in military ex-
penditures far above that of countries with similar increases in health and
education spending. In figure 3a, in addition to lying well above Namibia
and Albania, Armenia also has a much higher increase in military spending
than Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova or the Republic of Congo, all of
which had similar increases in health and education spending. Military ex-
penditure in Armenia increased by an average of 12.8% per annum from
2004 to 2014, roughly equivalent to the increase in Mongolia, though Mon-
golia managed to increase social spending by nearly 42% per annum, al-
most double the rate of increase of Armenia. There is little evidence of
military expenditure ‘crowding out’ social spending, however, as all of these
countries had increases in social spending higher than the changes in mili-
tary expenditure over this time period (see annex table).

Figure 3a: Armenia and relevant comparators

Change in milex and change in social spending

38
Similarly, Georgia remains a clear outlier within its comparator cohort. As
shown in figure 3b, increases in military expenditures from 2004 to 2013 in
Georgia were significantly higher than the changes in military expenditure
in countries with similar changes in social spending (Paraguay, Moldova
and Bosnia & Herzegovina). Indeed, without Georgia, the figure shows
little evidence of a budget effect – increases in social spending are not cor-
related with increases in military expenditures for this cohort for these time
periods. According to the annex table, there is, however, slightly more evi-
dence of military expenditure ‘crowding out’ social spending in this cohort,
suggesting a shift of resources within the budget constraint away from so-
cial spending and toward military expenditures. Georgia and Nicaragua
have higher increases in military expenditure than they do in education
spending and Kyrgyz and Nicaragua have higher increases in military ex-
penditure than they do in health spending.

Figure 3b: Georgia and relevant comparators

Change in milex and change in social spending

39
As in the previous section, Azerbaijan is significantly lower in terms of the
change in military expenditure relative to the change in social spending. As
discussed earlier, this owes in large part to the high level of military expen-
diture in Azerbaijan over the entire period. Still, despite very high levels of
military expenditure in Azerbaijan, there is little evidence of milex crowding
out social spending as social spending increased tremendously over the
period, in the case of education spending even outpacing the rate of excep-
tional economic growth.

Conclusion

This analysis has provided a snapshot of current military expenditures and

recent trends in the change in military expenditure for the three countries,
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, vis-à-vis relevant comparator countries
identified by similar population size and level of income. While acknowl-
edging that military expenditure is a context specific policy response, this
form of analysis allows for comparison between similar country experi-
ences and opens the door for policy discussions about social and military
expenditure.

Though these countries are clearly outliers in terms of military expenditure

and the change in military expenditure vis-à-vis their comparator cohorts,
there is little evidence that military expenditure is crowding out social
spending in these countries or their comparators.

Given the high levels of expenditures in the region, it is hoped that this
more global perspective and comparator approach to analysis will provide
baseline data and relevant comparisons for inquiry – for example, policy-
makers in Georgia may want to look to experiences in Paraguay, Jordan or
the Kyrgyz Republic to determine the right level of trade-offs between mili-
tary expenditure and social spending. In an increasingly globalized world,
countries that spend less on social spending or divert more resources to
military and security, risk their own security by reducing the competitive-
ness of their citizens in future economic markets.

40
Figure 3c: Azerbaijan and relevant comparators
Change in milex and change in social spending

41
 Country Start Annual % Milex GDP Annual Annual % Annual %
Year Change 2013 per GDP pc increase in increase
in Capita growth health in educa-
MILEX 2012 spending tion
spending

Armenia 2004 +12.8 427 3351 +22.9 +17.1 +28.0

Congo, Rep. 2000 +4.9 142 3153 +17.2 +26.8 +14.4

Comparators
Armenia
Macedonia, FYR 2000 -0.7 125 4565 +13.4 +10.2 +17.5
Mongolia 2005 +13.2 107 3672 +38.2 +34.9 +48.5
Namibia 2002 +10.1 465 5786 +23.7 +18.8 +32.6
Albania 2000 +6.7 168 3999 +21.5 +21.6 +22.0

and Georgia
Compara-
Armenia Bosnia and Herze- 2000 -4.2 204 4555 +18.1 +33.1

tors
govina
Moldova 2006 -1.6 24 2037 +19.1 +24.3 +33.3

42
Georgia 2004 +25.6 443 3490 +24.2 +34.5 +24.3
Jordan 2000 +2.2 1078 4909 +14.9 +12.0 +21.3

Georgia Com-
Kyrgyz Republic 2008 +7.8 221 1160 +4.9 +6.8 +9.5

parators
Lao PDR 2006 -1.6 19.1 1417 +23.7 +9.6 +26.3
Nicaragua 2005 +10.5 81.3 1753 +7.3 +9.8 +7.9
Paraguay 2002 +12.7 458 3813 +23.5 +38.3 +30.0

Benin 2001 +16.9 82 752 +10.5 +11.7 +33.6

Comparators
Georgia and
Azerbaijan
Honduras 2001 +9.5 223 2323 +8.6 +13.2 +12.9
Papua New Guin- 2007 +2.8 77 2184 +24.3 +23.1
ea

Azerbaijan 2004 +5.5 3440 7163 +73.1 +48.5 +80.1

Belarus 2001 +17.2 921 6685 +38.2 +27.4 +25.2
Azerbaijan Com- Bolivia 2004 +3.5 404 2576 +21.2 +18.1 +21.1
parators
Bulgaria 2000 -1.1 841 6978 +28.8 +39.2 +38.1

Serbia 2000 -3.3 919 5189 +45.1 +85.1 +2.6

Zambia 2000 +5.6 367 1469 +29.6 +34.8 +16.1
Annex Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Levels and Trends in Military Expenditures,
Levels in Socio-Economic Development Expenditures, South Caucasus and Comparator Countries
43
A Frozen Peace Process, not a Frozen Conflict

Diana Asatryan

For a war that reached a truce some two decades ago, it is not surprising
that the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict’s international media coverage is
steadily diminishing. Thomas de Waal, a senior associate specializing in the
region at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, described the
conflict as ‘one of those issues which … the diplomats pay more attention
to than the media does.’1

With so many principal powers pursuing their geopolitical interests in the

region, one would also expect an immense attention of the international
media to the dispute. The reality, however, looks quite different. Expres-
sions, such as ‘frozen conflict’ or ‘no peace, no war’, that are most com-
monly used when talking about the NK conflict, create a sense of a stability
and tend to conceal the actual sensitivity of the issue and the urgency of
reaching a decisive resolution. Seemingly endless mediation attempts have
reached their culmination in 1994, when a ceasefire through the OSCE’s
mediation was signed. Since then no significant progress has been observed
in the settlement of the conflict.

On the contrary, in 2011 the negotiations hit a deadlock and provocative

acts from both sides of the conflict became even more frequent, i.e. the
pardon of Ramil Safarov by the Azerbaijani government, or Armenia’s ex-
pressed intent of reopening commercial flights from Nagorno-Karabakh.
With Azerbaijan spending, as it claims, more on militarization than Arme-
nia’s entire state budget, and Armenia increasing its defence spending by 25
percent in 2013 only, the ongoing military race between the conflicting
sides severely damages both economies (The Economist, 2013). Currently,
Azerbaijani officials call for more radical moves and possible uses of force
in the resolution of the conflict. The Armenian side also announced its
readiness to withstand the current status quo. Meanwhile, as reported by
the International Crisis Group, thousands of ceasefire violations occur an-
nually on the Line of Contact, resulting in dozens of casualties. The scope
1 Dispatch from Armenia: The Not So Frozen War, World Affairs Journal 2013.

45
of the violations has long ago reached regions far away from Nagorno-
Karabakh (i.e. Nakhichevan), on the heavily militarized Line of Contact.
Some 40000 troops are located on the nearly 260 km long border. The
situation has intensified when an obvious sniper war erupted on the LOC.
The establishment of an Azerbaijan Voluntary Military Patriotism Techni-
cal Sport Society, that provides sniper training and other military prepara-
tory courses to Azerbaijanis over 15 years old, only added to a pre-war at-
mosphere (Barry, 2011). While the sides realize the importance of the in-
ternational mediation (namely, the Minsk Process) in preventing the
eruption of a full-scale war, steps in regulating the current scope of cease-
fire violations, which result from excessive militarization on the LOC, must
be taken urgently. An unintended escalation of the dispute is a possibility
nowadays.

Michelle Maiese, part of the research staff at the Conflict Research Consor-
tium, clearly defined de-escalation and the prerequisites for achieving it.
She wrote that de-escalation ‘involves changes within each of the adversar-
ies as well as new forms of interaction between them.’ In the case of NK
conflict, any sort of interaction, be it government to government, people to
government or people to people, is limited. Thus, a new, more social ap-
proach to confidence building between the sides should be implemented.
For that, Maiese offers breaking down the conflict into minor sub-issues
(Maiese, 2004). By resolving those sub-issues, a new ground for coopera-
tion becomes feasible. It is, of course, difficult to count all of the issues
that compose the two-decade long conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, con-
sidering the emotional attachment that both sides have to the conflicting
lands. However, Maiese suggests, that considering confidence building as a
process, not a set of events, will allow for progress.

Confidence building, or peacebuilding, faces an initial challenge of where to

begin. In the NK conflict, while both sides advocate the importance of
reaching a peaceful resolution, neither is willing to set a preliminary pattern.
Azerbaijan’s standpoint on peace building rejects any initiatives that would
entrench occupation of Azerbaijani lands. Armenia, though more open to
peacebuilding, declines formats that offer parity between the two popula-
tions of Karabakh (Broers, 2014). In the heated environment and the ab-
sence of communication on the LOC, it is difficult to identify ways in
which to put the sides on the track of confidence building.

46
Dr. Laurence Broers, a member of the Conciliation Resources, offered
three recommendations to be considered for facilitating this process for
Armenia and Azerbaijan (Broers, 2013). First of all, ‘A transformation in
Armenian and Azerbaijani understandings of what confidence building is
and the purpose it serves would be a breakthrough in itself’ he states. Cur-
rently, both parties’ attitudes on confidence building are hostile. Deter-
mined and sustained lobbying at the diplomatic level on the meaning and
purpose of confidence building is required to address this.

When sustained lobbying takes place, peace building initiatives which were
discontinued in the past, should be reinstated. One of those could be re-
suming the hotline across the line of contact. This would help avoid ‘acci-
dental war spill-overs’ and would serve as a tangible basis for mutual trust.
Another such initiative is a more frequent and announced monitoring mis-
sion. Given the limited media in the region2 and the limited international
media coverage, casualties reported on the LOC receive little public atten-
tion and perpetrators are often left unpunished. Thus, the establishment of
an announced monitoring mission could install a sense of responsibility and
accountability when it comes to mutual ceasefire violations.

Thirdly, Broers suggests that tangible progress across several different ini-
tiatives is important for meaningful long-term change. Tangible progress in
confidence building could be achieved from as small as, for example, was
the initiative by Conciliation Resources and the European Partnership for
the Peaceful Resolution of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (EPNK).
The initiative gathered a group of Armenian, Azerbaijani and Turkish
filmmakers in 2011, which together created a documentary ‘Memories
without Borders’ (Conciliation Resources, 2013). The film first screened in
Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2012. ‘Memories
without Borders’ served as a unique platform for knowledge and informa-
tion exchange in the region. Such initiatives should be encouraged espe-
cially among the younger generations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis, who,
if given a neutral platform, are eager to learn and exchange viewpoints.

Most significant Confidence Building Measures, according to Broers, are

cross-border. Of such measures, the withdrawal of snipers from the LOC

2 World Press Freedom Index 2014, Reporters Without Borders

47
is one of foremost importance. At the 2008 OSCE ministerial summit in
Helsinki, the Minsk Group proposed that both sides pull back their snipers
(Crisis Group, 2011). Armenia agreed, but Azerbaijan refused. Continuous
ceasefire violations and casualties, make the implementation of this pro-
posal urgent. Better monitoring and improved investigatory capabilities of
the OSCE will lead to an increased sense of accountability, and thus set the
precondition for the removal of snipers.

Cross-border visits are one of the ways, which not only would set basis for
confidence building, but would also allow for an improved monitoring mis-
sion. In particular, meetings of commissions on each side for missing per-
sons should be resumed. Also, reciprocal visits of journalists, that would
conduct interviews of high-level politicians for their home media, should
be resumed. Currently, only rare individuals are allowed to cross the border
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to Broers, the ‘one-off syn-
drome’ of intelligentsia visits adds to the pressure on the LOC. Cross-
border visits should become series, rather than separate events. This type
of communication, given a determined lobbying, should be a priority and it
will contribute to a gradual change in the mindset of local populations.

While the importance of CBMs is recognized by both sides, the question

stands: who should be in charge of establishing and monitoring those
CBMs? In a brief, where people residing on the LOC were interviewed,
Conciliation Resources concluded that
local participants on either side of the conflict, for whom their day-to-day existence
is a constant challenge, the case for implementing CBMs is viewed, albeit implicitly,
in terms of the potential for practical steps to improve their situation. The EU can
and should play a more active role in promoting the practical benefits of CBMs for
conflict-affected people, as part of its support for the OSCE Minsk Group (Conci-
liation Resources, 2012).
While the Minsk Group handles the ‘frozen’ peace process, people on both
sides expect more practical steps in bettering their ‘day-to-day existence’.
CBMs may not resolve the conflict all together, but a brand new platform
that will initiate and monitor their implementation is possibly a good place
to start.

Otherwise, among the many economic and social costs of a protracted war,
another cost would be added; ‘the more intangible toxic effect of war on

48
political discourse and the media, the way it renders a society incapable of
looking at the future, while it dwells on the past’ (De Waal, 2011).

References

Barry, Ellen (2011); ‘Frozen Conflict’ Between Azerbaijan and Armenia

Begins to Boil; The New York Times.
Broers, Laurence (2014); Confidence-building in the Karabakh conflict:
what next?; Caucasus Edition.
Broers, Laurence (2013); What lies between solution and resumption of the
Nagorny Karabakh conflict?; Conciliation Resources.
Conciliation Resources (2013); Memories without Borders; Featured Work.
Conciliation Resources (2012); Nagorny Karabakh Conflict and Frontline
Areas.
Crisis Group (2011); Armenia and Azerbaijan: A Season of Risks; Europe
Briefing N71.
Maiese, Michelle (2004); Limiting Escalation/De-escalation; Beyond Intrac-
tability.
The Economist (2013); A Festering Sore.

49
NATO Partnerships post-ISAF and after the Ukraine Crisis

Heidi Reisinger1

Throughout more than the first four decades existence, NATO had no
such thing as a partner. With the (important) exception of the non-aligned
countries,2 which were not referred to as ‘partners’, a country was either a
member or belonged to the opposite camp. Such is the vision reflected in
the old maps of the Cold War period, where the red area of the Warsaw
Pact countries contrasts clearly with the blue used to represent NATO.
This changed drastically when the Cold War ended, leading many newly
independent countries to become interested in NATO. The Alliance’s
Headquarters in Brussels did not have to think long or hard about how to
attract new members or bring them into the fold – indeed, more thinking
was needed about how to react to the call for closer relations (in several
cases, meaning membership) from a number of countries. The prevailing
climate was – seen from today’s standpoint – idealistic, the ultimate goal
being the transition to a united and free Europe.

From ‘partnership for membership’ …

The partnership agreements made at that time were makeshift solutions,

and also designed to offer something to countries showing clear interest in
joining the Alliance. Candidates needed programmes enabling them to
grow closer to NATO, in compliance with its political and military stan-
dards and procedures. In this setting, partnership prepared countries for
membership.

In the post-Cold War era, NATO welcomed twelve new member states in
three successive rounds of enlargement.3 All of these new members were

1 Heidi Reisinger is a Senior Analyst at the NATO Defense College. The views expressed
in this paper are the responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
the NATO Defense College or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
2 Austria, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland.
3 Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in 1999, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ro-
mania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, and finally Albania and Croatia in 2009.

51
able to benefit from NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in
order to transition their defence sectors. Today, this de facto central func-
tion of NATO partnership as a preparation for membership has moved
into the background. Of course, there are still candidates preparing for
membership.4 These cases are sometimes referred to as the ‘unfinished
business’ of NATO enlargement, triggering important and thorny political
questions (for example, in the case of Georgia) to which there is no easy
answer. Important as these questions are for the Alliance, its partnership
policy cannot be reduced to them, and raises far wider issues.

… to ‘partnership for partnership’

Today, for most NATO partners, membership of the Alliance is not an

issue. Nevertheless, for political, regional or military reasons, collaboration
with NATO is in their interest and can be a most relevant aspect of their
security and military policy.

For NATO too, things have changed: the Alliance is hardly thinkable with-
out partners today. Partnerships also define what NATO is, what it does,
and what it stands for. Questions arising in the context of partnerships go
to the very core of the Alliance: the end of the ISAF mission and the
Ukraine crisis are only two such issues.

Partnership is not about money, combat or life and death. It therefore

seems to be a ‘soft’ issue, which can be easily manoeuvred through politi-
cally difficult terrain. This is actually not the case. Partnership policy is a
controversial topic, with many players involved: 28 NATO member states,
with sometimes quite different perceptions and national interests, as well as
the multitude of different partners. Each of them has its own expectations.
Politically and diplomatically, an extensive field of thin ice stretches in all
directions.

It all begins with small things – the awareness that ‘what you give to one,
you have to give to the others too’ – and, at the other end of the scale, in-
cludes tough operational questions. Central to NATO as an Alliance, and

4 The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Turkey recognizes the FYRoM with its
constitutional name), Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia.

52
what it stands for, are a number of conceptual issues. For example, who is
a partner? What can NATO do with partners? And what can partners ex-
pect from NATO?

For partners, questions like these are not merely theoretical. Georgia and
Ukraine, for example, have supported NATO in nearly all recent opera-
tions – sometimes with substantial capabilities. With their security and terri-
torial integrity at stake, they had considerable expectations, but did not
receive the desired military assistance.

The idealistic setting of the 1990s has been overtaken by events. In addi-
tion, the Pottery Barn rule – ‘you break it, you buy it’ – applies in interna-
tional politics. This dampens appetites for bold political initiative, as even
the big spenders are challenged by the financial crisis and are showing in-
creasing signs of fatigue.

After 9/11, the coloured revolutions and the Alliance’s long-running mis-
sions (in the Balkans and, especially, in Afghanistan), geography plays less
and less of a role in shaping partnership arrangements. In other words, the
original regional frameworks – PfP, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and
the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) – were less adequate than before.

NATO struggled to revamp its partnership arrangements. The so-called

‘Berlin partnership package’ (not to be confused with the ‘Berlin Plus’ op-
erational agreement, between NATO and the EU) was the most coura-
geous step in this direction.

The Berlin partnership package

The April 2011 meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Berlin agreed on a

major reform to make partnerships more effective. With flexibility as the
key driver, the Berlin partnership package was based on a pragmatic ap-
proach. It is worth recalling the three main points in the agreement.

First, it encourages the use of the so-called 28+n flexible format, making
for flexibility in terms of the actors represented and actually involved in the
discussion and decision-shaping. The idea was to give all partners the op-
tion of being engaged in a variety of flexible dialogue formats, based on

53
shared interests, or on common threats and emerging challenges, such as
cyber threats, terrorism or energy security.

Second, NATO created a single menu of partnership activities (from semi-

nars and conferences to military exercises, related activities and training
programmes), open to all partners. This means that partners can now
choose what to participate in, regardless of which geographical framework
they belong to.

Third, the Political-Military Framework (PMF) was revised. This is a very

important document in the NATO world, as it clarifies the procedures for
all partners wishing to contribute to a NATO-led mission. Partners are
welcome to play a bigger role in shaping strategy and decisions. This means
that they have the opportunity to contribute more seriously to the prepara-
tion of operational planning decisions than before. In other words, they
can contribute to decision-shaping.

NATO’s flexibility and openness in regard with partners contributing to

operations is very remarkable: On some occasions the Alliance’s supreme
political decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), meets
in the morning, but excludes the topic of Afghanistan/ISAF because it is
on the agenda of a NAC meeting in the ‘ISAF format’ (NATO members
plus non-members contributing troops) in the afternoon. This is far re-
moved from a closed-shop mentality. Concerning practical cooperation in
missions, Alliance members and partners are now very close in status; in a
military operation the dividing line between being a member or a being a
partner seems to be fading.

To summarize, the Berlin package was viewed as a game changer in a num-

ber of respects:

• an overhaul of bureaucracy, with lean management, geography

moved into the background and flexible formats for dialogue that is
topic-oriented;
• an excellent basis for case-by-case development of cooperation;
• emphasis on ‘customer orientation’: the partner nation defines its
level of ambition for its cooperation with the Alliance;

54
 • a stronger role for partners participating in a NATO-led mission
(influence in decision-shaping).

The Berlin package can be seen as the most important development for
partnership arrangements since they were first introduced in the early
1990s, NATO having taken the all-important step of moving to the ‘part-
nership for partnership’ paradigm.

No good deed goes unpunished

With three years’ experience of implementing the Berlin reform alongside

(not instead of) the old partnership frameworks, the Alliance is now faced
with uncertainty among partners. There are also major concerns about
whether NATO partnerships are fit for the fast-approaching post-ISAF
era. The three main reasons for poor perception and performance of the
new partnership arrangements are as follows:

a) Short-term: Blockade of the Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM)

As a result of a bilateral dispute within NATO’s partnership frameworks,

many partnership activities were in practice brought to a standstill in 2012:
hundreds of options on the partnership menu, including operational and
NRF-related activities, were shut down as a result. With the vast pool of
partnership activities it introduced, the 2011 reform really deserved a better
start. The blockade has been partially overcome by a compromise and the
problem seems to have been, at least temporarily, postponed. But the dam-
age has been done: NATO has lost credibility among partners.

The new, more open structure allowed political sensitivities to hamstring

important initiatives. This phenomenon of political over-control by mi-
cromanagement is ultimately no real surprise, as it can be found in any large
administration. However, especially a consensus-based alliance has to keep
this counterproductive mechanism to an absolute minimum if it wants to
remain capable of acting.

It is in this perspective that further improvement of partnership pro-

grammes can be envisaged. In the old PfP world, an important role was

55
played by the label ‘in the spirit of PfP’, which created common ground for
many consensus-based initiatives: If a project was recognized as a PfP pro-
ject, or one ‘in the spirit of PfP’, it could be implemented without asking
the nations for case-by-case permission all over again, avoiding to invite
them to bring up any national issues and grievances in the course of the
Alliance’s daily dealings with its partners.

b) Old and new at the same time – a harmful coexistence

At the very heart of the Alliance partnership policy are two separate com-
ponents which stand for completely different goals: the old system of geo-
graphical frameworks (PfP, MD, ICI), and the new, open, flexible system
created in Berlin. The new management arrangements might be very sensi-
ble, but can never be fully effective as long as the old frameworks are
nominally still in use. Preserving the familiar and famous EAPC/PfP, MD
and ICI frameworks – albeit as little more than an empty shell – has not
left sufficient opportunity for new structures and concepts to take root.
The broad strategic community did not notice this shift and has continued
talking about the EAPC/PfP, the MD and the ICI. This means that the
reform has fared badly from the very start, in terms of how it has been
perceived.

In addition, the exclusive nature of the old frameworks is an obstacle to

consistent use of efficient and more flexible new formats. If NATO
wanted to meet with some PfP, MD or ICI countries to discuss a specific
issue, for example, the other partners in this framework could justifiably
ask why they were being left out. The old frameworks thus continue to
limit the possibility of innovative, more cluster-oriented dialogue.

Expectations and unresolved issues: The perils of disappointed ex-

pectations

This is the most serious problem. The political expectations of the partners
have been only partially met, and a number of questions still need to be
addressed. For example, are all partners equally important to NATO? Are
there ‘partners’ and ‘partners’? Does NATO have to prioritize, and how? Is
partnership with NATO only an operational link, or does it also have a
political meaning? If so, what is its significance?

56
Today’s management of partnerships is a good basis for individual devel-
opment of cooperation, which many partners see as an appropriate ap-
proach. However, quite a few partners are left looking for the political rele-
vance of the partnership initiatives (it would be too much to expect actual
political vision in this respect). They are completely right when they want to
know what NATO’s interest is in their country or region. And what’s in it
for them? The new partnership concept does not give too many answers.

‘Likeminded’ partners such as Austria, Sweden and Finland have supported

the reform of NATO’s partnership initiatives from the very outset as the
regional frameworks were no longer up-to-date for them. Some of the na-
tions concerned once saw their role in PfP as a national contribution to
overcome dividing lines in Europe; however, when twelve former PfP
partners (who were among the most active and constructive) joined the
Alliance, those who were left in PfP sometimes had little in common. Swe-
den, for example, played an important role in NATO’s mission in Libya,
while Belarusian President Lukashenko condemned the mission as ‘vandal-
ism’ and accused the Alliance of acting ‘worse than the Nazis.’5

However, the new concept works even less for them. As a result of the
Berlin package, partners are now all part of a single pool. Some of them
voiced their concern in a letter to the Secretary General. NATO’s initiatives
in response to this included a special meeting for a group of thirteen sig-
nificant operational partners at the Chicago Summit. However, the selec-
tion of the thirteen countries6 could be described as enigmatic, and of
course raised questions among other partners. There is an important lesson
to be learned here. The ‘flexible’ format is really not so flexible: exclusion
of some in favour of others is difficult to implement, and can cause irrita-
tions as the principle of no hierarchy amongst partners is touched. This
28+13 meeting – which was immediately branded as the ‘Chicago format’ –
demonstrated that even the flexible 28+n format creates political expecta-
tions.

5 Лукашенко сделал глав белорусских регионов генерал-губернаторами и отдал им

командование армией, 4 November 2011, http://www.newsru.com/world/04nov
2011/luka.html.
6 Australia, Austria, Finland, Georgia, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Morocco, New
Zealand, Qatar, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates.

57
This means that, even if NATO uses flexible formats consistently, sooner
or later it will have to address the political questions they prompt – in other
words, it will have to make a political investment. And ‘sooner or later’
means by the end of 2014, when NATO’s ISAF mission becomes history.

2014 is also a magic date for NATO’s partnership policy

ISAF is now in NATO’s DNA. This mission has also served as a main
driver of partnerships and interoperability. The follow-on ‘Resolute Sup-
port Mission’ has to be defined in greater detail. However, it is already clear
that it will be significantly smaller and will not have the same effect as ISAF
in terms of cooperation with partners. If the Alliance wants to avoid telling
its partners ‘See you in the next war!’ it has to come up with a more solid
political investment in its partnership policy, clarifying what partners can
expect from NATO.

The Alliance does not have to reinvent the wheel in this regard. It only has
to extend the ‘from deployed to prepared NATO’ principle to the partner-
ship business. That means continuous integration of partners into military
exercises, with common training programmes and initiatives such as the
Connected Forces Initiative (which was officially opened up to partners at
the Chicago Summit). This would definitely help sustain existing interop-
erability, through expanded education and training, increased exercises and
better use of technology. This is only one example for a whole range of
tools available. The Alliance has to use them, and to offer them to partners.
Above all, NATO has to talk to partners about them and keep them on
track. This is easier said than done, especially when it comes to complicated
initiatives such as the CFI, which is not entirely clear even to some member
states. Especially this initiative is work in progress and requires close coor-
dination. NATO has to prepare the partners, ensuring that they have the
necessary flexibility and patience. Also irritations might occur if there are
cases of partners finding themselves more fully engaged than some mem-
bers.

Another post-2014 question needs to be addressed. Countries such as El

Salvador, Malaysia, Singapore and Tonga, who are (or were) contributors to
ISAF, might also be important partners for the Alliance in the future with-
out entering into a formal partnership agreement. The Alliance therefore

58
needs to have an outreach and contact strategy in place, below formal (or
even institutionalized) partnership level.

The impact of the Ukraine crisis

As a non-member of the Alliance, Ukraine is not protected by Article 5 of

the North Atlantic Treaty. However, it has supported NATO-led missions
in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of
Africa. In addition, the turn of events in Crimea was seen as a crisis extend-
ing beyond Ukraine, accompanied by growing expectation that NATO’s
support would not be limited to political statements and would include
military assistance. Ukraine now shares the same experience as Georgia,
which is the largest non-NATO ISAF contributor and suffered 29 casual-
ties in its support for ISAF.7 It is difficult to communicate to a nation
whose soldiers have died together with Alliance soldiers that partnership
programmes are limited and do not include active military support or even
armament supplies.8

Other partners too are observing closely every step the Alliance takes. Like
the war between Russia and Georgia in 2008, the Ukrainian crisis again
showed that NATO does not give military support to a partner at war,
even if it happens close to Alliance territory and even if this partner is a
close operational partner. This means that a high level of engagement for
and in NATO-led missions is by no means tantamount to Article 5 protec-
tion for the partners concerned.

Partnership with NATO still confers many benefits, such as transfer of

know-how, upgrading of standards, greater efficiency, and trust through
cooperation. However, an investment in partnership with the Alliance does
not pay in the currency of Article 5. In combination with the earlier men-
tioned upgrades status of operational partners on one side and this strict

7 Ukraine and Georgia also contributed significantly to the US mission in Iraq, where
both nations suffered casualties (Georgia lost five soldiers, and Ukraine eighteen).
8 A Ukrainian officer stated during a seminar in Kyiv in early April 2014, organized by the
Ukrainian National Defence University and the NATO Defense College: ‘NATO offi-
cials should stop telling us that they are so concerned and give us at least the equipment
the Alliance doesn’t need any more in Afghanistan so that we can defend ourselves, if
NATO doesn’t fight with us as we’ve fought with them.’

59
Article 5 boundary on the other side, the might be perceived as an imbal-
ance. As a result this calculation might (1) dampen the enthusiasm of some
partners for NATO-led operations in the future, and lead to a renewed
emphasis on traditional bilateral alignment and (2) raise the question about
NATO’s open door policy.

The focus on operational cooperation might make way for a return to a

value-based conception of partnership. The Alliance needs all its partners
and should not take them for granted. However, as operational necessities
might be less central than in recent years, the Alliance might refocus its
work on partners who share its values. A potential area of cooperation
might be common projects regarding defence and military aspects of hu-
man security as a Romanian-Swiss initiative is suggesting.

The traditional importance of the value-based ‘PfP spirit’ has already been
mentioned above. A balanced approach that takes into account both values
and operational needs is now needed, to help overcome the structural di-
lemma NATO’s partnership initiatives are facing today.

The way ahead: a new balance and PfP renewed

2014 is also the year of anniversaries: PfP and MD are now twenty years
old; the ICI, ten. The time could be right to transform them, or perhaps to
take the more painful step of deciding that they have fulfilled their purpose
and pension them off.

The PfP has certainly been one of the most successful programmes in
modern history. Today, it is in a critical condition and is in danger of dying
a slow, bureaucratic death. The September 2014 NATO Summit in Wales
revived the PfP, providing tailored (if not tiered) partnership ‘menus’.

NATO should be aware of its values and the political visibility of its part-
nerships. Close partners should be visibly prioritized, which need not be a
taboo. The Alliance has prioritized and upgraded politically important part-
ners in the past. An example of this was the elevation of Russia to the
status of ‘strategic partner’, although it was neither likeminded nor a major
operational partner.

60
However, there is an important lesson to be learned from NATO-Russia
relations: a political façade combined with fading operational cooperation
can lead to disaster.

The closest partners, regardless of where they are and whether they want to
become members or not, should be those who: (1) want to engage in part-
nership with NATO; (2) share the Alliance’s values; and (3) are willing and
able to contribute to operations.

At the other end of the partnership spectrum would be the countries which
do not want to be official partners, but do want to stay in touch with
NATO (such as China, India and the contributors to ISAF).

In a nutshell, the Alliance should:

(1) Leave the big pool of partners, but upgrade longstanding opera-
tionally – and politically – like-minded partners;
(2) Either reform or pension off the old frameworks, which are a hin-
drance to the new approach. The ‘PfP’ hallmark should be used for
close political and operational partners: the 20th anniversary of the
programme would be a good opportunity for a high-profile political
step of this kind;
(3) Offer a contact platform for countries which are not official part-
ners, such as China, India, Malaysia and Brazil.

61
PART II:

SECURITY IN THE BREAK-AWAY REGIONS:

HOW MUCH OF A MONOPOLY ON THE USE
OF FORCE?

63
The Implementation of Functional Models of a
Decentralized National Security System in the
South Caucasus

Hrachya Arzumanian

The recent decades of world history are characterized by researchers, po-

litical and public figures as an age of profound and rapid changes. At the
same time, we may speak of the certain specificity of this emerging era,
when the development of philosophical and conceptual foundations of the
new world takes place in parallel with the changes themselves. Under these
conditions, the only reliable and safe basis for making sense and interpret-
ing the new times becomes the affirmation of the agility of the theoretical
foundation, upon which this sense-making is attained and developed.
However, such a conclusion is non-functional and unacceptable for the
sphere of state-building and national security. Having stated that the secu-
rity environment undergoes qualitative changes, the organizations respon-
sible for the formulation of responses to the challenges of the new era can-
not defer to the future the theoretical conceptualization of threats and the
formulation of responses, just because it is impossible to ‘grab’ the elusive
dynamics and construct an internally consistent vision of that future. The
functioning of state structures and the national security system cannot be
reduced exclusively to the theoretical discourse, which may be absent. The
state and the national security sphere constitute parts of society and public
life. The development and functioning of these systems need concepts and
doctrines, upon which the comprehension of challenges and threats to so-
ciety and methods of response, albeit imperfect, is formed.

In this sense one can speak of a serious challenge and a kind of paradox,
when the imperatives of the emerging age compel the development of a
theoretical basis, from the start implying a qualitative change through
mechanisms of adaptation and co-evolution. ‘Basis,’ a notion associated
with stability and permanence, acquires attributes of continuous and quali-
tative change. Is such an approach to thinking in terms of state-building
and the NS acceptable? Being rigid and driven by inertia, the latter also
demands corresponding rigidity from its doctrinal documents. How do you

65
reconcile the rigid and static character with the imperative of continuous
innovation in these conditions? Where is the balance between inertia and
agility; based on which philosophical positions and paradigm, and in the
terms and notions of which scientific discipline can this balance be con-
structed? These are serious challenges faced by the nation state and the
regional and global security systems in the 21st century.

In the current conditions, while attempting to build models of national,

sub-national and supranational systems, it is necessary to remember that
each of these models represents one of the possible projections, methodo-
logical lenses, which cannot claim exclusiveness and the status of ‘contain-
ers of the truth.’1 Such an authoritarian or imperialist style of thinking2,
typical in the 19th-20th centuries, should be deemed inappropriate for the
reality of the age of globalization. The achievements of the theory of com-
plex adaptive systems create the necessary theoretical basis, which in turn
allows formulating series of constraints and requirements in the form of
system laws and principles for the social theories and models that are being
developed.

In particular, when exploring the functional and/or structural models of

governmental systems, it is necessary to consider the system law: the struc-
ture adjusts to the function.3 With respect to the consideration of the na-
tional security systems, the structures in charge of national security formu-
lation will be forced to adjust to it according to the chosen functional mod-
el. This leads to a number of serious challenges, some of which are
discussed below.

First, as mentioned above, while developing theories and models, we have

no right to forget that we are talking about social systems – society and
people – which are already incorporated into an existing national security
system. The implementation of new models does not take place in a vac-

1 Richardson Kurt A., Graham Mathieson and Paul Cilliers. ‘The Theory and Practice of
Complexity Science: Epistemological Considerations for Military Operational Analysis,’
SysteMexico, Vol. 1, No, 1, 2000, pp. 25-66.
2 Flood, Robert L. ‘Six Scenarios for the Future of Systems ‘Problem Solving,’ Systems
Practice, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1989, pp. 75-99.
3 McShane, S. L. and Von Glinow, M. A. Organizational Behavior: Essentials. Boston:
McGraw-Hill Irwin, 2007, pp. 124–125.

66
uum. In history it is rather uncommon for a national security system to
start with a blank page. In this regard, the United States experience in Iraq
after Saddam Hussein should be considered as an exception to the rule. In
offering theoretical models we cannot be ‘Bolsheviks’ and resort to the full
destruction of the existing national security system and the building of a
new one. The experience of the 20th century unambiguously shows that the
way of revolution – the way of violent social reform – must be considered
as an extreme choice. The evolution or transformation should be recog-
nized as more productive and efficient option.

Before introducing a particular functional model of the national security

system, it must be ensured that the society is prepared to accept it and carry
out those functions and understanding of security that the theory proposes.
Sometimes religious, cultural, social and economic realities, which form the
internal context of society, make it impossible to implement a theoretically
perfect project. Similar problems arise with the external environment and
context, which will be discussed further below.

Let us now turn to the proposed distributed model of decentralized deci-

sion-making and provision of security to society. Theoretically, it looks
more attractive, economical and better-suited for environments where
complexity and instability are prevalent.4 However, the attempt of introduc-
ing the given model may meet the resistance of the existing system of state
power, which has been drawn up on the principles of rigid centralization.
In this case attempts of ‘forced’ introduction of the new functional model
will inevitably encounter resistance from state power structures and the
society as a whole. It becomes especially relevant when considering that the
national security sphere is directly linked and related to the problems of
distributing and exercising power in the state.

This may result not in the expected rise of the efficiency of the state sys-
tems, but in a decline and even paralysis. The experience of the Western
coalition in Afghanistan, Iraq in the last decade unambiguously testifies in
favour of such pragmatism, when the aspiration to introduce, as it may
seem, effective models reach opposite results. This led to doubts and ques-

4 Refer to Daft, R. L. Essentials of Organization Theory and Design, Eighth Edition. Mason:
Thomson Learning, 2004, p. 152.

67
tions about the justification for even posing a question regarding the feasi-
bility of conscious state-building.5

Thus, the development and implementation of functional and structural

models demand detailed knowledge of the society and the international
regional environment. The models should be considered as a theoretical
basis, but not as a practical guide and concept. Besides the models them-
selves, it is necessary to develop a strategy (practical) and tactics of imple-
mentation of the models, which would take into consideration existing
realities, the context and the condition of the particular state and society.

With respect to the region of South Сaucasus, it means that the functional
model of security built on the principles of decentralization should be sup-
plemented by a strategy and tactics of implementation, which consider the
supranational, national and sub-national contexts, which present a complex
problem. In the South Caucasus there are recognized, semi-recognized and
unrecognized state actors. Here there is a state that adheres to a rigid sys-
tem of authoritative governance; a state that is in a phase of disappoint-
ment after an unsuccessful dash of accelerated implementation of democ-
ratic principles in the society; and a state that is isolated and forced to solve
an existential problem of survival and military security. In the South Cauca-
sus there are semi-recognized states, which are under the dominating influ-
ence of one of the geopolitical centres, and an unrecognized state, which is
successfully solving the problems of state-building and in alliance with an-
other guarantor-state has created an unified system of NS, structurally
based on two states (an approach that spares limited resources).

It is also necessary to add to the aforementioned the complex geostrategic

context of the South Caucasus and the entire Caucasus, located in the grav-
itational field of the three regional centres of power and traditional empires
– Russian, Persian and Turkic – which try to preserve or restore their influ-
ence in the Caucasus of the 21st century. As a consequence, the Caucasus
appears in the focus of a geopolitical confrontation. The picture becomes
even more complicated by the globalization processes, the Arab Spring and
the instability in the Near East already extending to Turkey and Ukraine.

5 See Mazarr, Michael J. ‘The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm,’ Foreign Affairs,
January/February, 2014.

68
In such conditions the attempts to introduce decentralized models for pro-
viding national security, which would assume the delegation of some func-
tions and services to the sub-state level, should be carefully verified. Such
decentralization takes place on a continuum with the following two ex-
treme points (scenarios). It can be (1) the step of a strong established state,
which tries to solve the problem of optimization of resources allocated to
the national security sphere; and (2) the case when the weak central power
of the failing state, unable to cope with the demands of providing basic
needs and services, including the problems of security, is compelled to
delegate some of the functions to sub-national levels.

Each of the states of the South Caucasus is located in various points of the
continuum, where there are several system trajectories of transition to de-
centralized functions. Some of them can assume the creation of a strong
state and then the optimization of its functions. Other trajectories pass near
the point of the failing state when the decentralization and optimization of
the system of state power become a ‘bitter medicine.’ The complexity of
the South Caucasus and the entire Caucasus requires the careful considera-
tion of all the possible scenarios, and then the selection and adaptation of
the scenario for each state.

Such a formulation leads to the actualization of the problem of a reliable

security umbrella, an international security system that will take up the chal-
lenge of providing stability in the South Caucasus during the period of the
transformation and transition to new models of security. Unfortunately,
one cannot speak of the existence of such a system in the South Caucasus,
and that is one of the most serious constraints. Currently, the security um-
brella of Russia is deployed over the South Caucasus and in the near future
there are no likely alternatives.

This complicates the problem even more and makes success dubious when
we think in terms of a purposefully realized project. Instead of a transfor-
mation strategy, perhaps evolution is more appropriate, advancing in small
steps, solving local and private problems, all intended to reduce the overall
level of tension in the South Caucasus. Perhaps it makes sense to think
about the ‘salami strategy’; taking small – even ‘microscopic’ steps, aimed at
reducing the general level of tension in the region.

69
Even today, when the security system of the South Caucasus is built on the
basis of state actors, the maintenance of the current balance of power
represents a challenge. The attempts to transition to a more detailed picture
and form the security system at the sub-state level will lead to a sharp in-
crease in the quantity of actors, each of which will still have its own specif-
ics. The Iraqi and Afghani experiences show that these problems unexpect-
edly end up being qualitatively more difficult, than it was expected, and
impose a long and persistent presence in the region and, as a consequence,
serious financial cost. The decentralization of a security system will demand
from the international security guarantors to increase sharply the scale of
direct involvement in the processes at the sub-state level.

In the emerging global security environment, none of the centres of power

can afford it. As a consequence, the evolutionary way, when the state actors
independently engage in security issues and decide what volume of services
they are ready to give up to the sub-state level, is more promising. At the
same time, the actors can appeal to the models and projects developed by
the international experts. Perhaps the words of T. E. Lawrence of Arabia
concerning the Arab revolt are appropriate: ‘better the Arabs do it tolerably by
themselves, than you do it perfectly for them. It is their war and you are to help
them, not win it for them.’6

6 Lawrence, Т. Е. ‘The 27 Articles of T.E. Lawrence,’ The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917.

70
National Interests and Perspectives of International
Recognition of the Republic of Abkhazia

Astanda Pataraya

Security is a word that has private and public meaning. In recent years a
security collapse happened in both meanings in the Caucasian region. It
may be said with certainty that today the most complex problem of the
Caucasian region is a serious deficiency of safety. The situation in the Cau-
casus from the security point of view is still dangerously subject to sudden
unexpected crises and dramatic changes when incorrectly understood order
or chaotic fire fights can lead to the most tragic consequences. In other
words, the violence extends both from the bottom to the top, and from the
top to the bottom.

The 2008 August war and the following recognition of Abkhazian inde-
pendence by the Russian Federation were a crucial stage in the history of
the statehood of the Abkhaz republic. Having made an essential impact on
the system of the international relations and architecture of the interna-
tional security as a whole, the August events promoted political legal re-
formatting of the situation in the region.

The August events changed the balance of forces in the region and laid the
foundation for formation of a new world order. According to the British
politician Paddy Ashdown, ‘we are at the beginning of one of those periods
in history when the base on which the established order starts to displace,
and a new world order emerges.’ As V. Dzidzoyev notes, on the geopoliti-
cal value, the 2008 August war in South Ossetia extended beyond the re-
gion.

The act of recognition has had a tremendous impact on the morale of the
Abkhazian people, in view of the long historical fight of Abkhazia for ex-
ternal and legitimate self-determination. It is thus important to emphasize
once again that the legal foundation of the sovereign Abkhazian state is a
guarantee of the national security and continued existence of Abkhazia.

71
At the same time, this circumstance didn’t exclude from the agenda a ques-
tion of a settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, on the opposite
side brought up to date the necessity of guarantees for the creation of a
lasting peace in the region.

After the historical act of recognition of independence of the Republic of

Abkhazia by the Russian Federation and similar decisions by five other
member states of the UN, the world was given a signal of the impossibility
of the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict on the basis of the
notorious principle ‘territorial integrity of Georgia.’ In light of the new
conditions the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict has to be transformed from
intra-state into inter-state, and correspondingly, the approaches to its set-
tlement have to change. Actually the transformation assumes the change of
the relation to the conflict, caused by the change of the conflict context.
The process of transformation of the conflict has to trigger an increase in
the openness of Abkhazia, the adjustment of direct connections with the
outside world, the development of Abkhazian society and statehood
through interaction not only with the Russian Federation, but also with
European countries, organizations, and institutions. It assumes every pos-
sible protection of the rights of the population of Abkhazia, including on
freedom of movement. The result of conflict transformation should be the
establishment of wide-ranging international recognition of Abkhazia by an
organic integration into the processes of international communication and
cooperation.

The recognition of Abkhaz independence didn’t put an end to the deep

and tense Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, counting with the consequences of
the dramatic demographic changes in Abkhazia at the turn of the 20th cen-
tury. The twentieth century latently defined the relationship of the Abkha-
zian and Georgian population of Abkhazia. Conflict expressed the aspira-
tion of Georgia to eliminate the Abkhazian ethnic identity, so as not to
allow its self-determination. Ripening contradictions poured out in numer-
ous appeals of the Abkhazian people to the allied authorities about the
inadmissibility of the discriminatory practices of Georgia.

Reorganization and publicity made possible a radical emergence of the

Georgian-Abkhazian ethno-political contradictions that inevitably led to
the escalation of tensions, and then to military confrontation. This conflict

72
which is a conflict of values, a conflict of identity, and an ethno-political
conflict, still exists nowadays. The Georgian state didn’t reconcile with the
loss of Abkhazia, and undertook hostile actions against it.

Firstly, Georgia treats Abkhazia not differently as an ‘occupied region’ and

convinces the international community of this fact, trying to build, thus,
serious barriers for the process of recognition of our independence.

Secondly, Georgia doesn’t recognize Abkhazia as a party to the conflict,

and the Abkhazian authorities as a subject of relationship. It is a conse-
quence of the denial of existence of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict at the
official level in Georgia.

Thirdly, the denial of the conflict presumes the neglect of the opinion of
Abkhazia in the decision-making process that has a direct bearing on us.
Georgia diligently convinces the international community that it has no
conflict with Abkhazia and the Abkhazian people, and there is only a con-
flict with Moscow therefore any arrangements across Abkhazia have to be
discussed and be accepted at the level of the Russian-Georgian relations.

Fourthly, Georgia after the recognition of Abkhazia, made sharp use of a

variety of methods impacting Abkhazia with political and diplomatic, inter-
national legal, subversive and terrorist methods. We rarely receive visas for
European countries, a real information war is waged against Abkhazia, our
diplomatic efforts in foreign countries are jealously traced and whenever
possible blocked, methods of intimidation, murders, stealing and so on are
applied against our citizens in Gal region.

Abkhazia is an independent state created in realization of the international

and recognized right of the people on self-determination. It is time for
Georgia to reconcile to new realities, to cease interference in the interna-
tional formalization of the status of Abkhazia and not to bear against us
openly aggressive intentions. Any possible bilateral negotiations with Geor-
gia, the conditions for which can be created as a result of signing of the
agreement on the non-use of force, can have only for purpose the final
settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict on the basis of wide inter-
national recognition of Abkhazia. Only provided that can the Georgian-
Abkhazian conflict be considered settled and finished. The future relation-

73
ship between Georgia and Abkhazia will be defined by norms of interna-
tional law and the national right of each of the countries.

The conclusion of the Russian peacekeeping mission from zones of the

Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts and deployment for
security on the territories of the republics of the Russian military contin-
gents, the cancellation of the OSCE missions and UN Observer Mission in
Georgia, the unilateral denunciation by the Georgian leadership of the basic
Moscow Ceasefire Agreement of May 14, 1994 and the separation of forces
demand the creation of new mechanisms and approaches to the settlement
of the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

Recognition of independence by the Russian Federation of Abkhazia be-

came a turning point in the contemporary history of the country and cer-
tainly allocated Abkhazia with the status of subject of international law. It is
also a logical result of the processes happening in the region.

The provision of military security by the Russian Federation creates condi-

tions where more attention can be paid to internal problems of the state, to
economic development, the solution of social problems, the improvement
of living standards of citizens, education, science, culture, etc. Today Russia
and Abkhazia develop trade and economic cooperation, take steps for as-
sociation of power and transport systems, communication systems and
telecommunications. Cooperation in such areas as science, culture, art, edu-
cation, sports, information exchange has become more active. An impor-
tant element of cooperation is the joint efforts on fight against crime, drug
trafficking, and terrorism.

The Republic of Abkhazia at the present stage is building a strong system

of strategic partnership at various levels: contract and legal, political, social
and economic with the different countries, including with the Russian Fed-
eration. Today between Abkhazia and Russia are concluded international
documents (contracts, agreements, protocols, memorandums). They cover
a wide range of questions on cooperation at interstate, intergovernmental
and interdepartmental levels.

Recognition from Russia gave Abkhazia guarantees of military security.

Military security guarantees the physical preservation of the people, the

74
sovereignty of the republic, and the stability of the political and constitu-
tional system of Abkhazia. In turn, the security of Abkhazia in a broad
sense and in the long-term depends not only on Russian guarantees of mili-
tary safety, but also on an increased level of economic development, a sys-
tem of political relations in society and the extent of its democratic devel-
opment, and the character of relations with neighbouring countries, first of
all, with Russia and Georgia.

In the absence of an agreement between Abkhazia and Georgia on the

non-renewal of military operations, supported with international guaran-
tees, the Abkhazian side doesn’t see an alternative to the Russian military
presence in the region. Moreover, considering the fact that Russia was the
first to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and is its main strategic
partner, while the Western states express support for the ‘territorial integ-
rity’ of Georgia within the borders of the former GSSR, the Abkhazian side
is interested in maintaining the Russian military presence. Today the legal
base for the presence of armed forces of the Russian Federation in the ter-
ritory of Abkhazia is the Treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual aid
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Abkhazia, and also
agreements on military cooperation and on the joint Russian military base
on the territory of the Republic of Abkhazia.

One of the essential aspects of the military security of Abkhazia is border

protection. The agreement on protection of state border of the Republic of
Abkhazia provides joint efforts by the Russian and Abkhazian border
guards, who participate in joint border control at check points along the
Georgian-Abkhazian border. It should be noted that the presence of the
Russian border guards promotes noticeably the stabilization of the situation
in the Gal region recognized by the inhabitants and the participants of five-
sided meetings within the Mechanism on prevention and response to the
incidents which were held in Gal region.

The Abkhaz side, despite signing with Russia a number of bilateral agree-
ments on security of the Republic of Abkhazia, nevertheless considers nec-
essary and possible the signing of an agreement on the non-use of force
directly with Georgia, with the international guarantees of the UN, OSCE
and the EU. Staying in a state ‘neither war, nor peace’ increases conflict
potential of the region and increases dependence of the sides on the sup-

75
port of external actors. The absence of an agreement on the non-use of
force also complicates discussion and the solution of humanitarian affairs
in negotiations. According to the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Republic of Abkhazia Viacheslav Chirikba, ‘only the signing of an
agreement on the non-use of force with Georgia, with the corresponding
guarantees from a number of the states, and also the main international
organizations – the UN, OSCE, the European Union – will put the basis to
a lasting peace in Transcaucasia, will serve as a reliable barrier to any at-
tempts of a military solution of the problems of relationship between the
Republic of Georgia on the one hand and the Republic of Abkhazia and
the Republic of South Ossetia, on another.’

Considering geographical and historical conditions, and also the develop-

ment of the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus, it is possible to
speak of ‘the European vector’ of the Abkhazian foreign policy. After acti-
vation of the ‘Neighbourhood Policy’ and the Eastern Partnership pro-
gram, the European Union presence has become more noticeable in our
region. The EU plays a leading role through its co-chairmen in the Geneva
discussions on security and stability in the South Caucasus. The European
diplomats regularly visit Abkhazia, meet and communicate with officials
and representatives of associations of civil society.

However, the results of such communication are unobvious for our society,
considering the preservation among the European representatives of a hard
line concerning the status of Abkhazia. Unfortunately, the policy of the
West concerning Abkhazia continues to be based on the outdated geopo-
litical and regional schemes, on obsolete political approaches.

The European initiatives on ‘interaction without recognition’ remained for

some years only declarative in nature. There are no accurate and clear cer-
tainties that the European initiatives of interaction are distinct from the
Georgian plans for the ‘involvement’ of Abkhazia as part of Georgia. Ab-
khazia is interested only in the direct interaction with the European Union
and certain countries of Europe. Any projects and initiatives which demand
coordination with the Georgian side, or assume its control, have no future
in Abkhazia. If the EU would adhere to a neutral position concerning the
status of Abkhazia, it would be possible to begin realization of direct con-
tacts. Interaction with Abkhazia from the point of view of upholding non-

76
existent ‘territorial integrity of Georgia’ is impossible. The main condition
for adjusting to normal relations is respect for the historical choice of the
people of Abkhazia to live in an independent, sovereign state.

Abkhazia is ready to interact with those actors of world politics who wants
to help Abkhazia, to make the life of its citizens better, to promote democ-
ratic institutions, and the voice of the Abkhazian authorities and citizens.

Abkhazia will never cooperate with those countries and institutions which
try to impose us the pro-Georgian agenda. We want to communicate with
the world, but not at any cost. If such communication is caused by control
from Georgia, or need of rapprochement with this country, Abkhazia will
refuse it. Our opponents want Abkhazia to look like province which insult-
ingly has been fenced off from the whole world. But we are the part of the
world, and we will establish relations with all continents and parts of the
world. Ill-wishers of Abkhazia should reconcile with the fact that the Ab-
khazian independent state and the Abkhazian democracy are established.

In conclusion I would like to note the following. The security system in the
Caucasus resembles a house after an earthquake. Walls are deformed, in
some places floors are collapsed. Owners have no money for full restora-
tion of the house, but they manage to give it more or less an inhabited look
and continue to live there. But for the stranger it is obvious that the house
is dangerous to live in an unstable state – because after the following earth-
quake the whole edifice will collapse again. To make the house again suit-
able for dwelling and dignity will demand work on the restoration of the
whole building, and not just some of its parts. Recovery work is not only
the task of the communities of the South Caucasus, but also of all inter-
ested persons anxious about the future of this region, in which countries
deserve a prosperous future in mutual cooperation.

77
The Trajectory of Russian–Georgian Relations after the
Sochi Olympics

Bogdan Catalin Udriste

Background: the (in)significance of ‘Sochi’

The Russian Federation put its ‘normal’ policy towards Georgia on hold in
an effort to avoid international criticism that might have disrupted a calm
and peaceful Winter Olympics. The motives behind Moscow’s readiness to
engage in dialogue with Georgia on non-conflict related issues and allowing
Georgian products to its markets may partly be explained in this con-
text. However, once the games were over, Russia is expected to revert to its
pre-Sochi pattern and continue applying pressure on Georgia in an effort
to achieve its main strategic goals, i.e. prevent the ‘westward’ alignment of
Georgia with the EU and NATO, and consolidate the Russian influence in
the region through instruments such as the Customs Union.

This also supports the conclusion drawn earlier by the EUMM highlighting
the permanent nature of ‘borderisation’ activities along the Administrative
Boundary Lines (ABL) which intensified before the Sochi Winter Games.1
By now many of the temporary barbed-wire fences have been replaced by
more permanent mesh fence with an extensive surveillance system in the
South Ossetian theatre. Furthermore, the South Ossetian and Abkhaz au-
thorities have confirmed over and over again that all the restrictions be-
tween Georgian administered territory and Abkhazia and South Ossetia are
permanent, and may be eased only after Tbilisi has recognised their inde-
pendence/permanent separation from Georgia.2

1 EUMM MAC paper on Sochi Security Arrangements, June 2013; EUMM Special Op-
eration Pantelimon reporting.
2 DFWatch: ‘South Ossetia spokesperson ‘Razor wire will be dismantled’’, available at:
http://dfwatch.net/south-ossetia-spokesperson-razor-wire-will-be-dismantled-66701. In
the case of South Ossetia, the call for independence is not as strong as in the Abkhaz
case (but the call for permanent separation from TAT is). It is likely that the majority of
residents in South Ossetia would like to see South Ossetia becoming part of Russia.

79
Hence, this paper sets out to examine the short- to mid-term term trajec-
tory of Russia-Georgia relations after Sochi and its potential risks in a wider
perspective. The paper is divided into five sections; (1) Russian Federation
goals in Georgia, (2) assessment of Russia’s current leverage on Georgia,
(3) Russia’s potential ‘influence tools’ in Georgia, (4) impact of the crisis in
Ukraine, and (5) implications for EUMM

Russian Federation goals in Georgia

Russia-Georgia relations should be seen in the context of the overall policy

towards states of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Although Russian strat-
egies and policy instruments vary from country to country, the long-term
goals are essentially the same over the post-Soviet space. These goals have
been rather persistent since 2000 and – in a less explicit way – even before
that, and hence they are unlikely to change in short- to mid-term future.

The primary Russian goals in post-Soviet space can be summarised as:

a. Consolidating the Russian Federation position as the dominant regional power.

Influence in post-Soviet space is not only an instrumental goal but a
goal in itself and this is linked with Russian self-image as ‘Dierjava’ –
a great power. In practical terms this suggests that the Russians fa-
vour an active policy in these states even if the cost of that policy
was high relative to the immediate material gain.
b. Minimizing other players’ influence and pre-empting substantial integration of
post-Soviet states within Euro-Atlantic structures. Russian policy in the
neighbourhood is based firmly on zero-sum calculations and is un-
likely to be convinced by the EU’s or NATO’s arguments for posi-
tive-sum solutions.
c. Advancing Russian political, economic and security interests in the post-Soviet
space, both on the basis of bilateral arrangements and by creating in-
tegrationist regional formations such as Collective Security Treaty
Organisation (CSTO), the Customs Union and the soon-to-be Eur-
asian Union. Despite the ideational ‘Dierjava’ component in Rus-
sia’s foreign policy, the instrumental Georgia-political and Georgia-
economic calculations are far from absent from the Russia’s policy;
on the contrary, they are mutually reinforcing elements. Given the

80
 Georgia-strategic significance of the South Caucasus and Russia’s
problems in the North Caucasus, Russia’s security agenda is more
prominent in this region than in other parts of the Former Soviet
Union.

More specifically in the case of Georgia, Russian concrete short- to mid-

term goals appear to be the following;

a. Preventing Georgia’s move towards Euro-Atlantic integration and

limiting other outside actors’ influence in Georgia.
b. Increasing Russian influence in Georgia.
c. Keeping up South-Ossetia’s and Abkhazia’s formal status as inde-
pendent states while simultaneously strengthening Russia’s control
of their political, security and economic spheres.
d. Preventing any rapprochement between Tbilisi administered territo-
ries and the breakaway regions and limiting to the minimum trade
links and people-to-people contacts between the South Ossetian,
Abkhaz and Georgian controlled territories.

The achievement of these goals is inhibited by a contradiction: the Russian

political elite see Abkhazia and South-Ossetia as guarantees for long-term
Russian influence in the region3 but Georgia is unlikely to see any appeal in
the Russian-led Customs Union or soon-to-be Eurasian Union as long as
Russia ‘occupies Georgian territory.4 Given this contradiction, we assess
that the Russian Federation is most likely to try preventing Georgia’s Euro-
Atlantic integration by means of indirect ‘influence’ tools operating within
Georgian society, rather than direct political pressure from the outside.
However, this assessment would have to be revised in the event of con-
crete steps towards NATO Eastward enlargement.

3 See e.g. Grigory Karasin’s interview (3 September 2013) at http://www.russia-

direct.org/content/south-caucasus-history-cannot-be-played-backwards; and Vladislav
Surkov’s comments (21 October 2013) at http://osinform.ru/42307-vladislav-surkov-
vse-smotryat-chto-u-nas-poluchitsya.html.
4 According to the National Democratic Institute’s (NDI) opinion survey conducted in
November 2013, only 11 percent of respondents supported Georgia’s membership in
Russian-led Eurasian Union.

81
Assessment of Russia’s current leverage on Georgia

Typical Russian levers in the FSU include Russian minorities, Russian-

oriented business and political elites, energy policy, Russian-dominated
media space and economic relations. Many of these levers are relatively
weak in Georgia when compared with other states in the FSU.

Soft power levers: WEAK

Overall, the Russian soft power appeal in Georgia has weakened consid-
erably during the post-Soviet period, in particular since the cooling of rela-
tions in the early 2000s. Many Georgians speak Russian and Russian culture
still has considerable appeal in Georgia. Nevertheless, the trend is clearly a
negative one. Saakashvili’s government actively promoted the study of
English as part of school reform and much of this happened at the expense
of Russian language classes. The majority of Georgians do not follow Rus-
sian media on a regular basis and Russia does not have significant owner-
ship of Georgian media outlets.5

The general attitude of Georgians towards Russia is nuanced. A clear ma-

jority of Georgians believe that relations with Russia should be improved.6
However, strongly pro-Russian stances remain rare in politics and civil so-
ciety at large. A staggering 85 percent of Georgians surveyed in November
2013 supported Georgia’s goal of joining NATO and the EU. Reflecting
the same priorities, the ruling coalition GDC promotes cooperation and
improved ties with Russia but does not see this as an alternative to Geor-
gia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation.

Pro-Russian views are not non-existent, though; pro-Russia candidate Nino

5 The Georgian Media: Popular Assessments and Development Perspectives, Tbilisi, Eurasia Partner-
ship Foundation. 2012. http://www.epfound.ge/files/media_report_final_eng_
print_1.pdf.
6 According to a survey carried out in 2013 , 65 percent of respondents would like to have
closer political cooperation with Russia. Eurasia Foundation and CRRC, Knowledge and
Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia: Changes and Trends 2009–2013, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/201188141/Eurasia-s-Survey-on-the-%E2%80%9CKnow
ledge-and-Attitudes-towards-the-EU-in-Georgia-Trends-and-Variations-2009-
%E2%80%93-2013%E2%80%9D.

82
Burjanadze received slightly more than 10 percent of the vote in 2013
presidential elections and similar strongly pro-Russia stances have been
voiced by former prime minister Zurab Nogaideli. It has been estimated
that Russia financially supports the activities of some 20 NGOs/institutes
promoting the pro-Russia agenda.7 These pro-Russian activists and experts
are, however, in the margins of the Georgian society, and their views are
often better known outside Georgia than inside.8

Russia often reaches out for its ‘compatriots’ in the FSU and seeks influ-
ence in internal affairs of post-Soviet states in their name. However, there
is no significant Russian minority in Georgia (with the exception of the
breakaway territories’ Russian passport-holders). The ethnic Russian mi-
nority in Georgia constitutes only 1.5 percent9 of the population and hence
it can hardly be used effectively as a lever for influence in Georgia.

Energy lever: WEAK

In most strategic sectors, Georgia is rather well insulated from direct Rus-
sian pressure. Most importantly, Georgia is not dependent on Russian en-
ergy. 90 percent of its oil and gas comes from Azerbaijan. The 10 percent
of gas Georgia receives from Russia is effectively a transit payment for
Russia-Armenia pipeline cutting across Georgia. In case this source is cut, it
could be easily substituted with other sources.10 During summer months,
Georgia is a net exporter of energy.11

Part of the Baku-Supsa pipeline crosses South-Ossetian territory under-

ground near the village of Karapila. This stretch is, however, only 1-1.5 km
7 See e.g. internal EU reporting.
8 For instance, the director of Tbilisi-based Eurasian Institute Gulbaat Rtskhiladze is
often cited by Russian media but he is hardly known in Georgia. See Institute’s webpage
at http://geurasia.org/rus/mtavari and Russian news coverage at http://voiceof
russia.com/2012_09_28/No-one-wants-to-bear-responsibility-for-Georgia/
9 Data from 2002 available at the European Centre for Minority Issues in Georgia web-

site, http://www.ecmicaucasus.org/menu/info_maps.html. The data includes figures

from Akhalgori District and Kodori Valley and excludes the (rest of) breakaway regions
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
10 Ibidem.
11 See e.g. ISET, ‘Electricity Generation in Georgia: The Seasonality Problem’. Available at

http://www.iset.ge/blog/?p=2135.

83
long.12 In case South Ossetia or Russia would try to take advantage of this
fact by hampering the flow (which is unlikely), it would not be a major
problem to build a short stretch of new pipeline running completely on
adjacent territory. Hence, the pipeline hardly constitutes a major lever for
either South Ossetia or Russia.

Russia has made some investments in the Georgian energy sector and has
attempted to invest even more. Russia has no share of the pipelines cross-
ing Georgia but owns a share of Georgian infrastructure and services such
as electricity and gas distribution. For instance, RAO UES owns Telasi, the
electricity distribution network of Tbilisi.

Economic levers: WEAK/MEDIUM

Russia’s economic lever in Georgia has weakened considerably during the

2000s. In 2001, Russia was Georgia’s biggest trading partner and could
threaten Georgia by embargoes and sanctions affecting the whole Georgian
economy. In late 2005 Russia restricted exports of agricultural goods and,
the following year, imposed a ban on mineral water and wine from Geor-
gia. The bans hit Georgian economy hard and pushed Georgia to seek trad-
ing partners elsewhere. In 2012, Russia was Georgia’s 6th biggest trading
partner. In deploying the trade weapon against Georgia, Russia weakened
its leverage in the longer term.

This trend has recently been reversed. In April 2013 Russia finally lifted its
bans on Georgian goods and, as a result, Russia rose in the list of Georgia’s
trading partners to 4th place – already the same year. An interesting and
related fact is that the majority owner of Borjomi, the most well-known
Georgian mineral water brand, is in fact a Russian consortium (since De-
cember 2012).13 In 2013, half of Georgian wine exports went to the Russian
market. Some observers are concerned about the significant share sold to
Russia as it might increase the Georgian economy’s vulnerability.14
12 ‘Part of Baku-Supsa pipeline might fall beyond occupation line’, Tabula, 25 September,
2013. http://www.tabula.ge/en/story/74996-part-of-baku-supsa-pipeline-might-fall-
beyond-occupation-line.
13 ‘Alfa Group takes Borjomi for sale, 25 December 2012’. Georgia Times. Available at

http://www.georgiatimes.info/en/analysis/84812.html
14 Internal EU reporting.

84
Several Russian firms operate in the Georgian banking sector, most notably
VTB Bank, and Russian private investors bought two of the biggest mining
companies in 2012.15 However, Russian direct investments in strategic sec-
tors in Georgia remain modest in comparison with several other states in
FSU. Given the decades-long problematic relations with Russia and Rus-
sia’s aggressive policies in other former Soviet republics, Georgian deci-
sion-makers closely follow any changes in the level of Russian influence. It
seems that even with the stated rapprochement policy with Russia, Geor-
gian government is rather cautious in its engagement.16

It has been estimated that approximately 1 million Georgians live in Russia

and are by far the largest source of remittances to Georgia.17 About half of
the Georgian remittances come from Russia and its share has even slightly
increased during the recent years due to the economic problems of Greece
and Italy (which are other major sources of Georgian remittances). During
the first seven months of 2013, 434.8 million USD were transferred from
Russia to Georgia (53.9 percent of all remittances to GEORGIA).18 Ac-
cording to World Bank Georgia’s GDP is 15.7 billion (2012); hence this
makes the Russian Federation’s remittances’ share of Georgia’s GDP ap-
proximately 4.7 percent.

This is a large amount and the migrant issue is a lever that Russia could
potentially use against Georgia. In the past Russia has tried to use this issue
against Georgia: following disagreement over the so-called military spy
crisis in 2006, Russia expelled around 200 Georgian migrant workers in
Russia and cut all travel and communication links to Georgia for a time.
This was a short-lived protest by Russia rather than a carefully planned and

15 See e.g. Mariam Papidze, ‘Russian Interest May Be Useful for the Georgian Banking
Sector, Zurab Gvasalia’, the Financial Times, 31/03/2013 and Democracy and Freedom
Watch, ‘Georgian Mining Companies Bought by Russian Investors’, 21 June 2012. Arti-
cles are available at: http://finchannel.com/news_flash/GeoBanks/
125621_%E2%80%98Russian_Interest_May_Be_Useful_for_the_Georgian_Banking_S
ector,%E2%80%99_Zurab_Gvasalia/ and http://dfwatch.net/georgian-mining-
companies-bought-by-russian-investors-83120.
16 Ibidem.
17 Human Rights Watch, ‘Singled Out - Russia’s Detention and Expulsion of Georgians’,

1 October 2007. Available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/09/30/singled-out

18 Civil.ge, ‘Georgia Remittances USD 805.3 mln in Jan-July’, 18 August 2013.

85
applied economic blockade and the policy was soon reversed. Damage
done to mutual trust probably outweighed any economic harm done to
Georgia.

The breakaway regions: STRONG

The most obvious lever over Georgia is Russian control of the breakaway
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia has managed to strengthen
this – in early 1990s relatively modest – lever significantly over the years. At
this point in time, these territories are completely dependent on Russian
economic and political support, an overwhelming majority of their resi-
dents are Russian citizens, and they speak and are educated in Russian.
Russia dominates their internal political processes, economy and media
space, and provides security for them. Furthermore, the breakaways con-
tacts with the outside world have eroded significantly over the years.

Russian soft power appeal is very strong there; Russia constitutes the sun
around which satellites gravitate. Russian language is widely spoken, read
and taught and it dominates in urban areas.19 Close contacts with Russia is a
lifeline for both entities, as movement across the ABL is highly controlled
and restricted. Russian Federation funds scholarship programmes in Rus-
sian universities for de facto residents. Very few of the younger generation of
Ossetians and Abkhaz have ever had first-hand contacts with Georgians –
or foreign nationals apart from Russians – so they are even more oriented
towards Russia and Russian culture than the older generation.

Despite having invested millions in the breakaway regions, this has not yet
translated directly into Russian ownership of Abkhazian or South Ossetian
industries or even property. Both of the de facto states have restricted for-
eigners’ right to own land and to make direct investments in strategic sec-
tors. Even running a business in these regions can be difficult for Russian
businessmen who need to find local partners and who are often discrimi-
nated against in practice (this mainly relates to Abkhazia, as running a busi-
ness in South Ossetia is considerably less appealing for Russian actors).
There is pressure from Russia to allow for more Russian ownership and

19 Thomas de Waal, South Caucasus 2020. Available at http://russia-2020.org

/2010/07/23/south-caucasus-2020/.

86
this issue is a potential source of tension between Russia and the breakaway
regions in near future.20

Prior to the 2008 conflict, the breakaway regions offered an active and ef-
fective instrument to apply pressure to various political issues in Georgia.
In essence the logic was that whatever Georgia does/doesn’t do, Russia
will recognise the independence of the breakaways. But once pulled, this
lever lost some of its political utility. While Russia may have exhausted de
facto states as a ‘stick’ vis-à-vis Georgia, they could still potentially be used a
‘carrot’. As an extreme example, Russia could offer to withdraw recognition
or support of the breakaways if Georgia renounces its ambition of Euro-
Atlantic association and joins the Russian Eurasian Union. However, this
kind of bargain seems unrealistic and is not supported by Russian current
leadership.

Despite the apparent Russo-Georgian rapprochement there is little doubt

that Russia’s stance on the breakaway regions will remain unchanged – for
at least as long as Putin remains in power. This ‘status’ topic remains one
that Russia is not willing to discuss with Georgia. The formal state-building
in the breakaway regions and maintenance of substantial Russian control is
predicted to continue.

Albeit a small issue in the overall Russian foreign policy, the breakaway
regions have an important role to play in Russia’s strategy for the Caucasus.
Their role was hardly weakened by the appointment of Vladislav Surkov –
a prominent and extremely influential figure in setting up the whole Putin
system – to the post of presidential aide responsible for relations on South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. Furthermore, the Russian policy towards the break-
aways is not challenged by Russian public opinion. The Russian popular
ultra-right campaign ‘Stop feeding the Caucasus’ targets the North-
Caucasian Islamist-dominated republics, not the South-Caucasian break-
aways. The Russian support to South Ossetia and Abkhazia is much less

20 Russian interest in business is much lower in South Ossetia as there are very few people
and geographically it is more difficult and to access). See International Crisis Group,
Abkhazia The Long Road to Reconciliation. Available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/
media/Files/europe/caucasus/georgia/224-abkhazia-the-long-road-to-
reconciliation.ashx.

87
problematic, and the Russian public broadly supports Putin’s policy to-
wards them.21

Russia’s potential ‘influence tools’ in Georgia

Since the early 2000s, Russia has developed a more coordinated policy to-
wards the post-Soviet space that combines foreign policy with more indi-
rect ‘influence tools’.22 Examples of these tools – mainly from Ukraine –
include ‘elite capture’ through corruption, the establishment and use of
networks of economic dependency, sponsorship of political parties, NGOs
and other ‘sympathetic forces’, and the active shaping of the media space
through ownership and media campaigns in international and post-Soviet
space.23 This section describes and evaluates the potential of Russia using
new indirect influence tools vis-à-vis Georgia in the post-Sochi environ-
ment.

As was noted above, the Russian minority in Georgia is a small one. How-
ever, as the case of breakaway regions vividly demonstrates, other minori-
ties can also be deployed to advance Russian goals in other states. In a re-
cent survey carried out by CRRC-Georgia, 71 percent of Azeri and Arme-
nian minority representatives interviewed believed that Georgia should seek
‘closest political cooperation’ with Russia, and only 30 percent of them
suggested giving foreign policy priority to the EU. In comparison, 69 per-
cent of interviewed ethnic Georgians believed that Georgia should seek
closest political cooperation with the EU. This suggests that the Azeri and
Armenian minorities – together constituting over 12 percent of the inhabi-
tants in Georgia – are at least more oriented towards Russia than the ma-
jority of Georgians. Non-Georgian minorities are also more likely to follow

21 Mark Adomanis, ‘Russian Public Opinion on South Ossetia and Abkhazia’, Forbes, 8
October 2012. Available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/
2012/08/10/russian-public-opinion-on-south-ossetia-and-abkhazia/; ‘Russians support
recognition of S. Ossetia – poll’, Russia Behind the Headlines, 8 August 2013. Available at
http://rbth.co.uk/news/2013/08/08/russians_support_recognition_of_s_ossetia_-_
poll_28776.html.
22 James Greene, ‘Russian Responses to NATO and EU Enlargement and Outreach’,

Chatham House Briefing Paper, June 2012. Available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/

sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0612bp_greene.pdf.
23 Ibidem.

88
Russian media – mostly TV – than the Georgian media.24 However, there is
no indication that Russia has stepped up support for the non-Georgian
minorities apart from Ossetian and Abkhaz ones and hence, at most, they
constitute a latent or potential source of Russian leverage over Georgia.

One of the most notable changes in the Georgian society during the past
year or so has been the strengthening of conservative religious stance that
has become more political and vocal in its alignment with anti-Western
rhetoric. The Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) has become the central
force in this campaign against liberal secular values associated with the
‘West’, which are increasingly personified by the EU. This is very much the
same agenda that is being promoted by the Russian Orthodox Church –
with whom GOC has close ties – and touted by the Russian government
for its own purposes.25 Several prominent public figures – such as busi-
nessman and millionaire Levan Vasadze – openly support an anti-Western
agenda.26

Due to the similarity of the agendas, there has been speculation over Rus-
sian interests sponsoring or being linked to the GOC. Direct sponsorship is
unlikely as it would be a risky for both sides. First of all, both churches
promote a nationalist agenda, but of very distinct nations. Promoting chau-
vinistic Georgian nationalism is hardly in Russia’s interest and feeding this
sentiment could easily backfire. Secondly, if sponsorship of Russia of any
kind was publicised the already wealthy and highly-respected GOC would
risk its reputation among Georgians. The GOC’s anti-Western rhetoric
should not be taken as an indicator of a pro-Russian agenda.

However, Russian-owned and -sponsored media is already playing out the

claimed incompatibility of traditional Georgian and liberal Western values.

24 Eurasia Foundation and CRRC, Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia:
Changes and Trends 2009–2013, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
201188141/Eurasia-s-Survey-on-the-%E2%80%9CKnowledge-and-Attitudes-towards-
the-EU-in-Georgia-Trends-and-Variations-2009-%E2%80%93-2013%E2%80%9D.
25 See for example Putin’s state-of-the-nation address, 12 December 2013, http://voiceof

russia.com/news/2013_12_12/Russias-President-Vladimir-Putins-state-of-nation-addre
ss-to-Federal-Assembly-6893/?slide-1.
26 See, for instance, Davit Batashvili, ‘A Political Project’, Tabula, http://www.tabula.ge

/en/story/78568-a-political-project.

89
The purpose appears to be driving wedges into Georgian society to weaken
the Euro-Atlantic political orientation of the ruling elite and the society at
large.

This campaign is further strengthened by the financing of Georgian NGOs

and think-tanks.27 For instance, in 2013 the Russian-supported Eurasian
Institute established the ‘People’s Movement for Russian-Georgian Dia-
logue and Cooperation’ that organises demonstrations and meetings in
support of the pro-Russian agenda in Georgia.28 Some prominent figures in
the Russian-Georgian business elite advocate a similar agenda. The Chair-
man of the Union of Georgians in Russia, businessman Mikheil Khubutia
is claimed to have given advice to Putin on Georgian issues during the past
two years, and St. Petersburg-based banker Alexander Ebralidze has ac-
tively supported opposition to the UNM.29 However, these two Russian-
based businessmen have relatively loose ties within Georgia.

Moscow is fully aware of the fragility of its levers over Georgia and the
potential for overt political pressure to backfire. It is far more likely, there-
fore, that Russia will pursue a dual agenda: offering mutually beneficial
political and economic engagement (e.g. lifting the visa requirement for
Georgians), yet at the same time strengthening its influence tools in Geor-
gia and highlighting the incompatibility of liberal values and those of tradi-
tional Christian Georgia.

It appears that some indications of this strategy are already visible. During
the Sochi Olympics, Putin announced that he would be ready for a bilateral
meeting with the Georgian president. This news was received cautiously by
president Margvelashvili, PM Garibashvili and FM Panjikidze.30 It was
agreed that Russian Deputy FM Grigory Karasin and the Georgian PM’s
special envoy Zurab Abashidze would discuss the details of this high-level
meeting.

27 Internal EU reporting, January 2014.

28 See information on activities at GeoRus.ge.
29 Mikheil Khubutia will be an advisor of Putin, 09.06.2012 www.internet.ge; on Ebralidze

see the webpage of Free Georgia at http://www.freegeorgia.ge/?menuid=

60&id=2040&lang=2.
30 Margvelashvili Comments on Putin’s Readiness for Meeting, Civil.ge, 10 February 2014. Avail-

able at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26929.

90
This influence approach includes Russian relations with other states. Russia
is likely to attempt to pre-empt Georgia’s integration with Western institu-
tions by aiming to influence the positions taken on this matter by key Eu-
ropean actors, such as Italy, France and Germany. Such attempts have in-
creased with the approach of the September NATO summit, and events in
Ukraine are a further reflection of this tactic, some say.

Impact of the crisis in Ukraine

Russia

Difficult as it is to predict the mid and longer term outcome of the present
crisis in Ukraine, we may safely assume that it will take months to play out
and that assessments of whether the EU or Russia is ‘winning’ influence in
the region will accompany the lead-up to Georgia’s signature of the Asso-
ciation Agreement and the 2014 NATO Summit. The crisis is therefore
likely to influence the situation in Georgia to a certain extent.

Stirred by the irresponsible decision taken by the Ukrainian Parliament to

abolish the democratic law on languages that was adopted in 2012, Russia
chose a path of direct intervention and later annexation of Crimea in the
name of protecting the rights of the ethnic Russians in the peninsula and
eastern part of Ukraine. The EU and the US have cautiously condemned
Russian intervention as an ‘incredible act of aggression’31 and ‘completely
illegitimate’32 and ‘unacceptable’.33 However, the EU was aware of the fact
that its member states Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania expressed strong
dissatisfaction with a decision taken by the Ukrainian new power to abolish
the use of other languages than Ukrainian.

31 Will Dunham, ‘Kerry condemns Russia’s ‘incredible act of aggression’ in Ukraine’, Reu-
ters, 2 March 2014. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/02/us-
ukraine-crisis-usa-kerry-idUSBREA210DG20140302.
32 Aamer Madhani, ‘Obama: Russian intervention completely illegitimate’, USA Today, 2

March 2014. Available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/03/02/

obama-ukraine-putin-russia/5949439/.
33 Statement by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on the developments in

Ukraine’s Crimea, 1 March 2014. Available at http://www.eeas.europa.eu/statements/

docs/2014/140301_01_en.pdf.

91
All three EU member states have large national minority populations living
in several places throughout Ukraine and were therefore calling on the
Ukrainian new leadership to respect their rights. We believe that the Rus-
sian Federation makes significant efforts to prevent its intervention in Cri-
mea from escalating and turning violent, as if this happens Russia would
find itself in a very difficult, isolated place internationally.

Although nothing can be said for certain, now that the annexation of Cri-
mea is almost completed, it seems likely that a negotiated solution on
Ukraine will gradually emerge.

The EU

Some observers in Brussels take a critical view of the EU approach to the

‘Euromaidan’ crisis, suggesting the EU may have missed the point by en-
gaging in terms of vague, technocratic language instead of adopting a more
nuanced political understanding to address the realities in Ukraine. First of
all the EU should have prevented the new Ukrainian power of making such
nationalistic gaffes, completely out of the EU multicultural policy line. If a
narrative of the EU foreign policy failure takes root on this basis, then Eu-
ro-Atlantic institutions might be prone to send a clearer and more commit-
ted message to Georgia and Moldova.

However, the EU has generally been uncomfortable with notions of Geor-

gia political competition with Russia in the Eastern Partner states. There-
fore it is likely to wrap increased engagement in the Eastern part of Euro-
pean continent with inclusive rhetoric and accommodation of some Rus-
sian interests. Hence, the EU is likely to welcome and support potential co-
operation and warming of ties between Russia and Georgia. Reflecting this
general approach, the EU has also actively promoted negotiated solution to
the Ukrainian crisis in the auspices of Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe and attempted to avoid pushing Russia into a corner.34

34 See European Council Conclusions on Ukraine, 3 March 2014. Available at

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/14129
1.pdf .

92
Georgia

For obvious reasons, the political elite in UNM and GD camps alike – and
the Georgian public in general – sympathise with ‘Euromaidan’ and
Ukraine’s current struggle with Russia. PM Garibashvili called international
community to respond and ‘compel Russia to give up its forceful actions.
Otherwise, we may end up facing yet another wave of aggression and oc-
cupation, which Georgia has experienced firsthand.’35

The developments in Ukraine may put high-level meetings between Russia

and Georgia temporarily on hold. Also the prompt resuming of borderisa-
tion activities after the Sochi Olympics in South Ossetia and the new dem-
onstrations by Georgian activists against fences, may impact negatively the
progress on Georgia-Russia relations. If the Russian intervention in Crimea
does not turn violent and a negotiated solution is found to the crisis in
Ukraine, the pause in rapprochement is likely to be only a temporary one.

NATO

Until now NATO representatives have been somewhat evasive about the
likelihood of Georgia receiving a Membership Action Plan (MAP) proposal
at the September 2014 Summit. Georgia could be offered a special, tailored
instrument signalling NATO commitment to Georgia but falling short of
MAP.36 While some Georgian politicians have claimed that this would be a
drastic mistake by NATO and would strengthen anti-Western forces in
Georgia,37 PM Garibashvili has taken a more lenient and balanced take on
the issue, arguing that this moment is not so significant, and anyway Geor-
gia will get its MAP sooner or later.38

35 PM: ‘West Must Compel Russia to Stop Forceful Actions Against Ukraine’, Civil.ge, 2 March
2014. Available at http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26996.
36 See e.g. RFE/RL, Rasmussen Still Evasive On Georgia’s NATO Membership, 5 February

2014. Available at http://www.rferl.org/content/georgia-rasmussen-nato-membership/

25254477.html.
37 Usupashvili’s Blunt Warning over NATO MAP, Civil.ge, 14 January 2014. Available at

http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26857.
38 PM Comments on NATO MAP, Civil.ge, 16 January 2014. Available at
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26861.

93
Later, however, during his 25 February visit to the US, Garibashvili sug-
gested that NATO should grant MAP for Georgia at the September Sum-
mit.39

The US

Managing Georgian expectations on NATO touches on another factor that

could sharpen EU-Russian relations in the coming period: the declining US
and NATO attention to the region (reversed after evidence of Russian in-
volvement in Ukraine) is exposing the EU as the primary pole for Geor-
gia’s western orientation. The Obama administration signalled the intention
to shift its attention to Asia (the ‘pivot’) and ‘lead from behind’ in resolving
crises such as Libya on the European margins. Meanwhile, NATO’s top
priority is withdrawal from Afghanistan and reliance on Russian coopera-
tion offers a disincentive for NATO to disturb relations. Also, as ISAF
winds down, there is no clear successor as an operational platform for
Georgia-NATO. In contrast, Georgia has signed a framework partnership
agreement enabling its armed forces to participate in EU CSDP missions,
starting with the EU Military Mission to the Central African Republic
(EUFOR RCA) in May 2014.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has recast the strategic priorities of the
United States and the West in general. So far, a battery of economic and
personal sanctions have been levelled at the Russian leadership and agen-
cies to deter them from supporting separatisms in Ukraine, and to punish
Russia for affecting the status quo in Europe. As can be seen from the de-
cisions taken at the NATO Summit in Wales, US-Russian relations, as well
as NATO-Russia relations, are being recast to reflect the Ukrainian crisis.
One of the by-products of the worsening of relations is the creation of
ultra-high readiness units and the commitment to greater defence budgets.

Implications for the EUMM

These developments may create auspicious conditions for strengthened

coordination and cooperation between the EU actors in Georgia. The EU

39 MP calls for NATO MAP for Georgia, Civil.ge, 26 February 2013. Available at
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=26978.

94
is perceived among the Georgian political elite as a comprehensive political,
economic and security actor with one pervasive agenda.40 In practical
terms, only the representatives of the EU make a clear distinction with dif-
ferent EU bodies; for local Georgians they are more or less the same. In
practice, the EUMM is already associated with the wider EU-family and the
political statements of the EU. Therefore, the (re)new(ed) demand for
‘comprehensive approach’ may benefit EUMM by making its work more
relevant to the wider process in GEORGIA and beyond. Equally, EUMM
is in some ways the most visible aspect of the EU in GEORGIA, and
therefore, it cannot expect its ‘operational neutrality’ to guarantee immunity
from the effects of a potential sharpening of EU-Russian rivalry.

Any possible future rapprochement is naturally positive as such and may

gradually increase trust between the Russia and Georgia over a longer pe-
riod of time, but the possibly strengthened links and interaction does not
directly indicate greatly changed conditions for the Mission’s work. It is
unlikely that Russia would change its policy line on the de facto states or
show increased flexibility on this matter. Moscow believes that it is in its
long-term interest to hold the course and proceed with formal state-
building projects while at the same time strengthening its control over
these regions. During the past five years, there have been no signs that
Russia would be serious about handing over responsibility and control over
the breakaway regions to the de facto states.

On the other hand, Russia seems to have no desire to formally unite South
Ossetia with Russia either. The conclusion to be drawn is that economically
and politically dependent satellite states are, from Russia’s perspective, the
optimum state of affairs at least to the foreseeable future. Russia’s consis-
tency on this matter promises bleak prospects for any additional confi-
dence-building measures (CBMs) targeting the de facto states’ side of the
ABL – even in the post-Sochi environment. More interaction with TAT
could weaken the position of the de facto regimes and possibly the outcome
of the war, and therefore the regimes have no desire the engage with Tbilisi
authorities even if it would benefit locals economically and make the lives

40 Kataryna Wolczuk: Perceptions of, and Attitudes towards, the Eastern Partnership amongst the
Partner Countries’ Political Elites. Estonian Centre for Eastern Partnership, no. 5, 2011.
Available at http://www.eceap.eu/ul/Review_No5.pdf.

95
of – in particular – ethnic Georgians living near the ABL easier. From the
Russian viewpoint, interaction between the breakaway regions and Tbilisi
could weaken Russia’s position in the breakaways and hence there is no
interest to encourage CBMs.

The prospects of the CBMs and finding local solutions to local problems at
the ABL remain at least as limited after the games in Sochi as they were
before. The borderisation process continues to be a priority to the de facto
authorities, who have consistently highlighted that the goal of state-building
overrides the negative impact on the local population. Having said this, the
current state of affairs should not discourage the Mission and other EU
actors in developing a new CB strategy. The EUMM does, however, high-
light the need for a realistic assessment of and a long-term view on en-
gagement.

96
The Monopoly on the Use of Force in South Ossetia

Zarina Sanakoeva

Speaking about the security of South Ossetia, we should recollect the con-
ditions that existed in the republic since its formation in the early 90s. In
fact, it was the threat of physical destruction on the part of Georgia that
served as the impetus to announcing independence. In early 1991, the units
of the USSR internal troops were withdrawn, and the population of South
Ossetia was left face to face with the Georgian armed forces. Before that,
all the weapons, including hunting weapons, were taken away from the
South Ossetian population. At the same time, self-defence units started to
be formed, which subsequently became the basis for the formation of the
security units of the young republic.

In June 1992, the Agreement on Principles of Settlement of the Georgian-

Ossetian Conflict – the so-called ‘Dagomys Agreements’ – was signed. In
accordance with this agreement a tri-lateral Joint Control Commission and
Mixed Peacekeeping Forces were established in the conflict zone: they con-
sisted of the Russian, Georgian and North Ossetian troops (500 persons
from each side).

Placement of these peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone significantly

stabilized the situation in the region. However, with the coming of Mikhail
Saakashvili to power in Georgia, the situation around South Ossetia began
to deteriorate again. In summer 2004 during the so-called ‘anti-smuggling
operation’, Georgia tried to undertake another armed attempt to seize
South Ossetia. All summer Tskhinval and its suburb villages were shelled.
As a result of heavy shelling, mainly the civilians, whose houses were tar-
geted by the rockets, were killed. The tension reached its climax in August
during the fierce fight for Tliakana heights. The attack by Georgian military
units under the leadership of then Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili was
repulsed, but Gennady Sanakoev, an Ossetian serviceman, was taken pris-
oner. Only a few days later, the Georgian side handed over to the Ossetian
side his body with signs of torture. All this was noted and observed by the
representatives of the OSCE Office in Tskhinval.

97
Nevertheless, these facts were ignored at the international level. Failing to
succeed this way, the Georgian side chose another method, which meets all
the features of state terrorism. In 2005, Georgian Interior Minister Vano
Merabishvili officially announced the list of the citizens of South Ossetia,
who were subject to physical liquidation. The list included the representa-
tives of the government, the parliament and the security forces in South
Ossetia. From 2005 to 2009, 36 terrorist attacks were perpetrated against
South Ossetia, 26 persons died and 56 were wounded. Cars were bombed,
bombs exploded, vehicles and people were fired at, snipers shot at resi-
dents from the heights of the Georgian territory surrounding Tskhinval…
This was combined with the blockade of the capital of South Ossetia; the
Transcaucasian Highway was blocked in the Georgian-controlled villages to
the north of Tskhinval.

The meeting between Zurab Zhvania, the Prime Minister of Georgia, and
Eduard Kokoity, the President of South Ossetia, in 2004 became the only
official contact between Tbilisi and Tskhinval. Thereafter, Eduard Kokoity
repeatedly came out with the initiative to negotiate with President Mikheil
Saakashvili, but all these attempts were ignored. At the same time, in 2006,
Georgia created the so-called ‘alternative government of South Ossetia’,
presented it to the international structures as the real leadership of South
Ossetia, and carried out negotiations with it – and all this was done while
the blockade of Tskhinval was intensifying; blocking water supplies, night
attacks in the capital of South Ossetia and the surrounding Ossetian vil-
lages.

The situation reached its climax in August 2008. Civilians were continu-
ously killed in the course of the shelling of Tskhinval and the surrounding
villages. On August 7, the negotiations between the co-chairmen of the
JCC (Joint Control Commission) were held; the fire stopped for a while.
Around 7:00 pm, Mikhail Saakashvili spoke on Georgian TV addressing the
population of South Ossetia. He said that he issued a ‘very painful order’
prohibiting the Georgian army to fire at the targets in the territory of South
Ossetia. And just 4 hours later, Tskhinval was shelled from all types of
heavy artillery. A remarkable fact is that the beginning of the war was de-
clared by the ‘principal Georgian peacekeeper’, Commander of the Geor-
gian battalion of Mixed Peacekeeping Forces, Mamuka Kurashvili, who
allegedly ordered his men to start killing their Russian colleagues.

98
As a result of the Georgian aggression Tskhinval was actually destroyed –
more than 370 people died during the August 2008 ‘five-day war.’ On Au-
gust 26, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. The documents on cooperation in the military sphere and the
agreement on the deployment of Russian troops in South Ossetia were
signed among the very first interstate agreements. Russian troops included
border troops, which guarded the borders of South Ossetia and Georgia on
the basis of the agreement. During the last years, there has been a signifi-
cant reduction in the Ministry of Defence of South Ossetia.

As it always happens after the fighting, a lot of weapons were left in the
hands of the population. Nevertheless, we cannot say that the level of
crimes involving firearms in South Ossetia is higher than in any of the
neighbouring regions of North and South Caucasus. With regard to this,
we cannot but appraise the effective and coordinated activities of the Min-
istry of Internal Affairs of the Republic as well.

In accordance with the law, the citizens of South Ossetia cannot keep un-
registered firearms; the Ministry of Interior carries out systematic work
aimed at their withdrawal from the population. Just over a year ago, the
Minister of Internal Affairs of South Ossetia once again made a statement
that the illegally held weapons should be handed in. This provoked lively
discussion in the society; basically, the entire population was against raising
this issue in such a way. Everybody agreed that the weapons should be
controlled. In response to the requirement of the government, the oppo-
nents of disarmament proposed to develop legal norms that would make it
possible to get permission to possess firearms.

This topic continues to be discussed in mass media; in a recent publication

author Robert Kulumbegov qualifies Tskhinval as a frontline city. Accord-
ing to him, the population should keep their weapons because, in case of a
war, there will be no time for mobilization. Any resident, just coming out
of his house, would immediately find himself on the frontline.

I believe that despite the absence of any fighting during the last five years,
the population still does not believe that war is no longer possible. Georgia
still does not recognize either the existence of the Republic of South Os-
setia, or the inhabitants of this land, and in every way avoids the signing of

99
the international treaty on non-aggression. This is also confirmed by the
rhetoric of many representatives of Georgian authorities, who claim that
South Ossetia is an ‘occupied territory’, and that ‘occupants’ keep ruling
there. This recalls the pre-war rhetoric, when Georgia saw only ‘bandits-
separatists’ in South Ossetia, and negotiated only with its own ‘puppet’
government. The fact that the Georgian side insists on the term ‘Russian-
Georgian conflict’, thereby denying any involvement and will of the resi-
dents of South Ossetia proper, also causes irritation; everybody here re-
members very well that the Russian troops entered Tskhinval only on the
third day of the conflict, when half of Tskhinval was occupied by the
Georgian troops. Georgia refuses to sign a legally binding document with
Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the non-use of force; however, it remains a
key requirement of the South Ossetian authorities and in the discussions in
Geneva. Georgia insists on signing such a document only with Russia.

Russian military bases remain the main guarantor of security for South Os-
setia. But the fact that nobody in South Ossetia is willing to remain un-
armed proves the fact that people still remember very well that the same
Soviet troops left the residents of the republic face to face with the Geor-
gian armed forces in the early 90s. In addition, the supporters of South
Ossetia joining Russia also like to speculate with this topic, saying ‘if we do
not become part of Russia, it may some day leave the Caucasus again, and
then what do we do?’

After all, we cannot ignore elementary psychology, either. The vast majority
of men who fought for South Ossetia are at an age that they just do not
remember their republic being not in a state of war. They are used to the
fact that weapons are directly linked with the self-preservation and protec-
tion of their family. Excluding the last five years, of course.

In my opinion, the main achievement of the last five years is the recogni-
tion that, in contrast to the pre-war years, after 2008, continuous skirmishes
stopped and not a single man died in South Ossetia from a Georgian bullet
over these years. Every resident of the republic knows very well that this is
due to the presence of the Russian military bases in South Ossetia. How-
ever, I understand that this cannot be considered as the final resolution of
the conflict. The relative calm in which South Ossetia lives right now is
only due to the deployment of a constraining power factor, and not Geor-

100
gia’s goodwill. If we imagine the departure of the Russian forces, it seems
clear that all other conditions, such as Georgian legislation, the current
policy, the rhetoric of the politicians and the mass media, leave no place to
believe in peaceful intentions.

101
PART III:

SECURITY COMPETITION AMONG THE

SOUTH CAUCASUS STATES:
RACING TOWARDS DISASTER?

103
The Russian-Georgian August War of 2008 in the
Context of Georgia’s External Security

David Matsaberidze

Introduction

The Russian-Georgian August War of 2008 could be seen both as an out-

come of overt militarization of the Caucasus region, and of Georgia prop-
er, as well as a result of the transformation of the security complex in the
South Caucasus area, to which the first aspect was ahead. The US assis-
tance provided to Georgia after the Rose Revolution of 2003, both, finan-
cial, as well as military, ultimately could be seen as a part of the US attempt
to reconfigure the existing security matrix in the Caucasus; whereas the
Russian-led activities in the separatist enclaves of Georgia – Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali Region/South Ossetia – were efforts to maintain the existing
status quo, established back in the early 1990s.

Thus, the present paper aims to explore the following aspects of the re-
gional security: whether the developments of the August, 2008 were an attempt from
the side of Georgia to recover its control over the South Ossetia? (as argued by some
scientists) or as a [defensive] response of the Russian Federation to protect its own
citizens? (as it claims); apart from this, another set of legitimate questions do
arise: should we comprehend this precedent of war as an attempt of a regime change in
Georgia initiated by the Russian Federation to stop the pro-western orientation of the
country? Or was it a contradiction between Russia and the US/West over the zones of
influences in the [South] Caucasus region, in which Georgia was a key player?

Arguably, the truth might lie somewhere in between of all these [legitimate]
claims, but, evidently, all of them definitely comprise lines of security axis
of the region. Thus, firstly, the paper will reconstruct the process of milita-
rization of the region before the August War; then it will explore the inter-
nal and external repercussions of the Post-August War 2008 in terms of
changing security balance in the region; and finally, it will deal with some
misperceptions of security assistance of George W. Bush’s government to
Georgia and explore the reconsideration of the US led security support of

105
Georgia after the August War of 2008. Therefore, the study will draw the
entire picture of internal and external security matrix of the region, in
which Georgia is represented as a leading actor or bargaining piece.

Militarization of Abkhazia before/during the August War of 2008

The preconditions of the August War of 2008 have been created consid-
erably earlier than actual start-up of the war. It could be argued with some
evidence that Russia could have planned the August War well ahead,
though it could be equally claimed that it spun off from the military train-
ing of the Kavkaz 2008 field exercises. Anyway, whatever might be the
truth, the fact is that ‘Russians and their separatist allies in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia prepared and executed in August 2008 a war which the
Georgians did not predict or expect’ (Felgenhauer, 2009, 162). Indeed, in
spite of the range of preceding activities, the developments of 8-12 August
2008 came as a surprise, both to Georgia, as well as for its Western allies.
This is quite surprising, as a great deal of Russian-supported provocations
preceded the August War of 2008. On 14 June 2006, a special summit was
held in Sokhumi, bringing together the leaders of Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Transnistria, who signed a Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual
Support. The meeting drew comments from Vladimir Putin, who stated that
‘Russia would keep its peacekeeping troops in these regions in spite of
provocations’ (Illarionov, 2009, 61). Russia provided not only for the
strengthening of peacekeeping forces on the territory of Abkhazia (and
South Ossetia), but the actual military support to the secessionist elites was
also envisioned by the Russian political establishment. As a demonstration
of its support to the Abkhazian secessionist authorities, on 6 March 2008,
Russia unilaterally withdrew from the sanctions regime against Abkhazia
that had been imposed at the CIS Summit in January 1996. Thus, the way
was cleared up for intensive military and other sorts of contacts with the
de-facto Abkhazian authorities. Therefore, on April 16, President Putin
‘ordered the Russian government to establish direct relations with the gov-
ernments in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali’ (Illarionov, 2009, 67).

It is noteworthy that this was not a one-off action from the side of Mos-
cow, but was followed by a chain of similar developments. Thus, Nilsson
rightly mentions that ‘the Georgian government pushed relentlessly to
change the status quo in Abkhazia and South Ossetia’ (cited in Cornell and

106
Starr, 2009, 6) and this move was conditioned by unilateral activities of the
Russian Federation, therefore the Georgian efforts were a responsive
measure to the former.

Military confrontation over Abkhazia is one of the most hotly debated and
sensitive issues in the mainstream literature. Numerous studies deal with
the distribution of armaments among ethnic groups and their role in the
promotion and emergence of inter-ethnic rivalry.1 However, few discuss
the ‘channels inherited from Soviet Communist Party structures, through
which the Abkhaz elites had access to the military personnel in the former
Soviet military forces that were crucial in securing support for the struggle’
(Cornell, 2002, 266), which was crucial in the outbreak of war in the early
1990s. And none discuss the case of entering military units of the Soviet
Union the territory of Abkhazia on 22-23 February 1991 to reconstruct the
site of Ministry of Interior Affairs, which was a violation of sovereignty and
territorial supremacy of Georgia (Apkhazetis Khma, 1991). A comparative
analysis of Russia’s military involvement in Georgia after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union is offered by Ghia Nodia (1998, 34), who argues that ‘by
the time of dissolution of the Soviet Union, the military were extremely
influential in defining Russian policy in the near abroad’; whereas, I’d add, a
radically different picture of the Russian military involvement in Abkhazia
could be witnessed after 2006. A more premeditated, well-planned and
well-organized Russian military provision on the territory of Abkhazia,
which was demonstrated above, culminated in the August War of 2008.

The pre-war scenario was not different in 2008 from that of the early
1990s. Immediately before the August War of 2008, a Russian military-
logistical unit entered the territory of Abkhazia (Georgia) for reconstruc-
tion of the railway link from Leselidze to Ochamchire region. Hence, these
two developments (those of early 1990s and the developments of the
Spring, 2008) can be assessed as the comparable events due to their far-
reaching consequences: both of them laid the ground for intervention of
the Russian Federation on the territory of Georgia. Through these infra-
structural preparations, Russian military support to the local Abkhazian
guerrilla forces was secured, which was instrumental in each case – in the
success of the Abkhazian military actions (in taking control of the Abkhazi-

1 See Gurr and Harff (1994).

107
an AR down to the Enguri River in 1993 and the capture of the Kodori
Gorge, that is taking control over the entire territory of the then Abkhazian
autonomous region, in 2008).

The above-mentioned narrative should be contextualized through the two

wider sketches of the Abkhazian military build-up in the region after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Firstly, the Transcaucasian Military Oblast
(later on known as the Russian Army in the Transcaucasus) was not dis-
solved and remained as a huge bureaucratic institution, with its military
staff in close relations with the local autonomous governments (Devdari-
ani, 2006, p. 218). Additionally, the provision of the separate Abkhazian
military formations with ammunition was easily solved through Soviet in-
herited channels. On 29 December 1991, the presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Abkhazian ASSR issued a resolution on the transfer of the
property, heavy ammunition and artillery of (Soviet) Military Units #5482
and #3697 to the direct ownership and subjugation of the Abkhazian
ASSR (Diasamidze, 2005, 95-96).

Moreover, on the same day, the resolution of the presidium of the Supreme
Soviet of the Abkhazian ASSR, and Order #57 of the same structure, es-
tablished a temporary Military Council for the management and coordina-
tion of military and police forces located on the territory of the Abkhazian
ASSR after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Military units #5482 and
#3697 were transferred under the supervision of the newly created Military
Council (Diasamidze, 2005, 96). In addition, the property of Military Unit
#68087 located in the city of Sokhumi was declared as the property of the
Republic of Abkhazia (Diasamidze, 2005, 112-113). Thus, various instances
of open military preparation on the part of local authorities of the
Abkhazian autonomous region were staged after dissolution of the Soviet
Union.

These military preparation activities justify the claim that in both cases, in
1992-932 and in 2008, the local actions were not the spontaneous reactions,
but rather well-planned and premeditated military confrontations with the

2 Several published reports on the issue mention that the Russian military units provided
the Georgian and Abkhazian sides with direct and indirect military support in 1992-94.
See Lakoba (2001); Zverev (1996); Chervonnaya (1994).

108
central authorities of Georgia. In contradiction to the above-mentioned
statements, in their discussions of the military developments of the 1992-
93, Abkhazians experts and politicians point to the close links between the
Russian colonels and the Georgian warlord Tengiz Kitovani. Citing Trenin,
Akaba (2011, 9) argues that the ‘special relationship between Russian Gen-
eral Pavel Grachev and Georgian warlord Tengiz Kitovani is a well-known
fact’. This is not surprising though, as in the Caucasus, in the early 1990s
‘weapons came in very large quantities from the storehouses of the disinte-
grating Soviet Army. Both the newly independent states and challenging
rebel formations had no problems in arming themselves with cheaply
bought or easily stolen Soviet weapons’ (Koehler and Zürcher, 2003, 253).

From the 2000s Russia found another pretext for maintaining its military
presence in Abkhazia through policies on the distribution of Russian pass-
ports to the inhabitants of Abkhazia. Vladimir Socor (2008, 2) argues that
‘the fact that the Russian passports are widely distributed among the resi-
dents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Russian government claims a
right of intrusive protection, including military presence in the two areas’.
Socor adds that the Russian peacekeepers, who were in reality a party to the
conflict, like Russia itself, transformed the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict in
1992-1993 into a Russian-Georgian conflict from 1993-1994 and points to
the fact of ‘Russia’s military intervention and its subsequent, overt support
for Abkhaz secessionist authorities’. The Russian military provision of the
Abkhazian secessionist elites gained new force after the deterioration of
relations between Moscow and Tbilisi with the emergence of Mikheil Sa-
akashvili as a president of Georgia in 2004. After the Rose Revolution, the
militarization of Georgia’s separatist territories continued apace: ‘the strong
facilities in Ochamchire and Gali bases were designed to provide military
equipment, armament and fuel for 100 000 people,’ Illarionov (2009, 59,
60) claims. The Russian arms deliveries to the conflict regions of Georgia
exceeded to the total military capacities of Georgia proper, and the break-
away regions owned twice the military equipment possessed by Georgia, he
argues.

Russia even went on to violate the CIS agreement on peacekeeping opera-

tions. In April, 2008 Moscow relocated paratroopers from the Novorossi-
ysk Airborne Division to Abkhazia; the military equipment of these forces
testifies open and extensive militarization of Abkhazia by the Russian Fed-

109
eration. The military capabilities of Abkhazia were increased by: ‘three Buk
anti-aircraft complexes, fourteen additional D-30 self-propelled cannons,
ten 122mm BM-30 multi-rocket launchers, 20 anti-tank cannons, 120 anti-
tank rockets, 2 helicopters and 180 Russian technical specialists to service
this equipment. Besides this, Moscow increased its troops in Abkhazia
from 1997 to 2542 servicemen (Illarionov, 2009, 69). In addition, as Pop-
janevski (2009, 146) notes, on 31 May 2008, the Russian Ministry of De-
fence announced the deployment of an additional 400 military personnel in
Abkhazia with the task of repairing the railway infrastructure between Sok-
humi and Ochamchire. Officially, these measures were classed as humani-
tarian assistance to Abkhazians, although the real essence of these types of
military activities was not hidden. Subsequently, on 20 July 2008, an infan-
try battalion with fourteen Armoured Personnel Carriers entered the lower
part of the Kodori Gorge.

This was followed by promises to the separatist authorities of a further

increase in military capabilities on the separatist territories of Georgia. In-
terestingly, after the August War of 2008, in September 2009, a treaty of
military cooperation was signed promoting Russia’s military role in Abkha-
zia. The new treaty ‘granted Russia access to military facilities and bases in
Abkhazia (including the airbase at Gudauta and naval facilities at Ocham-
chire) for a period of 49 years’ (Cooley and Mitchell, 2010, 64).

Stephen Blank (2009, 108-109) provides a somewhat broader contextualiza-

tion of the pre-August 2008 Russian military build-up in the region. Ac-
cording to Blank, this was an endorsement of the anti-Western and anti-
NATO strengthening of the military position on the territory of Georgia,
i.e. the part of creation of the wider anti-NATO Eurasian military platform
– the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), on the one hand,
and the desire of the military officers to regain influence in the newly struc-
tured Russian defence policy, on the other. The first of his claims appears
valid for the presidency of Saakashvili, who became actively anti-Russian
and pro-western and pro-EU oriented. The second part applies to the both
eras, as it is hard to imagine that the interests of the Russian military would
have disappeared after 1990s. De Waal (2010) is somewhat neutral with
regard to the Russian involvement in the developments over Abkhazia.
Contrasting Georgian claims that they fought against Russia in Abkhazia,
and the Abkhazian claim that there was a Georgian-Abkhazian conflict

110
proper and Russia helped both sides, De Waal suggests that ‘the truth lies
somewhere in between’ (2010, 159).

Ron Asmus (2010, 20-21, 166), through his personal links, provides data
which testifies to the initial Russian military build-up in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia before the start of the August War: ‘the intercepts also men-
tioned the name of the colonel who commanded the 693rd regiment of the
19th division of the Russian 58th army. That unit was not authorized to be in
Georgia. Subsequent reports confirmed that elements of the 135th regiment
were also there’. Asmus particularly refers to the military exercise Kavkaz
2008 held in the North Caucasus shortly before the August War, which
included some 700 combat vehicles, fighter aircraft, and part of the Black
Sea fleet. In addition, by the evening of 5 August, nearly 12000 soldiers,
along with their armour and artillery, were deployed and ready to strike
against Georgia. Asmus cites some Georgian informants who claimed that
the Georgian state agencies observed ‘the shipment of a large number of
BMP/BTR armoured vehicles, D-30 type howitzers, SA-11 Buk antiaircraft
systems, BM-21 Grad rocket systems and ZSU02304 Shilka antiaircraft sys-
tems’ to Abkhazia by the late Spring of 2008.3

Assessing the post-August War situation in Abkhazia, on the basis of the

various international monitoring reports, O’Loughlin, Kolossov and Toal
(2011) point to the fact that on 15 September 2009, ‘the Russian and de facto
Abkhazian authorities signed a military cooperation treaty that enables the
Russian military to use, build and upgrade military infrastructure and bases
in Abkhazia’ (p. 6). That is to say that even if the Russian military involve-
ment was either hidden or constrained through the force of international
agreements in the 1990s and during early 2000s, just before and after the
August War Russia openly followed a path of total militarization of the
region. Evidently, this led to the change of the regional security complex
and balance, which now favours the Russian Federation. In fact, what
should have been reached according to the agreement of the OSCE Istan-
bul Summit of 1999 – withdrawal of the Russian military bases from the
territory of Georgia – and what has been fulfilled partially until August
2008 was reversed in favour of the Russian Federation as a result of the
war. In addition, it should be also mentioned that no international monitor-

3 For further information see: Asmus (2010); Cornell and Starr (2009); De Waal (2010).

111
ing on the fulfilment of the Istanbul Summit obligations of the Soviet era
military bases in Gudauta and Ochamchire – on the territory of Abkhazia –
has ever been implemented.

The Post-August War Regional Challenges and International Com-

petition in the Context of Open Russian Revisionism

Whatever the direct or indirect causes of the August clash between Russia
and Georgia, evidently, it was neither a purely defensive action from the
side of the Russian Federation in support of the Abkhazian and South Os-
setian communities, nor Georgia’s drive for territorial integration. None of
them could be at stake in the August 2008 from either side. But it is obvi-
ous that this crisis generated new sources of instability in the entire post-
Soviet space, which, I’d argue, could be termed as a new form of the Rus-
sian revisionism, bringing some limits to western policies in the region, an
area which is seen by the Kremlin as its sphere of influence. Meanwhile, the
US and European responses to Russia have been firm in rhetoric but com-
promising in reality. Russia made it clear that it has its own claims over the
South Caucasus, whereas the West showed its inability to prevent Russia
from moving aggressively to restore its primacy over the former Soviet
Union’s territory.

Asmus (2010, 12) claims that ‘Moscow had little interest in a resolution of
these conflicts which could have allowed Georgia to go to the West even
faster’. These words nicely sum up the essence of start-up of the conflict,
its transformation under Russian peacekeeping and its culmination in the
August War. The openly declared pro-Western, pro-EU and pro-NATO
course of the Rose Revolution government was particularly alarming for
Moscow. Russia could not tolerate its ‘encirclement’ by NATO member
states. The prospective involvement of Georgia in the Membership Action
Plan (MAP) seemed like the first step on this path. The idea that Russia
resisted Georgia’s aspirations to the west through the conflict zones of
Georgia in August 2008 is partially shared by Khintba (2011b, 31). Accord-
ing to him, Abkhazian experts agree that ‘August 2008 symbolized Russia’s
renaissance, affirming Russia capacity to take crucial decisions unilaterally,
without the approval of other states’. Thus, this can be taken as a direct
proof of the claim that the August War might be considered as open Rus-
sian revisionism.

112
In this line, De Waal (2010, 221) claims that through strengthening its pres-
ence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, ‘Russia reasserted its sphere of influ-
ence across the former Soviet Union and blocked the ambitions of any
neighbors to join NATO… two breakaway territories were less important
themselves than as an instrument of influence against Georgia and the
West. (Whereas Suny points out those opportunities which make the Cau-
casus a highly strategic area for Moscow; the region is a key for Russia to:

• Bolster its strategic interests in the North Caucasus;

• Exert a degree of influence on the newly independent South Cauca-
sus states; and
• Maintain a regional influence in competition with other key actors:
Iran, Turkey, and the Arab world (Zverev, 1996, 95-96).

Although, according to Sharashenidze and Sukhov (2011), Moscow’s belief

that it controls the situation in the North Caucasus may be mistaken. Thus,
the Abkhazian and South Ossetian precedents are likely to increase separa-
tist sentiments in the North Caucasus, although these independence
movements cannot pose a meaningful challenge to Russian armed forces in
the short to medium term. Unsurprisingly, the Russian Federation is facing
increased difficulties with the Northern Caucasus adjacent to Georgia, be-
cause of the activities of armed Islamic and fundamentalist groupings. In a
situation like this it would be too risky to stake on an increased confronta-
tion and tension with Georgia. For this reason, Russia will probably make
further efforts to change the attitude of Georgian public and political cir-
cles towards itself, even though these kinds of attempts have not been very
successful so far.

Asmus (2010, 4) claims that the war was not only planned against Georgia
or targeted at regime change in this country, but it was aimed at undermin-
ing European security: ‘an increasingly nationalist and revisionist Russia
was also rebelling against the European system that it felt no longer met its
interests and had been imposed on it during a moment of temporary weak-
ness.’ Under such conditions, it is interesting how the EU and the US could
engage with the region more intensively, thus how they should redefine
their strategy towards Russia. Moreover, it should be also taken into ac-
count that many European states share with Russia common interests,

113
which they are not willing to sacrifice. Meanwhile, this strategic change
might come at the expense of further destabilization in the South Caucasus.
Undoubtedly, from the Russian perspective, the Black Sea is critical for the
Russian naval force, allowing it to expand its influence into the Mediterra-
nean.

De Waal (2010, 97) identifies Russia’s interests in the South Caucasus as

the main precondition of the start of the August War. He argues that ‘[i]n
the age of Putin and Medvedev, it [Russian Federation] employs as instru-
ments its presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, its military alliance with
Armenia, and its gas pipelines to all three countries’ whereas for Pop-
janevski (2009, 145), the actual battle for Abkhazia started not in August
2008, but rather in April 2008, following the NATO Bucharest Summit.
According to Popjanevski the situation showed the first signs of deteriora-
tion on April 16, 2008, when ‘outgoing President Putin signed a presiden-
tial decree instructing Russian state agencies to establish official ties with
the Abkhaz and South Ossetian de facto administrations; to institutionalize
trade relations between Russia and the two entities; and to provide consular
assistance to residents of the two regions’ De Waal (2010, 209) concurs
that after the NATO Bucharest Summit, ‘Russian authorities duly took
their next step, announcing they were authorizing direct governmental rela-
tions with Abkhazia and South Ossetia’. Thus, it could be equally claimed,
that not only the militarization, but the [vital] geopolitical interest of Russia
in the Caucasus region should be also mentioned as one of the precondi-
tions of the August War in 2008.

In conclusion, it could be argued that the passive reaction(s) of the West in

time of the need of active action(s) in the Caucasus, most notably in the
August 2008, led to the change of military balance in the security network
in favour of the Russian Federation. The present reality of having occupied
territories at the periphery of Europe, without any real tool at hand to
counterweight the Russian expansion and policy in this respect, ultimately
raises questions on the viability of existing tool of the European security, in
the form of the OSCE, and poses some dangers in terms of unpredictable
future scenarios, which might emerge as a challenge to the European secu-
rity.

114
Georgia: Negative Effects of Militarization, but Still in Need of
Military Support

Michael D. Mihalka and Mark R. Wilcox (2010, 25) argue that ‘the large
increase in security assistance to the South Caucasus actually decreased
regional stability’ and point to the Russian-Georgian War of 2008 as a
proof of this statement.4 They claim that the Georgian attempt to recover
South Ossetia in August 2008 raises real questions about the unintended
consequences that security assistance brings to the region. Although the
United States argues that Washington’s supported military training was
strictly limited to counter-terrorism operations, neither Georgia nor Russia
share that interpretation. The 2006 Georgian National Security Concept
makes the following claim
Georgia’s defense capabilities have significantly increased as a result of assistance
programs conducted by the United States. The Georgia Train and Equip Program
initiated by the U.S. has proved to be a major success in the process of building the
modern Georgian Armed Forces. The new Sustainment and Stability Operations
Program is advancing Georgia’s defense capabilities to a higher level. Units trained
under these programs constitute the core of the Georgian Army’ (Mihalka and Wil-
cox, 2010, 29).
In relation to this clause, the Report of the Independent International Fact-
Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia made a veiled critique of secu-
rity assistance to the region:
The supply of arms and military equipment as well as the provision of military
training to the conflict region were and continue to be a sensitive issue. Even when
done within the limits established by international law or by political commitments
of a non-binding nature, military support must stay within the boundaries set by

4 US European Command has had several initiatives to train Georgian troops. From 2002
to 2004, the United States spent $64 million in the Georgia Train and Equip Program to
train Georgian security forces to fight terrorists, protect pipelines, and further internal
stability. Following this, the United States launched the Sustainment and Stability Opera-
tions Program to train four battalions of Georgian troops to support the US-led coali-
tion in Iraq. Sixty million dollars was spent in FY 2005 and another $30 million was
budgeted for FY 2006. Before the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, the United States was
preparing to train the 4th Brigade for operations in Iraq. Source: Michael D. Mihalka
and Mark R. Wilcox. Unintended Strategic Consequences of Security Assistance in the South Cauca-
sus, in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ) / Issue 57, 2nd Quarter, 2010.
http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-57/Mihalka-Wilcox.pdf [accessed on
22.12.2013].

115
 common sense and due diligence, keeping in mind both intended and unintended
use of the arms and equipment supplied (Mihalka and Wilcox, 2010, 30).
Whereas Antonenko (2006, 307) argues that the US military support to
Georgia was instrumental in paving way towards the Russian-Georgian
War of August 2008. She refers to the March 2002 statement of then Presi-
dent of Abkhazia, Vladislav Ardzinba, to the US and Western states, that
‘military support provided to Georgia could entail some undesired conse-
quences and escalation of the conflict … the military units trained with the
support of the US could be used in the military activities against Abkhazia.’
Nevertheless, it could not be claimed reasonably that military aid to Geor-
gia unilaterally pushed the country to the military clash in the August 2008
in its separatist enclave without serious consideration of the above-
described Russian military and political activities in the separatist regions of
the country.

This criticism of the US security aid to Georgia has not led to the dimin-
ishment of Georgia’s security assistance after the August War of 2008, but
it remained high on the agenda both in Georgia, as well as in the US. Im-
mediately after the August War of 2008, ‘Saakashvili placed the issue of
military aid at the top of the agenda with Washington. What Georgia really
needs is something that it cannot get from anywhere else [besides the US]
and that’s anti-air and anti-tank [weapons] and that’s completely obvious,’
he said in a 2011 interview with Foreign Policy magazine. ‘That’s where
should be the next stage of the cooperation’ but ‘Saakashvili soon accepted
a more modest level of military aid’ (Security Assistance Monitor, 2013).

Still, many would argue that while Washington may have viewed its post
Rose Revolution assistance to Georgia narrowly, the Georgians themselves
clearly viewed it as a strong political support and a means to recover lost
territory. As Cox and Mihalka (2010, 31) stress that
…utmost care should be taken by providers of military aid to refrain from giving
their support, even unintentionally or indirectly, to any actions or developments
detrimental to the stability of the region.
In reality, the August war destabilized the situation in the South Caucasus,
exacerbated long-standing tensions in some republics, created new threats
to stability in others and the possible emergence of new secessionist im-
pulses. Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in fact has cre-

116
ated a dangerous precedent in the region; opening Pandora’s Box of ethnic
and territorial claims in the North Caucasus.5

The future of the US security provision to Georgia is deliberately ambigu-

ous. On the one hand, since the war there have been no government-to-
government deliveries of any military hardware or export licenses granted
for commercial sales. Senior officials have cited the Georgian military’s
need for training, and US non hardware-related military assistance nearly
doubled after the war on the principle of ‘brains before brawn’ (Charap and
Welt, 2011, 56-57). While on the other hand, some high-ranking US offi-
cials insisted that as there was no ‘formal embargo’ against Georgia, Assis-
tant Secretary of State Philip Gordon stated that the US should pursue se-
curity cooperation with Georgia;
Georgia is making a very significant contribution in Afghanistan, which we value.
… and we are helping them with training for that mission [...] Georgia’s a sover-
eign, independent country [...] we’ve said that all sovereign, independent countries
in Europe and elsewhere have the right to self-defence (Charap and Welt, 2011,
57).
Charap and Welt (2011, 58) even argued for the necessity of the US military
provision to Georgia to increase its defence capacity, as this was also a re-
gional matter for the US and pointed to the extent of Russia’s deployments
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which could not be justified on defensive
grounds.

Thus, it could be argued that the US military support to Georgia did not
lead to the improvement of country’s security. The misperception of the
support provided, directed mainly to the rise of military capabilities of
Georgia, erroneously led the country into a defensive war against the Rus-
sian Federation, which ended up with devastating results for both – in
terms of the future solution of the conflict, as well as in terms of external
and internal security of the country. On the other hand, the outcome of the
war signalled the diminishment of the US strategic positions in the entire
Caucasus region. Therefore, re-modelling and re-structuring of the US sup-

5 Interestingly, after the August War of 2008 the US Senate discussed the need of provi-
sion defensive arms to Georgia. See: Nichol, J. (2013). Georgia [Republic]: Recent Develop-
ments and U.S. Interests. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, June 21.
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/97-727.pdf [accessed on 24.12.2013].

117
port to Georgia, for the improvement and upgrade of defensive capacity of
Georgia, became an urgent task after the end of the August War of 2008.

Conclusion

The preceding analysis of the case of Georgia in terms of the post-August

War security situation in the region demonstrates that a broader internal
and external contextualization of the pre- and post-August War 2008 de-
velopments is necessary. Arguably, these developments might have some
crucial effects on the regional development in the South and North Cauca-
sus, as well as on the Central Asia in general, and over Georgia, in particu-
lar. It is evident that the Russian-Georgian August War confirmed once
again that the EU and US do not have sufficient means (or willingness) to
protect Georgia/South Caucasus from Russia, even though it is one of the
crucial areas for their Middle East and remote Asian (Afghanistan) opera-
tions. This precedent has caused some serious concerns and doubts among
the Eastern European and Baltic States in terms of effective provision of
their security guarantees from NATO. Meanwhile, Russia gained a funda-
mentally new geopolitical situation in the region, expressed in Medvedev’s
words; ‘we are able to defend our national interests.’

With the August War Russia managed to restore and even strengthen its
military presence in the region, after the withdrawal of its military bases
from Georgia according to the OSCE Istanbul Summit of 1999. In addi-
tion, it is not a secret that through the August War Moscow paid back to
the US and the West for the recognition of Kosovo, which in Kremlin’s
mind destroyed the foundations of European security and neglected Rus-
sia’s interests. It is also evident that promotion of liberal democracy in the
South Caucasus brought some unintended consequence in terms of in-
creased political instability and through greater likelihood of internal and
external violence. This pattern is readily observed in the region and is most
apparent in the August War of 2008. As Mihalka and Wilcox (2010, 31)
rightly mention, ‘external actors promoting such reforms offer no accept-
able regional solutions to the endemic internal and external security prob-
lems.’

Thus, the post-August War reality led to ‘marginalization and diminishment

of politics and public sentiment in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia: these

118
regions are constituted externally, first and foremost, as strategic objects’
(O’Loughlin et al. 2011, p. 4). Therefore, there is an urgent need from the
side of the EU and US stakeholders to devise the new security assistance
and cooperation framework for Georgia, which will not only increase de-
fence capacities of the country, but also will provide some tools to balance
the overwhelming Russian presence in the [conflict] regions. And last, but
not least, the August War of 2008 demonstrated that the provision of only
hard security mechanisms is not a panacea for the regional stability; rather,
it should be effectively combined with soft security mechanisms, specifi-
cally devised for the region.

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Official Documents
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the Military and Police Units Located on the Territory of Abkhazia
(December 29, 1991) in Regional Conflicts in Georgia – South Ossetian
AO. Abkhazian SSR (1989-2005). A Collection of Political and Legal
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122
De-escalating Conflicts and Creating Conditions
for Peace Process in the South Caucasus

Elkhan Nuriyev1

Introduction

So far, local elites in the South Caucasus have been unable to formulate
flexible strategies of enhanced consent, since leaderships are mainly con-
cerned with short-term interests and immediate benefits. Though it is in-
deed essential but it is no surprise why it is almost impossible to build co-
operation between conflicting parties, especially in a situation in which po-
litical dialogue is still dominated by emotions, nationalist and/or
secessionist tendencies. The current tense atmosphere breeds numerous
risks to the regional security situation and the absence of progress in break-
ing the geopolitical stalemate over conflict zones has created new chal-
lenges and options that indicate the seriousness of the upcoming crisis in
the South Caucasus. This is especially true for the case of the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.

In the wake of growing tension around Nagorno-Karabakh, the coming

years seem to bring about new security threats to both Armenia and Azer-
baijan. Hence, perhaps the most difficult question confronting Baku and
Yerevan at the present time is how best to proceed on the peace process.
In actual fact, a sniper war is taking place along the ceasefire line, known as
the line of contact, Europe’s most dangerous militarized zone, which could
escalate again into full-scale armed conflict. Each side has deployed more
than 20 000 soldiers to face the other, provoking regular shooting inci-
dents, casualties on both sides and mutual accusations of ceasefire viola-
tions, which are very difficult to verify for third parties due to lack of ac-
cess to the conflict zone.

The risk of renewed war between Armenia and Azerbaijan is increasing as

1 Dr Elkhan Nuriyev, a former Director of the Center for Strategic Studies, Azerbaijan’s
premier think-tank in Baku, is Advisory Board Member of the Caucasus Institute for
Democratic Integration in Tbilisi, Georgia.

123
negotiations are deadlocked and popular frustration over the occupation of
Azerbaijani territories is rapidly rising in the country. If the peace process
brings no results in the near future, a renewed war may occur especially
under the pretext of actively pursuing retribution for attacks on its own
soil. Given more sophisticated armaments, a new war is likely to be of a
much larger scale than the fighting in the early 1990s. The regional implica-
tions of renewed warfare are immense, as several powerful players, most
notably Russia and Turkey, are tied militarily to the two neighbouring states
in the South Caucasus.

More important, the current situation is also exacerbated by the fact that
the United States and Russia have opposing views on the resolution of the
conflict. Washington does not want Russian troops to be placed in Na-
gorno-Karabakh under the pretext of the peacekeeping operation headed
by the Collective Security Treaty Organization.2 Moscow, in turn, views the
deployment of the American peacekeepers in the conflict zone as an inte-
gral part of a cunning US plan to invade the Islamic Republic of Iran.3 Un-
der such complicated circumstances, as long as the major outside powers
continue, in parallel with their situational cooperation, to compete for their
crucial interests in the South Caucasus, conflict resolution will certainly
prove elusive.

Different Security Perceptions and Regional Arms Race

Over the past two decades, national security concerns have been the central
issues on the South Caucasus countries’ agendas and still to date remain
important aspects of their foreign policy strategies. Both Armenia and
Azerbaijan seek security, but their vision of security concerns and percep-
tion of threats differ. Azerbaijan cooperates closely with Georgia and the
two countries strive at expanding their roles in the framework of interna-
tionally-sponsored economic projects. Azerbaijan and Georgia perceive
their future security based on regional economic cooperation. Armenia, in
turn, relies heavily on its special alliance with Russia, because of its hostile

2 This point was made to the author by a high-ranking American official, Washington,
DC, November 2010.
3 Private communication with Russian political analyst who requested anonymity, Berlin,
July 2011.

124
relationships to Turkey and its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan over Na-
gorno-Karabakh. As a result, different threat perceptions and differing ori-
entations in the foreign relations of the South Caucasus nations are the
central obstacles to the creation of a stable security environment and
broader economic cooperation within the region.

Clearly, Azerbaijan wants control of the lost territories to be restored and

people expect war to resume with Azerbaijan’s final victory. The govern-
ment neither wishes to nor can ignore public opinion. In turn, Armenian
people regard the conflict as having been already settled and they have no
intention to seek compromise with Azerbaijan, plus there is little room for
negotiations. From Azerbaijani perspective, growth in the country’s relative
military power is not accompanied by satisfactory progress in negotiations,
which leads to frustration and to the intensification of militaristic propa-
ganda. This in turn induces Armenia to become more intransigent and un-
compromising. Azerbaijani officials have repeatedly stated that Baku is
ready to recover control of Nagorno-Karabakh by force, whereas the ruling
authorities in Yerevan argue that the Armenian armed forces are prepared
for a well-organized defensive campaign.

After the deadlock in peace negotiations in 2011, Azerbaijan and Armenia

accelerated their stockpiling of arms and intensified their public rhetoric of
preparing for a new war. Both countries have raised their defence budgets.
For instance, Armenia increased its defence budget by 25 percent to USD
450 million in 2013 and the country’s spending on defence under the state
budget for 2014 rose by 6 percent compared to 2013.4 Armenia, as a mem-
ber of the CSTO, is actually protected by mutual guarantees against any
security threat, and is also integrated in the CSTO air-defence system. In
recent years, Armenia and Russia signed new military agreements, set to
strengthen cooperation between the two states and to extend the security
guarantees provided by Russia to Armenia.

Likewise, Azerbaijan increased its defence budget by USD 3.7 billion in

2013, given that oil revenues were boosted. Azerbaijan’s state budget is 6.4
percent higher in 2014 than in 2013, and the country’s defence budget will

4 ARKA News Agency, Yerevan, October 29, 2013.

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total USD 3.75 billion or 14.7 percent of budget expenditures in 2014.5 It is
argued that Azerbaijan’s military budget exceeds Armenia’s entire state
budget by USD 1 billion. In June 2013, the delivery of weapons worth
USD 1 billion fulfilled the last part of a deal worth about USD 4 billion
between Russia and Azerbaijan.6 Besides, Baku counts on Turkish military
and political support, whereas Armenia relies on Russia’s backing. The Ar-
menian and Azerbaijani strategic partnerships with third parties complicate
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its geopolitical implications.

In effect, political elites in Azerbaijan and Armenia are still guided by the
war images of the early 1990s and have not yet realized the destructive po-
tential of their current weapons. The arms race between the Azerbaijan and
Armenia is very alarming especially since both sides are acquiring more
sophisticated weapons systems. Militarization is disastrous both for Arme-
nian economy and for Azerbaijan’s future economic progress. It is believed
that the most dangerous period will be when Azerbaijan passes its peak
hydrocarbon production, which also indicates peak in growth of its relative
advantage over Armenia.

In the Shadow of Russian Influence

In reality, the Russian factor plays a crucial role in unfolding security situa-
tion in the South Caucasus and even beyond. Russia is the first arms pro-
vider of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, but Moscow would not gain any
advantage from a full-scale conflict in this area. Russian counterparts I re-
cently met in Moscow, London and Berlin strongly argue that Russia guar-
antees security in the entire region and preserves the military balance by
providing both sides with weaponry.7 Through its military partnership with
Armenia and its close relations in different spheres with Azerbaijan, Russia
seeks to satisfy Baku and Yerevan simultaneously by selling them large
amounts of military equipment, while it is securing its position as the key
mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and thereby increasing its geo-
political clout in the South Caucasus.

5 APA News Agency, Baku, October 7, 2013.

6 RIA Novosti, Moscow, June 18, 2013.
7 Private conversation with some Russian political scientists who requested anonymity,
Moscow, October 2009, London, May 2013, and Berlin, September 2013.

126
There is no doubt that a stronger Russia than in the 1990s may contribute
to greater stability in the region. The main question, however, is whether
the Kremlin is currently interested in a quicker solution to the conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Moscow apparently continues to influence the two
parties in various, subtle ways so as to orchestrate a conflict settlement
scenario that will not only serve Russian strategic interests but also gratify
Armenia and Azerbaijan in the end.

Why Demilitarization Matters

The loss of importance of the individual is one of the effects of militariza-

tion in the conflict-torn region. When the media reports of killings are
heard daily for years, sensitivity is diminished. One more killing does not
seem to make any difference. If a society is to remain sane however, threats
to the right to life must evoke outrage. The loss of such outrage signifies an
extremely negative transformation in the society, both morally and psycho-
logically. Such a situation creates further space for frequent killings to oc-
cur. This means that militarization and escalation strongly affect social atti-
tude and people begin to lose trust and respect for relationships based on
laws.

Evidently, with every year that passes it gets harder in order to reach a
breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. The Armenian
leadership becomes more accustomed to possession of the Azerbaijani
lands under their control and Yerevan is more reluctant to make the land-
for-peace deal that must lie at the heart of an agreement. For their part, the
Azerbaijani authorities have to deal with unrealistically high public expecta-
tions and a large constituency that favours going back to war. Even though
major outside powers are firmly committed to preventing a new, potentially
disastrous conflict over the secessionist territory, the effects of militariza-
tion are really dangerous to the current security situation and portend bad
trends for the future of the South Caucasus.

However, demilitarization and de-escalation often occur especially after the

conflict between the two parties reaches a deadlock and does not improve
at all. True, de-escalation will indeed be possible when Baku and Yerevan
begin to realize that ongoing stalemate is costly for both sides and when
they also recognize the need to have a better alternative that does not

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threaten interests of the parties involved in the peace talks. Given that the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is considered the most serious, protracted and
intractable one, and the de-escalation process will take a long time and
should start from small steps. Local elites must embark on seeking to
counter feeling fearful and threatened. Since the incumbent leaders in both
Armenia and Azerbaijan are publicly committed to pursuing a negotiated
settlement, they must manage the militant factions within their respective
countries. Besides, economic incentives may positively affect interaction
processes occurring between the conflicting parties, as well as significantly
contribute to conflict de-escalation and definitely facilitate finding win-win
outcomes.

OSCE Minsk Group and the Way Ahead

Obviously, the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairpersons do not want hostilities

to resume in the conflict zone. That is exactly what the peace talks are now
being conducted for. Any progress in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace proc-
ess, however, does not seem realistic until Armenia and Azerbaijan once
and for all give up their unusual policy of provoking an arms race and cur-
rent provocations along the line of contact. Yet the international mediators
are trying to persuade Baku and Yerevan to abandon the escalation of an
already tense situation and opt for confidence-building measures in order
to further proceed to negotiations. This means that the most likely scenario
over the next few years is the continuation of the situation of no peace, no
war – although the possibility of new fighting, caused either by miscalcula-
tion or by a political crisis, also grows stronger every year and must be tak-
en seriously.

Even so, there is a widening gap between expectations and reality. One can
see a strong resistance by Armenians and Azerbaijanis to any concessions,
and the chance that a compromise can be reached in the near future is
therefore minimal. Although growing tensions could be seen as Azerbai-
jan’s attempt to unfreeze the conflict and prepare for full-scale war, a mili-
tary confrontation is still risky option for the ruling authorities in Baku. It is
simply hard to believe that Azerbaijan would secure Russia’s friendly neu-
trality. It is therefore unlikely that there will be a repeat of the August 2008
Georgian-Russian scenario in the case of the Armenian-Azerbaijani con-
flict. There is an understanding that a defeat would pose a risk of internal

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breakdown and military conflict is almost prejudged in the longer term.
Overall, a final resolution of the conflict will be very difficult to achieve
unless Armenia and Azerbaijan relax their current stance.

For that reason, the OSCE Minsk Group is now facing serious challenges
to maintaining its effectiveness in the conflict settlement process. There is a
general feeling of disappointment in its perceived inability to deal with the
fundamental problem facing Armenia and Azerbaijan today, a feeling only
reinforced after the failure of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairpersons to
achieve a breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh stalemate during the recent
years. The lack of an integrated, effective and coherent strategy has served
as an embarrassing reminder of the Minsk Group’s weakness to effect sig-
nificant change. Yet despite the present-day disappointment expressed by
many at the limited achievements of the international mediators, the Minsk
Group continues to play an important role in the resolution of the Na-
gorno-Karabakh conflict.

Consequently, the Madrid Principles remain the basis for negotiations.8 In

truth, the problem is not the principles but how to go about materializing
them. Given the firm control the two leaders have over decision-making
processes, nothing can start without that. But there is a big deficit of trust
between two presidents and both have also signalled that they do not want
to make any significant new concessions on the Basic Principles document.
However, the Madrid Principles can actually be revived if the topic of de-
militarization is considered. The very fact that both sides will want to begin
a discussion on demilitarization process can be interpreted as a revival of
Madrid Principles and can be called the Minsk Group’s new policy towards
the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Still, there is much work that can be done to improve effectiveness of the
Minsk Group, especially within the framework of an international coopera-
tion-oriented strategy. Hence, a concerted approach is needed in order for

8 For more on this issue, see Elkhan Nuriyev, ‘Re-engaging Armenia and Azerbaijan in
Reconciliation Process: Prospects and Incentives for Nagorno-Karabakh Breakthrough,’
in Ernst Felberbauer and Frederic Labarre (eds.) What Kind of Sovereignty? Examining Al-
ternative Governance Methods in the South Caucasus, Study Group Publication Series, National
Defense Academy, Vienna, Austria, 3/2014, 163-180.

129
the Minsk Group co-chairpersons to maintain and consolidate effective-
ness of their mediation. This suggests that the Minsk Group should in-
crease cooperation at multilateral level to stimulate new initiatives and pro-
vide platform for dialogue in local communities both nationally and inter-
nationally. In order to manage the peace process effectively, intermediaries
must develop new policies that are responsive to the stage and nature of
the conflict, the parties’ relationship, and the direction of change in external
conditions. For instance, a non-political Working Group at the expert level
should be established by the Minsk Group to develop demilitarization
measures in the relevant conflict zone. This Working Group could also
foster better understanding between the ruling authorities and civil society,
organize problem-solving conferences and dialogue groups, and help the
negotiating parties identify mutual interests.

Conclusion

So far, many in Baku and Yerevan do not foresee any major changes in the
conflict resolution process in the near future. Even though the Madrid
Principles have been discussed for more than five years, the positions of
the two parties on the central issue – the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh
itself – remain almost irreconcilable. This leaves us with the continuing
reality that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict will be ‘managed’ but is unlikely
to be resolved.

Nevertheless, sooner or later tension around Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

will end with certain de-escalation. It is not ruled out that de-escalation
process will occur fast especially if insiders and outsiders do their best to
create conditions for effective dialogue and cooperation. Besides, the
Minsk Group diplomats need to take a more proactive attitude and a bold-
er approach in the negotiated settlement. Without doubt, there is scope for
fresh ideas and initiatives. In other words, new creative formats should be
tried as long as they do not disturb and distract the negotiating framework
of the Minsk Group. It is believed that a crisis management initiative could
be involved in a future creative format where experts would discuss re-
gional security issues and present well thought-out recommendations to the
negotiating parties. More important, the Minsk Group co-chairpersons
would develop conflict de-escalation policies that rest on a new way of
thinking and a vision of the desired new relationship with the other side.

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In sum, work at the grass-roots level, which means working with and
through local non-governmental organizations, is essential for anyone in-
terested in conflict resolution. What the conflicting parties need today is
more mutual understanding, more flexibility and more creative thinking so
that the current impasse can be breached. That is why expert community of
the South Caucasus states should continue to support people-to-people
contacts and non-political dialogue at the bilateral level. This is exactly what
the South Caucasus Regional Stability Study Group of the Partnership for
Peace Consortium has done in recent years. And it is this alone that can
provide grounds for optimism in the long run.

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PART IV:

THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AS NEXUS OF

LARGE POWERS’ SECURITY DILEMMA

133
Arms Control as Panacea for Russia and the
South Caucasus

Marcel de Haas

Introduction

Is it the great powers’ relationships which shapes the South Caucasus secu-
rity environment, or do the disputes within the South Caucasus colour the
relationship of the great powers? This article will deal with this question by
focussing on Russia’s (possible) role in arms control in relation to the
South Caucasus. First, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty
will be discussed. Concerning the South Caucasus, the aspects of the so-
called ‘Flank Agreement’ – ceilings of Russian forces in the North Cauca-
sus – as well as the 1999 OSCE Istanbul commitments – withdrawal of
Russian forces from Moldova and Georgia – come especially to the fore.
Due to Russia’s suspension of the CFE Treaty in 2007, as well as due to
the increase of Russian forces on Georgia’s separatist regions after the Rus-
so-Georgian of 2008, The CFE is in a dead-lock. Hence, an alternative ap-
proach of arms control and of confidence and security building measures
(CSBMs) has to be sought, which will be described in the subsequent part
of this work. The Vienna Document (VD) offers a number of opportuni-
ties to that extent. Next, Russia’s policy and attitude towards the South
Caucasus is scrutinized. Finally, the lead question – is Russia affected by the
South Caucasus, or the other way around – will be answered.

CFE

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, often referred to as ‘the

cornerstone of European security’ was a far-reaching CSBM. The CFE
Treaty was a landmark arms control agreement that established parity in
major conventional forces/armaments between East and West. The treaty
was signed in 1990 between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, in order to lower
the threat of war. It put an end to the arms race, by installing mechanisms
to lower the levels of conventional arms on both sides. The treaty declared
specific weapon systems of ground and air forces as ‘Treaty Limited
Equipment’ (TLE), with detailed ceilings and information exchanges (La-

135
chowski 2009, 1). The area of observance of the CFE Treaty was limited
from the Atlantic-To-The-Urals, the so-called ‘ATTU zone.’ The Treaty
also provided for central zonal limits to prevent destabilizing force concen-
trations in Europe and for regional (‘flank’) limits. The original CFE Treaty
set equal limits for East and West in the ATTU on key conventional arms
essential for conducting surprise attacks or initiating large-scale offensive
operations. The TLE weapon systems comprised: battle tanks; armoured
combat vehicles; artillery pieces; combat aircraft, and attack helicopters.
However, in summer 1991 the Warsaw Pact collapsed and half a year later
the Soviet Union was annulled.

Hence, one of the two military blocks as well as the other superpower were
no more. In the following years the geostrategic consequences of these
developments became visible when former Warsaw Pact member states,
starting with Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic (1999), as well as for-
mer Soviet republics – the Baltic States (2004) – joined NATO. A number
of other states followed suit in subsequent years. Although the CFE Treaty
no longer served as a CSBM between two military alliances, it continued to
serve that purpose between NATO and Russia.

Flank Agreement 1996

The flank zone was designed to prevent equipment being transferred from
Central Europe to the flank areas in the outermost areas of the treaty appli-
cation zone, and thus forming a threat. Previously a rear area, due to the
conflicts around Chechnya (1994-1996 and 1999-today), the southern
(North Caucasian) flank had developed into Russia’s forward line of de-
fence. Russia demanded adaption of the limitations since they were no
longer suitable for Russia’s security. On 31 May 1996, the CFE Treaty was
amended by the so-called ‘Flank Agreement’, which lowered the restric-
tions for Russia in the flank region as defined in the original treaty of 19
November 1990 in Article V, subparagraph 1(A) (Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe 1990):
within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes
(…) and that part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics comprising the (…)
Transcaucasus and North Caucasus Military Districts, each State Party shall limit
and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery…

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In the 1996 Flank Agreement this was revised as follows (Final Document
of the First Conference 1996): p. 6, Annex A, Article II, sub para 1):
Within the area described in Article V, subparagraph 1(A), of the Treaty, as under-
stood by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the time the Treaty was signed,
the Russian Federation shall limit its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, and
artillery so that, no later than 31 May 1999 and thereafter, the aggregate numbers
do not exceed….
With the Flank Agreement, the Russian area of the revised southern flank
zone was assigned new, higher limits, whilst Moscow agreed to freeze its
holdings of battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery at the lev-
els current at the time of the agreement until the new limits came into ef-
fect on 31 May 1999. In return Russia provided additional, more frequent
information on its part of the former flank area (Lachowski 2001, 247-248).
However, in the following years Russia remained in breach of its obliga-
tions under the Flank Agreement, although it did comply with the corre-
sponding provisions of the adapted CFE Treaty (Lachowski 2009, 3).

Istanbul Commitments 1999

Anticipating the 1999 Istanbul Summit of the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO had a number of concerns
regarding Russia’s attitude towards the CFE Treaty. Russian arms in the
flank region were in excess of the Flank Agreement limits. Furthermore,
NATO rejected Russia’s military presence in Georgia, as well as that in
Moldova, both lacking consent of the national authorities. During the
summit, NATO member states and Russia signed an adapted CFE Treaty
(Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty 1999). And in reply to
NATO’s demands, Russia agreed to withdraw from Moldova, reduce its
arms levels in Georgia, negotiate with Tbilisi on the presence of Russian
forces in that country, and reduce Russian forces in the flank region ac-
cording to the levels of the Adapted CFE Treaty. These agreements were
the ‘Istanbul commitments’, as laid down in 14 Annexes to the Final Act.
Moldova stated in the Final Act that:
…Constitutional provisions (…) control and prohibit any presence of foreign mili-
tary forces on the territory of Moldova. (Final Act of the CFE Treaty Conference
1999: 12).
Russia and Georgia agreed in the document i.a. that:

137
 …The Russian military bases at Gudauta and Vaziani will be disbanded and with-
drawn by 1 July 2001. (…) During the year 2000 the two Sides will complete nego-
tiations regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian
military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military facilities within
the territory of Georgia.’ (Final Act of the CFE Treaty Conference 1999: 13).
However, in the following years, Russia, while removing equipment and
ammunition from Moldova’s Transdniestria, did not fully withdraw from
that separatist region. Also concerning Georgia, Moscow partly withdrew
from the separatist regions of that state, but refused to clear its Gudauta
base located in Abkhazia.

Adapted CFE Treaty 1999

The changed geostrategic spectrum in Europe stimulated the CFE Parties

to draft a revised version of the original agreement. After the demise of the
Warsaw Pact and enlargement of NATO in the 1990s, the then 30 CFE
States party to the CFE Treaty signed the Adaptation Agreement at the
Istanbul Summit of the OSCE on 19 November 1999 (Agreement on Ad-
aptation of the CFE Treaty 1999). The original CFE Treaty established an
East-West group structure for limiting NATO and Warsaw Pact conven-
tional armaments. The Adapted CFE Treaty provided for a system of na-
tional and territorial ceilings (the former limited the number of armaments
each state was allowed to possess, while the latter limited the total number
of TLE’s present within a State Party’s borders).

The Adapted CFE Treaty also offered an accession mechanism for new
States Parties, as well as enhanced verification and transparency regimes.
Hence, the revised agreement was to facilitate NATO enlargement and to
reinforce the territorial sovereignty of individual States Parties (Lachowski
2009, 1-3). Although ratified by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus,
the ratification by NATO Allies of the Adapted CFE Treaty awaited Mos-
cow’s compliance with the adapted CFE flank provisions as well as with
fulfilment of the Istanbul Commitments regarding the withdrawal of Rus-
sian forces from Georgia and Moldova. The odd combination of arms con-
trol aspects, e.g. national and territorial ceilings, with political commit-
ments, e.g. the withdrawal of Russian troops, turned out to be the biggest
obstacle for the implementation of the revised treaty.

138
Russia’s CFE suspension and de-facto end of the treaty

Moscow provided a number of reasons for its suspension of the CFE

Treaty, which came into effect on 12 December 2007. Russia’s deferral was
related to the refusal of NATO members to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty
in reply to Moscow’s non-compliance with the ‘Istanbul commitments’, i.e.
the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. Moreover,
Russia demanded accession of the bordering new NATO (and former So-
viet republics) Baltic states to the Adapted CFE Treaty. The Kremlin also
disagreed with the CFE force ceilings aspects of the planned basing of US
military units in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as with NATO’s enlarge-
ments of 1999 and 2004 towards its borders, changing CFE holdings as-
pects. As compensation for NATO’s expansion, Moscow claimed abolition
of the flank limitations (President of Russia 2007; Mikhaylov, 2008). Fur-
thermore, Moscow’s suspension was probably also given in by the US plans
for a missile defence shield in Europe, deploying missiles in Poland and a
radar site in the Czech Republic. The August 2008 conflict between Russia
and Georgia further deteriorated the circumstances of the CFE Treaty.
Russia recognized the independence of the Georgian separatist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia and increased its troop contingents in these
regions considerably, i.e. with border troops and anti-aircraft defence sys-
tems. Hence, a withdrawal of (all) Russian forces from Georgian soil,
among them the Gudauta base, as described in the Istanbul Commitments,
became further out of reach than ever (Socor, 2008). In November 2011
the US Department of State announced that Washington would cease car-
rying out ‘certain obligations’ under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia.
NATO was soon to follow with a corresponding message. As such both
sides, Russia and NATO, have de-facto ended the workings of the CFE
Treaty (Rogozin, 2010; U.S. Suspends CFE Treaty Implementation 2011).

Vienna Document

Since the CFE Treaty has de-facto been declared dead by NATO as well as
Russia, an alternative has to be sought to encourage security in the South
Caucasus by way of arms control. The Vienna Document (VD), just like
the CFE Treaty dating back to 1990, might well be a suitable instrument.
The VD includes a number of measures designed to enhance the level of
transparency between states, such as the exchange of military information,

139
notice and monitoring of military activities, as well as verification visits and
inspections. The VD applies to all 57 OSCE states, i.e. more than the 30
NATO and former Warsaw Pact states of CFE. Unlike the CFE Treaty,
VD is politically, but not legally binding. However, the armed conflict be-
tween Russia and Georgia in August 2008 made clear that the conflict pre-
vention mechanisms of the VD had failed. A broadening of regional confi-
dence-building measures could lower the susceptibility to conflict also in
the South Caucasus. The VD instruments also comprise information ex-
change on defence planning, the modernisation of armed forces, military
doctrine and threat perceptions. Exchange of such data, together with veri-
fication inspections, are CSBMs which promote trust among the OSCE
partners (Bieri 2013: 3-4). The latest revised edition, VD 2011, increased
site visits, inspections and observations, emphasized risk reduction by con-
sultations, and provided constraining provisions limiting certain large-scale
military activities, thus promoting further consultations and cooperation
between participating states (Vienna Document 2011). As such, the
OSCE’s goals of disarmament and refraining from the threat or use of
force, also in the South Caucasus, were now better served.

Russia’s policy towards the South Caucasus

As of Putin’s second term in office, 2004-2008, especially due to the in-

creased energy revenues, Russia’s economy was booming, enabling the
Kremlin to take a more resilient stance in international politics. Russia’s
major security documents – the national security strategy, the military doc-
trine and the foreign policy concept – resemble this by stating that it is a
policy objective of the Kremlin to regain and strengthen its international
position. First of all, this is realized in Moscow’s so-called ‘near abroad’, the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia’s back yard, including
the South Caucasus (Security Concept of the Russian Federation 2009,
2010, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2013).

A ‘legal’ reason for Russia to use military force against Georgia (or Azerbai-
jan) is its claimed right to protect Russian citizens abroad (CIS), which is an
entry in every Russian security document. Russia’s invasion of Georgia of
2008 was justified by protecting South Ossetian citizens, which were issued
Russian passports (Haas 2010: 98-101, 147). The South Caucasus forms a
vital geo-strategic position between Asia and Europe and is in vicinity to

140
Russia’s unstable area of the North Caucasus. Russia intends to deny West-
ern leverage over the South Caucasus for geo-strategic reasons, due to the
importance of the energy resources and pipeline infrastructure present in
the area, of which the latter provides Russia with a power tool. This policy
is carried out by diplomatic, military and energy security means. Since the
1990s Russia has supported the separatist regions of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in Georgia and maintained troops in these areas. Russia developed
a strained relationship with Georgia, not only for its support of the separa-
tist republics, but also to counter Georgia’s wish to join NATO.

These conflicting matters have resulted in a Russian policy of political and

economic pressure on Georgia, and, conversely, of occasional confronta-
tional acts by Georgia, culminating in the armed conflict of August 2008.
Elsewhere in the South Caucasus, Russia maintains good ties with Armenia,
which is the only South Caucasian state that is a military ally of Russia.
Moscow has a military base in Armenia, and Yerevan is a member of the
Russian-led military alliance Collective Security Treaty Organization
(CSTO). The CSTO has a military assistance clause which Moscow explic-
itly mentions in its latest military doctrine:
…The Russian Federation regards an armed attack on a CSTO member state as
aggression against all CSTO member states and in that case will implement meas-
ures in accordance with the Collective Security Treaty (Security Concept of the
Russian Federation 2010, art. 21).
Therefore, should Azerbaijan decide to regain the Nagorno-Karabakh re-
gion and the adjacent Azeri districts, resulting in Armenian soldiers getting
killed, then Moscow could use this military assistance clause as a pretext for
Russian military action against Azerbaijan. The reason for Armenia’s (mili-
tary) relationship with Russia is pragmatic: in Russia it finds an ally against
its opponents Turkey and Azerbaijan. For Armenia Russia is guarantor of
its security, although at the same time it also maintains military ties with the
West, as a member of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. The oil-rich
Azerbaijan upholds good relations with the EU, USA and Turkey, but
though it favours the West, refrains from alienating itself from Russia
(Haas 2010, 138-139).

141
Assessment

Since both parties – NATO and Russia – have basically abandoned the
CFE Treaty, this ‘cornerstone of European security’ is not likely to return
as part of the European arms control system. Thus, Moscow will do what it
likes concerning the deployment of forces in its southern flank, the North
Caucasus, unhindered by CFE flank limitations. Likewise, it would be naive
to assume that the Russian armed forces will withdraw from the Georgian
separatist regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. This, in spite of the reiter-
ated calls from EU and NATO to do so. And also despite the ‘Instanbul
Commitments’, to which Moscow does not have to comply with after sus-
pending the CFE Treaty. Furthermore, the other South Caucasian ‘frozen
conflict’, the Azeri-Armenian contested Nagorno-Karabakh, is not in reach
of a political solution either. With its recent ‘farewell’ to the EU’s Eastern
Partnership and choice for Russia’s Eurasian Union, as well as given the
‘protection’ of the Russian/CSTO security umbrella, Armenia does not
have to fear for an armed solution by Azerbaijan (Socor, 2013).

Hence, the Kremlin has a solid position in the South Caucasus. Due to
Russia’s aforementioned stance of promoting its international stature by
way of ‘controlling’ the other former Soviet republics, Moscow will not
tolerate any significant changes in its current influence over the South Cau-
casus. However, this should not mean that nothing can be done to pro-
mote security and peace in the South Caucasus by way of arms control.

With the CFE Treaty out of order, the arms control system of the Vienna
Document (VD) offers a number of windows of opportunity to enhance
security in this region. Other than CFE, limited to the European ATTU
Zone, the Zone of Application of the VD includes the territory, surround-
ing sea areas, and air space of all European and Central Asian participating
States. Hence it has a more comprehensive application than the CFE
Treaty. Moreover, VD provides CSBMs, which can be applied in the South
Caucasus too. Information exchange on defence planning, on the moderni-
sation of armed forces, on military doctrine and on threat perceptions, can
boost trust between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Verification inspections, site
visits and observations can be useful too, also in the separatist Georgian
regions. Since tensions still exist on the borders of Georgia proper and
these regions, application of such CSBMs could prevent armed clashes.

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However, this fully depends on Russia’s cooperation, since the de facto
authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have so far denied access to the
territories under their control to the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM).
Other worthwhile instruments of VD are risk reduction by consultations
and limitation of certain large-scale military activities, hence conflict pre-
vention. Again, a successful application of these CSBMs around the Geor-
gian separatist regions hinges on Moscow’s endorsement. Armenia and
Azerbaijan could well be more supportive of such CSBMs, which strength-
en transparency and thus promote security.

As a final point, is it the great powers’ relationship which shapes the South
Caucasus security environment, or do the disputes within the South Cauca-
sus colour the relationship of the great powers? In my opinion the former
is applicable for this region: to a large extent the great powers dictate the
security circumstances of the South Caucasus. First of all, because on the
whole the relationship among the three South Caucasian states is not so
bad at all. Yes, of course the continued occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh
by Armenian/Karabakh troops forms a deep rift between Azerbaijan and
Armenia.

However, for reasons of their mutual interest in energy resources, Baku

maintains solid economic ties with Moscow. Furthermore, Baku is well
aware that Moscow will use military force in response to an Azeri invasion
of Nagorno-Karabakh. Hence, in this dispute Russia has a mitigating influ-
ence. Other than this dispute, in general Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan
have a good relationship. Azerbaijan has oil and gas pipelines which run
through Georgia towards the West. Moreover, Baku delivers energy re-
sources to Tbilisi, freeing Georgia of its energy dependence from Moscow.
And Georgia maintains good ties with both other South Caucasian states.

The geostrategic and economic importance of the South Caucasus of this

region makes it primarily ‘ruled’ by the great powers, i.e. Russia and the
West. As mentioned before, the South Caucasus, as part of the former So-
viet Union area, is seen in Moscow’s security documents as a region in
which Russia has the right to interfere, especially when it comes to protec-
tion of Russian citizens. Thus, the Kremlin has reasons to prolong the ‘fro-
zen conflicts’ of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh, which
serve as instruments for its political, economic and military clout. Con-

143
versely, the West, and the EU in particular, have interests too in the South
Caucasus. Although the USA uses Georgian an Azeri military bases as a
hub towards its military activities further East (Afghanistan), the bulk of
Western interests are not in the military but in the political and economic
realm. The energy resources of Azerbaijan (and of Turkmenistan, and pos-
sibly of other Central Asian states) are important to Europe, to diminish its
dependence on Russian energy resources. Furthermore, the EU has insti-
gated its Eastern Partnership of the three South Caucasian states, Belarus,
Ukraine and Moldova, to enhance a solid social-economic development of
those countries, and hence to promote security on its eastern borders.
Again, this Western policy contradicts Russia’s dogma of dominating state
of affairs in its ‘near abroad’.

Consequently, with the exception of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, the

interstate relations in the South Caucasus are quite well. The West should
realize that the Kremlin’s envisaged hegemony over the former Soviet re-
gion is a longstanding policy line which will last. Between these parameters
the West can promote security in the South Caucasus, also by way of arms
control, but only as far as Moscow allows. Nevertheless, although limited in
action, arms control and its CSBMs have proven to be respectable instru-
ments in promoting security. As such, implementing all possible aspects of
VD constitutes a beneficial approach for security in the South Caucasus.

References

Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in

Europe (1999) Istanbul, 19 November 1999. http://www.osce.org/
library/14108.
Bieri, M. & Nünlist C. (2013);The Future of Conventional Arms Control in
Europe, CSS-Analysis, No. 146, December.
Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conven-
tional Armed Forces in Europe (1999) Istanbul, 19 November 1999.
http://www.osce.org/library/14114.
Final Document of the First Conference to Review the Operation of the
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Concluding
Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength [‘Flank Agreement’]
(1996) Vienna, 15-31 May 1996. http://www.osce.org/library/14099.

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Haas, M. de (2010); Russia’s Foreign Security Policy in the 21st Century:
Putin, Medvedev and Beyond, London: Routledge.
Lachowski, Z. (2001); ‘Conventional arms control in Europe’, in I. An-
thony and A.D. Rotfeld (Eds.), A Future Arms Control Agenda: Pro-
ceedings of Nobel Symposium 118, 1999, SIPRI, Oxford University
Press, pp. 244-266.
Lachowski, Z. (2009); ‘The CFE Treaty one year after its suspension: a
forlorn treaty?’, SIPRI Policy Brief, January.
MFARF (2013); Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,
12 February. http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe
77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b1c38!Open
Document.
Mikhaylov, V. (2008) ‘God bez DOVSE’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Oboz-
reniye, 14 November.
President of Russia (2007); ‘Information on the decree ‘On Suspending the
Russian Federation’s Participation in the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe and Related International Agreements’‘, Mos-
cow, 14 July. http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2007/07/
137839.shtml.
Rogozin, D. (2010); ‘DOVSE: bol’she chem dogovor, ili k voprosu ob
oboyudnom doverii’, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 1 Octo-
ber.
SCRF (2009); National Security Strategy until 2020 (Strategiya natsional’noy
bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda), 12 May. in Russian:
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/99.html.
SCRF (2010); Military Doctrine of the RF (Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoy
Federatsii), 5 February. In Russian: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/
documents/33.html.
Socor, V. (2008); ‘CFE Treaty dead and buried in Georgia’, Eurasia Daily
Monitor, 22 October.
Socor, V. (2013); ‘Putin’s Visit Reinforces Military, Political Ties with Ar-
menia’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 10 December.
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ber 1990. http://www.osce.org/library/14087; http://www.state.gov/
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‘U.S. Suspends CFE Treaty Implementation’ (2011), Arms Control Today,
December.
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(2011) OSCE, Vienna, 30 November 2011. http://www.osce.org/
fsc/86597

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The Fate of the CFE Treaty: A Russian Perception

Sergei Denisentsev

As part of our contribution we have been asked to answer several ques-

tions that are, I would say, in different weight categories.

The first question is, can we really say that the conflicts in the South Caucasus
are a reflection of large powers’ security dilemmas or regional ambitions? This ques-
tion is largely philosophical.

In my view, all the conflicts in the South Caucasus have resulted from a
combination of local ambitions of the local elites, and the interests of
the big powers. Take, for example, the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. On
the one hand, it is a local ethnic conflict. That is how that conflict
emerged back in the early 20th century. Let us recall that the first armed
attempts to secede from the Georgian Democratic Republic took place
in South Ossetia almost a hundred years ago – I am talking about the
Georgian-Ossetian conflict of 1918-1920.

But on the other hand, the big powers always have some leverage to
push these conflicts towards either settlement or escalation, depending
on their own interests. For example, without the diplomatic, financial,
and military support of the United States, the Saakashvili regime proba-
bly would not have dared an attempt to seize South Ossetia by military
force in 2008. Meanwhile, South Ossetia itself would have ceased to
exist as a separate entity, and its population would have been ethnically
cleansed, were it not for the intervention of Russia and the Russian
armed forces.

The same is true of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. On the one

hand, it is a typical ethnic conflict, with a very long history. The origins
of that conflict can be traced back, if one is so inclined, back to the Ar-
menian-Persian conflict more than 2000 years ago. The Armenian-Azeri
war of 1918-1920, and the Karabakh conflict itself in 1987-1991 have a
very long history, as we all know. On the other hand, the fact that this

147
conflict is now in a frozen state can be explained by the fact that none
of the big powers wants an escalation, for the time being.

So let me reiterate the idea that all the conflicts in the South Caucasus
result from a combination of the interests and ambitions of the local
elites, and the interests of the big powers. I think this is quite obvious.
And it would be entirely pointless to try to determine who is using
whom in this situation – i.e. whether it’s the local elites playing on the
differences between the big powers, or the big powers using the local
elites. Any answer to that question is bound to be very partial and preju-
dicial.

The second question is more practical. What are the terms on which the big
powers could return to the CFE Treaty, at least on a regional level?

To answer that question, let us recall why the CFE Treaty was sus-
pended in the first place. In the Russian expert community, we usually
highlight seven distinct reasons why the CFE Treaty in its current form
had become disadvantageous to Russia, and why our country suspended
its participation in that Treaty. I will now list those reasons, and offer a
brief commentary as to how the problem could be addressed.

First; the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was signed on Novem-

ber 19, 1990 in Paris, and entered into force on 9 November 1992. The
purpose of the Treaty was to achieve a balance between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. After the Warsaw Pact broke up and several Eastern Eu-
ropean nations became NATO members, the CFE Treaty lost its main
reason for being. What is more, the accession of Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia to NATO led to an
increase in NATO’s maximum weapons holdings allowed by the CFE
Treaty.

In other words, the overall balance of forces had shifted in NATO’s

favour. The solution seems simple: we just needed to agree on the new
quotas that would reflect the new realities. But in practice, any negotia-
tions on new quotas would take a very long time because taking into
account the ambitions and the national security interests of every par-
ticipating country would be a monumental task.

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Second; in an effort to change this situation, on 19 November 1999 the
CFE member states signed the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE
Treaty. The agreement, which was signed in Istanbul, transformed the
system of arms ceilings for individual zones and blocs into a new system
of national and territorial ceilings. But then NATO members started to
drag their feet on the ratification of the new agreement.

Another problem is that NATO now has too many individual member
states, and the United States, the leader of the Alliance, is either unable
or unwilling – it is hard to say from Russia – to persuade or to force all
the NATO members to ratify and accept the new terms of the Treaty.

Third; at present some NATO members are not taking part in the im-
plementation of the CFE Treaty, thereby forming a so-called ‘grey zone’
(I am talking about Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia).

Let us recall the joke President Putin made when he explained the rea-
sons for the Russian moratorium on compliance with the CFE Treaty.
He, said, and I quote, ‘as for the Baltic States, all of them, according to
the old version of the treaty, constitute the Baltic Military District of the
Soviet Union’s Armed Forces. Shall I perhaps appoint a commander to
that district?’

Fourth; the CFE Treaty’s flank restrictions limit Russia’s right to deploy
and to freely move its own armed forces within its national territory. In
the current circumstances, that simply does not make sense.

The fact that during the conflict in Chechnya, i.e. an internal Russian
conflict, Russia’s freedom of manoeuvre was restricted by the terms of
the CFE Treaty caused a lot of irritation within the Russian general staff.
It is quite clear that the terms of the treaty in its current form are dam-
aging to Russian national security and the Russian ability to deal with
internal threats, such as Islamist terrorism and separatism. It is hard to
imagine, for example, the United States accepting any restrictions on the
freedom of manoeuvre of its own armed forces on the US mainland.

Fifth; the situation with the CFE verification arrangements is also disad-
vantageous for Russia. After the break-up of the Warsaw Pact, NATO’s

149
inspection activities under the CFE Treaty were aimed mainly at moni-
toring as closely as possible the Russian Armed Forces and the most
combat-ready units of the CIS states.

In addition, the intensity of the CFE inspection regime, with 30 to 40

inspection visits every year, is clearly excessive. It represents a significant
burden for the Russian army, which is forced to perform tasks that lie
outside its core remit, spend money that could be put to better uses, and
distract personnel from combat training and day-to-day work.

Sixth, even the adapted version of the CFE Treaty has already become
obsolete. It still includes flank restrictions, but lacks any restrictions on
naval forces, including carrier-based aircraft. Meanwhile, the experience
of recent armed conflicts shows that naval forces often play a decisive
role in ensuring the success of a military operation.

It is no secret that the CFE Treaty covers only ground forces, and does
not contain any restrictions on naval forces.

Finally, the CFE Treaty in its current form fails to take into account the
latest advances in military technology. It covers only five traditional
weapons categories: tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat
airplanes, and attack helicopters.

The treaty does not contain any restrictions on modern high-precision

weaponry, including cruise missiles and guided air bombs. It does not
take into account the capability of regional missile defence systems,
which can have profound effects on the balance of forces. It does not
take into account unmanned aircraft, which are one of the most rapidly
developing types of military hardware, and which often provide troops
in the field with entirely new kinds of capability.

The numbers of traditional weapons systems no longer guarantee a mili-

tary balance of forces. High-precision offensive systems, as well as re-
connaissance, command and control, and IT systems play a decisive role
in modern warfare. Also, the numbers of such systems alone do not
paint the whole picture, so any new agreement must also reflect such
parameters as the technical level of various defence systems, the genera-

150
tion of these systems, and their current state of technical readiness.

Any genuine attempt to take all these issues into account in a new treaty
would require huge amounts of work by experts and working groups,
which will take a very long time. Even if some kind of agreement can be
reached, some of the participants are bound to be left unhappy with the
terms, so securing all the necessary signatures and ratifications will be an
endless process.

We have now approached the key issue. Discussing any new treaty will
be impossible without establishing trust between the parties involved.
We are discussing problems in the South Caucasus, but our attention is
fixed on events in Ukraine. A large part of the Russian political leader-
ship, including President Putin, firmly believes that the Maidan, the
ousting of President Yanukovych, and the coming of Ukrainian nation-
alists to power were part of a US plan to destabilize the situation in
Ukraine and to turn Ukraine into a zone of long-term conflict on the
border between Russia and the EU.

Such an opinion can be questioned, but it certainly has the right to exist.
A destabilization in Ukraine is not in the interests of either the EU or
Russia – but it could well bring some benefits to the United States. In-
stability in Ukraine inflicts direct economic damage on Europe, which is
one of the main competitors of the United States on the global eco-
nomic arena. That instability will cause an outflow of investment from
Europe to the United States, and have other long-term consequences.

If the EU joins sanctions against Russia, such a move will cause serious
damage to European and Russian economies and their bilateral trade.
Meanwhile, the losses of the United States will be insignificant because
there is not much trade going on between the United States and Russia.
The US armed forces will have an additional justification for their con-
tinued presence in Europe. Clearly, such an understanding of Washing-
ton’s motives in Ukraine among the Russian leadership is a result of the
existing climate of mistrust.

The formation of that climate began a long time ago, probably when
NATO launched a military operation against Yugoslavia in 1999. Other

151
major contributing factors included NATO’s eastward enlargement,
with former Warsaw Pact states, and especially some former Soviet re-
publics, becoming members. A significant role has also been played by
Western support for anti-Russian nationalist forces and politicians in
Georgia, the Baltic States, and Ukraine.

The mistrust has reached such proportions that discussing any new dis-
armament treaties in the current circumstances would be pointless. The
discussion will drown in endless debates, attempts to discern some trick
in every single article of a new treaty, suspicions of deceit, accusations
that the other party is trying to gain some dishonest advantage, etc.

What can change this climate? In my view, change can be achieved only
through radical steps. At the very least, it will require a real, not declara-
tive Reset in the relations between Russia and the United States. But the
conditions for such a Reset can only emerge after the next US presiden-
tial elections in 2016 – and only if the political crisis in Ukraine does not
degenerate into a full-blown civil war.

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The Shape of the Great Powers’ Relations in the South
Caucasus: A View from Ankara

Burcu Gültekin Punsmann

Is it the great powers’ relationship which shapes the South Caucasus secu-
rity environment or whether is it the disputes within the South Caucasus
which colour the relationship of great powers?

In the 90s the continuation of the Cold War rhetoric negatively impacted
efforts aiming at stabilizing the region. Turkey became the new front line
state within NATO.

A new Cold War with Moscow would likely take the form of friction on
Russia’s Southern periphery rather than a more direct confrontation in Eu-
rope. Ankara is concerned that it could be left to face such ‘flank risks’
alone. One of the main reasons for Turkey’s initial lack of enthusiasm for
NATO enlargement was Ankara’s fear that this would provoke Moscow to
try to expand its military presence in the Caucasus.1 The New Strategic
Concept of NATO in the 90s is based on a shift from territorial defence to
a broader range of threats and acknowledges an interest in prospecting
stability around NATO’s periphery. A special emphasis is put on the Cau-
casus region. The security challenges are perceived as being harder, more
direct and more likely to involve the use of force in the eastern Mediterra-
nean, especially on Turkey’s borders.

The East-West energy corridor projects anchored a regional security sys-

tem, which aggravated regional tensions by further promoting a bipolar
regional order. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline became the linch-
pin whose fate would decide of Turkey’s ability to achieve its broader ob-
jectives in the Caucasus-Caspian region. The rationale behind this security
system is based on the assumption that the success of Turkey’s policy in
the Caucasus depends to a large degree on a continuation of the westward
leaning policies of Azerbaijan and Georgia. Henceforth Georgia’s inde-

1 Stephen J. Blank, The US: Washington’s New Frontier in the Transcaspian.

153
pendence ought to be crucial from the Turkish point of view. Such an
eventuality could disrupt or entirely cut off the East-West energy transit
corridor. In this perspective, the emergence of strong, stable and independ-
ent western, oriented countries along Russia’s southern borders would dis-
courage a revival of Russian neo-imperialism.

The energy issue had therefore given the old historical confrontation be-
tween Turkey and Russia a sharper geopolitical and economic focus. The
Black Sea-Caucasus region had historically suffered from being a grey area
of confrontation in the managed rivalry between Turkey and Russia. Tur-
key’s Caucasian border was part of the Iron Curtain during the Cold War
and has become NATO’s South Eastern border after the end of the bipolar
system. Before becoming the frontier between the republic of Turkey and
USSR in 1921, Transcaucasia had been the contact zone between the Ot-
toman and the Russian empires. This contact was all the more violent be-
cause the two empires had fought more than traded over decades.

The decade that follows provide Turkey and Russia to overcome the legacy
of the Cold War and to emancipate from the logic of a bipolar confronta-
tion.

Turkey and Russia have recently developed a many-faceted partnership in

which businessmen and tourists became the main actors. Economic ties
driven by a close partnership in the field of energy have been increasing
interdependence and interactions between the two countries, thus eliminat-
ing progressively the remaining traces of historical enmity. Turks and Rus-
sians have never had such amicable contacts, never intermingled and coop-
erated so closely. The establishment of a visa free regime in spring 2010 is a
good indicator of the degree of improvement of relations.

In the aftermath of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 a good political under-

standing on regional issues, if not a similarity of views, drove Turkey and
Russia even closer. Both countries clearly opposed to US attempts in 2004
to introduce NATO forces in the Black Sea. This warming in the relations
has not yet succeeded in establishing trust between the political elites of
Turkey and Russia, however.

154
This on-going Turkish-Russian rapprochement hasn’t affected positively
the Caucasus region; the shared neighbourhood where Turkish and Russian
policies operate seem at first sight to be competing. Although neither Tur-
key nor Russia have any vital interest in South Caucasus, they are not given
the option to forget about the region. Turkey and Russia have the upper-
most stake in the stability of the South Caucasus. Ensuring the sustainable
stability of the Caucasus region is the only relevant strategic concern for
these two neighbouring States.

Since the disappearance of the Turkish-Soviet border, Turkey and Russia

have opted for a direct linkage across Black Sea starting with the energy
field. The construction of Blue Stream One, the major energy projects of
the 90s-connecting Russia to Turkey beneath the Black Sea, has been how-
ever a missed opportunity for the Caucasus. A gas pipeline running
through the Caucasus between Russia and Turkey was very seriously con-
sidered. The option of a Caucasian route was ruled out in light of the po-
litical instability of the region. Politically, the easiest option has been to opt
for the technically and financially most challenging option which would
have avoided unreliable intermediaries. The region might have looked
completely different, had Russia and Turkey be connected by a gas pipeline
crossing through the Caucasus.

Russia and Turkey are being linked across the Black Sea, whereas the Cau-
casus has become a barrier between them. The situation arisen from the
conflicts of the South Caucasus is indeed less than optimal from Turkish
and Russian perspectives. The communication links through the Caucasus
have been severed. A major part of the infrastructure connecting the Cau-
casus to Eastern Anatolia and Turkish Black Sea region – a valuable legacy
from the Russian empire – is not operational. Kars lost its traditional func-
tion as key to South Caucasus. Sochi cannot be Russia’s Southern gate and
access to Vladikavkaz is dependent on the Upper Lars crossing at Kazbegi.

How Turkey is part of the regional security equation

The issue of the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has a re-

gional dimension and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is affecting Turkish-
Armenian relations. The processes of the normalization of Turkish-
Armenian relations and that of the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh

155
conflict remain distinct. However are increasingly intermingling. On the
official level there is a clear understanding in Turkey that Azerbaijan is part
of the Turkish-Armenian equation. The Azerbaijani factor has obstructed
the last normalization attempt of the bilateral Turkish-Armenian relations.
Azerbaijan is a stakeholder in Turkish-Armenian relations and Turkey, be-
cause of its inability to proceed further with its bilateral agenda with Arme-
nia, has become a stakeholder in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.

From an Armenian perspective, there is clearly a Turkish dimension in the

Nagorno-Karabakh issue. On the governmental level, the security concern
that has arisen from the ambiguity associated with relations with Turkey
pushed Armenia to a more intractable position at the negotiation table.
Armenia is taken in a stranglehold between a ceasefire line with Azerbaijan
and a sealed border with Turkey. The state of relations with Azerbaijan is
clear enough: the two states are still at war, the decade-old ceasefire agree-
ment is regulating their relations. However, it is difficult to get a clear un-
derstanding of the prevailing situation with Turkey. Uncertainties in its
relations with Turkey increase the widespread feeling of a lack of security in
Armenia. On another level, the perspective of the normalization of Turk-
ish-Armenian intergovernmental relations has become a matter of concern
for Azerbaijan. The conviction that the opening of the border without a
breakthrough in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would
be harmful to Azerbaijan is deep-rooted.

Furthermore, the genocide and the Nagorno-Karabakh issues have inter-

twined dimensions. The effects of the historical dispute between Turks and
Armenians are being felt in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Interestingly,
the Armenian language makes no difference between Turks and Azeris.
‘Turk’ is a generic word used for both. A confidence-building initiative
investigating the deep roots of the mistrust between Turks/Azeris and Ar-
menians will require indeed a trilateral format. Azeris have a clear stake in
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation. Unless such a step is taken, the convo-
luted context of the South Caucasus will continue to drive great powers
further apart, and make lasting solutions ever more remote.

156
PART V:

EPILOGUE AND
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

157
Epilogue

Frederic Labarre

What can be said after such an eclectic set of presentations and articles?
There is an element of success in the very variety of the contributions. For
this means that certain contributors were more at ease with the topic than
others. This also means that those who were less comfortable nevertheless
made the effort to meet the expectations of the programme. There were
two central messages to the 9th RSSC SG which the organizing team want-
ed to illustrate and convey.

First; arms racing is detrimental to security, but not in the security dilemma
perspective only. It is dangerous for national security because arms racing
diverges important national revenue to non-value producing expenses. In-
deed, the more military capital expenditures are pursued, the greater the
risk that the penury in other government expenditures will lead to domestic
unrest. In an atmosphere of uncertainty, austerity and prevalent risk, the
smallest event, whether it be natural or man-made, can have far-reaching
impacts down the line. For example, the occurrence of an earthquake in
Armenia can stress national finances and the government’s ability to deliver
much-needed services to the breaking point. The same could be said of a
major oil-spill in Azerbaijan that would affect the tourism industry. There is
evidence that Georgia has learned from past errors of this sort and re-
balancing its government expenditures to better address civic and social
needs. Indeed, Georgia looks more and more like a ‘normal’ country (not-
withstanding its disputes over breakaway regions) ever since the election
cycle of 2012 and 2013.

The second message is that demonstrating a will to control armaments and

to disarm if necessary is a useful way to come to terms with the issue of the
non-use of force in a non-confrontational way. The non-use of force had
always been reflected in past RSSC SG workshops as a pre-requisite to
open dialogue between the parties – whether between the breakaway re-
gions and Georgia or between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh. In a way, the 9th RSSC SG was a logical continuation of previous

159
workshops, but its focus on the non-use of force turned out to be more
‘courageous’ than first thought. The organizers had to devise an indirect
approach to this topic, and it was thought that disarmament, as a concept
which seeks to deny actors the availability of the means of coercion, was a
good starting point.

We remain convinced that it was. The Study Group workshop did not meet
all its expectations, but it exceeded in many other areas. Notably, in its abil-
ity to create a favourable environment for discussion between the EUMM
representative and the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides. It also allowed for
the frank expression of views – if unofficial – from a NATO representative
as to the future of NATO’s partnerships and prospects for enlargement.
That perspective is important in the context in which Russia thinks that the
current balance of power and strategic environment means that the CFE
Treaty is null and void; if NATO is willing to open discussions about the
quality of its future integration of other ‘members’ then perhaps conces-
sions from Russia on the resumption of transparency and confidence-
building measures in the realm of disarmament and arms control can be
entertained. This speaks to the usefulness of the Study Group as a forum.

It remains plain to see that many find it difficult to address even the broad-
est security topics. We are still looking for ways to make the study of the
South Caucasus appealing to non-experts, and to convince the regional
stakeholders that the future of the region depends on the mutuality of solu-
tions. The temptation to ‘elevate’ the Study Group workshops to quasi-
policy workshop is still prevalent; in our haste to make a difference, we (the
organizers) are prompted to convey these messages more directly to the
intended audience. We are forced to recognize that the ponderous, indirect
approach is still the best. For one, it helps us to refine our message, and
second, it helps in conditioning, over time, the audience (the workshop
participants) to what we want to discuss.

Meanwhile, the pool of regional experts available to the RSSC SG contin-

ues to grow, and as we cultivate our new members, there will come a time,
perhaps soon, when we will be able to entertain a discussion about what to
discuss, and then on how to more effectively convey our policy recommen-
dations for implementation in the South Caucasus capitals. We will have to
rely on the strengthening of the OSCE and Geneva context for talks to

160
support this initiative for some time in the future. How we more adequately
transmit South Caucasus preferences to the decision-makers remains to be
explored.

During the workshop, the question of the crisis in Ukraine and its impact
on Euro-Atlantic security – which inevitably encompasses South Caucasus
security – could not be avoided. The crisis has one beneficial outcome; it
reminds all concerned in the Study Group (and elsewhere as well, obvi-
ously) of how a frozen conflict is manufactured. The similarities between
the Crimean takeover and the situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia as it
evolved after the August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia are the
clearest example of this. But the similarity could also be extended to the
situation in Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, in particular, could rightfully
fear that a referendum on the breakaway region’s political status could echo
that which separated Crimea from Ukraine and re-attached it to Russia.
The major powers’ position on Crimea is without question opposed to
enforced annexation or separation, but this policy is not backed up by any
credible means to overturn the fait accompli. Azerbaijan’s prerogatives are
much wider than any concert of nations; it could be tempted to wrest Na-
gorno-Karabakh from Armenian possession violently in an effort to miti-
gate the eventuality of a referendum on re-attachment to Armenia.

As we write these lines, the ramifications of the crisis in Ukraine have

spilled over directly into the South Caucasus, in the form of a political coup
in Abkhazia, which has led to the overthrow and flight of President Ank-
vab. At time of writing, Abkhazia was busy preparing new elections to be
held 24 August, so it is difficult here to expand on a rapidly evolving situa-
tion. In South Ossetia, political stagnation at the level of Tskhinval also
remained on the agenda. So the second Ukrainian revolution is creating
exactly what Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov feared, when he spoke in
Paris on March 5th 2014; precedents. It is unclear, at this stage, whether the
events in the Georgian breakaway regions are to the advantage of Russia or
Georgia, or neither. The point is that the method of conflict resolution in
the post-Soviet sphere, whether openly violent or structurally violent
(through threats or intense coercive pressure) is still in operation. There
seems no way to extract the region from the mode of thought, and indeed,
as Ukraine shows, those methods are being applied to a region that was
openly pro-European.

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Evidently, this complicates future attempts at conflict resolution in the
South Caucasus, regardless of which conflict we speak of, because the gen-
eral impression (although some expert opinion could argue otherwise) is
that the number one actor in the region – Russia – is now clearly articulat-
ing a policy of roll-back against imperial disintegration. This means that not
only in the Ukraine, but in the South Caucasus as well, Russian intentions
have to be seen in a different light, notwithstanding Russia’s high degree of
activity at the Minsk Group and in the Geneva Process. In short, more
than ever before, there is the feeling, if not evidence that Russia holds the
key to the resolution of the conflicts in the South Caucasus. However, as
we have seen in Abkhazia, the tenuous control over what Russia calls the
‘near-abroad’ can have very unfavourable outcomes for the Kremlin.

If Moscow is concerned about ‘dangerous and contagious precedents’ (to

take Mr. Lavrov’s words), provided by the Maidan in Kiew, then how can
we – indeed, how can the Abkhaz and the Georgians – expect that the situ-
ation in Abkhazia will remain peaceful? How can the Kremlin be sure that
this revolution too will not breed its examples in Moscow, or Saint-
Petersburg? That is the chief fear of the Putin regime. At a moment when
sanctions are starting to hurt the ruling elite in Russia, the country – includ-
ing the South Caucasus – is moving apace towards a fateful anniversary
year; that of the 1917 Russian Revolution.

Such anniversaries have powerful and evocative symbolism attached to

them. Twenty five years ago, when the Berlin Wall began opening up and
then collapsing, the world was celebrating the bi-centennial of the French
Revolution. 2017 could trigger a similar spark in Russia, and demands for
greater social fairness would inevitably be answered violently, if the past is
any indication of the future. But more to the point, the Kremlin could be
tempted to alleviate social pressures by reactivating the tensions in the near
abroad, and undo the patient and incomplete work of the last two decades
in the South Caucasus. It will also bring greater challenges to the Regional
Stability in the South Caucasus Study Group.

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Policy Recommendations

Study Group Regional Stability in the South Caucasus1

Current Events in the South Caucasus

More than a year after Georgia’s presidential elections and 6 months after
the latest parliamentary elections, relations between Tbilisi and the break-
away regions remain strained. The Sochi 2014 Olympic Games, boycotted
by Georgia, are testimony to this, as well as is a relative hardening of the
rhetoric with regards to the re-integration of those regions within Georgian
territory, as well as the threat of use of the Olympic Games by Russia to
make further territorial gains at the expense of Georgia. While there ha-
ven’t been a resumption of large scale violence in Georgia since the 2008
war, the level of harmony between communities has not increased either.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain dependent on Russia for their security,
and while South Ossetia readily agrees to be supported by Moscow, the
presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia is grounds for disquiet in Sukhum.
Currently, Russian troops make themselves scarce in the breakaway region,
but puzzling developments continue both in Abkhazia and in South Os-
setia. In both cases, a line of separation of increasing solidity has begun to
appear in the last several months, with earthworks, razor-wire, monitoring
devices, miradors and fences effectively separating Abkhazia and South
Ossetia from Georgia proper. In Abkhazia, the Olympic Games and the
alleged threat from Islamist radicals seem to have given Russia a pretext to
move back its border some 12 kilometres into the territory of Abkha-
zia/Georgia. These developments cast a shadow on Abkhazia’s claim of
effective territorial sovereignty, let alone Georgia’s.

1 These Policy Recommendations reflect the findings of the 9th RSSC Workshop on
‘From Self-Defence to Regional Disarmament: Reducing Tensions and Stabilising the
South Caucasus’, convened by the PfP Consortium Study Group in Regional Stability in
the South Caucasus from 20-22 March 2014 in Istanbul, Turkey. They have been com-
piled by Frederic Labarre, RSSC co-chair, with input by David Matsaberidze, Peggy Ma-
son and Marcel de Haas. Valuable support came from Ernst M. Felberbauer and Edith
Stifter from the Austrian National Defence Academy.

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Relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan remain tense, and the conflict –
as well as the peace process – is frozen. There have been bilateral attempts
at resolution, at the initiative of both president Sargsyan and Aliyev in the
weeks leading to the 9th Regional Stability in the South Caucasus Study
Group. Precious little information has come out from these meetings. Had
there been anything of significance, the media would have relayed it, and it
is not impossible that the sides may be even farther apart since then. As a
matter of fact, on the contact line, very little has moved, and as late as
March 26, 2014, an Armenian serviceman had been killed after yet another
sniper incident.

To this we cannot fail to add that the crisis in Ukraine has cast a shadow on
the proceedings of the 9th RSSC SG. All sides of the conflicts of the South
Caucasus have readily grasped the significance of the Crimean referendum,
and the decision by Crimean and Russian authorities to effect the re-
attachment of that peninsula to Russia proper. There is no doubt that it is
in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that the significance of this event is more
keenly felt; Armenia, which had sent observers to monitor the Crimean
referendum, may be attracted by the idea to legitimize its claim over Na-
gorno-Karabakh, and the authorities of the Republic there would only be
too eager to consent to a Crimean scenario. This leaves few options for
Azerbaijan, and the fear now is that the pre-emption of that scenario can
only be done through force of arms.

Finally, one cannot exclude Turkey as a vital South Caucasus actor. Al-
though a giant in the region with important interests on the penultimate
year before the anniversary of the Armenian genocide, Turkey is facing
daunting challenges at home and in its immediate neighbourhood which
limits how she can positively influence events in the South Caucasus.

The developments in Ukraine and how the United States, NATO and the
EU have responded to Russia’s challenge have been of such rapidity that
our discussions on the non-use of force in the South Caucasus seemed
inapplicable, or even invalid. For the moment, therefore, South Caucasus
stability is better entombed in ice than as molten lava in the wake of the
Ukrainian events. We feel that when events such as Crimea threaten even
the most precarious stability, efforts should be redoubled within the Study
Group by facing the facts. In essence, the 9th RSSC SG was a calming exer-

164
cise and an effort at regional reassurance.

Individual Self-Defence and the State: Establishing Trust towards an

Effective Social Contract

This portion of the workshop was greatly helped by the expert involvement
of our keynote speakers. The intention of this panel was to unpack the
notion that regional groupings should lay down their weapons and return-
ing the responsibility of the populations to the State In particular, it was
clearly demonstrated that increases in defence spending had a direct impact
on the level of social and economic development of a country, and that, as
a matter of human security, a better balance meant a better social contract.

It was not suggested that the region should undertake a massive de-
armament program, merely that a better balance should be achieved. Since
this would mean in immediate terms that countries, would need to reduce
their share of defence spending (something Georgia has already done), the
realization of that balance could be an opportunity for a mutual demonstra-
tion of good will.

From the Georgian side, the notion of a ‘social contract’ extending to all
parts of its territory remains hampered not only by the continuing dispute
with breakaway regions, but also by the inability of the EU Monitoring
Mission (EUMM) to perform its work there.

The ‘social contract’ also has ramifications at the inter-State level as well. It
was clearly argued that countries in the region, not to mention breakaway
regions, had to find security in alliance with larger powers. In terms of what
NATO can offer to the region, it was stressed that a mutual transformation
had occurred during the years of the Afghan operation between NATO
and its partners. The rapidly evolving strategic situation regarding Ukraine
hampers NATO’s ability to enlarge on the premises of the Bucharest
Summit of 2008, which means that a renewed partnership needs to be de-
fined. One would expect, in particular, that a new mission be determined
for the Partnership for Peace, one that would positively secure the relation-
ship between NATO and its partners.

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Security in the Break-away Regions: How much of a Monopoly on
the Use of Force?

The presentations made by representatives of the breakaway regions were

unequivocal; for them, Russia remains the prime security guarantor, and the
presence of Russian troops either regulars or as a peacekeeping force, is
welcomed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As discussed above, the saving
grace of what the Georgians call ‘Russian occupation’ is that the human
security of Abkhaz and South Ossetian populations which Russian troops
provide allows the breakaway regions to avoid the costly diversion of fi-
nancial resources which so hampers social and economic development par-
ticularly in Armenia. It also remains that independence and sovereignty, as
concepts of international relations, are nullified by the presence of Russian
troops in the breakaway regions – not only for Georgia, but for the regions
themselves as well.

It is perhaps for this reason that Nagorno-Karabakh experts continue to

argue that the development of an effective self-defence force should not be
imposed from outside, but should be created from within. This way, the
balance that was alluded to in Panel 1 can achieved with a greater degree of
control while making the claim of sovereignty and independence real.

One of the more original contributions to this panel came during the inter-
active discussion. For demilitarization (a term encompassing arms control,
disarmament, as well as a functioning ‘social contract’) to happen from the
bottom up, three conditions had to be obtained; first, a working group at
expert/technical level had to be convened in a de-politicised atmosphere.
Second, the public needed to be prepared for the eventuality of demilitari-
zation (this was termed ‘psychological’ demilitarization, and three, military
procurement, force structures and defence expenditure had to be transpar-
ent and accountable.

Security Competition among the South Caucasus States: Racing to-

wards Disaster?

This panel gave way to a long discussion on the notion of intentionality. A

practical demonstration was given of how a country can decrease its de-
fence spending while also adapting to new regional conditions (especially

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after the August 2008 war). Apparently, a decrease in defence spending
must be accompanied by concrete political steps to offer the possibility of a
reduction of tensions, not to mention the guarantee that force will no long-
er be used to resolve disputes. This is what Georgia has done since the
presidential-parliamentary election cycle that took place in 2012 and 2013.

There was wide evidence from the presentation – influenced by the events
in Ukraine – that the wider region was suddenly ill at ease, that large pow-
ers were affecting the status quo, and that there was a risk that actors inter-
nal to the region could take advantage of the unrest to seek a military deci-
sion.

The new security environment created by the Ukraine crisis has not helped
matters between Armenia and Azerbaijan, or on the Line of Contact (LOC)
in Nagorno-Karabakh. There the sniper war continues on a front where
20000 soldiers are present. It was argued that a new format for talks be-
tween Armenia and Azerbaijan should be developed, without disengage-
ment from the Minsk Group process. In fact, a bolder approach on the
part of the Minsk Co-chairs was heartily recommended.

To stave off disaster in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it was argued that

de-militarization of some or all of the seven Azerbaijani districts now under
Armenian control should take place under the auspices of the Minsk
Group, and provide the de-escalation needed to undertake more meaning-
ful peace talks.

The South Caucasus as Nexus of Large Powers’ Security Dilemma

This panel offered a ‘realpolitik’ point of view of the security competition

between large powers beyond the region. It offered a backdrop to the idea
that the world was being perceived – once again – as a world divided by
different competing civilizations. By definition, this suggests that the coun-
tries of the South Caucasus find themselves at the fault line, and that a
‘choice’ must be made. Here again, Russia’s recent involvement in Ukraine
provided food for thought as to whether Azerbaijan could one day hope to
strike a deal on Nagorno-Karabakh owing to Armenia’s choice of engaging
with the Eurasian Union.

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Furthermore, it was argued that NATO membership would be the only
way to avoid nations being ‘torn’ by that choice, or other strategic and re-
source rich nations be ‘grabbed’ by Russia. On the other hand, a powerful
argument was made that this was not only a contest of nations or civiliza-
tions, but of personalities, and that these clashes had played out to the det-
riment of stability not only in the South Caucasus, but in other regions as
well.

There was widespread agreement that insofar as large powers were con-
cerned, arms control, disarmament and de-militarization methods based on
the Conventional Forces in Europe protocols were null and void. The CFE
had been signed before the collapse of the USSR, and therefore, the geopo-
litical changes that the collapse had created already hobbled the CFE re-
gime. Rather, it was argued that the Vienna Documents were a more prom-
ising avenue to generate confidence between competing powers. In fact,
the very principle of verification, especially in the form of the EU Monitor-
ing Mission (EUMM) which came forward in the wake of the 2008 Rus-
sian-Georgian war, has shown a dramatic increase in the level of security in
Georgia, especially along the de facto border between the breakaway re-
gions and Georgia proper over the last five years.

It was also argued that the EU should take a more proactive and coopera-
tive approach in seeking a viable solution to the conflicts in the South Cau-
casus, preferably in strategic cooperation with Russia and Turkey.

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List of Authors and Editors

ASATRYAN Diana, Yerevan

ARZUMANIAN Hrachya, Stepanakert

DENISENTSEV Sergei, CAST, Moscow

DE HAAS Marcel, Nazarbayaev Kazakh University, Astana

FELBERBAUER Ernst M., Austrian National Defence Academy, Vienna

LABARRE Frederic, PfP Consortium Operations Staff,

Garmisch-Partenkirchen

GÜLTEKIN PUNSMANN Burcu, Save the Children, Antakya

MASON Peggy, Rideau Institute, Ottawa

MATSABERIDZE David, Tbilisi State University, Tbilisi

MILANTE Gary, SIPRI, Stockholm

NURIYEV Elkhan, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Berlin

PATARAYA Astanda, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Sukhum

REISINGER Heidi, NATO Defense College, Rome

SANAKOEVA Zarina, Tskhinval

UDRISTE Bogdan Catalin, EUMM, Tbilisi

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