The Pacific Review

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Not our war. What ASEAN governments’

responses to the Ukraine war tell us
about Southeast Asia

Frederick Kliem

To cite this article: Frederick Kliem (21 Apr 2023): Not our war. What ASEAN
governments’ responses to the Ukraine war tell us about Southeast Asia, The
Pacific Review, DOI:
10.1080/09512748.2023.2202925
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2023.2202925

Published online: 21 Apr 2023.

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The Pacific Review
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2023.2202925

Not our war. What ASEAN governments’

responses to the Ukraine war tell us about
Southeast Asia
Frederick Kliem
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University
Centre for Multilateralism Studies, Singapore, Singapore

ABSTRACT
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been widely condemned by governments
of the ‘political West’. Most other states have been either neutral or even
Russia leaning in this war. Southeast Asia is no exception. There is a
sense in the West that the primary explanation for this reluctance to
unambiguously side against Russia is the relationship, perhaps even
dependency, that these states may have vis-à-vis Moscow; prima facie, a
logical presumption. This article finds that while there is some truth to this
claim, the relations between individual governments’ responses to the war
and their bilateral relationships with Moscow is too uneven to suffice as a
satisfactory explanation. Instead, one must look beyond materi
alistic, mono-causal explanations. To get the full picture, one must
appreciate Southeast Asia’s diplomatic tradition, their form of open and
inclusive region alism and the continued focus on domestic politics. This
research provides the first comprehensive empirical categorisation of
Southeast Asian responses to the Ukraine war and traces these to
ASEAN’s diplomatic culture.
KEYWORDS ASEAN; diplomacy; Russia-ASEAN relations; strategic studies; Ukraine war

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to gauge and explain the resistance by most
Southeast Asian states to condemn Russia for its invasion of Ukraine on
24 February 2022—despite international pressure to do so. Governments
of the ‘political West’, primarily the United States (US), the European
Union (EU), Great Britain, Japan and Australia strongly condemned the
invasion. US President Biden called it ‘naked aggression [in pursuit of ]
Putin’s desire for empire by any means necessary’ (The White House,
2022a), and Western governments implemented fierce sanctions against
Russia, seeking to isolate it internationally and inflict significant damage
to the Kremlin. Most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies are
supporting Ukraine

CONTACT Frederick Kliem Fredkliem@gmail.com

© 2023 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 F. KLIEM

financially, diplomatically and with military weapons and intelligence. In

Europe, the Ukraine war has ignited a complete overhaul of traditional
foreign and security policy, both on supranational- and national-level
(Kliem, 2022a), as governments outbid each other on who is ‘tougher’
on Russia.
However, two-thirds of the global population live in countries whose
governments have been either neutral or even Russia-leaning (EIU,
2022). Biden’s early attempt to characterise this war as ‘the great battle
[…] between democracy and autocracy’ (The White House, 2022b),
quickly turned out to be inaccurate, as democracies such as India and
Brazil also refused to side with Western efforts (Hirsh, 2022). The
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is no exception. Initial
responses by the ASEAN member states (AMS)—including two US
treaty allies (Thailand and Philippines)—were for the most part reserved,
even indifferent, and ASEAN’s institutional response remained muted.
This article analyses the response to Russia’s war against Ukraine by
individual AMS and ASEAN. At this stage, predictions that the war would
end with a swift Russian victory turned out to be false, and AMS have
found and settled into their respective position—and the West has
accepted that. As significant adjustments in any AMS are highly unlikely,
the article can at this stage present three major findings: first, views
among AMS diverge; second, the depth and quality of bilateral
relationships with Russia alone do not adequately explain the relative
restraint by the majority of AMS; and three, thus, additional explanatory
factors, namely ASEAN’s political tradition of neutrality and ASEAN
leaders’ preoccupation with domestic and regional affairs, complement
the picture and offer a more holistic explanation.
This research provides the first empirical analysis of Southeast Asian
responses to the war, and it produces quantifiable data to assess the
quality of AMS’ bilateral relationship with Moscow. Further, an inquiry into
the drivers of AMS’ responses adds to a deeper understanding of
ASEAN’s and AMS’ diplomatic culture in general. This both fills an
empirical gap of contemporary relevance and adds to the broad
literature on Southeast Asia’s international relations and approach to
extra-mural crises. With this, the below exercise concurrently serves as
an exemplary case study for Southeast Asian diplomacy and agency,
thereby allowing us to draw gen eral conclusions beyond the singularity
of the Ukraine war. These insights may contribute to an appreciation of
ASEAN’s political culture as a driver of AMS behaviour beyond
seemingly obvious mono-causal materialistic explanations, such as
volume of arms trade.

Analytical approach
The hypothesis going into this research was that the response of
individual AMS to Russia’s invasion was contingent on the individual
government’s relationship with Moscow, i.e. the deeper the political
relationship with and/ or materialistic dependency on Russia, the more
restrained the reaction. The
The Pacific Review 3

independent variable is, thus, the quality of the bilateral relationship, the
dependent variable the respective response. In a first qualitative
analytical step, individual AMS’ official public responses were classified
in a taxonomy with four distinct categories along a response spectrum:
explicit condemners; cautious hedgers; impassive bystanders; and full
supporters. In a second step, this taxonomy was benchmarked against
the independent variable of the primary hypothesis, i.e. the respective
bilateral relationship, deep or superficial, assessed with the help of four
key indicators: diplomatic relations; defence relations; arms
procurement; and overall economic relations.

• existing intergovernmental commissions;

• high-level diplomatic visits;
• formal bilateral partnership agreements;
• other noteworthy diplomatic arrangements.
Diplomatic Relations Myanmar]
• [Extra point for
Defence Relations • joint bilateral military exercises;
• high-level meetings of defence officials;
• military education exchanges;
• military agreements;
• and port calls.
Arms Procurement • Percentage of overall procurement. Economic
Relations • Percentage of overall trade;
• other economic linkages.
 Arms procurement and trade are measured in percentage of the AMS’
overall volume. More difficult to quantify are defence and diplomatic
relations, which is done here with the help of a scoring system. Each
indicator in each category scores one point if cooperation in this indicator
exists; zero points if there is no cooperation. Thus, the highest score,
denoting the closest relationship, that can be achieved for defence diplo
macy is five points and four points for diplomatic relationships. In the
case of Myanmar, an extra point for diplomatic relations was awarded
because of Russia’s immediate treatment of the military junta as
Myanmar’s legitimate government after the February 2021 military coup.
Analytical matrixes visualise the degree of correlation between the bilat
eral relationship and the AMS’s position in the taxonomy. The Y-axis
denotes the quality of the relationship, the X-axis the AMS’s response
category.
The following analysis will show that the quality of the bilateral rela
tionship alone cannot satisfactorily explain state behaviour. While there is
some overlap—most obviously in arms procurement—the causality is not
consistent and, thus, insufficient to adequately explain the broad range
of responses and AMS’ overall restraint. Overall, bilateral relations are
better understood as an intervening, not independent variable. Two
additional, equally important intervening variables are being explored: a
normative explanation, namely Southeast Asia’s tradition of impartiality;
and a prac
tical, namely a prioritisation of domestic (and regional) over foreign policy
issues among most AMS. An appreciation of ASEAN’s political tradition
is imperative to a holistic understanding of the international relations of
Southeast Asia.
4 F. KLIEM

National responses
The qualifying markers of each category of national responses are exclu
sively based on the robustness and candour of official governmental
reactions to the war. These include both rhetoric and action. Not all qual
ifying indicators are equally matched in all cases and assignment to one
or another category is not binary, but approximate.

1 Explicit Condemners Singapore • Condemning act, identified as war and unprovoked

invasion of a sovereign state
• Naming Russia as the aggressor and Ukraine
as the victim
• Strong action: Imposition of sanctions, no
bilateral visits/meetings
2 Cautious Hedgers Moved up• Priority: balancing between invasion • Not identifying
from Russia and the West • aggressor or victim • Some
Impassive Bystanders: Measured condemnation of moderate diplomatic action •
Vietnam Indonesia Cambodia war Bilateral meetings may still
Philippines • Not terming it unlawful or take place
3 Impassive Bystanders Brunei Laos • Priority: Not getting involved in any way •
Malaysia May refer to it as Russia-Ukraine war or
Thailand conflict in neutral terms but not speak of
invasion • Not identifying aggressor or victim • • No diplomatic action, bilateral meetings still
No condemnation, merely expressions of take place
concern
4 Full Supporters Myanmar • Stating full support for the invasion • Russia seen as
defending legitimate security
interests
• West identified as the original aggressor

1. Explicit Condemners

This category is as clear as it is sparsely populated. Condemners are

expected to react similarly to Western countries in terms of both
language and action. Governments in this category condemn the
Russian invasion and clearly identify it as such. They would voice moral
and offer diplomatic support for Ukraine and strongly denounce the
violation of international law, such as Article 2 of the United Nations (UN)
Charta. Strong action in the form of sanctions is expected, while bilateral
meetings with Russian elites are unlikely.
Singapore has reacted strongest of all AMS. Singapore’s government
repeatedly condemned Russian aggression against Ukraine, called it
both an illegal war and an unprovoked attack and military invasion
numerous times and in various settings, including international fora
which other AMS states attended. Furthermore, for the first time in over
four decades, Singapore imposed unilateral sanctions on another
country (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Singapore, 2022a). Prime Minister
Lee Hsien Loong reasoned that ‘[Russia’s invasion] endangers the
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries,
especially small ones’ (Prime Minister’s
The Pacific Review 5

Office Singapore, 2022a), such as the city-state Singapore. The prime

min ister and various cabinet ministers have repeated this position
numerous times in various settings (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Singapore, 2022b), including at the Group of Twenty (G-20) Summit,
hosted by Indonesia in Bali (Prime Minister’s Office Singapore, 2022b).
In practical consequence, Singapore has banned export of all goods
that could potentially aid Russia’s capacity to wage war against Ukraine
and implemented financial sanctions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Singapore, 2022c). It should be noted, however, that Singapore has
made it abun
dantly clear that they are decidedly not aligning with the West against
Russia but taking a stance solely based on international law. Neither is
Russia is seen as an enemy, nor the West as virtuous. The very senior
Minister for Law and Home Affairs, K. Shanmugam, also blamed the
West for the war and criticised all big powers, US and Russia, for
violating international law and interpreting it the way it suits them –
though he condemned the invasion and identified Putin as primarily
responsible (Ministry of Law Singapore, 2023).

2. Cautious Hedgers
Hedgers respond to the war much less categorically than the West and
without taking a stand against Moscow. At the same time, hedgers do not
want to be seen as indifferent to the plight of Ukraine and the strong
feelings ASEAN’s Western Dialogue Partners (DP)1 espouse. The
rhetorical compromise is to condemn the attack as such but not
necessarily charac
terise it as an illegal war of aggression. Hedgers might instead accept the
Russian nomenclature of ‘conflict’ or ‘military campaign’ or refer to it
neutrally as the Russia-Ukraine war. Hedgers also tend to avoid
identifying Russia as the responsible perpetrator. In practice, Russian
political elites are neither seen nor treated as pariahs – bilateral
meetings are still possible. Hedgers may also undertake some
diplomatic activity, including mediation efforts, track-two engagement or
humanitarian support for Ukraine.
Indonesia’s response was relatively muted, condemning the attack on
Ukraine as such but without naming Russia as the aggressor of an unpro
voked war. President Joko Widodo called for an end to hostilities but
focussed his concern on the war’s potential to derail the still feeble post
COVID-19 economic recovery and threatening food security. Foreign
Minister Retno Marsudi talked to her Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov
numerous times, including at numerous in-person meetings (Antara,
2022), doubling down on Indonesia’s message that while being
committed to the principles of international law, the specific concern is
the war’s impact on the regional economy (Yazid, Firdaus, & Ramadhan,
2022). Widodo resisted Western pres
sure to both withdraw the G-20 invitation to Russia and to condemn
Russia at the summit.2 With this, technically, Indonesia ought to be in the
‘impassive bystanders’ category was it not for the fact that Jakarta was
inadvertently drawn into the conflict by holding both the G-20 presidency
in 2022 as
6 F. KLIEM

well as the ASEAN chairmanship in 2023, which requires direct

engagement with Moscow, including physical presence of Russian
representatives in Indonesia. On June 30, Widodo also travelled to both
Kiev and Moscow. This locates Indonesia inevitably in the hedgers
category.
Vietnam has also abstained from any direct criticism of Russia and not
used the term ‘invasion’. Hanoi only expressed deep concern and that all
‘relevant parties’ should ‘exercise restraint’ (VNA (Vietnam News
Agency), 2022a). Hanoi appeared sympathetic to Moscow in general
and even used its domestic propaganda machine to mobilise
pro-Russian sentiments and provide counter narratives to the West
(Dror, 2022). Lavrov met his Vietnamese counterpart in person several
times, including at a personal visit to Hanoi in July 2022, where he was
afforded ‘red carpet treatment’ (Fischler, 2022). However, Vietnam also
emphasised that disputes should be resolved peacefully and offered to
contribute to a solution (VNA (Vietnam News Agency), 2022b). Indeed,
personal conversations in Hanoi with Vietnamese diplomats and the
wider foreign policy community revealed great concern as to the
potentially dangerous precedent Moscow is setting. Particularly Russia’s
pseudo-historical claim to Ukrainian territory unsettles Vietnamese
diplomats, fearing China’s claim to ‘historical rights’ in the South China
Sea might at some point translate into similar action – though most of
these conversations stopped well short of blaming Russia and instead
quickly pointed out NATO’s alleged responsibility.3
Covertly, Vietnamese officials have offered help to mediate on both
track one and -two level to facilitate conversations among Ukrainian and
Russian stakeholders. And Hanoi vowed to support Ukraine with
humanitarian aid, albeit with only a modest amount. On Ukraine’s
Independence Day, Vietnamese President Nguyễn Xuân Phúc sent a
congratulatory message to Ukraine’s President Zelenskyy (VOA Tiếng
Việt, 2022). Although the Vietnamese government continues to engage
deeply and cordially with the Kremlin, it appears sympathetic towards
Ukraine and genuinely interested in pulling its weight to help to bring
about an end to the war (Le Hong, 2022).
The Philippines and Cambodia are the only two AMS that have
changed their early position as ‘impassive bystanders’ and quickly
settled into the ‘cautious hedgers’ category. Manila was mostly
concerned with evacuation efforts of Philippine nationals from Ukraine.
Then-president Rodrigo Duterte initially remained silent on the war.
Then-defence minister Lorenzana stated that the Philippines would
remain neutral because the conflict was ‘none of our business’ (CNN
Philippines, 2022). However, on 12 April, Duterte himself expressed
explicit condemnation of the invasion of Ukraine and remarked that
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was ‘brutal’ and deserved ‘condemnation’
(Parrocha, 2022). At the same time, Duterte emphasised that Putin was
his friend and repeated numerous times in various settings that Manila
would remain neutral (Lalu, 2022). With this, Manila still fits into the
‘cautious hedg ers’ category despite the condemnation. Manila did not
follow up with any meaningful policy or diplomacy, and Duterte’s
emphasis on his personal friendship and his country’s neutrality
substantially qualifies his criticism.
The Pacific Review 7

Duterte’s successor, Ferdinand Marcos Jr., has rarely spoken publicly on

the conflict other than mentioning numerous times his ‘independent
policy’ and that there was ‘no need to take a stand’ (Mercado, 2022).
Generally, Marcos is likely to continue to straddle this cautious hedging
strategy, as his National Security Adviser Clarita Carlos confirmed
(Gita-Carlos, 2022).
Similarly, Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen was originally among
the most reserved ASEAN leaders. Early on, he only expressed his
hope for a ‘peaceful solution’ (Niseiy, 2022) and emphasised
Cambodia’s neutrality (Sochan, 2022a). Over time, however, Hun Sen’s
rhetoric became more robust (Storey, 2022b). He stated that Cambodia
‘stand[s] in solidarity with the Ukrainian people’ and condemned this
‘unacceptable act of aggression’ as violating Ukraine’s independence
and sovereignty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cambodia, 2022).
Reversing his earlier position, Cambodia could not be neutral in this
conflict despite Russia being Cambodia’s ‘friend’ (Sochan, 2022b).
Notably, Hun Sen related the Ukraine war to Cambodia’s own historical
experiences, such as US attacks against Cambodia during the Vietnam
War and the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Khmer Times,
2022). With this change of tone, Cambodia is closer to Singapore on the
response spectrum rhetorically, and it even co-sponsored a United
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution condemning Russia’s war
in Ukraine. However, Phnom Penh is often fickle and fell well short of
any meaningful action severing ties with Russia.

3. Impassive Bystanders

This category includes AMS that clearly expressed their neutrality in the
conflict and barely reacted at all. These states fell short of referring to the
war as an invasion or identifying who is aggressor or victim. No blame is
assigned, directly or indirectly, by any government in this category.
Instead, impassive bystanders express things such as ‘grave concern’
regarding ‘the situation/conflict in Ukraine’. The war does not trigger any
meaningful action and bilateral meetings are still taking place
unimpededly.
Malaysia’s Prime Minister Ismail only remarked that he was
‘saddened’ by events, and his office later issued a statement of ‘serious
concern’. Instead of naming Russia, Malaysia urged ‘all concerned
parties’ to de-escalate (Prime Minister’s Office of Malaysia, 2022).
Malaysia has abstained from a UN vote to suspend Russia from the UN
Human Rights Council (HRC), stressing that such a decision ‘should not
be made in haste’ (The Malaysian Reserve, 2022). Malaysia’s Foreign
Affairs Minister reaffirmed in July that Malaysia is utmost committed to
remaining neutral in the ‘current crisis in Ukraine’, that ‘Malaysia does
not support either side of the conflict’ and does ‘not wish to be drawn
into any political disputes or conflicts’ (Jaafar, 2022).
Thailand’s Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha similarly expressed
‘deep concern’ and highlighted ‘territorial integrity, international law, and
the UN Charter’ (Tan, 2022), but he did not identify who was breaching
what, if any, and was always clear that Bangkok would remain ‘neutral’
in this
8 F. KLIEM

situation (Rujopakarn, 2022). A position he defended in the lead-up to

the US-ASEAN Summit, which would ‘not compel Thailand to choose a
side’. Nor, the prime minister emphasised, would he allow to let the
Ukraine situation become the dominant issue at the summit
(Phaicharoen, 2022). Prayuth argued that it was time to ‘change the
narrative of the Ukraine situation from conflict to humanitarian
consideration for those who are affected by the Ukraine situation
(Phaicharoen & Watcharasakwet, 2022)’. Foreign Minister Don
Pramudwinai remarked that there was no need for Thailand to condemn
the war and would not ‘rush into playing a role’ (Thai PBS World, 2022).
He then visited Russia to meet Lavrov in person to discuss deepening of
bilateral relationships and especially trade ties (Shabbir, 2022).
Laos did not even express any concern. Almost identically to Vietnam,
though, the Foreign Affairs Ministry released a press statement that it
was closely following the ‘evolving, complex and sensitive
developments’ and cautioned ‘all parties concerned to exercise utmost
restraint and pursue efforts in deescalating’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Lao PDR, 2022). However, unlike Vietnam, there are no signs that
indicate any concern or indeed interest beyond this call. President
Thongloun Sisoulith also criti cised Western sanctions and embargoes,
which would ‘not make the world a better place’. Laos had a ‘clear
foreign policy direction’, which would be to ‘not take sides in today’s
conflicts and disputes’ (Phonevilay, 2022).
The small but wealthy Sultanate of Brunei initially responded similarly
to Indonesia, condemning the ‘violation of sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity of any country’ in the immediate aftermath of the
invasion (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Brunei Darussalam, 2022), but
Brunei’s leaders have remained silent and entirely passive ever since.

4. Full Supporters

The ‘full supporter’ category is self-explanatory and consists of only

Myanmar, who has fully endorsed Russia’s invasion and uncritically
adopted Moscow’s view of this ‘military campaign’ in defence of Russia’s
national security inter
ests, violated by the illegitimate Ukrainian government and the West.
Myanmar junta spokesperson Zaw Min Tun argued that Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine was ‘justified’, as Russia was protecting ‘their
sovereignty’ and was showing its ‘position […] as a world power’ (Al
Arabiya News, 2022). Myanmar’s leader Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia
numerous times since the invasion of Ukraine, discussing deepening the
already ‘positive ties’ across all domains, and he regularly expresses his
great friendship with and admiration of Putin, calling him the ‘leader of
the world’ (CAN, 2022). It should be noted that this is the position of the
junta government, the so-called State Administration Council (SAC). In
contrast, the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) takes the
opposite position and condemned the Russian invasion. However, as
the junta are and will for the foreseeable future remain the de facto
government in Naypyidaw (Seah, 2021; Thuzar, 2021), unfortunately,
this is Myanmar’s official position for the time being.
The Pacific Review 9

ASEAN’s multilateral response

Many observers have pointed out ASEAN’s lack of unity, which in
combination with its diplomatic tradition of consensus severely
complicates strong positions on any international crisis (See Ha, 2022;
Khoo, 2004; Kraft, 2017; Le Thu, 2019; Narine, 2009). Correspondingly,
when there are divergent views across mem
bership, as is the case here, ASEAN can at best function as a
bridge-builder. Its role then is best understood in minimalist terms: to
facilitate an exchange of views among AMS rather than taking a united
and coherent institutional position. At the same time, ASEAN is sensitive
to both the views of more forward-leaning members and its international
reputation, especially with Western DP. This means that ASEAN leaders
must strike a balance based on weak compromises while also meeting
international requirements.
This balancing act is reflected in ASEAN’s position on the Ukraine war.
At various occasions, statements were issued that share three broad
char acteristics: stressing the need for a peaceful resolution and
humanitarian assistance; support for international law and principles of
ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), to
which Russia is a party; and, despite invoking the TAC, no ASEAN
statement condemns Russia or its aggression. Neither does ASEAN
identify Ukraine as the victim, merely as the place where the war occurs.
For example, on 26 February, ASEAN foreign ministers expressed ‘deep
concern’ and hope that all ‘relevant parties’ would ‘exercise maximum
restraint’ (ASEAN, 2022a). Numerous statements followed but none
went beyond calling for a ceasefire and dialogue between ‘con flicting
parties’ over ‘the situation in Ukraine’ (ASEAN, 2022b). The issue was
discussed at the US-ASEAN Summit, but, remarkably, the joint statement
did not mention Russia and only included equally weak references to
Ukraine (ASEAN, 2022d), suggesting that Biden failed to convince
ASEAN leaders to take a tougher position. The 29 pages joint
communique of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in August
addressed the ‘situation in Ukraine’ in a mere 100 words without
mentioning either the word ‘Russia’ or ‘war’ (ASEAN, 2022e). The
closest ASEAN got to jointly expressing sympathy for the Ukrainian
victims was a call to establish an independent investigation into alleged
atrocities against civilians in Bucha (ASEAN, 2022c). The ASEAN led
East Asia Summit (EAS), which includes Russia and the US among
others, ended without a joint communique because of divergent views
on the war.
Former ASEAN practitioners are somewhat divided on how successful
and cohesive ASEAN is in global multilateral forums. (Mahbubani & Sng,
2017; Natalegawa, 2018, p. 153). Ideally, AMS would speak in unity.
However, there generally is academic consensus that voting patterns
among AMS in UN forums, for example, are characterised by diversion
rather than cohesion. To the extent that any alignments exist, this is
rather coincidental convergence of national interests than astute
diplomacy (Burmester & Jankowski, 2014; Nguitragool & Rüland, 2015).
Sometimes, diplomatic cohesion is poor even in cases that directly affect
Southeast Asia (Natalegawa, 2018, p. 221).
10 F. KLIEM

Unsurprisingly then, UN voting alignment on the Ukraine war is medi

ocre, with only a modicum of ASEAN unity. Singapore was the only AMS
joining 80 other nations in co-sponsoring UN Security Council (UNSC)
resolution S/2022/155 on 25 February condemning and deploring
Russia’s aggression, which ultimately failed due to a Russian veto. Four
days later, the UNGA adopted resolution ES-11/1, titled ‘Aggression
against Ukraine’, approved by 141 states with five votes against it and
35 abstentions. Eight AMS voted in favour, Vietnam and Laos abstained.
Myanmar is officially on record as pro-ES-11/1, for it is represented at
the UNGA by the NUG exile government—an arrangement predating the
2021 military coup. Had Myanmar’s de facto government, the SAC, be
present at the UNGA, Myanmar would have opposed the resolution,
technically leaving the ‘real’ ASEAN ratio at seven supports, one in
opposition and three abstentions.
A slightly different picture unfolded in April 2022, when no AMS was
among the co-sponsors of the draft resolution to suspend Russia from
the UNHRC. This resolution (ES-11/3) was eventually adopted in the
UNGA with only two AMS supporting it (Philippines and Myanmar), two
against (Vietnam and Laos) and six, notably including Singapore,
abstaining. Again, Myanmar technically clouds the official record. On the
other hand, Timor-Leste, a possibly soon eleventh AMS, supported both
resolutions.

Response Spectrum from Condemnation to Support

In sum, except for Singapore—and to a lesser extent Vietnam and
Cambodia—AMS and ASEAN remain reserved, in stark contrast to the
positions taken by Western governments. Most political spectrums tend
to be middle-heavy, i.e. most subjects trend somewhere around the
centre rather than at the extremes. However, this response spectrum’s
mid dle-ground denotes not necessarily a virtuous middle-way but rather
visualises the great reluctance in Southeast Asia to go along with
Western criticism and isolation of Russia. From a Western perspective,
in a crisis of such immense proportion, Singapore’s strong position could
be seen as an expected default reaction rather than the extreme outlier
that it de facto is. Both Singapore’s and Myanmar’s are isolated
positions, which no other AMS will likely emulate, not even silently
admire. Four AMS are still hedging their bets, not taking a position
against Moscow while at the same time not wanting to be seen as
indifferent especially to the strong feelings of the Western DP. A further
four AMS remain impassive, keen not to side with the West and, most
importantly, not to make this European war a Southeast Asian problem.
Corresponding with this overall reluctance, ASEAN’s position has been
a muted, with only generic calls for a peaceful resolution. Southeast
Asian voting patterns at the UN-level equally show measured restraint
rather than resolve.
The Pacific Review 11
Sources of Southeast Asia’s reluctance
The primary hypothesis of this research presumed a causal relation
between the quality of bilateral relationships with Russia and the specific
govern ment’s position. The following analysis will investigate this and
provide a

• bilateral explanation, i.e. the varying degree of

individual national relationship links with the Russian state;

Due to the unsatisfactory explanatory power of this mono-causality,

however, two further drivers will be investigated:

• normative explanation with Southeast Asia’s

diplomatic tradition of impartiality;
• practical explanation, a still prevalent
preoccupation by regional lead ers with domestic affairs.

In their sum, these three explanations provide a good picture as to the

mixed but ultimately reserved national responses as well as ASEAN’s
insti tutional indifference to the war in Ukraine.

Unpacking individual bilateral

relationships with Russia
Although Russia is an ASEAN DP, its engagement with the organisation
is limited. Under Putin, Moscow sees ASEAN predominantly as an entry
point to gain a voice in Asian regionalism (Buszynski, 2006). This serves
not least to strengthen Russian influence in global affairs as well as its
great power prestige (Rangsimaporn, 2009). Moscow’s primary focus is
still on developing bilateral ties with individual AMS. Russia and AMS
have enhanced their economic, diplomatic and military engagement, in
partic ular arms procurement, since the early 2000s. Moscow specifically
empha
sises its long-standing relationship with Vietnam and lately increasingly
with the otherwise isolated Myanmar junta. Moscow also seeks to
cultivate ties with Indonesia and Malaysia—seen as particularly
important and traditionally non-aligned—as well as with US allies who
might still be receptive to Russian advances, i.e. post-coup Thailand and
the Philippines since President Duterte (Gorenburg & Schwartz, 2019).
Generally, Moscow tends to exploit tensions between the West and AMS
over the former’s pressure on human rights and democratic backsliding
to gain a deeper foothold in these countries.

Diplomatic relations
Diplomatic relations are difficult to quantify. Measurement was, thus,
done with help of a simple scoring system from zero to four points.
12 F. KLIEM

Author’s Own Illustration

Although sound diplomatic relations could act as a deterrent against
strong condemnation of Russia’s war, there is no consistency at first
sight. The three AMS with the closest diplomatic relations with Moscow
(Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar), cover all response categories from two
or four. Vietnam is the most interesting case. Hanoi and Russia are tied
by a very close diplomatic relationship and a historical intimacy vis-à-vis
Russia among Vietnamese bureaucrats and the military. Parts of the
population, too, have pro-Russian sentiments, which are directly
translated into public support among a significant proportion of
conservatives (Ha & Luong, 2022). In 2012, both elevated their ‘strategic
part nership’ to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ (Thayer, 2012), and
there are plenty regular mechanisms for diplomatic exchange. However,
Hanoi has moved much closer to the West in recent years (Tung, 2022).
And Hanoi’s unease with Russia’s behaviour somewhat contradicts this
close diplomatic partnership. Unlike Vietnam, Lao PDR is often seen as
peripheral to Asian diplomacy. But like Vietnam, Russia and Laos have
historically good political relations, which both sides seek to protect.
Laos was a significant recipient of Soviet aid for fellow communist
regimes and many Laotian bureaucrats and indeed currently leading
political figures, including Thongloun Sisoulith, pursued their education in
Russia.
Lastly, Myanmar scores only averagely in terms of diplomatic relation
ships with Moscow. The two neither have a strategic partnership nor
other noteworthy formal diplomatic cooperation agreements. However,
because of the exceptionally strong mutual diplomatic support, Myanmar
has been awarded a ‘bonus’ point in this category, and Min Aung Hlaing
visited Russia at least twice since the Ukraine war; he even met Putin
personally. The Kremlin took the exceptional diplomatic step to engage
with the SAC
as Myanmar’s government and supporting the junta at the UN-level—
though stopping short of official diplomatic recognition (International
Crisis Group, 2022; Reuters, 2017; Storey, 2022c).
 Although bilateral diplomatic relations seem have some explanatory
power as far as Laos and Myanmar are concerned, there is no obvious
trend. The three highest scoring AMS in this assessment category are
not at all uniform
The Pacific Review 13

in their response to the war. Likewise, Indonesia sticks out as having

compar atively strong ties with Russia, including mutual high-level visits.
Indonesia and Russia also hold a regular bilateral consultation forum
and have drawn up plans to draft a comprehensive strategic partnership
agreement, which has not yet materialised (Sheany, 2018). Like
Malaysia, Indonesia’s interest in Russia is par tially motivated by
maintaining a regional balance among all great powers. Moscow for its
part sees Indonesia, not incorrectly, as the most consequential AMS
(Weatherbee, 2013). Nonetheless, Indonesia—a ‘cautious hedger’—has
generally been les reserved than other AMS. Lastly, even the three
lowest scoring AMS (Thailand, Brunei and Malaysia) are straddling the
middle ground in terms of their position on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
They have a more distanced diplomatic relationship with the Kremlin
than for example Indonesia but have been much more reserved in their
reaction. Similarly, Singapore—the only ‘explicit condemner’—has
stronger diplomatic ties with Moscow than others.

Defence relations
Defence relations were measured by consulting five indicators and
award ing a maximum of five points. Although Russia lags far behind the
US and China, and experts see this gap as increasing (Storey, 2021a),
this is an important indicator of comprehensive bilateral relationship as it
signals a degree of both trust and desire on AMS’ part to include Russia
as a regionally consequential power. It is important to note that a
substantial part of these defence ties are essentially Cold War relics,
carried over the fall of the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, exchanges
continue to foster good relations and mutual understanding among
defence elites.

Author’s Own Illustration

 Myanmar aside, which has increasingly close military ties with Russia,
three AMS stand out: Indonesia and Vietnam score full points while
Malaysia scores lowest. In the light of an only recently (2016) lifted
Western arms embargo and a mutual Cold War history, close
Russia-Vietnam defence relations are unsurprising. There are regular
high-level visits among defence
14 F. KLIEM

officials, and Vietnam even participated in Russia’s Army Games in

August 2022 and future military exercises with Russia cannot be ruled
out (Thayer, 2022). Highly noteworthy is Russia’s preferential access to
Vietnam’s Cam Ranh Bay since 2014, which allows Russia to access
the facility almost at will (Storey & Thayer, 2001; TASS, 2014). Russia
mostly inherited this, includ
ing the Cam Ranh Bay access, from the Soviet Union. Regardless of
origin, such favourable arrangements put Moscow in a good position
and enables regular correspondence and trust-building with Hanoi.
Once again, Indonesia has not forgotten the substantial economic,
polit ical and diplomatic support it received from the Soviet Union in the
early days post-independence (Boden, 2008; Wilborn, 1980).
Present-day Indonesia maintains these long-standing defence ties,
including dialogues, technology transfer and even joint development and
production (Parameswaran, 2019b). Recently, Indonesia hosted the
ASEAN-Russia Naval Exercise (ARNEX). Though a minor symbolic
exercise (Storey, 2021b), it indicates that Jakarta continues to see
Russia as an important regional balancer. As is the case with Vietnam, a
large number of Indonesian officers continue to study at first Soviet and
now Russian defence academies (Storey, 2021a). Although the Cold
War legacy plays an important role, contemporary Indonesia—and
likewise Malaysia—value Russia as a balancer particularly of US global
influence. Furthermore, while the US is often seen as having a global
anti-Islam agenda, Russia and especially Putin are regarded as one of
the few non-Muslim Islam-friendly world leaders.
Malaysia shares these sentiments (Gorenburg & Schwartz, 2019) but
is, somewhat surprisingly, on the other end of the spectrum. Malaysia is
important to Russia’s overall Southeast Asia strategy and was the driving
force behind Russia’s incorporation into ASEAN’s institutional
infrastructure. But despite sizable arms acquisitions in the past and
regular port calls, Malaysia has little other defence cooperation with
Russia. Perhaps an obstacle to closer security cooperation, especially
against the backdrop of the Ukraine war, is the 2014 downing of a
Malaysian Airlines flight. MH-17 was shot down by Russian separatist
forces over Ukraine during the 2014 war in Donbas, killing all 295
people, including 43 Malaysians.
In defence relations, Malaysia scores lowest but is more reserved in
their response to the Ukraine war than either Indonesia or Vietnam,
although the latter two have much closer and historic defence relations
with Russia. This second category is, thus, equally indefinite as to the
causal relationship between the quality of bilateral relationships and the
response to the invasion of Ukraine.

Arms procurement
Although arms sales could justifiably be part of the previous category, it is
Russia’s primary activity in Southeast Asia, and given the difficulty to
switch procurement sources, there is a degree of path-dependency. This
justifies a separate category. Furthermore, while there is some overlap,
the two results
The Pacific Review 15

are not synonymous in their analytical value. The most obvious cases
are Thailand and Singapore, who both score in the mid-range in defence
diplo macy but procure very little (Thailand) or no arms at all (Singapore)
from Russia.

Author’s Own Illustration; Source: SIPRI (Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute) (2019).
Superbly analysed by experts in the field (Storey, 2021a, 2022a),
Russia has been the leading weapons exporter to Southeast Asia since
2001 with sales amounting to over US$10 billion, although overall value
has been on the decline since 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine is likely
to perpetuate this downward trend. In absolute numbers, Russia’s
largest customers in ASEAN are Vietnam, with a very significant lead
over second-placed Myanmar, closely followed by Malaysia and
Indonesia. Singapore, Philippines and Brunei do not import any
weapons from Russia. Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and previously
Vietnam, have little choice but to buy from Russia (or China) due to
Western arms embargoes. Especially Vietnam has relied on Russian
weapons to mod ernise its armed forces since the mid-1990s and has
purchased most its current day military hardware, including fighter jets
and warships, from Russia. Hanoi continues to buy from Moscow, and
given its embargo experience, Hanoi will likely not switch to European or
US equipment. Indeed, Malaysia and Indonesia have a tradition of
buying both Russian and Western systems, but US pressure recently
forced Jakarta to cancel a deal with Moscow for eleven combat aircraft
(Suorsa, 2021). Russia is Malaysia’s largest source with purchases
summing up to USD1.2 billion since 2000, including combat aircraft.
Likewise, Laos is a traditional Russian customer. Although the overall
amount is minimal due Laos’ limited resources, the country relies on
Russia for almost half of its military imports. Intransparency is
particularly high in this case, and Russia is known to transfer weapons to
Laos for non-monetary payment, including swap deals and mining rights
(Parameswaran, 2019a), which distorts the statistic.
16 F. KLIEM

More important for this research than these details are relative per
centages. Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Malaysia stand out. Vietnam
imported over 80% of its weaponry from Russia, Malaysia around 30%.
Russia is the single largest source for these AMS except for Myanmar,
who procures marginally more from China. Of all four categories, arms
pro curement closest corresponds with the state’s position in the
response taxonomy, that is a large share of Russian equipment puts the
state closer towards the supportive end of the response spectrum.
Although Myanmar, the only clear supporter, purchases more from
China than Russia, Myanmar Russia defence cooperation is very strong
and will likely increase. According to the primary hypothesis, one would
also expect Laos and Malaysia to be located where they are, i.e.
trending towards the top right in the chart.
Two AMS appear to be defying the trend, albeit on different ends of
the spectrum: While Vietnam relies heavily on Russian arms, exports to
Thailand have been miniscule over the past 20years, a mere USD70
million or less than two percent of Bangkok’s overall procurement.
Despite being a formal US ally Thailand’s acquisitions are very
diversified. Predominantly Western kit, but China has filled a Western
vacuum since Thailand’s 2014 military coup. However, Vietnam has
displayed greater unease with Russia’s war than Thailand. Hence, in
terms of arms procurements from Russia and the AMS’ respective
position in the response taxonomy, Vietnam and Thailand are
noteworthy outliers, obscuring the hypothesis (the greater the
dependency on arms imports from Russia the more reserved the
response), while other AMS seem to confirm it.

Economic relationships
Economic relationships are often seen as a hallmark of bilateral relation
ships, and indeed dependency (Reuveny & Kang, 1998). This is not the
case with Russia and Southeast Asia.
 The Pacific Review 17

Author’s Own Illustration; Sources: Various trade accounting websites,

including Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), World Trade
Organisation (WTO) and Trading Economics.
There are no bilateral free-trade agreements in place, although
Singapore has an agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union. Russia
has invest ment treaties with several AMS, often dating to the late 1990s.
While there had been almost no progress for two decades, Russian
foreign direct investment into ASEAN is gradually increasing, Singapore
is of increasing interest to Russian services investment (Shira, 2021),
while a significant proportion of Russian investments in Vietnam are in
energy extraction operations in the South China Sea. Russia is now
overall just about the tenth largest investment source for AMS.
Many AMS have long-standing and deep diplomatic and defence ties
with Moscow, but trade volume remains miniscule. Despite Russia’s size,
proximity and historical role in the region as well as numerous
agreements to promote ASEAN-Russia economic relations, such as the
2012 Roadmap for ASEAN-Russia Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation (Chipman Koty, 2021; Corbin, 2018), Russia is not even a
top-ten trade partner of any AMS and remains the second last trade
partner among all ASEAN DP (ASEAN, 2020). Even all ten AMS
combined do not make it into Russia’s top-ten trade partners, totalling
less than USD20 billion—only a third of the bilat eral trade between
Singapore and Malaysia. Vietnam has the greatest trade ties to Russia
in ASEAN, even though Russia accounts for less than one percent of
Vietnam’s overall trade volume. For most AMS, trade with Russia
accounts for something around the half-percent mark of overall trade.
A deeper data analysis reveals that in a few specific sectors,
economic ties are stronger than meets the eye. For example, Thailand
receives a very significant number of Russian tourists, especially in
Phuket, where Russians are the largest tourists group. This is especially
the case currently, with Russians seeking to sit-out the crisis at home
and access to European des
tinations curtailed. Likewise, agriculture is a critical sector in most AMS,
and ASEAN as a whole imports almost ten percent of its fertilizers from
Russia. Even in terms of energy cooperation—Russia’s strongest
competitive advantage—little takes place beyond the investments in
Vietnam. As com pared to Europe or China, ASEAN fossil fuel imports
from Russia are min iscule, relying on imports from the Middle East and
Africa instead. Geography is a factor, of course, especially for
pipeline-bound gas, but one might have expected a much larger share of
Russian oil shipping. In terms of energy partnerships, in July 2022,
state-run Russian energy com pany Rosatom agreed with Myanmar’s
SAC to cooperate on nuclear energy, a source to which Myanmar thus
far has no access to. But this remains a notable exception in Southeast
Asia.
Despite greater interest to expand Russia’s economic footprint in
Southeast Asia (Lukin, 2012), seasoned observers identify a degree of
disillusionment in ASEAN as to Russia’s economic potential (Cheang,
2017; Chongkittavorn, 2016). Thus, as the overall trade volume chart
visualises,
18 F. KLIEM

of all four categories, trade relations are the weakest factor in terms of
its explanatory value. All AMS are scattered across the chart seemingly
at random. For example, Singapore and Myanmar, on opposing ends of
the response spectrum to Russia’s invasion, have similar relative trade
volumes with Russia. The chart also clearly shows that the ‘hedgers’
and ‘bystanders’ are not distinct either in terms of their trade relationship
with Russia.

Additional explanations
Except for Myanmar, there is no unambiguous pattern that would allow
mono-causal conclusions. Although some categories correspond closer
with the hypothesis than others, the positioning in the matrix across all
four categories is too uneven to clearly identify a causal relationship and
bilateral relations as the primary motivating factor of AMS’ reserved
response. Overall, bilateral relations are important. But they are better
understood as inter vening, not the independent variable. One must,
thus, look beyond mate
rialistic quantifiable indicators and get a deeper understanding of AMS
diplomatic culture and their perspective on global and regional matters.

Normative explanation: Southeast Asia’s

tradition of active impartiality
One of the main reasons the original five AMS founded ASEAN in 1967
was to help the comparatively smaller-sized Southeast Asian states to
insulate the region from external interference against the backdrop of
post-colo nialism, the expansion of communism in Indochina and the
general binary and later tripartite pressure from the great powers during
the Cold War. In November 1971, at the height of the Cold War, ASEAN
declared Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN). The deteriorating situation in Vietnam in mind, ASEAN
stressed its commitment to retain ‘the right of every state, large or small,
to lead its national existence free from outside interference’, with ‘the
neutralisation of South East Asia’ seen as a ‘desirable objective’
(ASEAN, 1971). Regionalism and neutralisation—though different
interpretations of neutralisation existed—were pursued in conjunc tion
(Acharya, 2009), at times in somewhat contradictory ways, with multiple
mechanisms to promote regional stability. The primary objective was to
shield Southeast Asians from the ‘push and pull’ dynamics of the Cold
War and to realise a degree of autonomy, explicitly rejecting great power
dom inance in Southeast Asia in order to construct a regional space of
stability, peace and prosperity (Acharya, 2014).
In the post-Cold War era, when great power competition in Asia
became more multipolar—most obviously including China and
India—ASEAN sought to increase its agency creating multilateral
institutions. These included numerous ‘ASEAN Plus-One’ mechanisms
for regular strategic conversations with specific DP as well as inclusive
multilateral mechanisms to keep these partners in discussion with
ASEAN and amongst themselves,
The Pacific Review 19

such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and EAS (Koga, 2017).
Simplified, ASEAN’s role in this institutional architecture has become
known as ‘ASEAN centrality’. Although a contested concept (Acharya,
2017; Ba, 2017; Caballero-Anthony, 2014), ASEAN centrality refers to
the association’s role as the driver, convener and facilitator of
regionalism (Haacke, 2013). The objective is to include as many
relevant extra-mural stakeholders as pos sible, enabling ASEAN to
influence the agenda of regional affairs and retaining a
disproportionately outsized role for these comparatively small states that
would be unattainable otherwise (Tan, 2017). Although the success is
disputed (Jones & Smith, 2007), there is largely consensus among
ASEAN scholars that both ZOPFAN as well as post-Cold War centrality
are genuine attempts to retain a degree of autonomy to promote peace
and stability, (see Acharya, 2017; Alagappa, 1991; Ba, 2017;
Caballero-Anthony, 2014; Emmers, 2018; Koga, 2012; Narine, 1998).
Despite the many differ ences, AMS share an acute sense of
vulnerability, deeply rooted in the colonial experience, that produces a
shared conviction that ASEAN-based multilateralism and ASEAN’s
central role as a neutral convener of great powers, are essential to their
independence and prosperity (Kuik, 2016).
To that end, ASEAN sought to project its own norms to the wider
region (Ba, 2009). Abundant literature discusses these institutional
norms, commonly known as the ‘ASEAN way’, including ASEAN’s most
important normative foundations, such as non-interference,
sacrosanctity of state sovereignty and territorial integrity and a
commitment to non-violent conflict resolution— many of these are
universal UN Charta norms (see Beeson, 2009; Haacke, 2013;
Nischalke, 2000). But as many influential ASEAN scholars and practi
tioners have argued, ASEAN’s role in managing regional affairs is
contingent on it being perceived as neutral and non-threatening to any
great power, including Russia (Kausikan, 2015; Mahbubani & Sng, 2017;
Narine, 2018). Some critics mock ASEAN as an empty rhetorical shell
that gives form without substance to its proclaimed norms (Jones &
Smith, 2002, 2007). In this view, ASEAN and its institutional mechanism
are, even if they wanted to, incapable of managing regional let alone
global security affairs. While this is an exceptionally pessimistic view of
ASEAN, even optimistic scholars agree that ASEAN has little meaningful
agency as far as global security crises are concerned. The primary
reason that ASEAN can function as a ‘bridge-builder’ between great
powers is the association’s relative weakness and virtual irrelevance in
matters of broader global security and great power competition
(Acharya, 2014, Ba, 2009, Kausikan, 2015, Kuik, 2016).
Neutrality, on the other hand, is a complex concept, and both the
interpretation of neutrality itself as well as the degree to which it is being
practiced differs among AMS, especially with regards to the United
States, and as Emmers (2018, p. 361) explains, ASEAN’s sense of
neutrality has evolved over time as the association reassessed
opportunities and limita tions over time depending on circumstances.
Some critics have pointed out that ZOPFAN was never a feasible
objective (Southgate, 2021). But while this may be so, it misses the point
that there is a shared
20 F. KLIEM

understanding among all AMS that engagement with external powers is

crucial to their survival but feasible only if ASEAN adopts neutrality. The
essence of ASEAN neutrality should be understood not as ‘lying low’ but
as impartiality—the objective is to not choose the side of any external
power and, thus, be neutral ground—an ASEAN that can ‘provide for all’,
as Marty Natalegawa (2018) put it. Neutrality, thus, does not mean Cold
War non-alignment or neutralisation of states in a legal and absolute
sense. Instead, it refers to the ability to retain a degree of regional auton
omy while allowing some flexibility for individual AMS to maintain rela
tionships with external great powers as they see fit (Acharya, 2014, p.
52). Kuik (2016, 2020) identifies this as ‘small state
hedging’—multi-layered alignments that develop and change in
pragmatic, overlapping and flexible ways without any commitment to
either great power.
So, the quest for ASEAN autonomy, both as a response to Cold War
uncertainties and later as an attempt to hedge between China’s rise and
the Western response, was always about creating ‘a platform for greater
manoeuvrability among the great powers’, as Weatherbee (2009, p. 2)
puts it. This manoeuvrability allows AMS to have a modicum of strategic
auton omy—to make own sovereign choices free from pressure, coercion
or manip
ulation by external powers; indeed, the rejection of all external leadership
(Kliem, 2022b). The preservation of this strategic autonomy took various
forms over the past decades but has remained a key objective of ASEAN
since its inception (Acharya, 2014, p. 49; Roy, 2005). Instead, AMS act in
their own national interest, both strategic and immediate. Often, this
includes ignoring the concerns even of the great powers. For example,
Washington has pushed its allies and partners hard to reject both
China’s Belt and Road Initiative and Huawei’s 5-G technology. These
campaigns were mostly ignored as AMS made individual decisions
according to own national needs, and ASEAN as an organisation
remained entirely passive.
In historical practice, ASEAN has, thus, distanced itself from most
cases and forms of inter-state conflicts, both in principle and out of
necessity. Internally, ASEAN principles and norms restrict a meaningful
ASEAN role in inter-state conflict—although ASEAN has occasionally
deviated from this general rule (Haacke, 2023). The 2011 Preah Vihear
temple conflict between Thailand and Cambodia is the only recent
example of two AMS in direct military confrontation. ASEAN’s role was
at best supplementary to a coin cidentally strong and determined
Indonesian ASEAN chair and the person Marty Natalegawa as
Indonesia’s foreign minister. As far as global conflicts are concerned,
ASEAN’s role is even less significant. In response to America’s invasion
of Iraq, for example, AMS had diverging views but generally dis tanced
themselves from the war the same way they do with regards to Ukraine.
The exception were Indonesia and Malaysia, for whom the US ‘war on
terror’ in general involved an ethno-religious element. But even then,
involvement was limited to a few statements addressing Muslims at
home (Smith, 2003). Closer to home, Vietnam’s 1979 invasion of
Cambodia pre cipitated a firm and coherent ASEAN response,
galvanising international
The Pacific Review 21

support in opposing Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. This

involvement in a crisis beyond its membership—neither Vietnam nor
Cambodia were ASEAN members at the time—remains the notable
exception that validates the rule. Not least because of this, ASEAN’s
opposition to the Vietnamese occupation is frequently cited as ASEAN’s
single greatest achievement on the global stage (Mahbubani & Sng,
2017, p. 56).
This diplomatic tradition helps to explain AMS’ reluctance to follow the
Western lead, even pressure, to take a strong stand against Russia in
the Ukraine war. Russia has been an ASEAN DP since 1996. As such,
Moscow is a participant in all major ASEAN-led strategic forums,
including the ARF, EAS and the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting
Plus (ADMM-Plus). From a Russian perspective, active participation in
these formats is valuable for the degree of influence in the Indo-Pacific
and regional institutions it accords Moscow as a great power as well as
in terms of acknowledgment of Russia as a great power by ASEAN by
having an equal level of repre sentation as China or the US (Buszynski,
2006; Rangsimaporn, 2009). Likewise, Russia’s value to ASEAN is not
materialistic per se, though arms imports and energy cooperation are
important. Instead, Russia was and remains a consequential great
power and its global standing and geopo litical heft make it an important
partner in ASEAN’s ‘omni-enmeshment’ strategy—to borrow Evelyn
Goh’s (2008) much acclaimed terminology—of binding all great powers
to deepen multi-directional interdependence, to foster a multipolar
balance in Asia and give all great powers a stake in regional stability. In
that quest, ASEAN does not take moral positions as such on any great
power’s behaviour. It should be no surprise to ASEAN experts that while
Russian Group of Eight (G-8) membership was sus pended following the
annexation of Crimea in 2014, ASEAN not only maintained its
relationship with Russia but even proceeded to elevated it to the level of
Strategic Partnership in 2018.
Nonetheless, ASEAN’s call for an independent investigation into
Bucha is evidence that ASEAN’s impartiality has limits. This is equally
obvious in the difference in AMS’ support for UNGA resolution ES-11/1
and ES-11/3. The comparatively strong support among AMS for the
resolution con
demning Russia’s invasion demonstrates that most AMS stand behind
the principles of the UN and ASEAN Charter as well as the TAC. The
significant decline in support for the suspension of Russia from the
UNHRC, however, shows that many AMS states do not simply follow an
anti-Russian Western agenda at the UN but instead exercise their
sovereign strategic choice to either lend support or not based on their
own individual priorities. A resolution on the violation of the territorial
integrity of a sovereign state is not the same as suspending Russia from
the UNHCR.
Unlike the West, AMS do not see Russia as an enemy. Indeed,
Southeast Asian diplomacy does not operate in such binary terms,
enemy or ally. Southeast Asia has only ‘a million friends and zero
enemies’, as former Indonesian President Yudhoyono once said about
his country (cited in Anwar, 2020). This applies to Russia just as much
as to China. ASEAN’s
22 F. KLIEM

accentuation of impartiality and regional autonomy leaves its members

to choose their own path on individual issues and broader strategic objec
tives. Overall, this approach has served the region well and it helps to
explain AMS’ reluctance to take a strong stand against Russia. This reluc
tance should be seen as independent agency rather than passivity.

Practical explanation: prioritisation of

domestic and regional issues
Beyond materialistic and diplomatic considerations, one must account for
the general foreign policy apathy that continues to characterise
Southeast Asian politics. To this day, many AMS grapple with
nation-building, as pre dominantly colonial legacies complicate domestic
consolidation despite many decades of independence and economic
growth (Narine, 2009). Some governments struggle with the
reconciliation of often vastly disparate ethnic and religious identities;
others with domestic political turmoil resulting from unclear or yet
unsettled domestic institutional hierarchies. Most AMS remain weak
states in terms of governance capacity, challenged by both institu tional,
social and political limitations—Singapore is arguably the only excep
tion. As is rather common among smaller post-colonial states around the
world (Ayoob, 1998), ASEAN leaders are primarily concerned with
creating stable domestic conditions and regime legitimisation
(Katsumata & Tan, 2007).
The primary purpose of ASEAN at its inception was to enhance
domestic socio-economic development and build political resilience on
the national level. ASEAN was and remains a shield from external
vulnerabilities (Acharya, 1998; Anwar, 1997, 2000; Jorgensen-Dahl,
1982; Weatherbee, 2009), and although all AMS have made substantial
socio-economic progress since, nothing has fundamentally changed in
terms of the inward-looking nature of Southeast Asian regionalism
(Anwar, 2020; Katsumata, 2003). Polls regu larly show that domestic
political challenges continue to dominate the agenda of most AMS’
elites, including the widening socio-economic gap and political instability
(ISEAS, 2020, ISEAS., 2022). Although such polling is often
elite-biased, this prioritisation of domestic stability is not a top-down
attempt by political elites jealously guarding their grip on power. As
Vatikiotis (2022) observes, even when national leaders take global
diplomatic initia tives, ‘these efforts lack full-hearted support […]. They
tend to be regarded cynically by domestic constituencies more
interested in how their govern
ments are addressing domestic issues […]’. As a result, ‘the region tends
toward insularity […]’. Marty Natalegawa (2018, p. 153) frequently
criticises ASEAN’s tendency to regard any development outside of
Southeast Asia as distant to its interests. This is particularly true for
some AMS that would have the capacity to lead ASEAN, including
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Indeed, experience shows that
ASEAN when leaders occasionally found the collective will to act on
international challenges, these tend to be regional rather than global
issues (Kliem, 2022b, 156ff).
It is no surprise therefore that local issues dominate the current
ASEAN agenda. The war in Ukraine is primarily seen as a regional war
in Europe,
The Pacific Review 23

some 6000km away. Closer to home, post-pandemic economic recovery

is still fragile, inflation high and food protectionism has become a
problem. There was an important political transition in the Philippines,
lingering political instability in Malaysia as well as possible leadership
transitions and an ever-explosive power balance between the monarchy,
the military, the executive government and other political factions in
Thailand. As far as international issues are concerned, the region is
grappling with an increas ingly volatile civil war in Myanmar. For those
countries that are in a state of democratic consolidation (Indonesia,
Malaysia) or democratic backsliding (Cambodia, Thailand), in acute
turmoil (Myanmar), or entering a new political era (Philippines,
Singapore), domestic preoccupations will likely continue to effect
Southeast Asia’s global position. In this context, a war in Ukraine, on
which no AMS realistically has any meaningful impact, is not a priority.
The position of Indonesia reflects this most visibly. As discussed
above, Jakarta is utmost concerned with the economic consequences of
the Ukraine war. President Widodo’s visit to Russia appears to have
been very cordial, and although the war was evidently being discussed,
it was pre
dominantly in the context of its impact on global food supply. The
meeting focussed on securing supply chains as well as increasing trade
and invest ment relations and even reinvigorating tourism between
Indonesia and Russia (President of Russia, 2022). That such agenda
items are being dis cussed at a critical time of the war supports the
argument that the war is only relevant in so far as it might have broader
economic ripple effects.
As shown above, responses varied in nuance, and there are notable
excep tions. Most obviously Singapore, whose leaders tend to take a
more global and long-term perspective. But even Singapore’s position
does not make Russia its primary reference point. Indeed, Minister
Shanmugam blamed the West, too, and condemned Western attempts
to present Russia as the enemy (Ministry of Law Singapore, 2023).
Instead, the concern is territorial integrity of small states as a general
principle—a fundamental part of Singapore’s foreign policy identity. In
ASEAN, Singapore remains an exception, and Singapore is not
investing political capital into galvanizing ASEAN in response to the war.
Cambodia and Vietnam also stood out as being somewhat con
cerned by the Ukraine war, predominantly because of own experiences
with invasion by larger states as well as close links to Moscow in Hanoi’s
case. However, by and large interest in the war across ASEAN remains
only peripheral. Yet, it would be highly unfair to criticise ASEAN and
AMS’ leaders as ignorant to global challenges or even myopic. Instead,
one ought to recognise ASEAN’s tradition of impartiality and that the
tangible benefits from a pursuit of a strong position on a distant war are
minor. At times of many compounding challenges, there are more urgent
priorities (Kliem & Seow, 2022). A domestic focus and a global outlook
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and ASEAN can function very
well if it prioritises appropriately. It is important to recall that the primary
objective of all AMS was and remains increasing national resilience. In
other words, AMS trust regionalism to maintain peace and stability in the
immediate
24 F. KLIEM

region to concentrate on nation-building and national socio-economic

development at home. Everything else is secondary.
Conclusion
President Putin has focussed on developing closer economic, diplomatic
and military relations with Southeast Asia both bilaterally and
multilaterally. There is a sense in the West that the primary explanation
of the reluctance by many states to unambiguously side against Russia
is the relationship that these states may have with Moscow. In some
cases, the dependency on Russian arms is being cited; in others the
interest in Russian and Ukrainian food supply chains or the interests to
buy oil and gas at dis counted prices. This article has tested this
hypothesis for AMS and demon
strated that this explanation does not suffice in its mono-causality. It is
undeniable that Russia uses its military and diplomatic resources to
project influence in Southeast Asia and beyond to punch above its
weight in global affairs (Krastev & Holmes, 2014). However, while
bilateral relation
ships do have an impact, the reasons for Southeast Asian apathy are
more complex and better understood in terms of the region’s political
tradition rather than as a dependence on or independence from Russia.
This article offers a tripartite explanation that in its sum helps to under
stand the relative restraint among AMS as well as ASEAN’s institutional
indifference with regards to Russia’s war against Ukraine. A bilateral
expla nation, i.e. the varying degree of individual national relationships
with Russia; a normative explanation, i.e. ASEAN diplomatic tradition of
impartiality; and a practical explanation, i.e. a still prevalent prioritisation
of domestic and regional issues over global affairs by most ASEAN
leaders. There are also more general conclusions that can be drawn.
Particularly the explanatory power of diplomatic culture. Not only do
such musings help understand ASEAN and appreciate AMS’ agency
beyond materialistic dependencies. The above analysis could also be
seen as a general case study blueprint for other potential extra-mural
crises. So perhaps one should understand ASEAN’s overall neutrality in
the Indonesian sense of bebas dan aktif—not as
‘fence-sitting’ but as the maintenance of strategic autonomy; not to bow
to either side but seek creative ways to strike a balance.
These three motivating factors are not necessarily exhaustive. In fact,
there are several alternative drivers that may also be relevant. The most
obvious ones are anti-American sentiments or general suspicions against
an allegedly hypocritical West in some AMS, especially Malaysia and
Indonesia. Beyond Southeast Asia, it would be interesting to apply this
analytical framework to India, too. All this shall be left for further
research.
Unfortunately, the tragedy that is the war in Ukraine is likely going to
continue in one form or another for many years, perhaps decades. Going
forward, it is rather unlikely that the war in Ukraine will substantially
impact Southeast Asia’s diplomatic relations with Russia. For example, it
is highly likely that Russia will be invited to all ASEAN forums as per
usual. This will put AMS
The Pacific Review 25
in a difficult position, as the G-20 dilemma for Indonesian President Joko
Widodo showed. AMS and much of the non-Western world have no
desire to isolate Russia and exclude it from participation in mechanisms
of global and regional governance. Yet, ASEAN’s Western DP might
continue to articulate their protest with ‘walk-outs’ or even skip important
meetings that have Russian participation. That notwithstanding, no
AMS—except for Myanmar perhaps, whose junta has found common
ground with Moscow—sees their nation’s future primarily with Moscow,
militarily or otherwise. Vietnam and Russia have been drifting apart for
decades, not least because of the close Sino-Russian relationship and a
widening of options for Hanoi. And yet, Russia remains an integral part
of the regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region because
most in ASEAN want this so. It is perhaps time to question the validity of
binary perspectives and mono-causal explanation attempts and
appreciate the great diversity in tradition and perspective that exists
globally.

Notes
1. ASEAN has “Dialogue Partnerships” with eleven states/organisations of particular
importance. 2. Jokowi also invited Ukraine to the G-20.
3. Personal conversations with government and track-two representatives in Hanoi, August 2022.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

ORCID
Frederick Kliem http://orcid.org/0000-0003-1151-5846

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