Obligationes: Acta Philosophica Fennica

ACTA
PHILOSOPHICA
FENNICA
VOL. 55 1994
OBLIGATIONES
14th Century Logic of Disputational Duties
..
MIKKO YRJONSUURI
SOCIETAS PlllLOSOPillCA FENNICA

DISTRffiUTED BY AKATEEMINEN KIRJAKAUPPA, HELSINKI
ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA
Vol. 55
OBLIGATIONES
14th Century Logic of Disputational Duties
MIKKO YRJONSUURI
HELSINKI 1994
Copyright c 1994 The Philosophical Society of Finland
ISBN 951-9264-20-5
ISSN 0355-1792
•
411
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(J()MI\?> 011
Kierratykseen sopiva tuote
Alhaiset paast6t valmistuksessa
Hakapaino Oy, Helsinki 1993
Acknowledgements
That this study has been so long under preparation is not the fault of the
numerous people who have helped me. On the contrary, with all the encourage-
ment I have received, one might think that the book would have come out years
earlier.
The foremost thanks go to Simo Knuuttila, who has patiently read
through, commented and discussed several versions of the manuscript. I also
feel gratitude to Calvin Normore for detailed comments on the manuscript and
fruitful discussions on the themes. Also several others, including Jenny Ash-
worth, have given valuable comments on many issues.
The financial support of the Academy of Finland, Emil Aaltonen's
Foundation and Alfred Kordelin's Foundation has made the study economically
possible.
Especially I thank Jaana and Varpu, with whom I have enjoyed many
comic aspects of obligationes at home.
November 1993 Mikko Yrjonsuuri

Contents
Acknowledgements 3
I Introduction • . 7
ll Background of the Genre 18

A. Historical background 18
B. Systematic background 30
ill Walter Burley's Theory of Obligations 36

A. Obligations as duties 36
B. Essential rules 49
C. Useful rules 54
D. Speciei of positio 59
IV Revisions of the Rules . 64

A. What time is it? . 64
B. Rejection of the order principle 76
C. Two column book-keeping 89
V Obligational Reasoning and Epistemic Sophismata 102
A. General remarks . . . . • . . 102
B. Kilvington's revision . . . . . . . 108
C. Doubting whether one would know . . 127
D. One cannot doubt whether one knows 138
VI Modern Interpretations . . . • . • . . • 145

A. The disputational context . . . . . • 145
B. A method for discussing possibilities 158
C. Obligations as thought experiments 174
Literature • • . . • . • . . . . . . . . 177
I Introduction
Treatises De obligationibus are commonly recognized as one of the somewhat

obscure genres of logica modema arising in the thirteenth century. Contrary to
what the title may suggest, these treatises are not general discussions of the
logic of norms, or deontic logic, as it is now called. The obligations or duties
discussed are of a rather specific kind. The main topic of these texts is disputa-
tions, and the duties referred to by the title are involved in special disputations,
called obligational disputations and defined in a rather technical way in these
treatises. Generally an obligational disputation has a loose resemblance to the
ancient Greek method of dialectical encounters, familiar to modem scholars
mainly from Socrates's behaviour in Plato's dialogues. As we know, Socrates
kept asking questions and making inconvenient inferences from things accepted
by his partner.
Typically, in the main body of an obligational disputation there were two
actors. The role of the opponent was to put forward questions in the form ·of
sentences, which the respondent would evaluate one by one, answering by
affirming, denying or declaring them to be 'doubtful'. As the answers are in
tum evaluated after the technical disputation has been broken off by the oppo-
nent claiming 'the time is finished' (cedat tempus), it becomes clear that the
point of the process is in study of the inferential connections between the
sentences answered by the respondent. In her evaluations in the technical part
of the disputation, the obligational respondent had to take into account primarily
a special duty given to her in the beginning of the disputation by the opponent.
This special duty is the obligation referred to in the standard title of •the trea-
tises. Paradigmatically the special duty was that of granting some actually false
contingent sentence, called the positum. As far as possible, the respondent had
to, nevertheless, also keep the general duty of following the truth. The interest-
8 Introduction
ing complications of the theory follow from the idea that in the subsequent
answers she had to solve problems arising from the opposition between the
general and the special duty.
It is not documented that obligational disputations were actually under-
taken in the middle ages in the technical format assumed in the treatises devel-
oping the structure. Obligations were part of undergraduate requirements in arts
faculties, but it seems that we have explicit evidence of only that students were
required to know the art (see Weisheipl1964 and 1966). Our documents do not
tell about the (naturally oral) disputations in which the art probably was prac-
tised. Judging from comments on obligations that can be found in treatises
concentrating on other areas of philosophy, it seems that the principles of
obligations were taken to be applicable also to looser formats of disputations, in
some cases even to reasoning outside disputational context.
To modern scholars, the structure of obligational disputations has seemed
obscure. It seems that even though the essentials of obligational disputations are
easily conceived, the point of the thirteenth-fourteenth century discussions of the
technique has not been adequately grasped. A philosophical reading of the
treatises seems to have raised more new questions than resolved old ones. The
confusion is caused at least partly by the state of research. Obligational disputa-
tions have not been paid much attention in the study of the history of medieval
philosophy until recently. Even now, most of the relevant manuscripts have not
been edited (though it seems that critical editions of the most important treatises
exist), and only few systematic interpretations of the basics of the theory have
been published. However, it seems that an adequate picture of the historical
development of the genre is now emerging, in large part thanks to papers by
Jenny Ashworth (see, e.g., Ashworth 1981, 1984, 1985, 1986). Her papers
provide a good view of the development of the genre, but offer few interpreta-
tional insights.
My study of the technique cannot avoid being in a sense tentative. I rely
mainly on existing modern critical editions of the texts, and I have been able to
consult only relatively few critical evaluations of the philosophical import of
these texts. However, my aim is not to provide an overall account of the so
called obligational treatises in full detail. Rather, I will try, first, to construct an
Introduction 9
overview of some main lines of the development of the genre to its full maturity
in the fourteenth century, second, to point out what I see as the philosophically
most important and interesting themes in the development of the technique.
For philosophical interpretation of obligations, the foremost question is
how to reconstruct the rules in modem terms. In this respect, Ignacio Angelelli
and C. I. Hamblin made important contributions in 1970. Angelelli's paper
"The Techniques of Disputation in the History of Logic" (Angelelli 1970)
discusses obligations as a game-like special technique of disputation, closely
connected to Aristotle's Topics. Hamblin in his book Fallacies (Hamblin 1970)
looks at obligations as a game. For Hamblin, the game is more closely con-
nected to the theory of fallacies: he analyses the Obligation game as a method
of discussing invalid reasoning. Angelelli's and Hamblin's idea of constructing
obligational disputations as games is an illuminating idea, and generally it seems
to be historically admissible, although it is clear that the concept of game is
somewhat anachronistic. However, some minor difficulties with this reconstruc-
tion must be pointed out.
First, when the rules given by medieval authors are anal~zed, it turns out
that the rules determine at each step of the disputation one and only one answer
to the sentence put forward by the opponent. Thus the respondent has no
' of choice in 'his action relevant to the game, if he follows the rules.
freedom
Typically, the case is that the game is simply finished immediately, if the
respondent breaks the rules. The issue in the game thus looks like testing how
long the respondent will survive. This makes the process relatively uninteresting
as a game.
Second, defining the results of the game in any manner appropriate to
modem game-theory seems to be utterly problematic. The way in which
obligational principles of reasoning are referred to in many kinds of late
medieval philosophical texts makes it implausible that obligational disputations
should be taken as merely competitive games of joyous undergraduates of arts
faculties. Something more was involved, but it seems utterly problematic to find
out ways of giving points for interesting conceptual insights or other such things
during the game. However, the results of obligational disputations seem to have
much more direct relation to the content of the game than improved cleverness
10 Introduction
has to a game of chess, for instance. Unlike moves in chess, sequences of

obligational answers are also interesting from viewpoints external to the ex-
change itself.
As I see it, the main insight in reconstructing obligational disputations as
games lies in looking at these disputations as activities governed by rules in a
certain manner. In this sense, the German word spiel seems to catch the game-
like character of obligational disputations better than either play or game in
English. In the following I will keep to the English word game, assuming that
the problems pointed out above can just be left unsolved.
Bamblin assigns to the game of obligations certain interesting formal
properties. According to him (1970, pp. 258-262), the game is a) rule-consis-
tent, which means that according to the rules, "there is no circumstance in
which all possible acts would be prohibited;" b) semantically consistent, which
means that the rules never require the respondent to grant a contradiction, and
c) semantically unforced with respect to a given evaluation, which means that
the respondent cannot be forced to grant a sentence, which is false in a certain
model connected to the game.
It seems that it was an explicit aim of the medieval authors writing on
obligations that the rules of obligations should give rules that are consistent in
the sense of Hamblin's property a). The rules are in this way thought to be
advice for the respondent rather than demands on him. A respondent, who has
enough logical skill to be able to follow the rules carefully enough, can avoid
embarrassment in obligational games. Such a requirement of sufficient logical
skill is often simply too heavy, but it seems legitimate both when the game is
looked at as a logical exercise (since in an exercise you may assume the art to
be known) and as a joint venture of logical study (since mistakes can be cor-
rected).
It is easily seen that for obligational games Hamblin's property a) (rule
consistency) is closely related to b) (semantical consistency). It is generally
clear that denying a sentence is (at least approximately) equal to granting its
contradictory opposite. It follows naturally that if the respondent would in some
situation be forced to grant both a sentence (p) and its contradictory opposite
(-p), he would equally be forced to grant the sentence (p) and deny, i.e. not
Introduction 11
grant it. It seems that medieval authors were aware of the idea that the aim of
putting the respondent into inconsistent duties in a disputation amounts to
making him grant contradictions. However, it is for the modem reader illu-
minating to pick out both a) and b) as formal properties of obligational games.
While a) draws attention to the practical character of the game employing actual
people, b) draws attention to its logical character concentrating on assertions
and their logical relations. Obligational games are both actual disputations and
logical constructions. They combine logical procedures and disputational
practises in a way analogous to the explication of logic as rules of disputations
undertaken by Paul Lorenzen and Kuno Lorenz in the sixties and seventies (see,
e.g., Lorenzen and Lorenz 1978).
Hamblin's property b) is interesting also in another way. As Paul Spade
shows in his paper "Three Theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington and
Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning" (Spade 1982) there are several
concepts of semantical consistency relevant to obligations. In obligational
disputations sentences occur essentially in an order, and thus the concept of
semantical consistency of a simultaneously evaluated set of sentences is often
irrelevant. Instead, the relevant concepts of semantical consistency combine past
evaluations, a present evaluation, and potential evaluations (present or future) in
different ways. It turns out that different rules of obligational disputations are
connected to different preferences among the concepts of semantical consisten-
cy. It may also be pointed out that in typical obligational disputations it is not
possible to avoid all kinds of inconsistency simultaneously, because typically a
false assumption is combined with actual facts. Nevertheless, in every variation
of the game, some selected kind of semantical consistency is to be uncondi-
tionally sustained in defence, while others may be violated.
In philosophical interpretation of obligations, Hamblin's property c)
(semantical unforcedness) seems to be the most problematic. In most standard
medieval variations of the technique of obligations this property runs into
serious trouble if it is interpreted as a guide to answering. As I will show,
typically answers are not given for the reason that they are true in a certain
model - contrary to what Hamblin seems to imply. Nevertheless, it seems that
a certain model connected to the game is of crucial importance in interpretation
12 Introduction
of the results of the game. It seems that the reason for sustaining some kind of
semantical consistency is to find or build a model connected to the game so that
all relevant answers are true in the model. However, often the choice of a
suitable model depends on the order and selection of propositions evaluated in
the game. Consequently, the model cannot be found until after the whole
disputation, and the model cannot guide answers.
In most medieval variations of the technique of obligations, the set of all
past evaluations must be semantically consistent. Therefore, it is easy to build
after the game a model where all the given answers are true. In the case of
Swineshed, who allows certain contradictions in given evaluations, it is explicit
that certain evaluations must be discarded from the main list, which remains
semantically consistent. Generally, because the main set of given evaluations is
semantically consistent, a model can be built where its sentences are true. Such
model can in a rather interesting sense be called the model connected to· the
game, even if it can be found only retrospectively.
In the above mentioned paper (Spade 1982), Paul Spade has put forward
the suggestion that obligations were developed as a theory of counterfactual
reasoning. Spade's idea is to take seriously the fact that typically an obligational
disputation begins with a false sentence, which is given to the respondent as a
sentence which he must grant. Spade understands this as some kind of commit-+
ment to assent to the sentence. Such technique is naturally looked at as a
technique of assuming a false sentence. In Spade's interpretation, the idea is that
the subsequent disputation is reconstructed as a discussion of what would be the _
case, if the positum were true. Technically, his interpretation amounts to the
claim that obligational disputations are related to the so called counterfactual
conditionals discussed by modern logicians: for each sentence granted in an
obligational disputation there is a counterfactual conditional with that sentence
as the consequent and the positum as the antecedent.
A standard theme of papers on obligations published after Spade's discus-
sion has been to point out that the counterfactual conditionals corresponding to
obligational disputations are often (even usually) not true. Lots of examples
have been provided, because it is rather easy to find examples of obligationally
Introduction 13
grounded counterfactual conditionals which are. ridiculously false. This is taken

to imply that Spade's interpretation is fundamentally incorrect.
As I see it, rejection of Spade's interpretation has been too wholesale.
Spade's interpretation has been taken as the only way of applying modal logic
to obligations. Because Spade's interpretational idea - counterfactual condi-
tionals ~ did not work out properly, it has been thought that modal logic ought
not be applied to this context. However, counterfactual conditionals are not the
only construction of modal logic applicable to interpretation of obligations.
Indeed, even if it seems to be clear now that the issue is not counterfactual
conditionals, there seems to be no way around the fact that the typical positum
of an obligational disputation is an assumed contingently false sentence. In one
way or another, obligational disputations consider non-actual possibilities.
In "Norms and Action in Obligational Disputations" Simo Knuuttila and
I (Knuuttila and Yrjonsuuri 1988) adopt the strategy of applying possible world
semantics without trying to imply that the standard theories of obligations have
'any positive relation to counterfactual conditionals. In this paper, the approach
of modal logic is combined with a straightforward reading of obligational rules
as special disputational norms.
In terms of possible world semantics, the main point (and the problem) of
Spade's interpretation (Spade 1982) is that the model connected to a certain
obligational disputation ought to pick out the possible world, where the positum
is true and which is most similar or closest to the actual world in the sense
pointed out by David Lewis in his Counteifactuals (Lewis 1973). However, in
my view there is simply no guarantee that the obligational model picks out the
world which is closest. Instead, it seems that any world, where the positum is
true, could be picked out. It remains indeterminate whether the world is far or
near.
The problem with the main alternatives to Spade's interpretation seems to
be that they are more practical than philosophical. From the systematic point of
view a satisfactory interpretation is thus still to be found. From the historical
point of view it may sometimes be satisfactory to give a practical answer to a
why-question, but in the case of obligations a practical answer seems insuffi-
cient for the simple reason that the technique was developed in such depth. The
14 Introduction
practical purposes of examination and exercise, which have been put forward,
for instance, by Alan R. Perreiah (Perreiah 1984) and (less strongly) by Jenny
Ashworth (see, e.g., Ashworth 1986), would not alone require as elaborate a
theory as we find in the texts.
In her paper "Roger Swyneshed's Theory of Obligations," Eleonore
Stump (Stump 1981) compares obligations with Hector-Neri Castaneda's early
work on indexical expressions, as fields of philosophical study not classifiable
into any standard determinate field of study. Such solution feels like no solu~
tion. It may well be true that it is not possible to map obligations into any field
of modern philosophy, but the genre of medieval logic will remain obscure as
long as its main insights cannot be translated into modern philosophical ter~
minology.
Stump's main interpretational ideas (see Stump 1989) centre on the fact
that sentences in obligational disputations often refer to the disputational
context. The problem with this interpretational approach seems to be that rather
than being the main interest, the disputational context serves as the philosophical
background of the insights developed in the texts. The role of the disputational
background is by no means insignificant, but Stump seems to be right in her
almost parenthetical suggestion that something else is typically also included. In
her view, it is not possible to give an unified account of what is this something
else for the whole history of obligations.
The main interpretational thrust of my work is to combine the two
viewpoints of Spade artd Stump, presenting a revision of Spade's view as the
obscure 'something else' to be put into the disputational context discussed by
Stump. In other words, I will try to look at the genre of obligations as merging
issues relevant to modal semantics into the context of disputations. The view of
obligational disputations that emerges is a view of a certain type of process of
logico-semantical research. An obligational disputation appears as a joint
venture where the opponent and respondent adopt a disputational technique for
the purposes of some analytical study.
I do not intend to show that these disputations were not used in the
fourteenth certtury for some rather practical purposes pointed out by modern
scholars. Also, it seems quite possible that the obligational technique can be
Introduction 15
used or was used for other purposes falling outside the textual and interpreta-
tional scope of my study. However, generally I think that the technique of
obligations is primarily a technique for the kind of analytic study spelled out in
)
this work.
My idea of the role and purposes of obligations in certain fourteenth
century philosophical circles is neatly crystallized in a passage of an anonymous
treatise De arte obligatoria edited by Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump.
This passage is one of the few passages known to modern scholars explicitly
describing the reasons why obligational disputations are undertaken 1:
... there are three reasons why casus are supposed. The first is to test
whether the respondent possesses the art. The second is to provide direc-
tion, as happens among people talking together for the sake of an exercise.
The third reason is so that we may admit something false [but] possible
while finding out what follows in order that we may know what to do and
how to respond when things are in fact as the false casus indicates. For
jurists and moral philosophers in their attempts to find out about things
that have to be observed before [the situation] actually occurs investigate
the truth that ought to be established by means of possible casus in exer-
cises. Natural philosophers, on the other hand, more especially contem-
plate the speculative knowledge that has to do with men's concepts and
intentions.
Here the anonymous author rather simply remarks that obligational disputations
are undertaken for the purposes of exercise and examination. He puts the most
weight on the third purpose: developing a contingently false assumption.
According to him, this technique is adopted in various fields of philosophical
study.
There seems to be reason for taking the suggestions of this anonymous
author seriously. Recently, it has been argued by Fabienne Pironet that obliga-
1 " ••• casus causa triplici supponuntur. Prima, ut temptetur respondens numquid
artem habeat. Secunda, ut dispensatio habeatur, ut accidit inter conferentes ob exercitii

causam. Tertia causa est ut falsum possibile admittamus inquirendo quid sequitur, ut
cum res ita de facto se habeant ut falsus casus denotat, sciamus per prius suppositum
et rationem quid sumus acturi et responsuri. Iuristae enim et morales philosophi per
possibiliter casus antequam in re accidat de observandis inquirentes veritatem in
exercitiis statuendam explorant. Sed philosophi naturales scientiam speculativam quae
circa conceptus et intentus hominum versatur principal ius contemplantur." Kretzmann
and Stump 1985, passage [vi] (text on pp. 243-244, translation on pp. 251-252).
16 Introduction
tional technique is relevant to fourteenth century legal theory (Pironet forth-

coming). John Murdoch bas made it clear for modem scholars that much of
fourteenth century natural philosophy followed metalinguistic practices, as the
anonymous author suggests (see, e.g., Murdoch 1975; 1979; 1981). It seems to
be as clear that the method of assuming a casus was widely employed in late
medieval natural philosophy. Below, in chapter V, I will show that at least some
well known authors understood the casus in obligational terms, as the anony-
mous author claims to be generally the ·case.
My work proceeds in the following course. Chapter II provides first a
glance at the historical background of obligations. I will pick up the roots of
obligations as a theory of disputation and as connected to modal semantics. Both
roots are traced back to Aristotle, even if it seems to be possible to go back
even to presocratic philosophy. Section II.B contains a preliminary presentation
of how an obligational disputation works. Some preliminary rules of the game
are also put forward.
Chapter III is central in terms of the rules. There Walter Burley's varia-
tion of rules obligational disputations is discussed in detail. Since Burley's
variation seems to have been the standard one, the chapter serves the purpose
of elaborating on the exact rules of the technique. The rules are formalized as
conditional norms, valid for disputational contexts. A short discussion of the
speciei of obligational disputations recognized by Burley is also included, in
order to provide an overview of the genre.
"
Chapter IV considers medieval disagreements over the correct rules.
Section IV.A takes up the issue of time. According to the standard thirteenth
century rules, the time of the disputation must be pushed indefinitely into the
future, if the assumed positum is false at the actual present instant of the
disputation. The reason for this is based on the conception of the necessity of
the present. Due to some remarks of Johannes Duns Scotus, it became clear in
the beginning of the fourteenth century that the necessity of the present (if there
is any) ought not to be seen as strong enough to guide answers in obligational
disputations. The point of section IV.A is not only to illuminate this technical
discussion, but also to shed light on the way in which obligational disputations
Introduction 17
were seen as discussions of possibilities. Thus the main object of the chapter is
interpretative.
Somewhat different kinds of disagreement are taken up in sections IV.B
and IV.C. In the second quarter of the fourteenth century the status and treat-
ment of sentences, which are logically independent of the assumed positum, was
put into question. It seems that in this disagreement it was taken for granted that
the point of the discussion is to describe more fully the possibility pointed out
by the positum. The disagreement concerned the problem of augmenting the
assumption. In order to draw a full picture, it is necessary to augment the
assumption given typically as one sentence. However, different views of the
conditions of the augmentation were put forward. Two alternative views, and
semantical interpretations connected to them, are discussed in sections IV.B and
IV.C.
The trail from the detailed rules, discussed in chapter III, to their phi-
losophical interpretation, comes in chapter V to the stage of practical applica-
tion. It is well known by modern scholars of obligations that Richard Kilvington
gives the technique quite important position in the discussion of epistemic issues
in his Sophismata. Problems of epistemic logic and obligational reasoning are
also quite closely connected in some works of William Heytesbury. The point
of chapter V is to look at the reasons why obligations were taken to have this
intimate relation to epistemic issues in particular, and to illuminate the way in
which obligations are used as a technique in the analysis of problems of epis-
temic logic.
Chapter VI serves as a conclusion, but also as an evaluation of Eleonore
Stump's and Paul Spade's interpretations of obligations. The point is to provide
a fresh look at the two ideas of obligations: as disputations, and as studies of
assumptions. The last section connects these two approaches and gives the result
as my own interpretation. Chapter VI is the place to look, if you think that you
know the tradition of obligations well enough, and just want to know how I
interpret it (although for evidence you will mostly have to look at the earlier
chapters),
II Background of the Genre
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Two passages from Aristotle are often cited by medieval authors as background
for obligational theory. In Topics VIII, 4 (159a15 -24) Aristotle summarizes the
roles of the two players of the dialogical game discussed in Topics Vlll (transla-
tion is from Aristotle 1984):
The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make

the answerer utter the most implausible of the necessary consequences of
his thesis; while that of the answerer is to make it appear that it is not he
who is responsible for the impossibility or paradox, but only his thesis.
As can be seen from this passage, Aristotle's dialogical game centres on some
thesis which is defended by the answerer and attacked by the questioner. The
questioner (called opponent in the following) tries to lead the answerer (called
respondent in the following) into embarrassment by developing arguments in
opposition to the discussed thesis.
In Prior Analytics I, 13 (32a18-20) on the other hand, Aristotle defines
his terms as follows:
I use the terms 'to be possible' and 'the possible' of that which is not
necessary but, being assumed, results in nothing impossible.
Aristotle's idea that from the possible nothing impossible follows has played a
major role in later discussions of possibility, even if his other condition, that the
possible is not necessary, has often been dismissed. This passage seems to lack
any connection to the above quoted passage of Topics VIII, 4, and, in fact, it
may well be that they cannot be connected except by obligational theory: i. e.
by a theory discussing possibilities in disputational context.
Background of the Genre 19
In addition to these two quotations, a third passage of Aristotle is some-

times referred to in obligational treatises. This passage is from Metaphysics (IX,
4, 1047bl0-12), and its content is similar to the above quoted passage of Prior
Analytics. However, Metaphysics became known in the middle ages too late to
provide a historical foundation for obligations. The relation of obligational
theory and this passage seems to be rather contingent.
Modem scholars know very few texts where the medieval authors of
obligational treatises themselves comment in any detail on the background of the
theory; obligational treatises contain usually very little discussion of the back-
ground. In this respect, one of the most interesting texts is Boethius de Dacia's
Quaestiones super librum Topicorum (Boethius de Dacia 1976) from the latter
part of the thirteenth century. There obligational theory is introduced as a
special technique to be used within the context of dialectical disputations
proceeding along the lines discussed in Topics VIII. Boethius de Dacia's
discussion seems to suggest that if historical roots must be sought in Aristotle's
works, Topics is the most plausible candidate. 1
Aristotle's aim in Topics VIII is to give detailed advice on the practical
side of the dialectical encounters having the form standard in Plato's academy
which form seems to have been close to that of the Socratic dialogues. These
dialogical games, as they are called by modem scholars, proceed mainly
through yes/no -questions, which are selected and put forward by the opponent,
and answered by the respondent. The idea of the game is that the answers are
used in an inferential manner. The respondent is defending a thesis, and the
opponent aims at building an argument to refute the thesis. Aristotle recognizes
different purposes for such a game, which may simply be a zero-sum game,
where the opponent wins, if he succeeds in refuting the thesis within the time-
limits. In addition to these merely competitive games Aristotle distinguishes
games for inquiry, where the opponent and the respondent act jointly in order
to achieve the most interesting possible refutation for the thesis, which may be,
for instance, some claim of an old authoritative theory of some science.
1 Boethius de Dacia's text has been paid little attention by scholars writing on
obligational theory. I also discuss the text in Yrjonsuuri 1993a.
20 Background of the Genre
Chapters 1 -3 of Topics VIII are dedicated to the opponent, containing

advice on how to pose questions. As it turns out, this advice is relevant to the
contentious kind of game. In these chapters, Aristotle is mainly interested in
how the opponent can proceed in his questions so that the respondent does not
notice how the conclusion comes about. The idea is to conduct the disputational
game so that the opponent's victory comes about as a surprise to the respondent
- and to the audience. It even seems that Aristotle's advice is designed to help
the opponent to mislead the respondent into granting what he should not.
In general Boethius de Dacia accepts Aristotle's model of dialectical
disputation in his commentary. However, he makes a clear distinction between
sophistical, or competitive disputations and dialectical, or co-operative disputa-
tions. While On Sophistical Refutations is supposed to discuss the sophistical
kind of disputation, Topics is supposed to discuss only the co-operative kind.
This makes the advice in Topics (VIII, 1 - 3) problematic. How are these
contentious means applied in co-operative disputations? In several questions
Boethius de Dacia stresses that such means are also to be used in dialectical
disputations. In order to explain their applicability he often refers to disputations
for exercise, where the opponent may use these contentious methods in order to
give the respondent exercise in quick recognition of inferential relations even in
less easily recognizable situations. (See esp. Boethius de Dacia 1976, pp. 310-
321.)
Aristotle's methods of copcealment are discussed with a quite different
flavour in a family of thirteenth century treatises discussed and edited by L. M.
De Rijk in Die mittelalterliche Tractate De modo opponendi et respondendi (De
Rijk 1980). In these treatises the advice is clearly read as advice on how to win
a disputation, by fair means or foul. While Boethius de Dacia's main problem
is to show how co-operative disputants may use such contentious methods, these
treatises even develop further Aristotle's ideas in how to conceal the argumenta-
tion and how to mislead the respondent.
In Topics VIII, 5 Aristotle takes a tum in his treatment of the subject.
After re-asserting the different purposes of dialectical disputations, he claims
that no one else has before given any articulate rules on how to proceed in co-
operative disputations for the purposes of inquiry. It is clear that Aristotle does
not mean that he is the first to give rules for dialectical disputations in general;
his point is to develop a specific variety of a standard technique. According to
Diogenes Laertius, Aristotle credited Zeno of Elea as the inventor of the
dialectical technique, and it is clear that the technique had a rather well devel-
oped form already for Protagoras and at least for Socrates. Gilbert Ryle has in
his paper "Dialectic in the Academy" given an interesting sketch of the early
history of the dialectical technique (Ryle 1965).
Aristotle's rules for dialectical disputations with the purpose of inquiry are
mainly aimed at the respondent, only hints are given as to how the opponent
should proceed. The basic idea of these rules is - within the context of a
disputational game of yes/no -questions - to build an argument for the opposite
of the thesis to be refuted from more readily acceptable premises. Aristotle
employs the idea that dialectics proceeds from that which is better known
towards that which is less well known. There are different criteria of accepta-
bility: authorities, what is commonly assumed, or the respondent's own opin-
ions, but it must always be the case that the respondent grants only what is
more acceptable than the conclusion aimed at. Aristotle gives also the strange
principle that if the opponent asks for something which is irrelevant to the
argument being built, the respondent should grant it both if it is acceptable and
if is not, albeit with a remark of the status of the question in order to avoid
appearing foolish. The idea behind such a rule seems to lie in the co-operative
character of the game: the respondent should grant the opponent whatever he is
asked to, if it does not lead to difficulties in defence of the thesis. Anything
external to the argumentation is, consequently, always to be granted.
Aristotle's rules show how the disputational game is to be characterized
rather as argument-seeking than directly truth-seeking. A co-operative game
cannot be aimed at deciding whether the opponent can beat the respondent's
defence, and therefore the aim cannOt simply be to decide the truth value of the
thesis. Rather, the point of the game is in the search for the most interesting
refutation of the disputed thesis. Nevertheless, the game is closely bound to the
actual reality, and the search for interesting arguments does not move freely in
the logical space. Granting individual steps in the argumentation is dependent on
acceptability in relation to the actual reality, and the idea of the argument is to
support the actual acceptability of the conclusion.
Boethius de Dacia takes a step away from reality in his discussion of
Aristotle's rules (Boethius de Dacia 1976, pp. 321-329). The discussion
concentrates on Aristotle's mention of two kinds of mistakes .which the respon-
dent can make, in Topics (VIII, 4, 159a23-24):
For one may, no doubt, distinguish between the mistake of taking up a

wrong thesis to start with, and that of not maintaining it properly, when
once taken up.
Boethius de Dacia and Aristotle seem to understand the poor maintenance of the
thesis in the .same way, as a defence which allows the argument refuting the
thesis to be built too easily, so that the argument does not achieve full credibili-
ty, either because a problematic premise is granted or because a questionable
step of inference is allowed. On the other hand, taking a wrong thesis to defend
is treated quite differently by Boethius de Dacia and Aristotle. While Aristotle
seems to have in mind the competitive game and the problems of trying to
defend an incredible thesis, Boethius de Dacia is ready to admit even an
impossible thesis, probably simply because Aristotle himself allows the possi-
bility of an implausible thesis in the next chapter (VIII, 5, 159a38-159b2).
According to Boethius de Dacia, anything that can give ground for a good
exercise, or some kind of truth-seeking, ought not be called a wrong thesis .
..
Boethius de Dacia calls wrong only such a thesis, as from which there can arise
no interesting disputation. Boethius de Dacia's example is the parity of the stars:
there can be no interesting arguments to show either that the number of stars is
even or that it is odd (Boethius de Dacia 1976, pp. 323-325).
In order to clarify further what is to be understood as poor defence of the
thesis, Boethius de Dacia undertakes to discuss how the respondent should act
in the disputation. He gives a list of three requirements: 1
1 " ••• bene respondents debet esse talis, quod concedat opponenti omnia, quae
concederet sibi ipsi secum cogitanti, et eodem modo negare. Debet ex naturali suo
ingenio vel ex habitu acquisito esse aptus ad concedendum verum et ad negandum
falsum et debet diligere propter se verum. Debet tertio cavere, ne sit protervus, id est
velle aliquam positionem, pro qua non habet rationem et a qua per nullam rationem
.[1] A good respondent ought to be such that he grants to the opponent all
that he would grant for himself thinking by himself, and {such that he]
denies in the same way.
{2] He ought to be inclined from his inborn nature or from acquired habit
to grant truths and deny falsities and he ought to love truth for its own
sake.
{3] Third he ought to be aware that he should not be impudent, that is, to·
keep to some thesis for which he has no reasons and from which he cannot
be turned away by any reason. Such a person, namely, cannot come to
understand the truth.
There seems to be no doubt that a useful truth-seeking disputation is possible

only if the respondent fills these requirements. The respondent must try to tell
the truth, as is implied by [1] and [2]. If arguments do not effect the respon-
dents views, as is required by [3], the dispute can make no progress in any
interesting way. With obligational theory in mind, it is useful to see [1]-[3] as
basic dialectical duties, to be prima facie followed in any dialectical encounter.
In order to handle these duties more conveniently, let us formulate formal
analogues for them.
In this respect it seems suitable to join [1] and [2] into the analogous duty
according to which if the respondent knows something to be true, he ought to
grant it to his opponent, if he is asked to. Similar duties pertaining denial and
doubt can also be formulated. Formally these duties can be stated as follows:
Ta (p)((Krp & Rp) > OCp)

Tb (p)((Kr-P & Rp) > ONp)
Tc (p)((-KrP & -Kr-p & Rp) > ODp)
(Ta is read: For any proposition p, if it is known (' K') by the respondent rand
it is put forward ('R'), it must be granted. 'N' stands for denying and 'D' for
expressing doubt.) These duties can be characterized as the general duty to
follow truth. However, it is important to recognize that they must be character-
ized as primafacie duties, which can be overridden by other duties in certain
disputational settings. As it turns out, the whole of obligational theory is
potest removeri. Talis enim ad cognitionem veritatis non potest pervenite." Boethius de
Dacia 1976, p. 321.
concentrated on situations where these duties are overridden to some extent by

other special duties.
Boethius de Dacia's requirement [3] is connected to the idea of supplying
reasons for ones beliefs. As Boethius de Dacia applies this requirement, it is
technically expressed by the idea that, semi-formally, if the respondent defends
a proposition q, accepting p and the entailment D (p > -q) should have an
adverse effect on the defence of q. Accepting reasons for the opposite of the
thesis ought to make the respondent to grant the opposite of the thesis. With
obligational theory in mind, it seems appropriate to generalize: the respondent
ought to grant, if asked to, anything that he knows to be entailed by anything
that he has already granted. Such a duty can be formalized as follows:
E (p)(q)((Cp & K.-D(p > q) & Rq) > OCq
(without the deontic operator 'Cp' is comfortably read in the perfect tense as 'p
has been granted.')
It is noteworthy that in these dialectical duties the uncertainty essentially
connected with Aristotelian dialectical reasoning is almost lost. Aristotle's
concept of acceptability is replaced by the concept of knowledge, which implies
truth and allows no uncertainty. Generally, the respondent following Boethius
de Dacia's rules for dialectical disputations is, nevertheless, less bound by truth
than the one following Aristotle's rules. Boethius de Dacia places very clear
emphasis on the duty to keep consistent over the duty to follow truth. Especially
in disputations for the purpose of exercise, the duty to follow truth is almost
completely overridden by the duty to defend the thesis as well as possible. As
Boethius de Dacia points out, the respondent defending an impossible thesis may
grant falsities and impossibilities, but he may not grant anything inconsistent
(cf., e.g., Boethius de Dacia 1976, pp. 328-329).
According to Boethius de Dacia, the truth is especially clearly to btf
forgotten in an obligatio, which he introduces as a special technique to be
employed in dialectical disputations: 1
1 "Et cum hoc debes scire, quod in disputatione dialectica, quae est ad inqui-
sitionem veritatis vel ad exercitium in argumentis ad quodlibet propositum de facili

And with this you must know that in dialectical disputations, which are
[undertaken] for inquiry into truth, or for exercise in easy invention of
· arguments for whichever proposition or in defence of the thesis, the art of
obligations is often used.
Within the obligational technique developed by Boethius de Dacia after this

introductory clause, the respondent is given the duty to grant false, even
impossible propositions, if they are consistent. These propositions are called the
posita. The respondent is to grant whatever follows from the posita and deny
whatever is repugnant with them, regardless of truth value. The respondent
must also grant all propositions, which neither follow from nor are repugnant
with the posita, again regardless of truth value. I will return to these disputa-
tional rules below; here it suffices to point out that all propositions are evaluated
regardless of their truth values, solely on the basis of syntactic considerations of
consistency.
To sum up, Boethius de Dacia discusses obligational theory as a special
technique within the framework of Aristotelian dialectical disputations, as a
development of the norm of keeping consistent. However, this seems to be only
one side of the coin. Boethius de Dacia offers no explanation why the principle
found in Prior Analytics I, 13, that nothing impossible follows from the possi-
ble, is introduced into this framework. Boethius de Dacia plainly asserts the
usefulness of the obligational technique of making assumptions. He does not
give any explanations, not to speak of examples, of the useful character of such
a technique. With his Questiones super lib rum Topicorum or, for that matter,
with seemingly any treatise on obligational theory, we are at loss for any
explanations of how and why the idea of making possible or even impossible
assumptions is introduced into the disputational context.
Unlike Topics VIII, Prior Analytics I does not offer any more interesting
background material. Explanations or at least descriptions of the connection
between this disputational technique and the principle found in Prior Analytics
I, 13, are to be looked for elsewhere. As matter of fact, the above discussion of
Boethius de Dacia's remarks on obligational theory already show how the
inveniendis sive ad sustinendum positionem, saepe attenditur ars obligatoria,

Boethius de Dacia 1976, p. 329.
principle is not used exactly in the form given in Prior Analytics I, 13, but
rather in the more challenging form: from the consistent nothing inconsistent
follows. Especially thirteenth century treatments of obligational theory discuss
as much impossible than possible assumptions, albeit only certain kinds of
impossibilities are admitted.
Christopher J. Martin has in his paper "Obligations and liars" (Martin
1993) given a sketch of the history of the technique of using a 'counterpossible'
hypothesis. He begins with Manlius Boethius's (ca. 480-526) De hypotheticis
syllogismis (Boethius 1969) and draws a picture of how the technique developed
to form a full obligational theory towards the thirteenth century. Although a full
analysis of the early history of the technique cannot be given until more editions
of the crucial texts are available, Martin's picture is interesting.
The passage of Boethius's De hypotheticis syllogismis in question credits
Eudemus for distinguishing between two kinds of hypothesis: first, a hypothesis
used so that "something which can in no way come about is agreed to ... in
order that reason may be pursued to its limit," and second, the condition of a
consequence. 1 The latter is the one developed by Boethius in his theory of
hypothetical reasoning, which has been interpreted as a logic of conditionals.
The former kind of hypothesis, called 'Eudemian hypothesis' by Martin, is also
used in some cases by Boethius. The idea seems to be that, as Martin describes,
"we start with something agreed to be impossible and set out to explore its
logical structure." Boethius's example of such a process in De hypotheticis syl-
logismis is agreed separation of form from its matter "if not in things, at least
in understanding (si non in re, saltern in cogitatione)'' (Boethius 1969, p. 214).
According to Martin, this 'Eudemian procedure' is often called positio impossi-
bilis by medieval commentators of Boethius. From the viewpoint of obligational
theory it is interesting to notice that in some cases it is not required that the
hypothesis should be impossible. Also positio possibilis is mentioned.
1 "Hypothesis namquae, uode hypothetici syllogismi accepere vocabulum, duobus
(ut Eudemo placet) dicitur modis: aut enim tale adquiescitur aliquid per quamdam inter
se consentientium conditionem, quod fieri nullo modo possit, ut ad suum terminum
ratio perducatur; aut in conditione posita consequentia vi coniunctionis vel disiunctionis
ostenditur." Boethius 1969, p. 212.
An interesting early medieval example of the use of hypothesis in philo-

sophical discourse can be found from Anselm of Canterbury's De grammatico.
Let me quote a piece of the discussion between Teacher and Student from this
treatise written in the form of a dialogue: 1
Student. Although I cannot deny what You say, nevertheless I am not yet
convinced that "expert-in-grammar" does not signify man.
Teacher. Let us suppose there is some rational animal - other than man
- which has expertise-in-grammar, even as does a man.
S. It is easy to suppose this.
T. Therefore, there is something which is not a man but which has
expertise-in-grammar.
S. This follows.
T. But anything that has expertise-in-grammar is (an) expert-in-grammar.
S. I grant it.
T. Therefore, there is something which is not a man but is (an) expert-in-
grammar.
S. It follows.
T. Now, You say that "expert-in grammar" signifies man.
S. I do.
T. Therefore, something which is not a man is a man - a conclusion
which is false.
S. [I agree that] the argument is brought to this conclusion.
T. Therefore, do You not see that the only reason "expert-in-grammar"
seems to signify man more than does "white" is that expertise-in-grammar
1 "D. Quamquam non possim negare quod dicis, nondum tamen mihi persuasum est
quod grammaticus non significet hominem.

M. Ponamus quod sit aliquod animal rationale - non tamen homo - quod ita sciat
gr<!llliilaticam sicut homo.
D. Facile est hoc fingere.
M. Est igitur aliquis non-homo sciens grammaticam
D. Ita sequitur.
M. At omne sciens grammaticam est grammaticum.
D. Concedo.
M. Est igitur quidam non-homo grammaticus.
D. Consequitur.
M. Sed tu dicis in grammatico intelligi hominem.
D. Dico.
M. Quidam igitur non-homo est homo, quod falsum est.
D. Ad hoc ratio deducitur.
M. Nonne ergo vides quia grammaticus non ob aliud magis videtur significarehominem
quam a/bus, nisi quia grammatica soli homini accidit, albedo vero non soli homini?
D. Sic sequitur ex eo quod finximus. Sed sine figmento volo ut hoc efficias." Henry
1964, pp. 37-38. Translation is from Anselm of Canterbury 1976, p. 56.
is an accident only of man, whereas whiteness is not an accident only of

man?
S. This follows from what we have supposed. But I want you to prove this
without a supposition which is contrary to fact.
In this passage the Teacher uses a hypothesis to prove his point: that the
concrete term 'expert-in-grammar' (grammaticus) signifies man only as the
carrier of the signified accident, and that the term could thus in respect to its
signification be connected also to other substances. The hypothesis works as an
imagined counterexample, which is sufficient to resolve the conceptual issue at
stake. I:Iowever, the Student may legitimately require proof without such fictive
suppositions, if he requires resolution of a real instead of a merely conceptual
issue.
The resemblance of this passage to obligational theory is even stronger if
the latin text is consulted. The terminology selected by Anselm is the same as
that used in obligational treatises. "let us suppose" is a translation of "posito,"
"I grant it" renders "concedo", etc. The process follows obligational practises
as well: after the positum, which is accepted as imaginable, propositions are put
forward by the Teacher, and granted by the Student. Three first propositions
follow from the positum, and are granted for that reason. The fourth and fifth
are from the viewpoint of Burley's rules of obligational disputations (to be
considered in chapter II) especially interesting. Here '"expert-in-grammar'
signifies man" is granted although it has no connection to the assumed positum,
.,
because it is accepted as true by the Student. The last proposition considered
combines this extraneous proposition with the propositions following from the
positum - and leaves the Student at an embarrassing situation. Then the
assumption is forgotten and the results of the piece of disputation are evaluated.
Even though this piece of disputation is reminiscent of the obligational
disputations, I do not think that there is any reason to think that Anselm knew
of obligational theory in any technical sense. The earliest texts considering the
technique technically seem to date from a hundred years later. The reason for
the similarity lies rather in the simplicity of the basic idea behind the highly
technical obligational disputations of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
Anselm uses the method, but he does not use it as a technique: he had to rely
on general intuitions of how a disputation proceeds if it employs a hypothesis.

The point of the theory of obligations was to provide an elaborated technique
for such thought experiments.
As for reasons why the use of hypothesis was connected to disputational
theory, one can only point out the importance of disputations for both the
ancient and the medieval philosophical enterprise. Anselm's text is but one
example of the central role of disputations. Also, it seems to deserve mention
that Boethius as well as later authors refer to the 'agreement' (consensus) which
is necessary in assuming a hypothesis. Literally, this word requires at least two
parties, who agree, and consequently some kind of dialectical encounter with
two or more persons present. As the history went, it seems to be no wonder that
the technical treatment of using a hypothesis is to be found in the context of
highly technical disputations.
If the use of hypothesis is to be found in the historical background, an
explanation emerges of why early authors of obligational theory, up to the
beginning of fourteenth century, elaborate on the idea of an impossible positum.
If Boethius's Eudemian hypothesis lies at the roots, we should ask why and
when they start discussing possible positum, instead of asking why they discuss
impossible positum.
As they stand, discussions of impossible positum are less special than one
might expect. The idea is simply to give the respondent something impossible
to defend; impossible in some unfortunately undefined sense, not implying any
contradiction. From the modem point of view such impossibilities look like a
subcategory of logical possibilities.
I will return in chapter IV.A to the disappearance of impossible positio in
the fourteenth century. As for the early history, the situation is obscure. As I
see it, the interest in obligational disputations was already in the early period
directed to logical possibilities, even if application of this concept seems
dangerously anachronistic. Spelling out the twelfth and thirteenth century
obligational discussions in terms of possibility seems rather complicated.
B. SYSTEMATIC BACKGROUND
It is clear that the technical format of obligational disputations assumed by the

fourteenth century authors was a contingent result of historical developments.
Assumptions can be developed within disputational contexts in various ways. In
this respect the theoretical disagreements of the fourteenth century seem rather
narrow. In order to characterize the technical consensus, let us compare it to an
alternative suggested in the thirteenth century by Boethius de Dacia. Let us
begin the comparison by a preliminary desc:fiption of the standard format
assumed in the fourteenth century. A suitable author is William Ockham, who
describes in his Summa logicae the structure of an obligational disputation as
follows: 1
And this art consists in this that in the beginning some proposition has to
be posited, and then propositions have to be proposed as pleases the
opponent, and to these the respondent has to answer by granting or
denying or doubting or distinguishing. When these answers are given, the
opponent, when it pleases him, has to say: "the time is finished." This is,
the time of the obligation is finished. And then it is seen whether the
respondent has answered well or not.
According to this description, the main body of an obligational disputation

consists of propositions put forward by the opponent and evaluated by the
respondent on the basis of the positum determined in the beginning. The
opponent serves an active role;' he has the choice of propositions to be put
forward, and he has the decision of when to break off the main process.
Ockham distinguishes four possible answers which the respondent may give.
Granting, denying and doubting form the standard domain of answers in
treatises on obligational theory, and Ockham seems to be quite alone in allowing
also distinguishing. However, it must be remembered that in the general theory
1 "Et consistit ars ista in hoc quod in principia debet aliqua propositio poni, deinde
debent propositiones proponi secundum quod placet opponenti, ad quas debet respon-
dens respondere concedendo vel negando vel dubitando vel distinguendo. Quibus
responsionibus datis debet opponens, quando sibi placet, dicere: cedat tempus. Hoc est,
cessat tempus obligationis. Et tunc videndum est an respondens bene responderit vel
non." Ockham 1974, p. 736.
and practise of medieval disputations distinguishing was perhaps even the most
interesting answer. That it is not usually discussed in obligational treatises
seems to be connected to the fact that making a distinction is necessary only
when the question has been ambiguous. Discussion of ambiguous questions
seems to fall outside the scope of obligational theory. From its viewpoint
making a distinction can be reduced into two answers to different questions.
Ockham's statement of what happens after the opponent has chosen to say
"the time is finished" may first give the impression that the issue is to test the
respondent through testing his ability to answer obligational questions. How-
ever, it must be pointed out that there is no reason to think that this checking of
the respondent answers is a simple and in itself uninteresting procedure. Since
this stage of the disputation contains also the evaluation of the reasoning by
which the respondent decided his answers, it is the stage where philosophical
and analytical discussion is undertaken. Consequently it is by far the most
interesting part of the disputation.
It seems that most medieval authors would have agreed on Ockham's
description of the structure of an obligational disputation. This description is
applicable to the earliest known treatises of obligational theory, Tractatus
Emmeranus de falsi positione, Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione
(De Rijk 1974) and Obligationes Parisienses (De Rijk 1975), and also to typical
fourteenth century treatises like, for example, those by Walter Burley (Burley
1963), Roger Swineshed (Spade 1977) and Paul of Venice (Paul of Venice
1988).
Boethius de Dacia's comments on obligational theory found in his Ques-
tiones super librum Topicorum are also interesting in this respect, presenting an
account of the obligational disputation, which does not agree with Ockham's
description. As Boethius de Dacia tells us, the art of obligations 1
1 " ••• super hoc fundatur, quod opponens ponat omnes positiones, quas vult ponere,
et respondens debet eas concedere, sive sint probabiles sive improbabiles sive necessa-
riae sive impossibiles, dummodo non inveniat, quod sint incompossibiles - sola enim
est incompossibilitas causa, quare respondens debeat negare opponenti aliquid eorum,
quae vult ponere - usque quo dixerit: "cedat tempus," et omnia quae ante sunt posita
intelligantur a respondente concessa. Tunc ex his, quae posita sunt, interrogat opponens
respondentem, et debet respondens concedere omnia consequentia ad suam positionem,
is based on the opponent positing every thesis which he wants to posit, and
the respondent must grant them, whether they are probable or improbable,
whether necessary or impossible, as far as it does not happen that they are
incompossible - incompossibility being the only cause why the respondent
has to deny the opponent any of those, which he wants to posit - until he
(the opponent) says "the time is finished," and all which have been posited
before this are understood to be granted by the respondent. Then from
these which are posited, the opponent questions the respondent, and the
respondent must grant all consequents of his thesis ... And the respondent
must deny everything which is repugnant to his thesis.
This account differs from Ockham's account in at least two connected respects.
First, Boethius de Dacia discusses how a set of propositions are given as posita,
while Ockham uses the singular. Second, Boethius de Dacia places the phrase
"the time is finished" between the posita and the propositions evaluated by the
respondent. He makes no mention of a stage of disputation where the respon-
dent's answers would be in tum evaluated.
It seems natural that the phrase "the time is finished" marks the end of
that stage of disputation, which is seen to be the technical part. While Ockham
sees the disputation primarily as a process of building a reasoning by putting
forward propositions on the basis of a positum that is agreed on, BoethitJS de
Dacia seems to understand the disputation as an evaluation of the consistency of
a set of propositions. In this latter model, the respondent is not so much
evaluating whether a given proposition follows from what has been accepted
earlier, but whether a proposition is consistent with what has been accepted
~
earlier, and thus whether it can be admitted into the set of posita. Boethius de
Dacia's theory of obligations thus seems to amount to a theory of introducing a
complex assumption. His idea is to evaluate when a set of sentences can be
introduced as posita.
Such a rule of introduction of posita is given as the criterion of internal
consistency of the positum or the set of posita in several thirteenth century
treatises on obligational theory, including those which agree rather with Ock-
quia si ea non concedit sibi contradicit, quia positionem suam negat; negato enim
consequente negantur sibi omnia antecedentia. Et debet negare omnia repugnantia suae
positioni, quia concesso ali quo eorum, quae repugnant positioni, positio negatur."
Boethius de Dacia 1976, pp. 329-330.
ham's description of the process than with Boethius de Dacia's account. How-
ever, it is clear that this criterion has a slightly different meaning in the case of
a single proposition serving as a positum. In the species of impossible positum
it is required that the positum is such that "it does not directly imply any
contradictions." In the species of possible positum such a requirement of
consistency turns into a requirement of non-paradoxicality. From the early
treatises Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi positione and Obligationes Parisienses
we find discussions of how "the positum is false" cannot be admitted as the
positum (De Rijk 1974, pp. 104-106; 1975, p. 28). Such discussions are not
found in later treatises of obligations, seemingly because the genre of insolubilia
specialized on discussions of such paradoxes.
Interesting examples of how the type of obligational disputation suggested
by Boethius de Dacia works can be found from the thirteenth century treatise De
petitionibus contrariorum (De Rijk 1976). This treatise presents a series of
sophisms, which follow Boethius de Dacia's rules for obligational disputation.
First the opponent gives a set of sentences, which are admitted as the posita.
After this stage, one proposition is put forward. As it turns out, it has to be
both granted and denied, since it both follows from the set of posita, and is
repugnant to the set. Following the obligational rules for granting the sequent
and denying the repugnant thus leads to trouble. This problem is solved by
pointing out how the assumed set of posita already includes inconsistency - it
requires contraries to be admitted, as the title suggests. The solution is to refuse
to accept all the posita, and object at the step where inconsistency enters. This
follows Boethius de Dacia's rule telling that inconsistent posita are not to be
admitted.
The anonymous author explicitly points out that "this kind of sophismata
are not to be solved as sophismata ofjalsa positio" (p. 44). This remark makes
it clear that the theory of obligations employed in these sophisms is not the
standard theory of positio favoured in the thirteenth century. Rather, the theory
employed is the one suggested by Boethius de Dacia. Consideration of the
thirteenth century treatises edited by L. M. De Rijk (De Rijk 1974, 1975, 1976)
thus makes it clear that Boethius de Dacia's rules of obligational disputation
were in this early period competing with the approach that seems to have
become the standard view in the beginning of the fourteenth century.
Most treatises dedicated to obligational theory concentrate on giving
detailed rules of how the respondent should evaluate propositions put forward
after the positum or posita. From the structure of obligational disputation
suggested by Boethius de Dacia it is clear that his rules for this purpose are
simple. As he already in the above quoted passage points out, the posita are
understood to be granted, and thus anything that follows from the posita must
be granted and anything that is repugnant to them must be denied. As it turns
out, these simple rules can be found in any obligational theory, elaborated and
qualified in differing ways. They can be formalized as follows:
R 1 (p) ((Pp & Rp) > OCp)

R2 (p)(q) ((Pp & D(p > q) & Rq) > OCq)
R3 (p)(q) ((Pp & D(p > -q) & Rq) > ONq)
(Here 'Pp' stands for 'pis the positum.' R 1 is thus to be read: For any proposi-
tion p, if it is the positum and it is put forward, it must be granted.) R1 is
clearly a competitor of the prima facie dialectical duty Ta• requiring the respon-
dent to grant any known true sentence put forward, while R2 and R3 are
versions of the duty E requiring consistency in answers. In R2 the positum is
given the place of a granted sentence occurring in E. R3 simply gives the
analogous duty for negative answers.
. In addition to these rules Boethius de
Dacia states that any irrelevant proposition, that is, proposition which neither
follows from nor is repugnant to the posita, must be granted regardless of truth-
value. This can be formalized as follows:
R4 (p) ((Ip & Rp) > OCp)
(Here 'I' stands for 'irrelevant.')

Boethius de Dacia's rules are clearly formulated with the idea that only
one or two propositions are put forward after the posita. The aim of the propo-
sitions is not to build any argumentation, it is simply to expose the possible
hidden inconsistency in the set of posita. This happens by pointing out a
proposition which both follows from and is repugnant to the set of posita. In
such a context it is clear that the propositions are put forward one by one, and
forgotten after the answer is given, if no problems arise. The rule for irrelevant
propositions is understandable within such a context: the lack of logical connec-
tion to the posita makes it unproblematic to grant even a false irrelevant
proposition, and thus the respondent can safely follow the Aristotelian idea of
co-operative disputations, that the respondent should grant the opponent every-
thing that the opponent wants, if that does not cause any problems.
As I pointed out, the structure of an obligational disputation described by
Ockham is rather different. His description seems to agree with the main line of
the development of the theory already from the beginning of the thirteenth
century. The idea that there is only one positum, and that the aim of the
propositions put forward is to develop an argumentative whole, requires rules
quite different from those given by Boethius de Dacia. If we look at the various
treatises, we indeed find differing rules. Thirteenth century treatises are general-
ly quite unanimous about the central rules, but from the fourteenth century we
find a discussion of what would be the correct set of rules.
Walter Burley's Treatise on obligations written in 1302 has been discussed
by modem scholars as giving an example of the standard model of obligational
disputations. Since Burley's treatise is also relatively long and carefully com-
posed, it offers a good basis for study. It is to this treatise that i now tum -
but that requires a new chapter.
III Walter Burley's Theory of Obligations
A. OBLIGATIONS AS DUTIES
Walter Burley begins his Treatise on obligations (Burley 1963) with a slightly
altered paraphrase of the passage of Aristotle's Topics VIII, 4 quoted in the
introduction. The very fact of beginning the treatise in such a way shows how
Burley conceived the art of obligations as an inheritor of Aristotle's dialectical
encounters. Simultaneously, however, alterations to Aristotle's text show that
his obligational theory is not simply reducible to the technique described by
Aristotle. Burley describes the roles of the two participants of the disputation as
follows: 1
The opponent's job is to use language in a way that makes the respondent
grant impossible things that he need not grant because of the positum. The
respondent's job, on the other hand, is to maintain the positum in such a
way that any impossibility seems to follow not because of him but rather
because of the positum.
...
Burley's description of the role of the respondent is basically similar to Aris-
totle's. The idea is, in both texts, that there is a thesis, or in standard medieval
terminology, apositum, which the respondent is defending in a disputation. The
respondent should use his logical skills so that it appears that any arising
problems were present implicitly already in the beginning, in the positum he is
bound to defend.
1 "Opus opponentis sic inducere orationem ut faciat respondentem concedere

impossibilia quae propter positum non sunt necessaria concedere. Opus autem respon-
dentis est sic sustinere positum ut propter ipsum non videatur aliquod impossibile sequi,
sed magis propter positum." Burley 1963, p. 34. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 370.
Walter Burley's Theory of Obligations 37
In his description of the role of the opponent Burley does not follow
Aristotle's idea as closely. According to Aristotle, the opponent should "so to
develop the argument as to make the answerer utter the most implausible of the
necessary consequences of his thesis" (Topics, VIII, 4, 159a18-20). Burley
turns this idea upside down: according to him, the opponent ought not be
interested in those paradoxes which follow from the discussed positum, but
instead he should try to mislead the respondent into accepting extraneous
impossibilities, which "he need not grant because of the positum." This diffe-
rence in the two texts is due to the basic difference between the status of thesis
in the Aristotelian dialectical encounter and the status of positum in obligational
disputations. While the point of the ancient dialectical encounters was to
evaluate the thesis and the arguments built against it, in obligational disputations
the falsity, or even impossibility of the thesis was clear at the outset. In the
Aristotelian disputations the point was, more or less, to determine whether the
thesis is admissible or not, and whether the arguments built in the disputation
were sound in terms of the reality. In obligational disputations the interest was
not in facts of the real world, but in logical, even purely syntactical relations
among sentences put forward in the disputation.
The art of obligations carries this label because these disputations are
based on some duty concerning the thesis, or as Burley says, the statable thing
(enuntiabile) at issue, usually called the positum. According to Burley's defini-
tion an obligation "is a prefix belonging to the statable thing [at issue] in
accordance with specific condition." 1 Some modem scholars have claimed that
obligational theory has nothing to do with duties in the general sense of ethics
(see, e.g. Spade 1977, p. 244; 1982, p. 1). However, even if it is clearly true
that ethics in general are not at issue in this theory, it seems as clear that
medieval scholars did conceive the rules of obligational theory to be norms in
a limited understanding of the term. As my discussion of Boethius de Dacia's
disputational theory in chapter IT has shown, obligational theory might be called
normative in the very limited meaning of providing norms of action in disputa-
1 "Ideo primo oportet scire quid sit obligatio. Et dicendum quod est praefixio
enuntiabilis secundum aliquem statum." Burley 1963, p. 34. Translation in Burley
1988, p. 370.
38 Walter Burley's Theory of Obligations
tion, as far as the logical side of how the respondent ought to argue is con-
cerned. Also Burley refers to the prima facie norms of granting what is known
to be true and denying what is known to be false; he as well gives the etymolo-
gy of obligatio as ob aliud ligatio. To be obligated in an obligational disputation
is to be bound to do some special things, as the idea of a duty is to bind to do
something. 1
Treatment of obligations used in this art as duties understood in such a
limited way is extremely clear in the species of obligations called petitio,
discussed shortly by Burley and some other authors of obligational treatises .. In
this species there is no central thesis, nor anything corresponding fo it. Instead,
the opponent commands the respondent directly to some action relevant to the
disputational situation. The name of this species comes from the verb 'to
require' (petere), and as Burley recognizes, to require does not alone suffice to
constitute an obligation,. but on the condition of respondent's consent to what is
required by the opponent, this species is a species of obligation. 2 Burley has in
mind the general norm of keeping promises. If the respondent promises to fill
the requirement, he has the obligation to do so. Burley's discussion of this
species is centred on logical problems of norms, and many of his remarks are
interesting from the viewpoint of modem deontic logic.
In his discussion of petitio Burley distinguishes from the general field of
requirements the field of dialectical petitio, which is defined as "an expression
that insists that in the disputation 'Some act must be performed with regard to the
statable thing [at issue]." 3 Such restriction in the field of acceptable petitio
seems to be necessary in order to make the technique a species of obligational
1 " ... et dicitur obligatio quasi ob aliud ligatio." Burley 1963, p. 34. Translation in
Burley 1988, p. 370. For discussion of applying the general duties of granting what is
true and denying what is false to obligational theory, see Knuuttila and Yrjonsuuri
1988.
2 "Adhuc videtur quod petitio non sit obligatio, nam petere non est obligare, quia,
nisi respondens consentiat propter petere opponentis, neue magis neque minus est
obligatus. Dicendum quod petitio est obligatio, sed non quaelibet, sed solum petitio
quae est cum consensu." Burley 1963, pp. 41-42. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 374.
3 "Petitionum alia vulgaris, alia dialectica, sed de petitione vulgari, nihil ad
praesens. Petitio dialectica est oratio deprecativa respectu alicuius actus qui habet
exerceri circa enuntiabile in disputatione." Burley 1963, p. 41. Translation in Burley
1988, p. 374.
theory, that is, to guarantee that the disputation based on a petitio is centred on
some logical issue. The statable thing at issue is called the obligatum by Burley.
According to Burley the general nature of petitio makes it look like it were the
genus for all the species of obligations. That this is not the case, is pointed out
by showing that the duties imposed directly, or per se, by an accepted petitio
may be imposed also indirectly, or per accidens. 1 In a petitio the opponent can
require the respondent to grant something, for example that he is running.
Given the respondent's consent, he is directly bound to granting that he is
running. However, the respondent can also be bound to maintain that he is
running, which does not directly imply that he must grant that he is running,
but, all the same, if he is asked whether he is running, he must grant it. This
latter technique of binding the respondent to give an affirmative status for
certain sentences was called positio, and was seen to be the most important
technique of obligational disputations.
Burley limits the field of requirements admissible within the technique of
petitio by some qualifications, not all of which are relevant only to the disputa-
tional setting. He points out that "no petitio should be admitted unless it is in
the respondent's power to satisfy the requirement. " 2 This qualification ('ought
entails can') is familiar from modern treatments of deontic logic, and it is also
found in fourteenth century treatments of deontic operators in ethical contexts
(see Knuuttila 1993a, pp. 190-196). Another interesting discussion is Burley's
consideration of disjunctive petitio. He says that "some people say that if
someone requires a cow or a donkey, it is up to the man from whom it is
required to give whichever he likes, a cow or a donkey, and he thereby satisfies
the requirement. " 3 The problem of disjunctive obligations is also familiar from
modern treatments of deontic logic.
1 " ... et videtur esse genus ad omnem speciem obligationis," and, some lines later:
"Dicendum quod petitio per se obligat ad actum, sed positio per accidens sol urn."
Burley 1963, p. 41. Translation in Burley 1988, pp. 373-374.
2 "Nulla petitio est admittenda, nisi fuerit in potestate respondentis ut satisfacere
petitioni." Burley 1963, p. 43. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 376.
3 "Quidam dicunt quod, si aliquis petat bovem vel asinum, in voluntate ill ius, a quo
petitur, est dare utrum voluerit, bovem vel asinum, et satisfaceret petitioni." Burley
1963, p. 44. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 377.
It also deserves recognition that petitio is not the only species of obliga-
tions that is interesting from the viewpoint of deontic logic. Burley distinguishes
a variety of different kinds of positio. Among the different species of positio he
discusses the possibility of determining a positum, which is dependent on a
condition (Burley 1963, pp. 76-81). Such positio gives the respondent the duty
to maintain the positum only if the condition is fulfilled - it is clear that such
examples are interesting in connection to modem as well as medieval discus-
sions of conditional obligation. I will consider Burley's discussion of this
species of obligation in detail below.
In his more systematic treatment of the speciei of obligational disputations
Burley gives the difference between per se and per accidens obligation to grant
something as a difference between obligations concerning an act (actum) or a
disposition (habitum). When also the distinction between obligations concerning
a term (incomplexum) and a statement (complexum) is introduced, the speciei of
obligations fall into four types. Writing the former distinction as rows ·and the
latter as columns, we achieve the following diagram: 1
obligat II super incomplexum I super complexum

ad actum petitio 'sit verum'
ad habitum institutio positio
depositio
.. dubitatio
As I already pointed out, petitio is a species of obligational disputation,

where the respondent is directly bound to some disputational act, typically an
external act of giving a certain answer. It concerns a 'term' (incomplexum) since
1 "Sed quia genus non est praeter suas species, primo est obligatio dividenda in
suas species. Obligatio sic dividitur: aut obligat ad actum aut ad habitum, et utraque sic
dividitur: aut quia cadit super complexum aut super incomplexum. Si obliget ad actum
et cadat super incomplexum, sic est 'petitio.' Si super complexum, sic est 'sit verum.'
Si obliget ad habitum, et cadat super irtcomplexum, sic est 'institutio.' Si super com-
plexum, aut obligat ad habendum pro vero, et sic est 'positio,' aut ad habendum pro
falso, et sic est 'depositio,' aut ad habendum pro dubio, et sic est 'dubitatio.' Et sic
sunt sex species obligationis." Burley 1963, pp. 34-35. Translation in Burley 1988,
p. 370.
the answer (concedo, nego or dubio) is not in this sense seen to be a proposition
(complexum). In the species of 'sit verum' the respondent is also bound to some
act, but in this case the act concerns a proposition. As Burley defines the
species, the act in issue may be any act of mind concerning a proposition, and
in all the examples he considers the act required for knowing a proposition. For
example, 'sit verum' could obligate to the mental act, by which you know that
you are in Rome. It may be somewhat problematic to identify what would be
this act, but in modem terms, the species of obligations 'sit verwn' seems to
consider cases where the respondent is obligated to propositional attitudes,
conceived as acts of the mind. In this sense the act required in the species of 'sit
verum' clearly concerns a complexum, which makes it slightly more understan-
dable why Burley introduces the typically external petitio as concerning an
incomplexum.
Petitio and 'sit verum' are interesting mainly as contrasted to positio,
which is in many interesting ways discussed as a duty of giving a certain status ·
to a false proposition. Positio neither gives a duty to simply grant the proposi-
tion, nor a duty to behave as if it really were true. Nevertheless, it gives in
some manner the duty to maintain the proposition as true. As speciei of obliga-
tional disputations, petitio and 'sit verum' complicate in interesting ways the
interaction of different kinds of false assumptions in obligational disputations.
The field of different kinds of assumptions is complicated further by the
common use of some actually false casus as "making definite" the truth of the
matter before the false positum is given. I will return to the interpretation of
casus below.
Also a seventh species of obligations, suppositio, is recognized by Paul of
Venice in the chapter dedicated to obligations in his Logica magna, written
towards the end of the fourteenth century. The purpose of suppositio, as a
species of obligations, seems to be to serve the purposes of the earlier technique
of casus. (Paul of Venice 1988, see esp. pp. 37-39; 49.)
As speciei of obligational disputations, petitio and 'sit verum' seem to
drop out of the field already at the beginning of fourteenth century. William
Ockham, while giving Burley's division of the different kinds, remarks that
petitio "does not have much space in individual sciences" and that 'sit verum'
"cannot differ much either from positio or from petitio. " 1 Very few authors
discussing obligational theory after Ockham more than mention these speciei. In
particular, systematically most interesting treatises do not give any special status
to them. For example, Paul of Venice mentions them only to say that they do
not result in anything distinct from positio (Paul of Venice 1988, p. 39).
The fate of institutio is different. It is recognized in practically all treat-
ments of obligational theory, and given an il)lportant status in several treatises.
However, it seems that after the disagreements over the correct rules at the
second quarter of the fourteenth century, this species, now called impositio, was
understood simply to apply the rules of positio in specific kinds of cases. This
is the explicit viewpoint of Paul of Venice (1988, p. 39). For Burley institutio
was an independent species of obligational theory requiring its own rules. He
understood institutio as the kind of obligation, where the respondent is given the
duty to understand some words in a given new meaning. Burley clearly was not
the inventor of such a technique. His discussion is also in this issue based on an
earlier treatment by an obscure master W. (possibly William of Sherwood2)
and the species of institutio is suggested in an even earlier treatise of obligation-
al theory, the anonymous Obligationes Parisienses (De Rijk 1975, p. 27). The
name of the species is taken from the standard terminology of medieval seman-
tics: spoken and written languages were taken to be characteristically based on
convention, and the imagined agreement in which the meaning of a word was
fixed was called impositio or institutio. If in an obligational disputation a new,
temporary meaning was given for some words, this agreement was accordingly
called a new impositio or institutio.
Burley's examples of problems encountered in disputations based on
institutio are connected to paradoxes based on .self-referentiality. A typical
example is the following: A is to signify "A signifies [something] false," and it
is asked whether A signifies something true or something false. This example is
1 " ... non habet magnum locum in scientiis particularibus." Ockham 1974, p. 735;
" .. .ista obligatio non potest multum differre tam a positione quam a petitione." Ibid, p.
743.
2 This treatise is edited in Green 1963. Green attributes the treatise to William
Sherwood (with a question-mark). For alternative discussion of the authorship, see
Spade and Stump 1983.
a variation of the liar's paradox, and Burley's solution of it is comparable to

Burley's explicit discussion of the liar in his treatise on insolubilia.
Of Burley's six speciei of obligations, three are located to the same
comer. Also in the separate treatments of these speciei, positio, depositio and
dubitatio are closely related. Depositio and dubitatio can be seen as variations
of the main theme, positio. While in positio some sentence is given an affirma-
tive status so that it must be granted, in depositio some sentence is given a
negative status with corresponding rules. The theoretical similarity is so strong
that giving a certain sentence as a depositum has exactly the same force as
giving the negation of that sentence as the positum.
The point of dubitatio is that a sentence is given the status of a doubtful
sentence; the respondent must doubt it, and he may not grant nor deny it even
later in the disputation. Dubitatio may seem more interesting than depositio, as
it cannot be in such a simple way reduced to positio. However, the apparent
suggestion of a third truth value loses much of its interest, when it is recognized
that giving an affirmative answer to a sentence in an obligational disputation
should not be interpreted as an assignment of an affirmative truth value. Even
in the species of dubitatio it is kept clear that there are only two truth values,
although an actual respondent can evaluate a sentence in three different ways.
As it turns out, more interesting discussions of the import of a doubtful answer
can be found from considerations within the species of positio than from the
short treatments of the species of dubitatio. There the presence of a doubtful
answer shows that also the positive and negative answers must be interpreted
with an epistemic import.
The technique of positio is, as I pointed out in the beginning of this
chapter, assumed in the beginning of Burley's Treatise on obligations, when
Burley describes the two roles in an obligational disputation. As we saw, the
respondent should "maintain the positum" so that he is not led to accepting any
impossibility that does not follow from the positum. The main part of Burley's
treatise, as well as that of most other treatises on obligations, is an elaborate
discussion of rules which the respondent should follow in order to keep his duty
of maintaining the positum, and, on the other hand, in order to avoid accepting
any impossibilities not present in the positum itself. The respondent's job is
basically to combine the specific obligation of maintaining the positum with the
general disputational duties of keeping consistent and granting only what is
known to be true. The duty to maintain a positum known to be false has to
override the prima facie duty to grant only what is true. However, within the
obligational theory it is kept clear that this duty is not to be abandoned altogeth-
er: the positum just allows exceptions to it. In the context of obligational
disputations many interesting developments follow from the clash between these
two duties: how is the duty to grant something actually false combined with the
duty to grant only what is true?
Burley divides his rules of obligational disputations in the species of
positio into two categories: those which are constitutive to its practice (de esse),
and those which guarantee that the art is practised well (de bene esse), also
described as merely useful (utiles). 1 Burley's idea seems to be that useful rules
are easy rules of thumb for some standard cases. Ultimately their validity rests
on the essential rules. Burley grounds his useful rules by explanations based
only on essential rules, which are by themselves relatively simple. In applica-
tions to special cases complications may arise, and those are often handled by
some useful rule.
I will proceed in the rest of my treatment of Burley's theory by first
giving a formalization of the essential rules in order to make clear the logical
structure of these disputations. Next I turn to the useful rules, which discuss
Burley's ideas of how the rules should be applied in some problematic situ-
ations. These applications give us a good opportunity to consider preliminarily
how Burley thought that these disputations should be interpreted. After discus-
sion of both kinds of rules, I will make a brief sketch of the different speciei of
positio considered by Burley. These special kinds of positio provide interesting
insights into the pragmatics of the technique.
1 "Sciendum quod quaedam regulae sunt de esse istius artis, et quaedam de bene
esse. Primo, dicendum est de regulis quae sunt de esse istius artis." Burley 1963, p.
46. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 379. And later: "Sequitur de regulis quae non sunt
de esse istius artis, sed solum utiles." Burley 1963, p. 52. Translation in Burley 1988,
p. 385.
Before going into the essential rules of obligational disputations in the

standard species of positio, which is both in medieval and in modern discussions
of the theory the main theme, let us make an excursus on the problems of
understanding the positum as an assumption that has to be granted in relation to
the casus as an assumption that is understood as if it told the truth of the matter.
Already in the thirteenth century treatises a typical obligational disputation
is based on a double structure of assumptions. The standard formulation would
be like the following:
In truth Socrates is black. It is posited that Socrates is white.
In this formulation the positum is given against the background of a description

of the situation in which the positum is to be considered. In the classroom
Socrates is not present, and consequently the status of 'Socrates is white' as
positum is interpretationally ambiguous. The point of the casus is to resolve this
ambiguity.
On the one hand the casus makes it clear that the positum 'Socrates is
white' must be understood to be false. For example, in Tractatus Emmeranus de
falsi positione (De Rijk 1974, p. 112) the above structure is used in an example
where it is important that the positmh is false, although the content of the
statement used as positum is otherwise indifferent.
On the other hand, the casus makes it clear that the positum is to be inter-
preted against the background that Socrates exists, and is coloured. This
clarification is needed in disputations paying attention to Socrates' colour, since
without the casus the respondent might think that the positum 'Socrates is white'
is false because Socrates does not actually exist. This is exemplified in Tractatus
Emmeranus de falsi positione (De Rijk 1974, p. 116), where the structure is
used in a disputation aiming at showing that blackness is whiteness through
pointing out that the colour Socrates actually has must be whiteness, if Socrates
is white. As the casus tells that Socrates is actually black, it may seem that the
positum implies that his colour, i . e. blackness, must be whiteness. I need not
bother the reader with the solution of this sophisma. The example is relevant
just as a case where it is important to be explicit about the way in which the
positum is false.
Also Walter Burley and William Ockham use such a double structure of
assumptions. They even give a technical account of the double structure. In
their descriptions, the assumption describing the assumed reality behind the
disputation is called the casus, and the technically obligational assumption is
called the positum. According to Burley, the positum (by definition) imposes an
obligation to the respondent. The point of the rules of obligational disputations
is to discuss how the obligation to grant the positum is to be dealt with in the
disputation.
The casus, on the contrary, does not, according to Burley, impose any
obligation to the respondent, it simply "makes definite" (certificat) what the
reality is. 1 As Burley applies this idea, it is clear that he does not mean that the
casus would really be true. In the very example in which this characterization
is given, the casus "makes definite" that Socrates is black. It seems too much
to suppose that Burley thought that at the time of writing the text Socrates
would have been black. Instead, the casus "Socrates is black" gives an assump-
tion in a way different from the positum. Characteristically, it is imagined to
determine the truth values of the sentences proposed in the disputation.
During the disputation the casus is used in deciding the answers for the
technically irrelevant propositions, which according to the rules are answered in
accordance with their actual truth-values. If a sentence included in the casus is
proposed in the disputation, and it is evaluated to be irrelevant, it is judged to
be true and it has to be granted. This follows naturally from the idea that the
casus is understood as if it were true.
Terminologically casus is distinguished from positum by Burley through
reserving the verb ponere and its derivatives for the positum. For laying down
the casus, Burley often uses the words sit rei veritas (the truth of things is), but
also other expressions are used, like simply stating the fact (for instance: sit
Socrates niger). Burley's selections of terminology suggest that he assimilated
1 "Secundo, videndum est qualiter ista positio habet fieri. Fit enim hoc modo. Sit
Socrates niger, et ponatur Socratem esse album. Sed casus non obligat sed certificat, et
quia possum esse certus de veritate unius oppositorum et sustinere reliquum pro vero,
potest admitti positio quae ponit Socratem esse album, prius dicto in rei veritate:
'Socrates est niger."' Burley 1963, p. 46. Translation in Burley 1988, pp. 378-379.
casus with the species of obligations called 'sit verum.' Unfortunately Burley
does not explicitly discuss the relation.
In his above mentioned description of the relations between casus and
positum Burley states that "I can be definite about the truth of one opposite and
maintain the other opposite as true". The point of the positum is to maintain as
true a sentence known to be false, or as the discussion shows, a sentence
opposite to the casus assumed to be true. The positum thus determines what is
to be maintained in the disputation, or, in other words, what is to be granted
and denied in the disputation. The truth value of the positum is not evaluated to
be 'true'. This is explicitly recognized by Burley in his useful rule 9. (to be
discussed below in section III. C), according to which the sentence 'the positum
is false' may have to be granted in a disputation based on a false positum. The
casus, on the other hand, determines the assumed truth values and is evaluated
as having the truth value 'true'. It naturally follows that a casus is used only
when the relation of the positum to the actual reality is unclear and the assign-
ment of truth values (or some other relevant semantical properties of the
positum) would be difficult; the purpose of the casus is to stipulate the reality
behind the positum, when the actual reality cannot for some reason be used in
determining the semantical background.
In his account of the relation of the concepts 'positum' and 'casus'
Ockham makes similar remarks: a casus does not put the respondent under
obligation like a positum does, a casus makes definite (certificat) how the reality
lies, and a casus and a positum are often opposed to each other. Ockham's most
interesting remark concerning the relation of casus and positum tells that casus
is about things (de re) while positum concerns propositions. 1 Since obligational
rules are primarily applied to the positum, not the casus, an obligational disputa-
tion must be looked at as a metalinguistic activity. That the positum is granted
does not mean that a positive turth value is assigned to it in respect to an
assumed possible situation. Instead, it amounts to a recognition of the syntactic
status of the sentence in the disputation. In this sense a positum could be
1 "Casus semper debet esse de re, et de re particulari, positio autem potest esse
unius propositionis indefinitae vel particularis." Ockham 1974, p. 735.
characterized as a syntactic assumption, and a casus, which determines the truth

values to be assigned in the disputation, as a semantic assumption.
Ockham gives three rules concerning the acceptability of a casus. These
three rules are stricter than the standard idea that a positum is acceptable if it is
possible, but it is to be remembered that they are not rules of acceptability for
a positum, but for a casus. The rules as follows: 1
(1) A casus must never be accepted for defence unless it makes known
[something] about some particular [thing].
(2) A casus must never be accepted for defence unless it is possible.
(3) A casus repugnant to the act of responding must never be accepted for
defence.
The two first ones are clear. The point in (1) is that the casus is a de re assump-
tion, which thus must concern some particular thing. Rule (2) simply requires
that the assumption is possible. Rule (3) may need more clarification. Its point
is in avoiding paradoxical situations; Ockham's example is the casus 'you are
dead', which is not acceptable as a casus. The respondent ought to take his
casus so vividly that, as a dead man cannot participate a disputation, he cannot
take that he is dead as the basis of his answers. However, Ockham explicitly
points out that the positum 'you are dead' is perfectly admissible. The positum,
which is dealt with at the propositional level, can in no way be repugnant with
the act of answering - it can be .repugnant only with the sentence asserting that
the respondent is answering, and thus only the sentence must be denied.
Ockham suggests that the casus could be given rules of answering inspired
by the standard obligational rules, which are rules of answering for a positum.
However, he says: 2
1 "Circa casum igitur sunt aliquae regulae. Una est quod casus numquam est
recipiendus ad sustinendum nisi fiat certificatio de aliquo particulari. Alia est quod
numquam est casus recipiendus ad sustinendum nisi possibile. Alia regula est quod
numquam est casus recipiendus ad sustinendum qui repugnat actui responsionis."
Ockham 1974, pp. 735-736.
2 "Scito tamen quomodo respondendum est facta ali qua positione, potest lev iter sciri
quomodo respondendum est posito aliquo casu, et ideo sufficiat pro nunc de positione
tractare." Ockham 1974, p. 736.
When one knows how one must answer, when some positio is made, one
can easily know how one must answer, when some casus is posited, and
thus it suffices for now to treat positio.
Ockham's discussion thus concentrates on positio, and the rules of answering

with casus are left at the level of a suggestion. Unfortunately I have to disagree
with him about whether "one can easily" reconstruct the rules he has in mind.
The central problem is when a sentence implied by the casus ought to be
granted. As Ockham's rules for acceptability of a casus show, the rules for a
positum are not to be straightforwardly transferred. It seems that a casus must
be d~t with as if it were true, which implies that anything that would be true
if the casus were true, ought to be granted because of the casus (if this duty is
not overridden by the positum). This turns the casus into a counterfactual
supposition of the type discussed by modem logicians. Then anything subjunc-
tively implied by the casus ought to be granted, and anything subjunctively
repugnant with the casus ought to be denied.
B. EsSENTIAL RULES
The basic idea of the technique of positio is that the sentence given as positum
must be maintained in the disputation. This idea is also given by Burley as the
first essential rule as follows: 1
everything that is posited and put forward in the form of the positum
during the time of the positio must be granted.
Burley gives two qualifications in this rule. The first qualification - that the
positum is to be understood in the specific form it is originally given - is, as
can be figured out from Burley's examples of the rule, connected to the idea
that the positum is the very sentence mentioned in the actual speech act giving
the obligation for the respondent. If the positum is 'Marcus runs', it does not
1 "Omne positum, sub forma positi propositum, in tempore positionis, est conce-
dendum." Burley 1963, p. 46. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 379.
follow that 'Tullius runs' should be granted, even if Tullius is Marcus. 1 In

addition to being posited, the sentence must be put forward during the time,
when the positing is valid, that is during the obligational disputation proper.
The rule can conveniently be formalized as follows: 2
R1 (p) ((Pp & Rp) > OCp)
(to be read: for any sentence p, if it is the positum (' P') and it is put forward
('R'), it must be granted ('OC').) The quantifier (p) ranges over sentences, as'
Burley's first qualification requires. The sentential operator 'P' standing for "is
the positum" must be understood so that it includes reference to the technical
time of the disputation. Being a positum is bound to a specific disputational
exchange, outside of which the sentence cannot be treated as a positum. The
sentential operator 0 is used as a deontic operator. The sentence OCp states that
there is a norm to the effect that p should be granted.
In the next rules Burley spells out the idea of keeping consistent after
accepting the usually false positum. The kind of consistency that he has in his
mind requires the rules to guarantee that the accumulating set of answers
remains consistent. Thus, at each step of the disputation, sentences possibly put
forward at that step fall into three classes: those which follow, those which are
repugnant, and others, technically called irrelevant. The respondent naturally
has to grant any of those sentences which follow. Burley dectees: 3
Everything that follows from the positum must be granted. Everything that
follows from the positum either together with an already granted proposi-
tion (or propositions), or together with the opposite of a proposition (or
1 "Et ponitur haec particula: sub forma positi propositum, quia si proponatur sub
alia forma quam sub forma positi, non oportet quod concedatur. Ut si Marcus et Tullius
sit nomina eiusdem, et ponatur Marcum currere, non oportet concedere Tullium
currere." Burley 1963, p. 46. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 379.
2 This kind of formalizations were first developed in Knuuttila and Yrjonsuuri
1988. For the logical background of the formalizations see also von Wright 1963.
3 "Omne sequens ex posito est concedendum. Omne sequens ex posito cum
concesso vel concessis, vel cum opposito bene negati vel oppositis bene negatorum,
scitum esse tale, est concedendum." Burley 1963, p. 48. Translation in Burley 1988,
p. 381.
the opposites of propositions) already correctly denied and known to be

such, must be granted.
The two parts of the rule can be formalized as follows:
R2• (p)(q) ((Pp & D(p > q) & Rq) > OCq)
R2b (p)(q)(r) ((Pp & Gq & D((p & q) > r) & Rr) > OCr)
(R2a is to be read: For any sentences p and q, if p is the positum, and p entails
q, and q is put forward, then q must be granted.) R2h introduces the sentential
operator G, which is quite complicated in order to avoid even worse complica-
tions. Gq states that q is a conjunction of sentences, which have either been
granted or whose opposites have been denied earlier in the same disputation.
The rule for denying repugnant sentences is analogous: 1
Everything incompatible with the positum must be denied. Likewise,

everything incompatible with the positum together with an already granted
proposition (or propositions), or together with the opposite of a proposi-
tion (or the opposites of propositions) already correctly denied and known
to be such, must be denied.
The formalizations are as well analogous:
R3a (p)(q) ((Pp & D(p > -q) & Rq) > ONq)
R3b (p)(q)(r) ((Pp&Gq & D((p & q) > -r) & Rr) > ONr
where 'ON' stands for 'must be denied'.

At each step of disputation, when a sentence is put forward by the
opponent, it can be answered on the basis of rules R 1 - R3 , if it is logically
dependent on what has been maintained earlier in the disputation. For other
sentences, which are called irrelevant, Burley gives the following rules: 2
1 "Omne repugnans posito est negandum. Similiter omne repugnans posito cum
concesso vel concessis, vel opposito bene negati vel oppositis bene negatorum, scitum
esse tale, est negandum." Burley 1963, p. 48. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 381.
2 "Si sit impertinens, respondendum est secundum sui qualitatem, et hoc, secundum
qualitatem quam habet ad nos. Ut, si sit verum, scitum esse verum, debet concedi. Si
sit falsum, sci tum esse falsum, debet negari. Si sit dubium, respondendum est dubie."
Burley 1963, p. 48. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 381.
If it is irrelevant, it must be responded to on the basis of its own quality;

and this [means] on the basis of the quality it has relative to us. For
example, if it is true [and] known to be true, it should be granted. If it is
false [and] known to be false, it should be denied. If it is uncertain, one
should respond by saying that one is in doubt.
Since irrelevant sentences cannot be evaluated by the previous rules, by the

principle of keeping consistent, they are evaluated according to their actual truth
value as far as it is known - this is the quality Burley has in mind. Thus in the
~ of irrelevant sentences the general principle of following the truth is
followed. Formally the rule for irrelevant sentences can thus be represented as
follows:
~. (p) ((lp & KrP & Rp) > OCp)

R4b (p) ((lp & K,.-p & Rp) > ONp)
R4c (p) ((lp & -KrP & -Kr-P & Rp) > ODp)
where 'OD' stands for 'it must be doubted whether,' and 'K,' for 'the respon-
dent r knows that.'
The epistemic conditions included in these rules for irrelevant sentences
are less interesting than they may seem to be. It may seem that these rules allow
a way in which the results of the disputation may depend on what the respon-
dent knows about the world. However, examples of obligational theory in
Burley's treatise as well as in other treatises are almost always built on the
assumption that knowledge of actual facts does not vary. The opponent can
easily predict the correct answers, since the only examples where the respondent
may show ignorance are cases where ignorance is indubitable in the context
(whether the king is seated, for example).
Another feature of the interpretation Burley gives to the epistemic condi-
tions undermining their importance, is the idea that a doubtful answer has no
consequences for the disputation. The respondent may not grant what she has
earlier denied, nor the other way round, she may not deny what she has earlier
granted. However, she may grant or deny what she has doubted earlier. First
doubting and then denying does not count as giving different answers to the
same proposition. Thus doubtful answer looks like refraining from response
where sufficient basis for an evaluation is missing. (See, e.g. Burley 1963, p.
62; 1988, p. 397.)
In the formalization of rules R2 and R 3 I have consciously omitted the
epistemic conditions given by Burley, although these conditions are of some
interest. In his formulations of the rules Burley says that a sentence must be
granted, if it is known to follow, and denied, if it is known to be repugnant. My
reason for omitting these epistemic conditions is that it does not seem clear that
Burley himself respects them in his applications of the rules. Often he shows
that a sentence is relevant by showing that it follows from earlier granted
sentences - without any explanation of whether the respondent knows it to
follow. In later treatments of obligational theory these epistemic conditions are
often simply omitted.
There might nevertheless be sense in taking the epistemic conditions of the
rules for relevant sentences seriously. The so called obligational sophisms
discussed in Burley's treatise are mostly built so that the opponent puts forward
early in the disputation a sentence, which the respondent misevaluates as
irrelevant, because he does not notice that the sentence follows from or is
repugnant to what has taken place earlier. The difficulties in these examples
arise from the respondent's ignorance of logical facts. As logical exercises,
these obligational sophisms require logical knowledge frotn the respondent. If
he does not have it, he falls into difficulty.
One of the examples has the following form: 1
D1
Pop** -KrP Accepted, possible
:{>rl p Denied, false, not known to follow
1 The text is as follows: "Unum sophisma est: ponatur tibi concludi et te nescrire
tibi concludi esse similia. Deinde: tibi concluditur. Hoc est falsum et non sequens, ut
videtur; igitur negandum. Deinde: tu nescis tibi concludi. Haec est neganda, quia suum
simile negatur. Deinde: ti scis tibi concludi. Debet concedi, quia illud est oppositum
bene negati, igitur concedendum. Deinde, tibi concluditur. Si concedas, idem concessis-
ti et negasti, igitur male. Si neges, negas sequens, quia sequitur: tu scis tibi concludi,
igitur, tibi concluditur." Burley 1963, p. 64. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 399-400.
That the false sentence used in this example refers to the ongoing disputation has no
importance here. 'The decision has gone against you' plays a role which could be
played as well by any false contingent sentence.
Pr2 -KrP Denied, repugnant (Po and opposite of Prl)

Pr3 KrP Granted, follows (opposite of Pr2)
Pr4 p ? (Follows (Pr3) and repugnant (Prl)
Burley solves the problem by pointing out that p actually follows already from
the positum, if the inference from knowledge of a fact to the fact itself (from Ji,
top) is taken into account. Thus a good response is to grant p already as Prl,
where it is put forward the first time.
In this disputation, as also in other obligational sophisms discussed by
Burley, the opponent misleads the respondent by putting forward a sentence,
whose logical connection to the positum is difficult to notice. When the respon~
dent gives his evaluation following the actual truth value, he in fact grants an
inconsistency, which is then made explicit in the rest of the disputation. In our
example, the respondent can avoid admitting contradictions only if his logical
knowledge is good enough to recognize that p follows from p ~ -K,p. 1
In this way, the disputation seems to offer a way of testing the respon-
dent's logical knowledge (in this example including also epistemic logic) as well
as a way of exercising quick recognitions of logical relations between sentences.
In such exercises, it would be fairly strange, if the respondent's answers were
taken to be good even if based on insufficient logical knowledge. A much more
natural reading of the rules in such contexts takes the epistemic conditions as
realistic- concessions: the respondent can actually grant a sentence as sequent
only if he knows that it follows from the positum - even if he really should
know this whenever it is the case.
C. USEFUL RULES
It is now time to turn to Burley's useful rules, which aim at providing easy-to-
follow rules of thumb for applying the essential rules in different situations.
Many of these rules are interesting, despite their practical character, in relation
1'"Tu nescis tibi concludi' et 'tibi concluditur' non possunt ess.e simiUa, nisi in
veritate tantum. Ideo, quodcumque istorum primo proponatur, debet concedi." Burley
to the interpretation of obligational theory as connected to modal concepts.

Burley gives the following nine rules with in many cases elaborate discussion:
[1] One must pay special. attention to the order [of the propositions]. 1
[2] During the time of the obligation one should not give a definite answer
to a doctrinal (disciplinalis) question?
[3] Outside the time [of the disputation] the truth of the matter must be
acknowledged. 3
[4] When a possible proposition has been posited, a proposition that is
impossible per se must not be granted, and a proposition that is necessary
per se must not be denied. 4
[5] When a possible proposition has been posited, it is not absurd to grant
something impossible per accidens. 5
[6] When a false contingent proposition is posited, one can prove any false
proposition that is compossible with it. 6
[7] When a false contingent proposition concerning the present has been
posited, one must deny that it is the present instant. 7
[8] All responses must be directed to the same instant. 8
[9] When the positum is false, the proposition 'The positum is false' can
be granted; and yet concerning what is posited one must never grant that
it is false. 9
This set of useful rules can be divided into three groups. Rules 2. and 3. are
connected to the practical undertaking of the disputation, rules 4., 5., 7. and 8.
to problems of time and modality within obligational disputations, and rules 1.,
1 "Ordo est maxime attendendus." Burley 1963, p. 52. Translation in Burley 1988,
p. 385.
2 "Durante tempore obligationis, non est certificanda questio < disciplinalis >."
Burley 1963, p. 52. I have revised the translation in Burley 1988, p. 385.
3 "Extra tempus, fatenda est rei veritas." Burley 1963, p. 53. Translation in Burley
1988, p. 386.
4 "Posito possibili, non est concedendum impossibile per se nee negandum necessa-
rium per se." Burley 1963, p. 53. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 386.
5 "Posito possibili, non est inconveniens concedere impossibile per accidens."
Burley 1963, p. 55. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 389.
6 "Posito falso de contingenti, contingit probare quodlibet falsum sibi compossi-
bile." Burley 1963, p. 57. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 391.
7 "Posito falso contingenti de praesenti instanti, negandum est praesens instans
esse." Burley 1963, p. 59. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 394.
8 "Omnes responsiones retorquendae sunt ad idem instans." Burley 1963, p. 61.
Translation in Burley 1988, p. 396.
9 "Quando positum est falsum, concedi potest haec propositio: positum est falsum.
De eo, tamen, quod ponitur, numquam est concedendum ipsum esse falsum." Burley
56 Walter }3urley's Theory of Obligations
6. and 9. try to explicate how the false positum should be treated as an assump-
tion.
Rule 2. tells the respondent not to answer any doctrinal questions. This
immediately raises the question: what is a doctrinal question? In answering this
question, it most first be pointed out that it is unclear whether the text should
read disciplinalis. Kretzmann and Stump in their translation of Burley's text
substitute distinguibilis for disciplinalis. This substitution is, as I shall soon
show, refuted by Burley's arguments supporting the rule and its examples. In
the above list of rules I have revised their translation by revoking this sub-
stitution and reading disciplill4lis in accordartce to Green's edition.
In his argument supporting the rule Burley turns to discussing the relation
of particular and singular predications within obligational contexts. Since the
example is illuminating also in respect to how the positum is understood as an
assumption, it seems suitable to consider it in rnore detail. Burley considers a
case, where the casus tells that Socrates is the only person to speak, and it is
posited that he is silent. As Burley points out, in this disputational setting 'some
man is speaking' is to be granted as true and irrelevant. It is irrelevant, because
the positum 'Socrates is silent' does not imply it nor its opposite. It is true,
because the casus stipulates that one man (Socrates) is speaking. The example
thus depends on evaluating irrelevant propositions strictly regardless of the
positum. Now, if ,the opponent, after 'some man is speaking' has been granted,
asks who is this speaking man, the respondent is in a problematic situation. He
cannot say that Socrates is speaking, since his positum is that Socrates is silent.
If he points out some other manj he admits a false irrelevant sentence, since he
is in no way obliged to predicate speaking to just this man. Burley's point is
that the respondent should not answer such a question.
In this example we thus have an example of the questions which ought
not be answered: "who is this man?" I do not think that we can call this
question in Kretzmann's and Stump's way "a question requiring a distinction"
(distinguibilis). Rather it seems that Burley has in mind that the respondent
should only answer yes/no -questions, often called dialectical questions, and not
any other kind of questions, particularly not those questions, which are some-
times now called wh-questions asking for a selection of an individual from some
given domain (see, e.g., Hintikka 1976). In the thirteenth century Tractatus
Emmeranus de falsi positione such questions are called doctrinal, and the
corresponding rule prohibiting such questions is given. The anonymous author
of this treatise states: 1
In positio falsa it must not be answered to what or to why or to when or

to any doctrinal question.
Burley seems to be following this older rule. Consequently I have retained

Green's selection of disciplinalis.
In rule 3. Burley's point is that during the time of the obligation proper
the truth need not be acknowledged, as it must be after the duty given by positio
is suspended by the phrase 'time is out'. Burley's specific application of this
rule is 'you are responding badly', which the respondent may grant during the
obligation without responding badly, if it follows from his positum together with
the earlier answers. As Burley points out, real decision about the status of the
respondent's answers must be made outside the technical time of the disputation,
since then the general duty to grant the truth is not overridden by any other
duty.
The useful rules 1., 6. and 9. develop further the problem of how to deal
with the false positum as an assumption. Each of these rules can be read as a
refutation of interpreting obligational theory as a theory of counterfactual
conditionals, and it is therefore natural that I will return to these rules in chapter
Vl.B; where I evaluate Paul Spade's interpre.tation of obligational theory
proceeding in these lines. Some remarks, though, seem appropriate already
here.
Rule 9. explicitly recognizes that the positum is not assumed to be true.
Even the answers given in the disputation may reflect the fact that the positum
is false. On the contrary, no true subjunctive counterfactual conditional in the
modem sense can have as the consequent that the antecedent is false. In Rule 6.
it is pointed out that practically anything may have to be granted in some
1 " ••• non est respondendum in falsi positione ad quid nee ad quare nee ad quando
nee ad aliquam disciplinalem questionem." De Rijk 1974, p. 110.
58 V{alter Burley's Theory of Obligations ·
obligational disputation based on any false positum. The corresponding principle

about counterfactual conditionals ~ that anything follows from any false suppo-
sition - is highly dubious. Indeed, the basic idea of modem discussions of
counterfactuals has been to give also to these problematic sentences criteria of
truth different from those of material implication. Rule 1. might be given a
reading favourable to interpretation of obligational theory as a theory of coun-
terfactuals, if it were taken to consist of the point that different ways of
strengthening the antecedent lead to different results in the consequent. How-
ever, the rule is theoretically connected rather to the feature of Burley's theory
of obligations that the set of propositions, which must be granted if put forward
at some particular stage of the disputation, is often inconsistent. This seems to
be rather dubious in the case of counterfactuals. If q and r are the consequents
of true counterfactual conditionals both having p as the antecedent, it seems that
q and r ought to be consistent.
It seems to be no accident that Burley discussed the rule requiring atten-
tion to the order in which propositions are put forward as the first useful rule.
This rule has a very central position in his theory of obligations. His way of
developing the false positum as an assumption at the basis of the disputation is
characteristically such, that the positum alone does not determine what will take
place in the disputation. Much of the results depend on the order and the
selection of propositions put forward. If the disputation following Burley's rules
is seen as a thought experiment developing the possibility given as the positum,
the possible situation is built rather than described by the answers to the
propositions put forward. In this process of building a description of a possible
situation the order of the propositions has a very important role.
Rules 4., 5., 7. and 8. are connected to problems of time and modality.
These rules reflect in very interesting ways the role of modal conceptions in
obligational theory, and the historical development of these rules is in an
interesting way connected to the historical development of modal concepts. I
have dedicated section IV .A to these rules, and postpone their discussion to
there.
D. SPECIE! OF POSITIO
Burley's treatise contains also some discussion of different special kinds of

positio. He distinguishes positio coniunctiva, positio indeterminata, positio
dependens, positio cadens, positio renascens and positio vicaria (Burley 1963,
pp. 68-82).
Positio coniunctiva is, as Burley defines it, either positio of a conjunction
(positio coniunctionis), or positio of several sentences simultaneously (coniunc-
tio positionis). We could formalize the former as giving a conjunctive positum,
or P(p & q). The latter would amount to having two (or more) posita as duties
simultaneously. This could be formalized as Pp & Pq. As Burley points out, we
do not need a strict distinction between these two alternatives, because their
normative consequences for the disputation are similar (Burley 1963, p. 68).
In the species of positio indeterminata, which is based on disjunction, the
situation is more interesting. According to Burley, in the case of positio disiunc-
tionis (P(p v q)) the proposition p v q is seen as the positum. Thus, if both p
and q are false, the first one proposed of them is to be denied, and the latter
one granted in order to keep consistently the given obligation (Burley 1963, p.
73). On the other hand, in the case of disiunctio positionis (Pp v Pq) the
respondent is, on Burley's interpretation, left in doubt about what is his posi-
tum, and therefore he has to answer with doubt both top and to q, if they are
false, since he does not know which of them is his positum (Burley 1963, p.
74).
From the viewpoint of modem deontic logic, it is somewhat disappointing
to notice that Burley takes such a short way with the problem of disjunctive
obligations in this context. While the respondent in an obligational disputation
has the possibility of refraining from answering by doubting, an agent in the
wider moral sense does not always have the possibility of refraining from both
act and omission in a situation where she knows that she has disjunctively two
obligations.
Problems of deontic logic are even more clearly present in the species of
positio dependens and its subspeciei positio cadens and positio renascens. The
idea of positio dependens is that the positio is given conditionally, again
60 Walter Burl~y's Theory of Obligations
possibly with the scope ambiguity between positing a conditional (P(p > q))
and giving the positio only under a condition (p > Pq) (Burley 1963, p. 78).
Burley's discussion shows that main alternative is the latter, where the obliga-
tion comes in force only if certain condition is fulfilled. Typically this condition
is some disputational act to be performed by the respondent.
Positio cadens contains in addition to the condition of the obligation
.coming into force a condition of dismissal of the obligation. In positio renascens
the obligation may return to force after being dismissed, if the condition of
coming into force is again fulfilled.
In each of these speciei, problems arise, as Burley points out, if the
positum - i. e. the content of the obligation - is connected to the condition on
which the obligation is in force. This may happen, if the condition amounts to
an answer to be given by the respondent. Let us look at the following example,
where the positum is given on the condition that the first propositum is not to
be denied (Socrates is assumed to be black): 1
D2
Po Socrates is white accepted (conditionally), possible
Prl Socrates is black ?
In this simple example Prl is problematic. If it is granted as a true sentence, the

condition is fulfilled, and thus the obligation is in force, and the answer
amounts to granting the opposite of the positum. If Prl is denied with this in
mind, the condition is not fulfilled, and thus the respondent is not bound by any
obligation, and the answer amounts to granting a false sentence, when no
special obligation requires.
This example is given by Burley as an instance for the following rule: 2
Positio dependens, where the possibility of the positio depends on a future

act, is not to be admitted, except on a condition.
1"Sit Socrates niger. Ponatur Socratem esse album, si primo non proponatur
aliquid negandum. Et proponatur: Socrates est niger." Burley 1963, p. 79.
2 "Positio dependens, ubi possibilitas positionis dependet ab actu futuro, non est
admittenda, nisi sub conditione." Burley 1963, p. 78.
Burley's idea is that the obligation given by the positio cannot depend on just
any condition. In the given example, he requires that Pr1 may not be inconsis-
tent (incompossibile) with the positum. However, Pr1 and the putative positum
Po clearly are inconsistent, and thus the conditional obligation should not be
admitted: the respondent, who at the giving of the positum Po does not know
which sentence he will receive as Pr1, should accept Po as the conditional
positum only if guaranteed that the first propositum, which is crucial to the
condition, will not be inconsistent with the positum.
Burley finishes his discussion of the above example by an illuminating
conclusion: 1
If a true [sentence] inconsistent with the positum is proposed, it is posited

that, if 'Socrates is black' is to be granted, it is not to be granted.
Here the contradictory character of the resulting conditional obligation is

explicitly pointed out. As a whole, this way out of the problems of positio
dependens is strongly reminiscent of points of von Wright's discussion of
deontic logic. He has argued that one of the presuppositions of conditional
obligations is consistency of the condition and the content of the obligation.
Similar discussions can be found in explicitly ethical contexts also in the
fourteenth century (see Knuuttila 1993a, pp. 190-196).
In the above example Burley does not attempt to resolve the inconsistency.
However, Burley is aware of a way of resolving inconsistency between the
condition and the content of the obligation. His idea is to distinguish between
the instant in which the answer is given and the instant for which it is given.
According to Burley, it is not inconvenient to deny the positum, if the answer
is given for an instant (pro tempore) at which the obligation was not in force.
The idea is that when a negative answer fulfils the condition given for the
positio, the obligation begins. However, a question always precedes its answer,
and thus the answer fulfilling the condition is given for an earlier time, when
the condition was not yet fulfilled. Thus the act of answering fulfilling the
1 "Si enim verum incompossibile posito proponatur, ponitur quod, si 'Socratem

esse nigrum' sit concedendum, quod non sit concedendum." Burley 1963, p. 79.
condition cannot break the obligation, since the obligation has not yet begun in
the instant for which the answer is given (see Burley 1963, pp. 76-78). Such
problems of beginning (incipit) and ceasing (desinit) are considered also in some
other fourteenth century discussions of deontic operators (see Knuuttila 1993a,
p. 196).
Burley also puts forward an interesting example showing that such
temporal distinctions are not - at least not in such simple form - sufficient for
solving the inconsistencies involved. Burley considers the dependent positio "let
it be posited that you are standing, for that instant for which [something that]
must be granted is proposed" . 1 The idea is to bind the condition to that instant
for which the answer is given, which means the instant in which the question is
put forward. In his discussion Burley again refers to the idea that dependent
positio is to be admitted only if consistency is guaranteed. This positum is not
to be admitted, because it requires that the obligation should come into force
before the condition is fulfilled. When the condition is fulfilled by the answer,
we must return to the instant of the question, which of course precedes the
instant in which the answer is given. As it is impossible to change the past,
binding the conditional obligation to instants in this manner is unacceptable.
(Burley 1963, pp. 77-78.)
As the last species of possible positio Burley considers positio vicaria
(Burley 1963, pp. 81-83). The basic idea of this species is vicariousness: either
(1) the respondent is acting on behalf of some other person, (2) the proposition
given as positum serves the role of some other proposition or (3) the actual time
represents some other time. Of the last alternative, Burley gives the example
that "Socrates is running" was the positum yesterday, and the respondent is
asked to answer today as he would have answered yesterday. The example of
the second is that "Socrates is running" is the positum instead of "Plato is
running." In both these cases Burley points out that "Socrates is running" must
be treated as a positum, regardless of the vicariousness. The reason in the
second case is illuminating: "Since it follows: if it is positum on behalf of
1 "Ponatur 'te stare' pro illo instanti pro quo proponitur concedendum." Burley
1963, p. 77.
another [sentence], therefore it is the positum. " 1 Burley's attitude again reflects
taking the positum simply as a sentence to be granted, not as something as-
sumed to be true.
The most interesting vicarious positio is the first, where the respondent is
answering on behalf of some other person. This alternative is based on Aris-
totle, who in his Topics (VIII, 5) considers the possibility of undertaking a
dialectical encounter so that the respondent is defending the thesis from the
viewpoint of some authority, answering as the authority would answer. It seems
to be this kind of answering on behalf of some other person that Burley has in
mind. Burley even refers to Aristotle's example of granting that nothing moves
when answering as Zeno would. For Burley, this is an example of how an
impossible proposition may have to be granted on the basis of a possible
positum.
One of Burley's examples of this kind of vicarious positio is curious
enough to be pointed out. He discusses the case where the respondent is asked
to answer with the positum "you are in Rome" on behalf of the ass Brunellus.
As Burley points out, "you are an ass" is to be denied, if it is proposed to the
respondent, since "Brunellus would not grant anything impossible, if it could
speak. "2 The example is based on the indexical character of demonstrative
pronouns.
1 "Qiua sequitur: si est positum pro alio, igitur est positum." Burley 1963, p. 82.
2 "Brunellus nullum impossibile concederet, si posset Ioqui." Burley 1963, p. 81.
IV Revisions of the Rules
A. WHAT TIME IS IT?
In a discussion concerning freedom of the will, Duns Scotus argues that the will
is free in such a strong sense that it can will the opposite of what it actually
wills even at the very same instant (Duns Scotus 1963, pp. 417-425, Ord. I,
dist. 38, pars 2). From the viewpoint of modal logic Scotus's claim comes
down to stating that it may be possible that -p at an instant A, even if it is true
that pat A. Even though for the modem reader the statement may seem plausi-
ble, few of Scotus's contemporaries accepted it as such. In effect, Scotus was
an advocate of a new conception of modalities.
In one of the putative counterarguments against his thesis Scotus refers to
a rule of the art of obligations, quoted as follows: 1
When a false contingent proposition concerning the present has been

posited, one must deny that it is [the present instant].
The rule is understood to apply to a situation where temporally unbound present

tense contingent, but actually false proposition is given as the positum. The
denial required by the rule concerns a sentence like 'it is now A', where A is a
proper name of the actual present instant. The point of this rule seems to be
expressed by the following simple disputation:
Dl
Po You are in Rome Accepted, possible
Prl It is now A Denied
1 "Posito falso contingenti de praesenti instanti, negandurn est ipsurn esse." Duns
Scotus 1963, p. 42i.

Revisions of the Rules 65
The answer at Prl simply follows the rule, but in order to understand the
logical grounds of the rule, let us ask whether it would lead to logical problems
if Prl were granted as irrelevant and true?
Scotus seems to quote the argumentation for the rule from the Treatise on
obligations by master W. This argument for the rule is short, strong and
illuminating. Its idea is to show that the false positum cannot be true at the
present instant. Master W. uses 'you are in Rome' as an example for a false
positum and 'A' as a name of the present instant. The argument is the follow-
ing:1
It cannot be made true except by movement or by change. It cannot be

made true by movement because there is no movement in an instant.
Neither [can it be made true] by change, because if it would change to
truth in A, there would be truth in A, since when a change occurs, it is
finished. In such a way, therefore, it is impossible to make this false
[proposition] true in A. If, therefore, it is true, it is not [now] A. There-
fore, if this false [proposition] is posited, it must be denied that it is [now]
A, and this is said by the rule.
Master W. 's reference to either movement or change makes it clear that he

thinks that anything possible can be reached by some real means from the actual
present. As physical theory shows, this can happen only through movement or
through change. Movement takes time, and thus it is not finished at the instant
at issue. An instantial change, on the other hand, would be already finished, and
thus it would have been in the first place a mistake to consider the positum
false: if it indeed is false, it cannot change to truth within the same instant. This
kind of consideration pushes all unrealized possibilities to the future; neither the
past nor the present can be changed, whereas the future is open in the relevant
sense. According to master W. 's argument any actually false sentence implies
that the time at issue is not the actual present. Instead one must turn to the
1 "Verificari enim non potest nisi per motum aut mutationem. Per motum non
potest verificari in A quia motus non est in instanti. Nee per mutationem quia si esset
mutatio ad veritatem in A, tunc esset veritas in A. Quia, quando est mutatio, est
terminus mutationis. Sic ergo impossibile est hoc falsum verificari in A. Si ergo est
verum, A non est. Ergo, si ponatur hoc falsum, oportet negare A esse, et haec dicit
regula." Green 1963, p. 9. On the question of identity of master W., see Spade and
Stump 1983.
66 Revisions of the Rules
future. Positing a false sentence thus forces the respondent to grant that he is
somewhere else in the passage of time than in the actual present.
According to master W., the respondent cannot, nevertheless, deny the
sentence 'it is now the present instant', since this indexical sentence is necessa-
ry. Master W. argues for its necessity by referring to its omnitemporal truth,
which strongly suggests a statistical interpretation of modalities: "This, namely,
is necessary, since it always was true to say 'it is [now] the present instant', it
is now true, and always will be true. " 1 Master W. points out that the indexical
expression "the present instant" is not at issue in the rule, but rather an expres-
sion where the actual present instant is referred by a proper name, in his
examples by the letter A. The sentence to be denied is of the unambiguously
contingent type 'it is now A'.
Another proof of the rule is provided by the early thirteenth century
anonymous Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi positione. The author first points out
that if in a disputation 'it is now A' were granted after the false positum
'Socrates is white' has been accepted, it would have to be granted as sequent
that 'Socrates is white at A'. According to the author this sentence is impossi-
ble, although he gives no explicit reasons why. It seems that he. takes the
Aristotelian dictum 'omne quod est, necesse est, quando est' as common
knowledge so that he need not give reasons for the necessity of the present. If
Socrates is not white now, at A, he simply cannot be white now.
The anonymous author takes very clearly the viewpoint that when a false
sentence like 'Socrates is white' is posited, attention shifts to some future
instant. If such a positum is understood in respect of the present instant,
"impossible is posited (ponitur impossibile)". Instead, the positum must be
understood in respect to other instants communiter, not picking up any definite
instant. As the author says, in this case "this proposition 'Socrates is white' is
equivalent with this [proposition] 'Socrates will be white' (hec propositio: 'Sor
est albus' equipollet huic: 'Sor erit albus')" (De Rijk 1974, pp. 112-113).
1 "Hoc autem est necessarium. Semper enim fuit verum dicere: praesens instans est,
et modo est verum, et semper erit verum." Green 1963, p. 9.

Judging from the modem editions of medieval obligational treatises, it

seems that the rule requiring one to deny that it is the actual present instant
when a false contingent sentence is posited was a commonplace in the thirteenth
century. The rule is discussed with different kinds of examples and putative
counterexamples. The most interesting examples are connected to building a
temporal relation . between A, the actual present instant, and the ihstant of
disputation, for which the present tensed positum is assumed to be granted.
Both in master W. 's text and in a thirteenth century anonymous treatise
Obligationes Parisienses we can find the following problematic example (it is
assumed that Socrates is black): 1
D2
Po Socrates is white Accepted, false but possible
Pr1 It is [now] A Denied, cf. the rule
Pr2 A has been future Granted, irrelevant and true
Pr3 A has been Denied, irrelevant and false
Pr4 A wilfbe ? (Follows, but impossible)
The answer to Prl simply follows the rule. Granting Pr2 guarantees that the
imagined instant of the disputation has a temporal relation with the actual
present instant A. Denial of Pr3 settles that the imagined instant of disputation
is not later than A. Thus the imagined instant of disputation has some temporal
relation to A, but it is not simultaneous nor later than A; it seems clear that it
must be earlier than A. However, the disputation did not take place before it
did, and thus the imagined instant of disputation can be located before A only if
the actual past is imagined to change, which is impossible. Pr4, which states
that the actual present instant A belongs to the future, is impossible, even if it
follows, and impossible sentences should not be granted, when the positum is
possible.
Master W. solves this problem by advising the respondent to grant Pr3,
which makes it unproblematic to deny the impossible Pr4. According to him, Po
1 De Rijk 1975, p. 32. I have read fuit for fit in some occasions, since otherwise
the example does not make sense. On p. 34 De Rijk acknowledges similar substitutions
in another example. For master W.'s discussion of the example, see Green 1963, pp.
9-10.
(as a false sentence in the present tense) implies the denial of Pr1. Thus Prl is
denied as repugnant, in accordance to the rule. Pr2 is judged irrelevant, and
granted, because it is true. Furthermore, in view of the impossibility of chang-
ing the past, Pr2 and the opposite of Prl imply Pr3, which therefore has to be
granted as sequent. In effect master W. here requires that the imagined instant
of disputation must be directed to the future, which serves as a place for all
unrealized possibilities. (Green 1963, p. 10.)
The solution given in Obligationes Parisienses is interestingly different.
In this treatise Pr4 is simply advised to be granted, despite its impossibility. The
author draws a distinction between impossible per accidens and impossible per
se. According to the anonymous author, a sentence is impossible per accidens
if it was at some time possible that it would be true, but neither now nor in the
future can it be true. The author does not explicitly tell us, but a sentence seems
to be impossible per se if it is omnitemporally impossible. While the latter may
not be granted, granting the former is unproblematic. Pr4 clearly is impossible
per accidens. In the actual past it was not only possible, but even true. (De Rijk
1975, p. 32.)
The author of Obligationes Parisienses is prepared to go even further. He
suggests that the following disputation is an acceptable variation of D2 (De Rijk
1975, p. 32):
D2'
Po Socrates is white Accepted, false but possible
Prl It is [now] A Denied, cf. the rule
Pr2 A has been Denied, irrelevant and false
Pr3 A will be Denied, irrelevant and false
Pr4 A has been future Denied, repugnant
Here denying Prl is simply based on the rule requiring one to deny that it is the
present instant. Pr2 is judged irrelevant, and it is denied, because it is false; the
respondent is not actually in a time later than the present, he is actually at the ·
present. Similarly Pr3 is denied as irrelevant and false; the respondent does not
actually find himself in the past. From the viewpoint of a retrospective interpre-
tation of the answers, denying Pr1 implies that the imagined instant of disputa-
tion is not simultaneous with the present, denying Pr2 implies that it is not later
than the present, and denying Pr3 implies that it is not earlier than the present.
Thus the imagined instant of disputation can have no temporal relation with the
actual present: actual present cannot belong to the same history than the ima-
gined instant of the disputation. This is made clear by denying Pr4 as repugnant
to the opposites of propositions denied earlier. This conclusion seems extremely
inconvenient if we keep in mind that the disputation began as exemplifying a
rule based on the necessity of the present. The disputation takes the present to
be necessary, but its answers are true only in respect to a history which has no
place for the actual present.
The author of Obligationes Parisienses seems to be right in claiming that
respondent's answers in D2' do not break any essential rules of obligations. As
the author explains, denying Pr4 is unproblematic, since the sentence is necessa-
ry per accidens, not necessary per se. As I see it, disputation D2' reflects the
tension between the rule requiring one to deny that it is the present instant, and
on the other hand the allowance to grant sentences which are impossible per
accidens (and to deny sentences which are necessary per accidens). It seems
that if the respondent is allowed to grant sentences which are impossible per
accidens, he should also be allowed to grant that it is the present instant, since
that amounts to no more than granting a sentence which is impossible per
accidens, even if the present is understood as necessary.
The early thirteenth century Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi positione also
introduces the distinction of modalities per se and per accidens, though unfor-
tunately without saying how to interpret the distinction. The author states, as I
already pointed out, that one must deny that it is the present instant when the
positum is false. More interestingly, he does not give the standard rule allowing
the respondent to grant sentences which are impossible per accidens. The
anonymous author suggests that an alternative solution could also be given to
the problems of time and modality, the idea being that if the respondent is
allowed to grant sentences which are impossible per accidens, he may also grant
that it is the present instant even when defending a false positum. From the
viewpoint of this solution, the present is necessary only per accidens, and this
necessity is not strong enough to guide answers in an obligational disputation.
(De Rijk 1974, p. 113.)
Walter Burley discusses these problematic rules at some length (Burley

1963 pp. 53-62). He seems to be aware of the tension between the rule
allowing one to grant sentences, which are impossible per accidens and the rule
requiring one to deny that it is the present instant. His view on the rule concern-
ing the present instant seems to mark a turning point in the history of the genre,
as Burley accepts the rule, but tries to give it a new interpretation which turns
out unproblematic.
In his useful rules 4. and 5. Burley takes the view that although anything
impossible per se may not be granted, it is unproblematic to grant sentences,
which are impossible per accidens. Burley proves his useful rule 5., which deals
with the sentences which are impossible per accidens in the following way
through two lemmas: 1
In reply we have to say that the rule is most firmly established and is
based on the following two rules:
[The first rule is:] If something is granted, it must always be granted
during the time of the obligation.
The second [rule] is: What is possible and true in one place [in a disputa-
tion] is impossible in another place; but when it is true and irrelevant, it
must be granted. Therefore, if it is proposed when it is impossible, it must
be granted because it was granted before.
First of the lemmas is very clear on basis of the requirement of consistency of

the set of answers. The respondent may not change his answers. The second
lemma gives a systematization of some examples by Burley; where some past
tense sentence turns from true to false during the disputation. As a basic
example Burley gives 'you have not granted that God exists,' which is first
assumed to be true, but turns false after the opponent has proposed 'God exists'
and the respondent has granted it. As a past tense proposition, it is impossible
as soon as it is false, because the past cannot be changed. In effect the second
lemma ·Codifies Burley's approach of not allowing the passage of time during the
1 "Dicendum quod regula certissima est, et fundatur super his duabus regulis: Si
aliquid est concessum, semper est concedendum, durante tempore obligationis. Secunda
est: quod uno loco est possibile et verum, in alio loco est impossibile. Sed, quando est
verum et impertinens, debet concedi. Ideo, si proponatur, quando est impossibile, debet
concedi quia prius est concessum." Burley 1963, p. 56. Translation in Burley 1988, p.
390.
disputation to have any effect on the answers. The passage of time may, due to
the necessity of the past, cause a change in the modal status of some earlier
evaluated sentence, but this change ought not effect the answers. Burley wants
to keep the set of answers consistent, and he is ready to pay the price of
occasionally being forced to grant sentences, which are impossible per accidens.
Burley gives the rule requiring one to deny that it is the present instant as
his useful rule 7. in similar form as master W. Burley also seems to defend the
rule: he briefly rejects three objections (see pp. 59-60). However, his approval
of the rule is ambiguous: he problematizes the rule in his discussion. In an
interesting passage he points out that it is not clear for which instant the rule
should be applied. He gives two alternatives. (1) If A is taken to name the
instant, which was present when the positum was given, no doubt one must
deny that it is A, as A is already past. This would make the rule true but
pointless. (2) If A is taken to name the instant which is present when the
sentence 'it is now A' is put forward, granting that it is A does not lead to
granting anything impossible per se, only sentences impossible per accidens,
which is not inconvenient, as Burley recognizes. This interpretation would thus
make the rule false. (Burley 1963, pp. 60-61; 1988, p. 395.)
With these two alternatives the rule seems to be in trouble: it is either
pointless or false. Burley does not straightforwardly settle this question of
interpretation. Instead, he turns to showing that regardless of which instant A
refers to, it may happen that one must deny that it is A. It seems that his
purpose is to point out an unproblematic interpretation of the rule: it does not
matter which instant is 'present' in the sense meant by the rule, if the rule
applies equally to any definite instant. Burley's proof for denying any definite
instant is the following disputation, where B refers as a proper name to any
definite instant (Burley 1963, p. 61; 1988, pp. 395-396):
D3
Po Antichrist exists Accepted, possible
Prl Antichrist exists at B Denied, irrelevant and false
Pr2 Antichrist does not exist at B Granted, follows
Pr3 It is not [now] B Granted, follows
Here Prl must be denied as long as the antichrist has not come, whatever
instant, including B, it actually is, because the sentence must be judged irrele-
vant. From the logical point of view, 'Antichrist exists' does not imply 'Anti-
christ exists at B'. Thus the disputation depends on evaluating the technically
irrelevant propositions strictly according to actual reality. This is Burley's
explicit viewpoint in his theory. Pr2 is naturally granted as the negation of the
denied Prl. Pr3 follows from the positum and Pr2: if the antichrist exists now
(the positum is in the present tense) but he does not exist at B, now cannot be
B.
D3 shows neatly that before the disputation is over, it is not possible to
pick out with certainty any instant as the instant at which all the answers follow
truth. The answers are neither based on truth at an instant nor, in modem
terms, truth in a possible world. The answers are in a twofold way based both
on syntactic considerations and the actual world - where the positum is false.
A similar disputation is used by Burley as his first example of the rule requiring
denial of the present instant. If B is here taken to refer to the present instant,
the present instant is denied at step Pr3. That Burley uses this kind of disputa-
tion as an example of the rule suggests that his interpretation of the rule is far
weaker than the one intended by master W. In Burley's treatment, the denial of
the present instant, or the useful rule 7. becomes just another instance of the
more general useful rule 6., according to which it is possible to prove in the
obligational disputation any falsehood compatible with the positum, if the
positum itself is false.
Burley connects the rule of denying the present instant to another rule
discussed also by master W. This rule, Burley's useful rule 8., tells that "all
answers must be directed to the same instant." Master W. gave this rule the
interpretation that the obligational disputation must be understood to be con-
nected to some future instant where the possibility of the positum could be
actualized. Burley cannot accept the rule in such interpretation, because no such
future instant can be given, as was concluded by disputation D3. His interpreta-
tion dismisses the temporal overtone of the rule. Burley says that the point of
this rule is that all the answers should be conceived to form one consistent
description, joined together by being "directed" (retorquendae) to one and the
same instant. 'Instant' serves simply as vehicle for easy formulation of the
requirement of consistency. The time of this instant turns into an impertinent
question. Burley's explanation is illuminating: 1
One must respond to all propositions proposed as if they were proposed at

the same instant, so that throughout the time of the obligation only those
propositions that can be maintained with respect to the same instant should
be granted. And because incompatible propositions cannot be maintained
with respect to the same instant throughout the time of the obligation,
incompatible propositions must not be granted. But it is not possible to
assign a particular instant as the instant to which the response to all the
propositions proposed should be [directed].
Burley thus emphasizes the implication that all the granted sentences and the
opposites of denied sentences must form a consistent set. It is not possible to
provide any connection to particular instants, including the actual present
instant.
Burley streches the idea of directing all answers to one instant to a
syntactic direction, to concern primarily relations between the propositions and
not so much relations of the propositions to things. In such a reading the set of
answers turns into a nonsensical whole. However, the rule seems to be much
more naturally read as a rule concerning the interpretation of the answers. In
such a reading the point of the rule is to claim that the set of answers should
retrospectively be taken to describe a possible situation, which would make
obligational disputation a study into how to build a description of an imaginable
situation. In such an interpretation, obligational disputation would have as
natural applications different kinds of thought experiments.
As developed by master W., the rule requiring one to deny that it is the
present instant is a rather bad obstacle for interpreting the set of answers as a
description of an imagined situation: if answers are connected to different
instants of time, irrelevant propositions to the actual present, and relevant
1 "Respondendum est ad omnia proposita ac si essent proposita in eodem instanti,

sic quod, durante tempore obligationis, non debent aliqua concedi nisi quae possunt
sustineri pro eodem instanti. Et quia repugnantia non possunt pro eodem instanti
sustineri, ideo, durante tempore obligationis, non debent repugnantia concedi. Non
tamen potest aliquod instans assignari, pro quo instanti deberet esse responsio ad omnia
proposita." Burley 1963, p. 62. Translation in Burley 1988, p. 397.
propositions to some future instant, their combination must be nonsensical.

Accepting Scotus's revision and dropping the rule thus seems to be an advance
in the theory internally, even if the problems of time and modality were not
addressed. As the texts show, Scotus's revision indeed was accepted, since
Burley seems to be last author to consider the rule requiring denial of the
present. On the other hand, the rule that the answers must be directed to some
one instant was accepted and discussed by some later authors. William Buser,
writing around 1360, even regards this rule as containing essentially all the rules
of obligations. His idea seems to be that the i~sue in an obligational disputation
is to consider an imagined instant, and the description of the states of affairs at
that instant is built in the disputation. (See esp. Buser 1990, p. 96.)
In regard to the rules ·concerning instants of time, the discussion in the
anonymous De arte obligatoria, to be considered in detail in the next chapter,
is in an interesting way twofold. The anonymous author seems to admit both the
possibility of undertaking a disputation where changes in reality are reflected in
the answers, and the possibility of a disputation reducible to one instant. If ·the
disputation is not "limited" to one instant, the re~pondent may first grant and
later deny some proposition, but if the disputation is so limited, answers may
not change. As the treatise proceeds, the two approaches are not always kept
clearly separate, which causes many confusions in the interpretation of the
theory.
It seems that the main idea is that the whole disputation is to be viewed as
reducible to one instant of time, so that no changes are allowed within the
disputation. The author summarizes his discussion as follows: 1
And so although what follows and what is incompatible with the. positum
are not proposed for precisely the same time, they must nevertheless be
responded to as if they were proposed simultaneously. For example, if one
proposition were proposed in writing and all the things that are incompati-
1 "Et ita licet non pto eodem tempore precise proponitur sequens ex posito et
repugnans, tamen eisdem respondendum est ac si simul essent proposita. Ut si pro-
ponatur una propositio in scripto et simul cum hoc omnia repugnantia et sequentia in
scriptis proponentur haberet respondens, iuxta quantitatem impertinentium, et prout
quaedam sequuntur et quaedam repugnant respondere." Kretzmann and Stump 1985,
passage number [xii] (p. 245, translation p. 253).
ble and that follow were proposed in writing simultanem~sly with it, the
respondent would have to respond according as some follow and others are
incompatible, in addition to the quantity of irrelevant propositions.
The idea presented in this passage, that we could imagine the respondent as
being given a bunch of slips of paper, with the positum and the propositions put
forward in writing, is interesting. (Some lines earlier the author presents the
spoken analogue: different people putting forward different propositions of one
disputation simultaneously.)
The idea of putting all the propositions forward simultaneously with the
positum seems to follow Burley's idea that the whole disputation is to be
reducible to one instant. However, this idea is in its application opposed to two
central principles of Burley's theory: First, Burley's reduction to one instant is
retrospective. While giving the answers, the respondent should not think of the
questions as being put forward in one instant. :His answers to relevant proposi-
tions follow the possible instant suggested by the positum, but his answers to
irrelevant propositions follow the actual present instant. These two instants may
even be very strictly separated in the answers. In contrast to this, the anony-
mous author requires that answers are not only interpreted but also given in
respect to one instant of time. Second, Burley thought that the order of proposi-
tions should be paid careful attention. However, if the propositions are put
forward simultaneously in the way the anonymous author suggests, they lack
any order to be paid attention.
The anonymous author makes the conclusion that each proposition is to be
evaluated directly on the basis of positum in combination with the actual world.
No proposition can change its status and become relevant in the way accepted
by Burley. This naturally forces a revision also in the essential rules. I will look
at the revision more systematically in the following section. The main point
seems, to be that the anonymous author does not interpret the idea of directing
all the answers. to one instant retrospectively. Instead, answers must be given as
if the questions were simultaneous.
B. REJECTION OF THE ORDER PRINCIPLE
Theoretically one of the most interesting obligational treatises recognized in

modern discussion is the anonymous treatise edited by Norman Kretzmann and
Eleonore Stump under the title De arte obligatoria. According to the editors,
the text is to be dated definitely after 1321. From doctrinal considerations,
which they do not specify, the editors suggest the time during which Dumbleton
composed his Summa, i. e. 1335-1349. 1 This treatise is, despite its confused
appearance, systematically very interesting. The editors describe the theoretical
outlook of the treatise as departing "from the traditional account as presented by
Burley, offering an innovation clearly distinct from those introduced by Kilving-
ton and Swyneshed, but leaning toward Kilvington and away from Swyneshed"
(Kretzmann and Stump 1985, p. 241). This description seems to connote that
the treatise has been written with knowledge of the treatments of Richard
Kilvington and Roger Swineshed.
I will return to the relations of the anonymous author and Richard Kil~
vington in my discussion of Kilvington in chapter V.B. Here it suffices to

remark that Kilvington refers to rules of obligations in a formulation which can
be found from the anonymous treatise, but not from any other treatise known to
modern scholars. On the other hand, the anonymous author seems to be ignorant
of the points of Kilvington's criticism of the common rules of obligations. This
would suggest a date for the treatise quite near the post quem 1321, since
Kilvington wrote his Sophismata soon after 1321.
Kretzmann and Stump seem to be right in their suggestion that generally
the viewpoint of the anonymous author is nearer to that of Kilvington than that
of Swineshed. It even seems that his viewpoint is closer to Kilvington than any
other known treatise; their similarities seem to be deeper than their disagree-
ments. Kilvington's revision of obligational theory can be read as further
development of the interpretational viewpoints insufficiently explicated in the
anonymous treatise, as I will point out in my discussion of Kilvington.
1 Kretzmann and Stump 1985, p. 239. (I refer to the anonymous treatise in passage
numbers, and to the introduction and to the commentary in page numbers.)
It is more difficult to assess the systematic relation of the anonymous

author and Roger Swineshed, because the two treatments lack almost any
common themes. The exception seems to be that the anonymous author criti-
cizes the rule allowing the respondent to grant each part of a copulative proposi-
tion, which itself ought to be denied. The editors of the treatise read this
criticism as an attack on Swineshed's position (Kretzmann and Stump 1985, p.
274), but as I will point out below, the criticism can be read as well, if not
better, as criticism of Burley's position on conjunctions combining false relevant
and true irrelevant propositions.
The anonymous author begins his treatise with the statement that "A
certain opinion associated with the principles of logic admits of an addition. " 1
In the following I will discuss the treatise as if it would amount to a revision of
Burley's theory of obligations, even though it is not certain that the anonymous
author had just Walter Burley's view in his mind as the 'certain opinion'
referred to in this sentence. It seems that my approach is defensible from the
systematic viewpoint; the theory criticized is fairly similar to Burley's theory.
As a preliminary statement of the theory the anonymous author offers a descrip-
tion fitting to Burley's theory. The art of obligations is characterized in the
standard way as based on admitting a possible positum, which is to be granted
within the time of the disputation and obligation. The author explicitly points
out that the obligational rules are followed by the respondent in a process of
response to the opponent. Furthermore, the author connects the theory specifi-
cally to Burley's outlook by the following statement of the rules of the art: 2
Whatever is incompatible with the positum or with what has been granted
(or with [both] these things) is to be denied, and what follows from them
is to be granted.
This rule combines earlier answers with the positum as they are connected in
Burley's rules R2b and R3b, and thus it seems clear that at the outset the obliga-
1 "Quaedam opinio iuxta principia logicae additionem patitur." Kretzmann and
Stump 1985, pass. [ii].

2 "Quicquid repugnat posito vel concesso vel eisdem negandum est, et quod ex illis
sequitur est concedendum." Kretzmann and Stump 1985, pass. [iii].
tiona! theory is looked at in Burley's variation. Neither Boethius de Dacia, as

we saw in chapter II.B, nor Swineshed, as we will see in IV.C, would have
accepted such a rule. In the case of Kilvington, the situation is less clear, but in
V .B I reconstruct his treatment of obligations as a criticism of this kind of
formulation of the rule.
In Burley's theory of obligations rules R2b and R3b have a central position
in relation to the useful rule 1., according to which the order of the propositions
put forward must be paid careful attention. As I pointed out in the preceding
section the author of De arte obligatoria interprets the idea of reducing all the
answers to one instant in such a way that the propositions put forward cannot
have any sequential order. It thus seems that this interpretation forces a change
in the essential rules, especially rules R2b and R3b, which imply the crucial
useful rule 1. It indeed seems that a new formulation of the rules R2b and R3b
is the "addition" to obligational theory suggested in the opening words of the
treatise, quoted above. The anonymous author gives his revised formulation of
Burley's rule R2b as follows:'
Every proposition that follows from the positum and one or more true
irrelevant propositions is to be granted.
While Burley requires that a proposition must follow from the positum together
with something that has already been granted, the anonymous author only
requires that the added premise is true, or as later discussion shows, known to
be true. Formally the rule stands as follows:
R2b' (p)(q)(r) ((Pp & K,.q & D((p & q) > r) & Rr) > OCr)
Here the difference to Burley's rule R2b is the replacement of Gq by K,q.

Instead of referring to the earlier phases of the disputation, the rule now refers
to what the respondent knows. The anonymous author does not present the cor-
responding rule for repugnant propositions, but there seems to be no doubt that
he thought that such a rule R 3b' should also be given.
1 "Omnis propositio quae <sequitur> ex posito et ali quo impertinenti vel veris est
concedenda." Kretzmann and Stump 1985, pass. [xvi].

The anonymous author offers an interesting proof for his revised rule
R2b'. He first points out that a true proposition irrelevant to the positum must
always be granted. Thus, he argues, it is pointless for the opponent to put
forward a proposition, if he knows that the respondent knows the proposition to
be true, and thus that it must be granted. As it is pointless to put forward true
and irrelevant propositions, which are recognized to be such, the anonymous
author argues that it ought to make no difference to the subsequent dispUtation
whether a true irrelevant proposition is put forward or not. However, from this
idea it follows that if a proposition must be granted, when it follows from the
positum together with a granted irrelevant sentence, the proposition must be
granted as well when it follows from the positum together with a true irrelevant
proposition, which has not been put forward and answered. (See Kretzmann and
Stump 1985, passages [xvii]-[xviii].)
This result is well in line with the anonymous author's idea, pointed out
in the preceding section, that the respondent ought to answer as if the proposi-
tions were put forward simultaneously so that the order of the propositions has
no effect on the answers. If the order makes no difference, answers are the
same whether the irrelevant true proposition used as a premise is put forward
before or after the putatively sequent proposition. Furthermore, if the irrelevant
true proposition is put forward after the putatively sequent proposition, its
evaluation is not available as an actual answer in the reasoning, it is available
only as a possible answer. Thus the actual act of answering does not in itself
have any effect.
This modification to Burley's rules is slight, but significant. Its drastic
effects to answers to propositions, which are according to Burley's rules
irrelevant, can best be clarified by an example. The anonymous author considers
the following disputation (Kretzmann and Stump 1985, passage [xix]):
D4
Po Every man is running Accepted, possible
Prl You are running Denied, false and irrelevant
Pr2 You are a man ?
Pr2 is repugnant with the positum together with the denial of Prl. Thus it seems
problematic to grant it. However, Pr2, as the anonymous author tells us, "is
known by you, and you are not obligated in any way whatever in relation to its
opposite; therefore it is pointless to suppose it to you. " 1 The anonymous author
has in mind that together with the positum alone, Pr2 would clearly have to be
granted, therefore it must be granted at any step, and, as he argues, that it must
be granted has to be recognized also in other answers. Thus the respondent has
made a mistake in denying Prl. As a man, he must keep the doors open for
granting that he is a man. In his rules Burley proceeds differently. According to
him, Pr2 would have to be denied as repugnant. Its actual truth would in
Burley's view make no difference, since the sentence is only contingently true.
The anonymous author defends his revised rule R 2b' also by reference to
the distinction between obligation "because of the casus" (propter casum),
which applies to the positum, and obligation "because of the way things are"
(propter rem). 2 The11e two obligations bring in an explicit way into the disputa~
tion the contrast between a false supposition and actual reality. The false
positum does not altogether release the respondent from the duty of following
the actual truth. Instead, the special disputational duty has to be combined wi.th
the general duty of following the truth.
The distinction into two kinds of obligations can be contrasted with the
distinction between casus and positum employed by, for example, Burley and
Ockham (see above, section III. A). The anonymous author does not use such a
double structure of assumptions. For Burley and Ockham we must distinguish
three layers: the reality, the casus, and the positum. For the anonymous author
the two relevant levels of obligational disputation are simply the reality and the
positum, called also the casus. It seems that the anonymous author interprets
positum, which is at the core of obligational rulesj in the way Burley and
Ockham interpret casus, which plays only a marginal role in the disputation.
1 "[Pr2] scitur ate, ad cuius oppositum non obligaris quovismodo; igitur illam tibi
supponere est frustra." Kretzmann and Stump 1985, pass. [xix].
2 "Ad conclusiones a quibusdam dictas, quod nihil est pertinens nisi quod sequitur
ex obligato et concesso, distinguendum est quod uno modo obligatio est propter casum
solum, ut cum ponitur aliquod falsum possibile; et alio modo est obligatio propter rem,
ut cum scitum a te proponitur tibi, illud babes concedere et asserere ex re." Kretzmann
and Stump 1985, pass. [xxii].
This explains neatly why the anonymous author puts forward a different set of
rules.
This interpretation is supported by the anonymous author's remark that the
obligation given as a positio is also ultimately based on things: the positum is to
be granted because "things can be in reality as the positum signifies." 1 Such
idea seems to be more closely related to Ockham's characterization of casus
than his picture of positum.
The anonymous author thinks that the respondent is in an analogous way
obligated both by actual reality and by the possible reality suggested by the
positum. These two obligations can be combined in answers connected to the
rule R2b'. This idea of a double obligation is in many ways interesting. The
anonymous author seems to have in mind that the respondent is constantly in his
answers trying to find a way of conforming to both kinds of duties as much as
possible. For this purpose he has to make a combination of facts of the actual
reality and facts of the possible reality of the positum. The tension of the
process comes from the fact that as far as the positum is false, it is not possible
to combine it fully with the actual reality. The obligations 'because of the way
things are' and 'because of the casus' are contrary in some instances, and
consequently the problem in composing satisfactory obligational rules is to find
a way of resolving this conflict of duties.
For Burley it was clear that the duty imposed by the positio overrides the
prima facie dialectical duty of following the truth. The prima facie duty had to
be followed in a disputation only if the act was indifferent to the special duty
imposed by the positio. Burley's aim in his obligational rules was to resolve in
a clear and unambiguous manner any possible conflicts of the duties. As a
result, the duty of following the truth was partly retained, but only in letter, not
in spirit. The disputation could proceed indefinitely far from the actual reality.
It seems that Burley and many other early authors writing on obligational theory
adopted such a technique because they did not pay much attention to the
interpretation of the sentences granted in the obligational disputation. It did not
1 " •.• potest ita esse ex parte rei sicut ipsum positum significat." Kretzmann and
Stump 1985, pass. [xxii].
matter how remote possibilities the disputations considered, if the results were
seen as consistent sets of sentences rather than descriptions of real possibilities.
Burley did not base the duty to grant the positum essentially on its
possibility. For Burley the positum was granted as a sentence uttered in a
certain context by the opponent. The semantical status of the sentence had only
secondary importance. The author of De arte obligatoria sees the status of the
positum differently. For him, the positum and other relevant sentences are
answered "in accordance with how it is possible for things to be," just as the
answer for an irrelevant proposition is given "on the basis of the facts then. " 1
In her answers, the respondent adopts a semantical viewpoint. Consequently,
she is faced with rather different aims of reasoning than in a disputation
following Burley's theory. Here the respondent is given the role of combining
the way how things are with the way things could bej while in Burley's theory
the respondent had the job of combining certain sentences, and the interpretation
was given retrospectively~ if at all.
However, it must be kept in mind that also the author of De arte obliga-
toria wrote within the genre of obligations, and thus also he aimed at a certain
specific kind of rules of how the respondent should answer. His solution, the
revised rule R2b', applied the idea that a sentence may be relevant also because
of the obligation 'because of the way things are.' Foreshadowing Kilvington's
discussion of obligational rules, it must be remarked that the explication of the
two kinds of obligations i.n terms of the concept of 'relevance' leads into
confusion of the concept. The anonymous author does not enter this discussion,
but Kilvington does, as I will show in the next chapter.
The idea of connecting actual truths with an assumed false supposition is
familiar from the earliest modem treatments of counterfactual conditionals. R.
M. Chisholm (e.g. Chisholm 1946) and Nelson Goodman (e.g. Goodman 1947)
tried to explicate the content of subjunctive counterfactual conditionals by a
reduction to logically true conditionals, where the antecedent contains actual
truths in addition to the counterfactual supposition itself. It thus seems under-
1 " ... mutanda

est responsio sine obligatione, quia tunc responsio debet consignari
rei prout tunc se habet, et non iuxta hoc quod possibile est se habere." Kretzmann and
Stump 1985, pass. [xiv].
standable that the editors of this anonymous treatise claim: "The author's
theory, insofar as it can be assessed on the basis of this short presentation, looks
more like a logic of counterfactuals than does anything else we know in the
literature of obligations" (Kretzmann and Stump 1985, p. 241).
The problem of disjunctive antecedents is familiar to modem logicians
from the context of counterfactual conditionals. An obligational example
discussed by the anonymous author addresses an analogous problem. Consider
the following disputation: 1
D5
Po You are in Rome or you are running Accepted, possible
Prl You are in Rome Granted, follows from
Po and the true irrel-
evant 'you are not
running'
Pr2 You are running Granted, follows from
Po and the true irrel-
evant 'you are not in
Rome'
Pr3 You are in Rome and You are running Granted, follows from
Prl and Pr2
The problems of this application of the rule allowing true irrelevant propositions
to be used without putting them forward are clear. The opposite of Pr2 is used
in the reasoning for Prl as a true irrelevant proposition, and similarly the
opposite of Prl is used in the reasoning for Pr2. In Pr3 the respondent is faced
with the problem of granting a conjunction of two false propositions, while only
their disjunction was supposed. As modem discussions of counterfactual
conditionals have shown, the problem is in the choice between different actual
truths to be admitted as additions to the counterfactual supposition. In this case,
the choice is between 'you are not running' and 'you are not in Rome.' Which
of these two are we to admit?
1 "Et ponatur haec: 'Tu es Romae vel tu es currens.' Proposita prima parte,
concedenda est quia ex posito cum impertinenti sequitur eadem. Similiter arguitur
secundam esse concedendam. Quare totalitatem ex eisdem partibus esse concedendam
probatur." Kretzmann and Stump 1985, pass. [xxiv].
The solution given by the anonymous author is simple and effective.

However, it is in direct conflict with his idea that the order of presenting the
propositions should have no effect. He writes: 1
In reply to this we have to say that as long as you are not in Rome and
you are not running, whichever part is proposed in first place is to be
granted. But the part which is proposed second is to be denied, because it
is in virtue of the fact that the opposite of the first one of the two parts
that is not proposed is being maintained that the part that is proposed first
is to be granted.
The author simply refers to the order chosen by the opponent: the one of the
disjuncts put forward first must be granted and the other one denied. This kind
of decision is in opposition to the idea that the disputation aims at research in
counterfactual conditionals. What would be the case, given the positum, should
not depend on how the opponent chooses the order of presentation.
Furthermore, this kind of reference to order seems even more strange than
reference to order in Burley's rules. By granting the first one of the false
disjuncts the respondent gives the impression that he is trying to give answers,
which deviate from the reality. His answers seem to follow reality only if
logical behaviour requires. According to Burley's rules, .the respondent at least
tries to keep to the truth as long as he can - even if he would due to his
stubbornness later be driven far from it. As I see it, the anonymous author did
not think properly about the example. (It may be remarked that this is not the
only point, where the author seems to argue hastily. Also the disorganized
character of the treatise speaks for the view that the text did not even aim at
being a careful systematic treatment of the subject.)
I believe that we may conclude that the anonymous author does not give
a satisfactory solution to the problem of disjunctive positum. However, that the
theory is deficient as it is stated in this treatise by no means makes it uninterest-
ing, especially if the theory is understood in the light of modem discussion of
1 "Ad istud dicendum quod quaelibet primo loco proposita est concedenda dum non
es Romae nee curris. Sed quae pars secundo proponitur neganda est, quia ex hoc quod
sustinetur oppositum primae alterius partis non propositae, concedenda est pars quae
primo proponitur." Kretzmann and Stump 1985, pass. [xxv].
counterfactuals. As modem readers we must keep in mind the troubles modern

logicians have had with counterfactuals with disjunctive antecedents. The
·author's general idea that the positum is to be combined with actual truths
before answering, and not only afterwards, is as difficult as interesting an idea
to develop in the form of simple rules of answering in an obligational disputa-
tion.
One type of a case where it makes, according to Burley's rules, a diffe-
rence whether a true irrelevant proposition has been answered or not, is the case
where a conjunction of a true irrelevant and a false but sequent proposition is
evaluated. This case is especially important in modem eyes because it has been
much discussed in connection to Roger Swineshed, who saw a variation of this
example as a good distinguishing property for his theory of obligations. I will
return to Swineshed soon, but let us first consider the discussions of Walter
Burley and the anonymous author.
Burley put forward the following example ('p' stands for 'You are in
Rome' and 'J#fq' for 'that you are in Rome and that you are a bishop are
alike'; both p and q are taken to be false, and thus also 'alike' in the intended
sense): 1
D6
Pop Accepted, possible
Prl p & (p ** q) Denied
Burley accepts that it is correct to deny Prl, but the reasons for this answer
need more discussion. The imagined objector in Burley's text states that the
reason for denying this conjunction is not the first part p ('you are in Rome') as
this is the positum, which is to be granted in any case. Thus, the objector
reasons, the conjunction is denied because of the second part JX'}q ('that you are
in Rome and that you are a bishop are alike'). This means, he claims, that the
second part alone would also be denied on the basis of positing p. However,
this is in contrast to Burley's idea that the second part of the conjunction ought
1 "Praeterea, si ponatur ista: 'tu es Romae,' et proponatur ista: 'tu es Romae, et te

esse Romae et te esse episcopum sunt similia.' Haec igitur est neganda primo loco, et
ita per regulam non probatur te esse episcopum." Burley 1963, p. 58.
to be considered as irrelevant and to be granted, because it is true (actually, you

are neither in Rome nor a bishop).
Burley's answer to this objection is 1
that the conjunction is to be denied, and not only because of the positum
nor only because of a true irrelevant proposition. Instead, it is to be denied
because it is false and does not follow; and therefore it is to be denied
because of both [parts of the conjunction]. And yet neither part is to be
denied [if it is proposed] in the first place.
Here Burley takes the view that at the first step of this disputation, the respon-
dent must grant either one of the conjuncts, or deny the conjunction, whichever
of the three is put forward. Thus in a certain situation Burley advises the
respondent to deny a conjunction, whose two conjuncts would be granted if put
forward at that step of the disputation.
The anonymous author attacks this view of Burley. He gives the following
thesis: 2
To grant each part of a copulative proposition that must be denied within

the time of the obligation is an absurd response.
The reason why the anonymous author has the view that the parts of a conjunc-
tion cannot be granted if the conjunction itself must be denied, is to be found in
his insistence on the reduction to one instant.
In their commentary on this rule Kretzmann and Stump find the subse-
quent argumentation confusing. They even suggest that perhaps the rule should
be read in an opposite way; perhaps non est has dropped from the text so that
the meaning of the rule turns around. On this reading the rule would claim that
the described answers are not absurd (Kretzmann and Stump 1985, pp. 272-
273).
1 "Ideo dico aliter quod copulativa est neganda, et non solum ratione positi nee
solum ratione veri impertinentis, sed est neganda quia falsa et non sequens, et ideo est
neganda ratione utriusque; neutra tamen pars est neganda primo loco." Burley 1963, p.
59.
2 "Utramque partem copulativae negaildae infra tempus obligationis concedere,
inconveniens responsio." Kretzmann and Stump 1985, pass. [xxvi].
I do not think that such emendation would be appropriate. It is indeed true

that the argumentation for the rule given by the anonymous author is rather
difficult to follow, but I do not think that we need to suppose any textual
confusion. The argumentation is far from straightforward, but it agrees rather
well with the general impression given by the treatise, which clearly is not too
carefully composed.
As an introduction to his argument the anonymous author presents a case
where a conjunction is denied after its parts have been granted. This case
proceeds as follows: 1
D7
Prl Socrates is seated Granted, true
Pr2 Socrates is standing Granted, true (Socrates has
stood up after the preceding
answer)
Pr3 Socrates is seated and Socrates is standing
Denied, contradictory
The point in this disputation is that both parts of the conjunction are granted,
but only with reference to different instants of time, so that the relevant reality
has changed between the answers. The connective 'and', however, binds the
conjuncts to reference to the same instant, and thus the conjunction can refer to
only one instant. The disputation can thus serve as an example of denying a
conjunction whose parts have been granted only as a disputation where answers
are not given for one instant. The answers contain a temporal shift, which is
generally not accepted by the author. Consequently, neither is it accepted by the
author that the respondent of an obligational disputation could in this way deny
a conjunction whose parts he has granted, since this would require granting
sentences with reference to different instants of time in an obligational disputa-
tion.
1 "Proposita hac 'Socrates sedet' Socrate sedente et in continenti hac proposita
'Socrates stat,' Socrate stante in tempore secunda prolationis, utraque a Platone

conceditur bene respondendo, quia turaque vera est pro tempore concessionis. Sed si
fiat copulativa ex illis, non obstante quod Socrate stet in secunda prolatione, copulativa
ilia est neganda, quia denotat Socratem stare et sedere pro eodem instanti." Kretzmann
and Stump 1985, pass. [xxvi].
I think that instead of providing evidence against the author's rule for
conjunctions, as Kretzmann and Stump suggest, this example explains what
would be required for denying a conjunction whose parts are granted. The point
of the example is thus to illuminate the background of Burley's rule allowing
denial of conjunctions whose parts would be granted at the same step, if put
forward. The anonymous author pinpoints by this example that negative evalu~
ation of a conjunction whose parts are evaluated positively requires some kind
.
of reference to different instants. The example gives such double reference in
the clearest possible form.
After the example, the author goes on to make two remarks. First, that
from two propositions the conjunction of them follows. This is introduced as a
simple matter of logic. (See Kretzmann and Stump 1985, passage [xxvii].)
Second, and more interestingly, he remarks that if the answers are tied to one
instant, whatever follows from granted sentences must be granted as well (see
Kretzmann and Stump 1985, passage [xxviii]). From these two remarks it is
easy to see that the anonymous author is trying to point out that denying a
conjunction whose parts are to be granted requires some kind of inadmissible
temporal shift.
Even though such a temporal shift is not clear in the case discussed by
Burley, its cognate is present there also. In Burley's example one of the con-
juncts was the positum and the other was an irrelevant true proposition. Accord-
ing to Burley's rules, the positum is granted because of the special duty, while
the irrelevant true proposition is evaluated in respect to the actual reality. Thus
the answers may semantically have connections to different directions, even if
they, according to Burley, are later reduced to the same instant. In the case of
a conjunction of the positum and a true irrelevant sentence it is the case that
independently the conjuncts would be interpreted with reference to different
instants: in some sense there are two instants involved. In Burley's theory,
multiplication of instants never causes problems, because as a part of another
sentence, the positum is not evaluated as the positum, but merely as a part of
that sentence. If the conjunction is irrelevant, both of its parts qua parts are
evaluated by the criteria for irrelevant sentences, in order to achieve an unam-
biguous response.
The anonymous author does not accept any double structure. He empha-
sizes that it is possible to grant the parts of a conjunction to be denied, only if
the disputation is not taken to be limited to one instant. That is, only if change
is allowed to be recognized in the answers. The anonymous author seems to be,
in his criticisms of Burley's stance on conjunctions, defending his idea that the
reduction to one instant ought to be acknowledged in finding the answers, and
not just retrospectively.
The ambiguities recognized by modem commentators in the discussion
concerning conjunctions seem to be analogous to the ambiguities in the discus-
sion concerning reduction to one instant. As the author leaves ambiguities in the
statement of his view of whether the time of the disputation is to be limited to
one instant, his discussions of whether one may deny a conjunction whose parts
have been granted can be seen to be troublesome to interpret. Nevertheless, it
seems indubitable that the anonymous author thought that if the disputation is
limited to one instant, one may not deny a conjunction whose parts are to be
granted.
According to the anonymous author all answers must be consistent, if the
disputation is limited to orte instant. Generally, he employs an even stricter
concept of consistency, due to his rejection of the order of propositions put
forward: at any single step of the disputation, all answers, which would be
given, if the sentence were put forward, must be consistent. This opposes
Burley's idea that one may deny a conjunction, whose parts would be granted,.
if they were put forward.
C. TwO COLUMN BOOK-KEEPING
In his treatise on obligations, written probably between 1330~ 1335, Roger

Swineshed. gave a remarkably looser rule about conjunctions and disjunctions: 1
1 "Propter concessionem partium copulativae non est copulativa concedenda nee

propter concessionem disjunctivae est aliqua pars ejus concedenda." Spade 1977, p.
257.
Because of granting the parts of a conjunction, the conjunction is not to be

granted, nor because of granting a disjunction is any part of the disjunc-
tion to be granted.
This rule has been much discussed both by medieval authors and by modem
commentators. The primary comment has been that this rule allows the respon-
dent to grant inconsistent sets of sentences. It indeed is the case that through
this rule Swineshed allows the respondent to grant both parts of a conjunction
and actually deny the conjunction. According to Burley's rules, the only
inconsistency allowed was among propositions, which potentially were to be
granted at a .single step of the disputation. As only one proposition can be
answered at each step, inconsistencies within the set of actually given answers
could not occur.
Swineshed himself accepts the conclusion that his rule makes the respon-
dent to grant inconsistencies. As he says: 1
The conclusion is to be granted that three repugnant propositions must be

granted, and four and so forth.
However, some lines later he points out: 2
This is true, but, however, no contradictory repugnant to t.'le positum is

granted during the time of the obligation. ·
Swineshed's point seems to be that although the respondent's answers may

include inconsistencies, the status of the positum is not to be questioned.
Nothing inconsistent with it may be granted. This raises the question: how are
the inconsistencies limited? It seems that many modem commentators as well as
medieval authors have ceased in their interpretational work when they have been
able to point out the source of inconsistencies in Swineshed' s theory. But
especially as Swineshed himself recognizes the inconsistencies and thinks that
they can be limited, such an approach seems to underestimate tbe merits of the
1 "Concedenda est conclusio quod tria repugnantia sunt concedenda et quattuor et

sic deinceps." Spade 1977, p. 274.
2 "Et hoc est verum dum tamen nullum contradictorium repugnans posito conceda-
tur infra tempus obligationis." Spade 1977, p. 274.
theory. Let us therefore spell out the rules of this theory in detail, and try to
defend it.
Swineshed's point of departure is the standard conception of positum as
something that is agreed to be maintained during the disputation despite its
falsity. He agrees with other authors also on the principle that also anything,
following from the positum is to be granted. It seems that the originalities in his
theory grow from the following principle, implied by Aristotle's discussion in
Topics, VIII, 5, but not (to my knowledge) pointed out by other authors writing
on obligational theory: 1
Because of a less inconvenience (inconveniens) a major inconvenience is

not to be granted.
It seems that Swineshed attacks something like Burley's useful rule 6., accord-
ing to which a false positum may lead the respondent into granting almost
anything. This feature is due to the rules R2b and R3b, which tell that anything
following from the positurn together with what has been granted must be
granted, and that anything repugnant to the positum together what has been
granted must be denied. These rules allow those propositions, which have
earlier been judged irrelevant, have an effect on what becomes relevant. This
leads to the feature of Burley's theory that the order and selection of irrelevant
propositions put forward has an effect to the answers. Furthermore, this leads
to the feature that with a suitable selection of irrelevant propositions, anything
compatible with the positum has to be granted.
It seems that Swineshed's point in not allowing "a major inconvenience"
to be granted is that the assumption given as the positum should not be widened
to include anything else. Given this strict interpretation of the 'major inconve-
nience' Kilvington's theory of obligations also seems unacceptable, since
Kilvington also approves of using irrelevant truths in inferences determining
relevance, even more widely than does Burley. In defence of the principle,
Swineshed's solution is to revise the rules so that the assumption given as the
1 "Propter minus inconveniens non est maius inconveniens concedendum." Spade

1977, p. 253.
positum cannot be widened without explicit recognition. I will shortly return to

the way in which he allows, with explicit recognition, the assumption to be
widened. Let us first look at the revision of the rules.
Swineshed simply rejects the rules ~b and R3b, and redefines the concept
of an irrelevant proposition accordingly, to include all those propositions which
neither follow from nor are repugnant to the positum alone. The set of rules
thus becomes the following:
R1 (p) ((Pp & Rp) > OCp)

R2 (p)(q) ((Pp & D(p > q) & Rq) > OCq)
R3 (p)(q)· ((Pp & D(p > -q) & Rq) > ONq)
R4a (p) ((Ip & KrP & Rp) > OCp)
R4b (p) ((Ip & K.--p & Rp) > ONp)
R4c (p) ((Ip & -KrP & -K.--p & Rp) > ODp)
(Here Ip applies to all propositions p, which are not covered by tbe rules R1, R:~
or R3 .) Swinesbed's rules are just a simplification of Burley's rules. From the

formal viewpoint it is noteworthy that rejecting R2b and R3b makes unnecessary
the clumsy sentential operator G (true of any conjunction of sentences, which
have been granted or whose opposites have been denied). All answers can in
principle be determined regardless of earlier answers. Only the positum .and the
actual reality must be taken into account.
In essence, these rules are the simplest and the most straightforward in the
tradition of obligations. The respondent has a relatively easy task in answering:
he has to keep in mind, in addition to logical principles, only the positum. If
actual facts are considered they can be immediately forgotten. No complicated
connections between the positum and either earlier answers (as in Burley's
theory) or actual facts (as in the theory of the anonymous author) need to be
remembered. Irrelevant and relevant sentences need not even retrospectively be
connected to each other.
While contradictions may occur between answers to relevant and irrelevant
sentences, in both sets consistency must be maintained in standard cases. Thus
one may point out that as anything following from the positum must be granted
and anything repugnant to it must be denied, similar rules of reasoning can be
employed in the set of irrelevant sentences, as far as no change in the actual

world is reflected in the answers.
The price of the simplicity in answering is that the intelligibility of the set
of answers is achieved only through two-column book-keeping. An imagined
book-keeper attending an obligational disputation following Swineshed's rules
must separate relevant and irrelevant propositions to different columns. As one
set, the answers may easily tum out inconsistent, if the positum is false. But
because answers to relevant and irrelevant propositions are explicitly connected
to different backgrounds, they cannot be even retrospectively combined into a
description of one possible situation, as is required by Walter Burley, the
anonymous author discussed above, and Richard Kilvington.
A natural consequence of this separation of relevant and irrelevant
propositions is that Swineshed does not give the traditional rules concerning
instants of time. On the contrary, he stresses that irrelevant propositions are to
be answered as the reality is at the time of answering. This may lead, as
Swineshed recognizes, into granting directly contradictory propositions. He
gives the example of a respondent granting "You are sitting" while being
seated, and then later during the same obligation, granting "You are not sitting"
because of being now standing (see Spade 1977, p. 274). The simple explana-
tion for such allowance to grant flat contradictions is that irrelevant propositions
must be seen to be literally irrelevant, outside the main course of the disputa-
tion.
That Swineshed had no intention of viewing the answers to irrelevant
propositions as contributing to the study of the assumption, becomes especially
clear in his idea of a second positum. In some of his examples the structure of
the disputation is complicated through giving one of the granted irrelevant
propositions as a second positum. This act, as it turns out, gives Swineshed's
model of obligational disputations the essential power of Burley's theory: the
possibility of studying the effects of the order of the analysis. In Burley's theory
the order was introduced by selection of the order of irrelevant propositions, but
in Swineshed' s theory similar re~mlts are achieved through selection of subse-
quent posita.
The bask idea is neatly illuminated by the following putatively problem-

atic example, discussed by Swineshed himself (Spade 1977, pp .. 273-274):
D8
Po 1 You are in Rome or You are running Accepted, possible
Prl You are in Rome Denied, irrelevant and false
Pr2 You are running Denied, irrelevant and false
Pr3 You are not running Granted, irrelevant and true
Po2 You are not running Accepted, possible
Pr4 You are in Rome ?
The putative problem in Pr4, as explained by Swineshed, is caused by the

second positum Po2. The sentence has already been denied as Prl, but as Pr4
it follows from the two posita, Pol and Po2.
To solve the problem, let us look at the example in detail. In this disputa-
tion the first positum is a disjunction. In accordance to Swineshed's rules,
particularly his rule concerning conjunctions and disjunctions, both parts of a
disjunction serving as the positum are denied (Prl and Pr2). This is the case
because neither part of a disjunction follows from the disjunction alone, which
makes the parts irrelevant in the disputation. After denying the parts the
disputation continues by evaluation of the negation of one of the disjuncts. The
negation Pr3 is granted, as the disjunct itself was denied. After this, the same
sentence is given as a new positum Po2. It seems that Swineshed thought that
granting the sentence shows that it is compossible with the original positum
Pol, and thus it can be combined with it in order to widen the assumption. The
respondent has to accept the second positum. In Pr4 the respondent faces, as it
seems, a problem. The reality has not changed, but he is forced to change his
answer to what has earlier been denied as an irrelevant and false proposition.
The change in answers seems to follow from a change in the status of the
proposition. As Prl "You are in Rome" was irrelevant and false, but as Pr4 it
is sequentially relevant, as it follows from the two posita.
Swineshed's solution is simply recognition of the new status of the
sentence. He points out that giving a second positum causes a change in the set
of relevant sentences, and that therefore it is no wonder that some answers may
change due to giving the second positum. A book-keeper attending the disputa-
tion might evaluate it by means of the following table:
D8T relevant irrelevant

Pol p v q P(p v q)
Prl p Np
Pr2 q Nq
Pr3 -q C-q
Po2 -q P-q
Pr4 p Cp
In this table, the answers in the relevant column are consistent. They would be
consistent even if some relevant sentences were answered before the second
positum is accepted, since whatever follows from the original positum, the
disjunction p v q, still follows from the conjunction of the two posita (i. e.,
from (p v q) & -q). On the other hand, answers in the irrelevant column are in
this case also consistent, since no changes in the reality have been reflected in
the answers. Between the two columns inconsistencies (as that between Np at
Prl and Cp at Pr4) can be pointed out, but, as Swineshed might remark, that is
not a surprise. A false assumption is inconsistent with actual facts just because
it is false.
Historically it seems that Swineshed developed into a systematic end an
important motive present in many texts related to obligational theory. I have
already pointed out in the preceding section IV.B that Swineshed's rules for
conjunctions and disjunctions are not completely novel, but have their predeces-
sors in the anonymous De arte obligatoria, in Walter Burley's and master W. 's
treatises. These discussions make rather explicit that an obligational disputation
combines the distinct domains of assumption and fact.
Another important root for Swineshed's two-columnar model comes from
the idea of elaborating the relations of two parallel disputations going on
simultaneously. References to such situations come occasionally up in Burley's
treatise (see, e.g., Burley 1963, p. 49; translation Burley 1988, p. 382). Also
Richard Kilvington recognizes such situation (Kilvington 1990a and 1990b,
sophisma 47, passages G)-(n); see also below, section V.B). A short systematic
treatment of such theme can be found from Richard of Campsall's Questions on
Prior analytics (Richard of Campsall 1968, pp. 227-229 and 237-238; see
also Knuuttila 1993b). Swineshed's two-columnar model dividing relevant and
irrelevant sentences into separate domains, if not disputations, is a rather natural

development of this theme.
Swineshed's two-columnar model of obligational disputations did receive
some support in the fourteenth century. About at the time of Swineshed's
Obligationes, 1 Roger Rosetus attacks the standard rules of obligations along the
same lines as Swineshed. The discussion is in an epistemic context in his
commentary on the Sentencei. Robert Fland, writing sometime between 1335
and 1370, presents Swineshed's rules of positio as responsio nova, as an
alternative to responsio antiqua, which is basically the model presented by
Walter Burley (Spade 1980). Richard Lavenham seems to have accepted
Swineshed's model unconditionally (Spade 1978). towards the end of the
century, however, Swineshed lost out to Burley with the Scotist revision.
Authors like Albert of Saxony (Albertus de Saxonia 1975), Paul of Venice (Paul
of Venice 1988) and John of Holland (John of Holland 1985) present a theory
basically like Burley's. As obligational theory developed, it was seen to be
important that all answers form one consistent set, which can be understood as
a description of a situation. Swineshed's acceptance of inconsistencies between
answers to relevant and irrelevant sentences was seen to be more problematic
than the feature of Burley's theory that the respondent may be led into granting
almost whatever.
Swineshed's theory of the species of obligational disputations called
impositio also deserves attention. As I pointed out in chapter III.A, Walter
Burley recognized six speciei of obligational disputations. Swineshed claims that
there are only three: impositio, positio and depositio. He discusses each of the
three separately, but like for Burley, also for Swineshed depositio is reducible
to positio. The discussion of depositio is in length only a quarter of the discus-
1Swineshed's Obligationes was written between 1330 and 1335 (Spade 1977, p.
246); Rosetus's commentary on the Sentences between 1332 and 1337 (Courtenay 1987,
p. 109).
2 Rosetus concludes: "Et ideo ista regula est neganda: sequitur ex posito et bene
concesso, ergo est concedendum, et multe alie regule que conceduntur ab aliquibus in
obligationibus." Rosetus manuscript, 36v (q. 1, a. 3, a. 3). I am thankful to Olli
Hallamaa for allowing me to see his edition in preparation.
sion of positio. The rules of depositio are simply derivatives of the rules of
positio. In the case of impositio the situation is more interesting.
Swineshed's itnpositio corresponds to Burley's species called institutio. In
· this species the obligation gives a new meaning to some term or some sentence.
For Burley, this means that the sentence, which is given a new meaning, is to
be evaluated according to the given new meaning. Similarly, if a term is given
a new meaning, any sentence containing that term is to be evaluated appre-
ciating the given new meaning. The problems discussed in this species of
obligations can be illuminated by Burley's following problematic example: 1
Let 'A' signify a donkey in a true proposition, a man in a false propo-

sition, and the disjunctive [term] 'a man or not a man' in an uncertain
proposition. Next, either you are A or not. If you are A, then the proposi-
tion ['You are A'] is true; therefore, 'A' signifies a donkey, therefore, you
are a donkey. If you are not A, then the proposition ['You are A'] is false,
and in a false proposition 'A' signifies a man; therefore, 'You are a man'
is false. If 'You are A' is uncertain, then 'A' is the same as the term 'a
man or not a man,' and in that case 'You are a man or not a man' would
be uncertain.
This example is in many respects interesting. First, it may be pointed out that
constructing the example as an obligational disputation is rather difficult. As an
obligational disputation the interchange would consist of giving the institutio,
and putting forward one proposition, 'You are A.' After the evaluation of this
proposition the discussion turns to discussing what is true and what is false -
a subject to be addressed according to Burley at least in the species of positio
only after the technical part of the disputation ends with the phrase 'time is
finished'. However, if the discussion concerning truth is undertaken after the
disputation proper, the obligation ought not to be valid in it. As it stands, the
1 "Significet A asinum in propositione vera, hominem in propositione falsa, et hoc

disiunctum: homo vel non homo, in propositone dubia. Deinde: aut tu es A aut non. Si
es A, tunc haec < 'tu es A'> est vera, igitur A est asinus, igitur tu es asinus. Si non
es A, tunc haec < 'tu es A'> est falsa, et in propositione falsa A significet hominem,
igitur haec est falsa: tu es homo. Si haec sit dubia 'tu es A' tunc A est idem quod iste
terminus 'homo vel non homo', et tunc haec esset dubia: tu es homo vel non homo."
Burley 1963, pp. 35-36; translation Burley 1988, p. 371.
example looks more like a sophism to be found from the sophismata-literature

than a straightforward obligational disputation.
Second, the example has connections to the liar paradox, like many other
Burley's examples concerning institutio. Burley's solution of the sophism makes
the connection even more evident than the sophism itself: 1
The solution is evident, because an institutio should not be allowed when

it makes what the utterance signifies depend on the truth of a proposition.
Within the scope of my study, the main interest lies in the simple fact that for
Burley, the institutio concerning the letter A forces a new interpretation to the
sentence 'You are A'. Without any institutio the respondent would surely deny
that he is the letter A, but within the time of the given institutio, the sentence
cannot be denied for the reason that the respondent is not the first letter of the
alphabet, since the sentence must now be interpreted differently.
Swineshed gives a different account of the situation (Spade 1977, pp.
259-261). He considers the same example, except changing the sentence to be
evaluated from 'You are A' to 'a man is A'. Given that the respondent is male,
the switch is negligible. In Swineshed's discussion it is taken to be rather clear
that 'a man is A' must be denied even after the impositio because a man is not
the first letter of the alphabet. In Swineshed's discussion, one of the central
principles of impositio as a species of obligational disputations is that2
Because of an imposition of some proposition the answer [to be given] ·to

it is not to be changed.
Swineshed' s reason for such a principle is prima facie as obscure as the prin-
ciple itself. According to him, the sentence, whose meaning the impositio
concerns, is irrelevant to the impositio. Given this view, it is clear that he
1 "Solutio patet, quia institutio non est admittenda cum ponat significatum vocis
dependere ex veritate propositionis." Burley 1963, p. 36; translation Burley 1988, p.
371.
2 "Propter impositionem alicujus propositionis ad· ill am non est responsio varianda."
Spade 1977, p. 254.
conceived impositio as a species of obligation in a very different way than did

Burley.
Let us tum to Swineshed's rules for impositio to understand his idea.
Whereas Burley did not give in his treatment of institutio rules which would be
analogous to his essential rules for positio, Swineshed gives four rules, which
are only slightly different from his rules for positio. According to the first rule,
the obligatum given by the impositio must be granted (cf. the positio-rule R 1).
According to the second rule, anything following from the obligatum must be
granted (cf. Ri). According to the third rule, anything repugnant to the obli-
gatum must be denied (cf. R3). And finally, according to the fourth rule,
irrelevant sentences are to be answered in accordance to their signification (cf.
R4a- R4c). As these rules show, the obligatum given by the impositio is to be
dealt with as a positum would be dealt with. (Spade 1977, pp. 258-259.)
Given these rules we are forced to ask: what is it that Swineshed calls the
obligatum given by the impositio? This becomes clear in his example of the
second rule (notice my underlining): 1
An example: it is posited that this proposition 'a man is a donkey' pre-

cisely signifies that God < exists> . Then this must be granted " 'a man is
a donkey' is true", because it follows from an obligatum by imposition
etc.
In this example the obligatum is the underlined sentence "this proposition 'a
man is a donkey' precisely signifies that God exists". From this sentence the
second underlined sentence "'a man is a donkey' is true" follows (given that
God exists), and thus the sentence must be granted as sequentially relevant.
The example suggests that Swineshed understands the obligatum by
impositio to behave in a way similar to a positum. His point seems to be that
impositio is to be dealt with as a positio of a sentence concerning the significa-
tion of some proposition or some term. This interpretation is supported by other
examples, as well as by the fact that he often uses the verb ponere as the main
1 "Exemplum: Ponitur quod haec propositio 'Homo est asinus' preacise significet
quod deus <est>. Tunc haec est concedenda "'Homo est asinus' est vera" quia
sequitur ex obligato per impositionem et cetera." Spade 1977, p. 258.
verb when an impositio is given, as in the above example. He even lists pono
as one of the three signs through which obligation in the species of impositio is
given (Spade 1977, p. 259).
Swineshed's view that a proposition is irrelevant to the imposition con-
cerning its signification becomes more understandable, if we understand imposi-
tio as essentially similar to positio. Let us return to the above example, where
the obligatum is
(1) this proposition 'a m!Ul is a donkey' precisely signifies that god exists.
Given this impositio, Swineshed's view amounts to claiming that
(2) a man is a donkey
is (in the technical sense) irrelevant. Reading (1) as a positum, the claim is not
too unreasonable. The words 'a man is a donkey' are in (1) in a material
supposition (in fourteenth century terminology), or mentioned, not used (in
modem terminology). As a proposition, (1) does not concern men nor donkeys,
it concerns, among other things, the words 'man' and 'donkey'. On the other
hand, (2) is a statement about men and donkeys. In this respect it seems clear
that in the technical obligational sense (2) is irrelevant, if (1) is the positum.
Let us now return to Swineshed's discussion (Spade 1977, pp. 259-261)
of the example considered also by Burley. In that example Swineshed claims
that 'a man is A' must be denied as it would be denied if no new signification
were given for A, regardless of the impositio giving the letter A three alternative
significations depending the truth of the sentence. In his solution of the sophism
Swineshed expands the obligational exchange into the following disputation,
given, to wit, as the solution of the problem:
D9
Im 'A' signifies only man in a false proposition, "!here it is posited, and
only donkey in a true proposition, where it is posited, and only the same
as this disjunctive [term] in a doubtful proposition, where it is posited.
Accepted, possible
Prl A man is A Denied, irrelevant and false
Pr2 This proposition is false Granted, irrelevant and true
Pr3 A is posited in this proposition Granted, irrelevant and true
Pr4 A signifies man in this proposition Denied, irrelevant and false
The point of this disputation is that, after the crucial sentence 'a man is A' has
been denied, the opponent tries to construct the consequence, which proved
problematic for Burley. Given the impositio Im, if the proposition Prl is false
(cf. Pr2), and A is posited in it (cf. Pr3), A signifies man in it (cf. Pr4). Burley
constructed a corresponding inference, but could not dissolve it. For Swineshed,
the consequence is clearly inadmissible, because it illegally combines the
obligatum with irrelevant sentences. The consequent cannot be inferred in the
disputation, because inferring it would require traffic between the columns for
relevant and irrelevant propositions.
Swineshed can by means of his theory solve a problem which simply had
to be barred by an ad hoc rule by Burley. In this respect it seems that Swine-
shed's theory is superior to Burley's. However, a remark is in order. Swine-
shed's solution is strongly dependent on using the obligational technique as the
methodology in addressing the problem. His solution leaves the impression that
the solution is purely obligational, its philosophical import is left unclear. The
viewpoint may be defensible, though. Such gruesome significations as spelled
out in the impositio of the example, seem to be mere figments of the imagina-
tion, and thus their consideration can be seen to fall quite naturally into the
locus of obligational reasoning.
V Obligational Reasoning and Epistemic Sophismata
A. GENERAL REMARKS
In his book Fallacies C. L. Hamblin (1970) suggested that principles of obliga-

tional reasoning were applied in the .so called sophismata literature already in
the early thirteenth century - so that perhaps obligational theory was from the
beginning seen to provide a theoretical basis for discussions of different kinds
of sophismata. Unfortunately Hamblin does not give much space to this sugges-
tion, and thus his evidence is also rather scanty. He just points out the similarity
between the general approach of sophismata and that of obligational disputa-
tions, together with some terminological similarities. In this chapter I try to look
in some detail at the relations between these two genres of logica modema.
In the scope of this chapter I cannot give a full discussion of the topic. I
will neglect problems related to the actual oral disputations on sophismata, and
restrict my discussion mainly to two texts: the epistemic section of Richard Kil-
•
vington's Sophismata 1 and the epistemic chapter De scire et dubitare of Wil-
liam Heytesbury's Regulae so/vendi sophismata. 2 In these texts Kilvington and
Heytesbury disagreed in an interesting way on issues of epistemic logic and of
obligational theory. This disagreement is especially interesting in the way it
sheds light on the relations of obligational technique and sophismata in general.
In the rest of this section I will make some general comments on the way in
which obligational principles were applied in the field of sophismata. In section
B I tum to discussing Kilvington's views of the modifications to obligational
1 Kilvington 1990a; translation in Kilvington 1990b. I refer to Kilvington by

sophisma number together with section letters given by N. Kretzmann and B. E.
Kretzmann both in the edition and in the translation.
2 I have used the edition Heytesbury 1494 and the translation Heytesbury 1988.
Due to problems of renaissance editions, I give page numbers only for the translation.
Obligational Reasoning and Epistemic Sophismata 103
theory needed so that it can serve the needs of sophismata. Section C and D
consider the epistemic-obligational disagreement between Kilvington and
Heytesbury. Section C is dedicated to Kilvington and section D to Heytesbury.
The thirteenth-fourteenth century technical sense of the term 'sophism'
was somewhat different from the meaning in which Aristotle used this term,
although this originally greek term was much used also in the old general sense
of an apparent problem of reasoning. For the late medieval technical sense I use
the word in the latin form 'sophisma' in order to make the technical character
of the term clear. In this technical sense a sophisma is a problematic sentence
(the sophisma sentence in the following) combined with a special structure. In
the written sophismata-collections the sophisma sentence is typically followed by
a casus providing the background on which the sophisma sentence is to be
evaluated. Affirmative evaluation is supported by a proof, and negative evalu-
ation by a disproof. After this statement of the sophisma, the solution or several
solutions, is or are given.
The heart of this structure is the sophisma sentence, whose evaluation is
problematic by purpose. The rest of the structure is developed in order to
facilitate the discussion. Typically the sophisma sentence has several inter-
pretations: it can be read in different ways, and different analysis of it lead to
different results. In the fourteenth century the sophisma sentences are often
composed in ways deliberately introducing competing methods of analysis, in
order to discuss them by means of the example.
One natural reading of the structure of each sophisma in Kilvington's
sophismata divides the text in each case into two parts. First the basics are
given as a sequence: the sophisma sentence, the casus, the proof and the
disproof. After this sequence of sentences has been presented, the real discus-
sion begins. Its main point is to show the correct responses to be given for each
sentence in the sequence. On this reading a sophisma looks like a disputation of
the obligational type (though with main emphasis after the 'the time is finished'
-phrase), so that inferences are evaluated by consideration of the sentences one
by one, on the basis of the casus and the obligational rules. Below I will show
that the sophisms 45, 46 and 47 can be read in this way; it is beyond the scope
of this work to go through all of Kilvington' s sophisms in order to show how to
104 Obligational Reasoning and Epistemic Sophismata
read them in this disputational manner. 1 If this reading is faithful to Kilving-

ton's intentions, his sophismata contain the obligational idea of distinguishing
between the sentences (arguments) evaluated, and the meta-level discussion of
the correct evaluations. The main problem in the meta~level discussion is often
the acceptability of alternative principles of inferences, as is naturally clear from
the opposition between the proof and the disproof, which are usually two
apparently valid arguments. Sometimes Kilvington employs obligational ter-
minology in addition to standard logical terminology in the meta-level discus-
sion, as I will below show through consideration of Kilvington's 'disputational
meta-arguments'. Generally it seems to be rather easy to transform Kilvington's
text into the technical form of obligational disputation with an extensive discus-
sion after 'time is out' has been pronounced. In these extensive discussions the
correct answers to the sophisma sentence and to the proof and disproof are
given.
The name and frame-story of William Heytesbury's Regulae so/vendi
sophismata reflects in an interesting way his approach for solving' logico-
semantical puzzles in the context of sophismata. According to the preface, this
work is intended for the young beginners attending disputations on sophismata,
belonging to the curriculum for young arts students. (See Heytesbury 1979.)
Heytesbury's idea is to provide general rules applicable to varying disputational
situations, where problems arise. These rules are somewhat different in each of
the six topics discussed, but the general idea is that of providing rules for
interpreting and analyzing complicated sentences and pieces of reasoning.
Despite their practical motivation, the rules are thus characteristically logico-
semantical. Much of the work consists of examples and counterexamples of the
rules,. some requiring qualifications for the rules. These examples and counter-
examples are usually not discussed in the strict technical format of a sophisma,
but the idea is at least strongly reminiscent of sophismata.
1 An interesting anonymous later fourteenth century text Declaratio sophismatum

Climitonis seems to provide a discussion of the first sophisms of Kilvington's Sophis-
mata quite explicitly as a disputation between an opponent and a respondent proceeding
sentence by sentence, in the obligational manner. The treatise is edited in Knuuttila and
Lehtinen 1979. See also Yrjonsuuri 1993b.
Using Heytesbury as a paradigmatic example, John Murdoch has made it

clear for modern scholars that in the fourteenth century especially in Oxford
rtew techniques of analysis rose to the front in natural philosophy. In Murdoch's
discussion, three techniques come up as especially important: (1) terminist
logic, especially the so called theory of supposition, (2) languages for ascribing
limits, carrying out functions of measurement, and (3) shifting attention to terms
and propositions instead of things themselves, which turns the analysis metalin-
guistic. (See, e.g., Murdoch 1979.)
It is clear that the metalinguistic character of fourteenth century analytical
natural philosophy is the central innovation. This 'linguistic turn' implies that
problems of natural philosophy must be approached through such techniques of
discourse as terminist logic and languages of measurement. In the context of
this study, it is interesting to recognize that obligations also have an interesting
relation to the new wave of natural philosophy in fourteenth century England.
It seems that we should add to Murdoch's list of new techniques obligations as .
a technique of discourse. Murdoch's paradigmatic example, Heytesbury, often
employs both in his Regulae so/vendi sophismata and in his Sophismata obliga-
tional methods of reasoning. It is my intention in the rest of this chapter to
illuminate the role of obligational techniques in the processes of reasoning
employed in epistemic sophismata of Kilvington and Heytesbury. (Parentheti-
cally it may be remarked that the use of obligational techniques is rather wide
in fourteenth century philosophy, although little attention has been paid to it. In
this respect it is interesting to point out that Olli Hallamaa has argued that
Roger Rosetus used obligational rules of reasoning in his theological work as an
integral part of his methodology (Hallamaaforthcoming).)
Instead of going here further into the problems of how sophismata
generally work, let me here analyze an extremely simple example of the role of
obligational reasoning in the criticism of logical principles. This passage is part
of Kilvington's discussion aimed at to show that the so called Tarskian bicondi-
tionals of the form p {=} 'p' is true are not valid. In Kilvington's discussion two
kinds reasons for rejection of such biconditionals are pointed out. (See S47,
(t)-(z).)
First, it was in the fourteenth century generally required that a sentence

p' must exist in order to be true; if a statement is not made, it cannot be called
1
true. This point is relevant to the consequence p > 'p' is true, since by such
reasoning it can easily be shown, say, that it might be the case that you are in
Rome without the sentence 'You are in Rome' being true. This would be the
case if you were in Rome while the sentence did not exist.' On the other hand,
from 'p' is true it follows, given this viewpoint; that 'p' exists, and thus sl!ch
distinction cannot disprove the consequence 'p' is true > p.
Second, in the statement 'p' is true the sentence p is not used significa-
tively, but as standing for itself. To employ Tarskian terminology, there is no
guarantee that the object-language sentence p signifies the same as the meta-
language p. If the significations are different, 'p' is true has nothing to do with
the simple clai.m p, just as the sentence 'il pluit' is true has nothing to do with
the claim that you are in Rome. In this case, the consequence 'p' is true >p
may fail. This approach is in Kilvington's mind when he turns the problem into
a problem of obligational disputations. The crucial text is as follows: 2
Again, I prove that that last consequence is not acceptable; for in an

analogous instance it does not follow. I prove this; for this does not
follow: "This is true: 'You are a donkey'; therefore, you are a donkey."
I prove that; for this is possible: "This is true: 'You are a donkey'."
Therefore, I put (pono) this to you: "This is true: 'You are a donkey'",
and then this is put forward (proponatur): 'You are a donkey'. If you .
grant it, then, on the contrary, "let him yield the time (cedat tempus)".
You have granted what is impossible when what was put to you was
possible (positione possibili); therefore, incorrectly. If you deny this: 'You
are a donkey', then, since anything following from the positum is to ·be
granted, it follows that ·'You are a donkey' does not follow from the
1"Assumptum probo; quia tu potes esse Romae Iicet haec propositio 'Tu es Romae'
non sit; et per consequens tu potes esse Romae licet haec propositio 'Tu es Romae• non
sit vera." S47, (u).
2 "Item, probo quod ista ultima consequentia non valet; quia in consimili non
sequitur. Quod probo; quia nort sequitur 'Haec est vera: "Tu es asinus"; igitur, tu es
asinus'. Quod probo; quia haec est possibilis; 'Haec est vera: "Tu es asinus".' Pono
igitur tibi istam: 'Haec est vera: "Tu es asinus"', deinde proponatur ista: 'Tu es
asinus'. Si concedis, contra, cedat tempus. Tu concessisti impossibile, facta positione
possibili; igitur, male. Si negas istam 'Tu es asinus', igitur, cum quodlibet sequens ad
positum est concedendum, sequitur quod 'Tu es asinus' non sequitur ad positum. Et per
consequens non sequitur 'Haec est vera: "Tu es asinus"; igitur tu es asinus'." S47, (z).
positum. And consequently this does not follow: "This is true: 'You are
a donkey'; therefore, you are a donkey."
In this passage Kilvington proceeds through turning attention to a simple

obligational disputation, which can be presented in a tabular form as follows
('p' stands for 'You are a donkey', generally it could stand for any impossible
sentence):
Dl
Po 'p' is true Accepted, possible
Prl p Denied, impossible
As Kilvington points out, here Prl cannot be granted as sequent, since the
sentence is impossible. But by denying Prl the respondent shows that he does
not think that Prl follows from the positum Po. Insofar as the respondent
reasons correctly, Kilvington has reached his point.
It is rather easy to see how this obligational disputation refutes the
consequence 'p' is true > p. In the above quoted text Kilvington points out that
if Prl is correctly denied, it "does not follow from the positum", since, by the
rules of obligations (of any particular theory), "anything following from the
positum is to be granted". In other words, the disputation provides us a partial
description of a situation, where the consequence fails: the antecedent of the
evaluated conditional is true, but the consequent is false. Through such a
counterexample it can ·be seen that the consequence is not necessary - as a
consequence ought to be in Kilvington's view. The disputation in its simplicity
thus offers us a method looking at the problems of the criticized consequence.
A more careful analysis of the answers - or a prolongation of the disputation
- would provide more information of the way in which the antecedent can be
granted while the consequent is denied. It seems that the analysis would soon
show that it must be granted that in Po the sentence p is referred to as words
signifying differently than similar words signify when they are used significa-
tively in Prl.
In this example an obligational disputation is explicitly used in order to
construct a simple counterexample for the criticized rule of consequence,
regardless of whether the counterexample is used syntactically or semantically.
Corresponding counterexamples are constructed, though often in a more

complicated manner, in order to refute or qualify many kinds of logico-seman-
tical principles in many fourteenth century philosophical texts. As I see it,
although obligational disputations are often not constructed in as explicit way as
here, obligational reasoning is used. The disputational terminology of obliga-
tional theory is abundant in many logico-semantical texts. As I see it, the
specific discussions of obligational rules are for the most part limited to treatises
on obligational theory because there was a general agreement on the most
important, characteristically simple principles (e.g.: grant the sequent, deny the
repugnant). In many disputations, even if following the obligational technique
strictly, rules for irrelevant sentences are not needed; logico-semantical discus-
sions try to keep to what follows. from the assumption directly, or is directly
repugnant with it. Special discussions of combining irrelevant truths with the
assumptions were at the heart of treatises of obligational theory, but despite the
systematic interest in the problem, these questions lie at the margin in view of
the applications.
Interestingly enough, it seems that fourteenth century authors found out
that there was a field considered in standard selections of sophismata, where
exact rules for irrelevant sentences are needed. Since Plato, it has been common
knowledge that the concept of knowledge combines epistemic attitudes, beliefs,
with reality by requiring that the belief is true. In Kilvington's and Heytesbury's
discussion it turns out that such combination of the distinct fields of belief and
fact is comparable to the combination of relevant and irrelevant sentences in an
obligational disputation. It is a special problem in this field that caused Kilving-
ton to propose a revision in the obligational rules.
B. KlLVINGTON'S REVISION
Modem discussion of obligational theory has paid much attention to Richard

Kilvington's comments on obligational rules, found in his Sophismata, sophism
47. Kilvington's text has been found difficult to interpret, but it seems to be
clear that Kilvington thought that a thorough revision should be made to the
traditional rules of obligations, as they are formulated, for example, in Burley's

treatise. Eleonore Stump, Paul Spade and Norman Kretzmann have in their
discussions of Kilvington's sophisma 47 tried to formulate a full theory of
obligational reasoning based on Kilvington's comments. 1 Their discussion has
concentrated on the content of the revision of the standard theory, while the
motivation behind the revision has been paid less attention. My aim here is to
provide a close analysis of the text of Kilvington's sophism 47 from the obliga-
tional viewpoint, in order to make it clear why Kilvington thought that a
revision is necessary. When the motivation of the revision is clear, the main-
lines of the revision become clear as well. As I see it, Kilvington did not work
out his revision into a full theory of obligations, and thus the construction of
such theory is bound to be merely suggestive. Nevertheless, I will provide my
conjecture towards the end of this section.
The structure of sophism 47 is similar to other sophisms of Kilvington's
Sophismata. The text begins with the sophisma sentence, which is 'You know
that the king is seated'. Next the casus providing the background is given, and
then short arguments are presented to serve as the proof and the disproof of the
sophisma. After these basics the real discussion begins. Kilvington presents and
refutes one strategy of answering the sophism, and after some additional con-
siderations, gives his own solution in an elaborated form.
As the basics are given sufficiently shortly, it is possible to give a full
quotation of this part of the text: 2
1 Spade 1982, Stump 1989, pp. 222-231. For Kretzmann, see his commentary in
Kilvington 1990b.
2 "(a) TU SCIS REGEM SEDERE. (b) Supposito isto casu, quod si rex sedeat, tu
scis regem sedere; et si rex non sedeat, tu scias regem non sedere. (c) Tunc probatur
sophisma sic. Tu scis regem sedere vel tu scis regem non sedere, sed tu non scis regem
non sedere; igitur tu scis regem sedere. Maior patet per casum, et minor patet quia est
vera non repugnans. Quod patet, nam ista non repugnant: 'Si rex sedet, tu scis regem
sedere; et si rex non sedet, tu scis regem non sedere' et 'Tu non scis regem non
sedere.' (d) Ad oppositum arguitur sic. Tu scis regem non sedere; igitur tu non scis
regem sedere. Antecedens patet, quia tu scis regem sedere vel tu scis regem non sedere,
sed tu non scis regem sedere; igitur tu scis regem non sedere. Et per consequens
sophisma est falsum. Et minor patet ut prius, quia est vera et impertinens." S47, (a)-
(d).
{a) You know that the king is seated.

(b) Suppose this hypothesis, that if the king is seated, you know that the
king is seated, and if the king is not seated, you know that the king is not
seated.
(c) In that case the sophisma is proved in the following way. You know
that the king is seated or you know that the king is not seated, but you do
not know that the king is not seated; therefore you know that the king is
seated. The major is evident by hypothesis, and the minor is evident,
because it is a true nonincompatible. That is evident, for these are not
incompatible: 'if the king is seated, you know that the king is seated; and
if the king is not seated, you know that the king is not seated.' and 'You
do not know that the king is not seated.'
(d) one argues on the other side in the following way. You know that the
king is not seated; therefore, you do not know that the king is seated. The
antecedent is evident, because you know that the king is seated or you
know that the king is not seated, but you do not know that the king is
seated; therefore, you know that the king is not seated. Consequently the
sophisma is false. And the minor is evident as before, because it is true
and irrelevant.
The text is divided into (a)-(d) by the editors: (a) gives the sophisma sentence,
(b) the casus, (c) the proof and (d) the disproof.
Structurally the proof is clear. From a disjunction and the denial of its
latter part, follows its first part, which is the sophisma sentence. Formally, the
argument can be put as follows:
(A)
1. K.-P v l{..~p
2. -K.--p
3. l{..p
The disjunction (Al) is pointed out to follow from the casus, and the denial of
the latter part (A2) is granted as "a true nonincompatible." This reason may
sound strange outside the obligational context, but as Kilvington develops the
sophisma, it becomes clear that we are to understand the evaluation in terms of
the obligational rule for irrelevant sentences.
The disproof is less clear. Kilvington starts with the following argument:
(B)
1. 1{..-p
2. -K.-p
The validity of this argument is clear: (B2) indeed follows from (Bl). However,
it is not as clear that (Bl) ought to be granted. Kilvington recognizes this and
offers. a separate argument to support (Bl). This argument is analogous to (A),
and it has a more central position in the discussion than (B). Formally, the
argument is as follows:
(C)
1. K.P v K.-p
2. -K.p
3. K.-p
Here (Cl) is granted for the same reason as (Al) in the proof: because it
follows from the casus. (C2) is again granted as true and irrelevant in the
obligational manner. Thus (C3), which implies the opposite of the sophisma
sentence, is achieved in the disproof with formally the same argument as the
sophisma sentence in the proof. (C) just uses a different irrelevant truth as
minor premise than (A).
It turns out that as a whole the disproof is circular: the denial of the
sophisma sentence, which is reached as conclusion in (B2), is used as an
assumption in the argument (C), which is supposed to support the premise (Bl).
Kilvington seems not to recognize this circularity, but fortunately his later
discussion does not lose anything, if the argument (B) is simply neglected, and
the opposition between proof and disproof is left at the level of opposition of
(A) and (C), or, in other words, the incompatibility of KrP and Kr-P· In their
evaluations ofKilvington's sophisma, Paul Spade (Spade 1982, pp. 19-20) and
Norman Kretzmann (see Kilvington 1990b, pp. 331-333) reason in this
manner.
The opposition between (A) and (C) arises from the fact that, as a set of
three statements the casus, (A2) and (C2) are incompatible. The disjunction used
as (Al) as well as (Cl) makes this clear: it contains the contradictory opposites
of (A2) and (C2). The reason for accepting the disjunction is that it follows
from the casus (together with the tautologous premise 'either the king is seated
or the king· is not seated'). The sophisma thus seems to be analogous to the type
of obligational disputations having a disjunctive positum. According to Burley's
rules, if the positum is a disjunction of two false sentences, the respondent must
deny the first one the disjuncts put forward as false and irrelevant, and grant the
latter one as sequentially relevant. For Burley, the correct response in such
situations thus depends on the selection of order in which the propositions are
put forward. (Burley 1963, p. 73.)
Kilvington begins his discussion of the sophisma by presenting a putative
solution of the sophisma employing obligational principles attributable to
Burley. According to this reply given, though not supported by Kilvington, "it
is possible to say to the sophisma [sentence], that it is false, because it is false
and irrelevant to the casus. " 1 The proof is evaluated in the following way: (Al)
must be granted, but (A2) must be denied, because "even if it is not repugnant
to the casus, it is repugnant to a copulative consisting of the casus and the
opposite of something well denied. " 2 As Kretzmann has shown, this 'something
well denied' is the sophisma sentence (see Kilvington 1990b, p. 332). Thus a
denial of the sophisma sentence is assumed in the refutation of the proof, and
consequently the disapproval of the proof is characteristically obligational. This
reply follows Burley's rules for an obligational disputation. It treats the casus as
positum and proceeds as follows:
D2
Po (p > K,.p) & (-p > K,.-p) Admitted, possible
Prl K,.p Denied, false and irrelevant
Pr2 K,.p v K,.-p Granted, follows from casus
Pr3 -Kr-P Denied, repugnant
Pr4 K,.p Denied, repugnant
The answers included in the table are those presented by Kilvington as the first
reply. After these answers are,given continuing the disputation by granting the
disproof as it is presented would be unproblematic (except for the negligible fact
that (C2) should not be granted as irrelevant and true, it should be granted as
following from what has been maintained earlier).
1 "Ad sophisma potest dici quod est falsum, quia est falsum et impertinens casui."
S47, (e). -
2 "Unde Jicet non repugnet casui, tamen repugnat copulativae factae ex casu et
opposito bene negati." S47, (e). ·
Kilvington does not accept this reply. He provides six different objections
to the ·solution, although in the text the sixth is so compressed, that it is impos-
sible to catch its point. Before turning to them, it must be noticed that Kilving-
ton uses the terms 'true' and 'false' in very different ways than Burley does in
his treatise on obligational theory. For Kilvington 'to grant' seems to be
equivalent to 'to say that it is true.' Such reading leads into serious problems
with Burley's theory. This may be one of the reasons why Kilvington thought
that a revision is necessary. But now to the objections.
Kilvington's general idea in the objections is to point out that the solution
is unsatisfactory, because it is based on selecting the premises which are
brought into the reasoning. When the evaluation proceeds in a specific order, it
makes a difference which sentences are brought into the evaluation. Kilvington
thinks that the order of evaluation ought not make a difference. Consequently,
he thinks that all sentences must be evaluated directly on the basis of the
sophisma sentence: no explicit nor implicit supplementary premises can be
admitted.
As first step of his criticism he attempts to show that if explicit supple-
mentary premises are accepted, implicit supplementary premises should also be
admitted. Given this, he continues to· show that if implicit supplementary
premises are admitted, obligational theory collapses. To solve the problems,
Kilvington proposes that obligational theory ought not rely on any supplementa-
ry premises, but that it ought to evaluate all sentences directly on the basis of
the positum. In consequence, this also means strict rejection of Burley's idea
that the order is important.
In the first three objections Kilvington turns his attention to mental
considerations of the respondent (see S47, (f)-(o)). Kilvington argues that
before the sophisma sentence is answered, the proof would have to be admitted,
because its disapproval is based solely on the already given negative answer to
the sophisma sentence itself. As Kilvington writes, 1
1 "... si respond ens fecisses argumentum factum in conceptu suo - vel ali quid
aliud convertibile cum illo argumento - antequam respondisset ad istud sophisma,
sequitur quod illud argumentum probavisset respondenti sophisma esse verum cum casu
posito." S47, (t).
if the respondent had produced in his thought the argument that was made
- or anything else convertible with that argument - before he had replied
to the sophisma, it follows that that argument would have proved to the
respondent that the sophisma is true taken with the stated hypothesis.
Kilvington is thus thinking of the situation in which the respondent finds himself
when the opponent has given the sophisma sentence and the casus, and he is
asked to give his evaluation of the sophisma sentence. The crucial point is
whether the arguments for and against which come up later must be paid
attention already at this step. If Burley's obligational theory is followed (as it is
in D2), the sophisma sentence ought to be denied as false and irrelevant, since
it is presented and evaluated before any proof is given. However, an explicit
consideration of the proof before evaluation of the sophisma sentence would
according to Burley's theory tum the sentence sequentially relevant.
Kilvington thinks that it ought to make no difference whether the proof is
considered explicitly, or only internally in the mind of the respondent. This idea
is quite natural from the viewpoint that the weight of an argument ought not
depend on its presentation, but on its content. However, it is also quite natural
to think that if internal consideration is enough to tum the sentence sequeptially
relevant, it ought to be sequentially relevant even without the internal considera-
tion, because the correct evaluation in the actual disputation ought to be objec-
tively decidable without reference to what the respondent happens to think
before his answer.
Kilvington's criticism comes down to claiming that if the proof is valid,
it must be recognized already before it is presented. The respondent is thus
required to think through and evaluate the arguments for and against before he
answers to the sophisma sentence.
Burley's answer to this kind criticism of the reply is easy to reconstruct.
He would have proceeded in strict obligational terms and said that any merely
mental consideration cannot tum a sentence from irrelevant to relevant. Such a
change can be caused only by actually answered sentences in an obligational
disputation. Mere mental considerations cannot on Burley's theory have any
effect on the correct answers.
The first round of Kilvington' s criticism reveals the following idea of how
sophismata work: accepting the casus binds the respondent into assuming a
situation, and his problem is to decide whether the sophisma sentence is true or
false in this situation, which is seen to be identifiable independently of the order
and content of the evaluation. The proof and disproof are given as evidence for
both sides, presented as logically valid inferences leading to opposite results.
This contradictory character of the evidence forces the respondent, instead of
simply evaluating the strength of the arguments, to point out some mistake in
either one of the arguments. As a decent philosopher the respondent should
consider the evidence before making his decision, Kilvington emphasizes (see
esp. S47, (h)). Furthermore, the order in which the evidence is considered,
ought to have no effect. If the situation is identified independently of the
evidence, the sophisma sentence has only one truth value in the imagined
situation, regardless of the order in which the situation is analyzed by the proof
and the disproof.
This understanding of the sophisma is quite natural, if we take sophismata
as a branch of questiones, which were treated in accordance with generally
entertained methodological quidelines in medieval learning. In a typical questio,
the task was to decide a yes or no -question about a certain area of knowledge.
It seems that in a sophisma, as it appears here, the point is to decide a yes or no
-question about imagined facts of the casus. When Burley's rules of obligational
disputations are applied to this kind of sophismata in the way Kilvington does,
obligational reasoning seems to be reasoning about possible states of affairs in
quite straightforward sense: obligational arguments would be arguments about
what is true in a given imagined situation.
Burley's theory does not work this way. If obligational arguments are
taken to show what is true in a given imagined situation, Burley's useful rule 6.
(see chapter III.C above), according to which anything compatible with the false
positum can be proved, has disastrous consequences. In an obligational disputa-
tion proceeding according to Burley's rules, the imagined situation is built as
the disputation proceeds. It is not given in the beginning. For Burley, the rule
requiring that all responses must be directed to one instant is to be interpreted
only retrospectively, so that it is· unproblematic if a switch in the order of

analysis causes a change in the situation achieved as the result of the analysis.
In his fourth objection to solving the sophisma with Burley's rules of
obligations, Kilvington asks us to imagine the discussion of the sophisma to
have proceeded as the following simple obligational disputation (see S47, (i)):
D3
Po (p > K,.p) & (-p > K,.-p) Accepted, possible
Prl p Doubted, irrelevant
Pr2 K,.p ?
Kilvington argues that as the respondent has to doubt Prl, he cannot deny Pr2,
since K,p follows (ut nunc, by the easus) from p, and if the consequent is to be
denied, the antecedent cannot be in doubt, it seems. Kilvington has in mind that
instead of denying Pr2, the respondent should doubt it, since a similar argument
can be built to show that the respondent should not deny the opposite of Pr2.
Kilvington has a different attitude to answering with doubt than does Burley.
For Burley, it was not problematic to first doubt the antecedent of a valid conse-
quence, then deny the consequent, and afterwards deny also the antecedent. The
respondent could change his doubtful answer, unlike affirmative or negative
answers. Here this would mean first doubting Prl, denying Pr2 and later
denying Prl if it is again put forward at some later step of the disputation.
Kilvington thinks that the doubtful answer to Prl cannot be changed.
In view of my discussion of Kilvington's sophismata 45 and 46 in section
V.C, it must be pointed out that Kilvington's evaluation of the obligational
disputation D3 can be reformulated as a disputational meta-argument of the
following form (with respect to an inference from p & q to r):
(D)
1. You must grant p
2. You must doubt q
3. You cannot deny r
(For disputation D3, positum Po can be substituted for p, Prl for q and Pr2 for
r.) Kilvington takes this argument to be valid, if the corresponding argument
from p and q to r is valid (as it here is).
Kilvington says that in disputation D3 the problematic sentence Pr2 K,p

is put forward "for the same instant" asp. 1 Unfortunately Kilvington does not
elaborate his ideas about instants and obligational theory, but it seems that he
thinks that the sentences are understood to be connected to one instantial
situation, which they must describe consistently. It seems that Kilvington's
interpretation of this reduction to one instant is similar to what we find in the
anonymous De arte obligatoria (Kretzmann and Stump 1985; see above chapter
IV .B), which presents the idea that all propositions are as if put forward
together on slips of paper, characteristically unordered, but referring to the
same instant of time as the present. With this interpretation it seems quite
natural both that no answer can be changed and that the order of sentences
cannot have any effect on the evaluations. All sentences must be answered
solely on the basis of the positum and actual facts. Burley's advice of first
doubting a sentence and later denying it becomes simultaneously doubting and
denying, which is clearly inconvenient.
Kilvington's fifth objection to the first reply shows that "from this
response it follows that some two men equally obligated to the same casus,
answering well have to grant two contradictories. " 2 This is pointed out by a
pair of examples, where Socrates and Plato are assumed to serve as respondents
(the subscript s refers to Socrates):
D4 (Socrates)
Po (p > K.p) & (-p > :l<g-p) Accepted, possible
Prl God exists Granted, true and irrelevant
Pr2 Man is an animal Granted, true and irrelevant
Pr3 -K1 p Granted, true and irrelevant
D4' (Plato)
Po (p > K.p) & (-p > :l<g-p) Accepted, possible
Prl K.p v :l<g-p Granted, follows
Pr2 -K.-p Granted, true and irrelevant
Pr3 K.p Granted, follows
1 "Si pro eodem instanti proponeretur tibi haec propositio 'Tu scis regem sedere',
ista non foret a te neganda." S47, (i).
2 "Item, ex ista responsione sequitur quod aliquo duo homines aequaliter obligati
ad unum casum bene respondendo haberent concedere duo contradictoria." S47, (j).
118 Obligational Reasoning and Epistem,ic Sophismata
These disputations are imagined to take place simultaneously. It is clear that

both follow accurately Burley's rules, but at the same step where Socrates
grants -KJJ, Plato grants KJJ, i.e. they grant contradictories on the basis of the
same positum. Kilvington goes even further: "and since Socrates and Plato are
similarly obligated,. it follows that two contradictories must be granted by
Socrates. " 1 However, Kilvington does not account here for the fact that for
Plato Prl and Pr2 make a difference, while for Socrates these steps are extra-
neous to the main line of argument in the disputation. Kilvington seems to
require that the positum should alone be sufficient for determining answers to
all relevant sentences. No sentence could tum relevant because of new sentences
brought into the disputation. Again KilvingtQn's argument comes down to not
accepting :Burley's principle that the order of putting forward the sentences may
make a difference.
After having refuted the first solution of the sophisma, which employs
Burley's rules of obligations, Kilvington turns to ·COnsidering an alternative
reply, which is basically the one he recommends at the end of the text. Kil-
vington did not object to the first reply primarily because it applied rules of
obligations improperly, but because it leads to inconvenient results. Kilvington
seems to think that the rules are applied correctly, and the resulting problems
show that the rules themselves are mistaken. Thus a revision of obligational
theory seems necessary, and Kilvington begins his discussion of the appropriate
reply to the sophism by considering some principles of obligational reasoning.
His strategy is to revise the rules of obligational disputations and to apply then
the revised rules in order to fmd a satisfactory reply to the sophisma.
To begin his explicit discussion of obligational theory, Kilvington asks us
to consider the following example (I have included answers according to
Burley's rules):
DS
Prl 'You are in Rome' and 'you are a bishop' are similar in truth-value
Granted, true and irrelevant
Pr2 You are a bishop Granted, follows
1 "Et cum tantum obligatur Socrates sicut Plato, sequitur quod duo contradictoria
forent concedenda a Socrate." S47, (n).
Kilvington presents this as an example of the idea which is familiar to us from

Burley's useful rule 6., according to which it is possible to prove any falsehood
compatible with the positum, if the positum is false. However, the disputation
is also connected to the rejected principle according to which the order of
presentation may effect evaluations of sentences put forward, and thus it is
expected that Kilvington does not accept the reasoning. According to Kilvington
there are three mistakes in the answers of D5 (see S47, (q)-(bb)).
First, Kilvington bluntly points out that the respondent should not grant
Prl if he is not a bishop, since positing that he is in Rome should not bind him
to accepting anything more than if he actually were in Rome (see S47, (q)).
Second, if it were the case that 'you are a bishop' should be granted as
Pr2, the same should be granted already at the first step, if it were put forward,
since just as it follows at the step Pr2 from the positum Po and the granted
sentence Prl, at the first step it "follows from the positum and from something
else that is true and irrelevant" . 1 This remark is based on a technical distinction
between granted sentences and unevaluated true sentences, which are logically
irrelevant to the positum. Kilvington states that according to those who hold the
criticized view, a sentence following from something true and irrelevant
together with the positum should be granted just as a sentence following from
the positum and a granted sentence. It is not clear who is Kilvington thinking
of, since Burley did not hold such a view. On the contrary, Burley kept an
important distinction between answered and unanswered sentences. Nor have I
found such view anywhere else than in the anonymous De arte obligatoria,
which presents a theory very different from Burley and which does not present
anything like Burley's principle of the effects of the order of presentation,
which is here criticized. In chapter IV .B I gave an account of how the author of
this treatise discusses the effects of admitting the principle of order.
According to Kilvington, there is also a third mistake in the answers of
D5. Even if it were "gratia exempli et disputationis", granted that 'you are in
Rome' and 'you are a bishop' are similar in truth, this and the positum do not
formally imply that you are a bishop (see S47, (bb)). Kilvington shows this
1 " ••• sequitur ex posito et alio vero impertinenti." S47, (r).

through a complicated discussion (S47, (s)-(aa)) based ort the fact that in Pd
the sentences 'you are in Rome' and 'you are a bishop' occur in material
supposition. Since the signification of these strings of words is a contingent
matter, their similarity in truth value may have nothing to do with the respon-
dent being either in Rome or a bishop. Thus the inference from Po and Prl to
Pr2 is not valid. It is in context of this discussion that Kilvington undertakes to
prove the invalidity of the so called Tarskian biconditionals in the way discussed
in the first section of this chapter.
The main aim of Kilvington's argument here is to show that the following,
answers would not bind the respondent into formal inconsistency:
DS*
Prl 'You are 1n Ronre' and 'you are a bishop' are similar in truth-value
Granted, gratia exempli
Pr2 You are a bishop Denied
It seems that Kilvington's point is not that the respondent should generally
answer in the way given in D5*. Rather, Kilvington is showing that if the
respondent accepts the criticized rules of obligations, it does not follow that the
respondent should grant Pr2 in this disputation, since only formal inferences
should be allowed within the criticized theory. It seems that at this point
Kilvington is providing reasonably good internal criticism of the standard
obligational theory exemplified by Burley. However, as Eleonore Stump has
correctly pointed out (Stump 1989, p. 226), this criticism does not apply to the
following variation of the disputation:
DS'
Prl You are not in Rome or You are a bishop
Granted, irrelevant and true
Pr2 You are a bishop Granted, follows (positum and Prl)
For this disputation Kilvington could apply only his first and second criticisms,
which are not as powerful.
As I already mentioned, Kilvington, without providing good reasons,
states that the respondent should deny Prl in D5. This seems to be applicable
also to 05'. Kilvington's discussion is confusing. To support his view, he

distinguishes two ways of using the word 'irrelevant'. The 'commonly assumed'
way is that of Burley: a sentence is irrelevant if it neither follows from nor is
repugnant to the positum together with earlier granted sentences and opposites
of earlier denied sentences. The other way of using the term 'irrelevant' is such
that it refers also to a sentence, which "is true now and that would not be true
in virtue of its being in fact as is signified by the positum. " 1
Kilvington thinks that such sentences should be denied. For example, Prl
in D5 (or, for that matter, in D5') is such a sentence, and in the common way
of speaking it is irrelevant and true, but it must, as he claims, be denied. His
point is that it does not follow that if a sentence is irrelevant and true in the
common sense, it must be granted. Kilvington thus rejects the standard rule for
irrelevant sentences.
Unfortunately Kilvington's discussion does not make clear how we should
und!!rstand his way of using the term 'irrelevant'. Eleonore Stump has tried to
solve the problems of these passages by constructing a new definition of
irrelevant proposition by introducing the idea that a proposition is irrelevant if
its truth value would be different if things were as is signified by the positum
(Stump 1989, pp. 228-229). However, such a definition cannot be given in the
standard obligational terminology. As Burley speaks of irrelevant sentences, the
truth values obtaining if the positum were true are ignored. Stump's definition
is inapplicable to the obligational disputations of Burley.
As l see it, Kilvington is not trying to give a new definition of irrelevant (
propositions. He is satisfied with the standard idea that a proposition is irrele~
vant if it neither follows from nor is incompatible with the set of sentences
determining relevance. Kilvington's concept of irrelevant sentence picks up the
same class of sentences as Burley's concept. Both authors can use the same
definition.
Instead, Kilvington wants to change the way in which truth values of
irrelevant sentences are evaluated: their truth values are not to be read from
1 01 •• • nunc est vera et quae non foret vera ex hoc, quod ·ita foret a parte rei sicut
si~ificatur per positum." S47, (cc).
actual reality, but with respect to the situation obtaining if the positum were
true. This would mean a profound change, not in the concept, but in the way
the role of irrelevant propositions in obligational disputations is conceived.
In terms of the disputation D5 discussed above Kilvington' s revision
would thus amount to the following. The sentence Prl in D5 (or D5') is still
irrelevant, as it lacks any logically necessary connection to the positum, but we
should not consider it as true, as it would not be true if the positum were true.
If this is his idea, Kilvington does not change the extension of the term 'irrele-
vant', but only the way of handling irrelevant sentences in an obligational
disputation. Furthermore, Kilvington 's theory would make answers of an obliga-
tional disputation reflect the counterfactual state of affairs obtaining if the
positum were true.
Perhaps the best support I have for this kind of interpretation of Kil~
vington's obscure remarks is that with this interpretation it seems rather easy to
formulate Kilvington's rules for obligational disputations so that they are not too
different from the standard rules. In particular, these rules would be much
nearer standard obligational rules than those suggested by Spade in his interpre-
tation of Kilvington (Spade 1982, p. 27). Spade's idea is that each sentence is
evaluated by inferential corutection to the positum together with 'basic' sen-
tences, whose truth values follow the actual reality. In Spade's strategy it seems
problematic that Kilvington is made to employ implicit supplementary premises
in the determination of answers.
On my reading, Kilvington's remarks can be interpreted simply as a slight
but significant revision of the traditional theory of obligations. He accepts the
standard rules for the positum and for the sentences following straight from the
positum or repugnant to the positum alone. Thus the following rules remain at
the core of obligational theory:
R1 (p) ((Pp & Rp) > OCp)

~ (p)(q) ((Pp & D(p > q) & Rq) > OCq)
R3 (p)(q) ((Pp & D(p > -q) & Rq) > ONq)
Kilvington rejects Burley's rules R2b and R3b. This rejection implies that a
proposition will remain irrelevant at any step of the disputation if it is irrelevant
at the first step. Kilvington's rules do not contain any reference to earlier
answers in the disputation, and consequently there is no basis for giving a rule
requiring attention to the order of propositions.
The rules for irrelevant propositions are central for Kilvington's theory.
As for Burley, so for Kilvington irrelevant sentences are evaluated according to
their truth values. However, the truth values used are different. Kilvington's
idea is that an irrelevant proposition is to be evaluated in accordance with its
counterfactual truth value, as far as it is known, and not according to its actual
truth value. With this idea, the rules for irrelevant sentences become the
following:
R4aK (p)(q) ((Pp & lq & K.(p ~ q) & Rq) > OCq)
R4bK (p)(q) ((PaP & lq & K.(p ~ -q) & Rq) > ONq)
R4cK (p)(q) ((PaP & lq & -K.(p ~ q) & -K.-(p ~ -q) & Rq) > ODq)
(Where 'p ~ q' is to be read as a subjunctive counterfactual conditional.) From

the systematic viewpoint it is interesting to notice that, since any entailment is,
although uninterestingly, true as a subjunctive counterfactual conditional, the
rules for relevant sentences are redundant (some assembly required, especially
with the epistemic conditions). The whole of Kilvington's theory can thus be
compressed to the rule that the counterfactual truth values are to be followed,
as far as they are known.
Rule R4c K is especially interesting. It is through this rule that Kilvington
is saved from the inconveniences attributed to him by Paul Spade in his recon-
struction of Kilvington' s theory. Intuitively, it seems acceptable that Kilving-
ton's rules are exhaustive and consistent, even if proof of these features is
impossible as long as subjunctive counterfactual conditionals are not satisfacto-
rily described. The consistency of these rules follows from the idea that all
answers are related to one situation imagined on the ground of the positum. A
description of one situation ought to be consistent. The exhaustiveness is
achieved through R4cK, which allows a doubtful answer, if some details of the
situation cannot be decided.
On the basis of these rules Kilvington's treatment of the disputation D5
becomes clear. Prl is in that disputation denied as. irrelevant and false on the
f24 Obligational Reasoning and Epistemic Sophismata
basis of R4bK, since (1) it is irrelevant as it neither necessarily follows from nor
is repugnant with the positum, and (2) its negation subjunctively follows from
the positum, since if the respondent were in Rome, 'you are in Rome' and 'you
are a bishop' would not be similar in truth value (unless the respondent actually
is a bishop). Pr2 is clearly irrelevant and false, and thus it is also denied on the
basis of R4bK. It may be remarked that the claim that Pr2 is sequentially relevant
is based on Burley's rule R2b, which is rejected by Kilvington.
In the end of the text of the sophisma Kilvington finally turns to his
favoured reply to the sophisma itself. The main idea of this reply could be
expressed by contrasting 'you know whether the king is seated' with 'you know
that the king is seated'. The casus does not tell whether the king is seated or
not, it only tells that you are informed, and thus you know whether the king is
seated, although in the actual disputation there is no way to decide whether you
know that the king is seated or that he is not. Consequently, the sophisma
sentence 'you know that the king is seated' must be doubted.
Kilvington supports this response by explaining that the proposition 'the
king is seated' must also be doubted, because "it is no more to be granted than
denied or subjected to the drawing of a distinction." 1 In terms of my recon-
struction of Kilvington's obligational rules, the reason for doubting is R4cK,
according to which an irrelevant proposition must be doubted if it does not fill
the crucial criteria of ~aK or R4bK - in other words, if it is neither to be
granted nor denied. Subjecting the proposition to the drawing of a distinction
comes in this passage as a new alternative, but its status seems to require no
special discussion. 'The king is seated' is in this context clearly unambiguous.
Spade's analysis of Kilvington makes the sentence 'the king is seated'
basic in an important sense so that it has a central role in determining the
answers to other sentences in the disputation (see Spade 1982, p. 27). The
sentence indeed is important in Kilvington's discussion, but in my view, its
status is clarificatory. As I see it, Kilvington does not suggest that evaluation of
this sentence is necessary for correct response, even if it may help in making
clear the reasons for the response. Evaluation of 'the king is seated' is in the
1 " ••• non est magis concedenda quam neganda vel distinguenda." S47, (dd).
context of this sophisma relatively easy, and after its correct evaluation has been
found, Kilvington's preferred way of reasoning can easily be extended to more
difficult propositions. It must, though, be remarked that, for Burley, such a use
of a clarificatory sentence is excluded by the order-rule. For Kilvington, it does
not make any difference in which order the answers are found, and thus we can
start from something which has not actually been put forward. Or, even further,
with Kilvington's approach we need not be bound to any selected presentation
of the sophisma.
In his fourth objection to the first unacceptable reply to the sophisma
Kilvington pointed out that if 'the king is seated' must be doubted, the respon-
dent may not deny 'you know that the king is seated', since by the casus, 'you
know that the king is seated' is an ut nunc consequent of 'the king is seated'
(S47, (i)). In his reply, Kilvington recognizes this objection. As 'the king is
seated' must be doubted, so must also 'you know that the king is seated' (S47,
(dd)). In his commentary, Kretzmann even goes as far as to call doubting 'the
king is seated' the basis for doubting the sophisma sentence itself (Kilvington
1990b, 345). However, an analogous reasoning can be presented to show
directly (without considering 'the king is seated') that 'you know that the king
is seated' must be doubted. 'The king is seated' does not follow necessarily nor
subjunctively from the casus, nor does 'you know that the king is seated'. Rule
R4cK applies to this sentence also directly, without recognition of the simpler
sentence. Thus, the sophisma sentence must be doubted.
Kilvington recognizes that there is a problem in answering with doubt to
these propositions. Eleonore Stump (and perhaps already William Heytesbury in
the fourteenth century, as I will show in the next section) interprets Kilvington's
problem as his being committed to the view that "the same proposition can be
simultaneously doubted and known by the same knower" (Stump 1989, p. 223-
224). Fortunately (for Kilvington) this grave problem involves a slight misinter-
pretation of Kilvington's view. The problem arises from the situation in which
the respondent finds herself if she answers with doubt to 'the king is seated'
when her casus clearly says that she knows whether the king is seated or not.
Kilvington's formulations, nevertheless, are elaborate enough. In terms of my
reconstruction of his obligational rules, the respondent of the sophisma 47 must
answer with doubt because she is actually in doubt whether the sentence would
be true or not in the possible situation. The casus does not say anything about
actual doubt: it says that the respondent would know in the possible situation.
The apparent inconsistency is thus between actual and possible states of affairs,
which is unproblematic (or even trivial). Kilvington does not, though, proceed
in this semantical terminology. In his terminology, the difference is between the
deontic terminology of what must be answered with doubt and what granted, on
the one hand, and the subjunctive terminology of what would be doubtful and
what would be known, on the other. The crucial difference is between having
the duty to doubt 'the king is seated' because of actual doubt, while having the
duty to deny 'you doubt that the king is seated' because of assumed possible
knowledge.
After the consideration of the sophisma sentence Kilvington turns to the
proof (see S47, (ee)). To get a good grasp of the solution of the sophisma as a
whole, let us return to the obligational formulation of the sophisma, presented
as D2 in connection to the first reply (in the beginning of this section). The
following revision of the table contains answers in accordance with Kilvington's
supported reply:
D2*
Po (p > Krp) & (-p > Kr-P) Admitted, possible
Prl K.P Doubted
Pr2 KrP v Kr-P Granted, follows from casus
Pr3 -K.-p Doubted
Pr4 Krp Doubted
According to Kilvington the disjunction 'you know that the king is seated or you
know that the king is not seated' (Pr2) must be granted. The reference would be
to the rule R2 • The irrelevant premise 'you do not know that the king is seated'
(Pr3) should not be granted, but doubted, as should also the repetition of the
sophisma sentence Pr4. The reasons for doubting ought to be clear after the
above discussion of the sophisma sentence. In this context, Kilvington gives an

interesting formulation of the reasons: 1
And when it is argued 'The minor is true and irrelevant; therefore, it must
be granted', I say that in the first way of speaking of about what is
irrelevant the consequence is not acceptable. But in the second way of
speaking about what is irrelevant it must be doubted whether the minor is
true and irrelevant.
In my view, Kilvington's distinction between two ways of speaking about

irrelevant propositions amounts to a difference in determination of truth values.
The favoured definition would be the traditional one, but the correct answers
deviate from Burley's theory. As Kilvington thinks, irrelevant sentences are to
be answered following the counterfactual truth values obtaining if the positum
were true.
Here Kilvington remarks that if the truth values of irrelevant propositions
were taken from actual reality, it would not follow that a true irrelevant sen-
tence must be granted, since often actually true irrelevant sentences are to be
denied because of negative counterfactual truth values. The second way of
treating irrelevant sentences is the one elaborated in my construction of Kilving-
ton's rules. If truth values are determined in accordance to how the reality were
if the positum were true, it remains unclear whether the discussed irrelevant
proposition would be true or not. Thus it must be doubted whether it is true and
irrelevant. This implies, by R4cK• also doubting the sentence.
C. DOUBTING WHETHER ONE WOULD KNOW
Kilvington's Sophismata can be divided into two parts. The main part of the
work (sophismata 1-44) is concerned with conceptual problems of natural
philosophy, while the last group of sophismata (45 -48) is related to problems
1 "Et quando arguitur 'Ista minor est vera et impertinens; igitur est concedenda,'
dico quod primo modo loquendo de impertinenti consequentia non valet. Sed secundo
modo loquendo de impertinenti dubitandum est utrum minor sit vera et impertinens."
S47, (ee).
of epistemic logic. As Norman Kretzmann has pointed out in his commentary,

the transition sentence at the end of sophisma 44 is strange: "But because this
is based on natural reason, I pass on to a sophisma whose solution, according
to some, depends on a certain preceding reply. " 1 Kretzmann puts forward a
bunch of questions, which pick out the problems of the sentence. Despite his
able commentary, Kretzmann confesses that he has not been able to find
satisfactory answers to those questions. 2
What is the 'preceding reply' and who are the people leaning on it? It
indeed seems impossible to give a fully satisfactory answer to this question, but
let me suggest a partial solution of the problem. As we saw in the previous
section, in sophisma 47 Kilvington attacks the obligational rules given, among
others, by Walter Burley. The central aim of the attack is the idea that the
respondent in an obligational disputation must take into account his preceding
replies in giving his answers. Kilvington argues for a revision of obligational
rules, so that the order of evaluation would make no difference and that all
propositions would be evaluated straight on the basis of the positum and, if
necessary, the actual world. Kilvington suggests some revisions of the obliga-
tional rules because these rules are applied in the evaluation of the proof and the
disproof on the basis of the casus of the sophisma.
The first putative solution of sophisma 47 follows Burley's rules, and it is
based on the evaluation taking place in a specific order. Kilvington rejects this
idea. One may say that since this solution, which is not supported by him,
depends on paying attention to the order of presentation, latter steps of the
solution depend on replies on preceding steps. In a sense the solution thus
1"Sed quia illud fundatur super rationem naturalem, ideo transeo ad unum
sophisma cuius solutio, secundum quosdam, dependet ex quadam responsione praece-
denti." S44, (i).
2 "What is meant by 'based on natural reason'? Is it an allusion to S44 in particu-
lar, or is [Kilvington] thereby signalling the shift from the long series of sophismata
that often derive their examples from natural philosopy (Sl-S44) to the final series
(S45 -S48) that might be described as concerned with problems of epistemic logic?
Why should the dependence of S44 (or of all the preceding sophismata) on 'natural
reason' give rise to S45? That is, what warrants the 'because'? On which 'preceding
reply' does the solution of S45 depend 'according to some', and who are they? I have
not found satisfactory answers to any of these questions." Kilvington 1990b, p. 314.
depends on a preceding reply. Therefore, Kilvington can be said to be in

disagreement with those who claim that the solution "depends on a certain
preceding reply", as he claims in the problematic transition sentence.
If we can interpret also the sophisms 45, 46 and perhaps also 48 as
employing principles of obligational reasoning in similar way, there seems to be
some basis for assuming that the people who think that the solutions of these
sophisms depend on a preceding reply are employing in these sophismata the
standard rules of obligations, which are not as such acceptable to Kilvington.
Kilvington's disagreement with certain received views would, on this inter-
pretation, tum out to concern rules of obligations at least as much as problems
of epistemic logic. As I will show towards the end of this section, it is not a
mere accident that obligational disagreement is connected to disagreement in the
field of epistemic logic. In order to find support for the interpretation, let us
look at the general structure of the sophismata 45 and 46. I will not treat the
sophisma 48, because this extremely complicated sophisma is concerned,
besides epistemic issues, with problems related to the liar's paradox, which is
a different issue not at the focus of interest here. In the following I will try to
show that both sophisma 45 and 46 are closely connected to the disputational
meta-argument (D) of a clear obligational type, laying at the heart of sophisma
47 as well.
The sophisma sentence of sophisma 45 is: "You know this to be every-
thing that is this." 1 As it stands, the sentence simply states that you know a
clear tautology, and prima facie it seems that it ought to be granted. The proof
is just a reminder of this fact. 2 The casus allows one to form a counterargu-
ment. It refers to a case of uncertainty, whose cognates are often used in
fourteenth century sophismata: "Suppose that you see Socrates from a distance
and do not know that it is Socrates. " 3 Without explicit recognition, the pronoun
"Tu scis hoc esse omne quod est hoc." S45, (a).
1
"Tunc probatur sophisma sic. Tu scis hoc esse hoc; igitur tu scis hoc esse omne
2
quod est hoc." S45, (c).
3 "Supposito quod tu videas Socratem a remotis et nescias quod sit Socrates." S45,
(b).
'this' is supposed to refer to what you see. Given this casus, the following
argument is built as the disproof: 1
(E)
1. You know this to be everything that is this.
2. Socrates is everything that is this.
3. You know this to be Socrates.
This disproof is in its structure a kind of reductio ad absurdum. The sophisma

sentence is given as premise (E1), premise (E2) is based on the casus, and (E3)
is the conclusion, which turns out to be problematic - its contrary is assumed
in the casus.
Kilvington continues by an evaluation of the disproof through an argu-
ment, which Kretzmann in his analysis calls a "disputational meta-argument,"
This argument follows the scheme (D), and it concerns what the respondent (to
whom it is presented) may do in a disputation where the disproof is presented
(Kretzmann 1988, see esp. p. 231). As it stands, this meta-argument turns
attention to an obligational disputation, so that the above inference (E) is
evaluated obligationally step by step. I repeat the scheme (D):
(D)
1. You must grant p.
2. You must doubt q.
3, You cannot deny r.
Now (E1) is to be substituted for p, (E2) for q and (E3) for r. Kretzmann
argues that (D) is valid so that if the inference from p and q tor is valid, (D3)
is as true as the premises (D1) and (D2) (Kretzmann 1988, pp. 231-232).
Kilvington's disproof separately points out that (E3) must be denied
because of the casus. 2 However, this is contrary to (D3), if (E3) is substituted
for r. As a whole, the disproof purports to show that no correct answer can be
1 "Ad oppositum arguitur sic. tu scis hoc esse omne quod est hoc, sed Socrates est
omne quod est hoc; igitur tu scis hoc esse Socratem." S45, (d).
2 "Sed probo quod sic; quia hoc dubitas esse Socratem; igitur hoc non scis esse
Socratem. Ista consequentia est bona, et antecedens est verum; igitur consequens est
concedendum. Igitur oppositum consequentis est negandum." S45, (d).
given to (E3). Kilvington interprets this reductio ad absurdum to mean that the
sophisma sentence (El) ought not be granted in the first place.
Let us consider the application of the disputational meta-argument (D) in
better detail in order to see the connections of this procedure to the obligational
practice. Kilvington formulates the argument as follows: 1
The major is true, and the minor is in doubt for you; therefore, the
conclusion is not to be denied by you.
In order to make the argument work, the first premise must be reformulated
disputationally. Kretzmann suggests "you cannot deny [(El)]," but my (Dl)
"you must grant p" (substituting (El) for p) seems to be a more straightforward
reformulation of Kilvington's claim that (El) is true, although there is some
ambiguity in determining the sense in which we are to take (El) to be true.
Since the casus of this sophisma seems to have nothing to do with the sentence
(El), a natural interpretation is that (El) is true regardless of the casus, perhaps
even in the sense that it is true and irrelevant, and must be granted in accord-
ance with the obligational rule.
The relation of (D2) and (E2) is interesting. According to Kilvington's
text, (E2) is "in doubt for you". This statement is based on the casus, but it is
noteworthy that the evaluation is correct only if the casus is interpreted from the
subjective viewpoint of the respondent. The casus tells explicitly that what the
respondent sees is indeed Socrates, that is, (E2) is true according to the casus,
but the respondent does not, according to the casus, know that it is true. (E2)
does not by itself contain reference to the respondent, and thus in a third-person
evaluation it ought to be granted. Kilvington's way of developing the disproof
shows that he is interpreting the casus in the same realistic de re way in which
Ockham claims a casus ought to be interpreted, as distinct from the positum of
obligational disputations. In this interpretation the respondent cannot accept a
casus according to which he is dead (see above, chapter III.A): similarly he
cannot grant a sentence which the casus tells that he does not know. Burley and
1 "Maior est vera, et minor ·est tibi dubia; igitur conclusio non est a te neganda."
S45, (d).
Ockham did not treat the positum of obligational disputations in such a way.
However, at the stage of (D3) it is clear that Kilvington employs obligational
principles in the reasoning. This foreshadows his disagreement over the rules of
obligational disputations in sophisma 47.
At (D3) the disproof claims that it follows that (E3) must not be denied by
the respondent. Kilvington does not explicitly tell why it follows; he does not
give independent support for using the meta-argument scheme (D). His point
seems to be that if the conclusion of a valid inference would be denied, at least
one of the premises ought to be denied as well. As he separately points out,
(E3) must be denied, and thus the evaluations of the premises (El) and (E2)
must be in some way incorrect, if (E) and (D) are valid as inferences.
According to Kilvington's solution of this sophisma, (E) is invalid.
Consequently, the disproof fails from the beginning, and the discussion need not
go to the obligational issue of combining known and doubted premises in in-
ference. Instead, the discussion turns to distinctions of divided and composite
sense. According to Kilvington, the crucial argument (E), on which the use of
(D) depends, fails due to problems of composite and divided senses. 1 If his
point is put in modern terms, (E) is a case of illegitimate substitution into an
opaque context. When the argument (E) fails due to the opaque character of the
epistemic operator, it is clear that the use of (D) fails, i.e., the respondent may
deny (E3) after granting (El) and doubting (E2), since no inferential connection
between the three is established. In the scope of this work, it is not necessary
to go into problems of composite and divided senses, and thus I need not
discuss the details of the solution of this sophisma. Instead, let us. tum to
sophisma 46, which according to Kilvington's transition sentence is similar to
the sophisma 45.
1 "Ad argumentum in oppositum negatur ista consequentia: 'Tu scis hoc esse omne
quod est hoc, et Socrates est omne quod est hoc; igitur tu scis hoc esse Socratem' ....
Unde licet isti termini convertatur - 'Socrates' et 'illud quod est Socrates' - tamen
hoc totum 'scire hoc esse illud quod est Socrates' non convertatur cum hoc quod est
'scire hoc esse Socratem'." S45, (t).
In sophisma 46 the sophisma sentence is 'you know this to be Socrates'.

The casus is as follows: 1
Suppose that you see Socrates and Plato at the same time, and that Soc-
rates and Plato are altogether alike, and that you are a little confused, so
that you do not know which is Socrates and which Plato. And suppose that
by 'this' is indicated the one who is in the location where Socrates was
before you became confused.
It is curious that the casus almost directly contains the opposite of the sophisma
sentence. Kilvington's disproof is, accordingly, rather short: "You doubt this to
be Socrates; therefore, you do not know this to be Socrates. "2
It is the proof of the sophisma that is interesting. As the disproof of
sophisma 45, the proof of this sophisma contains the disputational meta-argu-
ment (D). The proof begins with the following inference: 3
(F)
1. You know this proposition in your thought to be true: 'Socrates is
Socrates'.
2. In thought the proposition 'Socrates is Socrates' is the same as 'this is
Socrates'.
3. You know this: 'this is Socrates'.
The edge of this reasoning is in the indexical character of the pronoun 'this'.
The argument is based on the (problematic) idea that it is possible to substitute
for an indexical pronoun the proper name of the person referred to. Therefore,
if 'this' refers to Socrates, the mental correlates of the sentences 'Socrates is
Socrates' and 'this is Socrates' are identical.
1 "(a) TU SCIS HOC ESSE SOCRATEM. (b) Supposito quod tu videas Socratem
et Platonem simul, et quod Socrates et Plato sint omnino similes, et dubitas te modi-
cum, ita quod nescias quis sit Socrates et quis Plato. Et demonstrato per li 'hoc' ilium
qui est in situ ubi fuit Socrates antequam dubitebas te." S46, (a)-(b).
2 "Ad oppositum sophismatis arguitur sic. Tu dubitas hoc esse Socratem, igitur tu
non scis hoc esse Socratem." S46, (f).
3 "Tunc probatur sophisma sic. Tu scis hanc propositionem in conceptu tuo esse
veram: 'Socrates est Socrates,' et in conceptu haec propositio 'Socrates est Socrates est
eadem huic: 'Hoc est Socrates;' igitur tu scis istam: 'Hoc est Socrates.' Et per conse-
quens tu scis hoc esse Socratem." S46, (c).
Kilvington also points out that (F3) implies the sophisma sentence. Thus,
the inference seems to lead towards the sophisma sentence, and in this case
Kilvington is not building any complicated reductio ad absurdum. Premise (Fl)
is reasonably clear. However, premise (F2) is problematic, and thus the infer-
ence cannot be used as the proof by itself. Instead, Kilvington again continues
with the disputational meta-argument (D). 1 Now (Fl) is to be substituted for p,
(F2) for q and (F3) for r. Thus, the result is that (F3) may not be denied, if
(Fl) is granted and (F2) is doubted. As (F3) may not be denied, it seems that
perhaps it must be granted.
In sophisma 45 Kilvington had no need to enter the evaluation of the
meta-argument, because the inference (E) to which the meta-argument referred,
was pointed out to be fallacious. In sophisma 46 Kilvington again begins with
a putative solution of the sophism, where the disputational meta-argument (D)
is avoided. He starts with a solution, where the application of (D2) is claimed
to be simply false: (F2) must not be doubted but denied.
This claim requires reference to mental language. In this solution Kilving-
ton claims that there are distinct intentional acts in the soul for the two sen-
tences 'Socrates is Socrates' and 'Socrates is this', and thus they are distinct
propositions also in thought. The problem in this solution is that the full
similarity of Socrates and Plato implies that the two intentional acts correspond-
ing to the words 'Socrates' and 'this', respectively, would be altogether alike.
According to Kilvington's opponent one of the two intentional acts would be
superfluous. Kilvington answers simply by reaffirming (in a little uncertain way)
the numerical difference of two altogether similar intentional acts. (S46, (h)-
G).)
Kilvington also offers a second solution, which allows the view that there
cannot be two intentional acts altogether similar in the soul. In this solution
composite and divided senses of the sophisma sentence are first distinguished,
1 "Maior est vera, et minor est tibi dubia; igitur conclusio non est a te neganda."
S46, (c).
and then the divided sense is denied, while the composite sense is doubted. 1
The senses might be presented as follows:
1. Regarding this, you know it to be Socrates.

2. You know that this is Socrates.
The divided sense 1. indeed is clearly to be denied as repugnant with the casus.
On the other hand, Kilvington argues that the composite sense 2. can consistent-
ly be doubted, and it is this doubtful answer that the proof of the sophisma
sentence is really up to. Let us therefore accept this interpretation and return to
the inference (F) and its connection to (D).
The first premise (Fl) is clear and unproblematic: it is an instance of
knowing a clear tautology. (F2) is less clear. It claims that the mental sentences
corresponding to the written sentences 'this is Socrates' and 'Socrates is Soc-
rates' are the same. Thus it is a claim concerning the relations of written or
spoken language and the language of thought. According to this claim, the two
written sentences correspond to only one mental sentence. Evaluation of such a
claim is not as straightforward as evaluation of (Fl).
As an inference, (F) is an interesting case of valid substitution into an
epistemic context. If the intended sentences were written or spoken sentences,
the substitution would not be valid, but it is one of the central ideas of mental
language to allow substitutions of this kind. The reason for this is that there
actually would be only one mental sentence involved, and what looks like
substitution in written language would amount to finding out that there is only
ore mental correlate for the two written sentences. As written claims, (Fl) and
(F3) would be through (F2) shown to have the same meaning.
Since (F) is valid, attention turns to evaluation of the premises, or
application of (D). As (Fl) is unproblematic, so is applying (Dl). (Fl) must be
granted as true and irrelevant. Applying (D2) affirms the doubtful answer to
(F2), which entails that the respondent in his answers confesses that he does not
1 "Aliter tamen posset responderi ad sophisma distinguendo secundum composi-
tionem et divisionem: in sensu diviso fasum est, et in sensu composito respondendum

est dubitando. (Et sic respondendo potest dici quod unius speciei tantum est una intentio
in anima.)" S46, (m).
have a firm grasp of the relations of his mental language and the written
language. Since the intentional acts corresponding to the words 'Socrates' and
'this' are by the casus altogether similar, it is according to Kilvington possible
to defend the position that it is unclear whether the sentences 'Socrates is
Socrates' and 'this is Socrates' are the same in the mind. 1 Hence the doubtful
answer concerning (F2). Kilvington takes the meta-argument scheme (Drto be
valid. Since (Dl) and (D2) were shown to be true, (D3) is true as well: the
respondent cannot deny (F3). Kilvington suggests answering with doubt. This
indeed seems natural because (F2) is doubted, not granted. Furthermore,
consideration of the disproof makes it clear that the alternative of granting (F3)
is not feasible.
From the viewpoint of practical setting of sophisms, it is interesting to
notice that Kilvington turns attention also to the disproof, seemingly with the
idea that after the answer to the sophisma sentence is given, and the proof (to
be exact: after (F)) has been evaluated step by step, the disproof (presented in
the stage-setting of the sophisma after the proof) is evaluated, step by step, in
the manner of obligational disputations. According to Kilvington, when the only
premise of the disproof 'you doubt this to be Socrates' is put forward, it must
be answered with doubt. Then, as the antecedent of a valid consequence has
been doubted, the opposite of the consequent may not be granted. So also the
disproof is answered consistently with doubting the sophisma sentence (see S46,
(n)).
As my discussion of sophisma 47 (in section V.B) shows, Kilvington's
final solution there is to evaluate the proof and the disproof by applying the
meta-argument scheme (D), which objects to denying what follows from a
combination of granted and doubted premises. The structure of the sophisma
seems to be designed as an example where the inference scheme cannot be
avoided, as it can be both in sophisma 45 and in sophisma 46. As a series of
sophismata, these three can be called discussions of the meta-argument scheme
(D) as well as discussions of problems of epistemic modalities. Interestingly
"Tu dubitas an haec propositio 'Socrates est Socrates' sit haec propositio 'Hoc est
1
Socrates'." S46, (m).

enough, Kilvington's examples combining a granted and a doubted premise

combine an epistemic premise with a factual premise. As it turns out, such a
combination has interesting results.
As discussions of such a disputational meta-argument scheme, these
sophismata turn crucially on the problem of how a respondent should act in a
disputation in order to remain consistent. As a matter of fact, this means
discussion of how the casus and the earlier answers within the disputation are to
be accounted for. In this sense, Kilvington's epistemic sophismata indeed
discuss the problem of paying attention to replies given to preceding proposi-
tions. In the next section, I will (with the help of William Heytesbury) try to
point out that there is an interesting philosophical reason why such problems
arise especially in epistemic thought experiments.
The central conclusion achieved by Kilvington through employing the
meta-argument scheme is that in some cases the respondent must answer with
doubt to a proposition affirming that he knows something. Sophisma 46 leaves
the impression that this is not to be seen merely as a answer in a game: when
looking exactly similar twins, one may, according to Kilvington, really have
problems in evaluating what one knows. It may be unclear towards which
propositions one has the mental attitude required for knowledge. However, in
the discussion it turns out that Kilvington is forced to introduce a distinction
between doubtful evaluation in the disputation, and real doubt. The distinction
comes into the disputational context through evaluation of iterated epistemic
modalities. As Kilvington shows, according to his theory, the respondent may
have to answer with doubt to 'you know that p,' while he may not grant 'you
do not know that you know that p.' Evaluations of iterated epistemic modalities
turn out very complicated in Kilvington's discussion. 1
1 See, e.g., S47, (dd): "Nee sequitur 'Haec propositio "Rex sedet" est a me
dubitanda; igitur haec propositio "Rex sedet" est mihi dubia;' quia propositionem esse
dubiam est propositionem esse non scitam. Sed non sequitur 'Haec propositio est
dubitanda a me; igitur haec propostio non est scita a me;' quia propositio est dubitanda
in casu quando scitur, et ideo est dubitanda aliquando quando nescitur a me utrum
sciatur."
i38 Obligational Reasoning and Epistemic Sophismata
0.. ONE CANNOT DOUBT WHETHER ONE KNOWS
In the second chapter of his Regulae so/vendi sophismata, dedicated to the verbs
'know' and 'doubt,' William Heytesbury takes as the central thesis that "nothing
is known by a person that is in doubt for that person" (Heytesbury 1988, p.
436). Even if the opposite of this claim is not to be found in· Kilvington's
epistemic sophismata, it seems to be a natural development of his discussion -
albeit that probably Kilvington himself would have seen it as an unfriendly and
fallacious inference from his views. Even if the claim that something could be
both known and doubted were not Kilvington's own, a central tenet of Heytes-
bury's discussion of the problem turns out to be criticism of Kilvington's
revision of obligational theory., and in particular its applications in Kilvington's
disputational meta-arguments employing the idea that from a combination of a
granted and a doubted premise, nothing that must be denied may follow.
For discussion of such a meta-argument scheme, Heytesbury constructs an
interesting example (Heytesbury 1988, pp. 447-449). As for the background of
this example, it needs to be remarked that Heytesbury first gives a broad
definition of knowledge: "to know is nothing other than unhesitatingly to
apprehend the truth - i.e., to believe unhesitatingly that it is so when it is so
in reality" (Heytesbury 1988, p. 447). This definition gives two conditions for
knowledge, first an epistemic attitude of unhesitating belief, and second the
condition of truth. Heytesbury's example can be constructed as an obligational
disputation as follows:
D6
Po You believe unhesitatingly that the king is in London
Accepted, possible
Prl The king is in London Doubted, irrelevant
Pr2 You know that the king is in London ?
For evaluation of Pr2 Heytesbury's example constructs a disputational meta-

argument, which is of the same form as Kilvington's argument (D) discussed
above. In D6, the positum Po is clearly possible, it must be admitted and later
granted, if put forward. Pr1, on the other hand, is irrelevant, and actually
doubtful according to the example. The example tries to show that also Pr2
ought to be doubted, because it follows from Po, which is accepted and Prl,
which is doubted.
Heytesbury starts the evaluation of this example by reasserting his view
that the intended conclusion "is impossible and contains opposites." (Heytesbury
1988, p. 447.) Here I need not enter this discussion in detail, but let it be
remarked that Heytesbury's central idea in showing that this is the case is that
the epistemic attitude of unhesitating belief that p implies the second-order
epistemic attitude of unhesitating belief that one has an unhesitating belief that
p. Thus one cannot be in doubt about whether one has the unhesitating belief
that p, and when one has the unhesitating belief that p, one cannot be in doubt
about p, although one can naturally be mistaken about p. Consequently, when
the epistemic attitude of unhesitating belief exists, one cannot doubt either
condition of knowledge, and thus one cannot be in doubt whether one knows
that p. However, from this kind of explication it also follows, as Heytesbury
recognizes, that one may consider a proposition p, but not know that p, not
know that -p and not be in doubt whether p, simply if one has an erroneous
unhesitating belief that p. More interestingly, one may also have erroneous
unhesitating beliefs about what one knows even if one cannot doubt whether one
knows. 1
Since Heytesbury cannot give a doubtful answer to Pr2 in D6, he has to
give some other answer. His selection is to deny Pr2, in opposition to Kilving-
ton's ideas. Heytesbury recognizes that his solution of the example amounts to
rejection of the meta-argument scheme (D). To be exact, he rejects the follow-
ing slight revision (Heytesbury 1988, p. 448):
The proposition follows from the hypothesis and a proposition that is in

doubt for you; therefore, it is not to be denied by you.
1 See, e.g., Heytesbury 1988, pp. 447-448: "And on that basis one argues as
follows: 'You perceive that you perceive with certainty, unhesitatingly, that the king is
in London; therefore, you perceive that you know that the king is in London'." Or,
some lines later: "One argues, therefore, in this way: 'You are considering whether
you know that the king is in London, and you do not perceive that you know that the
king is in London; therefore, you do not know that the king is in London'."
14() Obligational Reasoning and Epistemic Sophismata
As a tneta-argument scheme like (D) this could be formulated as follows (with

respect to some valid inference from p and q to r):
(D')
1. You have the positum p
2. You have doubted q
3. You must not deny r
The only difference to Kilvington's (D) is that (Dl ') refers to the positum,
while Kilvington's (Dl) refers to a granted sentence.
In order to apply the meta-argument scheme (D') to the disputation 06,
the positum Po must be substituted for p, Prl for q, and Pr2 for r. Since Po and
Prl imply Pr2 by the given definition of knowledge, denial of Pr2 means
rejecting (D').
Our interest here is in Heytesbury's general reasons for rejecting this
meta-argument scheme. He starts his argumentation by making a contrast
between two disputational meta-argument schemes, which are as follows:
(G)
2. You know q
3. You must grant r
(G')
2. You have granted q
3. You must grant r
The central problem in the anonymous De arte obligatoria discussed in chapter

IV .B is the difference between these two schemes. The anonymous author based
his rules on the reasoning employed in (G), while according to the standard
rules (G') is valid, but (G) is not.
Heytesbury states that (D') has as little validity as (G). This has caused
some confusion in interpretation of his obligational rules, because (D2) con-
cerns, at least in his example, an already given doubtful answer, while the
crucial difference between (G) and (G') is just that (G2) concerns a proposition,
which has not been answered, while (G2') concerns an already given answer. It
may thus seem that in rejecting (D') Heytesbury is criticising the idea that it
makes a difference whether a proposition has been actually answered in a

disputation - which implies criticism of Burley's crucial principle that order
has an effect to the answers. Eleonore Stump has interpreted Heytesbury's
views in this way (Stump 1989, pp. 237-241).
As I see it, Heytesbury thought, like Burley, that answering with doubt
equals in some important senses refraining from answering. Burley points out
in his rules that it is unproblematic to grant or deny an already doubted sen-
tence. Switch from a doubtful to a determinate answer does not count as
changing the viewpoint. Such an idea makes it possible to compare a sentence
which has been doubted to a sentence which has not been answered. In this
sense, I think, Heytesbury criticizes Kilvington, who thought that answering
with doubt binds the respondent to give a doubtful answer to the same sentence
also later.
There is also another confusion over Heytesbury's rules of obligations.
This is a result of his discussion of the following more general disputational
meta-argument scheme (in connection to some valid inference from p to r) (p.
449):
(D*)
1. You doubt p
2. You must not deny r
According to Heytesbury, this scheme is valid only under rather strong limita-
tions.
Heytesbury introduces this scheme as providing putative support for the
prohibition to deny Pr2 in D6. However, he points out that the reasoning of D6
cannot be read as a case of (D*). To see this, consider the following inference:
(H)
1. You believe unhesitatingly that the king is in London and the king is in
London.
2. You know that the king is in London.
(Hl) is a conjunction of Po and Prl of disputation D6, and (H2) equals Pr2.
Putatively, (Hl) would have to be doubted at the first step of D6. Because of
(D*), this implies that (H2) could not be denied.
However, according to Heytesbury, the conjunction (Hl) would at the first

step of D6 be evaluated as an irrelevant sentence, since it neither follows from
nor is repugnant to the positum Po. As an irrelevant sentence, the conjunction
must be denied, not doubted, since it is false: actually .the.respondent has no
unhesitating belief about the king being in London. Thus (Dl *)is .not true about
the conjunction (Hl), and (D*) cannot support the prohibition to deny (H2).
Eleonore Stump has interpreted Heytesbury's discussion as an admission
of a version of Swineshed's well known rule concerning denial of conjunctions
whose parts are granted (Stump 1989, pp. 237-239). However, this overlooks
the crucial difference between doubting on the one hand, and granting or
denying on the other. Heytesbury's discussion is very strictly related to cases
where the positum is combined with a doubted sentence, not with anything that
has been granted. His remarks contain no deviation from Burley's rules of
obligations, only an elaboration of the doubtful answer.
In the end of his De sensu composito et diviso Heytesbury states that in
order to be able to give appropriate answers in epistemic problems connected
with compounded and divided senses one has to know well the rules of obliga-
tions and pay special attention to the treatment of irrelevant propositions. In this
short discussion Heytesbury supports Burley's rules of irrelevant propo~itions.
It seems that it is not mere chance that Heytesbury is calling for knowledge of
rules of obligations just in the context of epistemic problems. The disputation
D6 is also in this respect interesting.
In this disputation Heytesbury's imagined opponent tries to construct a
case where one must doubt whether one knows. The case combines an assump-
tion about an unhesitating belief with doubt over an actual fact. As it stands, the
example turns into a discussion of how an irrelevant doubt ought to be com-
bined with the positum of an obligational disputation. The arising disagreements
and problems of formulating complete and consistent rules for obligational
disputations can be interpreted as problems of strengthening an assumption by
combining it in some way with the actual world. While Kilvington allows
inferences based on combinations of assumptions and actual facts, Heytesbury
requires that an actual fact must explicitly be. turned into an assumption before
it can be used in inferences together with the original assumption. The arising
problems of rules for irrelevant sentences show that the clash between the
assumption given as the positum and actual facts was a central problem of
obligational theory.
It seems that the special relation between obligational technique and
epistemic sophismata arises from the fact that epistemic concepts like the verb
'to know' typically combine the domains of epistemic attitudes and actual facts
in a way analogous to how obligational technique combines assumptions with
actual facts.
Heytesbury defines knowledge in a rather typical fourteenth century way
as true unhesitating belief. Such definition could be formalized as follows
(simplifying 'unhesitating belief to 'B,'):
This definition makes knowledge a combination of epistemic attitudes and actual

facts. Such a combination seems to be a rather standard element in definitions
of knowledge. Knowledge as justified true belief could be formalized as
which as well combines actual facts with epistemic attitudes, regardless of how
the obscure concept of justification is developed.
Kilvington's sophismata 45, 46 and 47 are all based on discussions of
arguments combining epistemic attitudes with actual facts. Especially sophisma
47 is a clear case of consideration of an argument based on combining an
assumption about epistemic attitudes with an irrelevant doubt about the actual
facts. As we have seen, Kilvington solves the problems of such combinations
with rather different rules of obligations than Heytesbury, and consequently they
have rather different methods of solving problems related to the logic of
epistemic operators. Heytesbury thus seems to be right that it is important to
know the preferred rules of obligations in order to be able to solve such ,
problems in the way he recommends.
Heytesbury affirms that for solutions of epistemic sophismata, one must
pay attention to previous replies: that is, one must acknowledge the rules of
obligations as they are formulated by Burley (among others) and pay attention
to the order of the sentences put forward in the disputation, and pay attention
especially to the issue of irrelevant propositions. Kilvington, on the other hand,
had the view that epistemic sophismata ought to employ such rules of obliga-
tions, where no previous reply needs to be paid attention. This leads to different
solutions of epistemic problems. From our viewpoint it is interesting to notice
that Heytesbury's solution seems to rely on more explicit processes of rea-
soning. This may have been a reason why his reasoning received more favour-
able judgements from his successors than Kilvington's approach. In any case,
the disagreement between Kilvington and Heytesbury provides as interesting as
complicated an example of the application of obligational principles to the
context of sophismata. The special relation between obligational logic and
epistemic problems comes interestingly up in the way epistemic concepts
combine propositional attitudes with actual facts, analogously to the way
obligational rules combine the positum with actual facts.
VI Modern Interpretations
A. THE DISPUTATIONAL CONTEXT
William Ockham begins his set of commentaries on the Aristotelian Organon

with a short general discussion of the character of logic as a science. According
to Ockham, logic is to be classified as a practical science concerning the mental
activity of rational beings. He points out that it is useful in three different ways:
(1) in discerning truth from falsity. (2) in promptitude of answering. (3) in
evaluation of whether a statement ought to be understood de virtute sermonis or
in some looser manner. In each of these three different uses of logic, the point
is that logic helps in doing certain kinds of acts.
For our interests, Ockham's reference in (2) to promptitude in answering
seems especially interesting. The central text is the following: 1
The second utility is promptitude in answering. Namely, by this art it is

taught which is a repugnant proposition, which sequent, which antecedent;
as these are known, it is easy to deny the repugnant, grant the sequent,
and respond to the antecedent following its quality, likewise as to an
irrelevant [proposition].
When this quote is put in the context of this study, its natural first reading is
that Ockham is telling us that logic teaches the respondent in a disputation to
recognize the obligational status of a proposition: whether it follows from, is
repugnant with or is irrelevant to the positum. Then, as Ockham seems to state,
it is easy to follow the rules of obligations.
1 "Secunda utilitas est promptitudo respondendi. Nam per istam artem docetur quid
est propositio repugnans; quid consequens, quid antecedens; quibus notis faciliter
repugnans negatur, consequens conceditur, et ad antecedens secundum sui qualitatem,
sicut ad impertinens, respondetur." Ockham 1978, p. 5.
146 Modern Interpretations
This reading is, however, too favourable to the obligational theory.

Ockham's second utility, promptitude in answering, must be something fairly
general: it is one of three general purposes of logic. The way in which his
description continues makes it clear that he has in mind the ability to recognize
and evaluate all kinds of arguments, so that one can easily see which sentences
follow from the given sentences. This utility of logic, the art of arguments, is
discussed in the third part of Ockham's Summa logicae (Ockham 1974), whose
four divisions discuss, respectively, syllogisms, demonstration, consequences,
and fallacies. Here obligations have a minor position attached to the discussion
of consequences.
Here I cannot go in any detail into Ockham's theory of argumentation. I
need to just draw attention to one implication of the way in which he refers to
these theories in the above quoted passage. The disputational terminology there
gives the impression that he is thinking of argumentation as something which
one person presents to another. Logic, as far as the theory of argumentation is
concerned, tries to regulate action in a situation where one person tries to
convince another. The paradigmatic model of such a situation is naturally a
disputation. What one should do there, if one wants to evaluate the arguments
promptly, is to deny what is repugnant to, and grant what follows from the
agreed premises. If anything irrelevant to the agreed premises is put forward,
it must be evaluated independently on its own rights. As an art logic tries teach
how such promptitude in answering is achieved: how the status of a repugnant
or a sequent proposition is recognized most easily.
It is important to notice that Ockharn gives the duties of denying what is
repugnant, granting what is sequent, and evaluating an irrelevant sentence on its
own rights, as general duties for anyone evaluating an argument. These duties
are not taken to be specifically obligational duties, although of course they are
strongly reminiscent of the obligational rules R2 , R3 and R4 in their various
formulations discussed in different chapters of my study. As I pointed out in
chapter II in connection with Boethius de Dacia's discussion of obligational
theory, these duties are based on, first, the norm of keeping consistent, taken to
be the highest norm in disputational settings, and second, the norm of following
the known truth. That these norms are developed generally, not obligationally,
Modem Interpretations 147
makes it clear that the theory of obligations cannot serve as a general theory of
the logic of disputation. As a matter fact, it seems that medieval authors did not
develop a general theory of the logic of disputation. This may sound disappoint-
ing, given the important status disputations had for medieval scientific activity.
However, a medieval logician could have answered that the whole wide field of
logic equals a theory of disputation. The whole of logic tries to teach an art
giving success in disputation, through giving the practical ability to correctly
interpret the presented judgements, exact discernment of truth and falsity, and
quick evaluation of the constructed arguments - all that is needed for success
in disputation. Thus it may sound in a medieval ear fairly strange to require a
separate treatment of the general logic of disputation. Some special features of
disputations, like the technique of obligations, may require very explicitly
disputational treatment, but in general, the disputational setting may remain the
commonly assumed implicit background.
Ockham seems to be not very interested in obligational theory. He
discusses this art, because he wants to treat every mode of arguing, and "logi-
cians make special difficulties around obligations and insolubilia" . 1 In trying to
find a modem interpretation of what is happening in the fourteenth century
discussion on obligations, we are naturally interested to find an answer to the
question: what are these "special difficulties"? My purpose in this last chapter
is to try to give a satisfactory answer to this question. As I pointed out in the
introduction, various kinds of answers have been put forward in the modem
discussion. In the course of this chapter, I will take up two in detail, those by
Eleonore Stump (section VI.A) and Paul Spade (section VI.B).
In her paper "Topics, Consequences and Obligations in Ockham's Summa
logicae" Eleonore Stump gives her answer by relating Ockham's theory of
obligations to his theory of consequences. According to her, Ockham's obliga-
tional theory is concerned with consequences placed in a disputational context.
She claims that (Stump 1989,. p. 261):
1 "Quoniam Iogici circa obligationes et insolubilia speciales faciunt difficultates,

ideo ad istius Summae completionem, quae de omni modo arguendi generalem tradit
notitiam, sunt aliqua brevia perscrutanda." Ockham 1974, p. 731.
The interesting cases are those in which the disputational context makes a
difference to the evaluation of the consequence or to any of its constituent
propositions. It is perhaps easiest to generate such interesting cases by
including in the premises of an obligations argument a reference to the
evaluator of these premises.
In her chapter on obligations in the Cambridge History of Later Medieval

Philosophy Sturnp extends this kind of interpretation to the whole tradition of
obligations up to Ockham, suggesting that after Ockham the theory developed
differently. (Stump 1982, p. 328 and p. 332.)
As I see it, the main tenet of Stump's characterization is illuminating,
although the opposite of what she literally claims seems to be the case. In my
account, the cases referred to by Stump as "the interesting cases" are such that
the disputational context does not make a difference to the evaluation of the
arguments or the premises. In these cases, there can be found "a reference to
the evaluator of these premises", and even further, reference to the evaluation
of the premises, but, interestingly enough, the obligational context unbinds this
reference.
In general, Stump's idea is that obligational theory in the earlier period,
up to Ockham, is concerned with pieces of reasoning, where the reasoning
stands in a philosophically interesting (that is: problematic) relation to the
disputational context in which the reasoning is understood to be presented.
Consequently, obligational theory is comparable to the theory of insolubilia,
where pieces of reasoning stand in problematic relations to themselves. The
central oversight of Stump's interpretation of obligational theory lies in recogni-
tion of how this relation is developed in the obligations treatises. As in the
above quoted passage, Sturnp often claims that propositions are evaluated in
obligational disputations with reference to the disputation itself. I wilf show
below that the authors considered by Stump solve the problems that arise in the
opposite way: by dissolving the reference. However, Stump's misreading of the
solution in no way diminishes the value of her recognition of the problem.
Stump has discussed several examples from Burley's treatise and from
some other early treatises, where disputational terms are used, apparently
referring to the ongoing disputation and thus providing a link between the
reasoning and its disputational context. I will discuss some of these examples
Modern Interpretations 149
below. Let me, nevertheless, begin with Ockham. Immediately after the above
quoted passage Stump gives an example of her idea. This example is indeed
illuminating, but unfortunately it is illuminating also for the character of
Stump's oversight. I quote Stump for the description of Ockham's example
(Stump 1989, pp. 261-262):
For example, an opponent in an obligational disputation may want his

respondent to maintain as true the proposition that he, the respondent, is
dead. But if the respondent were to maintain such a proposition as true, he
would be in trouble in the disputation, not because this proposition is
incompatible with some other proposition which the respondent has
granted, but instead because it is incompatible with the action of the
respondent - it is not possible for the respondent to be dead and also
responding in an obligations disputation.
Stump's point is to present an example of a proposition having a problematic

reference to the disputation where it occurs (here as putative positum). The
sentence "you are dead" indeed refers in a problematic way to the respondent
of the disputation. However, it must be recognized that for Ockham the purpose
of this example is very different from that suggested by Stump. Ockham
discusses the assumption 'you are dead' as a difference between the two
techniques of positum and casus (see above chapter liLA).
According to Ockham, as a casus, 'you are dead' is not acceptable, but
within the standard obligational technique of positum, 'you are dead' is accepta-
ble. Ockham says that "such casus must not be admitted, although such [sen-
tence] possible to posit must be admitted. " 1 With the positum 'you are dead'
the respondent may very well answer questions. He has just to be aware that he
must not grant that he is answering questions - or for that matter, any sentence
that entails that he is alive. According to Ockham, the point is that the positum
is not taken to describe the reality during the disputation. Burley had a similar
view of the difference between positum and casus. As Burley says:
because I can be definite about the truth of one opposite and maintain the
other opposite as true, the positio that posits that Socrates is white can be
1 " ... tal is casus non est admittendus, tamen tale ponibile est admittendum."
Ockham 1974, p. 736.
150 Modem Interpretations
admitted even though the truth of the matter, as was already said, is that
Socrates is black.
Both Burley and Ockham keep it clear that the respondent is maintaining false
sentences in an obligational disputation, and thus they do not take it as prob-
lematic that reality does not in fact conform to these false sentences. The
respondent just has to maintain that it conforms; if his positum is "you are
dead", he must deny that he is disputing, but he may very well be disputing.
The oversight of Stump is thus neglect of the distinction between obligational
answers and semantic truth values.
An interesting case of relations between the disputational context and the
evaluated reasoning is provided by a subrule of Burley's useful rule 3. Accord-
ing to the subrule the respondent may grant that he is responding badly. The
principle is curiously reminiscent of the liar's paradox. Granting that one is
answering badly is closely analogous to saying that what one says is false.
However, Burley's point is that granting 'you are responding badly' is unprob-
lematic. The useful rule 3., whose subrule this is, tells that the truth of the
matters must be decided outside of the time of the obligation. Thus, if granting
'you are responding badly' is a good answer, it is recognized outside the time
of the obligation: during the time of the obligation the issue is to grant or deny,
not to decide truth-values. Thus 'you are answering badly' can be granted by a
good answer. If this happens, it may after the time of the obligation be recog·
nized that a false sentence was granted because of a false positum.
Let us consider another example pointed out by Stump in Master W. 's
treatise, also to be found in Burley's treatise. (Stump 1989, p. 190; Green 1963,
pp. 7-8; Burley 1963, p. 55; translation in Burley 1988, p. 389) The example
runs as follows (it is assumed for the background that the respondent has never
earlier granted that God exists):
Dl
Po You have not granted that God exists Accepted, possible
Prl God exists Granted, irrelevant and true
Pr2 You have not granted that God exists ?
Stump explains that the conflict arising at Pr2 is that on the one hand, the
sentence is the positum, and thus should be granted, but on the other hand, the
sentence denies the act of granting which the respondent has just undertaken at
Prl.
However, Stump is mistaken. As master W. and Burley present this little
disputation, it is not problematic to grant Pr2. They give the disputation as an
example of the rule allowing the respondent to grant sentences which are
impossible per accidens. The only suggestion of any problem is that after
claiming that Pr2 must be granted, both master W. and Burley point out that
"yet it is impossible per accidens". Burley is not pointing out that it would be
problematic that the act which the respondent has just performed is denied. On
the contrary, from some later treatises we even find the rule that the respondent
may deny his very act (proprium actum) (see, e.g., John of Holland 1985, pp.
101-102).
What happens here is that the respondent is at Pr2 faced with a false past-
tense sentence, which is impossible because the past cannot be changed, but
which should be granted since it is the positum. A possible positum should not
lead a good respondent into granting any impossible sentence. The idea of
master W. and Burley is that the sentence is impossible only per accidens, and
thus it may be granted because of a possible positum, although sentences, which
are impossible per se, may not be granted. Thus this disputation has nothing to
do with the fact that Pr2 contains reference to the disputation itself. Any past-
tensed sentence, which turns from truth to falsity would do in the place of 'you
have not granted that God exists.' Facts about the disputation have no privileged
status in this example.
Rather than being an example where respondent's acts in the disputation
are considered, this example shows how the actual passage of time may seem to
stand in problematic relation to the answers given in the disputation. As Stump
reads the example, the passage of time has an effect on the answers. My
analysis of the example is different. The standard medieval solution given for
this problematic case stipulates that, despite its per accidens impossibility, the
positum must be granted as Pr2. This stipulation amounts to claiming that the
passage of time is not to be taken into account. The possible sentence given as
positum must be granted as a possible positum also later, when it has turned
impossible per accidens.
In his treatment of obligations Ockham gives a neat explanation of what
takes place in this situation (although without mentioning the example). Ockham
tells us that the prohibition of denying necessary and granting impossible
sentences does not concern any sentence which becomes necessary or impossible
during the disputation (devenit necessarium vel impossibile infra tempus obliga-
tionis). The reason for this is the required uniformity of answers. (Ockham
1974, p. 738.)
It is now time to turn to examples of the kind of practical paradoxes
where Stump's case is at its strongest. B!Jrley's treatise, like some other
relatively early treatises on obligations, contains several examples employing
disputational terminology like 'must be granted' (est concedendum) or even the
word 'positum' itself. In these examples it is often the case that troubles arise
because these terms refer to the ongoing disputation.
Stump has discussed in two similar texts (Stump 1982, pp. 323-327;
1989, pp. 202-205) at length the following example, presented by Burley as an
apparent counterexample to his rule R 2b, according to which the respondent
must grant any sentence put forward, which follows from the positum together
with the opposite of something granted earlier. (Burley 1963, pp. 49~50;
translation in Burley 1988, pp. 382-383.) The disputation proceeds as follows

(to simplify the table, I have used p for 'you are in Rome'):
D2
Pop, or p must be granted Accepted, possible
Prl p must be granted Denied, irrelevant and false
Pr2 p follows from the positum and the opposite of something correctly
denied
Granted, necessary
Pr3 p must be granted ? (Repugnant (Prl) and follows (Pr2))
The reason for granting Pr2 may need more explanation, as the sentence does
not for the modern reader at first sight appear to be necessary. Burley says that
(Burley 1963, p. 49; 1988, p. 382):
This is necessary because this conditional is necessary: [C] 'If it is the

case either that You are in Rome or that You are in Rome is to be grant-
ed, and that You are in Rome is not to be granted, then You are in
Rome'.
As quick check makes clear, the antecedent of the conditional so carefully

formulated by Burley (which I labeled with the letter C) consists of the positum
and the opposite of Prl, which seems to be correctly denied, and the consequent
is 'You are in Rome' (or p). Thus Pr2 asserts in so many words that the
consequence C holds, or is necessary as medieval logicians used to say. Thus it
seems that if the consequence Cis necessary, so is also Pr2. But consequence
C is necessary, there seems to be no doubt of that, since it is simply a case of
inferring one part of a disjunction from the disjunction together with the denial
of the other part.
Strictly, what is needed for implying Pr2 is two facts about the disputation
together with the conditional C formulated by Burley. The two disputational
facts are the following: first, that 'p, or p must be granted' is the positum, and
second, that 'p is not to be granted' is the opposite of something correctly
denied. Thus we arrive at the following reasoning (where the conclusion is
identical with Pr2):
(A)
(1) 'p, or p must be granted' is the positum
(2) 'p is not to be granted' is the opposite of something correctly denied
(3) if p, or p must be granted, and p is not to be granted, then p
therefore
(4) p follows from the positum and the opposite of something correctly
denied
Interestingly enough, by recognizing that this inference is the one needed behind
Pr2, we are almost at the resolution of the problem arising at Pr3. On the
contrary to what was supposed when granting Pr2 as necessary, it is not
sufficient that (A3) (that is, the conditional C) is necessary. The two first
premises (Al) and (A2) are far from being necessary, as there are all kind of
different posita in different obligational disputations. It is just a contingent fact
that they are true for this disputation. As Burley remarks in his solution, "it is
not necessary that this disjunction be posited (tamen non est necessarium istam
disiunctivam poni)". (Burley 1963, p. 50; 1988, p. 383.)
Thus Pr2 is not necessary, and we should check its status again. But
before that, let us look at the answer given to Pr3. An affirmative answer is
excluded because the same sentence was denied when presented as Prl. Grant-
ing and denying the same sentence is a clear contradiction. But why is denying
Pr3 problematic?
Stump gives the following reason: "From [Pr2] it follows that you are in
Rome; and if it follows, it must be granted, and so [Pr3] is true." (Stump 1989,
p. 203; 1982, p. 324.) The first part of this inference is on a straightforward
reading clearly fallacious reasoning. You might very well be in Paris even if the
sentence 'you are in Rome' did follow from some other sentences. Pr2 only
states that a certain inference is valid, and this does not imply that you are in
Rome. It seems that Stump has in her mind the fact that Pr2 implies that p is
sequentially relevant in the disputation and must receive a positive evaluation.
However, that it follows that a sentence is sequentially relevant is a different
thing than if the sentence itself follows. That a sentence ought to be granted in
a disputation is a different thing than that the sentence is true. I pointed out
already above that Stump has neglected this distinction.
According to Burley, Pr3 ('it must be granted that you are in Rome')
follows from Pr2 because of his rule of obligations (R2b), which states that
every sentence put forward, which follows from the positum and the opwsite of
something correctly denied, must be granted. As Pr2 affirms the conditions
given in R2b for the obligation to grant the sentence 'you are in Rome', it
follows, with the rule of obligations, that the sentence 'you are in Rome' must
be granted, which is affirmed as Pr3. Thus granting Pr2 puts the respondent,
who takes the rules of obligations to be necessary, under obligation to grant Pr3
also. Since this would be granting a sentence denied earlier, the respondent
faces a problem. Burley's solution of the problem is that the respondent should
deny Pr2, which leaves him free to deny Pr3 also.
Stump says that "According to Burley, we ought to judge it [Pr2] false."
(Stump 1989, pp. 203-204; 1982, p. 325.) Stump has in mind the interpreta-
tion that Pr2 is irrelevant. According to Stump's explanation, Pr2 is judged false
by Burley because 'positum' in the sentence could refer to some other positum.
As Stump recognizes this would be a very dubious reason to hold that a sen-
tence is false, since it seems that 'positum' here actually does not refer to any
other positum - no other positum is at hand - and truth values of actual
sentences should be evaluated according to their actual meaning.
As matter of fact, in the text Burley does not tell us that Pr2 is denied
because it is false, he just says that it must be denied. It seems that Burley takes
Pr2 to be repugnant, which is a sufficient reason for denying it. The sentence
is inconsistent with the opposite of Pr1; we should recognize the following
reasoiling: If 'You are in Rome' follows from the positum and the opposite of
something correctly denied, 'You are in Rome' must be granted. The conse-
quent of this conditional has been denied as Prl, and thus, tollendo tollens, the
respondent has to deny the antecedent, even if it is in fact true. Thus we arrive
at a consistent set of answers in this disputation: positum is accepted, Pr1, Pr2
and Pr3 are all denied.
According to Stump Burley's answers still do not resolve the paradox. To
solve the paradox Stump criticizes Burley's approach in the following way:
Denying Pr2 does not make it clear that we must also deny Pr3. Furthermore,
if we accept the inference from Pr2 to Pr3, as Burley does, we are bound in
general to the inference from p to 'p must be granted'. But accepting that
inference, the positum together with the denial of Prl bind the respondent to
granting p, and thus also to granting 'p must be granted'. Thus we are still
faced with the problem of denying 'p must be granted' as Prl and granting the
same sentence 'p must be granted' as Pr3. After formulating this problem,
Stump wants to solve it by recognizing that the positum 'p, or p must be
granted' can be true only if both disjuncts are true, because the disjuncts are,
according to Stump, "logically equivalent". (Stump 1989, p. 205; 1982, p.
326.)
However, this criticism leans on misinterpretation of Burley's theory.
There seems to be no basis in assuming that accepting the inference from Pr2
to Pr3 leans on the inference from p to 'p must be granted'. As I pointed out
above, the inference from Pr2 to Pr3 is based on Burley's rule R2b. The equi-
valence of the statements 'p' and 'p must be granted' hangs on the rather
dubious principle that all truths and only truths must be granted. Such a prin-
ciple precludes the use of any kind of hypothesis, and its falsity should be at its
clearest in obligational disputations, which are based on a false positum.
Stump recognizes in her discussion that 'is true' ought not to be under-
stood literally if used in the way employed by her. She suggests that it should
be read as "is true in an obligational disputation" or as "must be granted by a
respondent". (Stump 1989, p. 205; 1982, p. 326.) Here Stump neglects the
difference between truth and grantability explicitly. It is a central tenet of
Burley's Treatise on obligations that often false sentences must be granted. In
distinction to what Stump argues, it may be pointed out that corresponding to
any case where a false sentence must be granted, a meta~disputation may be
formulated, where the false sentence (p) must be denied (as false), but a
sentence like 'p must be granted' must be granted. It thus seems highly dubious
to claim logical equivalence for p and 'p must be granted'.
The above disputation does not contain the sentence p ('You are in
Rome') itself. However, if put forward as Pr4, it would have to be granted,
because it follows from the positum together with the opposite of the correctly
denied Prl. Thus it turns out that in this disputation, if extended, p would have
to be granted, but 'p must be granted' would have to be denied. This disputation
provides an example of a disputation where p and 'p must be granted' receive
different evaluations. The disputation thus provides us an example where
disputational terminology is employed so that it produces problematic reference
to the disputation itself, but in which the reference is not allowed to have an
effect on the answers. The answers are guided by the inferential relations
between the presented sentences, and by the fact that the respondent is not in
Rome. The problematic character of the crucial sentence Pr2 arises from its
status as a sentence, which on the one hand is true if it is interpreted as its
terms stand, in reference to the ongoing disputation, but which, on the other
hand, must be judged repugnant so that it is to be denied Without evaluation of
its interpretation. The problems of the reference to the ongoing disputation do
not arise because the semantical side is neglected.
That examples of the discussed kind are so usual in Burley's treatise as
well as in the other edited early treatises, shows that one of the interests of
obligational theory was clarification of the relation between a piece of reasoning

and its disputational context. In short, this relation can be characterized as
relation between p and 'p must be granted'. The above example is one of the
many where, depending on viewpoint, it is shown that p, but p is not to be
granted, or not p, but p must be granted.
There are at least two reasons to be interested in such examp1es. One is
interest in disputational concepts like 'must be granted (est concedendum)',
'must be denied (est negandum)', 'follows (sequitur)' etc. Examples where these
concepts behave strangely can be illuminating in relation to their logical charac-
teristics. Burley puts forward the above discussed example as a putative counter-
example against the rule of obligations (R2tJ formulated with those concepts.
The purpose of the example is to show how to cope with different kinds of
sentences consistently with rule. Similarity, other examples relate to other
disputational principles - like the prima facie convincing idea that if p, p must
be granted.
If the respondent answers in this disputation according to the problematic
preliminary guidance, he is by Pr3 led to a situation, where he either has to
allow an exception to the rule, or to grant a sentence earlier denied, thus
maintaining an even clearer contradiction. If the respondent denies 'p must be
granted' as Pr3, he must also deny the rule R2b, since from Pr2 and this rule it
follows that 'p must be granted'. But what would denying the rule within an
obligational disputation mean? It would mean that the rule is not necessary, or,
in other words, that it is possible to formulate as a thought experiment a consis-
tent description of an obligational disputation, where the rule does not hold. In
that case we could conclude that the rule is not universally valid, and Burley
should have provided a better rule. If the respondent instead chooses to grant
what he has denied earlier, he does not fare any better. In this case it turns out
that the rules may lead the respondent into explicit contradictions from a
perfectly possible positum, while the point of the rules is to avoid this. Thus the
rules are not good enough. Thus we may conclude that in order to defend his
rules, Burley indeed has to solve the puzzle before the problem arises at Pr3 -
and so he does.
In short, the disputation serving as a putative counterexample is just

applying a general medieval technique of discussing imagined putative counter-
examples to supposed conceptual necessities. That the counterexamples .dis-
cussed within obligational theory are formulated in disputational terms, is· just
a consequence of the fact that obligational theory was conceived in the context
of disputation with disputational concepts.
Another good reason for interest in the non-equivalence of p and 'p must
be granted' is interest in assuming what is false. The study of something which
is false, but must be granted, can be also motivated by any of the reasons for
study in possibilities. This theme, to be found in obligational theory as well, is
the topic of the next section.
B. A METHOD FOR DISCUSSING POSSffiiLITIES
Paul Spade's paper "Three Theories of Obligationes: Burley, Kilvington and

Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning" gives an interesting detailed syste-
matic interpretation of what is going on in the obligational treatises. Spade
summarizes his interpretation in the form of following two principles (Spade
1982, pp. 13-14):
(1) For every true (or assertible) counterfactual, 'Were p, then q' - we
shall write this p 0+ q - there is an obligational disputation with positum
p in which q is conceded or -q denied.
(2) For every obligational disputation with positum p in which q is con-
ceded or -q denied, there is a true (and assertible) counterfactual p 0+ q,
and for every such disputation in which q is denied or -q conceded, there
is a true (and assertible) counterfactual p 0+ -q.
The idea behind these principles is simple. Granting a sentence q in an obliga-

tional disputation with the positum pis associated with the conditional p 0+ q,
which is to be interpreted in the way of modern subjunctive conditionals. In the
following I will adopt p 0+ q as a formalization of the obligationally defined
conditional, regardless of its translation in ordinary language, if there is any.
Spade's interpretational idea is that the translation ought to follow the lines of
modern logical theory of subjunctive conditionals. According to his interpreta-
tion, any counterfactual conditional is shown to be true by referring to an

obligational disputation with the antecedent as the positum and the consequent
as a sentence put forward and granted in the disputation. Similarily, for each
sentence granted in the disputation, there is a true counterfactual conditional
with the positum as the antecedent and the granted sentence as the consequent.
In this way, an obligational disputation considers what would be the case, if the
positum were true.
My purpose in this section is to discuss critically Spade's interpretation.
I will propose some rather fundamental revisions for the interpretation, so that
my own interpretation of the issue emerges as a revision of Spade's view. In
one word, my revision amounts to describing features of obligational theory
with the word thought experiment instead of Spade's favoured counteifactual.
Spade provides the following five interesting pieces of evidence for his
interpretation (Spade 1982, pp. 12-13):
a) Some of the texts tell that an obligational disputation explores what
'follows' from the positum. According to Spade, his 'counterfactual intetpreta~
tion' of obligational theory explains how irrelevant sentences can be understood

to 'follow' from the positum, despite their technical classification as irrelevant.
Spade refers to two early thirteenth century texts: Tractatus Emmeranus de falsi
positione, where it is often mentioned that the purpose of a positio is "that it
may be seen what happens then" (ut videatur quid inde accidat) or "what
follows then" (quid inde sequitur) and Obligationes Parisienses, where it is
explained that participants of this kind of disputation do not follow the truth of
things absolutely (vera simpliciter), but rather under a condition (credita sub
conditione) (see Spade 1982, p. 27). In addition to these two early texts con~
sidered by Spade, it may be pointed out that the anonymous De ane obligatoria,
discussed in chapter IV.B, provides three reasons for undertaking an obliga~
tional disputation. The two first ones are related to examination and exercise,
but the third one is more interesting: "The third reason is so that we may admit
something false [but] possible while finding out what follows in order that we
may know what to do and how to respond when things are in fact as the false
casus indicates." 1 These texts show quite clearly that obligational theory was
viewed as a theory of how to handle a false assumption. However, it must be
kept in mind that it is not as clear that they advocate a way corresponding to
modern idea of subjunctive conditionals. On the contrary, even in the context of
these texts there is a strong emphasis on formal consequences.
b) One of the central issues of obligational theory is the treatment of the
so called irrelevant sentences. According to Spade, his 'counterfactual inteiJJre-
tation' explains their status. Spade's point is that as irrelevant sentences are
evaluated following their actual truth values, they bring the actual reality into
the set of answers, so that the disputation describes "what would happen if the
positum were true but everything else stayed as much as possible the same"
(Spade 1982, p. 12). However, even if it is clear that irrelevant sentences do
bring the actual reality into the set of answers, it is not as clear that they keep
the set as near as possible to actual reality. The idea that everything other than
the assumption ought to stay as much as possible the same is very central to the
modern theory of counterfactual reasoning, understood in terms of subjunctive
conditionals. However, it seems rather problematic to assume that this idea is
to be found in obligational theory. I will discuss the problem below at some
length.
c) According to Burley, the positum may be in some senses impossibles,
it may be a contingently false sentence, it may be a true but doubtful sentence,
or it may even be a true sentence known to be true. As for the last case, Burley
remarks that it may be necessary to posit a true sentence known to be true "as
against quibblers". Burley clarifies his point even further: "For a truth known
to be true is not always held to be true". As Spade points out, his 'counterfac-
tual interpretation' of obligational theory provides a good explanation why
Burley feels it necessary to argue that an argument can be based also on
something true. In standard argumentation it would require more clarification to
argue from something false than from something true. The basic Wea of
obligational theory is, however, to argue from something false or even impossi-
1
"Tertia causa est ut falsum possibile admittamus inquirendo quid sequitur, ut cum
res ita de facto se habeant ut falsus casus denotat, sciamus per prius suppositum et
rationem quid sumus acturi et responsuri." Kretzmann and Stump 1985, [vi].
ble - which is also the idea of modem theory of counterfactual reasoning. As

Burley points out, known true sentences can be posited only as far as their
status is not acknowledged, as far as they are not held to be true.
d) The obligational conditional p 0-+ q, as defined by (1) and (2) above,
has several properties typical to counterfactual conditionals as they are treated
in the modem discussion. Spade points out that for the obligationally defined
conditional, the inference schemes of strengthening the antecedent, transitivity,
and contraposition fail, just as they fail in the case of modem subjunctive
conditionals. Also in some other respects, the formal properties of the obliga-
tionally defined conditional are very different from any modem indicative
conditionals, whereas they are quite similar to the formal properties of modem
subjunctive conditionals. However, it must be remarked that there are also
serious differences between the obligationally defined conditional and modem
subjunctive conditionals. I will return to the differences below.
e) Spade claims to provide on the basis of his 'counterfactual interpreta-
tion' "a plausible account of the transition from Burley's theory to Kilvington's,
and from Kilvington's to Swineshed's" (see Spade 1982, p. 13). In my follow-
ing criticism of Spade's interpretation, I hope to present an even more plausible
account of the theoretical development, though one partly based on Spade's
account.
As I see it, these five pieces of evidence do prove that obligational theory
at least contained in the species of obligational disputations called positio a
theory of how contrary to fact assumptions should be delt with. However, I do
not think that these reasons suffice for showing that such assumptions were in
the context of obligational disputations dealt with in any way corresponding to
the modem idea of subjunctive conditionals. It is, nevertheless, part of Spade's
intention to show that obligational theory should be connected to modem
treatments of subjunctive conditionals. Spade states in a footnote that he uses
"the term 'counterfactual' in the rather broad sense now common in philosophi-
cal literature, to include all subjunctive conditionals whether their antecedents
are actually 'contrary to fact' or not" (p. 3). To repeat my point, as theories of
'counterfactual reasoning,' obligational theories suggest a way in which this
sense of 'counterfactual' is too narrow: obligational disputations seem to
develop contrary to fact assumptions in a way fundamentally different from

subjunctive conditionals.
Spade's claim that the obligationally defined conditional p 0+ q ought to
be translated as a subjunctive conditional in the sense of modern logicians, has
been criticized fiercely. Recent discussion has pointed out a wide variety of
examples where the positum p and a sentence q granted in a disputation based
on p would form a subjunctive conditional clearly to be rejected. Instead of
going into such examples, let me here criticize the subjunctive translation more
systematically. I will structure my discussion following the historical develop-
ment of the genre of obligations. I will consider first and most generally the
more or less standard theory of obligations presented by Burley, and then
comment on Kilvington and Swineshed. Finally, I make some general remarks
on the interpretation of obligational disputations. I will accept Paul Spade's
practice of applying the modern idea of possible worlds to the conceptions of
possibilities present in different theories.
Generally, the five pieces of evidence for interpreting obligational theory
as a theory of counterfactual reasoning are applicable to Burley's theory. To be
more specific, let me turn to Burley's 'useful rules,' discussed in ill. C. These
rules provide interesting material in respect to the interpretation of obligational
disputations as counterfactual reasoning. Especially the useful rules 1., 6., 8.
and 9. are interesting.
Rule 8. requires that all responses must be directed to the same instant.
Such a rule suggests in a rather strong way some kind of counterfactual inter-
pretation. If all answers are to be directed to one instant, it is natural to think
this instant to be counterfactually assumed with the positum. However, as I
argued in chapter IV.A, it seems that Burley had in mind a somewhat more
syntactic interpretation for the rule; he wanted to interpret the rule primarily as
a rule concerning relations between sentences granted in the disputation, rather
than concerning the interpretation of these sentences.
The useful rules 6. (that it is possible to prove anything compossible with
the false positum) and 9. (that the positum is false may be granted, if the
positum is false) are mainly interesting as reflective of problems of Spade's
'counterfactual interpretation.' The problems revealed in rule 6. are considered
by Spade himself (Spade 1982, pp. 17 -18). If, for example, the positum is the
false sentence 'You are in Rome,' it may happen that 'the king is seated' must
be granted (i.e. it is possible to prove that the king is seated). To see that this
is the case, consider the following disputation (p stands for 'You are in Rome'
and q for 'the king is seated'):
D3
Po p Accepted, possible
Prl -p v q Granted, irrelevant and true
Pr2 q Granted, follows (Po and Prl)
Here Pr1 is granted as irrelevant and true, correctly according to Burley's rules.
The proposition is judged to be irrelevant, because it neither follows from nor
is repugnant with the positum. When it has been judged to be irrelevant, its
truth value must be evaluated. As a disjunction it is true if either of the dis-
juncts is true. As the facts are, the respondent is not in Rome, and thus -p is
true and the disjunction is true. After having granted Prl, the respondent has to
grant Pr2, since the disjunction has built a sufficient logical link between the
positum p and the sentence q: q follows from p together with the disjunction
-p v q. The example shows how a contingent proposition without any previous
link with the positum can artificially be turned sequentially relevant, and thus
'proved' in the sense of Burley's useful rule 6.
Given the 'counterfactual interpretation' of obligational disputations the
disputation entitles one to form the highly dubious subjunctive conditional 'If
You were in Rome, the king would be seated.' To make matters worse, it can
be shown that in the similar way it is possible to 'prove' the sentence 'the king
is not seated' from the same positum 'You are in Rome.' This leads us to
accept, given Spade's interpretation, that Burley is bound to hold as true both
'if you were in Rome, the king would be seated' and 'if you were in Rome, the
king would not be seated' (p 0-+ q and p 0-+ -q).
Spade suggests as a solution for this problem the idea that some disputa-
tions are preferable to some other disputations based on the same positum. If,
in addition, conditionals of the form p 0-+ q are relativized so that each
conditional "p 0-+ q is true or assertible relative to one disputation," there will
be a way in which we can prefer, say, p 0-+ q over p 0-+ -q, even if both are
true, relative to different disputations. An even better reading of the theory

would be achieved, according to Spade, if instead of evaluating truth of condi-
tionals, disputations evaluate their assertibility. Counterfactual conditionals
would be assertible relative to a disputation where the antecedent is the positum
and the consequent is granted, and true counterfactuals would be assertible
relative to the preferred disputation where the antecedent is the positum, and the
consequent is granted. In this interpretation both p Q+ q and p Q+ -q could be
assertible, but only one of them true.
As Spade recognizes, this interpretation is not to be found in Burley's
treatise. The closest we can find in Burley's text is his useful rule 1., according
to which "one must pay special attention to the order [of the propositions]." As
an example Burley provides the following disputation (Socrates and Plato are
both assumed to be black):
D4
Po Socrates is white Accepted, possible
Prl Socrates and Plato are similar Granted, irrelevant and true
Pr2 Plato is white Granted, follows (Po and Prl)
In this disputation Pr2 'Plato is white' is granted. However, if the sentence had
been put forward at the first step, it would have been denied, since it would
have been irrelevant and false.
Burley's point in calling attention to the order of the sentences is that the
answer to a sentence put forward does not depend only on the positum; a
sentence may receive different answers in different disputations consisting of the
very same sentences and the same positum, if only the order of the sentences is
different. It seems clear that this rule supports Spade's idea of relativizing the
conditionals of the form p Q+ q to particular disputations. However, this rule
gives no hint that Burley would have been prepared to give any preferences
among disputations based on the same positum. Rather it seems the opposite:
Burley is dealing with different disputations with the same positum in an equal
way. He does not say that some orders of putting the sentences forward are
better than others, he just says that they are different.
Given the definition of the obligational conditional, Burley leaves us with
the idea that almost always both p 0+ q and p 0+ -q are true. According to
Modem Interpretations 165
Burley's useful rule 6., the problem arises whenever both q and -q are consis-
tent with the positum p. This syntactic feature of the conditional seems very
strange from the viewpoint of interpretation into subjunctive conditionals. Spade
recognizes that Burley's obligational theory, interpreted as a theory of counter-
factual reasoning, does not agree with our ordinary use of subjunctive condi-
tionals. However, as Spade points out, "the fact that, so interpretedy his theory
departs from our sense of how counterfactuals actually behave would not for a
medieval be especially critical point" (Spade 1982, p. 19). Partially the reason
for this is that Latin, the language of medieval academic discourse, was a highly
technical language, and the purpose of medieval logicians was rather to regi-
ment the usage of Latin than to represent it.
It seems, nevertheless, easier to suppose that Burley's theory of obliga-
tions was not a theory of counterfactuals, at least as far as theory of counterfac-
tuals is understood as a theory of subjunctive conditionals. It seems clear that
Burley's obligational conditional p 0+ q cannot be translated to any modem
subjunctive conditional. The so called 'might'-conditional might be the nearest
candidate, but it seems that even it does not allow that the conditional p 0+ q
may tum out true whenever p & q is possible. In ordinary language, it seems
that there should be at least a putative connection between the antecedent and
the consequent of any kind of conditional. It seems extremely difficult to find
for the obligational conditional any interesting content apart from its obligational
definition. For ordinary language, the conditional behaves in too strange ways.
As if syntactic problems were not enough, Burley presents in his useful
rule 9. a semantic problem for Spade's interpretation. Even if the subjunctive
conditional 'if I were in Rome, the antecedent would be false' seems to be
clearly unacceptable, Burley states that if the positum is false, the sentence 'the
positum is false' must be granted unless there are special reasons for denying it.
This rule makes it clear that irrelevant sentences in an obligational disputation
following Burley's rules are not answered according to the state of affairs that
would obtain if the positum were true. Irrelevant sentences are evaluated strictly
according to actual reality.
In his discussion of the rule Burley makes very clear that 'the positum is
false' is to be granted as an irrelevant and true sentence. He asks us to consider
the following putative counterargument against the rule (it is assumed that the
given positum is the only positum):
D5
Prl The positum is false Granted, cf. the rule
Pr2 Only this is the positum Granted, true
Pr3 That You are in Rome is false ?
Granting Pr3 with the positum Po would violate what has become to be known
as Tarski's principle T, but Pr3 does follow from Prl and Pr2 (substituting 'that
You are in Rome' for 'this' in Pr2).
Burley develops this argument in the following way. First, the positum
binds the respondent only to the sentence asserting that he is in :Rome, not to
anything implying that he has any particular positum. That the respondent is in
Rome does not alone imply that his positum is true - or false, for that matter
- since a premise concerning the identity of the positum is needed for such an
inference. Prl is therefore irrelevant, and its evaluation depends on its, actual
truth value. The respondent is actually not in Rome, he is answering in an
obligational disputation where the positum is 'You are in Rome', which is
actually false. Thus the statement that the positum is false, is true. The crucial
step in the disputation is Pr2, which according to Burley is wrongly evaluated
above. According to him Pr2 ought to be denied as repugnant, following rule
R3b. The proposition can easily be seen to be repugnant with the positum
together with Prl, when Pr3 is considered. Prl and Pr2 indeed imply Pr3, but
Pr3 is clearly inconsistent with the positum: if that you are in Rome is false,
you are not in Rome, contrary to what is assumed in the positum. Since Prl has
already been granted when Pr2 is put forward, Pr2 must be denied in order to
avoid granting anything inconsistent with the positum.
According to modem treatments, in subjunctive reasoning the idea is to
evaluate the truth value of the sentences in the position of consequent in respect
to some situation where the antecedent assumption is true, rather than according
to actual reality. This is not the case in an obligational disputation following
Burley's rules. The truth values are according to Burley assigned with respect
to actual reality, the assumption given as the positum effects only the answers
given by the respondent, not the truth values serving as basis for answers, as is
shown by the above discussed useful rule 9.
As I pointed out in chapter liLA, Burley often uses a double structure of
assumptions in his theory of obligations. First the "truth of the matter" is made
clear by the casus, and then a positum is given to determine what is to be
maintained in the answers given in the disputation. In Burley's theory the casus
determines truth values in the disputation, it works as a semantical supposition.
Positum, on the other hand, does not determine any truth values, it has only
inferential effects to sentences evaluated in the disputation. From the semantical
point of view it thus seems that, in the context of Burley's theory of obligations,
the casus might amount to counterfactual suppositions in the sense meant by
Spade. However, Burley's rules of obligational disputations do not consider
casus, they regulate how a positum is to be dealt with.
In terms of possible world semantics, it seems that the casus can be
characterized as fixing one world, which is to be treated as the actual world
during the disputation. Truth values are evaluated in respect to this world, and
the respondent should in the disputation act as if he were in this world. Interest~
ingly enough, the selection of the world is taken to be unproblematic; no special

rules for how to handle a casus are developed in Burley's treatise.
The possible worlds interpretation of positum is less simple, but its
construction on the basis of Burley's discussion of the rules of obligations seems
to be possible. To avoid excessive complications, I neglect the possibility of
answering with doubt, and assume that the respondent is logically omniscient.
First of all, the standard requirement that the positum must be possible turns
naturally into the requirement that there must be a nonempty set of possible
worlds, where the positum is true. Even the standard characterization of an
impossible positum can be turned into the requirement that there must be a
nonempty set of consistently describable, though not possible, worlds. At the
simple level of the first proposition put forward, the rules R2a and R3a require
the respondent to grant anything following the positum and to deny anything
repugnant with the positum. These rules amount to the requirement that the
respondent must grant any sentence, which is true in all worlds, where the
positum is true, and similarly he must deny any sentence, which is true in all
those worlds. Irrelevant sentences (rules R 4a, R4b and R 4J tum out to be true in
some, but not all the worlds, where the positum is true. The ground for their
answer is, according to Burley's rules, the actual world - in this way Burley
can easily guarantee one and only one answer in an unambiguous way.
Burley's rules R2b and R3b say that all earlier answers are to be accounted
for in determining whether the proposition put forward is relevant. This require~
ment can be explained by paying attention to the set of worlds, where all earlier
answers follow the truth, instead of recognizing only the set of worlds, where
the positum is trUe. The rule R2& tells that the respondent must grant any
sentence which is true in all those worlds, where all earlier answers follow
truth; the rule R3b similarly tells that the respondent must deny any sentence,
which is false in all those worlds.
The whole procedure can thus be explained as follows: The positum
determines a set of worlds, let us call it S 1• Originally, at step 1, this set
determines answers to relevant propositions. At the i:th subsequent step the
respondent must recognize the set Si> which is the set of worlds where all
answers up to the answer to (i-l):th proposition follow truth. Irrelevant proposi-
tions are to be evaluated according to the actual world. As the disputation
proceeds, the set determining relevance may shrink. Answers to televant
sentences do not cause any changes, but at any step (i) where an irrelevant
sentence is answered, the set determining relevance (Si) is divided in two
subsets: those where the given answer follows truth, and those where it is false.
The former of these subsets is the set determining relevance at the next step
(Si+ 1). As the disputation continues, the step determining relevance shrinks, and
after an infmite disputation the set may include only one world; the point of
Burley's useful rule 8. (requiring reduction to one instant) is, in this terminolo-
gy, that the set never becomes empty: there is always at least one world at
which all answers are true.
The outcome of the disputation is described by Spade as follows (Spade
1982, p. 11):
the disputation could be described as incompletely but progressively

describing a single possible world in which the positum is true but that
otherwise differs as little as possible from the actual world.
As I see it, this characterization is generally illuminating, but contains one

mistake, and in addition seems to be misinterpreted by Spade.
Let us first consider the mistake. Contrary to what Spade claims, there is
no guarantee that the world, which is the ideal outcome of the process, "differs
as little as possible from the actual world." The process may lead towards any
of the worlds where the positum is true, depending on the order and selection
of the sentences put forward. That this is the case, and even that Burley (with-
out the terminology of possible worlds) knew this to the case, is shown by the
useful rule 6., according to which anything compatible with the positum can be
proved in the disputation. Spade's phrase "differs as little as possible from the
actual world" is not based on obligational theory, it is inspired by some modem
theories of subjunctive conditionals, based on possible worlds. David Lewis, as
a foremost example, has built a theory where truth values of a subjunctive
conditionals are found by looking at the truth value of the consequent in such
possible worlds, where ,the antecedent is true, but which otherwise are 'closest'
or 'most similar' to the actual world. Such similarities or relations of closeness
are not even hinted at in Burley's obligational theory.
Spade seems also to misinterpret the outcome of an obligational disputa-
tion following Burley's rules. Spade finds a similarity in the structures of the
procedures employed in obligational disputations and in theories of subjunctive
conditionals of Lewis' type. However, there is an important fundamental
difference. Lewis' idea is that the antecedent of a subjunctive conditional selects
(through the similarity function) the closest world or worlds, according to which
the consequent is to be evaluated. In obligational disputations, on the contrary,
the positum does not by itself determine such a fixed set of worlds. The set is
reconstructed constantly during the disputation, and even so irrelevant sentences
are evaluated regardless of the set. As a semantical theory of conditionals
Burley's obligational theory thus seems to be standing on its head: the evalu-
ation of truth values is not based on possible worlds, but on the contrary, the set
of worlds at issue depends on the given evaluation.
Semantical consideration of Burley's theory thus seems to lead to the same
result as the syntactic considerations. Burley's theory of obligations was not a
theory of subjunctive conditionals. However, in order to avoid arguing hastily,
Spade's evaluations of Richard Kilvington and Roger Swineshed also deserve

attention.
Many of the problems in reading Burley's theory of obligational disputa-
tions as a theory of subjunctive conditionals are connected to the fact that the
positum and the actual facts do not alone suffice for determining all answers.
The order and selection of sentences put forward in the disputation has often a
crucial role for the answers. Kilvington's attack on Burley's theory is aimed at
this feature - it almost explicitly starts as a rejection of Burley's useful rule 6.
Kilvington does not accept that, in Burley's theory, the same sentence may
receive opposite answers in different disputations based on the same positum.
As I<ilvington develops his argument, it means an attack against the idea that
the order of the sentences in the disputation may make a difference.
Kilvington may have had the anonymous author of De arte obligatoria as
a predecessor. The anonymous author had a very strong view about the interpre-
tation of the principle of reduction to one instant, and wanted to suspend the
idea of successive propositions. In his view, all answers ought to be based
directly on a comparison of the positum and actual world. In terms of rules, his
solution was that an irrelevant and true proposition need not be proposed in
order to effect the reasoning. Thus a sentence could turn out to be relevant on
the basis that it follows· from the positum together with some irrelevant and true
proposition, even if the proposition has not been evaluated.
In his discussion Spade gives this interpretation also for Kilvington' s at
many points obscure remarks. I will soon return to my reading of Kilvington's
theory, but let us first consider the merits of the theory of the anonymous author
in respect to understanding obligational theory as a theory of subjunctive
conditionals. Let us return to one example by the anonymous author already
considered (D4 of chapter IV.B; here I give answers according to the solution):
D6
Po Every man is running Accepted, possible
Prl You are running Granted, follows (Po and Pr2)
Pr2 You are a man Granted, true and irrelevant
In this example Prl is granted as following from the positum together with a
true irrelevant sentence, which at that stage has not been put forward. At Pr2
the true irrelevant sentence is put forward and granted. The problem in this way
of answering is, as I pointed out already in chapter IV.B, that of selection. Why
is Pr2 to be granted as true and irrelevant rather than Prl denied as false and
irrelevant, even if Prl is put forward first?
In his interpretation of Kilvington's theory of obligations, Spade provides
a suggestion, or at least a name for such an unknown principle of selection
(Spade 1982, pp. 25-28). His idea is that, in addition to the positum, 'basic
sentences' may be used in determining whether a sentence is relevant. Which
sentences are 'basic', is a rather complicated question. However, it seems rather
plausible to suggest that 'you are a man' ·is more 'basic' than 'you are not
running.·• Given the set of basic sentences, it is possible to construct an account
of the process of an obligational disputation following these rules. Spade does
it as follows (neglecting some details): the positum together with the basic
sentences, whose truth values are to be respected in the disputation, together
determine a set of worlds, where the positum is true and the basic sentences
have their actual truth values. Now, anything true in all these worlds must be
granted, anything false in all these worlds must be denied, and anything true in
some but false in others, must be doubted. As I pointed out in chapter IV.B,
this kind of theory of obligations looks very much like some modern theories of
subjunctive conditionals. Constructed in the way suggested by Spade, it is not
guilty of most of the problems in Burley's theory interpreted as a theory of
counterfactuals.
It is not clear that Kilvington would have accepted these rules of obliga-
tional disputations, but, in fact, it is even clearer in the case of Kilvington than
in the case of the anonymous author that the answers of an obligational disputa-
tion are aimed at describing the state of affairs that would obtain if the positum
were true. In Kretzmann's translation of the crucial sophisma 47 of Kilvington's
Sophismata we find typical english subjunctive conditionals so carefully ana-
lyzed by modern theories of counterfactual reasoning. Kilvington even goes as
far as to state that in an obligational disputation the respondent ought to grant
(as far as he knows) whatever would be true, if the positum were true (S47,
(q)). If my interpretation of Kilvington's view of irrelevant sentences is correct,
he suggests that the rule for irrelevant sentences ought to take into account the
truth values of these sentences as they would be, if the positum were true,
rather than as they are actually.
The problem in reading Kilvington's theory of obligations as a theory of
subjunctive conditionals is not where it is in Burley's case. From Burley's
theory it was impossible to locate acceptable subjunctive conditionals. Kilving-
ton,. on the other hand, seems to use subjunctive conditionals as admissible
principles of reasoning in his theory of obligations. From the viewpoint of
Spade's counterfactual interpretation this practise is almost as bad. A theory of
subjunctive conditionals cannot be based on subjunctive conditionals as prin-
ciples of reasoning. The way in which Kilvington uses subjunctive conditionals
suggests that he was not trying to explain them, but on the contrary, trying to
explain something else with their help.
As far as modem scholars know, neither Kilvington nor the anonymous
author had any influence in the later history of obligational theory. We seem to
not even know why later fourteenth century authors rejected their views. A
good suggestion is provided by Spade. He presents an example similar to an
above considered disputation (D5 of chapter IV.B; here I give answers accord-
ing to the solution):
D7
Po You are in Rome or you are running Accepted, possible
Prl You are in Rome Granted, follows from posi-
tum and the true irrelevant
'you are not running'
Pr2 You are running Denied, false and irrelevant
Pr3 You are in Rome and You are running Denied, false and irrelevant
The positum in this disputation is of the form p v q, where both p and q are
actually false and 'basic' in the sense suggested by Spade. In Spade's reading of
Kilvington's theory, both p and q must be denied, which leads into inconsist-
ency in the set of all answers, since p v q, -p and -q are inconsistent. As I
pointed out in chapter IV.B, the anonymous author tried to solve this problem
by reference to the order of presentation. However, the solution did not cohere
with the general line of the treatise.
That Kilvington cannot according to Spade give a solution may seem even
more strange, since the context of Kilvington's remarks on obligational theory
is a case where a disjunction (of two non-basic sentences, in Spade's view) is

admitted as a positum, and the respondent ought to make a choice between the
disjuncts. Kilvington's solution in the sophism is, as I pointed out in chapter
IV.B, that both disjuncts ought to be doubted. As is clear from the rules based
on my interpretation of Kilvington's theory, my interpretation implies that this
doubtful answer applies also to the case of a positum, which is a disjunction of
'basic' sentences. It seems that my interpretation is also supported by the fact
that in his solution of the sophism Kilvington advises the respondent to doubt
the sentence 'the king is seated,' which is in Spade's treatment basic. If this
sentence is doubted, why could not a part of disjunctive positum be doubted? As
a solution, such a doubtful answer may easily seem insufficient in many cases,
and William Heytesbury criticizes it fiercely in a case very similar to the one
provided as sophisma 47 by Kilvington.
According to Spade, the case where a disjunction of basic sentences is
posited offers an example, where Kilvington's theory cannot give a unique
answer for all sentences which are put forward. Such problems led, in Spade's
reading, into rejection of the theory. However, if the theory was a theory of
subjunctive conditionals, the problem of a disjunctive positum ought not to be
given too decisive a weight. Modem theories of subjunctive conditionals have
stumbled with it as well; it may even seem that no good general solution is
possible.
As I see it, a more probable reason for rejection of Kilvington 's theory
lies in its reliance on subjunctive conditionals, whether it is represented in the
form of division into 'basic' and 'non-basic' sentences, or explicitly in the form
of granting actually false sentences, which follow from the positum only
subjunctively. As modem logicians well know, finding agreement over the
criteria of truth values of subjunctive conditionals is a rather problematic issue.
In an obligational disputation employing subjunctive conditionals, this means
difficulties in finding agreement over whether a sentence ought to granted or
not, and such difficulties are just what the rules of obligational disputations
ought to solve.
In this sense, Swineshed's rules are the clearest and simplest. All sen-
tences can be evaluated straight after the positum, the order needs no attention,
and no vague subjunctive reasoning is needed. As I showed in chapter IV.C,

this simplicity has the price of requiring the division of answers into two
columns. In terms of possible worlds, this means that all irrelevant sentences
are connected to the actual worlds, while relevant sentences are connected to the
set of worlds, where the positum is true. The simplicity of the theory is visible
also in this formulation: there are no obscure developments in the set where
answers to relevant sentences follow truth - a simplification from Burley's
theory - and the set is determined in a clear way - a simplification from
Kilvington's theory. Given this simplicity, it may seem that Swineshed's theory
is superior to the other theories in a clear and decisive way. However, the
disadvantage ofgranting outright contradictions was taken to be weightier, even
if the contradictions would require confusion of criteria. It may be that the
weight of this disadvantage was connected to· the practical character of the
theory: in a sometimes disorganized actual disputation it may be rather embar-
rassing to grant contradictions, even if one were able to explain the logically
acceptable character of the contradictions.
According to Spade, "Swyneshed's theory is by no means an attractive
account of counterfactuals" (Spade 1982, p. 30). This seems to be indeed true.
In Swineshed's account the obligational conditional p ~ q, where the anteced-
ent is the positum, and the consequent is a granted sentence, cart never be an
interesting subjunctive conditional. A granted sentence q either follows logically
from the positum, or is evaluated as irrelevant and thus answered regardless of
the positum.
C. OBLIGATIONS AS THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS
The above considerations have, I believe, made it clear that generally obliga-
tional theory was not a logical theory of subjunctive conditionals. The 'obliga~
tiona! conditional' p ~ q has no interesting translation into modem ordinary

language, and thus it ought not be seen as a real help in interpretation of
obligational disputations. However, as I see it, obligational theory is a logical
theory of handling assumptions, which are contrary to fact. In order to see more
clearly how the theory functions, let us return to Spade's characterization in

terms of possible worlds, of what happens in an obligational disputation follow-
ing Burley's rules - which, after all, turned out to be the standard rules. To
repeat, Spade's characterization is the following (Spade 1982, p. 11):
the disputation could be described as incompletely but progressively

describing a single possible world in which the positum is true but that
otherwise differs as little as possible from the actual world.
Above I accepted this characterization with the two reservations. First, that the
clause 'that otherwise differs as little as possible from the actual world' ought
to be erased since it is a mistake; and second, that the evaluations are un-
derstood to form a description only retrospectively - they are not given because
the single world to be described is such and such, but the world is imagined to
be such and such, because just those answers were given.
These reservations change the spirit of Spade's characterization. The
process cannot be understood as an explication of counterfactual reasoning in
the subjunctive sense. The process seems to amount to a construction of one
possible world, where the positum is true. As such, the process seems to give
us a technique of building a whole possible situation on the basis of a possible
sentence. In a sense this kind of technique can be called counterfactual rea-
soning, because the point is to develop a counterfactual supposition further.
However, it seems that the name for this kind of discussion in the modem
philosophical literature is thought experiment rather than counterfactual rea-
soning. In a thought experiment the reasoning starts with a contrary to fact
possibility, but it is not necessary to stay as near as possible to the actual world.
Especially in the case of conceptual studies it may fruitful to go very far from
the actual world; strange idealizations often prove to be the most useful.
Nevertheless, a thought experiment must remain consistent and proceed logical-
ly. These two conditions are clearly fulfilled by the theories of obligations,
perhaps best by Burley's theory (with the Scotist revision concerning the rules
for time and modality).
It seems that from the viewpoint of Kilvington or Swineshed the central
problem in Burley's theory of obligations was that the assumption given as the
positum does not alone suffice for identification, of the situation discussed in the
thought experiment. As Burley's useful rules clearly show, the assumption can
be developed further in almost any direction. As a solution of this problem,
Kilvington's theory was not too successful, because it was found guilty of the
even more serious problem of vague principles of reasoning. Swineshed' s theory
was perhaps too restrictive; this seems to be reflected by his idea of allowing a
second positum to serve the purposes served by granted irrelevant sentences in
Burley's theory.
An interesting little piece of evidence for interpreting obligational disputa-
tions as thought experiments is the curious phrase 'the time is finished'. As
Burley and other authors point out, the idea in this phrase is not that the issue
is finished, but on the contrary, that it turns to the second, possibly more
interesting phase. The idea in the second phase is the analysis of the respon-
dent's evaluations - of the results of the thought experiment.
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ACTA

SOCIETAS PlllLOSOPillCA FENNICA

14th Century Logic of Disputational Duties

November 1993 Mikko Yrjonsuuri

ll Background of the Genre 18

ill Walter Burley's Theory of Obligations 36

IV Revisions of the Rules . 64

VI Modern Interpretations . . . • . • . . • 145

Treatises De obligationibus are commonly recognized as one of the somewhat

has to a game of chess, for instance. Unlike moves in chess, sequences of

grounded counterfactual conditionals which are. ridiculously false. This is taken

artem habeat. Secunda, ut dispensatio habeatur, ut accidit inter conferentes ob exercitii

tional technique is relevant to fourteenth century legal theory (Pironet forth-

The business of the questioner is so to develop the argument as to make

In addition to these two quotations, a third passage of Aristotle is some-

Chapters 1 -3 of Topics VIII are dedicated to the opponent, containing

For one may, no doubt, distinguish between the mistake of taking up a

There seems to be no doubt that a useful truth-seeking disputation is possible

Ta (p)((Krp & Rp) > OCp)

concentrated on situations where these duties are overridden to some extent by

E (p)(q)((Cp & K.-D(p > q) & Rq) > OCq

sitionem veritatis vel ad exercitium in argumentis ad quodlibet propositum de facili

Within the obligational technique developed by Boethius de Dacia after this

inveniendis sive ad sustinendum positionem, saepe attenditur ars obligatoria,

1 "Hypothesis namquae, uode hypothetici syllogismi accepere vocabulum, duobus

An interesting early medieval example of the use of hypothesis in philo-

quod grammaticus non significet hominem.

is an accident only of man, whereas whiteness is not an accident only of

on general intuitions of how a disputation proceeds if it employs a hypothesis.

It is clear that the technical format of obligational disputations assumed by the

According to this description, the main body of an obligational disputation

R 1 (p) ((Pp & Rp) > OCp)

R4 (p) ((Ip & Rp) > OCp)

(Here 'I' stands for 'irrelevant.')

1 "Opus opponentis sic inducere orationem ut faciat respondentem concedere

obligat II super incomplexum I super complexum

As I already pointed out, petitio is a species of obligational disputation,

a variation of the liar's paradox, and Burley's solution of it is comparable to

Before going into the essential rules of obligational disputations in the

In truth Socrates is black. It is posited that Socrates is white.

In this formulation the positum is given against the background of a description

characterized as a syntactic assumption, and a casus, which determines the truth

Ockham's discussion thus concentrates on positio, and the rules of answering

follow that 'Tullius runs' should be granted, even if Tullius is Marcus. 1 In

R1 (p) ((Pp & Rp) > OCp)

the opposites of propositions) already correctly denied and known to be

The two parts of the rule can be formalized as follows:

Everything incompatible with the positum must be denied. Likewise,

The formalizations are as well analogous:

where 'ON' stands for 'must be denied'.

If it is irrelevant, it must be responded to on the basis of its own quality;

Since irrelevant sentences cannot be evaluated by the previous rules, by the

~. (p) ((lp & KrP & Rp) > OCp)

Pr2 -KrP Denied, repugnant (Po and opposite of Prl)

to the interpretation of obligational theory as connected to modal concepts.

In positio falsa it must not be answered to what or to why or to when or

Burley seems to be following this older rule. Consequently I have retained

obligational disputation based on any false positum. The corresponding principle

Burley's treatise contains also some discussion of different special kinds of

In this simple example Prl is problematic. If it is granted as a true sentence, the

Positio dependens, where the possibility of the positio depends on a future

If a true [sentence] inconsistent with the positum is proposed, it is posited

Here the contradictory character of the resulting conditional obligation is