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JOSEF KOCH
W£ITERGEFOHRT VON
HERAUSGEGEBEN VON
JAN A. AERTSEN
IN ZUSAMMENARBEIT MIT
BAND LXXVII
GIORGIO PINI
BY
GIORGIO PINI
BRILL
LEIDEN· BOSTON· KaLN
2002
This book is printed on acid-free paper.
ISSN 0169-8125
ISBN 90 04 12329 6
All rights reserved. No part '!!this publication may be reproduced, translated, swred in
a retrieval.rystem, or transmitted in any foTm or by a"!JI means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written
permissionftom the publis"".
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Introduction.
Bibliography
Primary sources. ..... ................ 203
Secondary sources 208
Francesco Del Punta, who saw the beginning of this research and
always provided his precious advice on most various matters.
Marylin McCord Adams, Stefano Di Bella, Gianfranco Fioravanti,
Massimo Mugnai, and Dominik Perler read an Italian version of
some of the ideas that resulted into the present study. Michael J.
Loux and Claude Panaccio read a first version of this work. All of
them suggested many corrections and improvements. If I was not
able to follow their advice on every matter, this was only due to my
incapacity. Concetta Luna read a first version of the Introduction.
Roberto Lambertini and Andrea Tabarroni generously shared their
knowledge of medieval logic with me and provided much needed
encouragement. Alessandro D. Conti, Silvia Donati, Stephen D.
Dumont, and Cecilia Trifogli provided me with materials, ideas,
and friendship. Conversations with them gready clarified my con
fused views and saved me from many faux pas. Carlos Steel, Jos
Decorte, and all the people at the De Wulf-Mansion Centrum made
my stay in Leuven most profitable and enjoyable. Andreas Speer
has been generous with advice and friendship, as always.
Any errors contained in this book, of course, are entirely my re
sponsibility.
I finally wish to thank all the friends who made me feel at home
whether in Pisa, London, Leuven, or Toronto. T his book is dedi
cated to them.
INTRODUCTION
I. Aristotle
I Cat. 4,Ib25-2a4.
, Top. 1,9,I03b20-39.
' Met. V, 7,IOI7a22-27.
4 M. Frede, "Categories in Aristotle," in Studits in Aristotle, ed. D. J. O'Meara
in Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 987). 29-48; D. Mor
rison, "The Taxonomical Interpretation of Aristotle's Categories: A Criticism," in A.
Preus andj. P. Anton, eds., Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, vol. 5, Aristotle's Ontology
(Albany, N. Y.: SUNY Press, 1 992), 1 9-46; D. Morrison, "Le statut cat<goriel des dif
ferences dans l'Organon," Revue philosophique de la France el de l'Etranger 183 (1 993): 1 48;
J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1963, 1 9858), 78-8 1 . On how Aristotle obtained the list of the categories, after the
classic works by Trendelenbug and Brentano, see C. M. Gillespie, "The Aristotelian
Categories," The Classical Q¥arterry 19 (1 925): 75-84, reprinted in Collected Articlts on
Aristotle, ed.]. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1 979), vol.
3, Metaphysics, 1 - 12; C. H. Kahn, "Questions and Categories. Aristotle's Doctrine of
Categories in the Light of Modern Research," in Questions,ed. H. Hiz (Dordrecht
Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1 978),227-78. For a brief introduc
tion to the notion of category, see R. Wardy, "Categories," in Routledge Encyclopedia '!!
Philosophy, ed. E. Craig, vol. 2 (London-New York: Routledge, 1 998), 229-33.
'Cat. 4, Ib25-2aI0. See Ackrill, Aristotle's Categories, 77-81 .
6 Frede, "Categories," 32-36; J. P. Anton, "On the Meaning of K ategoria in Aris
totle's Categories," in Anton and Preus, eds., Essays in Ancient Greek. Philosophy, 3-18. On
the various interpretations of the Topics passage, see R. Smith, Aristotle. Topics. Books
I and VIII (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 997), 74-76.
1 Kahn, "Questions and Categories," 227-78; C. Kirwan, Aristotle. Metaphysics.
Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia, ed. P. Moraux and J. Wiesner (Berlin-
4 INTRODUCTION
New York: de Gruyter, 1983), translated as "The Title, Unity, and Authenticity of
the Aristotelian 'Categories'. " In Frede, Essays in Ancient Philosophy, 24-28.
9 Ibid., 11·24. Already Andronicus of Rhodes,in the first century BC,had main
tained that the postpratdicamen/(J were spurious. See H. B. Gottschalk, "The Earliest
Aristotelian Commentators," in R. Sorabji, ed.,Arislolle Ta r nsformed.
mentators and tluir Influence (London: Duckworth, 1990),66-67.
10 See C. Luna's notes to Simplicius, Commentaire sur tes Catigorits. Traduction
mrnli, sous la direction d, Iiseraut Hadot. Fascicult Ill. Priambult aux Galigorits. Gommrn
taire au premier chapitr, d, Galigon,s (Leiden-New York-K0benhavn-Koln: E. J. Brill
1990),43-50. For some modern solutions to this problem,Frede, "Title,Unity," 23-
24; S. Menn, "Metaphysics, Dialectic and the Categories," Revue de mitaphysique ttl de
moralt 100 (1995): 320-21; M. Wedin, "The Strategy of Aristotle's Gaugories," Archi.
for Geschichu der Philosophi< 79 (1997): 1-26; C. Shields,Order in Multiplici!y. Homonymy
in the Philosophy W Aristotlt(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999),20-21; W. R. Mann, Th,
Discovery of Things: Aristotle's Categories and Their Contlxt (Princeton: Princeton Up,
2000),50·57.
II
Gat. I, l a l-15; 2, l aI6-19; 2, la20-b9; 4,Ib25-2a4.
INTRODUCTION 5
Several solutions have been put forth. The most successful one is
perhaps the evolutionary hypothesis. According to this interpreta
tion, Aristotle's ontology has evolved from a youthful version he
gives in the Categories to a mature and revised doctrine he provides
in the Metaphysics, where he introduced the notions of form and
matter into his ontology and sometimes openly contradicts what he
had previously maintained. 14 Alternatively, it can be held that the
Categories and the Metaplrysics are both treatises on ontology but do
not propose alternative systems. According to this view, the differ
ence between the two works is of method and purpose: the Cate
gories gives an elementary treatment of the same topics that the
Metaphysics considers in a more advanced way.15
view 76 (1967): 90; R. Dancy, "On Some of Aristotle's First Thoughts about Sub
stance, " Philosophical Review 84 (1975): 338; D. W. Graham, Aristotle's Two Systems
(Oxford: OUp' 1987); Loux, Primary Ousia, 4-5, 49-51; Lewis, Substance and Predica
tion, 143.
l5 M. Furth,Substance, Form and Psyche; An Aristotelian Metaplfjsics (Cambridge: CUp,
1988).
16
P. Hoffmann, "Categories et langage seIon Simplicius. La question du «skopos»
du traite aristotelicien des Categories," in Simplicius. Sa vie, son fEUvre, sa survie: Actes du
Col/oque international de Paris, 28 sept. - ler oct. 1985, ed. I. Hadot (Berlin-New York:
de Gruyter, 1987), 68-72; S. K. Strange, introduction to Porphyry, On Aristotle Cau
gones (London: Duckworth, 1992), 5-7. For a general introduction to Late Ancient
commentators, see R. Sorabji, "The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle," in
Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transformed, 1-30.
1 7 Strange, introduction to Porphyry, On Aristotle Categories, 7; P. Moraux, Der Aris
toulismus bei den Griechen. Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, vol. I (Berlin-New
INTRODUCTION 7
York: de Gruyter, 1973), 45-94, 97-113; Gottschalk, "The Earliest Aristotelian Com
mentators," 55-67.
16 Moraux, Der Aristotelismus, vol. I, 147-64; Gottschalk, "The Earliest Aristotelian
Commentators," 74-77.
19 J. Barnes et at.,introduction to Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Prior Ana
{ytics 1.1-7 (London: Duckworth, 1991); R. W. Sharples, 'l\lexander of Aphrodisias:
Scholasticism and Innovation," in W Haase and H. Temporini, eds., Arifstieg und
Niedergang der Romischen l#/t 2.36.2 (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter, 1987),1176-243.
2Q Porph. In Cat. 58, 5-6, 27-9. See above, n. 17.
alectic."
22 Plotinus Enn. VII, 1-24. See C. C. Evangeliou, "The Plotinian Reduction of
29 Simplicius gives the most complete account of the debate (In Cat. 12, 3-13). See
Hofm f ann,
30 Porph. In Cat. 58, 5-20 (transl. Strange, 34-35). See Ebbesen, "Porphyry's
Legacy to Logic." In his own commentary on the Categories,Simplicius quotes large
sections of Porphyry's lost commentary, traditionally known as 'ad Gedalium" from
the name of its dedicatee. (I thank Concetta Luna for this remark.)
SL
On the date of Boethius's commentary, L. M. de Rijk, "On the Chronology of
Boethius' Works on Logic," 2 ( 1964): 125. On Boethius's dependence on Porphyry,j.
Shiel, "Boethius' commentaries on Aristotle," Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 4
(1958): 217-44, reprinted in Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Transflrm,d, 349-72. Shiel's conclu
sions, however, should be corrected in the light of S. Ebbesen, "Boethius as an Aris
totelian Commentator," in]. Wiesner, ed., Aristoteles: Wtrk und Wirkung, vol. 2 (Berlin
New York: de Gruyter, 1987), reprinted in Sorabji, ed., Aristotlt Transformed, 373-91.
Like Porphyry, Boethius planned to write a second, longer commentary on Aristotle's
Categories, the only extant fragment of which is edited in P. Hadot, "Un fragment du
commentaire perdu de Boece sur les 'Categories' d'Aristote dans Ie codex Bernensis
363, " Archives d'hirtoire doctrinalt et litteraire du M�tn Age 26 ( 1959): 1 1-27.
10 INTRODUCTION
inalism and the Commentaries on the 'Categories' from the Earlier Twelfth Cen
tury," Vivarium 30 (1992): 51-61.
38 See for example Abelard, Glossae in Cat.,Il l: "Cuius etiam teste Boethio in hoc
opere intentio est de primis vocibus prima rerum genera significantibus in eo quod
res significant, disputare, hoc est carum significationem secundum naturas subiec
tarum rerum aperire." On twelfth-century Nominales,see the monographic issue of
Vivarium 30 (1992). On their position on the subject matter of the Categories, see S.
Ebbesen, "Philoponus, 'Alexander' and the Origins of Medieval Logic," in R.
Sorabji, ed., Aristotle Traniformed,456-58.
39 s. Ebbesen, "Anonymous D'Orvillensis' Commentary on Aristotle's Categories,"
turies Aristotle's Metaphysics, which had long been lost to Latin au
thors, became available to the West again.40 The knowledge of Aris
totle's Metaphysics implied a new consideration of the Categories,
since in the Metaphysics Latin authors could find a treatment of cat
egories partially different from the one with which they were fa
miliar in theCategories. F irst, in the Categories Aristotle does not men
tion matter, which plays a very important role in the Metaphysics.
Second, in the Categories Aristotle regards substantial concrete indi
viduals as primary substances, whereas in the Metaphysics he main
tains that the foremost and true substances are forms.
Thus, interpreters had to find a solution to the apparent contra
diction between what Aristotle says in the Categories and what he
says in the Metaphysics. This problem, which is well known to con
temporary scholars, became inescapable for medieval interpreters
once they acquired familiarity with Aristotle's Metaphysics. Surpris
ingly, the old logical interpretation of the Categories kept its validity
and allowed commentators to solve this new problem. For them, in
the Categories Aristotle speaks as a logician and considers the cate
gories as significative words, whereas in the Metaphysics he speaks as
a metaphysician and considers the categories as the genera of ex
tramental things. The doctrine of the twofold consideration of the
categories, derived from Porphyry, assumed new importance for the
interpretation of Aristotle's work and of the doctrine of categories
in general.
In this work, I treat the interpretation of the Categories as a work
of logic in the thirteenth century, after the translation and diffusion
of Aristotle's Metaphysics in the West. This period is characterized
by the rise of the theory of second intentions in logic. Second in
tentions are concepts of a specific kind, which constitute the au
tonomous field of logic and give logic its status as a science separate
from other sciences. Latin authors received the notion of second in
tention from the Arabs and subjected it to debate at the end of thir
teenth century. Since the debate on logic and intentions had mo
mentous consequences for the doctrine of the logical study of the
categories, I will dwell on the main doctrines of second intentions
developed between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.
John Duns Scotus, Q;laestiones in librum Porphyrii Isagoge et Q;laestiones super Praedica
menta Aristotelis, Opera Philosophica,vol. I (St. Bonaventure: The Franciscan Insti
tute, 1999), xxix-xxxi.
INTRODUCTION 15
derwent several stages, from his logical works to his theological and
metaphysical writings. It can be seen as a sophisticated version of
Thomas Aquinas's view, developed in such a way as to respond to
the criticisms to which it had been subject.
After this long excursus on second intentions, I return to the doc
trine of the logical consideration of the categories. In the fifth
chapter I apply my analysis of second intentions to the case of cat
egories, and I show the effects each doctrine of intentions has on
the doctrine of the logical study of categories. Specifically, I de
scribe how Duns Scotus and Radulphus Brito developed different
views on the role categories play in logic. Finally, in the sixth
chapter, I give a brief presentation of Duns Scotus's reading of
Aristotle's Categories. Scotus saw Aristotle's treatise as a logical work,
dealing not with extramental things but with the way we represent
extramental things. His interpretation appears to be one of the
most coherent from a philosophical point of view, and it attests to
the autonomy that logic had acquired from other sciences by the
end of the thirteenth century.
CHAPTER ONE
2 For the dates of Kilwardby's logical commentaries, see O. Lewry, "The Oxford
• Ibid. (ed. Lewry, 368.25-29): '>\d hec ergo notandum: ad primum quidem
dicimus quod generum primorum est sciencia, et est illorum accepcio possibilis per
causam. Cum enim unumquodque eorum ex materia et forma aggregatum, sicut
patebit in sequentibus, et ideo possibilis est eorum cognicio per sua principia."
5 Ibid. (ed. Lewry, 368.30-34): "Et hec cognicio est propria primo philosopho; con
siderat enim in principiis substancie sensibilis, et consequenter in principiis sub-
22 CHAPTER ONE
And what is asked after that is solved in this way, that the first philoso
pher's attention is turned to those things [scil., the categories] without
taking into account the relationship to speech. On the other hand, the
logician's attention is turned to them because of that relationship. In
deed, the first philosopher considers them as they are parts and
species of being, whereas the logician considers them as they act as
predicates and subjects. And in addition to this, the first philosopher's
attention is turned to the parts of being only insofar as they are re
duced to being. The logician's attention, however, is turned to being
only with respect to its parts.7
[ed., parte] philosophie supponuntur quia racionali aut sermocinali: racionalis enim
non omnino a sermocinali absoluitur."
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 23
Some time after Kilwardby, probably between 1 250 and 1 264, Al
bert the Great wrote his logical treatises.9 There he showed a con
ception of logic quite different from Kilwardby's. In this respect, as
9 1t is difficult to date Albert the Great's logical paraphrases. It is now generally ac
cepted that Albert wrote them after 1250 and before 1 264, with the exception of the
paraphrases on the Topics and on the Sophistical refutations, posterior to 1 264. See]. A.
Weisheipl, "The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great," in Albertus Magnus and
24 CHAPTER ONE
the Sciences. Commemorative Essays 1980, ed.]. A. Weisheipl, (Toronto: Pontifical Insti
tute of Mediaeval Studies, 1 980), 1 35-40; and R.·A. Gauthier, Pryace to Thomas
Aquinas Sentencia libri de sensu el sensalo (ed. Leon., XLY.2), 9 1 0.920. Albert the Great's
commentary on the Categories is dated at 1261 by the Leonine editors, see Thomas
Aquinas, OJtodl. (ed. Leon., XXv, 2), 452.
1 0 On Avicenna's views on logic, Sabra, '�vicenna on the Subject Matter of
Logic."
1 1 Albert the Great Liher de univ., tr. I, c. 4 (ed. Borgnet, I, 7): "Sunt tamen qui
logicam interpretantur idem quod sermocinalem . . . Et ideo dicunt logicae generalis
subiectum esse sermonem, prout est designativus rerum quae significantur per
ipsum. Quam opinionem impugnat Avicenna dicens, quod sermo de se nihil signi
ficat. Non ergo significat nisi secundum quod conceptus est in inteUectu instituenti. . .
Propter quod logicus et ad se et ad alterum utitur sermone per accidens, e t non per
se: quia sine sermone designativo procedere non potest ad notitiam eius quod ig
notum est. . . "
12
Ibid. (ed. Borgnet, I, 6-7).
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 25
13 Ibid., tr. I, c. 1 (ed. Borgnet, I, 1 7). Albert often contrasts a logical with a meta
physical consideration: see Super Cal., tr. 6, c. I (ed. Borgnet, I, 2 7 1 ); tr. 7, c. I (ed.
Borgnet, I, 273); tr. 7, c. 4 (ed. Borgnet, I, 278).
26 CHAPTER ONE
But is not difficult to solve this. For these things [scil., categories) are
first principles insofar as they are essences and parts of being. Insofar
as they are something that can be predicated or ordered in a genus ac
cording to this or that mode of acting as a predicate or as a subject,
they are not considered as principles, but have many properties and
attributes that can be demonstrated of them. And it is in this latter
way that we deal with categories here. But insofar as they are parts of
being and principles of diversity among things, in this way it is the
first philosopher who deals with them, as those who devote themselves
to the study of metaphysics can know. But this does not pertain to the
present study, but must be considered by the logician. 14
" Albert the Great Liber de Prad, tr. I, c. I (ed. Borgnet, J, 95): "Sed hoc solvere
non est difficile. Haec coim, secundum rem et secundum quod sunt naturae
quaedam et partes eotis, sunt prima principia. Secundum quod sunt aliquid praedi
cabile vel ordinabile in genere secundum hune vel ilIum modum praedicandi vel
subiiciendi, sic non considerantur ut principia, et habent multas proprietates et pas
sianes quae sunt demonstrabiles de ipsis: et hoc modo agemus de ipsis hie. Prout
autem sunt partes entis et principia diversitatis rerum, sic de ipsis agit primus
philosoph us, sicut scire potest qui in metaphysica studendi ponit intentionem: quod
non pertinet ad praesens negotium, quod logicus habet considerare."
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 27
Imposition," in Kretzmann, Kenny, and Pinborg, cds., The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy,479-95.
17 See K. Gyekye, "The terms 'Prima [ntentio' and 'Secunda Intentio' in Arabic
Logic," Speculum 46 (197 1): 32-38; M. Grignaschi, "Les traductions 1atines des ou
vrages de la logique arabe et l'ahrege d'Alfarabi," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litttraire
du Moyen Age 39 ( 1972): 41-107; Maieril, "Influenze arabe e discussioni sulla natura
della logica presso i 1atini fra XIII e XIV seco10," in La diJfosione delle scitn�e islamiche
net media eva eurepeo (Rama: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1 987). 243�67.
1 8 Hoffmann, "Categories et iangage," 78-8 1 ; A. C. Loyd, The Anatomy oj Neopla
tonism (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 36-4 1 ; A. De Libera, fA querelle des universaux (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1 996), 283. The distincion between first and second intention
names was known to the Latin through Boethius, see Ebbesen, "Philoponus,
'Alexander' and the Origins of Medieval Logic," 456.
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 29
'" Ibid. (ed.July, 157.459): "Hinc eliam palel quare [scil., logical dicilur esse de se
cundis intentionibus et de nominibus significantibus secundas intentiones. Res enim
ipsae sunt primae intendanes, et nomina eas significantia, cuiusmodi sunt substantia,
quantitas et huiusmodi, sunt nomina primarum intentionum; sed rationes rerum,
cuiusmodi sunt universale, particulare, antecedens, consequens et huiusmodi, sunt
secundae intentiones, et nomina eas significantia nomina secundarum intentionum.
Et dicuntur ilIae primae et istae secundae, quia primo comprehenduntur res et
deinde ex consideratione et collatione rerum ad invicem colliguntur rationes earum,"
21
Still in the fourteenth century, Adam Wodeham quotes the opinion according to
which first intentions are the extramental things, but he remarks that this opinion is
generally discarded since everyone agrees that intentions are concepts, See Adam
Wodeham Lee/uTa secunda in librum pn'mum Sententiarum 23, q, un. (ed. Wood and GaI,
3, 304.25-32).
30 CHAPTER ONE
" Duns Scotus /Up. par. II, d. 13, q. 1, n. 4 (ed. Vives, XXII, 44a): "Tamen hoc
nomen 'intentio' aequivocum: uno modo dicitur actus volutantis; secundo, ratio for�
malis in re, situt intentio rei a qua accipitur genus differt ab intentione a qua accip
itur differentia; tertio modo dicitur conceptus; quarto, ratio tendendi in obiectum,
sicut similitudo dicitur ratio tendendi in illud cuius est . . ...
" Radulphus Brito n. anima 1, q. 6, in]. Pinborg, "Radulphus Brito on Univer
sals," eakin's tk l'Instilut du Moyen Ag. grec .t latin 35 (1980): 124: "Et primo videndum
est quid significetur nomine intentionis in communi. Unde notandum est quod in
tentia est illud quo intellectus tendit ad aliud. Et haec est cognitio in ipso inte1lectu
existens. Et hoc est manifestum per interpretationem quia 'intentio' est 'in aliud
tentio'." See Thomas Aquinas, Summa thtologiae I-II, q. 12, a. I: "Intentio, sicut ipsum
nomen sonat, significant in aliud tendere."
" Henry of Ghent Qy.odl. V, q. 6 (ed. Badius, 161L): "Unde dicitur intentio quasi
'intus tentio" eo quod mens conceptu suo in aliquid quod est in re aliqua determi
nate tendit, et non in aliquid aliud quod est aliquid eiusdem rei."
25 Some caution must be paid as far as Thomas Aquinas is concerned. Sometimes
he uses the term 'intention' as a synonym of 'concept' or 'conception', other times he
uses it to refer only to a concept representing another concept, namely to what other
authors call 'second intention'. Notwithstanding these terminological peculiarities,
Thomas Aquinas always maintains that intentions - both first and second - are con
cepts.
26 See C. Panaccio, "From Mental Word to Mental Language," Philosophical Topics
20 (1992): 1 25-47; Panaccio, I.e discours intJrUur de PiIl"'n a Cui/illume d'Ockham (Paris:
Editions du Seuil, 1999), 1 77·20 1 ; G. Pini, "Species, Concept, and Thing: Theories
of Signification in the Second Half of the Thirteenth Century," M.duval PhiWsophy
and Theology 8, 2 (1999): 21-52.
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTII CENTURY 31
Second intentions are concepts, like first intentions, but they are
acquired after first intentions. They are still described as "properties
following from the modes of understanding" or as "relations
holding between things." Only in Scotus's times will the relationship
between these two different descriptions of intentions be fully clari
fied, as we shall see. Whether second intentions are concepts or
properties, however, a crucial question remains to be answered: of
what are they concepts or properties? According to a widespread
doctrine, second intentions are second-order concepts, namely con
cepts representing concepts, and not things, or, alternatively, they
are properties founded on the mode in which something is under
stood, as opposed to the mode in which something is. As we shall
see, however, this view of second intentions is not generally ac
cepted. Other authors prefer to regard second intentions as con
cepts representing certain modes of being of the extramental
things. Be that as it may, everybody agrees that second intentions
are notions such as genus, species, dqinition, proposition, and syllogism,
even though there is some disagreement concerning individual27 and
the copula 'is'.28
The distinction of first and second intentions interacts with the
distinction between terms of first and second imposition. Latin au
thors remark that the two distinctions are somehow related, but they
also know that they are different.29 In general, the distinction be
tween first and second imposition terms is considered as pertaining
to grammar, for in a second imposition only the grammatical fea
tures of a term are taken into account. Accordingly, second imposi
tion terms are grammatical terms such as 'noun' and 'verb'. By con
trast, the distinction between first and second intentions is between
two kinds of concepts or two ways of considering an extramental
thing. Consequently, names of second intentions signify not the
grammatical features of a term but the way in which the thing sig
nified by that term is understood. Typical examples of second in
tention terms are 'species' and 'genus', which signify the concepts
species and genus.
" See Duns Scotus Ord. I, d. 23, q.un. (ed. Vat., V, 35 1-63).
28 Scotus regards the copula as a second intention, but his position does not seem
to have been universally accepted. See Duns Scotus Qjtaesliones. super Met. V, q. 5-6, n.
63 (OPh, III, 461).
29 See Knudsen, "Intention and Imposition," 484-85; Kretzmann, "Semantics,"
369-70.
32 CHAPTER ONE
The subject of logic, as you have learnt, are intentions secondarily un
derstood, which are added to intentions primarily understood, ac
cording to the fact that through them one comes from the unknown to
what is known . . . ' !
30 Thomas Sutton In Cat. (ed. Conti, 1 87): "Sed inter nomina secundarum inten
tionum consideranda est quaedam differentia. Quaedam eoim eorum dicuntur de
nominibus primae impositionis, sed non pro rebus significatis, sed pro nominibus sig
nificantibus, ut cum dicitur 'homo est nomen', 'cunit est verbum'. Quaedam vero di
cuntur de nominibus primae impositionis, sed non pro ipsis nominibus significan
tibus, sed pro rebus significatis, ut cum dicitur 'homo est species', 'animal est genus',
Non eoim est hoc nomen 'homo' species, neque hoc nomen 'animal' genus, sed res
significata sic abstracta <ab> individuis per hoc nomen 'homo' est species, et res sig
nificata abstracta a speciebus per hoc nomen 'animal' est genus." For the date of
Sutton's commentary, se,e A. Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the Categories
according to ms. Oxford, Merton College 289," in The Rise if British liJgic: Acts if the
Sixth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics,ed. O. Lewry (foronto: Pon
tifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1 985), 1 73.
3 1 Avicenna Liber de phil. prima (ed. Van Riet, I, 10.73-76): "Subiectum vero logicae,
sicut scisti, sunt intentiones intellectae secundo, quae apponuntur intentionibus intel
lectis primo, secundum hoc quod per eas peIVenitur de cognito ad incognitum ... " On
second intentions as the subject of logic, see Panaccio, U discours intbieur, 228-50.
Specifically on Thomas Aquinas, see R. W. Schmidt, The Domain Q/ Logic According to
Saint Thomas Aquinas (rhe Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1 966), 94-129; R. Mcinerny,
Aquinas and Analogy, The Catholic University of America Press: Washington, D.C.,
1 993, 56-6 1 .
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 33
32 See for example Bartholomew of Bruges's version of the debate on the subject
matter of logic in S. Ebbesen and J. Pinborg, "Batholomew of Bruges and His
Sophisma on the Nature of Logic," Cahiers de I'lnstitut du Moyen Age grec et latin 39
( 1 98 1): iii-xxvi, 1-80. See also R. Lambertini, "Resurgant entia rationis. Matthaeus de
Augubio on the Object of Logic," Cahiers de l'lnstitul du Moyen Age gTec et latin 59
( 1 989): 10-30.
33 Thomas Aquinas In An. Post., Proemium I (ed. Leonina, I.* 2, 4).
34 Thomas Aquinas In Met. IV, lect. 4, n. 574; 1 7, n. 736. See Schmidt, The Domain
of Logic, 52-57; I. Boh, "Metalanguage and the Concept of ens secundae inten
tionis," in Thomas von Aquin. Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forshungen, ed. A. Zim
mermann and C. Kopp, Miscellanea Mediaevalia I 9 (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter,
1 988), 53-70.
34 CHAPTER ONE
,. Peter of Auvergne Super PoTph., q. 3 (ed. Tine, 273); Radulphus Brito Super
Poph., q. 3 (ed. Venet., 6va-b).
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTIi CENTURY 35
".'I Thomas Sutton explicitly accepts the description of logic as the science of
second intentions. See In Cat., Prol. (ed. Conti, 185): "Dicendum quod logica est de
intentionibus secundis quae sunt communes et applicabiles primis intentionibus,
sicut dicit Avicenna quod logica est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis <primis>."
CATEGORIES AND LOGIC IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 37
+6 Thomas Sutton In Cal. (ed. Conti. J 9 1): "Liber igitur Praedicammtorum, cum sit
pars logicae, est de decem primis vocibus decem prima genera rerum significantibus
- ut dicit Boethius - ut significantes sunt, et ut sunt praedicabiles et subicibiles, et
prout aliae intentiones secundae eis conveniunt in ordine ad syllogismum. It See also
In Cat. (ed. Conti, 193): "Conveniunt autem [scil., praedicamenta] in hoc quod sig
nificantur per dictionem incomplexam, quae est terminus in syllogismo. Et sub hac
ratione determinatur hie de praedicamentis, prout scilicet quodlibet eorum signifi
catur per dictionem quae polest esse pars sylJogismi."
47 That the syllogism is the proper subject of logic is a classical doctrine, wide
spread in Paris since the middle of the thirteenth century. See Marmo, "Suspia."o. A
Key Word," 1 56-58.
38 CHAPTER ONE
49 Ibid. (ed. Conti, 1 9 1): ')\d tertium dicendum quod quia deteminat hie de
. . . Among the things that are common to the ten categories some are
of first imposition and some are of second intention. First imposition
common terms are 'being' and the other things that pertain to being.
And in this way metaphysics, which is about being as being as about
its subject, deals with categories. On the other hand, second intention
common terms are 'universal', 'sayable', 'most common genus',
'genus', 'signified by a simple word', 'capable of being ordered in a
syllogism', and similar notions. And with regard to these common no
tions it is not metaphysics but logic that deals with the ten categories.50
ponunt pro vocibus, sed pro rebus. In sequentibus vera libris determinat de syl1o
gismo et suis partibus non prout significantur per voces primae impositionis, sed per
nomina secundarum intentionurn, quae supponunt pro vocibus primae impositionis
complexis."
50 Ibid. (ed. Conti, 1 94): " . . . decem praedicamentis quaedam sunt cammunia quae
sunt primae impositionis, et quaedam quae sunt secundae intentionis. Communia
primae impositionis sunt ens et ea quae sunt entis; et sic de decem praedicamentis
determinat metaphysica, quae est de ente in quantum ens ut de subiecto. Communia
vero secundae intentionis sunt universale, dicibile, genus generalissimum, genus, sig
nificatum per vocem incomplexam, ordinabile in syUogismo et huiusmodi. Et
quantum ad ista communia non tractat metaphysica de decem praedicamentis, sed
logica."
40 CHAPTER ONE
But it must be said that in the Categories the Philosopher speaks ac
cording to a logical consideration. But the logician considers things in
sofar as they are in the mind, and therefore he considers substance in
sofar as it is subject to the intention of universality according to the
consideration of the intellect . . . But the first philosopher deals with
things insofar as they are beings . . . 53.
" Anonymous of Madrid Super Prrud., q. 3 (ed. Andrews, 125): "Dicendum ad hoc
quod praedicamenta possunt dupliciter considerari. Uno modo inquantum sunt
entia, et sic pertinent ad metaphysicum. Alia modo inquantum sunt res praedica
menti subiectae intentioni et secundum quod sunt res subicibiles vel praedicabiles, et
ut hoc superius, istud vero ut inferius. Et sic pertinet considerare de hus ad di
alecticum. Vel inquantum sunt principium motus et quietis, et sic pertinent ad natu
rale<m>."
56 Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 3 (ed. Andrews, 1 1): '�d hoc dicendum quod
de praedicamentis possumus loqui dupliciter: aut secundum sui entitatem et essen
tiam, et sic de consideratione ipsius metaphysici; aut secundum quod in ipsis fun
dantur secundae intentiones, et sic ea logicus considerat."
57 William Arnaldi Super Praed. (ed. Venet., 1 5vb): "Notandum quod de praedica
mentis determinat logicus et metaphysicus, sed diversimode. Nam metaphysicus de
terminat de ipsis ut sunt entia, sed logicus prout cadunt sub actu rationis. Nam, ut
dicit Commentator, logica tota est de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis. Et di
cuntur primae intentiones ut homo vel asinus; secundae intentiones autem dicuntur ut
istae intentiones: genus et species, differentia, et sic de aliis."
44 CHAPTER ONE
species. Brito then draws two conclusions. First, categories as real be
ings are not studied in logic. Second, categories as they are subject
to second intentions are studied in logic. 58 He demonstrates the first
conclusion by saying that logic, which is a rational science, cannot
deal with real entities. He demonstrates the second conclusion by
saying that since logic studies second intentions it must also deal
with the things on which second intentions are founded.59
By the end of the thirteenth century, this is the standard opinion
on the difference between the logical and the metaphysical consid
eration of categories. All these authors say that logic studies cate
gories as they are subject to second intentions. Accordingly, in order
to understand what the logical study of categories is, it is necessary
to turn to the doctrine of second intentions developed by these au
thors. Only after such a consideration will it be possible to see how
categories function as subjects of second intentions and conse
quently how logic considers categories. Some interesting differences
in the conceptions of second intentions will appear behind the ap
parent consensus about the logical consideration of the categories
we have just reviewed.
58 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 2 (ed. Venet., 36ra): "Dicendurn quod praedica
menta possunt accipi dupiiciter, uno modo ut sunt res vere extra animam existentes,
alio vera modo ut supra ipsas fundantur intentiones generis et speciei, et sic de aliis.
Tunc dieo duo ad questionem: primo quod scientia de praedicamentis secundum
quod sunt entia realia non pertinet ad logicum; secundo dieo quod determinare de
ipsis ut supra ipsa fundantur intentiones pertinet ad logicum."
59 Ibid. (ed. Venet., 36ra-b).
CHAPTER TWO
Several questions have been asked about second intentions. For ex
ample, their ontological status has been hotly debated. Although
Scotus and Radulphus Brito already raised this issue, it would re
ceive more attention in the treatises on intentions written in the
fourteenth century, including Haerveus Natalis De secundis intention
ibus, where many opinions, including Brito's and Peter Auriol's, are
collected and criticized. 1 What type of entity is an intention? Either
an intention is a real quality inhering in the mind or it is something
with a special kind of being, usually called 'intentional being'.
These are the two main answers, even though there is room for a
great number of nuances.
If intentions are regarded as real qualities, they are given a real
kind of existence insofar as they inhere in the mind, which is called
'subjective being'. Still, it remains undecided what those qualities are.
Some say that intentions, so considered, are identical with the intel
ligible species received in the possible intellect. The early Thomas
Aquinas and Roger Bacon' are among those who adopted this posi-
Hervaeus Natalis's life and manuscripts, see T. KappeJi, Scriptares Ordinis Praedicatorum
Medii Aevi, vol. 2 (Roma: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1975), 2 3 1 , 237. On the debate
concerning the ontological status of second intentions, see the texts by Hervaeus Na
talis, Peter Auriol, and Hugo de Traiecto edited by Pinborg, in his "Radulphus Brito
on Universals," 1 30-42; D. Perler, "Intentionale und reale Existenz: eine spatmitte
lalterliche Kontroverse," PhilosophisehesJahrbueh 102 ( 1 995): 261-78. See also R. Lam
benini, "Le teorie delle intmtiones da Gentile da Cingoli a Matteo da Gubbio. Fonti e
Hnee di teodenza," in L'insegnamento della logiea a Bologna nel XIV seeolo, ed. D.
Buzzetti, M. Ferriani, and A. Tabarroni (Bologna: Istituto per la storia dell'Univer
sita, 1 992), 293-3 1 7 . Lambertini focuses on Bolognese authors, but his remarks are
extremely useful to grasp the whole debate between Brito and his supporters on the
one hand and Hervaeus Natalis on the other. See also D. Peder, "Peter Auriol vs.
Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality. A text with Introductory Remarks," Archives d'his
tom doetn'nal< e/ littiraire du M<rytn Age 6 1 (1994): 227-62.
, Thomas Aquinas De Ver., q. 10, a. 8 (ed. Leon., XXII.2, 322). Roger Bacon
De multiplicatione speeierum 1 . 1 , ed. D. Lindberg in Roger &eon's Philosophy of Nature,
(Oxford: OUP, 1 982), 2. See K. H. Tachau, Vision and Certitud, in the Age if Oekham.
46 CHAPTER 1WO
traditae in codice Cracoviensi 742 (anno fere 1 360)," Calliers de l'Institut du Moyen Age
gTe, et latin 41 (1982), 23: "Nota: opinio prima et antiquissima de secundis intention
ibus ponit duas conclusiones, quarum prima est ista, quod species inteUigibilis sit in
tentio prima. "
• William of Ware Sent. I, d. 27, q. 3 in M. Schmaus, Dtr Liber Propugnatorius des
Thomas Anglicus und die Lehruntersehiede �wisehen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus. II.
Teil: Die Trinitarisehen LehrdifJeren�en, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und
Theologie des Mittelalters, XXIX.I (MUnster: Aschendorff, 1930), 253*-71*. On
Ockham, see the following note. See also Duns Scotus Leet. 1, d. 27, q. 1-3, nn. 32-
42, (ed. Vat., XVII, 352-54) and Ord. I, d. 27, q. 1-3, nn. 48-61 (ed. Vat., V, 84-88).
5 See for example Thomas Aquinas De Pot., q. 8, a, I. On Thomas Aquinas's ma
ture theory of the concept, see W. W. Meissner, "Some Aspects of the Verbum in the
Texts of St. Thomas," The Modern Schoolman 36 (1958): 1-30; Panaccio, "From
Mental Word," 1 26-29; R. Pasnau, Theories if Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cam
bridge: CUp, 1997), 256-71. On Aquinas's early doctrine of the concept, see J.
Chenevert, "Le verbum dans Ie commentaire sur les Sentences de Saint Thomas
d'Aquin," Sciences ecelisio.stiques 13 (1961): 1 9 1-233, 359-90. On the debate con-
INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS 47
prefer the first solution, while others prefer the second one, and still
others try to formulate an intermediate position, which is the result
of a mixture of elements taken from the other two.
The question concerning the ontological status of intentions or
concepts, however, is only one among the various questions that can
be asked about intentions. Another question focuses on the fact that
intentions are representations of something. As Thomas Aquinas
remarks, a mental image can be considered in two ways: first, as
something in itself, second, as representing something else.6 If con
sidered in the first way, a concept is addressed according to its onto
logical status, as we have seen. If it is considered in the second way,
however, it is the representative capacity of the intention that is ex
amined. In the last case, the paramount question is what an inten
tion represents, and not what it is. This question is further con
nected to the issue of what causes an intention, for it is usually
maintained that a representation is caused by the thing it repre
sents.1
In this chapter, I focus on the second issue concerning intentions,
for it is insofar as second intentions are representations that they are
8 See L. Hickman, Modern Theories of Higher Level Predicates. Second Intentions in the
Neu�eit (Mtinchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1 980), 32-53, 103-25, 1 32-6 1 . Hickman labels
the first approach 'rationalist conceptualism' and the second approach 'realist con
ceptualism'. See also Lambertini, "La teoria delle intentiones," 3 1 7.
50 CHAPTER 'IWO
1-4 Ibid.: '1\liquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei exis
tentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae
est extra animam: et huiusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit;
sicut significatum huius nominis 'genus' non est similitudo alicuius rei extra animam
existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, at
tribuit ei intentionem generis; et huiusmodi intentionis, lieet proximum funda
mentum non sit in re sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa.
Verbi gratia, intellectus intelligit naturam animalis in homine, in equo, et multis allis
speciebus: ex hoc sequitur quod intelligit earn ut genus. Huic intellectui quo intel
lectus intelligit genus non respondet aliqua res extra immediate quae sit genus; sed
intelligentiae ex qua consequitur ista intentio respondet aliqua res."
INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS 53
Hence the intellect that adds these intentions is not false. And it hap
pens similarly for all the other notions that follow upon the mode of
understanding, as for example the abstraction of the mathematical
entities and similar things. 15
Still other words signify concepts that do not have any foundation in
the extramental world. These concepts represent neither extra
mental things nor the ways the intellect understands extramental
things. For instance, a concept such as chimera lacks any foundation
in reality, either directly or indirectly. Aquinas regards these con
cepts as false since they do not represent anything in the world:
1 5 Ibid.: "Unde inteUectus non est falsus qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est
de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathe
maticorum et huiusmodi."
16 Ibid.: ')\J.iquando vera id quod significatur per nomen non habet fundamentum
in re, neque proximum neque remoturn, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est
similitudo alicuius rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem
aliquam naturae: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa."
54 CHAPTER lWO
For the first things understood are extramental things, towards which
the intellect is first turned in order to understand them. The second
things understood, however, are called intentions consequent to the
mode of understanding. For this mode is what the intellect secondly
understands inasmuch as the intellect reflects on itself, and under
stands that it understands and the mode in which it understands."
(Trans!. mine.)
Aquinas deals with the same issue also in another passage of the De
Pot., q. 7, a. 6. Here he explains that the intellect first understands
extramental things, and second, it reflects on itself. In its first act of
cognition the intellect knows extramental things, whereas in the
second act the intellect understands that extramental things are un
derstood. These two stages of understanding are two different acts.
11
Thomas Aquinas De Pot., q. 7, a, 9 (ed. Pession, 207-08): "Prima enim intellecta
sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem
inteUecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo
intellectus inteUigit inquantum reflectitur super seipsum, intelligens se intelligere et
modum quo intelligit."
INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS 55
For by the fact that the intellect reflects on itself, just as it understands
things existing outside the mind, so does it understand that they are
understood. And so, just as there is a conception or notion of the in
tellect to which the thing existing outside the mind corresponds, so is
there a conception or notion to which the thing understood corre
sponds as understood. For instance, to the notion or conception of a
man there corresponds the thing outside the mind, while to the notion
or conception of a genus and species there corresponds only the thing
understood. 16
18
De Pot., q. 7, a. 6 (ed. Pession, 20 I): "Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in seipsum re
flectitur, sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas; et
sic, sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio cui respondet res ipsa quae est
extra animam, ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio cui respondet res intellecta se
cundum quod huiusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni hominis respondet
res extra animam; rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei respondet solum
res intellecta." Here and in the following quotations I slightly modify the translation
provided in Thomas Aquinas On the Power of God, transl. the English Dominican Fa
thers, vol. 2 (London: Burns Oates and Washbourne Ltd., 1933), 36.
56 CHAPTER TWO
And yet the intellect is not false. For the notions of the kind of these
notions, namely genus and species, are not attributed by the intellect
to things as existing outside the mind but only as existing therein.20
res." I slightly modify the translation provided in Thomas Aquinas On the Power of
God, transl. the English Dominican Fathers, vol. I (London: Burns Oates and Wash
bourne Ltd., 1 932), 7.
" Thomas Aquinas In Peryerm. I, 10, on Aristotle's De into 1 7b 1-2 (ed. Leonina, I."
I, 51): "Quandoque enim attribuitur ei [seil., universali] sic considerato [seil., se
cundum esse quod habet in intellectu] aliquid quod pertinet ad salam actionem in
tellectus, ut si dicatur quod homo est praedicabile de multis aut universale aut genus
aut species; huiusmodi enim intentiones format intellectus attribuens eas naturae in
teUeetae, secundum quod comparat ipsam ad res quae sunt extra animam."
INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS 59
23 See C. Boyer, "Le sens d'un texte de St. Thomas: De Ver. 1, 9," Gregorianum 5
(1924): 424-43; F.-X. Putallaz, Le sens de La rijlexion che� Thomas d'Aquin (Paris:J. Vrin,
1991).
60 CHAPTER TWO
The things that are said in respect to something properly signifY only
a relation to something else. This reference sometimes is in the very
nature of things. For example, this is the case when some things are
ordered one to the other according to their natures and have an incli
nation one to the other. And it is necessary that the relations of this
kind be real. For example, in a heavy body there is an inclination and
an order towards the intermediate place, so that a certain relation is in
the heavy body itself with respect to the intermediate place. And sim
ilarly in the other cases of this kind. Sometimes, however, the relation
signified by the things that are said to be with reference to something
else is only in the apprehension of reason comparing one thing to the
other. And then the relation is only rational, as when reason compares
man to animal as a species to a genus 'S (Transl. mine.)
ipsa apprehensione ralionis conferentis unum alteri: et tunc est relario ralionis
tantum; sicut cum comparat ratio hominem animali, lit speciem ad genus."
26
Sent. I, d. 26, q. 2, a. l (ed. Mandonnet, It 630-31): "Et hoc contingit quatuor modis,
scilicet quod sint relationes ralionis, et non rei. Uno modo, ut dictum est, quando relatio
non habet aliquid in rei natura supra quod fundetur . . . Secundo modo quando relatio
non habet aliquem realero diversitatem inter extrema, sicut relatio idemitatis . . . Tertio
modo quando designatur relatio aliqua entis ad non ens . . . Quarto modo quando poni
tur relatio relationis: ipsa enim relatio per seipsam refertur, non per aliam relationem."
27 De Pot., q. 7, a. 1 1 (cd. Pession, 2 1 2): "' . . . sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei
ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter
potest contingere: uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adiventus per intellectum,
et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur
ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei:
has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu
ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem."
62 CHAPTER lWO
" Giles of Rome's second QJ<odlibet is dated at Easter 1287. See P. Glorieux, La lit
ttrature quodlihllitjue de J 260 a 1320, vol. 1 (Le Saulchoir,Kain: Revue des sciences
philosophiques et tbeologiques, 1925), 1 4 l .
29 Avicenna Lib., de phil. prima, tr. V, cap. 1 (<d. Van Riet, vol. 2 , 227-38); Logica I
(ed. Venet., 2rb).
INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS 63
30 See for example Albert the Great Met. V, tr. 6, cap. 5 (Opera omnia, XVl. I , 285-
tellectus primo aspectu fertur in ipsam essentiam secundum se sive in ipsum esse es
seotiae. Per istam tamen lationem sive per istum aspectum ipsa essentia non appre
henditur per intellectum ut est quid universale. At vero quando intellectus se
convertit supra ipsum esse essentiae et videt quod illud sit commune multis, tunc dicit
quod illud esse sit quid universale. Ideo cognitio essentiae est intentio prima. Dieo
'prima' quia est obiectum intellectus secundum lationem primam. Cognitio autem
universalis est intentio secunda. Dico 'secunda' quia est obiectum intellectus non se
cundum lationem primam, sed prout reftectit se supra illud quod cognovit et nunc
videt esse commune multis."
64 CHAPTER TWO
renziana, cod. plut. XlI sin. 3, 7va-8va - are edited by Pinborg in his "Peter of Au
vergne on Porphyry," Cahiers de l'Instilut du Moyen Age grec et latin 9 ( 1973): 64-68. For
a description of the manuscript, see S. Ebbesen and]. Pinborg, "Studies in the Log
ical Writings attributed to Boethius de Dacia," Cahiers de ['Instilut du Moyen Age gree et
latin 3 (1970): 3-5.
37 Peter of Auvergne Super uniu. (ed. Pinborg, 64): "Supra res autem ipsas intel
lectus duplicem habet matum. Unum quidem quo directe et immediate movetur in
suum obiectum, quod ipsum quod quid est esse dicitur, et sic acquirit cognitionem de
ipsius rei natura sibique nomen imponit [ipsamque repraesentans] sicut est 'homo'
vel 'anima' vel 'Sor', quorum unumquodque idcirco primae intentionis dicitur
nomen, quia conceptum significat intellectus in rem primo intendentis. Alium vero
motum habet super rem iam apprehensam, quo, post [post: prius ed.] ipsius appre
hensionem, movetur ad considerandum ipsius conditiones quibus perspectis secun
dae intentionis nomen attribuit, ut puta 'universale'." See De Libera, La querelle,
294-95.
INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS 65
" Peter of Auvergne, Super Prad. q. 47 (ed. Andrews, 67-68): "Quidam tamen
dixerunt de hoc cum quaeritur utrum relatio sit res rationis vel naturae, dieunt quod
quaedam est relatio quae fundatur supra res rationis, sicut oppositio supra affirma
tionem et negationem, et talis relario, ut dicunt est rationis. mud tamen non est
verum, quoniam ilia res quae fundatur supra res rationis non est aliquid funclatum a
ratione supra ipsas res, sed per naturam talium rerum fundatur supra ipsas. Uncle re
latio quae est inter ipsa genus et species non fundatur supra istas res a ratione, sed
per naturam quam habet una istarum rerum respectu alterius fundatur relatio supra
illas. Sed dicitur res naturalis, cum a natura talium rerum causetur. Cum hoc, verum
est quod si a ratione fundaretur supra istas res tunc esset res rationis, sicut ipsi di
cunt."
39 Ibid.
INTENTIONS OF UNDERSTANDING IN THOMAS AQUINAS 67
the Isagoge are real features pertaining to the nature of the things
understood. These conditions are not caused by the intellect. Nei
ther does the intellect posit those conditions in things when it un
derstands them. Consequendy, second intentions are relations
founded on real properties, and so the intellect, by reflecting on its
object, does not produce the features on which intentions are
founded, but only knows them. Thus, Peter of Auvergne's concep
tion of rational relations opens the way to a doctrine of second in
tentions alternative to Aquinas's, a doctrine where intentions follow
not from modes of understanding, but from modes of being of the
extramental things.
C HAPTER THREE
:./ Henry of Ghent Summa quaest. ord., art. 53, q. 5 (ed. Badius, II, 64vH).
But these intentions are of two kinds, since some are taken by the in
tellect as properties concerning mainly things, while others as proper
ties concerning the names of things. Of the first kind are logical in
tentions, such as, on the one hand, the notion of universal, i.e. of a
genus or a species or a differentia and of the other similar things, con
cerning the universal notions of things, and, on the other hand, 'indi
vidual', 'particular' and the other similar notions concerning each
thing . . . Of the second kind are grammatical intentions . . . 5
5 Ibid.: "Sed istae [sci!. intentiones] sunt in duplici genere, quia quaedam 5unt ac
ceptae ab intellectu ut proprietates circa res principaliter, quaedam vero ut propri
etates circa nomina rerum. De genere primo sunt intentiones logicales ut sunt ratio
universalis, generis scilicet et speciei et differentiae et huiusmodi circa universalia
rerum, individuum particulare et huiusmodi circa singula rerum . . . De secundo
genere sunt intentiones grammaticales . . . n
6 Ibid., 66r-vT: "" . hoc nomen 'individuum' circa substantias irrationales non est
nomen rei sed nomen intentionis sccundaet quae nihil a1iud est quam modus quo in
tellectus rem concipit respectu superioris et collateralis, ut deteminatam et non di
visam in a1iqua sub se atque divisam ab eo quod. est iuxta se . . . "
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 71
10
Ibid.
II
See S. Ebbesen et ai., introduction to Simon of Faversham Quaestiones super libro
Elenchorum, ed. S. Ebbesen et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1 984), 5, 1 3.
1 2 See L. M. de Rijk, "On the Genuine Text of Peter of Spain's Summule Logicales,"
Vivarium 6 ( 1 968): 69- 1 0 1 .
13 T. Yokoyama, "Simon o f Faversham's Sophisma Uniuersale est intentW," Mediaeval
Studies 3 1 ( 1 969): 1 - 1 4;]. Pinborg, "Simon of Faversham's Sophisma Universale est in·
/entio: A Supplementary Note," MedUuval studies 33 ( 1 97 1): 360-64.
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 73
14 Simon of Faversham Super Summulas (ed. de Rijk, 94): "Intentio prima est primus
intellectus sive conceptus rei quo anima rem et naturam rei comprehendit secundum
se et sub inteUectu dus essentiali prout res ab omnibus condicionibus individualibus
est abstracta."
74 CHAPTER THREE
15 Ibid.: "Intentio autem secunda est intellectus sive conceptus rei secundus, quo
anima apprehendit rem non secundum se nec sub inteUectu essentiali sed sub intel
lectu accidentali vel respectivo. Verbi gratia, quando anima intelligit hominem non
inquantum homo vel animal vel rationale, sed inquantum species vel diffinitio vel
diffinitum, talis intellectus hominis vocatur intentio secunda."
16 Ibid" 92: u . . . per genus loycum intelligimus nil aliud nisi secunclam intentionem
ab intellectu causatam <rei intellecte applicata denotantem essentialem et quidita
tivam naturam respectu> ad supposita forma et secundum speciem differentia." On
this passage, see De Libera, La querelle, 290.
1 7 Simon of Faversham Super Summu/as (ed. de Rijk, 92): "Et dieo denolantern essen
tialem et quiditativam naturam etc. quia genus est quoddam ens respectivum."
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 75
20
Simon of Faversham Sophisma (ed. Yokoyama, 9; corr. Pinborg, 361): "Sed ad
dendum quod ad hoc quod natura rei fit actu universalis non sufficit quod fit actu in
tellecta; sed cum natura rei apprehenditur ab intellectu per comparationem ad sup
posita, et inteUectus considerat quod supposita in ilia natura rei conveniant, ita quod
quantum ad naturam illam unum suppositum ab alio non differt; tunc inteUectus
agens agit in ea intentionem universalitatis.et accipit ipsam ut aliquid praedicabile de
pluribus."
21
Ibid. (ed. Yokoyama, I I ; corr. Pinborg, 362): "Intentio universalitatis est con
ceptus quidam in anima, attributus rebus. Huiusmodi autem conceptus dicitur esse
genus vel species et huiusmodi, quae non habent esse nisi per animam."
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 77
Simon goes on to say that for this reason it was not a logician who
discovered logic. In fact, logic considers intentions, not the nature of
things, but the intellect causes such intentions by taking into ac
count the nature or essence of extramental things. Thus, the one
:l:l
Simon of Faversham Super Porph., q. 4 (ed. Mazzarella, 23-24).
23 Ibid., q. 12 (ed. Mazzarella, 32); see also q. 26 (ed. Mazzarella, 48)
24 Ibid., q. 2 (ed. Mazzarella, 19): "Cum autem intellectus causat tales intenciones,
et movetur ab apparentibus in re: et propter hoc intellectus diversas mtenciones log
icales attribuit diversis rebus propter diversas proprietates . . . Ideo tota logica accip
itur a proprietatibus rerum, quia aliter logica esset figmentum intellectus, quod non
dicimus."
78 CHAPTER THREE
2� Ibid.: "Ex quo sequitur quod qui logicam invenit, logicus non fuit; ex quo enim
consideravit naturas rerum logicus non fuit, cum logicus, secundum quod logicus,
non considerat de naturis rerum, sed intenciones solas; vel si consideret, hoc solum
est, ut sub intencionibus sunt."
" Sophism. (ed. Yokoyama, 9): ..... quod si intellectus apprehendit ipsam de
pluribus differentibus specie solum praedicabilem, attribuit sibi intentionem generis;
si autem de pluribus differentibus numero solum praedicabilem, attribuit ei inten
tionem speciei, et sic de aJiis."
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 79
27 Ibid. (ed. Yokoyama, B; corr. Pinborg, 361): "[ntentio autem universalitatis, cum
non sit purum figmentum, causatur ex aliqua proprietate reali. Et ideo contingit
quod anima diversas intentiones logicales attribuit diversis rebus secundum diversas
proprietates rerum. "
" Sup" Porph. q. 20 (ed. Mazzarella, 39): "Dico tunc quod genus non significat
unam quiditatem, sed significat diversas quiditates diversarum specierum secundum
quod sub aliquo conceptu communi veniunt apud intdlectum, et iSle conceptus com
munis sumitur ab aliquo communi apparenti in reo Ab operacione coim senciendi,
que apparet in homine et in asino et in hove et in multis aliis, elicit intellectus unam
rationem intelligendi communem, suh qua significantur diverse species per nomen
generis. "
,. Ibid. q. 22 (ed. Mazzarella, 44): "Dieo ad hoc quod verum est quod predicari est
actus rationis; si enim nos circumscriberemus intellectum, nihil predicaretur; tamen
circumscripto intellectu adhuc homo esset animal. . . n
80 CHAPTER THREE
30 Ibid., q. 22 (ed. Mazzarella, 42): "Cum ergo dicimus genus predicari de specie,
non est hoc intellegendum de intencione, sed est intelligendum de re subiecta inten
ciani. Cum igitur dicimus, Homo est animal, hie predicatur genus de specie, quia hie
predicatur aliqua natura, cui applicabilis est intencio generis; res ergo subiecta in
tencioni predicatur." See also q. 22, (ed. Mazzarella, 44; text quoted in the following
note); q. 26 (ed. Mazzarella, 48-49).
3 1 Ibid. q. 22 (ed. Mazzarella, 44, with modified punctuation): "Et cum dicis ul
terius quod, cum animal predicatur de homine, est aliquid comprehensum a ratione,
verum est, sed non sequitur, Non predicatur de homine, nisi cum est comprehensum
a ratione, ergo predicatur de eo sub ea ratione. Non sequitur, sed verum est illud
quod, nisi intellectus esset, animal <non> predicaretur de homine, tamen sub ea ra
tione non predicatur de homine . . . Sic ergo apparet quid est quod predicatur hie,
Homo est animal, quoniam illud quod predicatur est natura et quiditas animalis im
portata per diffinicionem."
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 81
" Aristotle De an, III, 6, 430a26-28. See Thomas Aquinas In Peryerm. I, I (ed.
Leonina, 1.* 1 , 5).
33 Scotus lists the three operations in Super Periherm, op. sec., Prol., n. 1 (ed. Vives,
1, 581).
82 CHAPTER THREE
34 Thomas Aquinas In Periyerm., I, I , (ed. Leonina, 1.* 1 , 5); In An. Post., 1, 1 , (ed.
Leonina, '*. 2, 4-5); Giles of Rome Super Sopko El. (ed Venet., 2rb, 2va-b); Duns
Scorus Super Periherm., op. sec., Pro!., n. 1 (ed. Vives, " 581). See chap. I, par. 4.
35 Simon of Faversharn Super Summulas (ed. de Rijk, 94).
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 83
36 Radulphus Brito's logical writings stem from his activity as a master of arts in
Paris and date to the years between 1295 and 1305. See J. Pinborg, "Radulphus
Brito's Sophism on Second Intentions," Vwarium 1 3 (1 975): 1 1 9; W. Fauser, Der Kom
mentar des Ratlulphus Briw <It Buch III De Anima (Ratlulphi Briwnis QIlaestiones in Am
totelis lihrum tertium De Anima), Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und The
ologie des Mittelalter. Neue Folge. Band XII (Munster: Aschendorff, 1974), 14. On
Brito's doctrine of second intentions, see J. Pinborg, "Zurn Begriff der Intentio Se
cunda. Radulphus Brito, Hervaeus Natalis und Petrus Aureoli in Diskussion," Cahi.ers
de l'lnstitut du Ml!Jlen Age grec et latin 1 3 (1974): 49-59, reprinted in Pinborg, Medieval
&mantics: Selected Studies on Medieval ugic and Grammar, ed. S. Ebbesen (London: Var
iorum Reprints, 1 984), VI; Pinborg, "Die Logik der Modistae," Studia Mediewistyc{ne
1 6 (1975): 39-97, reprinted in Pinborg, Medieval Semantics, V; Knudsen, "Intention
and Imposition," 487-90;J. Marenbon, lAter Medieval Philosoph) (/ /50-/350). An In
troduction, (London-New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 140-43.
" Pinborg, "Zum Begriff der Inlentio Secundo.."
84 CHAPTER THREE
agreed that the object of the intellect (i.e. what the intellect under
stands in its normal activities) is an extramental thing. Specifically,
the intellect was thought to understand the essence of an extra
mental thing. It is a basic tenet of the Aristotelian psychology, how
ever, that when a thing is understood by the intellect it becomes in
a way identical to the intellect itsel( This doctrine is based on a pas
sage of the De anima, where Aristotle states the identity between the
intellect and what the intellect understands as far as immaterial en
tities are concerned.38 Such a thesis was generally taken as a general
description of what takes place in intellectual understanding, both
in created and in uncreated intellects. Medieval authors articulated
this point by saying that what is known is in the knower in the way
in which the knower is.39 Since the intellect is immaterial, an extra
mental thing, in order to be known and to become somehow iden
tical with the intellect, must acquire an immaterial status.
Thus, there seemed to arise a contradiction: on the one hand, it
was recognized that the object of the intellect is something extra
mental; on the other hand, it was said that such an object, in order
to be known, must be immaterial and internal to the intellect. An
obvious way out from this contradiction was to distinguish between
the object of the intellect as considered in itself and as considered
as understood. The intellect understands something that, by itself, is
external to the intellect, but when such a thing is considered as it is
understood by the intellect, it is internal to the intellect and it enjoys
a mental status as an object of knowledge (this peculiar status is
what will be called 'objective being'). A thing, then, can have two
kinds of being, a material being and an intellectual or intentional or
objective being as it was variously called. The first kind of being is
that of extramental existence, the second kind of being is the one a
thing acquires when it is considered as an object of understanding.
Usually, it is said that the intelligible species is that by which an ex
tramerital thing becomes something present in the intellect.
The elements of this position can be found in Aquinas's doctrine
of the concept. Actually, Aquinas changes his mind concerning
38 Aristotle De an. III, 3, 430-3-4. See also ibid., III, 8, 431 b2 1 , b29.
39 See Thomas Aquinas Sent. de Anima, liber II, cap. XII (ed. Leon., XLV, I , 1 1 5):
"Unumquodque autem recipitur in aliquo per modum <ipsius et non per modum>
sui. Cognitio autem omnis fit per hoc quod cognitum est aliquo modo in
cognoscente, scilicet secundum similitudinem: nam cognoscens in actu est ipsum
cognitum in actu." See also STI, q. 85, a. 2, ad I .
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 85
what a concept is, for in his early writings he maintains that a con
cept is a quality inherent in the mind, i.e. an intelligible species,
whereas from the Summa contra Gentiles onward he distinguishes be
tween the intelligible species, which is that by which something is
understood and present in the mind, and the inner word or con
cept, which is the thing as it is present in the mind. According to
Aquinas's mature doctrine, the inner word or concept is not a real
quality, but a product of the act of understanding that has a special
kind of intentional being. In his maturity, Thomas also distinguishes
the thing that is understood and the mental concept representing
such a thing. The thing that is understood is something outside the
mind, whereas the concept of that thing is a representation pro
vided only with intentional existence. There are other passages,
however, where Thomas seems to assume that the thing understood
is identical to the mental concept. Consequently, he seems to think
that the mental concept of something is identical to the thing itself
insofar as it is understood.40 It is likely that Aquinas did not see
these two conceptions as alternative. He may have contended that a
thing understood is conceived as an intentional entity and as a con
cept only when it is compared with what it represents, namely with
the thing itself insofar as it is something outside the mind. Only
when it is compared to extramental essences, is a thing understood
considered as an intention, to which intentional properties pertain.
Thus, the thing understood is by itself something extramental, but
when it is considered as understood it is something mental.
This solution, however, is subject to criticism. Radulphus Brito
maintains that there are two aspects in the notion of 'thing under
stood'. On the one hand, there is an extramental thing. On the
other hand, there is the mode in which that thing is understood,
which is something mental. The mode of understanding can be
predicated of the thing understood and can denominate it, as when
we say, "man is a species." By such predication, we say that the
essence of man is understood and that it is understood as a species.
It is still true, however, that the essence of man remains an extra
mental thing, even when it is understood. It follows that those who
maintain that the thing understood as understood is something ex
clusively mental are wrong, for what is in the intellect is only a mode
Brito takes over the distinction between abstract and concrete in
tentions that we have already found in Simon of Faversham, and he
links it to his conception of the two aspects present in the thing un
derstood. He maintains that the thing understood itself is a con
crete intention. By contrast, he calls the mode in which that thing is
understood an 'abstract intention'. We can describe Brito's distinc
tion of abstract and concrete intentions as a distinction between the
form and the content of concepts. The form of a concept, ac
cording to Brito, is the act by which we understand something,
whereas the content of a concept is the thing understood by such an
" See Radulphus Brito, Super Porph, q. SA (ed. Pinborg, 1 1 6): "Et cum dicitur quod
intentio secunda rem denominat ut dicendo 'homo est species" dicunt quod homo
est species ut est in intellectu. Sed isti male dicunt quia homo ut est in intellectu nihil
aliud est nisi species vel cognitio hominis. Modo cognitio hominis non est homo; ista
enim falsa 'cognitio hominis est homo',"
88 CHAPTER THREE
act. For example, the concept man is a concrete first intention, since
it is an extramental thing understood by our intellect. The act by
which we understand the concept man is an abstract intention. Brito
maintains that this act is a quality present of the mind. Like Simon
of Faversham, Brito refers to concrete accidental terms in order to
show that concrete intentions are not pure concepts but extramental
things conceived by the intellect. Concrete accidental terms such as
'album' not only signifY an accidental nature, but also denominate
the subject in which such a nature inheres. Similarly, concrete
second intention terms, such as genus and species, signify both a con
cept and the thing understood through that concept; accordingly,
the corresponding concrete intentions are constituted both by a ratio
intelligendi and by the thing understood denominated by that ratio.43
Furthermore, Brito maintains that there are two modes of under
standing. First, something can be understood according to its proper
mode of being. Second, the same thing can be understood according
to a mode of being it shares with other things, namely insofar as that
thing is related to those other things. Brito associates these two ways of
understanding to first and second intentions, respectively".
By combining the distinction between abstract and concrete in
tentions and the distinction between first and second intentions,
Brito obtains the following fourfold division: (a) an abstract first in
tention is the understanding of something according to its proper
mode of being and to its phantasm; (b) a concrete first intention is
a thing understood according to its proper mode of being; (c) an ab
stract second intention is the understanding of something according
to a common mode of being, to the extent that such a thing is re
lated to other things; (d) a concrete second intention is a thing un
derstood according to a common mode of being:
rei cognitio sive prima ratio intelligendi rem sumptam a modo essendi proprio [ed.:
proprie] rei, verbi gratia, sicut hominem possum intelligere primo secundum quod
ratiocinans et intelligens. Et ista cognitio vocatur prima cognitio sive prima ratio in
telligendi hominem sumpta [ed.: asumpta] a modo essendi proprio hominis, quae est
ratiocinari. Et res sic primo cognita vocatur prima intentio in concreto. Ulterius
hominem sic primo cognitum in quantum est intelligens vel ratiocinans possum
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 89
intentio prima et quid secunda, tam in abstracto et in concreto. Intentio prima uni
versalis in abstracto est prima rei cognitio vel intellectio secundum proprium modum
essendi ipsius rei. Prima autem intentio in concreto est res primo modo intellecta se
cundum proprium apparens vel modum essendi ipsius rei, sicut homo secundum
quod intelligitur ratiocinans vel sentiens dicitur prima intentio, et sicut dieo de
homine sic intelligo de aliis. Secunda intentio universalis in abstracto est ratio inteUi
gendi rem ut est in pluribus, et talis non est intellectio rei absoluta sed respectiva,
quia prius est intelligere rem absolute quam ut est in pluribus. Sed intentio secunda
universalis in concreto est res intellecta ut est in pluribus. Et sicut dico de universali,
sic intelligo de aliis intentionibus incomplexis et attributis rei incomplexae iuxta
primam operationem intellectus, sicut est praedieatum et subiectum et sic de aliis se
cundum diversos modos essendi ibi repertos." See also Super de anima I, q. 6 (ed. Pin
borg, 1 24); Sophisma, n. 50 (ed. Pinborg, 1 4 1 -42).
46 For a table illustrating Brito's classification of intentions, see Marenbon, Later
Now, all these modes of understanding are taken from some modes of
being present in reality. For example, the mode of understanding
something as it is in several numerically or specifically different things
is taken from the mode of being that is 'being in several things for
mally or quantitatively different'.4B
It is true that the intellect plays some role in forming second inten
tions, but that role is the same that it plays in forming first inten
tions. According to the common opinion, universal concepts of first
intention such as man and animal are caused by the extramental
thing together with the agent intellect. The extramental thing has a
proper mode of being, which acts on the sense through the phan
tasm, namely through a sensible image. From this phantasm, the
agent intellect abstracts a universal notion, which represents the ex
tramental thing. This universal notion is received by the possible in
tellect, which plays a purely passive role as a receptacle of concepts.
Brito is fully aware that this account of how first intentions are
formed, if applied to the case of second intentions, is incompatible
with the doctrine of second intentions of Thomas. In fact, Thomas
thinks that second intentions pertain not to the extramental things but
to their modes of understanding. Consequendy, second intentions are
caused by the things as understood and as mental entities. The advo
cates of Thomas's account maintain that things as understood are no
tions stored in the possible intellect at the end of the process of under
standing extramental things. Therefore, they think that the possible
intellect plays the role of efficient cause in forming second intentions.
43. Ibid. (ed. Pinborg, 70.1 29-32): "Modo omnes iSlae rationes intelligendi
sumuntur ab aliquibus modis essendi in re, sicut ista ratio quae est ratio intelligendi
rem ut est in pluribus differentihus numero vel specie sumitur ab ista modo essendi
qui est esse in pluribus differentihus formaliter vel per quantitatem." See also q. 5B
(ed. Pinborg, 7 1 . 124-31). See also Sophisma, n. 52 (ed. Pinborg, 144)
49. Radulphus Brito Sophisma, n. 58 (ed. Pinborg, 147): " . . . sicut modus essendi a
quo sumitur prima intentio est realis, ita etiam modus essendi communis rei a quo
sumitur secunda intentio est realis . . . "
92 CHAPTER THREE
50. Ibid., n. 53 (ed. Pinborg, 144-45): "Sicut prima cognitio secundum modum es
sendi proprium rei se habet ad rem cognitam sub modo essendi rei proprio fantasiato
ita secunda cognitio rei secundum modum essendi communem rei se habet ad rem
cognitam sub modo essendi rei communi fantasiato. Modo in prima rei cognitione
secundum modum essendi rei proprium intellectus possibilis est solum recipiens
istam cognitionem et non causans. Ergo eadem modo in secunda cognitione intel
lectus secundum modum essendi communem rei intellectus possibilis erit solum
subiectum et recipiens et non agens, ita quod sicut res sub modo essendi proprio rei
potest movere intellectum possibilem, ita et res sub modo essendi communi fan
tasiato poterit ipsum intellectum possibilem movere, et ita intellectus possibilis non
erit ibi agens." See also Super Porph., q. 4, (ed. Venet., 8rb); q. 7A (ed. Pinborg,
1 00.89- 102. 1 22), q. 7B (ed. Pinborg, 1 03.79- 1 0 1 ).
" Super Porph. q. 7A, (ed. Pinborg, 108. 1 96-201); Super de anima, I, q. 6 (ed. Pin
borg, 125).
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 93
;, Super Porph., q. 7A (ed. Pinborg, 104. 1 32-50); Sophisma, n. 54 (ed. Pinborg, 1 45).
:':1 Super de anima, I, q. 6 (ed. Pinborg, 1 25-26): "Si autem sumatur universale pro se
cunda intentione in concreto eodem modo dicendum est quantum ad illud quod est
ibi materiale: non est ab intellectu quia sicUl prima intentio denominat rem quae in
teUigur primo intellectu, sic secunda intellectio sive secunda intentio denominat rem
ipsam secundum quod secundario intelligitur. Sicut enim haec est vera "homo ab
solute intelligitur" sic haec est vera "homo est aliquid intellectum in pluribus." Sed
tale esse intellectum ut in pluribus est quod significatur nomine universalis. Sed res
ista quae est sic intellecta potest esse sine operatione intellectus."
54 Super Porph., q. 7A (ed. Pinborg, 104.1 32-42): "Sed ulterius notandum est quod
quamvis universale quod est secunda intentio praesupponat rem primo intellectam
sicut cognitio respectiva praesupponit absolutam, non tamen intelligo quod univer
sale quod est secunda intentio fundatur supra primam cognitionem rei quae est in
94 CHAPTER THREE
8. Logical dqinitions
intellectu, ita quod illae duae cognitiones, scilicet prima rei intellectio et secunda sint
simul in intellectu, quia impossibile est duas intentiones distinctas simul esse in intel
leetu. Modo universale ut dicit secundam intentionem est quaedam intellectio. Ideo
ista intellectio non potest simul esse cum prima intellectione in inteUectu. Sed debet
inteUigi quod rei quae prius fuit secundum se et absolute intellecta postea attribuitur
secunda intentio . . ." See also Super Porph., q. 7B (ed. Pinborg, 105. 1 1 4-30); Super de
anima, q. 6 (ed. Pinborg, 1 26).
�5 Radulphus Brito Sophisma "Omnis homo est amnis homo," quoted in Pinborg,
"Zum Begriff," 54.
56 Super Por
ph., q. 1 7 (ed. Venet., 21 va-22va).
HENRY OF GHENT, SIMON OF FAVERSHAM, RADULPHUS BRITO 95
" Porphyry Isagoge 2.14- 1 7. See Boethius's translation (ed. Minio-PalueUo, 6.25-
7.2): "Tripliciter igitur cum genus dicatur, de tertia apud philosophos sermo est,
quod etiam describentes adsignaverunt genus esse dicentes de pluribus et differen
tibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatum, ut 'animal'."
" Radulphus Brito Super POTph., q. I I (ed. Venet., 15rb-1 6rb).
" Super Praed., q. 4 (ed. Venet., 39va).
96 CHAPTER THREE
things by which they are caused, whereas proposition and ryllogism are
representations of mental operations and are caused by the intel
lect:
But what shall we say about the other intentions attributed to some
thing according to the second and the third operation of the intellect?
I say that these intentions such as ryllogism, induction, proposition, etc . ,
are caused by the intellect, since the intellect, as it is made actual and
as it has the first understanding of something, is what composes a
predicate with a subject, for example, "a man runs." In fact, this sen
tence or union of a predicate with a subject would never take place if
there were not an intellect, for even if in reality a man ran, neverthe
less only the intellect composes this complex, "a man runs," from
those terms . . . Hence, as what is composed according to the second
and the third operations of the intellect depends on the intellect, so
and even more will the understanding based on those operations de
pend on the intellect. 62
62 So
phisma, n. 55 (ed. Pinborg, 145-46): "Sed de aliis intentionibus attributis rei se
cundum secundam et tertiam operationem intellectus, quid dicemus? Dieo quod istae
causantur ab intellectu cuiusmodi sunt syllogismus, inductio, propositio etc., quia intel
lectus factus in actu et habens primam rei cognitionem habet componere praedicatum
cum subiecto ut homo currit. Ista enim oratio vel unio praedicati cum subiecto
numquam esset, si intellectus non esset. Licet eoim in re esset quod homo curreret,
tamen ilIud complexum "homo currit" non est compositum ex istis terminis nisi per in
tellectum . . . Unde cum complexum secundum secundam et tertiam operationem intel
lectus dependeat ab intelJectu, multo rortius cognitio ibi rundata dependebit ab intellec
tu." See also the short rererence in Super Porph., q. 7A (ed. Pinborg, 100.7 1).
63 Sophisma, n. 55 (ed. Pinborg, 146): "Tamen cum intellectus intelligit illud com-
98 CHAPTER THREE
plexum "omnis homo currit" vel quodcumque alius, sicut in prima operatione intel
lectus obiectum erat causa talis cognitionis, ita et in ista cognitione qua intelligo com
plexum positum pro alia in praemissis, ista intellectio non est effective ab inteUectu
imIno ab abietto. Sed illud obiectum complexum dependebat ab inteUectu, et ita a
primo ad ultimum secunda intentio sibi attrihuta dependebat ab inteUectu."
CHAYfER FOUR
] On dating Duns Scotus's commentaries on the Sentences and Q¥estions on the Meta
physics, see A. B. Wolter, "Reflections on the Life and Works of Scotus," TJu American
Catholic Pililosophical Q!larter!1 47 (1 993): 1 -36; "Reflections about Scotus's Early
Works," in L. Honnefdder, R. Wood, and M. Dreyer, eds., John Duns ScoWs. Meta
P/rlsics and Ethics (Leiden-New York-Ko1n: E. J. Brill, 1996), 37-57; S. D. Dumont,
1 00 CHAPTER FOUR
tentiones secundae, accidunt rebus primae intentionis." Not only second intentions,
but also their definitions inhere in first intention things as accidents in their subjects.
See Super Po,ph, q. 9-1 1 , n. 21 (OPh, I, 48): "Ad ,ecundam quae,tionem dicendum
quod hoc [scil., "homo est universale"] est vera eo modo quo nunc dictum est, hoc
accidens inest rei, quia ilia modo definitio intentionis inest rei."
3 Ibid. (OPh, I, 46): "Sciendum tamen quod significatum termini communis, sig
nificantis veram naturam, tripliciter patest considerari. Uno modo secundum esse in
suppositis, quod dicitur esse materiale eius, et hoc modo insunt ei accidentia com
munia. Secundo modo consideratur absolute secundum esse quiditativum, et sic in
sunt ei praedicata essentialia. Tertia modo ut per formam inteUigibilem ab inteUectu
apprehenditur, quod est esse cognitum, et sic insunt ei intentiones." See D. O.
Dahlstrom, "Signification and Logic: Scotus on Universals from a Logical Point of
View," Vivarium 18 (1 980): 99- 102.
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 101
tellectu apprehenditur, quod est esse cognitum, et sic insunt ei intentiones. Intellectus
enim, considerans naturam hominis unam in multis et de multis, ab aliqua propri�
etate reperta in natura sic considerata movetur ad causandum intentionem; et illam
causatam attribuit ilti naturae cuius est proprietas a qua accipitur."
, Simplicius In Cal. 82, 35-83, 20; Avicenna Liber dt phil. prima, V, 1 (ed. Van Riet,
228.24-36); Logica I (ed. Venet., 2rb). See De Libera, Lo qrurtlle des univnsaux, 182-89;
Uoyd "Neoplatonic Logic," 59-6 1; Uoyd, The Anatomy ,!! Ntoplatonism, 67-68; D. L.
Black, "Mental Existence in Thomas Aquinas and Avicenna," Mediaeval Studies 61
(1999): 47-5 \ .
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 1 03
Therefore one must understand that, with regard to the quiddity and
the nature of a thing whatsoever, there can be a true understanding in
three ways . . . just as <something> has three modes in being. In fact,
something has a first being of nature outside <the mind> in the
things, it has a second being of reason, and it has a third being of
essence. For an animal, when taken with its accidents in the singulars,
is a natural thing (res naturalis) ; when taken with its accidents in the
mind is a rational thing (res ratlOnis); and when taken by itself is an es
sential thing (res essentlae) . . . 13
" Henry of Ghent Qyodl. III, q. 9 (ed. Badius, I, 6 I rO): '\<\nimal enim ex eo quod
est animal et homo ex eo quod est homo, scilicet quantum ad definitionem suam et
intellectum secundum se absque consideratione omnium aliorum quae concomi
tantur illud, non est nisi animal tantum vel homo."
1 3 Ibid.: "Est igitur intelligendum quod circa quiditatem et naturam rei cuius
cumque triplicem contingit habere intellectum verum . . . sicut et tres modos habet in
esse. Unum eoim habet esse naturae extra in rebus, alterum vero habet esse rationis,
tertium vero habet esse essentiae. Animal eoiro acceptum cum accidentibus suis in
singularibus est res naturalis, acceptum vero cum accidentibus suis in anima est res
rationis, acceptum vero secundum se est res essentiae . . . "
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 105
that the intellect does not cause second intentions but only receives
them."
How does the intellect cause second intentions? Scotus says that
the intellect causes a second intention when it is moved by a property
that it finds in an essence considered as "one in many and said of
many."25 Since "one in many and said of many" is the classic Aris
totelian definition of a universal, we could say that the intellect is
moved to cause a second intention when it considers an essence as
a universal. Elsewhere Scotus draws the distinction between essence
and universal: the essence is the object of the intellect and what the
intellect understands, whereas the universal is the mode in which the
intellect understands an essence. Since the object and its mode of
understanding are essentially distinct, the intellect can acquire a
concept of each of them and can understand each of them distinctly:
The first object of the intellect, namely the 'what it is' is understood
under the aspect of a universal (sub ratione universalis). That aspect
(ratio), however, is not essentially identical with that 'what it is', but it
is its accidental mode. Therefore, the intellect can know the difference
between its first object and that mode, since it can distinguish all the
things that are not essentially the same.26
" Duns Scotus Super Porph., q. 1 1 , n. 1 7 (OPh, I, 47): "Intellectus enim, consid
erans naturam hominis unam in multis et de muitis, ab aliqua proprietate reperta in
natura sic considerata movetur ad causandum intentionem; et illam causatam at
tribuit illi naturae cuius est proprietas a qua accipitur."
" Ibid., q. 5, n. 4 (OPh, I, 27-8): " . . . primum obiectum intellectus, scilicet 'quod
quid est' intelligitur sub ratione universali. Illa autem ratio non est idem essentialiter
cum ilia 'quod quid est', sed modus eius accidentalis. 19itur intellectus potest
cognoscere differentiam inter suum primum obiectum et ilium modum, quia potest
distinguere inter omnia quae non sunt essentialiter eadem." See also ibid., q. 4, n. 6
(OPh, I, 23): "Quidquid autem intelligitur, intelligitur sub ratione universalis."
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 1 09
But not only is the nature itself indifferent of itself to being in the in
tellect and to being in a particular - and therefore also to being uni
versal and to being particular or singular. It does not primarily of it
self have universality even when it does have being in the intellect. For
even though it is understood under universality (as under the mode of
understanding it), nevertheless universality is not a part of its primary
concept, since it is not a part of the metaphysical concept, but of the
logical concept. For the logician considers second intentions applied
to first ones, according to him [sci!., AvicennaJ . Therefore, the first in
tellection is an intellection of the nature without there being any co
understood mode, either the mode it has in the intellect or the one it
has outside the intellect. Although universality is the mode of under
standing what is understood, that mode is not itself understood.
(trans!. Spade, 64)27
" Ord. II, d. 13, p. I, q. I, n. 33 (ed. Vat., VII, 403-4): "Non solum autem ipsa
natura de se est indifTerens ad esse in intellectu et in particulari, ac per hoc et ad esse
universale et particulare (sive singulare), - sed etiam ipsa, habens esse in intellectu,
non habet primo ex se universalitatem. Licet eoim ipsa intelligatur sub universalitate
ut sub modo intelligendi ipsam, tamen universalitas non est pars eius conceptus
primi, quia non conceptus metaphysici, sed logici Oogicus enim considerat secundas
intentiones applicatas primis secundum ipsum). Prima ergo intellectio est naturae ut
non cointelligitur aliquis modus, neque qui est dus in intellectu, neque qui est eius
extra intellectum; licet iUius intellecti modus intelligendi sit universalitas, sed non
modus intellectus." I quote from P. V. Spade's translation in his Five Texts on the
1 10 CHAPTER FOUR
Medieval Problem '!! Universals: Porphyry, Boelhius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham (Indi
anapolis: Hackett, 1 994), 64. On the distinction between a metaphysical and a log
ical concept in Duns Scotus, see O. Boulnois, "ReeUes intentions: nature commune
et universaux selon Duns Scot," Revue de Mitaphysique et de Morale 97 (1992): 2 1-26.
28 Super Praed., q. 3, n. 1 3 (OPh, I, 271). See above, n. 22.
29 Super Porph., q. 4, n. 12 (OPh, I, 25): "Dico quod effective [scil., universale] est
ab intellectu, sed materialiter sive originaliter sive occasiomlliter a proprietate in rej
figmentum autem non sic; igitur non est figmentum."
30 Super Praed., q. 3, n. 13 (OPh, I, 270).
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS III
Why does Duns Scotus deprive the extramental thing of any effi
cient role in forming second intentions? How can he maintain that
second intentions are not fictitious concepts while stating that their
only cause is the intellect?
The answers to these two questions lie in the fact that Scotus sees
second intentions as concepts founded on concepts, namely on
properties pertaining to things as they are in the mind, whereas
others, such as Radulphus Brito, see them as concepts founded on
properties pertaining to things insofar as they extramental. Scotus
thinks that second intentions such as genus and species are represen
tations of modes of understanding, or concepts caused by the intel
lect when considering a thing insofar as it is understood.
Both Scotus and his rivals maintain that extramental things play
a causal role in the production of first intentions. Actually, RaduI
phus Brito maintains that the thing is the only cause of first inten
tions, whereas Scotus thinks that both the thing and the agent intel
lect act together as causes of first intention concepts representing
extramental thingsY Since the possible intellect does not have any
content by itself, when it forms its first-order concepts it receives its
content from outside, namely from the extramental things under
stood through sensible and intelligible species. Whether the agent
intellect plays only a secondary role, as Brito maintains, or a causal
role, as Scotus maintains, the objective ground for concepts repre
senting extramental things is assured by the fact that the extra
mental things act as causes or at least con-causes of the concepts
themselves. Thus, Scotus and his contemporaries refer to causality
to explain the intentional character of our concepts: first-order con
cepts truthfully represent extramental things because they are
caused by extramental things.
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Radulphus Brito, fol
lowing Simon of Faversham, maintains that both first and second
intentions are concepts founded on and representing extramental
things and real properties, if we take intentions in an abstract way.
Alternatively, Brito and Simon of Faversham maintain that con
crete intentions, both first and second, are extramental things con
ceived according to certain real modes of being. It is not surprising
that Brito regards extramental things as the efficient cause of both
31 Radulphus Brito Super d, Anima IIJ, q. 2 (ed. Fauser, 1 09-26). Duns Scotus Ord.
I, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, nn. 486-503 (ed. Vat., IIJ, 289-98).
1 12 CHAPTER FOUR
. . . I say that a thing is not the entire cause of an intention, but is only
its occasion, insofar as it moves the intellect so that it considers in act,
and the intellect is the main cause. Therefore in the thing a lesser
unity than the unity of the intention is sufficient, since it is sufficient
that the intellect be moved by something external to cause many no
tions by <simple> consideration, and to these notions there are no
correspondent things in reality, simply speaking . . . the intellect, when
considering something through that one species, can reflect on its op
eration thousands of times by that considering, and each considera
tion is something that does not have any external correspondence ex
cept only the first object as an occasion, insofar as it is what first moves
the intellect to that consideration . . . "
32 Ibid. (OPh, I, 270-7 1): " . . . dieD quod res non est tota causa intentionis, sed
some role in forming intentions - not that of main causes but that
of occasions. That is to say that an extramental thing is what is un
derstood by the operation on which the intellect reflects when it
forms second intentions. This is enough to give some real ground
to second intentions and to differentiate them from fictitious con
cepts.
Throughout this discussion, Scotus adheres to Aquinas's position
regarding the foundation of intentions on things. Scotus's distinc
tion between the main cause and the occasion of intentions can be
seen as a device to make Aquinas's account more cogent.
33 Super Praed., q. 1 3, n. 45 (OPh, I, 376). Ibid., q. 27, n. I (OPh, I, 447): " . . . se
est intentionis primae qui natus est fieri immediate a re, sine opere vel actu intellectus
negotiantis. . . "
37 Ibid., n. 10 (ed. Vat., V, 352): "Ornois intentio secunda est relatio rationis, non
vel saltern conferentis unum ad alterum (hoc patet, quia intentio secunda - se
cundum omnes - causatur per acturn intellectus negotiantis circa rem primae inten
tianis, qui non potest causare circa obiectum nisi tantum relationem vel relationes ra
tionis." I have modified the translation provided by Tachau in her Vision and Certitude,
63. See, with some caution, S. Swiezawski, "Les intentions premieres et les intentions
secondes chez Jean Duns SC01," Archives dJhistQire doctrinale et littiraire du Moyen Age 9
( 1 934): 205-60j C. Verhulst, '� propos des intentions premieres et des intentions sec
andes chez Jean Duns Scot," Annales de l'lnstitut de Philosophie de I'Universiti Lihre de
Bruxelles 7 ( 1 975): 7-32
38 Tachau, VlSion and Certilute, 64.
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 117
the case for second intentions, as a matter of fact. These two au
thors, as we have seen, maintained that second intentions pertain to
all three operations of the intellect: the apprehension of simple
items, composition and division, and reasoning. As Brito explained,
the intellect causes only second intentions pertaining to its second
and the third operations. Intentions such as genus and species, by con
trast, are simple concepts based on a relation existing in the extra
mental world independently of the intellect's understanding. The
intellect understands that relation but it does not cause it, and the
intellect understands that relation as a simple concept and repre
sents it as a second intention pertaining to its operation, such as
genus and species. Since Scotus thinks that the intellect always plays a
causal role in forming intentions, however, he maintains that no
second intention pertains to the first operation of the intellect,
which only understands things but does not cause them. Moreover,
since second intentions are comparisons, they specifically pertain to
the second operation of the intellect, not to the third.
41 A second intention fails to satisfy the first condition, too, since its foundation is
cognitive being, and not a real feature of an extramental thing.
42 Ord. I, d. 23, q. un., n. 1 0 (ed. Vat., V, 352-53): "hoe patet, quia intentio secunda
- secundum orones - causatur per actum inteUectus negotiantis circa rem primae in·
tenionis, qui non potest causare circa obiectum nisi tantum relationem vel relationes
Tationis." I modify the translation provided by Tachau in her Vision and Certitude, 63.
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS I lg
" Duns Scotus Qj<est. in Met. VII, q. 18, n. 38 (OPh, IV, 347).
44 Ibid., n. 42 (OPh, IV, 348): "De primo modo potest intelligi secunda opinio, quia
ista comparatio, quae est intentio secunda, non est nisi obiecti ut in intellectu com
parante." The English translation is taken from John Duns Scotus Questions on the
Metaphysics, transl. A. B. Wolter and G.]. Etzkorn, vol. 2 (St. Bonaventure, N.V: Fran
ciscan Institute Publications, 1998), 299. I deleted an integration of the translators,
namely the reference to individuals as that to which universals are referred.
1 20 CHAPTER FOUR
" Lec/u,a I, d. 23, q. un., n. 12 (ed. Vat., XVII, 306): "Intentio secunda est relatio
rationis, et non quaecumque, sed relatio rationis pertinens ad acturn intellectus, qui
est componere et dividerej uncle intentiones secundae pertinent ad unionem vel ad
extrema unionis (ut praedicati et subiecti)."
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 121
order to deduce that they are caused by the second operation of the
intellect. It can be contended that what Scotus assumes as uncon
troversial is precisely what is subject to controversy. In fact, not
everyone is willing to admit that the intellect is the cause of second
intentions; philosophers such as Simon of Faversham and Radul
phus Brito concede that the intellect plays a necessary role in
forming second intentions, but they advocate that only extramental
things and their modes cause second intentions.
Simon of Faversham and Radulphus Brito concede that second
intentions are rational relations, because they are relations under
stood by the intellect, and at the same time maintain that intentions
are not founded on the operation of the intellect but on a mode of
being of things. For example, these authors agree that the intellect
represents the relation between animal and man by the concept of a
genus, but they also maintain that such a relation is founded on the
nature of animals and men independently of the ability of the in
tellect to understand them. This is the gist of Peter of Auvergne's
objection to Aquinas's .conception of rational relations. The same
objection could be leveled against Scotus's conception of second in
tentions as presented in his commentaries on the Sentences.
So how can Scotus still assume that second intentions are rational
relations caused by the intellect? Scotus himself takes into account
this objection in his Qyestions on the Metaphysics, where he provides a
detailed analysis of rational relations. Here Scotus clarifies two
points, namely both which relationship holds between a rational re
lation and a second intention and what relationship holds between
a property of a thing understood and a second intentions as a rep
resentation of a mode of understanding. So far, there has been
some confusion between these notions. Some medieval authors
seem to have regarded these notions as synonyms, and Scotus him
self does not pay much attention to their distinction in his other
treatments of the issue. Second intentions are concepts and are ra
tional relations, it is said. But are these descriptions equivalent or do
they pick up different aspects of second intentions? Are all rational
relations concepts and second intentions? In his Qyestions on the
Metaphysics, Scotus finally explains the relationship between rational
relations and second intentions. He starts with an analysis of ra
tional relations and ends up with what can be seen as his third ac
count of second intentions.
I do not intend to suggest that what I call a 'third account' is
1 22 CHAPTER FOUR
that the subject of a second intention is not the intellect but the
thing considered insofar as it is understood. By contrast, Brito main
tains that a second intention is founded on the intellect and that it is
attributed to an extramental thing as to its cause. For that reason,
Brito thinks that intentions are real entities (qualities). Scotus, in his
Q)/estions on the Metaplrysics, maintains the position he had presented
in his questions on Porphyry, but he now explains his doctrine in
much more detail.
Scotus shifts from the issue of the status of a rational relation to
that of its foundation. The object of investigation should be the on
tological status of the object of the intellect when it is considered in
sofar as it is understood. Scotus maintains that, when the object of
the intellect is considered in that way, it has existence only insofar as
it is in the intellect and in the very act of understanding:
If you ask: what really is a conceptual relation? The [proper) response
is: Ask what the object of the intellect insofar as it is understood really
is. For it has no existence except in being understood "
We have already noted that Brito had also remarked that the crucial
issue in order to ascertain the nature of second intentions is the
status of the object of the intellect when conceived as understood.
Is it something provided with merely a mental existence, or is it a
fully extramental thing understood by the intellect? Brito, as we
have seen, adopts the second answer. By contrast, Scotus maintains
that the object of the intellect, considered insofar as it is under
stood, is a mental entity, a sort of internal object, whose being is
identical to its being understood. Whereas Brito thinks that a thing
understood, as understood, is still an extramental thing, Scotus
maintains that a thing understood, as understood, is a concept.
Consequently, for Scotus 'concept' means not only the mental entity
by which we represent something, but also that thing itself insofar as
it is understood. A concept for Scotus, then, is not only the concep
tual form of an act of understanding, but also its content, when it is
considered as understood. Since a rational relation is founded on a
thing considered as understood, it follows that such a relation is a
property of a mental entity, and as such has a purely mental exis-
49 Ibid., n. 44, (OPh, III, 581-82): "Si quaeratur 'quid realiter est reJatio rationis?'
Responsio: quaero primo 'quid realiler sit obiectum intellectus inquantum intellig
itur?' Nullum eoim esse habet nisi in 'intelligi'." I modify Wolter's and Etzkorn's
translation (Q!ustions on the Metaphysics, vol. I , 530).
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 125
tence. I t i s for this reason that the intellect not only understands but
also causes rational relations, Scotus maintains. Such relations are
established by the intellect among mental entities and do not follow
from real modes of being of extramental things.
Scotus arrives at this doctrine of rational relations by correcting
Aquinas's doctrine. According to Aquinas, a rational relation is
founded on the apprehension of the intellect comparing entities
among themselves. But in this way, as Scotus remarks, a rational re
lation is always a relation between the intellect and something else,
and it is never a relation between two entities considered by the in
tellect.50 By contrast, Scotus maintains that the extremes of the re
lation caused by the intellect are not the intellect itself and an ex
tramental thing, but two things considered insofar as they are
understood. It follows that second intentions are founded not on the
intellect and on its operation, but on the thing understood as a
mental entity.51
It also follows that Scotus can distinguish between two acts of the
intellect that Aquinas had identified: the act of comparing and the
act of reflecting. According to Scotus, rational relations are caused
not by a reflection of the intellect on itself, but by a comparison the
intellect makes between two things considered to the extent that
they are present to the intellect itsel[ The intellect carries out this
comparison by directly considering the things as mental entities.
The intellect's reflection comes about only at a second stage, when
the intellect turns to the relation is has caused and gets an under
standing of it. Thus, Scotus can distinguish between the act by
which the intellect causes rational relations and the act by which the
intellect understands them:
It is also false that a rational relation stems from a reflex act of un
derstanding. For it comes to be by a first or direct act of the intellect
comparing this to that. But when the intellect reflects, thinking of its
comparison qua object, then the conceptual relation is not caused but
only considered, and it is a logical consideration. 52
Scotus agrees with Brito that intentions such as genus and species are
concrete intentions, but he provides a very different interpretation
of this fact. According to Brito, species and genus are concrete inten
tions because the terms 'species' and 'genus' signifY extramental
essences and the modes in which those essences are understood.
These modes of understanding are abstract intentions. Conse
quently, terms signifYing intentions abstractly differ from terms sig-
S3 Super Porph., q. 1 4, n. 6 (OPh, I, 69): ')\d quaestionem dicitur quod res sub in
55 Ibid. (OPh, I, 7 1): "Tamen 'intentio' potest significari in concreto vel in ab
stracto. Primo modo significatur per hoc nomen genus, et proprie secundum quod
intentio, quia secundum hoc est applicabilis rei. Et ideo secundum quod significatur
per hoc nomen genus, definitur hie, scilicet ut est inteRtio."
56 Super PrlUld., q. 8, n. 14 (OPh, I, 3 1 7): "Dicendum quod si contingat subiectum
et accidens unieD actu intelligere, et composito ex eis unum nomen imponere . . . illud
nomen non significat utrumque sub propria ratione. . . NuDum autem nomen potest
utrumque significare, nisi sit aequivocum, sub propria ratione . . . Ideo dicendum
quod nomen concretum non significat subiectum, sed tantum formam."
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 1 29
:>7 See Ebbesen, "Concrete Accidental Terms," 1 1 7-18. As Ebbesen remarks, Brito
seems to have embraced that position with some hesitation. See ibid" 1 34.
58 Duns Scotus Super Por ph., q. 27, n. 26 (OPh, I, 1 72): '�d aliud dico quod eius
[scil., differentiae] abstractum non significatur uno nomine sicut nee abstractum
generis, speciei vel accidentis vel proprii, quae omnia constant esse conereta. Sed
potest exprimi per circumlocutionem sic 'intentio differentiae'; et illud non praedi
catuT de rationali."
1 30 CHAPTER FOUR
" Ibid., q. 7-8, n. 20 (OPh, I, 39): "Quaelibet istarum intentionum potest aeeipi ut
'quid' vel ut 'modus'. Quando enim est illud quod intelligitur, tunc est quid; quando
autem est ratio sub qua aliud intelligitur, tunc accipitur ut modus. Secundae ergo in
teotiones non opponuntur nisi utrumque accipitur ut quid vel utrumque ut modus.
Haec autem 'genus est species', ut vera est, accipitur genus ut 'quid', quia in compa
ratione ad universale quod est suum genus; species ut modus, quia sub tali modo in
telligitur genus respeetu universalis." See also Super PrQld.,q. 38, n. 43 (OPh, I, 524-
25): " . . . dico quod non est inconveniens duorum accidentium intentionalium
utrumque esse in utroque ut in subiecto. Quia quodlibet intentionale, praeter hoc
quod est modus intelligendi alterius, est inteUigibile per se. Quando est modus intel
ligendi, habet rationem accidentis; quando est intelligibile, est quid, et potest intelligi
sub aliquo quod est modus intelligendi eius . . . " See also Super Porph., q. 26, n. 7 (OPh,
I, 1 62) on the differentia ul quid and ut modus.
60
Super Porph., q. 14, n. I I (OPh, I, 7 1): "Tamen forte ut 'quid est' [seil., intentio]
habet definiri a metaphysieo." See also Super Porph., q. 7-8, n. 28 (OPh, I, 42): " . . .
did potest quod metaphysicus omne ens reale considerat, non ens rationis cuiusmodi
est universale ut hic loquimur. - Vel conceditur quod considerat intentionem in
quantum ens; non tamen sequitur 'intentionem in quantum intentio', quia non sunt
idem."
61 See above, chap. 2, n. 6.
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 131
" Super Porph., q. 27, n. 16 (OPh, I, 1 68): " . . . dieo quod differentia potest esse
nomen primae intentionis vel secundae. Primo modo est nomen abstractum, et sig
nmeat relationem, et est species multitudinis ut 'multum' est differentia entis. Se
cunda modo est concretum, sicut et alia nomina intentionum de quibus hie agitur, et
transumitur a differentia ut est nomen primae intentionis; significat autem inten
tionem applicabilem ei quod est principium formale differentiae ut est res primae in
tentionis."
63 Ibid, n. 1 7 (OPh, I, 1 69): "Et quod dicit Porphyrius quod Socrates senex differt
a se puero, non est quia differentia ut est intentio sit in uno extrema et denominet
ipsum sic 'Socrates differt'; sed sic est illud ad propositum: si Socrates senex differt a
se ipso puero, igitur differentia est inter extrema ut differentia est nomen primae in
tentionis. Igitur in altero extremo est aliquod principium quod dicitur differentia ut
differentia est intentio. IUud est pueritia, igitur pueritia est differentia communis."
64 Ibid., n. 27 (OPh, I, 1 7 2-73).
quivoce est nomen primae impositionis et secundae. Primo modo significat naturam
extra animam, secundum quod Aristoteles V Metaphysicae dividit ens in substantiam
et accidens. Secundo modo adhuc est aequivocum. Uno enim modo idem est quod
1 32 CHAPTER FOUR
'praedicatum non-essentiale', et sic est idem quod 'esse in' secundum quod 'esse in'
distinguitur contra 'dici de' in principio Praedicamentorum . .. Alia modo est intentio
sumpta a proprietate in re, sub qua et eius opposito potest intelligi cuius est accidens
sine repugnantia."
67 Ibid" q. 35, n. 8 (OPh, I, 221): "Ubi sciendum quod 'adest et abest' (sive 'inesse
et non inesse', quae ponit Aristoteles in sua definitione) sunt aequivoce nomina
primae impositionis et secundae. Ut sunt nomina primae impositionis, dicitur VII
Melaphysicae 'accidentis esse est inesse'; et hoc de accidente reali de quo loquitur ibi . . .
Alia modo 'aclesse' vel 'abesse' est nomen secundae impositionis e t significat praedi
cationem eorum quae sunt extra essentiam subiecti vel alterius generis a subiecto,
sicut 'praedicari de' dicit propriam praedicationem essentialium quae sunt in eodem
genere cum subiecto."
63 On the history of the analysis of such predications, from Porphyry and Dex
ippus to Boethius, see Uoyd, Tiu Anatomy if Neoplatonism, 39-43, and Ebbesen,
"Philoponus, 'Alexander' and the Origins of Medieval Logic," 457. For Thomas
Aquinas's approach to this question, see G. Klima, " 'Socrates est species': Logic,
Metaphysics and Psychology in St. Thomas Aquinas' Treatment of a Paralogism," in
Argumenlations/heorn: Schoiastischtn Forschungen zu den logischen und semantisch.. Regeln
Korreklen Folgerns, ed. K. Jacobi (Leiden-New York-K6In: E.]. Brill, 1 993), 498-504.
SECOND INTENTIONS IN DUNS SCOTUS 1 33
69 Super Porph., qq. 9-1 1 , nn. 2 1 -23 (OPh, I, 48): '\\d secundam quaestionem di
cendum quod est vera [scil., "homo est universale"] eo modo quo nunc dictum est,
hoc accidens inest rei quia ilIo modo definitio intentionis inest rei,"
1 34 CHAPTER FOUR
15 Super Porph., q. 9-1 1 , n. 23 (OPh, I, 48): '\<\d hoc dico quod species ioest homioi
76 uctura I, d. 23, q. un., n. 9 (ed. Vat., XVII, 305): "Propter rationes tamen dicunt
quod intentio secunda patest intelligi in abstracto vel in concreto: Primo modo, non
supponit pro re primae intentionis nee praedicatur de re primae intentionis; uncle
non dicitur vere quod universalitas agit vel quod animal sit universalitas. Si autem
accipitur secundo modo, in concreto, sic supponere patest pro prima intentione et
praedicari de re primae intentionis; uncle haec vera est 'animal est universale'. Et sic
definitur universale quod est species, cum dicitur quod 'species est quae praedicatur
de pluribus differentibus' etc.; 'species' enim non praedicatur ilia intentio secunda,
sed ilIa res pro qua stat praedicatur." See also Ord. I, d. 23, q. un., n. 8 (ed. Vat., V;
351).
77 uctura I, d. 23, q. un., n. 32 (ed. Vat., XVII, 3 1 3): "Quod etiam dicunt de specie
quod definitur, hoc non est pro eis, quia est praedicatio signata et praedicatio ex
ercita: ibi autem definitur species per praedicationem signatam, non exercitam; et
ideo stat pro secunda intentione, sicut est et praedicari signatum."
CHAPTER FIVE
there are two main doctrines of second intentions, we must now de
termine to which extent each of these doctrine influences the doc
trine of the logical consideration of the categories and the interpre
tation of Aristotle's Caugories. In this chapter, I focus on Scotus's
case and I compare his views to those of the advocates of different
doctrines of second intentions.
It follows that logic deals with categories insofar as they are con
cepts, since the mental properties logic considers are attributed to
categories insofar as they are concepts. Scotus gives his solution to
the old question concerning what categories are: terms, concepts, or
things? By themselves, categories are things, for they are the types of
essences of real things. In logic, however, categories are considered
as concepts. As to Boethius's position of categories as terms, Scotus
regards it as a formulation of how logic considers categories. He in
terprets Boethius as saying that since logic deals with the ten genera
of being insofar as they are signified by ten terms, logic deals with
• Duns Scotus Super Pra,d., q. I , n. 18 (OPh, I, 253): u . . . dico quod logica nec est
scientia realis nee sermocinalis, quia nee sermonem nee passiones sermonis consid
eral, nee suum subiectum sub ratione sermon is. Immo quod iSla divisio sit insuffi
ciens sic ostenditur: medium inter rem et sermonern vel vocem est passio; ergo sicut
est aliqua scientia per se de rebus, aliqua per se de vocibus significativis, ut gram
matica, rhetorica . . . ita patest aliqua scientia esse de cooceptu per se; haec est logica.
Uncle per se debet dici scientia rationalis, non tantum quia traditur per rationem
skut quaelibet alia scientia, sed cum hoc quod est de conceptibus formatis ab actu
rationis." On Scotus's doctrine of signification see D. Perler, "Duns SCONS on Signi
fication," Medieval Philosophy and Th£owgy 3 (1 993): 97-1 20; Pini, "Species, Concept,
and Thing;" Pini, "Signification of Names in Duns Scatus and Some of His Con
temporaries/' Vivarium 39 (200 I), forthcoming.
1 42 CHAPTER FIVE
Scotus also asserts that logic studies the properties inhering in cate
gories insofar as categories are the most common genera (generalis
sima).6 Scotus has already said that logic studies categories insofar as
they are understood, insofar as they are concepts, and insofar as in
tentional properties are attributed to them. Scotus's new description
of how logic considers categories may look surprising, for it is the
metaphysician, not the logician, who is usually said to consider cat
egories as the highest kinds or genera of being.
Scotus, of course, does not say that categories are the most basic
types of essences only because our intellect understands them. He
draws a sharp distinction between the metaphysical notion of cate
gories as types of essences and the logical consideration of cate
gories as the most common genera. He agrees that substance,
quality, quantity, etc. are the ten types of essences of extramental
things, whether our intellect understands them or not. Categories
have a real status in the world, and they are not mind-dependent
classifications of reality.
Instead, Scotus intends to make another point. By now, we
should already be familiar with Scotus's contention that a genus is
not a mode of being of extramental things but a mode of under-
, Super Pro<d., q. 1, n. 12 (OPh, I, 251): "Ad auctoritatem Boethu potest dici quod
intelligit passivam per activam, sic: "de decem genera rerum significantibus", id est,
de decem generibus significatis per decem voces."
6 See above, n. 2.
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 1 43
7 Super Praed., q. 3, n. 8 (OPh, I, 269): " . . . aJiquid intentionale univocum potest ap
plicari rebus omnium generum, quia omnis diversitas in rebus primae intentionis
inter se non impedit ipsas posse concipi per eundem modum concipiendi. Inten
tiones autem eis attribuuntur in quantum ab inteUectu concipiuntur, et ideo inten
tiones eaedem specie possunt diversis rebus attribui."
1 44 CHAPTER FIVE
11
ST I, q. 28, q. 2: ')\d cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod in quolibet
Dovern generum accidentis est duo considerare. Quorum unum est esse quod com
petit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in om
nibus est inesse subiecto: accidentis eoim esse est inesse. Aliud quod potest consid
erari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum." See also ST
III, q. 77, a. I and Quod!. IX, q. 3, art. un. (ed. Leon., XXY. I , 99).
" STI, q. 28, a. 2.
,OJ In Met. V, lect. 9, n. 889; In Plrys. III, lect. 5, n. 332. See]. F. Wippel, "Thomas
be confusing, since Henry calls res what Aquinas calls the ratio of a
category, and ratio what Aquinas calls the esse of a category.
Like Aquinas, Henry of Ghent thinks that each category can be
analyzed into two elements or constituting aspects.15 First, there is
the thing of a category (res praedicamentz), which is an extramental
essence. Second, there is the mode of being proper to that category
(ratio praedicamenl:!) . For example, a substance is an essence whose
mode of being is not being in a subject and being something by it
self:
Both the res praedicamenti and the ratio praedicamenti are necessary in
order to constitute a category as a type of being and to differentiate
one category from the others. 17
By the notion of mode of being proper to each category, Henry
can offer a justification or deduction of the Aristotelian categories.
All the items belonging to a category share a very general mode of
being, namely 'being caused'. This common mode of being makes
the categorial beings different from God, whose being is uncaused.
The common mode of being caused is divided into two less general
modes. First, there is the mode of being in itself, which is proper to
the items belonging to the category of substance. Second, there is
the mode of being in something else, which is common to the items
belonging to one of the accidental categories. Being in something
else is in turn divided into two less general modes: being in some
thing else in an independent way and being in something else with
respect to another thing. Being in something else in an independent
way is in turn divided into being a quality of something and being
18 Ibid. (ed. Macken, XXVII, 80); QJtodl. V, q. 6, (ed. Lovan., 1 6 1 0); QJtodl. Xv, q.
5, (ed. Lovan., 5770).
19 Cat. 2, la20-b6.
" See Duns Scotus Qjlaest. in Met. VII, q. 7, n. 22 (OPh, IV, 1 53-54).
22 QgaeSI.
in Met. V, q. 5-6, n. 81 (OPh, III, 466): "Concedo ergo diyisionem esse
sufficientem, et quod distinguuntur realiter." Ibid., n. 76 (OPh, III, 465).
" Super Praed., q. 259, n. 7 (OPh, I, 258-59).
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 1 49
" QJ'aesl. in Mel. VII, q. I, nn. 12-14, 1 8-20 (OPh, IV, 93-94, 96).
25 Super Porph., q. 35, n. 8 (OPh, I, 2 2 1 ): "Ubi sciendum quod 'adest et abest' (sive
'inesse et non inesse', quae ponit Aristoteles in sua definitione) sunt aequivoce
nomina primae impositionis et secundae. Ut sunt nomina primae impositionis, dic
itur VII Metaphysicae 'accidentis esse est inesse'; et hoc de accidente reali de quo lo
quitur ibi. . . Alio modo 'adesse' vel 'abesse' est nomen secundae impositionis et sig
nificat praedicationem eorum quae sunt extra essentiam subiecti vel alterius generis
a subiecto, sicut 'praedicari de' dicit propriam praedicationem essentialium quae
sunt in eodem genere cum subiecto." See also Super Porph., q. 3 1 , nn. 9- 1 1 (OPh, I,
1 96-97), where Scotus considers 'accident' as a second intention as synonymous to
'inhering' as a second intention.
1 50 CHAPTER FIVE
26 Quaest. in Met. VII, q. I (OPh, IV, 91-1 01); Ord. IV, d. 12, q. I (ed. Vives, XVII,
.
518-59).
" Q!laest. in Met(lph VII, qq. 5-6, nn. 73-76 (OPh, III, 464-65).
28 Peter of Auvergne SUP<' l'raed. q. 24 (ed. Andrews, 41): "InteUigendum quod ad
hoc quod aliquid sit praedicamentum tria exiguntur. Primum est quod supra ipsum
non sit genus. Secundum quod habeat modum praedicandi distinctum ab omnibus
aliorum praedicamentorum. Tertium est quod accipiatur ab aliqua proprietate com
muni in qua conveniant omnia quae sub ipso sunt contenta."
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 151
29 Ibid., q. 54 (ed. Andrews, 75): "Ad quod dicendum quod relatio est genus gen
eralissimum, cuius ratio est quoniam illud est genus ad aliqua plura, quod dicit es
sentiam et quiditatem ilIarum, et quod sumitur ex aliqua proprietate communi in
qua conveniunt omnia ilia quae sub ipso sunt; relatio autem est huiusmodi."
30 Ibid., q. 16 (ed. Andrews, 28): "Nam omnia quae in genere substantiae sunt,
conveniunt in aliqua proprietate quae est per se stare, a qua proprietate sumitur
genus quod est substantia; ideo etc."
" Ibid., q. 15 (ed. Andrews, 26).
1 52 CHAPTER FIVE
crete substances in a concrete way (such as man, horse, etc.) but not
of abstract substances (such as humanity, horseness, etc.), he con
cludes that only concrete items are in the category of substance.
The case of the accidents, by contrast, is opposite because any acci
dental category is univocally predicated of accidental abstract items
but not of concrete ones. For example, quality is univocally predi
cated of whiteness and tallness, not of white and tall. Then Peter of
Auvergne maintains that only the abstract items belong to an acci
dental category.32
By contrast, Scotus maintains that what constitutes a category is
having an essence of a certain kind and being a certain kind of real
being, whereas the mode of predication does not play any role in
constituting a category. Therefore he concedes that both abstract
and concrete items of a certain kind belong to the same category.
Both whiteness and white are qualities, Scotus maintains, because
whiteness and white are two ways of referring to the same essence
insofar as it is considered either in abstract (whiteness) or in con
crete (white). It is true that quality is essentially predicated only of
whiteness, but that fact merely concerns predication and does not
have any bearing on the question concerning which category an
item belongs to.33
32 Ibid., q. 53 (ed. Andrews, 74): " . . . ornne genus dicit quiditatem et essentiam
suarum specierum [ed.: speciarum] et nihil plus. Quia si sic, tunc non praedicaretur
de eiis in quid. Nunc autem relativum, cum sit quoddam concreturn, includit aliquid
quod diversum est a relativis in quantum relativa sunt, scilicet subiectum. Et sic patel
quod non sit genus, quia etiam importat diversas essentias, sicut dictum est."
" See Duos Scotus Super Praed., q. 8, o. 14 (OPh, I, 3 1 7); Super Porph., q. I I , o. 23
(OPh, I, 349-50), quoted above, chap. 4, o. 33.
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 153
nacio predicabilium [ed.: probabilium] secundum sub et supra . . . ". Ibid., q. 41 (ed.
Mazzarella, 1 32): "Predicamentum enim non est aliud quam coordinacio predica
bilium secundum sub et supra, ita quod in predicamento relationis possimus facere
unam arborem . . . "
1 54 CHAPTER FIVE
39 Ibid., q. 1 (ed. Mazzarella, 74): "Et ex hoc apparet quomodo diversimode coo
siderat ista scientia [scil., logical de eis [seU., predicamentis] et scientia divina, quo
niam scientia divina considerat de eis ut sunt quedam essencie et partes entis; in ista
autem libro [scil., Predicamentorum] non determinatur de predicamentis secundum
quod sunt res materie absolute, sed secundum quod habent talem modum predi
candi ve1 talem; et ideo dicitur liber Predicamentorum." Ibid., q. 23 (ed. Mazzarella,
98): .. . . . logicus non considerat essentias rerum . . . "
4() Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 4 (ed. Venet., 39va): "Dicendum quod
dinatione, ut dictum est, sic potest accipi adhuc dupliciter, quia vel ista praedica
menta ordinantur penes modos praedicandi magis communes et minus communes
vel penes proprietates reales rerum positarum in ista coordinatione. Si accipiatur
primo modo penes modos praedicandi superioris et inferioris, sic praedicamentum
est aliquid rationis, quia modus praedicandi est aliquid rationis (numquam enim erit
modus praedicandi, si intentio hon erit); ergo coordinatio praedicabilium sumpta
penes modum praedicandi est ens rationis . . . <Si> autem accipiatur ista relatio penes
proprietates reals, sic praedicamentum pro ista coordinatione est aliquid reale, quia
suum fundamentum est aliquid reale, scilicet praedicamentalia ordinata penes pro
prietates reales."
43 Ibid., q. 6 (ed. Venet., 4Iva): "Praedicamentum logicum est ordinatio praedica
bilium vel res ordinatae secundum superius et inferius et sub ista ratione. Praedica
mentum metaphysicum est ipsa res ut est quaedam differentia entis, sicut substantia
ut est differentia distincta entis a qualitate, et sic de aliis."
1 56 CHAPTER FIVE
have properties that are not caused by the intellect and do not de
pend on their being understood. It is true, therefore, that categories
appear in logical definitions, but this does not mean that they are
rational beings, for there are two kinds of logical definitions ac
cording to Brito: definitions entirely consisting of logical terms and
definitions through genus and differentia but not entirely consisting
of logical terms. The second kind of logical definition clearly con
tains a reference to extramental things, but even if the definitions in
which categories appear are of the first kind that does not mean
that categories are merely and exclusively rational beings. For the
first kind of logical definitions, too, refer to their objects and their
causes, which are real modes of being of extramental things. Since
every logical definition contains a reference to real and extramental
items, Brito concludes that a category, even when it is part of a log
ical definition, is not necessarily a merely rational being.44
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Brito says that a logical catego
ry and a metaphysical category are really one and the same thing.
Brito maintains that two things are really identical if they have the
same properties, but a category considered as a logical entity and a
category considered as a metaphysical entity have the same proper
ties. Therefore, they are really identical. For example, substance has
the property of receiving contraries both when it is considered as the
hierarchy of predicates ordered according to different degrees of uni
versality and when it is considered as a difference of being. The only
difference between a logical and a metaphysical category is the way
they are considered, which is a difference of rationes, as Brito says.45
.. Ibid., q. 4 (ed. Venet., 39vb): " . . . dieo quod diffinitio logiea est duplex. Una est
quae datur ex terminis logicalibus, alia est diffinitio logica quae datur ex genere et
differentia quamvis haec non sit in terminis logicalibus. Modo quocumque modo ac
cipiatur diffinitio logica, ibi ponitur aliquid reale. Si coim accipiatur ultimo modo,
non est dubium. Si edam primo modo, adhuc ponitur ibi aliquid reale, quia istae in
tentiones logicales habent diffinire per sua obiecta."
45 Ibid., q. 6 (ed. Venet., 4 I va): "Tunc dieD duo ad quaestionem, primo quod
praedicamentum logicum et metaphysicum quantum ad rem non distinguuntur, se
cunda dieo quod quantum ad rationes formales secundum quas considerantur a
metaphysico et a logico distinguuntur. Primum declaratur sic, quia illa non distingu
untur quantum ad rem quorum sunt eaedem proprietates reales; sed praedica
mentum logicum et metaphysicum sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc . . . Quantum ad rationes
formales distinguuntur, quia logicus considerat praedicamenta penes modos praedi
candi superioris de inferiori et penes illud praedicamentum logicum est praedica
mentum formaliter. Sed praedicamentum metaphysicum non dicitur metaphysicum
penes modos praedicandi superioris de inferiori, sed magis ut est quaedam differ
entia entis."
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 157
16
Met. VII, I , I 028b2·4.
1 58 CHAPTER FIVE
47 Duns Scatus Super Praed., q. 2, n. 1 1 (OPh, I, 260): " ... ens non convenit univoce
omni enti extra animam . . . ". Ibid" q. 4, n. 38 (OPh, I, 285): "Ideo lens' a rneta
physico in IV et VII M,taphysic.. ponitur analogum ad substantiam et accidens, quia
scilicet haec quae significantur, in essendo habent ordinem . . ... Scatus consistently
holds the opinion that being is analogous to the categories, metaphysically speaking,
because the accidental categories are really ordered to and dependent on substance:
see Ord. I, d. 3, p. I , q. I , nn. 162-63 (ed. Vat., III, 100-01). Scotus, however, changes
his mind concerning the logical issue of the univocity/equivocity of being, since he
first thinks that the term 'being' signifies each category separately, then he comes to
maintain that 'being' signifies a single concept whenever it is used to refer to a cate
gory or a categorial item. See S. P. Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity in Duns
Scotus's Early Writings," Franciscan Studils 43 (1983): 347-95. On Scotus's notion of
univocity in general, see S. D. Dumont, "The Univocity of the Concept of Being in
the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William Alnwick," M,dituval Studils
49 (1987): 1-31; Dumont, "Transcendental Being: Scotus and Scotists," Topoi I I
(1992): 135-48; Dumont, "Srotus's Doctrine of Univocity and the Medieval Tradi
tion of Metaphysics,n in Was ist PhiLosophit im Mittelalter? Alden des X. Internationalm
Kongressesfor millelalterliche Philosophil der Sociiti InternatWnak pour I'Etwk ik la Phiwso
phil Mtdiivak, ed. J. Aertsen and A. Speer, Miscellanea MediaevaJia 26 (Berlin-New
York: de Gruyter, 1998), 193-212; O. Boulnois, J,an Duns Scol sur la connaissanc, d,
Dieu el l'univoati ik l'llanl: OrdinalUi 1 - DistinctWn 3 - I" parti.; OrdinatW 1 - Distinction
8 - I" parti.; CollatW 24 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1988).
48 The notion of dicibilt, 'sayable', possibly derived from the Stoic [elUon, is known
to Latin authors thanks to Augustine (?) De diakctica, IV (ed. Pinborg" 127), which is
quoted by John of Salisbury M,talogicon, III, 5 (ed. Webb, 142). See N. Kretzmann,
"Medieval Logicians and the Meaning of Propositio," Journal if Phiwsop/v! 67 (1970):
773; G. Nuchelmans, Theories if 1M PropositWn: Ancienl and Medilvai Conc,ptWns if 1M
Bearers if Truth and Falsi!JI (Amsterdam-London: North Holland Pub. Co. 1970), 1 16;
A. Graeser, "The Stoic Theory of Meaning," in The Stoics, ed.J. M. Rist (Bedeley
Los Angeles-London: University of California Press, 1978), 88. On the Stoic kkton,
see A. A. Long, "Language and Thought in Stoicism," in Problems in Stoicism, ed. A.
A. Long (London: University of London-The Athlone Press, 1971), 75-113; M.
Frede, "The Stoic Notion of a [ekton," in Companions to Ancient Thought. 3. LAnguage,
ed. S. Everson (Cambridge: CUp, 1994), 109-28.
49 See C. LaBeur, ""Logique et theorie de l'argumentation dans Ie "Guide de l'e
tudiant" (c. 1230-1240) du ms. Ripoll 109," Diawgue 29 (1 990), 340, 353 n. 14; R.
Andrews, "Thomas of Erfurt on the Categories in Philosophy" , in Was isl Phiwsophie
im Mitlelalterl, 801-08.
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 1 59
Great maintains that the unitary subject of the logical study of cat
egories is the notion of "capable of being ordered as a predicate or
as a subject insofar as something is designed by a term indicating
such an order." This amounts to saying that categories are studied
in logic as they are subjects and predicates ordered into different
kinds according to their different modes of predication and, within
each kind, according to different degrees of universality. 52
The same opinion, only slightly modified, is also common around
the end of the thirteenth century. Thomas Sutton proposes the no
tion of "being signified by an incomplex term, which acts as a term
in a syllogism."53 Peter of Auvergne introduces the notion of "being
incomplex as it is capable of being ordered in a genus."54 Martin of
tandum quod unitas istius sciencie est ab unitate generis subiecti; genus autem
subiectum est simplex sermo significativus, que quidem significado non absoluitur
ab ardine, que quidem ordinacio non est separata a rebus. Non sunt ergo genera
prima secundum se distincta subiectum, set magis ut sit ad unum dicibile, ipsum or
dinabile, in quo quidem conueniunt et uniuntur ipsa genera prima."
52 Albert the Great Liber de Praed. I, I (ed. Borgnet, 95a): "Ex his planum est quid
sit huius libri subiectum: est enim subiectum ordinabile in ratione praedicabilis vel
subiicibilis, secundum quod stat sub voce talem ordinem signante. Et sic patet
qualiter ista scientia est una ab uno subiecto. Partes autem huius subiecti sunt or
dinabilia secundum diversum modum praedicandi in substantia, et accidente et in
accidentibus secundum omnia novem genera accidentium."
53 Thomas Sutton In Cat. (ed. Conti, 193).
� Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 2 (ed. Andrews, 1 0): .. . . . talia sunt praedica
menta, attribuuntur enim enti incomplexo secundum quod ordinabile in genere . . . "
1 60 CHAPTER FIVE
Dacia adopts the same opinion. He affirms that the subject matter
of the Categories is the incomplex sayable, identical with the capacity
of acting as a subject or a predicate (ratio subicibilis or praedicabilis). 55
Simon of Faversham maintains that the Categories considers
things insofar as they are attributed to the "incomplex sayable
being, capable of being ordered in a genus according to different
degrees of universality." For example, the Categories studies sub
stance and other categories insofar as in each category there is
something capable of being ordered according to its universality. 56
The same opinion is present in Brito, who thinks that the subject
matter of the Categories is categories considered as "incomplex
sayables capable of being ordered in a genus according to different
degrees of universality."57 Brito also says that categories, considered
in this way, have a unity of analogy, because they all are attributed
to the notion according to which they are considered. 58 He presents
this opinion as the one on which all commentators agree.
Scotus does not agree with this view. He is aware of this opinion,
but he criticizes it. He sees two main faults in the notion of 'incom
plex being capable of being ordered in a genus'. First, if that notion
refers to an extramental being, as Brito's conception of second in
tentions seems to require, then it is an accidental notion consisting
of an aggregate of extramental and mind-dependent beings. The
extramental aspect is the notion of being whereas the mind-depen
dent aspect is the reference to notions such as sayable, incomplex, and
capable qf being ordered in a genus, which all are second intentions rel-
sunt dicibilia incomplexa ordinabilia in genere secundum sub et supra. . . Unde no
tandum est quod ad unitatem scientiae non requiritur unitas scibilis secundum genus
vel secundum speciem, sed sufficit unitas analogiae vel attributionis, sicut meta
physica est una scientia quae est de ente quod est unum secundum attributionem. Ita
dieD in proposito quod unitas subiecti in ista scientia non requirit quod sit unitas [ed.:
una] secundum genus vel secundum speciem, sed sufficit quod sit unitas secundum
attributionem ad hoc quod ista scientia dicatur una."
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 161
61
Ibid., q. 2, n. 19 (OPh, I, 262): "Ideo diei potest quod hie eonsideratur de decem
praedicamentis in quantum eis attribuitur aliquid causatum a ratione, quia aliter non
possunt considerari a logico. Et ilia modo non habent fantum unitatem analogiac,
sed etiam univocationis; et illud univocum istis ilia modo est aliquod intentionale,
quod est hie primum subiectum. mud potest nominari 'praedicamentum' vel 'gener
alissimum', quia amnes proprietates quae per se determinantur hie de istis, determi
nantur de eis in quantum habent rationem generalissirni vel praedicamenti."
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 1 63
62
Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. I (ed. Mazzarella, 73): "Sed scientia de
predicamentis habetur ex prioribus nobis, posterioribus autem simpliciter; essencie
eoim predicamentorum nobis occulte sunt, skU( essencia cuiuslibet rei. Et ideo
Philosophu5 in determinando de predicamentis, solum determinat de eis quod ip
sorum proprietates, ut quoad substantia non suscipit magis et minus, et quod sub
stantie nihil est contrarium, et talia quantum ad hune acturn substare; et secundum
hoc comparat substantiam prirnam et secundam ad invicem. Et omnia ista sunt pos
teriora simpliciter quiditate substantie, priora tamen quoad nos."
164 CHAPTER FIVE
63 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 2, (ed. Venet., 38vb): " . . . istae passiones non
G4 Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. I (ed. Andrews, 9): "Cum quaeritur utrum de
praedicamentis possit esse scientia, dicendum est: ad hoc quod de aliquo sit scientia
requiritur quod ipsum habeat causam et etiam causam per se . . . Requiritur etiam
quod ipsum sit universale. . . Nihilominus tamen potest esse scientia de aliquo, quae
idem est quod certa cognitio ipsius, et haec datur per definitiones et descriptiones; et
hoc modo patest esse scientia de praedicamentis, cognoscuntur enim per quosdam
deflnitiones et descriptiones. Et cum non habeatur de praedicamentis scientiam per
causam, cum ipsa non haheant causam, tamen isto modo per definitiooes et descrip
tiones potest de hiis esse scientia."
6.S Simon of Faversham SUP" Praed., q. I (ed. Mazzarella, 74): .. . . . demonstracio
autem duplex est, scilicet demonstracio quia et demonstracio propter quid; et ideo
scientia duplex est, quedam adquisita per demonstracionem propter quid et quedam
adquisita per demonstracionem quia. Prima habetur per causarn, secunda non; et
per talem demonstracionem habetur scientia libri Predicamentorum: habetur ex pri
oribus quoad nos, non ex prioribus quoad naturam; et ideo concedo quod ipsa non
est per causam." See also ibid. (ed. Mazzarella, 73): "Sic ergo de predicamentis est
scientia, et ilia non est ex prioribus et nocioribus simpliciter, sed ex prioribus et 00-
cioribus quoad nos. Unde Philosophus hic non procedit demonstrative, sed magis
nominative et exemplariter. II
166 CHAPTER FIVE
entia est per causam, " verum est loquendo de scientia propter quid, sed scientia quia
non oportet esse per causam . . . vel potest negari minor, quia licet praedicamenta se
cundum esse reale non habeant causam propter quam possint sciri... tamen
praedicamenta considerata ut habent rationem dicibilem bene habent causas sicut
modos essendi ex quibus sumuntur modi praedicandi ipsorum. Tunc isto modo non
dat hie Philosophus scientiam de istis,immo a posteriori, ut dictum est. "
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 167
principale dieD quod licet illorum [scil., praedicamentorum] in se non sit aliqua
causa, tamen respectu suarum passionum habent causam, praecipue respectu pas
sionum intentionalium quae insunt eis in quantum considerantur a ratione. Et quod
dicitur "nihil est prius cis naturaliter", verum est in se; tamen respectu inhaerentiae
passionis intentionalis potest eis aliquid esse prius naturaliter."
168 CHAPTER FIVE
count the ten terms signifying the ten genera of things. Since the
terms are taken into account insofar as they signifY something and
since they signifY things, it is not surprising that the logician consid
ering the significative terms also considers what they signifY, namely
things. Thus, Porphyry and Boethius conclude that this is why the
Categories contains many observations concerning things and not
termsJo
Scotus moves an objection to this response. If we say, with Por
phyry and Boethius, that logic deals with things because it deals
with terms signifYing things, it follows that logicians should have a
definite understanding of things because when one of two correla
tives (i.e. a term signifying a thing) is understood, the other (i.e. the
thing signified) is understood as well. This conclusion, Scotus ob
serves, is unwanted, for logicians do not have a definite under
standing of things, because this is something only metaphysicians
can acquire. One could respond that a term is primarily a sign of a
concept, not of a thing, according to a doctrine of signification
widespread in the thirteenth centuryJ l Again, Scotus objects that a
concept is in turn a sign of a thing, so logicians, if they deal with
categories as concepts, should also deal with them as things. Scotus
remarks that this argument not only is against Boethius's (and Por
phyry's) explanation of why Aristotle speaks of things in the Cate
gories, but it also risks undermining the notion of logic as a science
dealing with concepts. Scotus, however, points out that it is not nec
essary that, when a relative item is understood, its correlative is also
understood in all its features. In fact, those who understand a rela
tive item must understand only the features pertaining to its correl
ative insofar as it is a correlative. It is true, then, that in order to
know categories as concepts we have to know the things of which
such concepts are signs, but it is sufficient to know such things only
to the extent that they are represented by concepts, not insofar as
they are things by themselves. It is therefore clear that logicians
must know things only to the extent that they are represented by
70 Porphyry In Cat. 58.21 -29; Boethius In Cat., 163B: '1\tque ideo necesse fuit quo
dammodo disputationem de rebus quoque misceri, ita (ut dictum est) ut non aliter
nisi ex rebus proprietates in sermonibus apparerent, atque ita non de rebus proprie,
sed de praedicamentis, id est, de ipsis rerum significativis vocihus in eo quod signifi
cantes sunt serien disputationis orditur."
11 See Duns Scotus Super Periherm., op. sec., nn. 4-6 (ed. Vives, I, 583). See Pini,
"Species, Concept, and Thing," 25-27.
SCOTUS ON THE LOGICAL CONSIDERATION OF CATEGORIES 1 69
concepts. Scotus can conclude that what Aristotle says about things
in the Categories concerns things not by themselves, but only insofar
as they are represented by concepts. 72
Interestingly, Brito faces the same problem but assumes a dif
ferent position. He thinks that Aristotle in the Categories considers
categories as things in order to obtain an understanding of the
second intentions founded on them. Because of his doctrine of
second intentions, Brito maintains that we have an understanding of
second intentions only if we know the things on which such inten
tions are founded. Consequently, he thinks that logicians must as
sume the metaphysicians' role and must consider things, which are
the foundations and causes of intentions. For this reason logicians
study many things concerning the real being of categories. 73
While Brito thinks that it is due to the very nature of second in
tentions that logic deals with things and with categories as types of
being, Scotus maintains that the consideration of things is merely
accidental to logic. It is true that Aristotle in his Categories often
speaks about things, but he does so only in order to shed more light
on intentional predicates. Speaking about things is pedagogically
useful, but not necessary to obtain knowledge of intentions.74 Scotus
does not hesitate to say that Aristotle is rather careless with the ex
amples he provides.75 Aristotle often speaks of things only to show
" Duns &otus Super Praed., q. I , nn. 22-26 (OPh, I, 255-56): "Contra hoc: "cog
nito uno correlativorum definite, cognoscitur et reliquum," per Aristotelem cap. 'De
relatione'. Ergo si logicus considerat vocem in quantum est significativa rei, oportet
eum cognoscere rem definite. Quod videtur inconveniens . . . Ad primum istorum
postest did quod vox non est primo signum rei sed conceptus, quem oportet logicum
considerare non ut primum subiectum, sed propter cognitionem primi subiecti.
Contra: conceptus est ulterius signum rei; igitur adhuc sequitur quod 0poftet rem
cognosci. Istud argumentum non est tantum contra Boethium, sed etiam contra di
centes logicam esse de conceptibus. Ideo potest dici quod non oportet propter unius
relativi cognitionem alterum cognosci quantum ad omnia quae sibi insunt in se, sed
tantum quantum ad ilia quae insunt ei in quantum refertur ad aliud. Hoc autem
modo non est inconveniens rem cognosci in logica in quantum est significatum per
conceptum."
" Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 2 (ed. Venet., 38va), quoted above, n. 63.
74. Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 2, n. 7 (OPh, I, 259): "Et si de aliquibus aliis quae
istis generalissimis insunt, in quantum sunt entia, hie determinatur, hoe non est prin
cipaliter ad propositum. sed ad maiorem manifestationem ilIorum quantum ad
praedicata intentionalia."
7.5 Ibid., q. 5, n. 21 (OPh, I, 299): "Sicut communiter de exemplis non multum
curat [scil., Aristoteles] nisi quod sint vera ut sunt ad propositum, hoc est quod ars
sua sit vera in eis."
1 70 CHAPTER FIVE
76 Ibid, q. 20, n. 25 (OPh, I, 4 1 2): "Ita, frequenter, quando loquitur [scil., Aris
toteles] de aliquo, ubi non est proprius locus determinandi veritatem, de illo utitur
communi sententia aliorum, usque alibi ubi locus est de ilio veritatem determinare;
dummodo ars possit dari secundum sententias aliorum sicut et secundum veritatem
propriam. Ita paene de omnibus exemplis in logica; quia si sic sit vel non, non curat;
sed quod ars sit vera in istis, si haec sint talia."
CHAPTER SIX
So far I have shown how Scotus's approach to logic and second in
tentions has influenced his interpretation of Aristotle's Categories.
Scotus maintains that logic is the science dealing with the modes in
which our intellect understands things and that those modes do not
reflect the modes in which things are, for second intentions are con
cepts representing modes of understanding things and not modes of
being. Like many of his contemporaries, Scotus regards the Cate
gories as a work devoted to the logical study of the highest genera,
but he also maintains that the properties studied in the Categories are
not real but intentional. Accordingly, the Categories deals with the
way we know the basic kinds of beings, not with the way in which
the basic kinds of beings are. Of course, Scotus must also account
for the numerous passages where Aristotle seems to be talking about
things and not about the mode in which we know them. According
to Scotus, those passages deal with extramental things only acciden
tally, for things are considered as providing an occasion for second
intentions to be caused.
In the previous chapter I gave a general account of how Scotus
reads the Categories. In this chapter I intend to follow Aristotle's Cat
egories more closely in order to reconstruct Scotus's interpretation
topic by topic. As will become evident, Scotus's reading is remark
ably coherent and original.
Since Late Antiquity, interpreters have debated for which reason Aris
totle opens the Categories with a presentation of homonymy, syn
onymy, and paronymy since the first chapter of his treatise seems to be
disconnected from what follows. Interpreters have sometimes tried to
explain it in the light of the treatment of categories in chapter four. 1
6 Duns Scatus Super Praed., q. 5, n. 1 0 (OPh, I, 295-96): "Et ita aequivocum in
9 Peter of John 01ivi Sent. II, q. 7 (ed. Jansen, 1 45-46): "Communis autem opinio
quae Avicennam et philosophos sequi videntur tenet quod ubi est dare plures ra
tiones reales, ibi est dare aliquo modo plures essentias. Probationes autem ad hoc ad
ducere non videntur curasse) quia hoc pro primo principia videntur fere uhique sup
posuisse . . . "
10
Duns Scotus Super Prad. q. 7, n. 1 1 (OPh, I, 3 1 0): " . . . univocum apud 10gicum
dicitur omne illud quod per unam rationem devenit ad intellectum secundum quam
dicitur de multis; apud naturalem non est ornne tale, sed tantum quod est unum se
cundum ultimam formam completivam. Uncle dicitur VII Physicorum: "In genere
rnultae latent aequivocationes", quod tamen logicus non diceret." See also Super
Praed., q. 7, nn. 9-10 (OPh, I, 309), concerning what in reality corresponds to the
univocal logical notion of a genus.
1 1 Super Ptaed., q. 6, n. 4 (OPh, I, 302): "Item, quorum substantia essentialis est
eadem, ipsa sunt eadem essentialiter. Sed univoca univocata habent eandem ra
tionem substantiae univocantis. Ergo omnia univocata essent eadem essentialiter,
quod falsum est, quia sic homo et asinus essent idem essentialiter." Ibid" n. 1 5 (OPh,
I, 305): '�d tertium dieD quod quorum est ratio substantiae propria et completa
eadem, ipsa sunt eadem; sed univocatorum non est ratio eadem propria, lieet ratio
univocantis sit eadem cis, quia ilia nulli univocato est propria."
" Duns Scotus Ord. l, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, n. 1 36 (ed. Vat. IV, 221). See S. D. Dumont,
"Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus," in Routkdg, History of Philosophy, vol. 3, ed. J.
Marenbon (London-New York: Routledge, 1 998): 3 1 9-20.
13 See Marrone, "The Notion of Univocity," 35 1 .
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 1 75
2. Analogy
14 Duns Scotus Super El. Soph., q. 15, n. 6 (ed. Vives, II, 22): "Unde in re potest esse
analogia, sed in voce significante nulla cadit prioritas vel posteriorita� . . . Hoc etiam
patet per signum, quia Aristoteles in libro Praedicammtorum, ubi determinat de vo
cibus significativis, nullam mentionem facit de his quae in re sunt analoga, sed solum
ibi de univocis et aequivocis."
15 Irwin, "Homomymy in Aristotle," 1 1- 1 2.
16 Ashworth, '�nalogy and Equivocation," 1 05-22; C. Marmo, Semiotica e linguaggio
",!lUi Scolastica. Pang;, Bologna, E1:fo.rt /270-/330. La semiotica dei modisti (Rom.: Istituto
storieo italiano per i1 Mediaeva, 1 994), 325-28.
1 76 CHAPTER SIX
11
See below, n. 23. Scotus moves a detailed criticism to logical analogy also in
Super Soph. El., q. 15, nn. 1-8 (ed. Vives, II, 20-23), on which see R. Prentice, "Uni
vocity and Analogy according to Scotus's Super Libros Elenchorum Aristoltlis," ArchilJts
d'histoire liltiraire el doctrinalt du Moyen Age 35 ( 1968): 39-64. On the relationship be
tween univocity and analogy in Scotus, see O. Boulnois, "Duns Scot, theoicien de
I'analogie de I'etre," in Honnefe1der, Wood, and Dreyer, eds. John Duns Scotus. Meta
physics and Elhics, 293-3 15.
" Duns Scotus Super Pra,d., q. 4, nn. 27-29 (OPh, I, 280-82); Simon of Faversham
Super Soph. EI. (quaest. novae), q. 9 (ed. Ebbesen ,I al., 1 23-24); Incerti Auctores Super
Soph. EI., q. 823 (ed. Ebbesen, 3 1 5- 1 7).
19 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 4, n. 27 (OPh, I, 280-8 1): "Ponitur autem analogia
in vocibus tripliciter: vel quia significat unam rationem primo, quae in existendo di
versimocle convenit duobus vel pluribus, quae dicuntur analogata."
20 Incerti Auctores Super Soph. Eltnch, q. 823 (ed. Ebbesen, 3 16); Radulphus Brito
Super Phys., q. 14, Utrum ens sit unum rationis ad substanlwm et accidentem, ffiS. Firenze,
Bib!. Naz. Centr., Conv. Soppr. E. I . 252, fols. 6rb-7ra. I thank Silvia Donati for
calJing my attention to Brito's passage.
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 177
21
Duns Scotus Super Praed, q. 4, n. 30 (OPh, I, 282): "Voces analogicae primo
modo videntur esse apud logicum simpliciter univocae. Quia genus, secundum log
icum, est simpliciter univocum; licet ratio, quam primo significat, diversis speciebus
secundum ordinem conveniat."
22
Peter of Auvergne Super Met. VII, q. 2, ed. A. Monahan in Nine Mediaeval
Thinkers: A Collection r!! Hitherto Unedited Texts, ed. J. R. O'Donnell (Toronto: Pontif·
ical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1 955), 160: "Ens igitur non dicitur penitus ae
quivoce, nee etiam penitus uDivQce, sed dicitur de omnibus entibus secundum aoalo
giam, videlicet secundum diversas rationes, ut habet habitudinem ad aliquam
rationem unam." Simon of Faversham Super Soph. El., quaestiones veteres, q. 18 (ed.
Ebbesen et al., 78); ibid., quaestiones nouae, q. 9 (ed. Ebbesen et aI., 123-24). See Ash
worth, ')\nalogy and Equivocation," 1 20.
1 78 CHAPTER SIX
" Duns Scotus Super Prad., q. 4, n. 28 (OPh, 281): ')\Iio modo ponitur analogia in
vocibus, quia unum significatur per prius per vocem, et reliquum per posterius.
Cuius causa ponitur: quia significare sequitur intelligere. Quod igitur per prius intel
ligitur alia, si significetur per eandem vocem per quam et illud aliud, per prius sig
nificabitur. " Ibid., n. 32 (OPh, I, 282-83): "Secundus modus analogiae supra dictus
videtur impossibilis. Quia contingit ignorare simpliciter prius, quando nomen im
ponitur posteriori, quia posterius simpliciter potest esse nobis prius, et ita prius intel
ligi et prius significari. Si ergo secunda vox ista imponatur priori simpliciter, mani
festum est quod significabit per posterius illud cui primo imponitur, quia illud semel
significavit primo, igitur semper. Vox enim postquam imposita est, non mutatur in
significando illud cui imponitur,igitur ordo rerum non concludit ordinem in signifi
catione vocum."
,. Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 4, nn. 27-36 (OPh, I, 280-84); n. 38 (OPh, I, 285):
"Intelligendum tamen quod vox, quod apud logicum simpliciter aequivoca est, quia
scilicet aeque primo importat multa, apud metaphysicum vel naturalem, qui non
considerat vocem in significando sed ea quae significantur secundum illud quod sunt,
est analoga, propter illud quod ea quae significantur, Hcet non in quantum signifi
cantur, tamen in quantum existunt, habent ordinem inter se. " (I slightly modified
punctuation.)
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 1 79
who deals with the way things are understood and signified, only
speaks of equivocity and univocity.25
Scotus remarks that this conclusion explains why in the Categories
Aristotle mentions only equivocity and univocity but not analogy,
Since the Categories is a work of logic, Aristotle avoids any reference
to analogy, which Scotus thinks is a metaphysical notion.
3. Denominatives
" Duns Seotus Super Sopko E/., q. 15, n. 7 (ed. Vives, II, 22): '\o\d aliam rationem di
cenduro est quod naturalis et etiam metaphysicus ipsas res considerant. Logicus
autem considerat res Tationis, et ideo multa sunt univoca apud logicum, quae di
cuntur aequivoca apud naturalem. Naturalis eoim diceret quod corpus aequivoce
dicitUT de corpore superiori et ioferiori. Sed logicus diceret quod de utroque
diceretur univoce. Uncle a quibuscumque potest logicus abstrahere unam ratianem
communem dicuntur ilia in ilIa ratione communi uniri vel univocari; unde, quia in
corpore superiori et inferiori contingit reperire unam ratianem communem, quae
haec et ilia corpora conveniunt in habendo tres dimensiones, ideo logicus dicit tam
haec quam illa in ilia ratione communi uniri. Sed quia naturalis applicat suam con
siderationem ipsis rebus, et alia est natura corporis corruptibilis et corporis incor
ruptibilis, ideo naturalis dicit quod corpus dicitur de hoc aequivoce et de ilIo. n See
also Q!laest. in Met. IV, q. I, n. 70 (OPh, III, 315- 1 6); Ord. I, d. 3, p. I , q. 3, nn.162-3
(ed. Vat., III, 100); Ord. I, d. 8, p. l , q. 3, n. 83 (ed. Vat., IV, 19 1).
1 80 CHAPTER SIX
" Peter or Auvergne Super !'raed., q. 10 (ed. Andrews, I I); q. B (ed. Andrews, 1 7).
See above, chap. 5, n. 32.
" Duns Scotus Super !'raed., q. B, n. 14 (OPh, I, 3 1 7).
" Cat. 2, 1016- 1 9.
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 181
are divided thanks to two relations, being said if a subject and being in
a subject. These two relations single out four classes of beings: (a)
general objects or universal substances, namely things said of a sub
ject but not in a subject; (b) particular properties or individual acci
dents, namely things in a subject but not said of a subject; (c) gen
eral properties or universal accidents, namely things said of a
subject and in a subject; and finally, (d) individual objects or indi
vidual substances, namely things neither in a subject nor said of a
subject.29
Scotus maintains that the two divisions concern things insofar as
they are understood, and that Aristotle's sayings must be interpreted
accordingly. The interpretation of the first division - between
things said with and without combination - is not particularly prob
lematic, for Scotus suggests that when Aristotle introduces his first
division as a division of things said, he is not referring to sentences
and terms, but to the concepts sentences and terms signify. Scotus's
interpretation of the second, fourfold division, however, is less
straightforward, for Aristotle explicitly introduces it as a division of
the "things that are," and this fact is at odds with Scotus's view that
here Aristotle is dealing with concepts. Scotus maintains that when
Aristotle introduces the second division as a division of things that
are, he must be read as referring to things that are in the mind and
have rational existence. 30
Scotus, by his interpretation, takes a position against those who
consider the two relations begin said if a subject and being in a subject
as holding between extramental things, for he maintains that these
relations are intentional and not real since they hold between things
only insofar as they are understood.
By contrast, Peter of Auvergne and Simon of Faversham think
thatbeing said if a subject and being in a subject are two real relations
constituting categories in their real being.3 1 Following Avicenna,
Simon of Faversham says that not being in a subject - namely, sub-
sisting in itself - and being in a subject are two real modes of being,
by which substances and accidents are characterized, respectively. 32
Radulphus Brito holds a similar position.33 These authors think that
the fourfold distinction the two relations produce is a distinction of
real beings. Simon of Faversham accordingly maintains that a sub
stance is said to be primary because of two real acts, subsisting and
being subject to properties.34
Scotus adopts a different position. He maintains that 'being in' or
'inhering' is an expression equivocal to a first and a second inten
tion. As a first intention, being in is a real relation, pertaining to the
nine accidental categories. Aristotle deals with that relation and
those categories in his Metaphysics. As a second intention, being in is
an intentional relationship, pertaining to things not considered in
themselves but insofar as the intellect understands them. Logic deals
with the intentional meaning of 'being in'. Taken as a second in
tention term, 'to be in' means 'to predicate a non-essential predi
cate'. Similarly, 'being said of' is an intentional term that means the
same as 'predicating an essential predicate'. 35
Scotus, therefore, thinks that the fourfold distinction Aristotle
puts forward in Cat. 2 is not a division of things into substances and
accidents. It is the metaphysician who considers substances and ac
cidents, but the division of the Categories is logical and is carried out
according to intentional relations. Accidental predicates attributed
to a subject, as opposed to real accidents, inhere in the sense of in
herence Aristotle describes in Cat. 2. These accidental predicates
are to be distinguished from real accidents, which are extramental
32 Simon of Faversham Super PrlUd., q. 1 3 (ed. Mazzarella, 86): "Propter quod dicit
Avicenna secundo Metaphysice sue quod ratio predicamenti substantie est quod sit
res cuius esse est non in alia, et ratio predicamenti accidentis est quod sit res cuius
esse est in alia."
33 Radulphus Brito Super Prtud., q. 8 (ed. Venet., 43vb): " . . . omne ens aut est per
se subsistens aut in alia existens."
34 Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. 5 (ed. Mazzarella, 77): " . . . substantia dieM
itur duplici actu, scilicet ah aetu suhsistendi et ab actu suhstandi. Prima substantia
subsistit proprie, et ideo dicitur proprie substantia ah actu suhsistendi. Principaliter
etiam substat, et ideo dicitur principaliter substantia ab actu substandi."
" Duns Scotus Super Porph., q. 3 1 , nn. 9, I I (OPh,I, 1 96-97): "Sciendum autem quod
'accidens' aequivoce est nomen primae impositionis et secundae . . . Secundo modo
adhuc est aequivocum. Uno enim modo idem est quod 'praedicatum non-essentiale',
et sic est idem quod 'esse in' secundum quod 'esse in' distinguitur contra 'dici de' in
principio Praedicamentorum. Quia quod 'dicitur de' est praedicatum essentiale; quod 'est
in' non-essentiale." Super Porph., q. 32, n. 16 (OPh, I, 204). Super Porph., q. 23, n. 7
(OPh,I, 2 1 5);q. 35,n. 8 (OPh,I, 221), quoted above, chap. 5, n. 25.
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 1 83
" Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 12, n. 31 (OPh, I, 363): "Nota quod divisio sub
stantiae in primam et secundam non est divisio generalissimi in species, sed subiecti
in accidentia, quia 'substantia' secundum quod intelligitur - secundum quam con
siderationem pertinet ad logicum - dividitur in intentianes sibi accidentes."
37 Duns Scatus Super Por ph., q. 4, n. 9 (OPh, I, 24): "Secundae autem substantiae,
ut ibi loquitur, non sunt praeter operationem intellectus. Probatio minoris: Dividit in
principio capituli substantiam in primam et secundam. Si igitur ilIa divisio valeat, se
quitur quod membra, ut ibi intelligit [scil., Aristoteles in principio Praedicamentorum],
opponuntur. Sed quod est 'secunda substantia praeter operationem intellectus' non
opponitur primae substantiae, sed est idem sibi. Igitur non intelligit de secunda sub
stantia quoad illud quod est ens praeter operationem intellectus." Ibid., n. 1 1 (OPh,
1, 24): " " . dico quod secundae substantiae, ut ibi loquitur [scit., Aristoteles in prin
cipio Praedicamentorum] , sunt accidentia non realia, de quibus ponit aliud membrum,
scilicet 'esse in', sed intentionalia, quibus per se competit 'dici de'." It must be noted
that here Scotus considers the inherence that Aristotle introduces in the Categories as
a real accident, contrarily to what he says elsewhere. See above, n. 35.
1 84 CHAPTER SIX
substantia in primam et secundam, non est divisio generis in species, - cum nihil
contineatur sub secunda substantia quod non sit in prima, - sed est divisio generis
secundum diversos modos essendi. Nam secunda substantia significat naturam generis
secundum se absolutam; prima vero substantia significat earn ut individualiter sub
sistentem."
" Cat. 3, I b l O- 1 5. Aristode states the same rule in Anal. Pr. I, I, 24b27-3 1 ; 14,
32b38-33a5.
40 Simon of Faversham Super Pra,d., q. 3 (ed. Mazzarella, 76): "Dico ad hoc quod
regula sic est intelligenda, quod quando aliquid reale et in linea predicamentali dic
itur de predicato, illud dicitur de subiecto . . . "
41 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 9, n. 14 (OPh, I, 331): "Sed ad quaestionem tunc est
dicendum quod regula est vera, quia per se datur de secundis intentionibus, sicut logicus
debet loqui, et sumendo 'praedicari' proprie, quod est 'prae alio diei'. Tunc tantum et
non plus significatur per regulam: 'quod est prius priore in genere est prius posteriore'
vel 'quod est superius superiore est superius inferiore', cuius veritas nulli dubia est. n
., Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 9, nn. 15- 1 7 (OPh, I, 33 1 -32).
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 185
5. Sufficientia praedicamentorum:
The distinction and derivation if categories
des CaligorilS (Xlle-XVe siicles): Xllle Synposium europien de logique et de s""antique midii
vais, ed. J. Biard and I. Rosier, forthcoming.
., Albert the Greal Liber tk Praed., IT. I, cap. VII (ed. Borgnel, I, 163-64), Thomas
Aquinas In Met. V, leel. IX, nn. 889-893; In Phys. III, leel. V, n. 332. See]. E Wippel,
"Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories;" Wippel, Tiu Meta
physi<a/ T/wught of Thomas Aquinas. From Finite &inK to UnCTeated Being (The Catholic
University of America Press: Washington, D.C., 2000), 208-28.
1 86 CHAPTER SIX
thing is the other. In each predication the verb 'to be' links the sub
ject to the predicate. For Thomas, this entails that the verb 'to be'
has as many meanings as there are modes in which a predicate is at
tributed to a subject. Thus, when we say, "Socrates is a man," 'to be'
means a substance; when we say, "Socrates is white," 'to be' means
a quality, and so on. Moreover, Aquinas maintains that to each of
these meanings of the copula there corresponds a different genus of
being, namely the genus 'substance', the genus 'quality', and so on.
By this way, Aquinas obtains the genera of being or categories
through an analysis of predication.
Other authors derive the list of the Aristotelian categories by re
ducing them to some basic modes of being. Simon of Faversham
and Radulphus Brito, for example, derive the categories from two
basic modes of being, being not in a subject and being in a subject. The
mode of being not in a subject, which pertains to accidental being,
is then subdivided until the nine accidental categories are obtained.
Simon of Faversham, unlike Brito, does not distinguish this way of
deriving the categories from the derivation from the modes of pred
ication, for, like Aquinas, he thinks that there is a correspondence
between the modes of being and the modes of predication. Occa
sionally, he even states that categories are constituted by the modes
of predication themselves.<6
Scotus maintains that categories are the most basic types of
essences but that Aristotle does not present them as such in Cat. 4.
Here categories are considered as they are understood and as con
cepts. Consequently, Scotus first asks whether it is up to the logician
to argue for the distinction among categories. He replies that, not
the logician, but the metaphysician must deal with the distinction
among categories and provide their derivation since categories are
distinguished insofar as they are mind-independent essences, not in
sofar as they are understood. Considered as they are understood,
categories are not distinguished from one another since they are all
most universal generic concepts on an equal footing. It follows that
the logician must accept the distinction among categories from the
metaphysician and cannot give any derivation of or justification for
'" Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. 12 (ed. Mazzarella, 83-85); q. 13 (ed. Maz
zarella, 86); Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 8 edited by W E. McMahon in "Radul
phus Brito on the Sufficiency of the Categories," Cahiers de {'Institut du Moyen Age gTec
,I lalin 39 (1981): 8 1 -96.
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 187
it. Accordingly, Scotus does not provide any justification o f the list
of the categories in his logical writings, but he says that perhaps the
metaphysician can provide such a derivation:
It must be said that there are only ten highest genera of things, whose
distinction is not drawn according to something merely logical, but
according to the essences themselves. For the intention of the highest
genus is only numerically varied in them [scil. the categories] . Hence,
regarding what here is difficult, this question is more metaphysical
than logical. Therefore, it is enough to know that things are so, al
though the metaphysician perhaps must or can know why they are
SO,47
47 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 1 1 , n. 26 (OPh, I, 350-5 1): "Dicendum quod tantum
sunt decem generalissima rerum, quorum distinctio non sumitur penes aliquid log
icum tantum, sed penes ipsas essentias. Ipsa enim intentio generalissimi est tantum
variala numero in istis. Uncle quoad illud quod difficultatis est, magis metaphysica
quam logica. Ideo sufficienter hie scitur quia ita est, quamvis forte metaphysicus de
beat vel possit scire propter quid."
.. Duns Scotus Q.uaest. in Met. V, q. 5-6, nn. 73-80 (OPh, III, 464-66).
", Peter of John Olivi Sent. II, q. 28 (ed.Jansen, I, 483-86).
1 88 CHAPTER SIX
,. Duns Scatus Q!<aesl. in Mel. V, q. 5-6, nn. 73-5 (OPh, 1II, 464): "Nota: variae
sunt viae divisivae ostendendi sufficientiam praedicamentorum, quae videntur du
pliciter peccare. Primo, quia ostendunt oppositum propositi, scilicet quod divisio
entis in haec decem non sit prima. Si enim prius fiat in ens per se et in ens non per
se, et ultra unum membrum subdividatur vel ambo: aut quaelibet divisio erit tantum
nominis aequivoci, in aequivocata, quod nihil est probare - quia nomina sunt ad
placitum; aut aliquo istorum decem erit conceptus cammuniar immediatior enti, et
ita ens non immediate dividitur in decem. Exemplum patet: ponendo quod per divi
sianes multas subordinatas in genere substantiae tandem deveniretur ad decem
species specialissimas, illae non primo dividerent substantiam. Secundo, quia omnes
illae viae divisivae non probant. Oporteret enim probare quod divisum sic dividitur,
et praecise sic, et hoc ad propositum, scilicet quod dividentia constituant generalis
sima."
" Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 5, (ed. Venet., 4Orb-va): '�d istarn quaestianem
dico quod. logicus non potest per se ponere distinctionem inter praeclicamenta, sed
per accidens potest aliqualiter ponere distinctionem inter ea. Primum declaratur et
ad hoc declarandum suppono duo. Primum est quod logicus quicquid considerat hoc
est ut habet attributionem ad intentiones, quia formaliter considerat intentiones et
non res nisi ut super ipsas fundantur intentiones . . . modo praedicamenta penes or
dinem quam habent ad intentiones secundas non distinguuntur. Ergo logicus non
habet distinguere praedicamenta secundum quod ea considerat, et sic logicus per se
non considerat distinctionem praedicamentorum."
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 1 89
Scotus admits that in the Categories Aristotle also deals with other
properties, which would be difficult to consider as pertaining to cat
egories as they are understood. These are properties such as, for a
substance, not having a contrary, not being subject to more or less, and being
subject to contraries. These properties pertain to categories to the ex
tent that they are beings, but Scotus thinks that Aristotle deals with
them not because they are the main object of his interest, but only
because their consideration can shed some light on the intentional
properties logic considersY Scotus's position is very different from
entia, hie determinatur, hoc non est principaliter ad propositum, sed ad maiorem
manifestationem illorum quantum ad praedieata intentionalia."
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 191
" Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 2 1 (ed. Andrews, 38-39): "Et ad hoc di
cendurn: videtur quod duplex est substantia. Est coim substantia quae est
compo<s>itum et est substantia quae est simplex. Et ista adhuc est duplex, quaedam
est materia, quaedam autem forma. Cum igitur quaeritur utrum differentia sit sub
stantia, dicendum quod non est substantia quae est compositum sed est substantia
quae est simplex, scilicet forma." Ibid., q. 59 (ed. Andrews, 80-8 1): "Sed ad istud est
dicendum quod differentia substantialis non est qualitas secundum quod hie
definitur quaJitas."
.3 Simon of Faversham Super Praed., q. 45 (ed. Mazzarella, 141); ibid. (ed. Maz
zarella, 1 42): " . . . dieo quod predicamenta distinguuntur penes diversos modos pred
icandi, qui sumuntur a diversis modis essendi. Cum dicitur quod differentia substan
tialis predicatur in quale, dico quod extendendo modum predicandi in quale,
differentia predicatur in quale. Et tu queres: Quomodo tunc distinguetur [ed.: dis
tinguendo] modurn differentie substantialis a modo predicandi qualitatis? Dico quod
hoc modo, quia qualitas que est predicamentum predicatur in quale absolute; sed
differentia substantialis non predicatur in quale absolute, sed magis in quale quid; ex
hoc quod imponat formam predicatur in quale, ex hoc quod imponat substantiam
predicatur in quid; et ideo ratione tocius dicitur predicari in quid."
64 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 14, n. 5 (OPh, I, 380): "Si dicatur quod Aristoteles
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 1 93
intelligit in V quod hahet modum praedicandi 'in quale': Hoc non videtur verum,
quia metaphysicus a logico differt in hoc quod metaphysicus considerat ens in
quantum ens; logicus in quantum consideratur a ratione. Quod ergo habet solum
modum praedicandi 'in quale', quamvis a logico posset aliquo modo did qualitas,
non tamen a metaphysico nisi sit essentialiter qualitas."
65 Ibid., n. 1 0 (OPh, 381): ''Ad quaestionem poteS! diei quod differentia in genere
substantiae est substantia, quia est idem per se ei quod est per se substantia. Non
tamen est species vel individuum in genere substantiae, nec per se substantia. Verior
tamen est talis praedicatio 'rationale est substantia' quam ista 'quantum est sub
stantia', quamvis utraque necessaria et utraque per accidens. Prima enim est per ac
cidens, non quia aliquid est substantia cui accidit rationale, sed cui per se inest ratio
nale. Sed secunda est per accidens, quia illud est substantia cui accidit quantum."
0; Ibid., n. I I (OPh, I, 381).
1 94 CHAPTER SIX
69 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 14 (ed. Venet., 49va-b): " . . . quod habet unam
species eorum in quas essent dividenda, secundum quod sunt genera, non sunt notae,
nee passiones eorum quae insunt eis secundum quod considerantur a ratione. De his
autem passionibus, quae insunt eis secundum esse naturale eorum, plenius determi
natur in libris naturalibus et Metaphysicae; de 'actione' et 'passione' in III Physicorum
et in De generah'one; de 'quando' et 'ubi' in IV Physicorum, in hoc quod determinatur
ibi de loco et tempore . . . ; de 'positione' et 'habitu' aliquantulum V Metaphysical. Et
ita determinatio hie habita de istis sufficiens est quantum ad logicum."
73 Frede, "Title, Unity and Authenticity," 1 1-24. See above, Introduction, n. 9.
75 Duns Scotus Super Pra,d., q. 43, nn. 10- 1 1 (OPh, I, 553-54). Scotus is referring
to M,t. V, I I , 1 0 1 8b9-a23.
76 Duns Scotus Super Praed., q. 44, nn. 1 8- 1 9 (OPh, I, 563). Albert the Great had
already given a similar explanation of Aristotle's treatment of these notions in the
Categories, see Liber d, Pra,d., tr. 7, chap. I (ed. Borgnet, I, 273).
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 197
1 0. Seotus's omissions
77 Duns Scotus Super Prad, q. I I , n. 26 (OPh, I, 350-5 1). See above, par. 5.
78 See above, Introduction, par. 2. See A. Tabarroni, IUUtrum deus sit in praedica
mento': Ontological Simplicity and Categorial Inclusion," in LA tradition midiJvale des
CaUgorin, forthcoming.
1 98 CHAPTER SIX
83 Radulphus Brito Super Praed., q. 10 (ed. Venet., 46va-b): "Et ideo dieD aliter ad
XVII, 1 6-47).
89 Averroes In Mel. XII, com. 19 ( ed. Venet., 306B).
90 Peter of John Olivi &n!. II, q. 14 (ed. Jansen, I, 264); Henry of Ghent Summa
quaes!. •rd., a. 55, q. 6 (ed. Badius, II, 1 12S). See Henninger, Reilltions, 52-54.
91 Peter of Auvergne Super Praed., q. 46 (ed. Andrews, 64); Radulphus Brito Super
Praed., q. 23 (ed. Venet., 57vb-58vb).
SCOTUS'S READING OF ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' 201
92 Duns Scatus Qjlaest. in Met. V; q. I I , n. 50 (OPh, III, 583): "Relatio realis non est
eadem res cum fundamento, quia nulla unitiva continentia." See also Ord. II, d. I , q.
4-5, n. 275 (ed. Vat. , VII, 136); Leel. II, d. I , q. 4-5, n. 184 (ed. Vat. , XVIII, 61 -66).
See Henninger, Relations, 68-78.
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Torrell, J.-P. Initiation a saint Thomas d'Aquin. Sa personne et son fEUVTt. Fribourg-Paris:
Editions du Cerf, 1993.
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( 1975): 7-32.
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Century Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press,
1981.
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-. "Thomas Aquinas's Derivation of the Aristotelian Categories (Predicaments)."
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Wolter, A. B. "Reflections on the Life and Works of Scotus." The American Catholic
Philosophical QyarteriJ 47 ( 1 993): 1 -36.
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Yokoyama, T. "Simon of Faversham's Sophisma Universale est intentio." Mediaeval
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INDEX OF NAMES
Sabra, A. I. I On, 24n 99, 102, 1 02n, 103, 1 03n, 105, 1 05n,
Schmaus, M. 46n 107, 1 1 3, 1 1 7, 1 2 1 -123, 125, 130,
Schmidt, R. W. 32n, 33n, 50n, 60n 132n, 138, 1 44, 1 44n, 1 45, 145n, 1 46-
Schofield, M. 3n 1 48, 152, 172n, 174, 183, 184n, 185,
SCOIUS, John Duns see John Duns Sco- 185n, 186, 198, 1 98n
IUS Thomas of Erfurt 1 58n, 1 59n
Sharples, R. W. 7n Thomas Sutton (Anglicus) 32, 32n, 36,
Shiel,j. 9n 36n, 37, 37n, 38, 38n, 39, 40, 46n,
Shields, C. 4n, 1 72n 159, 1 59n
Sileo, L.I OOn Tine, A. 34n
Simon of Faversham 14, 16, 17, 48, TorreU,j.-P. 41n, 50n
68, 72, 72n, 73, 73n, 74, 74n, 75, 750, Trendelenburg, A. 3n
76, 76n, 77, 77n, 78- 82, 82n, 83, 87-
90, 95, 103, 103n, I I I , 1 15, 1 1 6, 1 2 1 , Van Riet, L. 32n, 62n, 102n
123, 1 27, 128, 136, 138, 152, 153, Verhulst, C. 1 16n
153n, 1 54, 1 60, 160n, 163, 163n, 165, Vives, L. 30n, 81 n, 82n, 1 06n, 1 14n,
1 65n, 166, 176, I 76n, 177, 1 77n, 1 8 1 , 1 1 7n, 1 47n, 168n, 1 75n, 1 76n, 1 79n
1 8 1 n, 182, 182n, 1 84, 184n, 186,
1 86n, 1 9 1 , 192, 192n, 1 98, 198n, Walter Chatton 1 16
1 99n, 200, 200n Wardy, R. 3n
Simplicius 4n, fin, 7, 7n, 9, 9n, 10, Webb, C. C. I. 1 58n
I On, 1 02n, 172n Wedin, M. 4n
Smith, R. 3n Weisheipl,j. A. 23n, 24n
Sorabji, R. 3n, 4n, 6n, 8n, 9n, l in Wiesner,J. 3n, 9n
Spade, P. V. 16n, 1 09, 1 09n William Alnwick 158n
Speer, A. 1 58n William Arnaldi 40, 43, 43n
Strange, S. K. 6n, 8n, 9n William Burley 20n
Swiezawski, S. 1 16n William Ockham 20n, 30n, 46, 46n,
47n, I IOn, 1 16
Tabarroni, A. 45n, 197n, 199n William of Champeaux I I
Tachau, K. 45n, 1 16, 1 16n, 1 1 8n William of Moerbeke IOn
Te Velde, R. A. 41n William of Ware 46, 46n
Temporini, H. 7n Wippel,j. 63n, 1 45n, 185n, 1 98n
Thomas Aquinas 14, 16, 17, 18, 24n, Wolter, A. B. 99n, 1 1 9n, 124n, 125n
30, 30n, 32n, 33, 33n, 35, 40, 4 1 , 41n, Wood, R. 29n, 99n, 1 76n
42, 45, 45n, 46, 46n, 47, 47n, 48-50,
50n, 5 1 , 51n, 52-54, 54n, 55, 55n, 56- Yokoyama, T. 72n, 76n, 78n, 79n
58, 58n, 59, 59n, 60-63, 63n, 64, 65,
67, 68, 72, 76, 77, 78, 8 1 , 8 1 n, 82n, Zimmermann, A. 33n
83, 84, 84n, 85, 85n, 86n, 90-92, 98,
INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Abstract and concrete intentions 70- generalissima 15, 16, 39, 142-144, 1 48,
74, 87-90, 95, I I I , 1 26-1 29, 132, 1 36- 154, 162, 1 90, 198; as immediatelydi
138 verse 1 44, 1 48; as meanings 3, 5, 7, 9,
Abstract and concrete accidents 74, 1 2 , 27, 37, 38, 185; as rational beings
75, 128, 129, 152, 179, 180 154-1 56; as real beings 154-156; as
Abstraction 52, 73 subjects or foundations of second in
Accidental consideration 73, 74, 1 3 3 tentions 13, 1 7, 37, 40-44, 48, 138-
Accidents 1 06, 1 4 5 , 146, 148-150, 1 40, 169, 188; as things 1 , 2, 4, 7, 9,
153, 1 8 1 -183; common 1 00, 104 16, 37, 43, 1 69; as words 8, 9, 10, 12,
Acts of the intellect 35, 46, 54, 55, 8 1 , 16, 2 1 , 27, 37, 38, 1 40, 1 4 1 , 167, 168;
82, 88, 96, 1 06, 124, 125 (see airo First considered accidentally in logic 139,
act of operation of the intellect; Sec 164; derivation of 185-188 197; dis
ond act or operation of the intellect; tinction among 144, 148, 185-187,
Third act or operation of the intellect) 200; in the Metaphysics 2, 3, 5, 6, 1 2 ; in
Analogy 160, 1 75; of being 157, 158, the Topics 2, 3; intentional vs exten
1 76, 1 78; metaphysical 1 75, 1 78, 1 79; sional interpretation of 14, I S; logical
logical 175-178; three kinds of 1 76, consideration of categories I, 1 1- 1 3,
1 77 1 5 , 1 7- 1 9, 2 1 -26, 32, 39-44, 48, 1 39-
Apparens, Apparmtio. 77, 79 1 44, 150, 154, 157- 1 59, 1 6 1 , 164,
167, 1 7 1 , 186, 188, 197; last six: 195;
Being said of 4, 5, 4 1 , 1 8 1 - 1 84 metaphysical consideration of cate
Being 39, 40; as copula 3 1 , 120, 186; gories I , 10-13, 1 5 , 19, 2 1-25, 39-44,
cognitive 1 0 1 -1 04, 106, 1 1 3, 126; ma 139, 1 44, 147, 150, 154, 167, 186,
terial 100, 103; objective 13, 46, 49, 187, 197; number of 1 , 8, 185-189;
84, 105, 1 14; of reason or rational 33, principles or causes of 2 1 , 22, 25, 26,
35, 103; and essence 198; quidditative 164-167; properties of 22, 23, 25, 26,
or essential 1 0 1 , 103, 1 04; subjective 40, 140, 1 63- 1 66, 1 75, 189- 1 9 1 , 1 94,
13, 45, 1 14 195, 197; twofold consideration of 1 2 ,
1 3, 1 7, 19, 20, 23, 24, 27, 28, 36, 39,
Capable of being ordered in a genus (or 40-42, 138, 139, 144, 147, 1 5 1 ; unity
dinabi" ingenere) 158-161 of 194, 195
Categories: as a logical treatise 6- 1 1 , 18, Comparison between a concept and a
38, 167, 195; as a metaphysical trea thing 58, 6 1
tise 5-9; as a work for beginners 8; as a Comparison between concepts 60, 6 1 ,
youthful work 6; as concerning the 1 1 3, 1 19, 120, 125, 1 38, 143
way we understand things 18; authen Comparison between something and its
tiey of 4; subject matter of 8-1 I , 2 1 , supposita 74-76, 78
38, 157- 1 63; unity o f 4 , 157, 1 7 1 , Comparison between two things 66,
1 72, 196 69, 70,82, 1 1 5, 125
Categories: as a hierarchy 15, 16, 26, Concepts 9, 1 2 , 1 3 , 16, 19, 28, 30, 3 1 ,
27, 1 5 3- 1 55, 157, 159, 160; as con 33, 36, 4 1 , 46, 50-53, 59, 69, 76, 84,
cepts 7, 9, 16, 26, 1 40, 1 4 1 -1 44, 186, 87, 102, 105, 1 1 0, 120, 124, 128, 1 33,
197; as constituted of matter and 137, 163, 167, 168, 173; representa
form 2 1 , 198; as constituted by two el tive 54, 55, 57, I l l , 168, 169; false 56;
ements 144-147, 152, 154, 197; as fictitious 56, I I I , 1 1 3; common 143
essences 25, 27, 142, 144, 147, 152, Correspondence between intentions and
1 6 1 , 166, 167, 180, 186, 187; as genera things 78, 80, 1 10, 148
224 INDEX OF SUBJECTS
Definition 3 1 , 165, 189; logical 94--96, sible 45, 9 1 -93, 96, 98, 105; as cause
156 of second intentions 73, 75, 76, 77,
Denomination (paronymy) 4, 5, 1 79, 91, 96-98, 102, 106-109, 1 1 0, 1 1 5,
180 1 1 6, 1 1 8, 1 20-1 26, 140, 1 6 1 , 162, 164
Dictum de omni ,t de nufro 184 Intelligible species 45, 46, 85-87; 1 0 1 ,
DiiJerentiM 1 9 1 , 192, 193 102, 104-106, I I I
Intention 28, 30, 32, 1 06; ontological
Equivocity (homonymy) 4, 5, 1 7 1 - 1 76, status of 45-47, 1 1 4, 142, 1 6 1 (see
1 79; of 'being' 1 78; of terms of first also first intentions and second inten
and second intentions 1 30-132 tions)
Essence 14, 59, 64, 75, 78, 85, 94, 1 0 1 ,
102, 108, 1 2 7 , 133, 147, 1 48, 154, Logic 1 , 1 2 , 20, 77, 95, 105, 126, 128,
1 73, 200; three consideration of 62, 1 4 1 , 163, 168-1 7 1 , 1 88, 1 89, 199; as a
63, 100-104; unknown to us 163, 165, rational science 22, 24, 27, 1 4 1 ; as a
166 sermocinal science 22, 24, 35; subject
Essential attributes or properties 1 0 I , matter of 20, 24, 27, 32-36
103, 1 33
Essential consideration 73 Matter 1 2 , 2 1 , 196-198
Examples 169, 1 70, 189 Modes of being 29, 53, 67, 90, 92-94,
107, I I I , 1 1 2, 123, 126, 1 33, 134,
Fictitious entities 1 6 1 142, 1 44-149, 152-154, 162, 166, 167,
First intentions 28-3 1 , 36, 42, 48, 55, 1 77, 185, 186, 195, 197; proper 88,
6 1-64, 69, 73, 88, 9 1 , I I I , 1 1 2, 1 1 5, 89, 9 1 ; common 88, 89, 9 1 , 95, 157,
1 1 8, 1 20, 1 30, 137, 184 167
First act or operation of the intellect Modes of understanding 31, 51, 53,
33, 66, 8 1 , 1 1 4, 1 16 54, 59, 62, 68, 69, 80, 85, 86, 90, 95,
Form 12, 2 1 , 196, 198 108, 109, 1 2 1 , 1 2 7 - 1 30, 132, 136,
137, 1 40, 1 42-144, 163, 1 7 1 , 1 77 , 1 78
Genus 1 3 , 1 5 , 27, 31, 36, 43, 5 1 -53,
55, 56, 58, 64-66, 68, 69, 74-78, 80, Names 69
82, 96, 98, I I I , 1 1 3, 1 1 7, 120, 1 2 1 , Nominalism 2, 10, 1 1
126, 1 29, 142, 143, 1 48, 184, 190, Not being in a subject 38, 4 1 , 146-148,
1 94; definition of 95, 1 27, 128 152, 1 66, 1 8 1 , 183, 190, 1 9 1 , 193, 199
God: whether He belongs to a category
199, 200; as the highest immaterial Object of the intellect 46, 84, 86, 87,
substance 2 1 , 146 97, 1 0 1 , 105, 106, 109, 123, 1 24
Grammar vs logic 3 1 , 69, 70
Paronymy see denomination
Homomymy see equivocity Phantasm 88, 89, 105
Postpr..dicamenta 4, 196
Identity between the knowing intellect Predicables 1 6 1
and the thing known 84, 85, 105 Predication 3, 22, 24, 34, 8 1 , 82, 1 0 1 ,
Imposition of terms 28, 3 1 , 32, 38, 39 103, 108, 1 1 9, 1 2 7 , 1 3 3 , 145, 1 49,
Individuals 69, 70, 100, 103, 108, 133, 1 5 1 - 1 53, 155, 159, 167, 180, 1 82-187,
135, 1 36, 148, 1 8 1 190, 194, 195; designated (pr..dicatio
Inherence (being in) 4 , 5, 145-148, signata) 1 34-- 1 37 , 1 84; in qual< 1 9 1 , 192;
153, 1 8 1 ; as first intention 1 3 1 , 1 49, in quid 192; of an essence 78-80, 95; of
150, 1 82; as second intention 120, intentions 7 1 , 85, 94, 129, 132-137;
1 3 1 , 1 49, 150, 1 8 1 , 182 performed (pr..dicaho ,xercita) 134-137,
Inner word (verbum) 46, 55, 85 184
Intellect 24, 25, 33, 4 1 , 46, 48, 53, 58, Properties: intentional 55, 56, 65, 76,
1 0 1 , 1 1 2; agent 9 1 , 92, 105, I I I ; pos- 77, 85, 87, 99, 1 0 1 , 102, 106-108,
INDEX OF SUBJECTS 225
1 1 2, 126, 133, 134, 139, 140, 150, 90, 95, 107, 1 15, 1 1 6, 120; following
1 5 1 , 157, 163, 1 64, 166, 1 7 1 , 1 75, from the modes of understanding 5 1 ,
188, 190, 193, 195; of substance 38, 53-55, 59, 62, 68, 83, 107; foundation
1 9 1 - 194; of things 25, 29, 64, 78-80, of 5 1 -53, 57, 58, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68,
87, 150, 156, 157, 163-165, 1 9 1 , 195; 75, 78, 93, 99, 1 1 0, 1 1 1 , 1 1 3, 122,
Proposition 1 3 , 20, 25, 3 1 , 82, 96, 97, 1 24, 138; occasion of 1 1 0- 1 1 3, 1 7 1 ; ul
148 modus 129, 1 30, 132; ul quid 129, 130,
Propria 189 132
Second act or operation of the intellect
Quality 14, 29, 30, 36, 142, 143, 145, 33, 8 1 , 1 1 5- 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 120, 1 2 1
183, 186, 189, 1 9 1 - 1 95 Signification 50, 69, 7 1 , 72, 75, 1 00-
Quantity 142, 143, 145, 189, 195 102, 128, 1 4 1 , 142, 145, 168, 179,
190; p"prius ,Iposterius 1 77, 178
Ru.tio subslantW I 73 Species 1 3, 31, 36, 43, 53, 55, 56, 58,
Realism 2, I I 65, 66, 68, 69, 7 1 , 76, 77, 82, 96, 98,
Reasoning 33, 8 1 ; as the subject mat 109, I l l , 1 1 7, 120, 1 26-129, 132,
ter of logic 24, 25, 35 133, 135, 1 48, 190, 1 94, 195
Reflection (of the intellect on itseiD 48, Subjects and predicates 22, 23, 25- 27,
49, 53, 54, 58, 59, 63, 64, 67-69, 73, 37, 39, 82, 1 48, 150, 159, 1 60, 185
89, 99, 106, 107, 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 19, 120, Substance 1 2 , 14, 27, 29, 30, 36, 40,
125, 138 1 0 1 , 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 1 5 1 ,
Relations 147, 189, 195; of reason or 1 52, 157, 158, 186, 189, 1 9 1 - 193,
rational 49, 6 1 , 65, 66, 68, 99, 1 18, 195, 1 97-200; primaty or first 12, 26,
1 2 1 - 1 26, 143; real 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 200, 201 4 1 , 166, 1 8 1 , 183, 1 84; secondary or
Relationship between first and second second 4 1 , 166, 1 8 1 , 183, 184
intentions 92-94, 1 1 2, 1 1 8, 1 30 S'!lJicimtia pratdicammtorum 185-1 89,
Representation 50- 52, 56, 57, 59, 85 197
Syllogism 13, 29, 31, 38, 96, 97, 159;
Sayable (dUibile) 39, 158- 1 6 1 , 166 as the subject matter of logic 20, 24,
Science 165; quia and propUr quid 165, 34, 35, 37, 38
166 Synonymy S�t univocity
Second intentions 12, 1 3, 1 7 , 20, 27,
28, 29, 31, 36, 37, 40, 42-45, 48, 55, Things as understood 13, 19, 4 1 , 55-
6 1 , 64, 69, 88, 9 1 , 155, 1 6 1 , 1 84, 1 88; 58, 6 1 , 62, 68, 72, 74, 77, 78, 82-87,
as accidents 1 00; as concepts 13, 1 2 1 , 90, 94, 1 0 1 , 102, 1 04-106, 1 1 3, 120,
128; as concepts o f concepts 1 7, 3 1 , 1 2 1 , 123, 1 24, 126, 127, 140
48, 5 1 , 57, 93, 1 1 1 , 138, 1 7 1 ; as rela Third act or operation of the intellect
tions 28, 3 1 , 48, 59-6 1 , 65-70, 78, 99, 33, 8 1 , 96, 1 1 7
1 1 3- 1 15, 1 1 6, 1 1 7- 1 20, 1 2 1 , 122, 1 38; Transcendentals 39
as representations of real properties
1 7 , 48, 66-70, 77-80, 83, 9 1 , 93, 138; Universals 1 1 , 1 3 , 25, 29, 40, 4 1 , 59,
as the subject matter of logic 32-36; as 62, 63,65, 69, 70, 72, 75, 90, 1 0 1 - 1 03,
things and qualities 13, 45, 49, 1 1 5; 108, 109, 1 1 9, 129, 132-1 34, 1 8 1 , 184
cause of 47, 49, 62, 65, 66, 77, 79, 80, Univocity (synonymy) 4, 5, 1 5 1 , 1 6 1 ,
89-94, 96, 1 1 0, 1 1 2 , 164; classification 1 7 1 - 1 76, 179; o f 'being' 1 74, 1 78
of 8 1 , 82, 96; definition of 70, 73, 88-
STUDIEN UND TEXTE
ZUR GEISTESGESCHICHTE
DES MITTELALTERS
3. Koch, J. (Hrsg.). Humanismus, Myslift und Kunst in der Welt des MiIJe/QlIers. 2nd. impr.
1 959. reprint under consideration
4. Thomas Aquinas, Expositio super librum Boethii De Trinitate. Ad fidem codids auto
graphi nee non ceterorum codicum manuscriptorum recensuit B. Decker. Repr.
1965. ISBN 90 04 02173 6
5. Koch, J. (Hrsg.). Arlts liberaks. Von der antiken Bildung zur Wissenschaft des Mit
te1alters. Repr. 1 976. ISBN 90 04 04738 7
6. Meuthen, E. J("c'" und Heilsgeschichu bei Gt¥hoh von Reichersberg. 1959. ISBN 90 04 021 744
7. Nothduril, K.-D. Stndicn <Um Einjluss s.n.cas auf die PhiJosopIrU und 11uowgie des 12.
Jakrhunderts. 1963. ISBN 90 04 021 75 2
9. Zimmermann, A. (Hrsg.). Verzeichnis ungedruckler KommmlMe zur Metophysik und Physik
des Aristo/eks aus der ZtiI von etwa 1250-1350. Band I. 1971. ISBN 90 04 02177 9
10. McCarthy, J. M. Humanistic Emphnses in the Educatimwl T/wughI if Vrncenl ifBemmais.
1976. ISBN 90 04 04375 6
1 1 . William of Doncaster. Explicatio Ap/wrisnwJum PhilosoplrUorum. Edited with Annota
tions by O. Weijers. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04403 5
12. Pseudo-Boece. De DiscipliM Scolmium. Edition critique, introduction et notes par
O. Weijers. 1976. ISBN 90 04 04768 9
13. Jacobi, K. IN ModIllbegriffi in den wgisc"," Schrijlm des WUluIm von Shyreswood und in
anderen KomfJendicn des 12. und 13. Jakrhunderts. Funktionsbestimmung und Gebrauch
in der logischen Analyse. 1980. ISBN 90 04 06048 0
14. Weijers, O. (Ed.). Us questions ik CraJon tt kurs commenJoiTes. Edition critique. 1981.
ISBN 90 04 06340 4
15. Hermann of Carinthia. De Essentiis. A Critical Edition with Translation and Com
mentary by Ch. Burnett. 1982. ISBN 90 04 06534 2
17. John of Salisbury. Entheticus Maim and Minor. Edited by J. van Laarhoven. 1987. 3
vols. I. Introduction, Texts, Translations; 2. Commentaries and Notes; 3. Biblio-
grapby, Dutch Translations, Indexes. 1987. ISBN 90 04 078 1 1 8
18. Richard Brinkley. 11uory if ScntentWl Reference. Edited and Translated with Introduc
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19. Alfred of Sareshel. Commentary on the Metheora ifAristotle. Critical Edition, Introduc
tion and Notes by J. K. Otte. 1988. ISBN 90 04 08453 3
20. Roger Bacon. c.mpendiwn ifthe Stu4J if 11uokiD. Edition and Translation with intro
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2 1 . Aertsen, J. A. Nature and Cremure. Thomas Aquinas's Way of Thought. 1988.
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22. Tachau, K. H. VISion and Certituik in the Age if Ockhom. Optics, Epistemology and the
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23. Frakes, J. C. TIu Fate if Fortune in the EArlJi MilMk Ages. The Boethian Tradition.
1988. ISBN 90 04 08544 0
24. Muralt, A. de. L'Etgeu ik /Q Philosoph;' MidUvaJe. Etudes thomistes, scotistes, occa
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25. Livesey, S. J. Theolngy and Scimce in the Fourlmtth Century. Three Questions on the
Unity and Subahemation of the Sciences from John of Reading's Commentary on
the &nunces. Introduction and Critical Edition. 1 989. ISBN 90 04 09023 I
26. Elders, L.]. The Philnsophical Theolngy ofSt Thomas Aquinas. 1 990. ISBN 90 04 09156 4
27. Wissink, ]. B. (Ed.). The ElmJity of the World in the Thought of Thomas Aquinas and his
Contemporaries. 1 990. ISBN 90 04 09183 I
28. Schneider, N. Die Kosmolngit des Franciscus de Marchw. Texte, Quellen und Unter
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29. Langholm, O. &onomics in the Meditval Schools. Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and
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32. O'Rourke, F. Pseudo-DWnysius and the Metaphysics ofAquinas. 1992. ISBN 90 04 09466 0
33. Hall, D. C. The Trinity. An Analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas' Expositio of the De
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34. Elders, L. ]. The Metaphysics of Being of St. Thomas Aquinas in a Hiswrical Perspectio<.
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35. Westra, H. ]. (Ed.). From Athens w Chartres. Neoplatonism and Medieval Thought.
Studies in Honour of EdouardJeauneau. 1 992. ISBN 90 04 09649 3
36. Schulz, G. Vnitas tsl aditquatio inlelltclus et rei. Untersuchungen zur Wahrheitslehre des
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1 993. ISBN 90 04 09655 8
37. Kann, Ch. Die Eigenschaflen der Termini. Eine Untersuchung zur Perutilis logica Alberts
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38. Jacobi, K. (Hrsg.). Argumentationstheorie. Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen
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39. ButteIWorth, C. E., and B. A. Kessel (Eds.). The Introduction of Arabic Philnsop/iY inw
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40. Kaufmann, M. Begriffi, Satl;<, Dinge. Referenz und Wahrheit bei Wilhelm von
Ockham. 1 994. ISBN 90 04 09889 5
4 1 . Hulsen, C. R. Zur SemantiJc anaphorischrr Pronomina. Untersuchungen scholastischer
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42. Rijk, L. M. de (Ed. & Tr.). NICholas ofAutreeourt. His Correspondence with Master
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1 994. ISBN 90 04 09988 3
43. Schonberger, R. Relation als Vergleich. Die Relationstheorie des Johannes Buridan im
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44. Saarinen, R. Weakness of the Will in Meditval Thought. From Augustine to Buridan.
1994. ISBN 90 04 09994 8
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46. Te Velde, R. A. Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas. 1 995.
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47. Tuninetti, L. F. "Per Se Notum". Die logische Beschaffenheit des Selbstverstandlichen
im Denken des Thomas von Aquin. 1 996. ISBN 90 04 1 0368 6
48. Hoenen, MJ.F.M. und De Libera, A. (Hrsg.). Albertus Mngnus und der Alhertismus.
Deutsche philosophische Kultur des Mittelalters. 1 995. ISBN 90 04 1 0439 9
49. Back, A. On Reduplication. Logical Theories of Qualification. 1996. ISBN 90 04 1 0539 5
50. Etzkorn, G. J. Iter Vaticanum Franciscanum. A Description of Some One Hundred
Manuscripts of the Vaticanus Latinus Collection. 1996. ISBN 90 04 10561 I
51. Sylwanowicz, M. Contingent CausaliD' and the Foundations of Duns Scatus' Metaplrysics.
1996. ISBN 90 04 10535 2
52. Aertsen, J.A. Medieval Phiwsophy and the Transcendenlllis. The Case of Thomas Aquinas.
1996. ISBN 90 04 10585 9
53. Honnefelder, L., R. Wood, M. Dreyer (Eds.). John Duns Scotus. Metaphysics and
Ethics. 1 996. ISBN 90 04 10357 0
54. Holopainen, T. J. DWlectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century. 1996.
ISBN 90 04 10577 8
55. Synan, E.A. (Ed.). Queslions on the De Anima of Aristotle by Magister Adam Burley and
Dominus Walter Burley 1997. ISBN 90 04 1 0655 3
56. Schupp, F. (Hr.;g.). Abbo von Fleury: De syllogismis hypotheticis. Textkritisch heraus
gegeben, uber.;etzt, eingeleitet und kommentiert. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10748 7
57. Hackett, J. (Ed.). Roger Bacon and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays. 1997.
ISBN 90 04 100 1 5 6
58. Hoenen, MJ.F.M. and Nauta, L. (Eds.). Boethius in the Middle Ages. Latin and Verna
cular Traditions of the Consolalio philosophio£. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10831 9
59. Goris, W. Einheit als Prin<;ip und <.iel. Ver.;uch uber die Einheitsmetaphysik des Opus
lTipartitum Meister Eckharts. 1997. ISBN 90 04 1 0905 6
60. Rijk, L.M. de (Ed.). Giraldus adonis O.F.M. : Opera Philosophica. Vol. I.: Logica.
Critical Edition from the Manuscripts. 1997. ISBN 90 04 10950 I
61. Kapriev, G. . . . ipsa vita el veritas. Der «ontologische Gottesbeweis" und die Ideenwelt
Anselms von Canterbury. 1998. ISBN 90 04 1 1097 6
62. Hentschel, F. (Hrsg.). Musil< - und die Geschuhte der Philosophi. und Naturwissenschajlen im
Mittelalter. Fragen zur Wechselwirkung von 'musica' und 'philosophia' im Mittelalter.
1998. ISBN 90 04 1 1093 3
63. Evans, G.R. Gelling it wrong. The Medieval Epistemology of Error. 1998.
ISBN 90 04 1 1 240 5
64. Ender.;, M. Wahrheit und Notwendiglr.eit. Die Theorie der Wahrheit bei Anselm von
Canterbury im Gesamtzusammenhang seines Denkens und unter besonderer
BeIiicksichtigung seiner Antiken Quellen (Aristoteles, Cicero, Augustinus, Boethius).
1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 264 2
65. Park, S.C. Die &<;eplion der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophi. in der Theologic des 7homas von
Aquin. Mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Analogie. 1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 272 3
66. Tellkamp, J.A. Sinne, Gegensliinde und Sensibilia. Zur Wahrnehmungslehre des Thomas
von Aquin. 1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 410 6
67. Davenport, A.A. Measure of a Different Greatness. The Intensive Infinite, 1250-1 650.
1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 481 5
68. Kaldellis, A. The Argument of Psellos' Chronographia. 1999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 494 7
69. Reynolds, P.L. Food and the Bot[y. Some Peculiar Questions in High Medieval Theo
logy. 1 999. ISBN 90 04 1 1 532 3
70. Lagerlund, H. Modal �Iwgistics in the Middle Ages. 2000. ISBN 90 04 1 1 626 5
71. Kohler, T.W. Grundlagen des phiwsophisch-anthropologischen Diskurses im drei<;ehnlen Jahr
hunderl. Die Erkenntnisbemuhung urn den Menschen im zeitgenossischen Versmnd
nis. 2000. ISBN 90 04 1 1 623 0
72. Trifogli, C. Oiford Physics in the 7hirteenth Century (ca. 1250-1270). Motion, Infinity,
Place and Time. 2000. ISBN 90 04 1 1 657 5
73. Koyama, C. (Ed.) Nature in Medieval 7hought. Some Approaches East and West. 2000.
ISBN 90 04 1 1966 3
74. Spruyt, J. (Ed.) Matthew of Orlians: Sophistaria sive Summa communium distinctio
num circa sophismata accidentium. Edited with an introduction, notes and indices.
200 1 . ISBN 90 04 1 1 897 7
75. Porro, P. (Ed.) The Met/inial Concept of T""". The Scholastic Debate and its Reception
in Early Modem Philosophy. 200 1 . ISBN 90 04 12207 9
76. Perler, D. (Ed.) AncienJ and Met/inial Theories ofIntentionaliJy. 200 I .
ISBN 9 0 0 4 1 2295 8
77. Pini, G. CaJegories and Logic in Duns &otus. An Interpretation of Aristode's Categories in
the Late Thirteenth Century. 2002. ISBN 90 04 1 2329 6