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for models without target

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 PRE PRINT

Models and the applicability of logic:

a free and dialogical approach for models without target

Prof. Dr. Juan Redmond

Institute of Philosophy
Universidad de Valparaíso
CHILE
juan.redmond@uv.cl
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3436-9490

Abstract
Aim of this article is to develop a Free Dialogic Logic (FDL) that offers the necessary con-
ditions to address the difficulties that present targetless models. Our proposal is fully devel-
oped in the ludic approach of Dialogical Pragmatism and allow to understand inferences as
flow of information without ontological commitments. A central point of our work is the
defense of what we will call "the applicability of logic". We are going to defend that this is a
condition of adequacy that must be considered in conjunction with the function of substitute
reasoning that models fulfill. In particular, in the case of targetless models, the applicability
of the logic chosen for the substitute reasoning will determine the success of the practice of
proposing hypotheses on the target system from M. In our logic we are going to develop
particle and structural rules to elaborate a ludic semantics where targetless models are con-
sidered as symbolic entities.

Keywords: targetless models, dialogical logic, inferentialism, flow of information

Introduction
The objective of our work is to propose a Free Dialogic Logic (FDL henceforth) that ad-
dresses the problems that arise when we must infer from models that are substitutes for tar-
gets whose existence is contestable. If a model M should allow us to generate hypotheses
about their target systems (Surrogate Reasoning), it can only be done from a notion of infer-
ence that is not committed ontologically. In other words, the question that guides our work
is which is the most adequate inference notion for the function of Surrogate Reasoning that
fulfills M when there is no target system that corresponds to what is represented by M (Tar-
getless)? Our general answer, on the one hand, consists in proposing Dialogic as a dynamic
and interactive frame appropriate for the study of the modeling process in terms of flows of
information; on the other hand, within this frame, we developed a FDL as a proof system
without ontological commitments, suitable for Targetless cases.

As has already been pointed out in the general literature (Cf. for example Frigg 2018), the
terms model and modelling are polysemic and have a different specificity in each scientific
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field. In this sense it is complicated to describe ‘targetless’ in general terms. In the first place
we will say that if the objective of a model is to represent (it is not the case of models that
exemplify a theory, for example), there is always a target system that is "thought" in the
practice of generating hypotheses out of the Model. In these cases it is not clear what the
ontological status of the 'intended' target is in this practice (more details below).

It is worth noting that targetless, as a condition of adequacy, is a problem that points to the
notion of representation that is at the basis of every approach to modeling. But our objective
is not to undertake research into the ontological nature of target systems. This is a broad topic
that we will leave for another article. In this work we only pick up the inferential aspect of
this problem. Indeed, if the primary function of models is to generate hypotheses about its
target systems (Surrogate Reasoning), our claim is that this task is not fully accomplished if
it is not performed from an inferential frame without ontological commitments. If we do not
know its nature or we are not sure if it exists, then we cannot use, for example, classical logic.
It is necessary to use a notion of inference that does not have these restrictions. In this sense
we maintain that "inferring targetless" is an epistemic problem and that is why we are aligned
with the free approaches of logic that propose logical systems "free of Ontological Commit-
ments" (Bencivenga 1986, 2002; Lambert 2003a, 2003b).

Next we will give details about what we understand by the inferential point of view of tar-
getless, then we will see what relation it has with what we call Applicability of Logic. Then
we will present the dialogical frame as a possible approach to study in an ideal way the
modelling practice and finally, within this frame, we will develop an FDL.

Applicability of Logic
In a recent work Frigg and Nguyen (2018) summarize the following conditions of adequacy
that all perspective on modeling, to be well defined, must completed satisfactorily. These
are: Surrogative Reasoning (scientific representations allow us to generate hypotheses
about their target systems); Possibility of Misrepresentation (if S does not accurately repre-
sent T, then it is a misrepresentation but not a non-representation); Targetless Models (what
are we to make of scientific representations that lack targets?); Requirement of Direction-
ality (scientific representations are about their targets, but targets are not about their repre-
sentations); Applicability of Mathematics (how does the mathematical apparatus used in
some scientific representations latch onto the physical world).
However, we believe that this list is incomplete if we do not consider what we will call the
applicability of logic. Our claim is that the applicability of logic is relevant because of the
limitations and restrictions imposed by the different logical frames (and their semantics) on
the statements performed in a given scientific field. Indeed, in particular with modeling, we
believe it is necessary to include among the conditions of adequacy the applicability of
logic since the relevant role played by surrogate reasoning. According to this, in our article
we stress this relevance by pointing to the ontological commitments of the logic underlying
surrogate reasoning, especially for the case of targetless models.
Let us consider the following case as an example of the difficulties that may result from not
properly considering the applicability of logic: let us consider the case of models without
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target-system iii mentioned above for a surrogate reasoning that follows the guidelines of
classical logic. Let us consider then that for our model M the most relevant property is A:
"x possesses three sexes". Let us now consider an individual k1 who satisfies that property
in order to be able to simulate with it in our model. But at the same time, from the assertion
that such an individual fulfills such a property (Ak1), we can infer -according to the princi-
ples that govern classical logic- that there must exist at least one individual with three
sexes: Ak1→∃xAx (Specification). And if we transfer the latter as a hypothesis to the target
system (substitute reasoning), it will lead to a predictable failure. But the interesting thing
is that the failure is not due to a problem of the standard of adequacy and the possibility of
misrepresentation. This is a case where we apply the wrong logic. For if we confront a situ-
ation like iii, we cannot use a logic with ontological commitments for its singular terms (ki).
Thus, we intend to defend two points:

1. First, Dialogic Logic as an adequate frame to capture the modelling process as an

interactive flow of information. In general we affirm that Dialogics is a suitable
framework for modeling, whatever the focus on representation (structuralists, X-mor-
phists, inferentialists, etc.) Indeed, as we will detail below, Dialogics is a playful se-
mantics (game theory) based on the notion of use, where three levels of rules are
distinguished: local, global and strategic, which regulate the exchange of information
between agents that define whether or not there are winning strategies for certain
statements. In this exchange, information about the ontological status of the objects
involved is an option among others according to the design of the rules. We believe
that this frame, because of its interactive and non-referentialist structure, fits the ex-
change dynamics that characterizes the modeling process. Surrogate reasoning is per-
haps the condition of adequacy that most clearly reflects the latter. One of the positive
consequences of this approach to modeling is that it allows us to propose a dialogical
approach to the "representational strength of a model", that is, to present the relation-
ship between models &target systems in terms of the ludic flow of information.

2. Secondly, the necessity to develop a Free Dialogical Logic (FDL) that allows infer-
ences to be made from a frame without Ontological Commitments. In other words,
the proposal of an FDL points to the cases of ‘targetless inference’. A frame without
ontological commitments is only possible if it eliminates the validity of those princi-
ples or axioms that are only valid if the objects involved exist. Without these princi-
ples or axioms it is possible to make surrogative inferences from a model without
committing to the ontological status of the target system (Targetless: i, ii and iii).

For the rest of the article contact the author

Targetless inferring1
Logic as a game: origins of another paradigm

1
A genuinely targetless model would be one for purposes of exemplification or adjustment between theories.
What Luczak (2017) calls, for example, a Toy Model.
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Dialogical Logic2
Particle or local rules
Structural or global rules
Crucial to the dialogic approach are the following points:
Global Meaning
Dialogues and information flow: dialogue states
Models, Target Systems and the Dialogical Frame
1. Representational force of the model
Free Dialogical Logic for Targetless Models
Rules for FDL
Structural rules for the symbolic stage of FDL
Some final remarks on targetless models and FDL
Conclusions

2
For a more detailed presentation see the Appendix at the end of this article.
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