2015 CULAS Et Al. Project 135 - Case of A Key Participation Program Ethnic Minorities Vietnam PDF

Local Politics, Global Impacts
Steps to a Multi-disciplinary Analysis of Scales
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CoEdited by
Olivier Charnoz
French Development Agency, France
Virginie Diaz Pedregal

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French Development Agency, France
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&
Alan L. Kolata
University of Chicago, USA
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Charnoz Book.indb 3 8/27/2015 9:21:15 AM

© Olivier Charnoz, Virginie Diaz Pedregal and Alan L. Kolata 2015
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Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the editors of this work.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
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ISBN 978-1-4724-6050-9 (hbk)

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1 1
2 Contents 2
3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
7 List of Figures vii 7
8 List of Tables ix 8
9 List of Contributors xi 9
10 10
11 Introduction 1 11
12 Olivier Charnoz, Virginie Diaz Pedregal, and Alan L. Kolata 12
13 13
14 Part I Epistemology 14
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15 15
16 1 Fractal Social Facts: A Durkheimian Model for a Globalized Era 19 16
17 Jacques Plouin 17
18 18
19 2 The Scale Issue in Global International Environment Governance: 19
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20 For a Transdisciplinary Perspective 39 20
21 François Lerin 21
22 22
23 Part II From Local to Global Dynamics 23
24 24
25 3 Corruption, Scale and Governance in India 67 25
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26 Arjun Appadurai 26
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27 27
28 4 Drugs, Local Politics and the Subversion of Global Counter-Narcotics 28
29 Ideology in Burma’s Eastern Borderlands, 1988–2012 79 29
30 Patrick Meehan 30
31 31
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32 5 The Political Economy of China’s Urban Expansion and its 32

33 Climate Cost: Insights from Nanjing 105 33
34 Jie Yu and Olivier Charnoz 34
35 35
36 6 Scalar Effects in Transnational Networks: The Arab Spring and 36
37 the Global Response 137 37
38 Nikolaos Zahariadis and Akis Kalaitzidis 38
39 39
40 Part III From Global to Local Dynamics 40
41 41
42 7 The Local Power Effects of Global Discourses: A Methodological 42
43 Enquiry into “Community Participation” 157 43
44 Olivier Charnoz 44

1 8 A Containment Tool in Changing Hands: The Global Discourse 1

2 on Participation in Latin America 185 2
3 Olivier Charnoz 3
4 4
5 9 The Effects of Donors’ Ownership and Participatory Policy 5
6 Ideas on Local Power Structures: A Case Study of Informal 6
7 Settlements in Nairobi 205 7
8 Andrea Rigon 8
9 9
10 10 Ownership and Participatory Processes: From Global Motto to 10
11 Local Challenges. The Case of a Key Poverty Reduction Program 11
12 in Ethnic Minority Areas of Vietnam 223 12
13 Christian Culas, Mireille Razafindrakoto, and François Roubaud 13
14 14
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15 11 Globalization and Domestic Politics: A Call for Theoretical 15
16 Reorientation251 16
17 Lloyd Gruber 17
18 Co 18
19 Index279 19
20 20
21 21
22 22
23 23
24 24
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25 25
26 26
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27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
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31 31
32 32
33 33
34 34
35 35
36 36
37 37
38 38
39 39
40 40
41 41
42 42
43 43
44 44
vi

1 Chapter 10 1
2 2
3 Ownership and Participatory 3
4 4
5 Processes: From Global Motto to Local 5
6 6
7 Challenges. The Case of a Key Poverty 7
8 8
9 Reduction Program in Ethnic Minority 9
10 10
11 Areas of Vietnam 11
12 12
13 Christian Culas, Mireille Razafindrakoto, and François Roubaud 13
14 14
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15 15
16 16
17 17
18 The new international poverty reduction strategies (initiatives such as PRSP, MDG, 18
19 HIPC, IADM, and so on), which have been at the core of development public policies 19
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20 for more than a decade, put forward the key principles of participation, ownership, and 20
21 accountability. The focus on the political economy of the economic reforms, supposedly at 21
22 least as important as the policies themselves, raises the issue of the way they are effectively 22
23 applied on the ground. Do they only aim to present aid more attractively in the context of a 23
24 profound legitimacy crisis? Or, on a more positive note, do they reflect a real paradigmatic 24
25 change that places beneficiary populations in the driver’s seat? This contribution aims 25
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26 to provide some substantive answers to this topic, taking as an example one of the 26
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27 most important poverty fighting programs in Vietnam. With the participation of many 27
28 international donors, this program is focused on ethnic minorities living in mountainous 28
29 areas. Taking stock on the limited impact of the first phase of the program, the second 29
30 phase (2006–2011) specifically aims to adopt the principle of commune ownership in 30
31 order to improve its efficiency. 31
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32 Based on the interactions between different actors at play (the donors’ community, the 32
33 Vietnamese authorities—both national and local—levels, and the targeted populations), 33
34 this contribution analyzes how these principles are concretely applied in the field, 34
35 reappropriated, and possibly diverted. Upstream, it raises the question of how development 35
36 is conceived by ethnic minorities who may, in many instances, be at odds with the national 36
37 and international doxa. This study draws on a rich body of both quantitative (baseline and 37
38 follow-up surveys of the program) and qualitative (interviews, official documentation, 38
39 participatory observation) data. It offers a unique opportunity to open discussion on a 39
40 issue of interest to both economists and anthropologists. 40
41 The chapter is organized as follows: first, it illustrates how the emergence of new 41
42 international poverty reduction strategies at the turn of the 2000s put governance issues 42
43 and their key principles (accountability, ownership, and participation) at the forefront of 43
44 the development agenda. It analyzes the transposition and customization of this global 44

1 stance with respect to the specific circumstances of Vietnam. It presents the emblematic 1
2 Program P135, a multi-billion dollar development project launched nearly 15 years ago, 2
3 with a special focus on its participatory component. Program P135 is implemented by 3
4 the government with the support of key international donors, and aims to reduce poverty 4
5 in ethnic minorities in mountainous areas. The following two sections of the chapter are 5
6 dedicated to the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the participatory approach. For 6
7 this purpose, we draw on two kinds of primary data: firstly, we draw on the 2007 baseline 7
8 survey conducted by the General Statistics Office (GSO) (with the assistance of two of 8
9 the authors) using an impact evaluation protocol; secondly, we draw on anthropological 9
10 field work (participatory observations and in-depth interviews) implemented over the 10
11 years in the northern areas of the program. We assess the participatory component of 11
12 the program along two dimensions: its intrinsic value (that is, how far is participation 12
13 really operating in the field?) and its instrumental value (that is, does participation make a 13
14 difference on the economic outcomes of the program?). In particular, we show how the 14
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15 more we investigate beyond quantitative data (that is, moving from general quantitative 15
16 measures to deeper anthropological approaches), the less obvious the positive impact of 16
17 participation tends to be. Finally, drawing from this case study, we learn more general 17
18 lessons concerning the articulation of our global and local lenses of analysis: how can
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19 a global motto assist in addressing local challenges? Are local experiences mobilized to 19
20 shape the global stance? 20
21 21
22 22
23 Governance, Participation, and Ownership: A Call from the Top 23
24 24
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25 Governance Issues at the Core of the International Agenda 25
26 26
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27 At the end of the last decade, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 27
28 (IMF) were forced to change their attitude and renew their approaches and practices 28
29 in developing countries. The acute awareness of the increase of poverty incidence in 29
30 many parts of the world contributed largely to this evolution, in addition to the failure 30
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31 of structural adjustment policies in most countries (as well as the questioning of the 31
32 Washington Consensus on which they are based). These various elements resulted in a 32
33 crisis in legitimacy of the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), which were confronted by 33
34 rising criticism from civil society, various protest movements, and the phenomenon of 34
35 so-called aid fatigue. 35
36 The BWIs reacted by launching a joint initiative at the end of the 1990s, which places 36
37 the fight against poverty at the core of development policies. Under this initiative, low- 37
38 income countries wishing to apply for aid from either organization, or for debt relief under 38
39 the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, are required to draw up poverty 39
40 reduction programs known as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). Since then, 40
41 the BWIs have mobilized considerable human and financial resources to implement the 41
42 initiative and to ensure its success. All other donors rapidly followed suit and linked their 42
43 aid policies to the PRSP Initiative. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) initiative, 43
44 endorsed by 200 countries in 2000, is a key element of this major change. After a few years, 44
224

Ownership and Participatory Processes
1 the new poverty reduction programs now channel all official international aid resources 1
2 destined for low-income countries (in other words, these countries’ external resources). 2
3 These new converging initiatives not only changed the content of public policies, but 3
4 also the processes involved in their design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation. 4
5 For the first time ever, the political economy of reforms is considered as important as the 5
6 economic policies themselves. In each country where a PRSP is implemented, a participatory 6
7 process involving the largest range of stakeholders is supposed to be systematically 7
8 organized to build more balanced relationships between the state, civil society, and donors. 8
9 Among the civil society, not only intermediary bodies and organizations like NGOs are 9
10 included. Rather, ordinary citizens, many of whom are poor themselves, are invited to take 10
11 part in the process. There is a wide consensus nowadays that a participatory approach gives 11
12 more insight into the living conditions of the poor and allows the identification of the 12
13 most effective policies (Cling, Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2003). This approach aims 13
14 to enhance the ability of the poor to effectively influence public decisions affecting their 14
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15 lives. The objective of all international initiatives is to respect the following principles: 15
16 16
17 • Ownership: governments are responsible for preparing policies and conducting participatory 17
18 processes should increase their commitment to efficiently undertake the actions decided 18
19 within the PRSP. Meanwhile, civil society, not only by definition but also in terms of policy 19
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20 monitoring, should ensure the wide support of reforms by the population. 20
21 • Empowerment: the participatory process is supposed to contribute to improving the quality 21
22 of the political debate and to help define a more adequate strategy to meet real social needs. 22
23 By offering the poor a means to express themselves, raise their voice and to influence 23
24 policies affecting their living conditions, this approach also aims to fight social exclusion 24
25 (one dimension of poverty). 25
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26 • Accountability: through participation, all stakeholders are invited to discuss government 26

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27 policies, and government is therefore accountable to all citizens. Accountability applies to 27

28 government policies in general (have the policies actually been implemented and for what 28
29 effect?) and, more specifically, to the use of resources (especially foreign aid) and public 29
30 expenditure management. 30
31 31
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32 Beyond national policies, ownership, empowerment, participation, and accountability 32

33 principles have been endorsed by the international donor community within the frame of 33
34 the aid effectiveness agenda. The Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action 34
35 (2008), and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011) are 35
36 founded on five core principles and born of decades of experience concerning effective 36
37 development policy. According to OECD-DAC (2008), 37
38 38
39 it is now the norm for aid recipients to forge their own national development strategies with 39
40 their parliaments and electorates (ownership); for donors to support these strategies (alignment) 40
41 and work to streamline their efforts in-country (harmonization); for development policies to 41
42 be directed to achieving clear goals and for progress towards these goals to be monitored 42
43 (results); and for donors and recipients alike to be jointly responsible for achieving these 43
44 goals (mutual accountability). 44
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1 Even if participatory processes seem to have lost momentum in practice compared to 1

2 their launch in the early 2000s, their underlying principles are still a core commitment on 2
3 the international agenda. 3
4 4
5 Acclimating Governance to Local Contexts: The Case of Vietnam 5
6 6
7 Poverty reduction is a long-standing priority in Vietnam. It predates the international 7
8 community’s adoption of the poverty reduction strategies and Millennium Development 8
9 Goals (MDGs). In 2002, at the donors’ request, Vietnam prepared and adopted a Poverty 9
10 Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) entitled Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy 10
11 (CPRGS). Vietnam, like all low-income countries, had to observe the PRSP initiative if 11
12 it wanted to continue receiving funds from the Bank and the other aid agencies. Around 12
13 100 million dollars in annual financing (150 million dollars assigned for 2012) has been 13
14 allocated to the poverty reduction and growth strategy in the form of budget support 14
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15 every year since 2001. 15
16 Vietnam, which not only embarked on the poverty reduction initiative, also 16
17 endorsed the principles of the participatory process. Vietnam, unlike most of the other 17
18 developing countries, does not have a civil society legally independent of the ruling
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19 political party (Fforde and Porter, 1995; Hansson, 2003; Salemink, 2003; Hannah, 19
20 2005; Thayer, 2008). All civil society organizations are under the control of the so- 20
21 called mass organizations under the umbrella of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, which 21
22 belongs directly to the Communist Party.1 However, in practice, these associations are 22
23 allowed some leeway, which is not precisely defined and which evolves permanently. 23
24 Furthermore, there is no clear indication that the different functions promoted by the 24
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25 international community via participatory processes (participation, empowerment, 25
26 ownership, and accountability) are less well fulfilled than in many other developing 26
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27 countries with more liberal political systems. In addition, Abrami, Maleski and Zheng 27
28 (2008) argue that Vietnam’s political system empowers a larger group of citizens and 28
29 accepts more accountability than China’s. 29
30 From the mid 1990s onwards, Vietnam adopted the rhetoric of good governance, both 30
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31 for internal and external reasons. Up to 1998, the term civil society was censored by the 31
32 media, and corruption considered a taboo subject that could only be raised with great 32
33 risk. Offenders could be prosecuted for endangering state security. Since then, “grass 33
34 roots” democracy, good governance, transparency, and anticorruption have been officially 34
35 recognized and, in line with international standards, many concrete policies are undertaken 35
36 under these headings (World Bank, 2010). The top-down call for governance at the 36
37 international level was all the more acceptable to the Vietnamese authorities since this 37
38 hierarchical structure fit perfectly with the traditional political organization. Thanks to 38
39 its impressive capacity to adopt the international rhetoric and its strategic keenness to 39
40 embark on global initiatives, Vietnam is often presented by the donor community as a 40
41 frontrunner among developing countries in terms of governance reform (even if in some 41
42 cases the change appears more formal than effective). Obviously, Vietnam’s remarkable 42
43 economic and social records represent a powerful incentive not to question the country’s 43
44 commitment to tackle governance issue. 44
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1 Fighting Poverty in Ethnic and Mountainous Areas: The Governance 1

2 Component of the P135 Program 2
3 3
4 Poverty reduction is a long-standing priority in Vietnam. It predates the international 4
5 community’s adoption of the poverty reduction strategies and Millennium Development 5
6 Goals (MDGs). According to the World Bank (2012), Vietnam has “one of the most 6
7 impressive histories of poverty reduction in modern times.” 7
8 After decades of war followed by years of economic depression and penury, Doi 8
9 Moi (1986) marked Vietnam’s transition to “market socialism.” The economic take-off 9
10 observed since then is quite exceptional among developing countries. Since the mid-1980s, 10
11 GDP growth has been close to 8 percent per year (a performance similar to China whose 11
12 annual growth rate has hovered around 9 percent over the same period) and export growth 12
13 has been even higher than in China over the last decade. These performances prompted 13
14 The Economist to hail Vietnam as “Asia’s other miracle” (the first being China) in a special 14
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15 report on the country (The Economist, 2008). 15
16 In this macroeconomic context, Vietnam registered a massive reduction in poverty. At 16
17 the beginning of the 1990s, poverty remained endemic in Vietnam despite the end of the 17
18 previous decade’s penury. The first household survey conducted in 1993 estimated that 58 18
19 percent of the population was poor. By 2008, this percentage had plunged to less than 15 19
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20 percent and extreme (food) poverty had plummeted to 5 percent of the population (from 20
21 25 percent in 1993). This massive national drop in monetary poverty is due primarily 21
22 to the Vietnamese economy’s rapid growth. Unlike in many developing countries, this 22
23 growth has been largely inclusive, avoiding the marginalization of a large proportion of 23
24 the population and a sharp rise in inequalities. The Gini Index, the most widely used gauge 24
25 of inequalities, posted an increase from 0.34 in 1993 to 0.37 in 2008. This is relatively 25
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26 low (especially compared to China’s increase), bearing in mind that the level of overall 26
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27 inequalities itself remains modest. 27

28 However, this exceptional record on poverty reduction suffers from a massive 28
29 drawback. While poverty among ethnic groups was only emerging at the end of the 1990s, 29
30 it became a dramatic concern in recent years (World Bank 2012). In spite of progressing 30
31 living standards, the ethnic poverty rate decreased much slower than the Kinh majority 31
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32 one, and was five times higher at the turn of the present decade (Figure 10.1). By 2010, 32
33 47 percent of poor households in Vietnam belonged to ethnic groups, which represented 33
34 only 15 percent of the population. Not only did ethnic groups perform worse in terms 34
35 of monetary poverty, they were far behind on every kind of non-monetary indicator of 35
36 well-being too. 36
37 The 53 official ethnic minority groups are scattered in rural, remote and mountainous 37
38 areas, occupying the main part of the Vietnam territory, while the Kinh population is 38
39 concentrated in cities and lowland, more fertile deltas. However, both quantitative and 39
40 qualitative studies (Baulch et al., 2010; VASS, 2011; World Bank, 2009; 2012) suggest that 40
41 a huge ethnic gap remains unexplained, even once this location disadvantage is taken 41
42 into account in addition to the many other usual variables (lower access to education, 42
43 markets and credit, lower land quality, and so on). Furthermore, this gap seems to increase 43
44 over time, providing evidence that a disproportionate part of ethnic population is locked 44
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1 1
2 Other Ethnic 2
3 Groups, 1993, 86%
3
Other Ethnic
4 Groups, 1998, 75% 4
5 Other Ethnic Other Ethnic 5
Groups, 2002, 69% Groups, 2010, 66%
6 Other Ethnic 6
Kinh/Hoa, 1993, Groups, 2004, 61%
7 54%
Other Ethnic
Groups, 2006, 52%
7
8 Other Ethnic
Groups, 2008, 50% 8
9 9
10 Kinh/Hoa, 1998, 10
31%
11 Kinh/Hoa, 2002, 11
23%
12 Kinh/Hoa, 2004, 12
14% Kinh/Hoa, 2006, Kinh/Hoa, 2010,
13 10% 13%
13
Kinh/Hoa, 2008,
14 14
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9%
15 15
16 Other Ethnic Groups Kinh/Hoa 16
17 17
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19 Figure 10.1 Poverty rates by ethnic group, 1993–2010 19
20 Source: World Bank (2012)—this report mobilizes the Vietnam Living Standards Survey (VLSS) of 1993 and 20
21 1998, and the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) of 2002–2010 implemented by the 21
22 General Statistics Office (GSO). 22
23 Note: for 2010, a revised methodology has been applied: Hoa—the most favored Chinese-origin ethnic 23
24 group—has been aggregated with the Kinh majority. 24
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25 25
26 in a poverty trap. Among the factors not captured by the classical regression approach, 26
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27 anthropological work shows that ethnic stereotyping of cultural backwardness and 27

28 lack of voice are at stake (McElwee, 2004; Taylor, 2004), thereby identifying potential 28
29 discriminations anchored in social evolutionism (Culas, 2010a). Such a feature is at odds 29
30 with the Vietnam Constitution and the derived legal documents, which guarantee by law 30
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31 equality of rights and opportunities between ethnic groups. To address this politically 31
32 incorrect and embarrassing (de facto rather than de jure) issue, and among the broad array of 32
33 economic policies dedicated to fixing this broadening ethnic divide, two specific programs 33
34 were launched in the mid 1990s under the umbrella of the global eradication of hunger 34
35 and poverty projects. One directly targets ethnic people regardless of their location (to 35
36 supply health cards, and so on), while the other focuses on ethnic communes. This chapter 36
37 focuses on the latter as it is the only one to explicitly consider better governance as a way 37
38 to overcome the deceiving economic performances of ethnic groups. 38
39 Program P135 is a targeted program for Extremely Poor Communes in the Ethnic 39
40 Minority and Mountainous Areas. During its first phase (1998–2005), it focused primarily 40
41 on developing village, communal and inter-communal infrastructure and was largely funded 41
42 by government revenues alone. For Phase II (2006–2010), P135 objectives have been 42
43 extended to include four broad components: basic infrastructure, agricultural production, 43
44 socio-cultural livelihoods, and capacity building for officials. The program is an integral 44
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1 part of the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy (CPRGS), for which 1
2 the term “country ownership” has been put forward, following consensus on the relevance 2
3 of this principle to ensure more effective use of resources (OECD, 2006). 3
4 One could question the effectiveness of the country ownership principle given the 4
5 contribution of multiple donors to P135-II and their potential influence. According to the 5
6 definition formulated by Killick et al. (1998), “Government ownership is at its strongest 6
7 when the political leadership and its advisers, with broad support among agencies of state 7
8 and civil society, decide of their own volition that policy changes are desirable, choose 8
9 what these changes should be and when they should be introduced.” However, given 9
10 the strength of Vietnamese institutions, and the role they already played during the first 10
11 phase of P135, there is no doubt regarding the national leadership’s ability to define and 11
12 implement the program. The Vietnamese authorities have the capacity to resist international 12
13 donors’ potential pressure to impose their own agendas (Cling, Razafindrakoto and 13
14 Roubaud, 2009). 14
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15 However, the participation of civil society and other stakeholders in the design and 15
16 implementation process of programs is also an important feature of ownership. In this 16
17 regard, one pillar of the P135-II was decentralization. Besides, the Vietnamese authorities 17
18 rely on the Grassroots Democracy Decree, which was established in 1998 and revised 18
19 in 2003 to foreground the participation of different stakeholders (Bui Quang Dung, 19
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20 2006). The high degree of administrative decentralization in Vietnam permits transfer 20
21 of responsibility to the local political echelons in the form of the people’s committees 21
22 and councils that operate at different administrative levels (province, district, and 22
23 commune). For P135-II, community-driven approaches were promoted to help improve 23
24 resource allocation and the implementation of investment projects. The concept of 24
25 commune investment ownership was introduced with the target that 100 percent of P135-II 25
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26 communes would be investment owners of infrastructure projects by 2010. This concept 26

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27 means that the commune is responsible for the management of funds, the involvement 27
28 of local people in planning, supervising and monitoring processes, and leadership in the 28
29 procurement process. 29
30 Concretely, the State Committee for Ethnic Minority Affairs (CEMA) manages 30
31 Program P135 at the central level. Implementation guidelines are provided to different 31
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32 administrative levels (provinces, districts, and communes). According to these guidelines 32

33 (CEMA, 2006), program implementation should include: 33
34 34
35 • organizing village meetings to select infrastructure projects; 35
36 • creating an operational project management unit (PMU); 36
37 • putting in place a commune supervision board (CSB), with qualified (that is, trained) 37
38 members from the population; 38
39 • organizing public bidding; 39
40 • opening a treasury account; 40
41 • disseminating financial information in order to ensure transparency; 41
42 • promoting and organizing household contributions to the infrastructure projects (labor days 42
43 or cash); 43
44 • an operation and maintenance plan (with the contribution of households). 44
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1 Behind the principles that the P135-II put forward, it was implicitly assumed that 1
2 community-driven approaches to selecting, planning, managing, operating, and maintaining 2
3 basic rural infrastructures would help improve the targeting of poverty in program 3
4 resource allocation. In addition, it could lead to an enhanced fiduciary transparency and 4
5 accountability in project implementation, as well as increased sustainability of the project. 5
6 The principle of a participatory process is also implicit although the relationship 6
7 between ownership and participation is not straightforward. Ownership might only lead 7
8 to the commitment and endorsement of decisions resulting from a top-down approach. 8
9 But participation is a key element to ensure that the program will meet the needs of the 9
10 poor. It aims at enhancing the ability of people at the local level (especially poor people) to 10
11 influence effectively the decision-making pertaining to and implementation of the projects 11
12 affecting their lives. 12
13 13
14 14
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15 Participation in Question: From Theory to Practice 15
16 16
17 The objective of this section is to question the effectiveness of participation and ownership 17
18 in the P135-II program. Our analysis is based on quantitative as well as qualitative data.
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19 The quantitative data are provided by the baseline survey (BLS) conducted by the General 19
20 Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) under the coordination of the State Committee of 20
21 Ethnic Minority Affairs (CEMA). The BLS was implemented in 2007 in 266 communes 21
22 (4,000 households), which are representative of the P135-II communes.2 This survey 22
23 allows the assessment of the level of participation of households, the impact of the 23
24 commune investment ownership principle, and the household satisfaction (Herrera et 24
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25 al., 2008). The results of a qualitative study, which relied on interviews with households 25
26 and local authorities, complement and assist in interpreting the quantitative assessment 26
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27 (Gironde, 2009). 27
28 28
29 To What Extent Is the Principle of Participation Effective? 29
30 30
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31 The baseline survey implemented to monitor the P135-II program provides some 31
32 indicators that permit an assessment of the extent to which the principle of a participatory 32
33 process was applied. A first glance at the results based on the views of the commune 33
34 staff interviewed suggest that the participatory process was widely applied in the P135- 34
35 II infrastructure projects. According to commune staff, participation meetings were 35
36 organized to select 87 percent of all infrastructure projects implemented. Eighty-eight 36
37 percent of the households in the P135-II communes, of which 60 percent were poor, 37
38 participated in these participatory meetings. 38
39 The BLS provides an opportunity to confront the assessment made by the commune 39
40 staff with the perceptions of households on the same issues. Regarding the participatory 40
41 process, the information provided by the households interviewed seems to reaffirm, 41
42 globally, the effectiveness of this approach.3 On average, nearly 60 percent of households 42
43 reported that participatory meetings were organized to select the P135-II projects in their 43
44 villages (Table 10.1). However, poor households and ethnic minorities were less informed 44
230

1 on the organization of these meetings (respectively, 54 and 57 percent of them were aware 1
2 of these meetings). The BLS reveals that the rate of participation of households in the 2
3 participatory meetings was lower compared with the figures reported by the commune 3
4 staff. Only 50 percent of households had attended these meetings. This participation 4
5 rate was even lower for the sub-group of households who spoke absolutely no or little 5
6 Vietnamese (43 percent). 6
7 7
8 Table 10.1 Households’ views and experience regarding participatory meetings 8
9 to select projects 9
10 10
11 Projects HHs who HHs who HHs whose Satisfaction 11
for which participated voiced opinion was with project
12 12
meetings were in the their considered selection
13 organized for meetings opinion (%) (%) 13
14 selection (%) (%) (%) 14
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15 Ethnicity 15
16 Kinh and Hoa 63 48 27 53 91 16
17 Non-Kinh and non-Hoa 57 50 27 56 82 17
18 18
Daily languages
19 19
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Absolutely no or little 52 43 29 48 79
20 Vietnamese 20
21 21
Mixed Vietnamese and 63 57 29 64 85
22 ethnic languages 22
23 23
Absolutely no or little 67 65 18 74 90
24 ethnic languages 24
25 Living conditions of 25
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26 household 26
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27 Poor 54 49 17 50 87 27
28 Non-poor 62 49 34 57 83 28
29 29
Total 59 49 27 55 84
30 30
Non-P135 communes 57 50 32 57 78
31 31
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(control group)
32 32
33 Source: P135-II Baseline Survey (2007); GSO; authors’ calculations 33
34 34
35 The percentage of households who voiced their opinion provides further insights on 35
36 the participatory meetings. Only 27 percent of the participants expressed their views during 36
37 the meetings. The poor seemed to have particular difficulty: only 17 percent contributed 37
38 their opinions. Furthermore, among those who spoke, only 55 percent of households, 50 38
39 percent of the poor (that is to say, 15 percent of households and 8.5 percent of the poor) 39
40 perceived that their point of view was considered by the authorities or the commune 40
41 staff. Moreover, despite the principles of commune ownership and participation put 41
42 forward in the P135 program, no significant difference can be observed when compared 42
43 to the control group in non-P135 communes. Given these results, the effectiveness of the 43
44 participation process is questionable. 44
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1 Decisions seem to be taken unanimously as 98 percent of the participants in these 1

2 meetings agreed with the selection of the projects, according to the commune staff 2
3 (Table 10.2). However, assessment made by households provided a lower percentage (84 3
4 percent). The assessment provided by households could be considered satisfying, even if it 4
5 is less positive. But the limited effectiveness of their participation in the selection process 5
6 (as specified above) raises the question as to the meaning of the satisfaction expressed 6
7 by households. 7
8 8
9 Table 10.2 Discrepancy between commune staff ’s and households’ views 9
10 10
11 Participation of households % 11
12 Participation of household in selection meeting (1) 87 12
13 Participation of household in selection meeting (2) 49 13
14 Households who voiced their opinions (2) 27 14
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15 15
Households’ opinion considered to select infrastructure (2) 55
16 16
Households agreeing selection of project (1) 98
17 17
Satisfaction of households regarding the selection of project (2) 84
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20 Notes: (1) commune staff ’s assessment; (2) households’ assessment. 20
21 21
22 A qualitative study, based on interviews of commune and district staff, as well as 22
23 ordinary citizens, regarding the process of decision-making and participation in P135 23
24 program implementation (Gironde, 2009), provides additional information consistent 24
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25 with the survey results. This also permits us to ascertain precise explanations regarding the 25
26 practices and views expressed at the commune level. 26
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27 First, regarding the meetings organized by the commune to select infrastructure 27

28 projects, interviews reveal that most of the time, these meetings consist of the 28
29 endorsement of a list of projects provided by the district. Therefore, the selection 29
30 process is actually made at the district level, and the households who attend the meetings 30
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31 do not have room to make suggestions or to have an influence on decisions. Moreover, 31

32 given the raising-of-hands voting system, participants at the meetings have no choice but 32
33 to agree if they do not want to be identified as opponents and stigmatized. This statement 33
34 explains why households declare in the survey that they are satisfied with the project 34
35 selection process even if they did not voice their opinion or even if their views were not 35
36 taken into account. 36
37 Besides, some interviewees consider that the district has the legitimacy to select projects. 37
38 They put forward the fact that the fund is from the central government so it is normal if 38
39 the district people’s committee is responsible for the allocation decision. This is also the 39
40 result of the prevailing idea that the local authorities (at the district and the provincial 40
41 levels) are in a better position to know the population’s priority needs than the commune 41
42 staff or the households (who are not qualified to identify and to formulate them). Finally, 42
43 when meetings were organized, the objective was mainly to comply formally with the 43
44 P135-II guidelines and to endorse decisions already taken at a higher level. 44
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1 Second, concerning the implementation phase, the participation of ordinary citizens at 1

2 the commune level appears to be limited due to various constraints. In some cases, for the 2
3 design of the project, even for the location of the infrastructure project, they are not asked 3
4 to give their views. The choice is made without their participation. For the supervision of 4
5 infrastructure construction, commune representatives’ possible interventions can be restricted 5
6 due to constraints related to the availability of information and capacity. They cannot really 6
7 intervene and provide remarks to the company in charge of the construction if they do 7
8 not have enough information on the project (budget, plan), or if the type of infrastructure 8
9 requires specific expertise or technical skills (for electricity-related projects, for example). 9
10 But the main problem stems from the power of intervention of different stakeholders 10
11 at the commune level. The latter have little margin of intervention if the work was assigned 11
12 to one company by the district, and if they are not sure that the district will support 12
13 them in their complaint. Practically, supervision is under the control of the management 13
14 board (at the commune or district level), and the members of this board are nominated 14
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15 by the People’s Committee Chairman (PCC). The imbalanced power, with the control and 15
16 influence that the PCC has on every decision, does not favor the participation of village 16
17 leaders or ordinary citizens at the local level. 17
18 18
19 Assessment of Results 19
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20 20
21 One could argue that whatever the shortcomings of the participatory process, households 21
22 express their overall satisfaction with the selection process and the quality of the 22
23 infrastructure built. But, first, the discrepancy between the commune staff ’s assessment 23
24 and the households’ views raises some questions (Table 10.3). For example, for the former 24
25 the level of satisfaction with the quality of the infrastructure projects is 81 percent, 25
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26 compared to 68 percent for the households. 26

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27 27
28 Table 10.3 Level of satisfaction of households regarding P135-II program 28
29 29
30 Satisfaction with infrastructure project % 30
31 Satisfaction with the quality of infrastructure (1) 81 31
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32 Satisfaction with the quality of infrastructure (2) 68 32

33 Households benefiting from the infrastructure (1) 47 33
34 Agricultural extension services 34
35 35
Households coming to agri. extension center to receive training 20
36 36
Households receiving agri. extension staff at home 5
37 37
38 Households happy with the quality of the information 90 38
40 Notes: (1) commune staff ’s assessment; (2) households’ assessment. 40
41 41
42 Second, according to the commune staff, 47 percent of the P135-II households 42
43 benefited from the infrastructure development projects. A similar rate of satisfaction is 43
44 found for the poor households in the P135-II communes. This finding is quite worrying as 44
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1 it implies more than half the households in the targeted communes did not benefit from 1
2 the infrastructure projects. 2
3 In order to better understand the consistency of households’ answers regarding their 3
4 satisfaction and the usefulness of projects, we draw on detailed questions regarding 4
5 agricultural extension services that appear to be an illustrative case. As part of the P135- 5
6 II, agricultural extension services were provided for households to support agricultural 6
7 production. Some key services are offered by this network, including training, face-to- 7
8 face consultation on cultivation and other techniques, information provision. Questions 8
9 on training were asked for groups of households. Using this information, we found that 9
10 only 23 percent of the P135-II households participated in groups of farmers/agricultural 10
11 households or agricultural extension and that training courses were delivered to 54 percent 11
12 of these groups. With regard to cultivation consultation techniques, 20 percent of the 12
13 P135-II households had visited agricultural extension centers for these techniques. Notably, 13
14 the staff of these agricultural extension centers was reported to be inactive since only 5 14
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15 percent of the P135-II participants had received agricultural extension staff visits to their 15
16 homes to provide support services. This could be taken to suggest the low effectiveness 16
17 of these centers. It seems that the same set of services were offered everywhere without 17
18 taking into account the above differences in land endowment and patterns of land uses.
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19 However, 90 percent of households reported that they are satisfied with the information 19
20 provided regarding agricultural extension services. But when interviewed, a non-negligible 20
21 part of those who claim their satisfaction declare that the services (information) had little to 21
22 no impact (Table 10.4): this is the case for 35 percent of those satisfied with the agricultural 22
23 extension services related to farming options (and 49 percent of the very satisfied). 23
24 24
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25 Table 10.4 Satisfaction with and impact of agricultural extension services 25
26 on activities 26
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27 27
28 For farming options For husbandry models 28
29 Satisfaction with services Satisfaction with services 29
30 Satisfied (%) Very satisfied Satisfied (%) Very satisfied 30
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31 (%) (%) 31
32 No impact 17 38 No impact 12 22 32
33 Small impact 18 11 Small impact 19 4 33
34 Fairly strong 59 32 Fairly strong 61 52 34
35 impact impact 35
36 Strong impact 7 19 Strong impact 7 22 36
37 100 100 100 100 37
38 38
40 40
41 These results do not necessarily question the reliability of the whole survey, but 41
42 the apparent inconsistency of the answers provided by the respondents suggest that 42
43 households avoid reporting possible dissatisfaction with projects in their commune. 43
44 Moreover, we must wonder what the satisfaction expressed by the households means 44
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1 when only half of them declare that they know about the P135 program (Table 10.5). 1
2 The figure is lower for the poor (44 percent), the category that is supposed to benefit 2
3 the most from this program. 3
4 4
5 Table 10.5 Households’ knowledge of the P135-II program 5
6 6
7 Satisfaction with infrastructure project % 7
8 Poor households who declare they know the P135 44 8
9 program 9
10 Non-poor households who declare they know the 50 10
P135 program
11 11
13 13
14 The Principle of Commune Ownership among Investment Projects: 14
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15 Controversial Results 15
16 16
17 As the community-driven approach was intended to be a key aspect of the P135-II 17
18 program, the characteristics of the infrastructure projects for which the commune was 18
19 the investment owner deserve specific attention. The target is that 100 percent of P135-II 19
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20 infrastructure projects have communes as investment owners. However, the percentage 20
21 of commune-owned P135-II projects is low. Indeed, only 23 percent of the P135-II projects 21
22 compared with 45 percent of the non-P135-II projects among P135-II communes are 22
23 commune-owned. This might be due to the origin of the funds. In most cases (around 23
24 90 percent), communes were investment owners of the projects when they were the main 24
25 financing institutions. When, however, the projects were mainly financed by the district 25
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26 authorities, or by those at higher levels, communes were investment owners for only 25 26
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27 percent of the projects implemented. It should be noted that the average value of projects 27
28 was twice or three times higher when the main financing institutions were the authorities 28
29 at the district, province, or central levels. This provides a possible explanation for the low 29
30 incidence of district- (provincial/central) funded projects owned by communes since the 30
31 investment scale of those projects (compared to those owned by communes) renders it 31
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32 difficult to leave these in the hands of commune staff. 32

33 33
34 Table 10.6 Commune investment-owner projects 34
35 35
36 Ownership of infrastructure projects Commune investment Non-investment owner 36
37 owner (%) (%) 37
38 Think that commune investment 97 67 38
ownership is better
39 39
40 Commune which encountered problems 32 45 40
41 Households benefiting from the project 40 44 41
42 Poor benefiting from the project 40 44 42
43 43
Source: P135-II Baseline Survey (2007); GSO; authors’ calculations
44 44
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1 We expected that commune-owned projects would give the commune authorities 1

2 autonomy in the planning and implementation of the projects. Therefore, the projects 2
3 would best meet the needs of the community. Furthermore, as ownership implies 3
4 the community’s direct responsibility for the project, we expected that projects would 4
5 be better monitored. However, these advantages are conditional as they can only be 5
6 realized if the communal authorities are capable enough of planning and managing the 6
7 project implementation processes. If such management capacity is not available, owning 7
8 projects may results in problems. In fact, the majority of the commune staff considered 8
9 that commune investment ownership is a better option than ownership of projects by 9
10 authorities at higher administrative levels. This is particularly the case for the communes, 10
11 which are already project investment owners (97 percent favored this option). But the 11
12 choice is less clear for the communes that are non-investment owners of projects: one 12
13 third of these communes considers that investment ownership is not a good option (Table 13
14 10.6). Indeed, the BLS seems to suggest that owning the P135-II projects was not so 14
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15 problematic for the commune staff: we found that only 32 percent of the commune- 15
16 owned projects encountered problems during the implementation process, while the 16
17 corresponding figure for the projects in which the P135-II communes were not the owners 17
18 was 45 percent. However, the higher frequency of problems for the latter might be due
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19 to the characteristics of these communes (lower management capacity, for example) and 19
20 not to the fact that they are not investment owners. Besides, if we compare the percentage 20
21 of households benefiting from the infrastructure projects in the investment-owned 21
22 communes with non-investment-owned communes, the picture is mixed. For the P135-II 22
23 communes, the percentage of households who benefited from the investment projects 23
24 owned by the commune was slightly lower (39 percent) than for the communes that did 24
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25 not own the projects (44 percent). A similar finding was found for the poor. 25
26 In summary, the target of 100 percent of infrastructure projects having communes 26
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27 as investment owners appears to be unrealistic. Moreover, the evidence of the impact 27

28 of owning projects tends to suggest that households benefited less from the investment 28
29 projects owned by the commune. Moreover, some communes that owned infrastructure 29
30 projects faced problems in the implementation process. 30
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31 The results of the qualitative study (Gironde, 2009) allow us to deepen the analysis. 31
32 The local authorities’ point of view underlines the fact that the relevance of the principle 32
33 of commune investment ownership deserves to be questioned. The commune staff stress 33
34 their difficulty in following the guidelines for the management of investment projects: 34
35 these guidelines are complicated and sometimes unrealistic. Some examples are given 35
36 by the interviewees: the organization of public biddings to select the contractor is not 36
37 possible when only one company can do the work in the commune or if companies are 37
38 not registered as legal entities; the difficulty in providing a precise three-year plan and 38
39 budget when the rate of inflation cannot be anticipated; and so on. 39
40 Consequently, on the one hand, the district staff is reluctant to allow the commune to 40
41 be an investment owner of infrastructure projects, since they are the ones responsible for 41
42 reporting on the projects’ results to the province and the central government. In this sense, 42
43 they bring to the fore the limited capacity of the commune level. Even when communes 43
44 are investment owners, one person from the district might be assigned to work with the 44
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1 commune to manage the project. On the other hand, commune officials and households 1
2 are not really convinced that they can benefit from the principle of commune investment 2
3 ownership. They do not deny the fact that their capacity to manage or supervise projects 3
4 might be limited. They consider that the procedure specified in the guidelines is complicated 4
5 when put into practice and they risk failing in their responsibilities. 5
6 Finally, the quantitative and qualitative information provide consistent explanations 6
7 for the difficulties in applying the commune investment ownership principle. Moreover, 7
8 this transfer of responsibility does not really correspond to a practical demand from the 8
9 commune and does not lead to the expected participation of the local population. 9
10 The conclusion of our analysis at this stage does not mean that the whole process 10
11 should be condemned. We show how commune investment ownership, a framework 11
12 aimed at allowing local participation, is simultaneously imposed without taking into 12
13 account local contexts (from a top-down approach) and might not be relevant. Still, this 13
14 framework creates opportunities for exchange (meetings, information dissemination, and 14
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15 so on), even if it is limited between different stakeholders, and can at least partially lead 15
16 to accountability. 16
17 17
18 18
19 Adapting Ethnic Minorities to the Project 19
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20 20
21 The purpose of this section is to question previous results in terms of an anthropological 21
22 reading. This new perspective involves a threefold change in approach: change in scaling, 22
23 change in method, and change in analysis categories. 23
24 Indeed, for the anthropological approach, accounting for the ownership and 24
25 participation in the P135 program from the perspective of recipients (authorities at 25
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26 province, district, and commune levels, as well as peasant families) requires a change in 26
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27 the scale of observation: we must pass from statistical data at the global level to fine 27
28 anthropological data at communal and family levels. 28
29 The anthropological reading implies an adaptation of the reading grid based on existing 29
30 relationships between the P135 program and local populations. From this point of view, 30
31 the concepts used above to describe the governance concepts (ownership, participation, 31
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32 accountability, and so on), which are also used by the projects, are not relevant to understand 32
33 how the project is experienced locally, how it is perceived by the target population, or how 33
34 it is integrated into local life. 34
35 Rather than address the theoretical debate on the relevance of these analytical categories,4 35
36 we propose to consider, as the basis of our analysis, the relationships that we observed 36
37 between the P135 program and farmers in several ethnic communes in North Vietnam. 37
38 The overview of categories based on the observed relationships that we present is not 38
39 exhaustive. However, its main advantage is that it helps in understanding the meaning of 39
40 the actions of the populations targeted by the program without pre-formatting them in 40
41 the mold of standard categories. Such standard categories are certainly well suited to the 41
42 criteria and the management standards of international donors and the Vietnamese state, 42
43 but they are constructed a priori and are often detached from local realities. These two 43
44 orientations (describing the meaning of the actions of project recipients and answering 44
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1 to management needs of states and international donors) are largely incompatible. 1

2 Descriptions here are based on the existing local situations. Classical normative categories 2
3 tend to refer to situations assumed to exist, and which tend to be much more theoretical 3
4 and abstract. 4
5 The data used here are derived from a long-term work, conducted by a team of 5
6 researchers and coordinated by one of the authors. The data comes from anthropological 6
7 investigations conducted between 2003 and 2012 in 12 ethnic communes in the provinces 7
8 of Phu Tho, Lao Cai, and Ha Giang in northern Vietnam. The different communes studied 8
9 are inhabited by the following ethnic groups: Dao, Giay, Hoa, Hmong, Kinh, Nung, Tay, 9
10 and Thai. The data is based on anthropological research approaches: immersion within 10
11 local populations, participant observation, and semi-structured surveys conducted over 11
12 long periods (from several weeks to several years). This data set is not only focused on 12
13 the P135 program or even development projects. Rather, it provides a wider collection of 13
14 information on all aspects of local life (economics, politics, social relations, culture, ritual 14
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15 practices, non-market exchanges, natural resources management, and so on) in order to 15
16 account for the diversity of practices and positions in local populations. 16
17 Based on these data, the research process is relatively simple. The first step is the 17
18 empirical description of the project. A development project consists of multiple
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19 interactions between distinct social groups (cultural, economic, political, and so on). This 19
20 interaction stems from the desire of one group (that is, all agents of development: state, 20
21 private enterprises, and NGOs), whose main objective is to transform the lives of targeted 21
22 populations. The next step describe the relationship between target populations and the 22
23 P135 program. Indeed, in order to exist, it is necessary that all the groups involved are 23
24 in connection each other.5 Our concern focuses on the quality, shape, limitations, and 24
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25 implications of these relationships. In this case, being connected or in relationship means: 25
26 firstly, to gather information on other groups within the project; secondly, to establish 26
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27 contacts, direct or indirect, with the other groups; thirdly, and ideally, to find space for 27
28 exchange, dialogue, or negotiation about the project activities. 28
29 Once these premises are stressed, the first question posed to understand the relationship 29
30 between local people and the P135 program focuses on the exchange of communication 30
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31 and knowledge:6 Who knows what about whom? Provided that participation and ownership 31
32 are two specific forms of communication (see below), what kind of information and 32
33 knowledge exchanges exist between the P135 program and the target populations? 33
34 The second question concerns the actual patterns of local participation, such as its 34
35 meaning in the program, among farmers, and among the local authorities. Finally, we 35
36 examine the diversity of participation beyond the normative framework used for project 36
37 evaluation purposes. 37
38 38
39 Who Knows What about Whom? 39
40 40
41 What the P135 program knows about the target populations? 41
42 According to the anthropological data from northern Vietnam, commune authorities and 42
43 farmers reveal that no investigation, survey, or consultation had been carried out prior 43
44 to the implementation of the P135 program. This information is confirmed by Do Tran 44
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1 Nhung’s surveys (2008) in two communes in Hoa Binh province. In fact, in the absence 1
2 of a specific survey for the project design in Phase I (1998–2004), the main source of 2
3 data for the installation and implementation of the program was drawn from databases 3
4 from the General Statistics Office of Vietnam. For the evaluation of phase II (including 4
5 2007 and 2012), some surveys commissioned by major donors were implemented in 5
6 order to better connect the project with the local population. This program is built on 6
7 a top-down model, which usually characterizes development projects in Vietnam. In other 7
8 words, Hanoi central authorities determine local needs and ways to meet them without 8
9 conducting any real investigations or consultations with local communities. In the case of 9
10 ethnic minority populations, this top-down attitude is amplified by the fact that the dominant 10
11 Kinh population holds key political, administrative, and economic power. Their thinking 11
12 and writing openly consider that ethnic minority populations are backward and that they are 12
13 not able to fit into modernity and the market economy, nor to develop by themselves (Evans, 13
14 1992; Culas 2010a; 2012; Culas et al., 2012; Nguyen Van Chinh, 2010). In practice, these 14
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15 three arguments reinforce and justify the self-development of state programs in ethnic 15
16 areas, as well as their particularly strong top-down characteristics. On the other hand, over 16
17 the past 15 years, Vietnamese officials have used the argument of improved participation 17
18 by poor ethnic minority populations to capture funds from international donors. 18
19 19
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20 What do the populations know about P135? 20
21 To answer this question, we present some key elements of the specific context of 21
22 development projects in Vietnam: firstly the importance (in number and diversity) of the 22
23 projects and secondly how they are perceived at the local level. 23
24 Ethnic mountain communes have been the recipients of development projects for over 24
25 50 years.7 Since the economic opening of Vietnam in the 1990s, the World Bank and other 25
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26 international and national bodies have supported Vietnam to develop its market economy. 26
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27 In addition, they have largely increased funding available to the Vietnamese state and 27
28 NGOs, and, in particular, for projects to be carried out in villages. For example, Ban Lai,8 a 28
29 Tay ethnic commune in the southern province of Lao Cai, has been the recipient of more 29
30 than 20 state projects since 2000. These involve multi-activity programs focusing on the 30
31 fight against poverty (P135, P134, Building a New Country Side), reforestation projects 31
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32 like P327 and P661, four water supply programs since 2007, an urbanization project in the 32
33 center of the commune, a development project on ethnic tourism, nearly a dozen projects 33
34 of agricultural innovation and training, several education projects, projects concerning 34
35 the regulation of cultural, social and religious life, as well as public health projects. This 35
36 influx of projects has several major implications. Firstly, these projects are developed with 36
37 similar protocols: compulsory attendance, standardized training, mandatory contribution 37
38 to collective work, and subsidies or donations of equipment. Secondly, farmers are 38
39 embedded in a routine of projects. In other words, they are used to seeing the implementation 39
40 of new projects that end without necessarily having any lasting results. This sometimes 40
41 leads to project fatigue. In this sense, any new project is naturally assumed to be similar to 41
42 dozens of previous projects and this has the effect of limiting the impact of innovative 42
43 projects. Within this mass of projects, farmers and commune staff struggle to distinguish 43
44 which project is involved in which activities. According to our estimates, less than a third 44
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1 of the population (farmers and officials alike) is able to identify the specific actions of the 1
2 P135 program. For example, in the Bac Me District, Ha Giang Province, several village 2
3 chiefs interviewed say that the tanks to store water were built by the P135 program. Upon 3
4 verification, however, the surveyed villages have not been using this program for water. 4
5 Rather, they used tanks that were built by the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA) 5
6 between 2004 and 2007. Farmers know that projects are not generally efficient, and this 6
7 limits their motivation to participate actively in projects. Instead, farmers appear to follow 7
8 directives from officials to accept new projects so that the commune will keep on receiving 8
9 projects from the district. 9
10 This specific context affects also the local perception of projects. In fact, the villagers 10
11 have been in contact with dozens of projects in their daily lives. They have often recorded 11
12 these projects in the local stories and history of their commune, and thus ultimately in 12
13 the history of their relations with the state since it is the major source of projects in 13
14 Vietnam. Most of the time, this story is ignored by development researchers, and, above 14
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15 all, by the projects themselves. In other words, these stories are never taken into account 15
16 to understand the current behavior of local actors. 16
17 In addition to the issue of participation, one may wonder about the objectives of the 17
18 program and the extent to which ethic populations may potentially agree with the aims of
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19 these programs. As is the case for any public intervention in Vietnam, the P135 program 19
20 can be described as an enforcement of the state’s attempt to transform the lives of target 20
21 populations, without taking into account the will or the capacity of the latter. Consequently, 21
22 the idea of ownership is a real problem since the beneficiaries are not consulted and the 22
23 general guidelines of the program are broadly defined without their input. As a result, 23
24 these populations must adapt or endorse these programs. 24
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25 The history of direct intervention of the state in the lives of peasants began in 1950 25
26 with the agrarian reform and the creation of communal cooperatives. These are two major 26
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27 transformations that have led to serious economic and social crises. While the 1980s and 27
28 1990s were marked by an economic openness and the empowerment of farmers in the 28
29 agricultural production process, many aspects of their lives were still designed, managed, 29
30 standardized, and controlled more or less directly by the state. From this point of view, the 30
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31 P135 program does not differ from its predecessors. Development projects implemented 31
32 by the Vietnamese government are often “total”:9 they take care of all social, economic, 32
33 productive, technical, cultural, educational, health, religious and political activities. Few 33
34 countries in the world implement projects that are this all-encompassing. 34
35 35
36 Participatory Process: Farmers’ and Local Authorities’ Perspectives 36
37 37
38 The above has shown that the issue of participation in the P135 program cannot be 38
39 properly addressed without a minimum of background information. This issue raises 39
40 several questions: Who participates? What kind of action does this participation involve? 40
41 What is the form of participation? This section deepens the analysis of participation by 41
42 showing how local actors (local authorities and farmers) describe relations with the P135 42
43 program beyond the scope of formal surveys. The aim is to reflect the diversity of local 43
44 perceptions and practices with regards to participation. 44
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1 What are the motivations for participation? 1

2 One of the main statistical indicators presented to assess local participation is the 2
3 attendance rate at meetings organized by the program. However, this indicator should be 3
4 nuanced for three reasons. First, since the 1950s, Vietnam has implemented a standardized 4
5 mode of exchange between the political and administrative authorities and the population 5
6 based on voluntary participation.10 This form of participation is an integral part of a system 6
7 of management, mobilization, and population control by the state-party. It is on this basis 7
8 that more than 95 percent of Vietnamese are going to vote, and almost all public servants 8
9 and employees of large companies make voluntary donations of solidarity for public assistance, 9
10 such as for families affected by natural disasters. The percentage of volunteers is often 10
11 close to 100 percent and the fact that all give exactly the same amount of money leads us 11
12 to question the nature of voluntary donations. Second, local authorities from communes 12
13 and villages (as well as in urban neighborhoods) are evaluated by their superiors based 13
14 on voting participation and community activities organized by the state. Good results in 14
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15 this evaluation allow the community to enjoy direct benefits such as participation in new 15
16 development projects, a significant source of income, skill acquisition, and infrastructure. 16
17 In this way, the authorities encourage peasants to participate in meetings, promising new 17
18 benefits for the commune. The idea of voluntary participation has neither the same meaning 18
19 nor the same shape in Vietnam as it does in other political contexts. In the ethnic communes 19
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20 of Vietnam, the attendance of one person per household at project meetings is the usual 20
21 norm. In many cases, if the male head of a household is busy or not interested in the 21
22 project, he sends his wife or one of his children to meet the demands of the commune. In 22
23 this sense, there is no real motivation except the response to informal obligation. Finally, 23
24 in the meetings of the P135 program, as in all official meetings, the organizers grant 24
25 financial compensation (on average 50,000 VND in 2012, about 2 euros) to participants 25
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26 for time spent in meetings. More informally, a project meeting is always an opportunity to 26
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27 share a meal, which is taken in charge by the project or the commune. These elements of 27
28 motivation, which are not usually included in the usual questionnaire surveys, raise doubts 28
29 about the relevance of participation based on attendance rate at meetings (despite the fact 29
30 that this indicator is technically easier to measure).11 30
31 31
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32 Local margins of possible adaptation for the P135 program compared to the 32
33 legal framework 33
34 In-depth anthropological research has demonstrated that development projects, 34
35 and the P135 program in particular, are transformed and adapted at the local level. 35
36 Transformation and adaptation processes can help us to understand how the project is 36
37 integrated into the life and local practices. These processes can also help us to recognize 37
38 the specific modes of participation in the project. The P135 program is a state project. 38
39 Before being applied at the level of communes, villages, and families according to their 39
40 stated degree of poverty, it is reviewed by the provinces and districts. Participation in 40
41 the program must be considered according to the successive changes operated at these 41
42 different scales. 42
43 Firstly, the provinces and districts conduct the first adaptations. Some are within 43
44 the official framework. Indeed, one aspect of the democratic centralism of Vietnam 44
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1 is a strong decision-making autonomy vis-à-vis development policy at the provincial 1

2 level. This autonomy in decision-making is accompanied by a strong redistribution 2
3 of resources from taxes and duties.12 As a result, Vietnamese provinces and districts 3
4 have the legal capacity to reformulate, adapt, and transform the measures in national 4
5 development policies according to their plans, their goals, and specific knowledge of 5
6 local needs. 6
7 Beyond the authorized and legal practices, provincial and district authorities often feel 7
8 free to use funds from development projects and, at times, to orientate projects for political 8
9 or personal purposes. These arrangements (which might be qualified as misappropriation) 9
10 are widely known and tolerated by the government and international donors if its extent 10
11 does not undermine the viability of the project. Of course, evaluation reports never 11
12 mention these practices that go beyond the planned framework. 12
13 Second, development projects are transformed by the target population. Unlike at the 13
14 provincial and district levels, no forms of transformation or adaptation of local projects 14
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15 at the commune or household level are legally authorized in the project’s framework or 15
16 within the decision chain of Vietnamese authorities. Nevertheless, detailed investigations 16
17 show that the changes are numerous and take place at all levels. For example, in 2011, in the 17
18 ethnic commune of Ban Lai13 (Lao Cai province) only seven among 16 villages are classified
Co 18
19 as the poorest in the official classification, and therefore likely to receive assistance from 19
20 the P135 program. However, surveys show that four other unlisted villages have benefited 20
21 from roads, bridges, and irrigation canals constructed or rehabilitated under the P135 21
22 program. This freedom of action outside the framework provided is a form of ownership, 22
23 but it is neglected by questionnaire, rapid assessment surveys, and project reports due to 23
24 its informal character. 24
f
25 The shape and quality of these arrangements by which the authorities of the commune 25
26 accommodate the P135 program are sometimes beneficial to the targeted population. 26
oo
27 Several villages of Lao Cai province, whose irrigation canals (vital for rice production) 27
28 had been destroyed by the floods of 2009, have informally benefited from P135 program 28
29 funds to rapidly rehabilitate these canals. In this case, while not planned or permitted (or 29
30 recorded in activity reports, for that matter), P135 program funds helped to address this 30
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31 irrigation emergency. However, this is not always the case. For example, the authorities of 31
32 an ethnic commune in Ha Giang province took advantage of their rights to divert to their 32
33 personal advantage a part of project activities. This is illustrated in a joke among farmers: 33
34 “Where is the house of the President of the People’s Committee of the commune?” The 34
35 response: “It’s simple, just follow the commune’s best paved road, and you’ll come to 35
36 his house!” 36
37 Transformation of the projects by target populations (communes, villages, and 37
38 households) are an important and frequently occurring reality. However, unlike 38
39 at the level of the provinces and districts, rearrangements of the project terms of 39
40 reference (TOR) and logical framework (LF) at the commune level are informal and 40
41 illegal. Therefore, these diversions and local adaptations are never reported in project 41
42 evaluations, even if they are one of the main forms of participation and ownership in 42
43 development projects. 43
44 44
242

1 Diversity of Participation beyond the Normative Framework for 1

2 Project Evaluation 2
3 3
4 According to the project’s rhetoric, participation is both a goal and a means to correctly 4
5 and effectively implement a project. Participation is therefore responsible for a normative 5
6 perspective. In this sense, participation in the project is positive and non-participation is 6
7 negative. This dichotomous approach towards local actors’ participation or non-participation 7
8 reflects a lack of knowledge of the forms of project appropriation and transformation. 8
9 We present some examples of water management in different ethnic communes in north 9
10 Vietnam to illustrate the variety of the types of participation. 10
11 Participation can be total and aligned with the objectives of the project. When the P135 11
12 program, via the authorities of the commune, asks people to mobilize for the construction 12
13 of a dirt and paved road, those who agree to participate voluntarily comply with the 13
14 project conditions (intervention procedures, working hours, wages) on the condition that 14
py
15 these activities do not occur simultaneously with urgent agricultural activities like rice 15
16 transplantation or harvest. However, participation is often partial. In some villages in the 16
17 commune of Ban Lai (Lao Cai province), many drinking water systems are in operation. 17
18 The local autonomous system with plastic pipes provides daily use of water free of charge. 18
19 The P135 program water system, however, delivered in metal pipes and with filters, is 19
Co
20 charged based on a water meter reading and is used only for banquets (such as weddings, 20
21 the celebration of new homes, funerals, and so on) or instances in which the former 21
22 autonomous network is not sufficient. From the locals’ perspective, the two systems are 22
23 complementary. However, the P135 program expects a complete replacement of the old 23
24 autonomous system with a new water system that uses metal pipes. 24
25 Participation in the project also occurs through an overlap with other activities. The 25
f
26 most significant example of this also involves water systems. In the commune of Nong 26
oo
27 Lao14 (Ha Giang province), Hmong farmers have used bamboo pipes to collect water for 27
28 more than 40 years. Since the 1990s, some houses have made small investments in plastic 28
29 pipes to connect their homes to the source. In 2004, the P135 program installed a metal- 29
30 pipe water system for the village. In 2012, we observed three types of pipes connecting 30
31 houses to a single source. Hmong farmers have opted to keep the old method (bamboo 31
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32 pipes) because it is the one that can be most easily repaired with local and free materials. 32
33 Plastic pipes are inexpensive and can be quickly and easily installed and repaired. The 33
34 system put in place through the P135 program, however, has not worked for years, given 34
35 the lack of regular maintenance and the impossibility for villagers to repair metal pipes 35
36 by themselves. Thus, the local community’s maintenance of pre-project practices and the 36
37 incorporation new elements from the project represents a stratification accumulation. 37
38 Finally, we can observe a plurality of norms in action, and this plurality allows people to 38
39 play with these different systems to ensure their water supply. 39
40 Finally, participation in projects may take the form of resistance to and/or rejection 40
41 of project activities. In Vietnam, direct refusal is rare and always only happens in 41
42 particular contexts. For example, it occurs when projects involve land expropriation15 42
43 and/or when local authorities are among those who resist (Culas, 2010b). In most cases, 43
44 44
243

1 the refusal is not explicitly expressed. Instead of saying “no” directly, people say “yes, 1
2 but.” In this sense, refusals are embedded in forms of official acceptance. Even this 2
3 type of position, which finally means refusing state action and thus involvement in open 3
4 and sometimes tense negotiations with authorities, is still rarely taken. Some forms of 4
5 dialogue between the state and the population exist but they must be organized and 5
6 managed by state officials. One of the most characteristic cases observed in the Ban 6
7 Lai commune was the refusal of the P135 program water system by all inhabitants of 7
8 a village with an existing autonomous, free, and well-managed water system. Several 8
9 important personalities such as a former Party secretary and a former president of the 9
10 People’s Committee of the commune were among the protesters. It was due to this 10
11 kind of political and administrative support that the village was able to express a direct 11
12 refusal. However, this kind of refusal rarely has effects. According to interviews in 12
13 most ethnic communes in northern Vietnam, nearly all refusals and complaints from the 13
14 villagers have never received a response from the authorities of the commune, district, 14
py
15 and province. 15
16 In fact, some cases of refusal of project activities must be considered a form of active 16
17 participation. Indeed, a farmer who does not participate in a project if he has not received 17
18 the necessary information cannot be considered a participant. But the farmer or groups of
Co 18
19 farmers who knowingly refuse project implementation are in an active position regarding 19
20 the project process. The usual evaluation grid of the P135 program classifies these two cases 20
21 in the non-participation category, but neglects to take into account the main local dynamics 21
22 around the project. Distinction between these two attitudes is therefore necessary, and 22
23 resembles practices in electoral sociology in which passive and active abstentions in an 23
24 election are clearly differentiated. 24
f
25 25
26 26
oo
27 Conclusion 27
28 28
29 The P135 program is the most important program to be implemented to address the ethnic 29
30 poverty gap in Vietnam. This chapter, based on primary quantitative and anthropological 30
Pr
31 data, aims to assess the effectiveness of participation and ownership principles applied by 31
32 this program. While this global motto, promoted by international donors and endorsed 32
33 by Vietnamese authorities, seems unquestionable in theory, the principles of participation 33
34 and ownership appear problematic in practice. In this sense, participation appears high 34
35 according to indicators. However, the analysis suggests that simplistic statistical measures 35
36 are misleading, and that digging deeper shows few changes compared to previous 36
37 practices. In line with international donors’ recommendations, the national authority at 37
38 the central level provides guidelines on participatory process implementation to provincial, 38
39 district, and local staff in communes and villages. These guidelines convey a normative 39
40 stance that fails to take into account local contexts and leaves little space for households’ 40
41 initiatives and local needs. Eventually, statistical survey and anthropological analyses lead 41
42 to complementary and consistent results: the framework imposed through a top-down 42
43 approach does not really involve the expected outcome of project ownership and the 43
44 participation of the ethnic minority population. 44
244

1 However, our focus on participation and ownership is only one (albeit important) part 1
2 of an assessment of the P135 program. This should be kept in mind, as the program 2
3 has a value impact for the population in terms of both infrastructures (roads, schools, 3
4 health centers, and so on) and services (capacity building, vocational training, and so on). 4
5 Secondly, a rigorous impact evaluation is still a work in progress that can be assessed 5
6 through the analysis of the recently completed follow-up survey. However, what can be 6
7 firmly assessed at this stage, and expanding on the latest available data, is the governance 7
8 component of the program. This component did not make a substantial (and maybe not 8
9 even a significant difference) on the targeted outcomes (poverty rate, and so on). 9
10 As it turns out, the change in discourse has not resulted in real changes in governance 10
11 practice. In spite of the displayed commitment to the participation principle, hegemonic 11
12 international donors as well as the strong and hierarchical Vietnamese authorities cannot 12
13 help but impose their views. Concretely, for the P135 program, guidelines and targets 13
14 give precise instructions on the type of participation and ownership expected. Ownership 14
py
15 directives are questionable since they are imposed without consulting the target population 15
16 who cannot do anything but endorse. This top-down approach not only impedes the 16
17 objectives, but also prevents the acknowledgement of the diversity of participation 17
18 modalities beyond the normative framework. Indeed, our analysis sheds light on how 18
19 formal guidelines from the top are quasi-systematically circumvented, adapted, mitigated, 19
Co
20 diverted, and re-appropriated at the local level by the district and commune staff or the 20
21 population. These local arrangements are, at best, tolerated by the pragmatic Vietnamese 21
22 authorities. However, since they are considered failings of the program, they are formally 22
23 ignored. We could then question the readiness of international donors as well as national 23
24 authorities for an effective bottom-up approach. From the beginning and by design, the 24
25 standardized projects framework is not able to monitor and relay actual local arrangements 25
f
26 and take stock of them. 26

oo
27 The participation principle is a global motto but the deep changes it requires have not 27
28 yet occurred. It seems that top institutions are still reluctant to learn from local initiatives. 28
29 To be effective, the promotion of participation and ownership principles should embrace 29
30 much more than putting the local population in the driver’s seat as the chauffeur of a pre- 30
31 established itinerary. The opportunity to choose the itinerary might be more important than 31
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32 being in the driver’s seat. By persevering with the current practice, there is a real risk that the 32
33 participatory approach could come to be considered a dead-end which could result in a return 33
34 to projects as usual. At odds with such a conclusion, we consider that, apart from providing a 34
35 formal umbrella for the population to express their voice, reversing and enlarging the way 35
36 participation and ownership are implemented may make a difference. But starting from local 36
37 circumstances to shape the global stance would undoubtedly be a paradigmatic revolution. 37
38 38
39 39
40 References 40
41 41
42 Abrami R., Malesky, E. and Zheng, Y., 2008. Accountability and Inequality in Single-Party 42
43 Regimes: A Comparative Analysis of Vietnam and China. Harvard Business School Working 43
44 Paper, 08-099, May. 44
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1 Albrecht, D., Hocquard, H. and Papin, P., 2010. Les acteurs publics locaux au coeur du 1
2 développement urbain vietnamien. Moyens, limites et évolution de l’action publique locale. Focales, 5. 2
3 Paris: Agence Française de Développement. 3
4 Arce, A. and Long, N. eds, 2005. Anthropology, Development and Modernities Exploring Discourses, 4
5 Counter-tendencies and Violence. London: Routledge. 5
6 Baulch, B., Nguyen, H., Phuong, P. and Pham, H., 2010. Ethnic Poverty in Vietnam. Chronic 6
7 Poverty Research Centre Working Paper, 169, February. Manchester: Chronic Poverty 7
8 Research Centre. 8
9 Bui Quang Dung, 2006. “Grassroots Democracy” in Rural Areas of Vietnam: Achievements and 9
10 Lessons Learnt. Hanoi: Institute of Sociology, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences. 10
11 CEMA, 2006. Research to Propose the Criteria Guideline for Commune Investment Ownership in P135 11
12 Phase II (2006–2010). Consultative report, Committee of Ethnic Minorities Affairs. 12
13 Cling, J-P., Razafindrakoto, M. and Roubaud, F. eds, 2003. The New International Poverty 13
14 Reduction Strategies. London, New York: Routledge. 14
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15 ——— eds, 2009. The World Bank: Looking for a Development Model and the Case of Vietnam. 15
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18 Culas, C., 2010a. Nghiên cứu sự trao đổi về kiến thức và tập tục địa phương trong quản lý
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19 môi trường ở miền núi Việt Nam: Nhìn từ quan điểm nhân chủng học. [Study of discourses 19
20 on local knowledge and practices on environment management in Vietnam mountains: an 20
21 anthropological perspective]. In: Lương Văn Hy, Ngô Văn Lệ, Nguyễn Văn Tiệp, Phan Thị 21
22 Yến Tuyết, eds. Hiện đại và động thái của truyền thống ở Việt Nam: Những cách tiếp cận nhân 22
23 học. [Modernity and Dynamics of Tradition in Vietnam: Anthropological Approaches], Quyển 23
24 2. Hồ Chí Minh: Nhá Xuất Bản Đại Học Quốc gia Thành Phố Hồ Chí Minh. pp. 292–324. 24
f
25 ———, 2010b. A failed “success story” for tourist development projects in Tam Đảo: gaps 25
26 between laws and their applications. In: Culas, C. and Nguyen Van Suu, eds. Norms and 26
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27 Practices in Contemporary Rural Vietnam: Social Interaction between Authorities and People. 27
28 Bangkok: IRASEC. pp. 21–78. 28
29 ———, 2012. Relations entre l’histoire de la gestion des espaces agricoles et l’environnement 29
30 au Vietnam: logiques de production des réglementations et ambiguïté de leurs applications. 30
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31 In: Ferrari, O. and Bourg, D. eds. Politiques environnementales en Asie du Sud Est. Enjeux, 31
32 pratiques et idéologies. Paris; Bangkok: Karthala; IRASEC, 2014. pp. 275–324. 32
33 Culas, C., Massuyeau, B., Razafindrakoto and M., Roubaud, F., 2012. State of play of the 33
34 living conditions of ethnic groups in Vietnam: economic and socio-anthropological 34
35 approaches. In: Lagrée, S. ed. Social Differentiation and Inequalities: Methodological and Cross- 35
36 cutting Approaches to Questions of Gender and Ethnicity. Hanoi; Paris: Knowledge Publishing 36
37 House; Agence Française de Développement. pp. 64–93. 37
38 Delarue, J., Naudet, J-D. and Sauvat, V., 2009. Les évaluations sont-elles utiles? Revue de littérature 38
39 sur “connaissances et décisions.” Notes Méthodologiques, 3, January. Paris: Agence Française 39
40 de Développement. 40
41 Do Tran Nhung, 2008. Decentralization process in Vietnam: Assessing commune 41
42 investment ownership under the program 135. A study of two communes, Kim 42
43 Boi District, Hoa Binh Province. Professional Master’s Thesis. Master’s Program of 43
44 44
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2 CEM Project Vie/02/001, Hanoi, October 2008. 2
3 The Economist, 2008. Special Report on Vietnam, April 24, 2008. 3
4 Evans, G., 1992. Internal colonialism in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Sojourn, 7(2), 4
5 pp. 274–304. 5
6 Fforde, A. and Porter, D., 1995. Public Goods, the State, Civil Society and Development Assistance 6
7 in Vietnam. Paper for the 1995 “Vietnam Update Conference,” Australian National 7
8 University, Canberra, Australia. 8
9 Gironde, C., 2009. Decentralized Decision-making and Participation under Program 135—Phase 9
10 II. A Study in Five Provinces of Vietnam. Hanoi: World Bank. 10
11 Hannah, J., 2005. Civil society actors and action in Vietnam: preliminary empirical results 11
12 and sketches from an evolving debate In: Towards Good Society: Civil Society Actors, the State, 12
13 and the Business Class in Southeast Asia—Facilitators or Impediments to a Strong, Democratic, and 13
14 Fair Society? Berlin: Heinrich Boell Foundation. pp. 101–110. 14
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15 Hansson, E., 2003. Authoritarian governance and labour: the VGCL and the party-state 15
16 in economic renovation. In: Tria Kerkvliet, B.J, Heng, R.H.K. and Koh, D.W.H. eds. 16
17 Getting Organized in Vietnam: Moving in and around the Socialist State. Singapore: Institute of 17
18 Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 153–84. 18
19 Herrera, J., Le Dang, T., Pham, H., Razafindrakoto, M. and Roubaud, F., 2008. Impact 19
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20 Evaluation of the Program P135 Phase 2: Analysis of the Baseline Survey 2007. Hanoi: 20
21 Committee for Ethnic Minorities Affairs (CEMA) and UNDP. 21
22 Killick, T., Gunatilaka, R. and Marr, A., 1998. Aid and the Political Economy of Policy Change. 22
23 Overseas Development Institute. London: Routledge. 23
24 Long, N., 2001. Development Sociology: Actor Perspectives. London: Routledge. 24
25 Luong Xuan Quy and Nguyen The Nha eds, 1999. Doi moi to chuc va quan ly cac HTX 25
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26 trong nong nghiep, nong thon [Réforme de l’organisation et de la gestion dans les coopératives agricoles 26
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27 rurales]. Hanoi: NXB Nong Nghiep. 27

28 McElwee, P.D., 2004. Becoming socialist or becoming Kinh? Government policies for 28
29 ethnic minorities in the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. In: Duncan, C. ed. Civilizing 29
30 the Margins: Southeast Asian Government Policies for the Development of Minorities. Ithaca, NY: 30
31 Cornell University Press. pp. 182–213. 31
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32 Nguyen Van Chinh, 2010. Representation of Ethnic Minorities on Mass Media: Analysis of the 32
33 Representation of Ethnic Minorities on Several Popular Newspapers in Vietnam. Hanoi: Institute 33
34 for Studies of Society, Economy and Environment and Academy of Journalism 34
35 and Communication. 35
36 Olivier de Sardan, J-P., 1998. Anthropologie et développement, essai en socio-anthropologie du 36
37 changement social. Paris: Karthala. 37
38 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2006. Aid 38
39 effectiveness: 2006 survey on monitoring the Paris Declaration—overview of results. 39
40 OECD Journal on Development, 8(2). 40
41 ———, 2008. Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. 41
42 Paris: OECD-DAC. 42
43 43
44 44
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1 Salemink, O., 2003. Disjunctive development: the politics of good governance and civil 1
2 society in Vietnam. SOAS/EIDOS conference, Order and Disjuncture: The Organisation of 2
3 Aid and Development: An Informal Workshop. September, London. 3
4 Taylor, P., 2004. Social Inequality in Vietnam and the Challenges to Reform. Singapore: Institute 4
5 of Southeast Asian Studies. 5
6 Thayer, C.A., 2008. One party rule and the challenge of civil society in Vietnam. In: City 6
7 University of Hong Kong, Remaking the Vietnamese State: Implications for Viet Nam and the 7
8 Region. Hong Kong, August 21–22, pp. 1–27. 8
9 Vietnamese Academy of Social Sciences (VASS), 2011. Poverty Reduction in Viet Nam: 9
10 Achievements and Challenges. Hanoi: The World Publisher. 10
11 World Bank, 2009. Country Social Analysis: Ethnicity and Development in Vietnam. Washington, 11
12 DC: World Bank. 12
13 ———, 2010. Vietnam Development Report 2010: Modern Institutions. Hanoi: World Bank. 13
14 ———, 2012. Revisiting Vietnam’s Remarkable Record on Poverty Reduction: Progress and New 14
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15 Challenges. Hanoi: World Bank. 15
16 16
17 17
18 Notes Co 18
19 19
20 1 For all projects and activities, National and International NGOs are also under the control 20
21 of the Vietnam Father Front through the State-Party organizations VUFO (Vietnamese Union 21
22 Friendship Organization) and PACCOM (People’s Aid Coordinating Committee). 22
23 2 The fact that the survey was also implemented in 134 non-P135-II communes, constituting a 23
24 control group, enables a comparison and assessment of the P135 program’s possible impact. 24
f
25 3 Comparisons of figures must be read with caution, as the households’ knowledge on the 25
26 projects could be limited compared to that of the commune staff. 26
oo
27 4 This debate is of great interest to understand the technical and ideological underpinnings of 27
28 the projects from design to evaluation, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter. For more details, 28
29 see Olivier de Sardan (1998), Long (2001), Delarue, Naudet and Sauvat (2009). 29
30 5 At this level, it is possible to simplify the description into two main groups: development 30
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31 agents and communities targeted by the project. We will see below that varied positions exist within 31
32 these two groups, and the illusion of homogeneity of these groups hides games of authority and 32
33 interests, which are often complex. 33
34 6 “… the 1990s have ushered in a more open intellectual climate which is more receptive 34
35 to locating the analysis of development within theoretical frameworks that deal explicitly with 35
36 the dynamics of cross-cultural practices, meanings and discourses. These new approaches to 36
37 development and local/global relationships underline the importance of analysing how knowledge and power 37
38 are constituted and reconfigured” (Arce and Long, 2005, emphasis added). 38
39 7 Between 1958 and 1962, land reform inspired by the Chinese model and land collectivization 39
40 are the two major development projects strongly imposed by the state on farmers (Luong and 40
41 Nguyen 1999). 41
42 8 To protect the confidentiality of people interviewed, the name of the commune has 42
43 been changed. 43
44 44
248

1 9 In Vietnam, development projects with globalizing characteristics are still very active in 2012. 1
2 The objective of building a “new socialist man” still prevails in many projects. See, for example, 2
3 the project applied nationally entitled “Xây dựng nông thôn mới” (Building a New Country Side) 3
4 (2010–2020) which started in practice in January 2012 and supports all activities regarding targeted 4
5 populations on agriculture, health, the fight against poverty, education, water supply, culture, 5
6 morality, social relations, rules of community life, politics, religion, police, security outside of the 6
7 commune, and so on. Official website: http://www.nongthonmoi.gov.vn/. 7
8 10 This is one of the notions of official propaganda to motivate or mobilize people for collective 8
9 action (vân động ou huy động). 9
10 11 The list of participants and the list of people who received money for their participation 10
11 are recorded in a document. 11
12 12 The 10 richest provinces among the 63 (Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi, Danang, Haiphong, and 12
13 so on) pay 60 percent of their tax revenue to the state to support poorer provinces such as those 13
14 in the northern mountains and in the center of the country. “On average at national level, transfers 14
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15 account for 47% of the budgets of the provinces” (Albrecht et al., 2010). 15
17 been changed. 17
19 been changed. 19
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20 15 Farmers know that the price paid by the state for expropriated land is very low and that the 20
21 hidden profits for the public servants in charge of the project are very important. In addition, land 21
22 remains a safe haven for 70 percent of the Vietnamese population who live in the countryside. 22
23 23
24 24
25 25
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26 26
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27 27
28 28
29 29
30 30
31 31
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32 32
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Local Politics, Global Impacts

Steps to a Multi-disciplinary Analysis of Scales

Virginie Diaz Pedregal

Charnoz Book.indb 3 8/27/2015 9:21:15 AM

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

ISBN 978-1-4724-6050-9 (hbk)

Printed in the United Kingdom by Henry Ling Limited,

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32 5 The Political Economy of China’s Urban Expansion and its 32

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1 8 A Containment Tool in Changing Hands: The Global Discourse 1

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26 • Accountability: through participation, all stakeholders are invited to discuss government 26

27 policies, and government is therefore accountable to all citizens. Accountability applies to 27

32 Beyond national policies, ownership, empowerment, participation, and accountability 32

Charnoz Book.indb 225 8/27/2015 9:21:27 AM

1 Even if participatory processes seem to have lost momentum in practice compared to 1

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1 Fighting Poverty in Ethnic and Mountainous Areas: The Governance 1

27 inequalities itself remains modest. 27

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27 anthropological work shows that ethnic stereotyping of cultural backwardness and 27

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26 communes would be investment owners of infrastructure projects by 2010. This concept 26

32 administrative levels (provinces, districts, and communes). According to these guidelines 32

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Charnoz Book.indb 230 8/27/2015 9:21:28 AM

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1 Decisions seem to be taken unanimously as 98 percent of the participants in these 1

27 First, regarding the meetings organized by the commune to select infrastructure 27

31 do not have room to make suggestions or to have an influence on decisions. Moreover, 31

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1 Second, concerning the implementation phase, the participation of ordinary citizens at 1

26 compared to 68 percent for the households. 26

32 Satisfaction with the quality of infrastructure (2) 68 32

Charnoz Book.indb 233 8/27/2015 9:21:28 AM

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32 difficult to leave these in the hands of commune staff. 32

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1 We expected that commune-owned projects would give the commune authorities 1

27 as investment owners appears to be unrealistic. Moreover, the evidence of the impact 27

Charnoz Book.indb 236 8/27/2015 9:21:28 AM

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1 to management needs of states and international donors) are largely incompatible. 1

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1 What are the motivations for participation? 1

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1 is a strong decision-making autonomy vis-à-vis development policy at the provincial 1

Charnoz Book.indb 242 8/27/2015 9:21:29 AM

1 Diversity of Participation beyond the Normative Framework for 1

Charnoz Book.indb 243 8/27/2015 9:21:29 AM

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26 and take stock of them. 26

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1 Economic Expertise and International Project Management, 2007–2008, with UNDP/ 1

27 rurales]. Hanoi: NXB Nong Nghiep. 27

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